Why did Britain win the BoB? How could have the Allies have done even better? Homework help!

Why did Britain win the BoB?

Let us imagine that we are going to be playing a complex wargame
assigned to us some 3rd or 4th year military science course. There
are 20 classmates. Each will have to write a report from either
GErmany's or Britain's perspective, and the grade will determine your
standing on your team when the game is played.
The Battle of the Atlantic is open to play too. In addition, any
commentary on any matter could boost your grade. Such as commenting
on mass communications then and now, or anything that seems intersting
and anytime relevant to military studies.

The setting is July 1st, 1940. What must the Axis do better? And
what must the Allies do better?

To me it looks like Germany can improve a lot, and Britain only a
little bit. It is easy for the Axis team to create a shopping list of
things to do better, or more, or less, but what can be put on the
Allies list?

John Freck

"John Freck" wrote in message
om...
Why did Britain win the BoB?

Let us imagine that we are going to be playing a complex wargame
assigned to us some 3rd or 4th year military science course. There
are 20 classmates. Each will have to write a report from either
GErmany's or Britain's perspective, and the grade will determine your
standing on your team when the game is played.
The Battle of the Atlantic is open to play too. In addition, any
commentary on any matter could boost your grade. Such as commenting
on mass communications then and now, or anything that seems intersting
and anytime relevant to military studies.

The setting is July 1st, 1940. What must the Axis do better? And
what must the Allies do better?


The Germans need to

1) Develop drop tanks for the Bf-109
2) Go after the RAF sector control rooms, they
were largely above ground and vulnerable
3) Use the Me-110 as fighter bombers on low level
strike missions not as heavy fighters
4) Get their intel sorted out, attacking coastal command
airbases was a massive waste of resources
5) Target the Supermarine works at Southhampton
and keep hitting it

To me it looks like Germany can improve a lot, and Britain only a
little bit. It is easy for the Axis team to create a shopping list of
things to do better, or more, or less, but what can be put on the
Allies list?


1) Ground the Defiants and requip the squadrons with Hurricanes
2) Ditch the outdated RAF tactics and adopt the German method
3) Disperse and reinforce those sector control rooms
4) Increase efforts to disperse aircraft production
5) Kick Leigh-Mallory and Dowding's ass and make them
work as a team, if necessary fire one or other of them.
6) Get the carburettor mods to stop the engine cutting out
under +ve G done as a matter of priority
7) Get the bomber force after the German airfields every night
deprive the buggers of sleep if nothing else.

Keith

Keith Willshaw wrote:
"John Freck" wrote in message
om...

Why did Britain win the BoB?

Let us imagine that we are going to be playing a complex wargame
assigned to us some 3rd or 4th year military science course. There
are 20 classmates. Each will have to write a report from either
GErmany's or Britain's perspective, and the grade will determine your
standing on your team when the game is played.
The Battle of the Atlantic is open to play too. In addition, any
commentary on any matter could boost your grade. Such as commenting
on mass communications then and now, or anything that seems intersting
and anytime relevant to military studies.

The setting is July 1st, 1940. What must the Axis do better? And
what must the Allies do better?



The Germans need to

1) Develop drop tanks for the Bf-109
2) Go after the RAF sector control rooms, they
were largely above ground and vulnerable
3) Use the Me-110 as fighter bombers on low level
strike missions not as heavy fighters
4) Get their intel sorted out, attacking coastal command
airbases was a massive waste of resources
5) Target the Supermarine works at Southhampton
and keep hitting it


To me it looks like Germany can improve a lot, and Britain only a
little bit. It is easy for the Axis team to create a shopping list of
things to do better, or more, or less, but what can be put on the
Allies list?



1) Ground the Defiants and requip the squadrons with Hurricanes

They did - Defiants got one or two daylight outings during the BoB.
After that their main roles were Night Fighting (more Effective than
Hurricanes), SAR (safer than a Lysander!) and Convoy cover (Better than
an Anson if range permitted). Better Defiants than Battles - Bomber
command were actually rebuilding Battle squadrons at this time.

2) Ditch the outdated RAF tactics and adopt the German method

Getting rid of the outdated Vics and formations and going to Finger Four
or Loose Duce tactics yes. RAF tactical control of Fighter formations
was way ahead of the Luftwaffe's.

3) Disperse and reinforce those sector control rooms


4) Increase efforts to disperse aircraft production
5) Kick Leigh-Mallory and Dowding's ass and make them
work as a team, if necessary fire one or other of them.
6) Get the carburettor mods to stop the engine cutting out
under +ve G done as a matter of priority

I think you mean -ve G. Indeed this is the major shortfall that the RAF
should have anticipated


7) Get the bomber force after the German airfields every night
deprive the buggers of sleep if nothing else.

Night intruders would be a good improvement on things but we need to
keep in mind that 2 Group actually did a god job of bombing the invasion
ports and impacting the German build up of barges etc.

Less important than the aircraft production is to get more Pilots into
Fighter command earlier. Dowding - Leigh-mallory is not a real time
issue. Parks vs Leigh-Mallory was an issue but Dowding was on top of
it. Most of the differences there were down to the nature of the
problem in Kent VS north of the Thames. Parks could not use a big wing
because his warning periods were to short to assemble it. Leigh Mallory
had a relatively long period between alert and engagement which could
usefully be used to assemble the big wings. Park's problem was that
LM's reinforcements were taking to long to arrive with the result that
the Germans were being hammered AFTER Park's airfields had been trashed
rather than before.

That said the RAF could have withdrawn from Kent and still punished the
LW enough to prevent Germany being able to secure the beaches. LM's big
wings performing a fighter sweep timed with a mass 2 group attack would
sure mess up Germanys ad hoc landing forces. One thing the post war
aggrandizement and publicity does not make clear is that the RAF was in
no way out of options during the BoB - they continually had the choice
of when and where to engage and were able to conserve and rotate forces
through the whole Battle. The Luftwaffe on the other hand was making a
much more committed effort and with much less flexibility about what
they hit and where.

One of the things I find most odd about Histories of the Battle of
Britain is how one sided the stories are on the British side. Very few
give Bomber or Coastal command a mention yet these were the forces that
would have been committed to hitting them "on the beaches". The
presence of Fleet Air Arm Fighter Squadrons in the UK are also
unmentiond but their locations would have been such as to "free up" RAF
squadrons.

The big thing that the LW should have done is take out the Radar
stations and the Sector stations. The LW only made one serious attempt
to take out the Radar chain and the RAF managed to cover the resulting
hole with the one replacement radar set they had and a couple of bluffs
that fooled the LW signals into thinking that at least 2 other stations
were still functioning (They were transmitting but the receiver complex
was u/s for a couple of days). The RAF needed to get CH Low going
earlier that was not something that could have been sorted out between
Jan and July '40.

Given the timeframe the RAF should have been taking over the Skua and
Roc's of the Fleet Air Arm and forming Dive bomber squadrons with them
in place of Battle Squadrons. Capacity was there to do this - BP
produced both Roc and Defiant and it would not have been a major loss to
turn the Roc production over to a Dedicated Skua/Roc Dive Bomber. (2 gun
turret instead of 4, No Wing folding kit etc. - larger bomb load). Note
that these aircraft used Bristol engines so freeing the Merlins for H &
S that would have been used in Battles and Defiants.

I am not saying that the Roc dive bomber would have been able to operate
in the face of Bf109's but it would have been an improvement over the
Battle since as a dive bomber it would have had better accuracy at
hitting ships and front line targets than the Battle. Also 2~4 turret
mg's has got to be better than 1 hand trained mg!





Keith

"Steven Vincent" wrote in message
...
Keith Willshaw wrote:
"John Freck" wrote in message
om...

Why did Britain win the BoB?

Let us imagine that we are going to be playing a complex wargame
assigned to us some 3rd or 4th year military science course. There
are 20 classmates. Each will have to write a report from either
GErmany's or Britain's perspective, and the grade will determine your
standing on your team when the game is played.
The Battle of the Atlantic is open to play too. In addition, any
commentary on any matter could boost your grade. Such as commenting
on mass communications then and now, or anything that seems intersting
and anytime relevant to military studies.

The setting is July 1st, 1940. What must the Axis do better? And
what must the Allies do better?



The Germans need to

1) Develop drop tanks for the Bf-109
2) Go after the RAF sector control rooms, they
were largely above ground and vulnerable
3) Use the Me-110 as fighter bombers on low level
strike missions not as heavy fighters
4) Get their intel sorted out, attacking coastal command
airbases was a massive waste of resources
5) Target the Supermarine works at Southhampton
and keep hitting it


To me it looks like Germany can improve a lot, and Britain only a
little bit. It is easy for the Axis team to create a shopping list of
things to do better, or more, or less, but what can be put on the
Allies list?



1) Ground the Defiants and requip the squadrons with Hurricanes

They did - Defiants got one or two daylight outings during the BoB.
After that their main roles were Night Fighting (more Effective than
Hurricanes), SAR (safer than a Lysander!) and Convoy cover (Better than
an Anson if range permitted). Better Defiants than Battles - Bomber
command were actually rebuilding Battle squadrons at this time.


They withdrew the squadrons but didnt immediately re-equip
them at a time when pilots were in much shorter supply than
aircraft.

2) Ditch the outdated RAF tactics and adopt the German method

Getting rid of the outdated Vics and formations and going to Finger Four
or Loose Duce tactics yes. RAF tactical control of Fighter formations
was way ahead of the Luftwaffe's.

3) Disperse and reinforce those sector control rooms


4) Increase efforts to disperse aircraft production
5) Kick Leigh-Mallory and Dowding's ass and make them
work as a team, if necessary fire one or other of them.
6) Get the carburettor mods to stop the engine cutting out
under +ve G done as a matter of priority

I think you mean -ve G. Indeed this is the major shortfall that the RAF
should have anticipated


7) Get the bomber force after the German airfields every night
deprive the buggers of sleep if nothing else.

Night intruders would be a good improvement on things but we need to
keep in mind that 2 Group actually did a god job of bombing the invasion
ports and impacting the German build up of barges etc.

Less important than the aircraft production is to get more Pilots into
Fighter command earlier. Dowding - Leigh-mallory is not a real time
issue. Parks vs Leigh-Mallory was an issue but Dowding was on top of
it. Most of the differences there were down to the nature of the
problem in Kent VS north of the Thames. Parks could not use a big wing
because his warning periods were to short to assemble it. Leigh Mallory
had a relatively long period between alert and engagement which could
usefully be used to assemble the big wings. Park's problem was that
LM's reinforcements were taking to long to arrive with the result that
the Germans were being hammered AFTER Park's airfields had been trashed
rather than before.

That said the RAF could have withdrawn from Kent and still punished the
LW enough to prevent Germany being able to secure the beaches. LM's big
wings performing a fighter sweep timed with a mass 2 group attack would
sure mess up Germanys ad hoc landing forces. One thing the post war
aggrandizement and publicity does not make clear is that the RAF was in
no way out of options during the BoB - they continually had the choice
of when and where to engage and were able to conserve and rotate forces
through the whole Battle. The Luftwaffe on the other hand was making a
much more committed effort and with much less flexibility about what
they hit and where.


True enough

One of the things I find most odd about Histories of the Battle of
Britain is how one sided the stories are on the British side. Very few
give Bomber or Coastal command a mention yet these were the forces that
would have been committed to hitting them "on the beaches". The
presence of Fleet Air Arm Fighter Squadrons in the UK are also
unmentiond but their locations would have been such as to "free up" RAF
squadrons.


Yes at the time a every bomber squadron had to keep
an anti-invasion flight on readines 24/7

The big thing that the LW should have done is take out the Radar
stations and the Sector stations. The LW only made one serious attempt
to take out the Radar chain and the RAF managed to cover the resulting
hole with the one replacement radar set they had and a couple of bluffs
that fooled the LW signals into thinking that at least 2 other stations
were still functioning (They were transmitting but the receiver complex
was u/s for a couple of days). The RAF needed to get CH Low going
earlier that was not something that could have been sorted out between
Jan and July '40.


The radar stations were quite hard targets to hit and even if they were
knocked out some warning was available from the observer
corps. The sector stations were the point where everything
converged and in many cases were little more than an Nissen
hut

Given the timeframe the RAF should have been taking over the Skua and
Roc's of the Fleet Air Arm and forming Dive bomber squadrons with them
in place of Battle Squadrons. Capacity was there to do this - BP
produced both Roc and Defiant and it would not have been a major loss to
turn the Roc production over to a Dedicated Skua/Roc Dive Bomber. (2 gun
turret instead of 4, No Wing folding kit etc. - larger bomb load). Note
that these aircraft used Bristol engines so freeing the Merlins for H &
S that would have been used in Battles and Defiants.


The Skua/Roc werent very survivable though and production
was in such small numbers that I doubt ramping up was very
practical. A better option may have been to fit bomb racks
to the P-40's (Tomahawk I and Tomahawk IIA) the RAF
got in June 1940

I am not saying that the Roc dive bomber would have been able to operate
in the face of Bf109's but it would have been an improvement over the
Battle since as a dive bomber it would have had better accuracy at
hitting ships and front line targets than the Battle. Also 2~4 turret
mg's has got to be better than 1 hand trained mg!


Trouble is with the power turret fitted the Roc couldnt carry
the bombload the Skua did, arguably the cleaner, fatster
and more manoeuverable Skua was more survivable.

Keith

Here's some programs:
1) Have the Governor-General of Canada light a fire under Mackenzie
King and get the Canada portion of the Empire Aircrew Training Program
rolling full speed ASAP. No 'nice guy' treatment.
2) get the Polish fighter pilots cracking ASAP. They were held back
too long.
3) get the cannon Hurricane program cracking ASAP^2 for anti-bomber
work.
4) send Leigh-Mallory off to New Zealand.
5) move Bader to Kenley or Manston.
6) get a meaningful night intruder program working every night all
night.
7) External tank on Spitfires to bounce 109s sucking fumes on the way
home. See if they can swim the rest of the way. (Route Spits around
the battle scene to arrive at intercept points with height advantage
and lots of internal fuel. Bounce and go home.)
Walt BJ

WaltBJ wrote:

Here's some programs:

snip

7) External tank on Spitfires to bounce 109s sucking fumes on the way
home. See if they can swim the rest of the way. (Route Spits around
the battle scene to arrive at intercept points with height advantage
and lots of internal fuel. Bounce and go home.)

No, this one's not going to fly, if you'll excuse the expression. Already
by August 18th, Park had ordered his controllers not to puruse
reconnaissance a/c out to sea, and to engage major formations 'over land
or within gliding distance of the coast', to cut down on pilots being lost
over the channel. Pilot losses were starting to hurt, and they couldn't
afford to lose pilots shot down over the North Sea and Channel, but
otherwise okay at the time of bailout.

Guy

"Herbert Pocket" wrote in message ...


Agreed, it is hard to pick out any outstanding Allied failures at the
macroscopic level, though this is probably a consequence of knowing (with
20:20 hindsight) that the Allies were ultimately victorious.


Snip


In no particular order:


A) Earlier recognition of aerial bombing inaccuracies, and development of
improved assessment, equipment & training (with reference to the RAF's poor
performance in early bombing missions and the general misbelief that the job
was being well done).


Herbert Pocket,

Your point A) isn't any scraping the barrel by any means. The Allies
wasted immense resources on bombers and strategic bombing. If
Britain, and the Allies, had cut out four engined bombers in order to
have a large increase in top fighters and a boost to strong, fast,and
long-ranged 2 engined bombers: Then Germany would have had a harder
time much sooner. Hopefully, I'm not reading to much into your
sugggestion, I have long put forward similar notion that most of the
strategic bombing was a waste, or it could have been done with much
less and even better. During the Summer of 1940 the Allies could have
had more fighters and more fuel, and have had the bombers on lower
level missions cutting up Germans energy and transport.

All strategic bombing could have, and should have, been done by long
ranged fighter-bombers, and fast 2-engined bombers, and 100% of the
effort shoud have been against German military targets, energy, and
transport. IN 1947 the USAAF stated that 95% of startegic bombing
reasouces were wasted, only 5% of the strategic bombing effort was
worthwhile. But Christ, that 5% was a knock-out! Viturally, all the
crippling damage done by strategic air attack was done by long-ranged
fighter bombers and 2-engined bombers attacking at low altitude, and
almost no serious damage was done by the wasteful other line.

One hundred Mustangs each with a single 1,000lbs bomb, flying in low
in order to lay down 50+ direct hits on railline is very troublesome
to the GErmans, and did I mention the destoyed and badly damaged
locomotives, loads, and other equipment, and the need for Germany then
to disperse AAA? The Allies can put down 500 fighter-bomb sorties
like that a day in the Rhur by 1943 and sleep in to boot.




John Freck

"John Freck" wrote in message
om...
"Herbert Pocket" wrote in message
...


Agreed, it is hard to pick out any outstanding Allied failures at the
macroscopic level, though this is probably a consequence of knowing
(with
20:20 hindsight) that the Allies were ultimately victorious.


Snip


In no particular order:


A) Earlier recognition of aerial bombing inaccuracies, and development
of
improved assessment, equipment & training (with reference to the RAF's
poor
performance in early bombing missions and the general misbelief that
the job
was being well done).


Herbert Pocket,

Your point A) isn't any scraping the barrel by any means. The Allies
wasted immense resources on bombers and strategic bombing.

There were no strategic bombers in 1940

RAF bomber command was almost exlusively equipped
with light day bombers such as the Blenheim and Battle.
The handful of 'heavies' available were twin engine types
such as the Wellington, Whitley and Hampden.

Keith

Keith

"Keith Willshaw" wrote in message


Your point A) isn't any scraping the barrel by any means. The
Allies
wasted immense resources on bombers and strategic bombing.

Snip


There were no strategic bombers in 1940

I was getting beyond the time frame I began with, July 1st 1940.
My commentary gets more and more relevant from July 1st, 1940,
however.
IMO, the RAF had strategic bombers if the strategically bombed. To me
then,
'strategic bomber' is any plane dropping bombs on a strategic mission
bombing run.
This then begs the question what is 'strategic bombing'. If on July
1st, 1940 a single Hurricane Super Marine
Spitfire drops a single 1,000lbs bomb on a railroad line near Arnhiem,
then a strategic bombing mission occured. I find it important to
note: 'tactical' and 'strategic' are not opposite. The sentence
'There are tactical variations of strategic bombing that include type
of aircraft used, altitude and speed at moment of bomb release,
maginitude, and target.' makes sense, and the inverse is true. There
are strategeis behind tactical choises. In any case, the RAF can from
July 1st, 1940 favor fighters even more than they did, and use fighter
bombers more over bombers and use bombing better.



RAF bomber command was almost exlusively equipped
with light day bombers such as the Blenheim and Battle.
The handful of 'heavies' available were twin engine types
such as the Wellington, Whitley and Hampden.

You are telling me that the RAF had no heavy bomb load capacity
4-engined bombers yet by July 1st, 1940, or not many. Furthermore,
you indicate strategic bombing must be "heavy" bombing as opposed to
"light" bombing. I think you use you vocabulary differently than me,
and that we need to understand our idiomatical difference and develop
from there carefully.


John Freck

"John Freck" wrote in message
om...
"Keith Willshaw" wrote in message


Your point A) isn't any scraping the barrel by any means. The
Allies
wasted immense resources on bombers and strategic bombing.

Snip


There were no strategic bombers in 1940

I was getting beyond the time frame I began with, July 1st 1940.
My commentary gets more and more relevant from July 1st, 1940,
however.
IMO, the RAF had strategic bombers if the strategically bombed. To me
then,
'strategic bomber' is any plane dropping bombs on a strategic mission
bombing run.
This then begs the question what is 'strategic bombing'. If on July
1st, 1940 a single Hurricane Super Marine
Spitfire drops a single 1,000lbs bomb on a railroad line near Arnhiem,
then a strategic bombing mission occured.

No that would have been a bloody miracle since there never was such
a thing as a Hurricane Super Marine Fighter

I find it important to
note: 'tactical' and 'strategic' are not opposite. The sentence
'There are tactical variations of strategic bombing that include type
of aircraft used, altitude and speed at moment of bomb release,
maginitude, and target.' makes sense, and the inverse is true. There
are strategeis behind tactical choises. In any case, the RAF can from
July 1st, 1940 favor fighters even more than they did, and use fighter
bombers more over bombers and use bombing better.


They DID favor fighters, there was no such thing as the fighter bomber
at the time and the bomber force was being used in the tactical
role to attack the invasion barges. The strategic attack on German industry
didnt begin in earnest until 1942.



RAF bomber command was almost exlusively equipped
with light day bombers such as the Blenheim and Battle.
The handful of 'heavies' available were twin engine types
such as the Wellington, Whitley and Hampden.

You are telling me that the RAF had no heavy bomb load capacity
4-engined bombers yet by July 1st, 1940, or not many.

Exactly that, not one 4 engined bomber was in service.

Furthermore,
you indicate strategic bombing must be "heavy" bombing as opposed to
"light" bombing. I think you use you vocabulary differently than me,


Thats for sure, I also know what missions RAF bomber command
flew in 1940 do you ?

and that we need to understand our idiomatical difference and develop
from there carefully.


I think you need to read up a little on the subject , here's a free clue.

Of the 13,000 tons of bombs the RAF dropped in 1940 only
137 tons fell on Industrial towns, the majority were on airfields,
naval targets and troop concentrations.

These usually count as tactical missions.

In fact raids on tactical targets exceeded those on strategic ones
until 1942.

Of the 13,000 bombs dropped in 1940 5,000 were delivered by
Wellingtons (twin engined) , 3000 by Whitleys (twin engined),
2700 by Hampdens (twin engined), 2000 by Blenheims (twin engined)
and the remainder by the single engined Fairey battle.

Keith