Mike Spera
August 31st 03, 01:37 PM
"Under Reagan's watch"... "A Bush appointee". Are you saying that
Republican presidents cause shuttle disasters?
wrote:
> I posted here last February, my opinion on what caused the Columbia
> Shuttle disaster. I was pretty much 'right on the money', this article
> verifies my points. I may have been wrong on some of the technical
> information involving space flight, but my analysis that it was bad
> management that contributed to the tragedy was 'right on the money'.
> And I compared it to the last time we had a Shuttle disaster, 17 years
> ago, when our other Space Shuttle, Challenger, blew up also, under
> Reagan's watch.
>
> I was roundly condemned by most of the people who responded to my post,
> and I was even accused of being unpatriotic back then for questioning
> O'Keefe's management, a Bush appointee. But now the truth comes out,
> this article vindicates me. I was right. I'm always right.
>
> Abel Malcolm
> http://www.democrats.org
>
> Shuttle report urges major changes in NASA
>
> Management decisions singled out for criticism
>
> By Kathy Sawyer and Eric Pianin
>
> Wednesday, August 27, 2003
>
> From The San Francisco Chronicle
>
> Washington -- The shuttle Columbia and a crew of seven were destroyed
> on Feb. 1 because NASA, for the second time in its recent history,
> allowed its engineering to grow careless, its safety system to wither,
> its communications to get muddled and its professional curiosity to
> become stunted.
>
> Those conclusions were part of a far-reaching indictment issued
> Tuesday by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board in a comprehensive
> and unsparing assessment of the human spaceflight program. Placing at
> least part of the blame for NASA's failings on persistent budget and
> other pressures flowing from Congress and the White House over several
> administrations, the plainspoken 248-page report is designed to provide
> the foundation for an unprecedented national debate on the future of
> human spaceflight, which the board said is long overdue.
>
> A 1.7-pound chunk of foam insulation that struck Columbia's left wing
> at more than 500 mph during the Jan. 16 ascent was "the direct, physical
> action that initiated the chain of events leading to the loss of
> Columbia and her crew," the board wrote.
>
> But, in chilling echoes of the environment that produced the 1986
> Challenger accident, the board found that NASA's management and cultural
> mind- set were just as culpable because they paved the way for the foam
> strike to do its deadly work. Before the mission, managers did not heed
> signs of the potential threat; and during the mission, they allowed
> deadline pressures to squelch the aggressive pursuit of information
> about the possible damage and its implications.
>
> "Management decisions made during Columbia's final flight reflect
> missed opportunities, blocked or ineffective communications channels,
> flawed analysis and ineffective leadership," the report said. "Perhaps
> most striking is the fact that management . . . displayed no interest in
> understanding a problem and its implications."
>
> 'MISSED OPPORTUNITIES'
>
> The investigators identified eight "missed opportunities" when NASA
> officials suggested using spy satellites or other methods to investigate
> the wing damage, but the agency didn't follow through.
>
> Unless the agency makes fundamental changes this time, the board
> warned, "the scene is set for another accident." At the same time, the
> investigators repeatedly said that, based on NASA's past performance,
> they expect the NASA bureaucracy to resist such a transformation. "The
> changes we recommend will be difficult to accomplish -- and will be
> internally resisted."
>
> There were bits of good news for NASA in the board's grim verdict,
> however. Among them, the board did not find the shuttle to be
> "inherently unsafe."
>
> Board chairman Harold W. Gehman Jr. said at a briefing for reporters,
> "If this board had set out to spend seven months listing all the good
> things that NASA does, the report would be thicker than this one.
> Unfortunately, that's not what our task was."
>
> To make certain that NASA implements not only the 15 actions it
> recommended before the next shuttle flight, but also the more basic and
> difficult long- term changes, the board called for a system of long-term
> external policing.
>
> REPORT HAS SOME SURPRISES
>
> While the panel had signaled many of its findings in advance, there
> were some surprises. For example, the report offered the first direct
> criticism in the investigation so far of NASA administrator Sean
> O'Keefe. Citing unsolicited comments from NASA personnel, the report
> said employees blamed O'Keefe for a seemingly "arbitrary" buildup of
> pressure to meet a deadline of February 2004 for the launch of a key
> space station component -- at the same time top management was denying
> there was schedule pressure.
>
> The board found that the four flights scheduled in the months from
> October 2003 to February 2004 would have required a shuttle processing
> push comparable to the much-criticized pattern that led up to the
> Challenger accident 17 years ago.
>
> Concern about the schedule "may have begun to influence" managers'
> decisions regarding the foam shedding during Columbia's launch and one
> of Atlantis last October, the report said. The rigorous shuttle
> schedule "had no margin to accommodate unforeseen problems," and with
> flights coming in rapid succession, there was no assurance that
> anomalies on one flight would be identified and resolved before the
> next.
>
> O'Keefe on Tuesday reiterated his intention to "comply with the full
> range of recommendations released today" and said the agency has set up
> a special team to help "change the culture." O'Keefe has set a target
> date of next March for resuming shuttle flights, but a launch next
> summer is considered more realistic.
>
> On Tuesday, Bush issued a statement that implied continued support
> for his appointee, saying, "The next steps for NASA under Sean O'Keefe's
> leadership must be determined after a thorough review of the entire
> report." He added that, "Our journey into space will go on."
> As the board had previously documented during its public hearings and
> tests,
> the report said the insulating foam that came off Columbia's external
> propellant tank during the ascent smashed the heat shielding along the
> underside of the leading edge of the left wing. When the shuttle
> re-entered the atmosphere on Feb. 1, superheated air at temperatures as
> high as 8,000 degrees penetrated the wing structure, melting it from the
> inside and leading to the vehicle's disintegration.
> NASA already is redesigning the external tank to eliminate the most
> serious source of foam shedding -- a problem the board said engineers
> had wrongly come to accept as routine, much as engineers did almost two
> decades ago when they accepted problems with the O-ring seals of the
> shuttle rocket boosters before the Challenger disaster.
>
> But because it is unlikely that all debris impacts on the shuttle can
> ever be eliminated, the board also has called on NASA to harden the
> shuttle's protective heat shielding to better withstand minor impacts,
> and to develop in- flight inspection and emergency repair capabilities
> before the next flight.
> Columbia investigators' recommendations
> Some recommendations from the Columbia Accident Investigation Board's
> final report, released Tuesday:
>
> --Try to eliminate debris shed from external fuel tank, while increasing
> shuttle's ability to sustain minor debris damage and still safely
> re-enter Earth's atmosphere.
>
> --Improve preflight inspections of the thermal protection on shuttle
> wings.
>
> --Develop methods to inspect and do emergency repairs of any potential
> damage to the shuttle's outer thermal layer -- during a mission -- with
> or without the aide of the International Space Station.
>
> --Improve launch pad maintenance.
>
> --Develop computer models to better evaluate damage caused by debris.
>
> --Upgrade imaging system on both the shuttle and ground to take better
> pictures of shuttle during and after liftoff.
>
> --Better train mission management team to handle emergencies.
>
> --Establish an independent Technical Engineering Authority, funded from
> NASA headquarters, to identify and analyze any possible hazards during a
> shuttle system's life. It would be the sole waiver-granting authority
> for all technical standards and would independently determine launch
> readiness.
>
> --Give NASA Headquarters Office of Safety and Mission Assurance direct
> authority over entire safety of shuttle program, providing its resources
> independently.
>
> --Submit annual reports to Congress on progress of implementing
> independent safety measures.
>
> --By 2010 recertify all shuttle components and systems for operation.
>
> From URL:
> http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2003/08/27/MN250559.DTL
>
>
> ETERNAL VIGILANCE IS THE PRICE OF LIBERTY
>
> Educate yourself and go to these links:
>
> http://www.buzzflash.com & http://www.moveon.org &
> http://www.veteransforpeace.org & http://www.salon.com &
> http://www.huppi.com/kangaroo/LiberalFAQ.htm
>
__________________________________________________ ____________________
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Republican presidents cause shuttle disasters?
wrote:
> I posted here last February, my opinion on what caused the Columbia
> Shuttle disaster. I was pretty much 'right on the money', this article
> verifies my points. I may have been wrong on some of the technical
> information involving space flight, but my analysis that it was bad
> management that contributed to the tragedy was 'right on the money'.
> And I compared it to the last time we had a Shuttle disaster, 17 years
> ago, when our other Space Shuttle, Challenger, blew up also, under
> Reagan's watch.
>
> I was roundly condemned by most of the people who responded to my post,
> and I was even accused of being unpatriotic back then for questioning
> O'Keefe's management, a Bush appointee. But now the truth comes out,
> this article vindicates me. I was right. I'm always right.
>
> Abel Malcolm
> http://www.democrats.org
>
> Shuttle report urges major changes in NASA
>
> Management decisions singled out for criticism
>
> By Kathy Sawyer and Eric Pianin
>
> Wednesday, August 27, 2003
>
> From The San Francisco Chronicle
>
> Washington -- The shuttle Columbia and a crew of seven were destroyed
> on Feb. 1 because NASA, for the second time in its recent history,
> allowed its engineering to grow careless, its safety system to wither,
> its communications to get muddled and its professional curiosity to
> become stunted.
>
> Those conclusions were part of a far-reaching indictment issued
> Tuesday by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board in a comprehensive
> and unsparing assessment of the human spaceflight program. Placing at
> least part of the blame for NASA's failings on persistent budget and
> other pressures flowing from Congress and the White House over several
> administrations, the plainspoken 248-page report is designed to provide
> the foundation for an unprecedented national debate on the future of
> human spaceflight, which the board said is long overdue.
>
> A 1.7-pound chunk of foam insulation that struck Columbia's left wing
> at more than 500 mph during the Jan. 16 ascent was "the direct, physical
> action that initiated the chain of events leading to the loss of
> Columbia and her crew," the board wrote.
>
> But, in chilling echoes of the environment that produced the 1986
> Challenger accident, the board found that NASA's management and cultural
> mind- set were just as culpable because they paved the way for the foam
> strike to do its deadly work. Before the mission, managers did not heed
> signs of the potential threat; and during the mission, they allowed
> deadline pressures to squelch the aggressive pursuit of information
> about the possible damage and its implications.
>
> "Management decisions made during Columbia's final flight reflect
> missed opportunities, blocked or ineffective communications channels,
> flawed analysis and ineffective leadership," the report said. "Perhaps
> most striking is the fact that management . . . displayed no interest in
> understanding a problem and its implications."
>
> 'MISSED OPPORTUNITIES'
>
> The investigators identified eight "missed opportunities" when NASA
> officials suggested using spy satellites or other methods to investigate
> the wing damage, but the agency didn't follow through.
>
> Unless the agency makes fundamental changes this time, the board
> warned, "the scene is set for another accident." At the same time, the
> investigators repeatedly said that, based on NASA's past performance,
> they expect the NASA bureaucracy to resist such a transformation. "The
> changes we recommend will be difficult to accomplish -- and will be
> internally resisted."
>
> There were bits of good news for NASA in the board's grim verdict,
> however. Among them, the board did not find the shuttle to be
> "inherently unsafe."
>
> Board chairman Harold W. Gehman Jr. said at a briefing for reporters,
> "If this board had set out to spend seven months listing all the good
> things that NASA does, the report would be thicker than this one.
> Unfortunately, that's not what our task was."
>
> To make certain that NASA implements not only the 15 actions it
> recommended before the next shuttle flight, but also the more basic and
> difficult long- term changes, the board called for a system of long-term
> external policing.
>
> REPORT HAS SOME SURPRISES
>
> While the panel had signaled many of its findings in advance, there
> were some surprises. For example, the report offered the first direct
> criticism in the investigation so far of NASA administrator Sean
> O'Keefe. Citing unsolicited comments from NASA personnel, the report
> said employees blamed O'Keefe for a seemingly "arbitrary" buildup of
> pressure to meet a deadline of February 2004 for the launch of a key
> space station component -- at the same time top management was denying
> there was schedule pressure.
>
> The board found that the four flights scheduled in the months from
> October 2003 to February 2004 would have required a shuttle processing
> push comparable to the much-criticized pattern that led up to the
> Challenger accident 17 years ago.
>
> Concern about the schedule "may have begun to influence" managers'
> decisions regarding the foam shedding during Columbia's launch and one
> of Atlantis last October, the report said. The rigorous shuttle
> schedule "had no margin to accommodate unforeseen problems," and with
> flights coming in rapid succession, there was no assurance that
> anomalies on one flight would be identified and resolved before the
> next.
>
> O'Keefe on Tuesday reiterated his intention to "comply with the full
> range of recommendations released today" and said the agency has set up
> a special team to help "change the culture." O'Keefe has set a target
> date of next March for resuming shuttle flights, but a launch next
> summer is considered more realistic.
>
> On Tuesday, Bush issued a statement that implied continued support
> for his appointee, saying, "The next steps for NASA under Sean O'Keefe's
> leadership must be determined after a thorough review of the entire
> report." He added that, "Our journey into space will go on."
> As the board had previously documented during its public hearings and
> tests,
> the report said the insulating foam that came off Columbia's external
> propellant tank during the ascent smashed the heat shielding along the
> underside of the leading edge of the left wing. When the shuttle
> re-entered the atmosphere on Feb. 1, superheated air at temperatures as
> high as 8,000 degrees penetrated the wing structure, melting it from the
> inside and leading to the vehicle's disintegration.
> NASA already is redesigning the external tank to eliminate the most
> serious source of foam shedding -- a problem the board said engineers
> had wrongly come to accept as routine, much as engineers did almost two
> decades ago when they accepted problems with the O-ring seals of the
> shuttle rocket boosters before the Challenger disaster.
>
> But because it is unlikely that all debris impacts on the shuttle can
> ever be eliminated, the board also has called on NASA to harden the
> shuttle's protective heat shielding to better withstand minor impacts,
> and to develop in- flight inspection and emergency repair capabilities
> before the next flight.
> Columbia investigators' recommendations
> Some recommendations from the Columbia Accident Investigation Board's
> final report, released Tuesday:
>
> --Try to eliminate debris shed from external fuel tank, while increasing
> shuttle's ability to sustain minor debris damage and still safely
> re-enter Earth's atmosphere.
>
> --Improve preflight inspections of the thermal protection on shuttle
> wings.
>
> --Develop methods to inspect and do emergency repairs of any potential
> damage to the shuttle's outer thermal layer -- during a mission -- with
> or without the aide of the International Space Station.
>
> --Improve launch pad maintenance.
>
> --Develop computer models to better evaluate damage caused by debris.
>
> --Upgrade imaging system on both the shuttle and ground to take better
> pictures of shuttle during and after liftoff.
>
> --Better train mission management team to handle emergencies.
>
> --Establish an independent Technical Engineering Authority, funded from
> NASA headquarters, to identify and analyze any possible hazards during a
> shuttle system's life. It would be the sole waiver-granting authority
> for all technical standards and would independently determine launch
> readiness.
>
> --Give NASA Headquarters Office of Safety and Mission Assurance direct
> authority over entire safety of shuttle program, providing its resources
> independently.
>
> --Submit annual reports to Congress on progress of implementing
> independent safety measures.
>
> --By 2010 recertify all shuttle components and systems for operation.
>
> From URL:
> http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2003/08/27/MN250559.DTL
>
>
> ETERNAL VIGILANCE IS THE PRICE OF LIBERTY
>
> Educate yourself and go to these links:
>
> http://www.buzzflash.com & http://www.moveon.org &
> http://www.veteransforpeace.org & http://www.salon.com &
> http://www.huppi.com/kangaroo/LiberalFAQ.htm
>
__________________________________________________ ____________________
Posted Via Uncensored-News.Com - FAST UNLIMITED DOWNLOAD - http://www.uncensored-news.com
<><><><><><><> The Worlds Uncensored News Source <><><><><><><><>