PDA

View Full Version : Cirrus chute deployment -- an incredible story


Michael182/G
July 5th 05, 08:14 PM
I received this story from a friend. The author I suppose wrote these
thoughts down to share them, so I imagine he will not be upset to see
them on the internet.I would be interested in your reactions.


.................................................. ..

Cirrus in the Water: Here's What Happened

Ilan Reich
July 3, 2005

Thanks for the huge outpouring of support, good wishes and prayers from
my friends. I was deeply touched by everyone's sentiments, whether
from reading the COPA website, listening to voice mails or reading
emails. I will try to answer each person individually, but please
understand if I don't.

I am writing to answer the common questions on everyone's mind and to
attempt to organize my own thoughts and emotions after having gone
through a very traumatic ordeal.

Many lessons can be learned from my experience of surviving an airplane
crash, including:

Don't trust anything the news media publishes. Various inaccurate
and misleading reports had me: inexplicably parachuting out of a plane
that already had its own parachute; losing control in a dive; coming
dangerously close to a nuclear reactor; and activating the chute
because of mechanical problems. None of these is true.

Practice, practice and more practice. Maneuvers like recovery from
unusual attitudes, deploying the parachute, shutting down the plane
after any emergency, should be instinctive. Quite simply, when things
go awry there's no time to consult a checklist or the pilot's
operating handbook (POH). While in retrospect I didn't do everything
right, I did get all of the important stuff right.

Don't fly a single engine plane that isn't equipped with a
parachute. Although the chances of actually encountering an emergency
situation that is worthy of "pulling the chute" are probably small
to infinitesimal over the course of any given pilot's career, the
penalty for not having a parachute is almost certain death. Each pilot
has to establish and evaluate their own risk assessment criteria, but
for me something that has a greater than 50% risk of death, even if
only 1% of the time, is an unacceptable risk. That's why I bought a
Cirrus in the first place.

* * * * *

Before I describe in minute detail what happened, here's a brief
summary. On the afternoon of Thursday, June 30 I was incapacitated by
a short seizure while being vectored for an instrument approach. When
I became alert again, the plane was descending at 204 knots, which is
faster than redline speed. Following normal procedure I was able to
recover from this unusual attitude; an instant later I chose to
activate the parachute. On the descent, I steered the plane clear of
a fuel tank farm, and crash-landed into the water near Haverstraw, NY.


My injuries are more severe than the "cuts on the hand" described
in the press. First, my back was broken by the impact of crashing into
the water. Thankfully I retain full body function and have every
reason to expect a complete recovery after wearing a brace for the next
month. Second, I have a benign brain tumor, which has been growing
undetected in the middle of my brain for many years and was apparently
the cause of the brief seizure in-flight. Thankfully the tumor does
not affect my mental facilities in any way, and the risk of future
seizures is now being controlled by medication. In the coming weeks I
will be discussing treatment options with various specialists: these
include surgery or doing nothing. In either event, it is fairly
certain that my flying days are over.

* * * * *

Now for the details..

I departed Lincoln Park, NJ at approximately 4:20 pm. My plane was
there for two weeks for its regular 50 hour inspection and an
assortment of squawks, including new spark plugs after 400 hours,
replacement of the broken shear coupling on Alt 2, cosmetic work on the
leading edges and wheel pants, and a new fuel sender unit and gauge.
The last item required emptying the tanks and then refilling them so
that the new fuel gauge could be properly calibrated. This exercise
introduces air into the fuel lines, so we spent a lot of time running
the engine on the ground to ensure that all the air was gone.

The destination was my home base at Westchester County Airport, NY
(HPN): 35 miles and 12 minutes as the SR22 crow flies.
Notwithstanding the short distance, I filed an IFR flight plan because
the weather was hazy and the weather forecast for HPN was predicting
temporary cloud buildups starting at 2,000 feet. As I climbed through
800 feet I contacted NY air traffic control and picked up my clearance:
V39 BREZY intersection, Carmel VOR, direct; 3,000 feet. In quick
succession I was handed off to the next controller, and coming up at
BREZY intersection I was told to expect the ILS 16 approach at HPN.
After BREZY intersection I was handed off again, and that controller
started to give me vectors for the final approach course: fly a
heading of 080 degrees and maintain 3,000 feet. A few moments later I
was instructed to turn an additional 20 degrees to the left and
maintain 3,000 feet. Incidentally, the visibility in the air was only
2-5 miles, so the decision to file IFR was certainly prudent.

As I came out of the turn to 060 degrees, I noted that my altitude had
slipped to 2,840 feet while I was busy changing frequencies, turning
and loading the approach procedure into the Garmin. Apparently the
plane was not trimmed properly, and I concentrated on climbing back up
to 3,000 feet, while continuing my scan and noting that everything was
running just fine. Indicated airspeed was 160 knots, which is normal
for the cruise power setting then in use. Then I blacked out for a
period that I now estimate as being 5-10 seconds.

When I became alert again, I scanned the instruments and was stunned to
see the airspeed indicator showing 204 knots indicated; the attitude
indicator showing the nose below the horizon; and the altimeter
scrolling down quickly toward 1,900 feet. I also realized that my
right leg was weak, and that the controller was calling, asking what
happened to my altitude. For non-pilots, the redline threshold is also
known as the "never exceed" speed, because the airframe was not
designed to retain structural integrity above that number. In other
words, the wings can break off at any moment.

Adrenaline shot through my body as I quickly and methodically executed
the procedure for recovering from this unusual attitude: level the
wings, decrease power, and carefully lift the nose to avoid any further
stresses on the airframe. While accomplishing this I concentrated
almost entirely on the attitude indicator, and after a few seconds I
was satisfied that the loss of altitude had been reversed at roughly
1,700 feet above the ground. I did not see the airspeed, although I
knew instinctively that it was out of the red zone. After a fraction
of a second of thought, I then activated the parachute. The factors
that led me to this decision included: no desire to proceed any
further into marginal weather; concern over the loss of altitude;
concern that the plane's structural integrity was compromised by the
high speed descent and recovery; and concern that the weakness in my
right leg might hinder my ability to control the plane down to the
runway.

My parachute experience was quite different from what fellow COPA
member Bill Graham described last month at M3. I heard the rocket
launch and briefly smelled its fumes. A few seconds later I heard a
loud, ripping sound as the parachute reached full deployment. I then
felt a tremendous jolt-worse than any turbulence that I've
experienced-as the parachute billowed open and caused the plane to
decelerate. The POH advises 130 knots indicated as the highest
deployment speed for the parachute; but I have no idea what the
airspeed was in my situation. I suspect it was somewhere above 130
knots based on the very different experiences that Bill and I had.

This jolt tilted the airplane downward as the parachute established a
level position; it also threw my headphone and glasses in various
directions, and caused my head to hit the ceiling near the visor. I
have a very small bump to show for it; but that was the only injury
from the parachute deployment. In my opinion the seatbelt retraction
system and the parachute worked exceptionally well under the
circumstances.

After finding the headphone and realizing that the plane was now level
at roughly 900 feet above the ground and descending straight down under
the canopy, the first thing I did was call the controller on the
existing frequency: I had no time to switch to 121.5; and saw no point
in doing so since the controller was already urgently asking what was
going on. I said "Mayday, mayday, 52 Lima here, pulled the parachute
near the Hudson River." I believe that the second thing I did was
punch in 7700 on the transponder, although I later learned that my
plane was already below radar coverage. Inexplicably, I did not pull
the mixture back to idle, as advised by the POH, and left the power
lever just below the detent (roughly 19 inches MP). In the next minute
this would prove to be an invaluable deviation from what the POH
requires.

I looked out the window and saw that the plane was descending directly
over a fuel tank farm for the nearby conventional power station
(incidentally, Indian Point, which is a nuclear reactor, is located on
the other side of the river, 5.-8 miles upstream, and away from the
vectors for the ILS 16 approach course). This was now the scariest
part of the flight: worse than emerging from a seizure to find the
plane in a high-speed descent, because I already knew from training how
to handle that situation. But there is no advice in the POH on how to
control the plane once the parachute has been deployed.

Now everything happened at warp speed. I called the controller again
and said "Mayday, 52 Lima is descending directly over the fuel
tanks". No response; and besides, there was nothing the controller
could do to help me. I then used "all available resources" to
change that outcome: I applied right aileron and rudder, and rocked
the power lever to make sure that the engine still had power. These
actions caused the plane to gently veer away from the tank farm and
over the water: Bowline Creek, a very wide, calm tributary to the
Hudson River near the town of Haverstraw, NY, a few miles north of
Nyack and the Tappan Zee Bridge.

An instant later the plane crashed straight down into the water, which
both then and now I consider to be the lesser of two evils. It was
like a massive belly flop. This was now the second, scary part of the
flight, as water splashed up almost to the top of the windows. Because
I landed in water rather than solid ground, the gear did not absorb
much of the impact. Instead, the wings and seat did all the work. It
was at this point that the fourth lumbar vertebrae in my back cracked
and compressed from the impact of the crash.

Then came the very worst part: I could not open the door. The wings
were now sitting right at water level, which leads me to theorize that
the doorframe or pins were deformed by the impact of the crash. And
upon impact, water immediately came into the cabin; in the three
seconds it took me to realize that the door wasn't going to open, the
water level was up to my ankles. More adrenaline shot through my body.
I reached for the hammer in the armrest compartment, and with two
hands swung at the pilot's window. Two whacks with all my strength
and there was an eight inch hole. Steam was now coming out of the
engine as the nosecone dipped underwater and the cabin tilted forward,
so I now remembered to shut down all the switches and turn the fuel
selector to off. I ripped the lap board off my leg, reached behind my
seat and grabbed one of the two life jackets that's always there. I
then clawed apart most of the rest of the window glass (which gave me
some cuts and splinters) until the hole was big enough, and climbed out
of the cabin. The wings were now slightly under water; I sat down to
put on and inflate the lifejacket.

I sat on the wing for a minute to survey the situation and collect my
thoughts. The closest point to shore was roughly 300 feet away, near
the power plant. Several people were already assembled there at a boat
launch, and I spotted a police car already driving in that direction.
The parachute was flat on the water, mostly on the other side of the
plane. I slipped into the water and began swimming to shore. My leg
got caught on something: no doubt a line from the parachute. I kicked
it free and swam faster and farther away from the plane. Within four
minutes of impact, the plane was nose down in the water and sank in 30
feet of water. No fuel leaked out of the plane. In the next ten
minutes I kept swimming slowly, but stopped after roughly 150 feet.
There was pain in my back and some blood on my left hand. I was
getting cold. A Haverstraw Fire Department launch appeared about half
a mile away, where the tributary joins the Hudson River. They came up
beside me and sloppily pulled me onboard. The pain in my back was now
considerable, so I lay down flat across the deck. A moment later the
boat docked near the power plant, where an ambulance was waiting to
take me to Nyack Hospital.

Enroute to the hospital, a police detective sat next to me and took
sparse notes of my story. The EMT folks stuck me full of needles for
IV and blood tests; my body temperature was 90 degrees, so they wrapped
me in more blankets. I felt a hot spot on my rear end; it turned out
to be the battery from my cell phone that was overheating from being
underwater. We arrived at the hospital and I was wheeled into the
trauma part of the emergency room. They immediately cut off all my
clothes (losing my keys in the process), poked more needles into me and
did a quick check of my limbs and abdomen. I was then sent for a CT
scan of my neck and brain; and later for X-rays of the rest of my body.

When all the test results were in, the ER doctor came in and told me
that my back was broken, and that the orthopedist would be there
shortly to explain further. He then left the room, but came back a
moment later and casually said: "By the way, did you know that you
have a brain tumor? The neurologist will be here soon to explain it
some more".

* * * * *

I walked out of the hospital on Friday afternoon. My back still hurts,
mostly from the pressure of the brace that I have to wear for the next
four weeks whenever I'm vertical. I'm taking anti-seizure and pain
medications and next week will consult with neurosurgeons on what (if
anything) to do about the brain tumor.

Last night was the first time I was able to sleep through the night
without waking up several times, sometimes in a sweat; other times just
to cry for ten minutes because I couldn't deal with the emotions of
how and why I nearly died, yet somehow managed to survive.

* * * * *

Unlike other people's descriptions throughout history of near-death
experiences, I did not see my life flash before my eyes; a warm glowing
light; or any symbols of divine presence. What I saw were stark
realities that needed to be dealt with: airspeed, jolts, altitude,
fuel farm tanks, water, pain.

When the plane crashed and the cabin was underwater, and I couldn't
open the door, I sadly thought: "So this is how it ends". But I
immediately determined to reject that outcome, grabbed the hammer and
clawed my way out.

Jose
July 5th 05, 09:49 PM
Thanks for posting the story - it's quite a far cry from what the news
reported. In fact, I wouldn't recognize the two stories as being the
same event.

> I would be interested in your reactions.

I just wonder if in retrospect he might have deemed it a better idea to
not pull the chute, and to instead fly the plane onto a runway or open
field, even uncoordinated if necessary. He says he's never fly a plane
without a chute, but if this plane didn't have a chute, he would have
had to fly the plane, and the outcome may well have been better. A
forward impact under control is better than a downward one out of control.

Jose
--
You may not get what you pay for, but you sure as hell pay for what you get.
for Email, make the obvious change in the address.

Peter R.
July 5th 05, 10:19 PM
Jose > wrote:

> I just wonder if in retrospect he might have deemed it a better idea to
> not pull the chute, and to instead fly the plane onto a runway or open
> field, even uncoordinated if necessary. He says he's never fly a plane
> without a chute, but if this plane didn't have a chute, he would have
> had to fly the plane, and the outcome may well have been better. A
> forward impact under control is better than a downward one out of control.

The author and pilot mentioned his reasoning for pulling the 'chute. He
questioned the structural integrity of the aircraft after his unusual
attitude recovery as well as his health and ability to safely continue.

I certainly see his reasoning for his decision, especially imagining how
little time he perceived he had to make a decision.

I don't necessarily agree with his comment about only flying an aircraft
with a chute, given that there is a potential that a pilot as a sole
occupant could experience an extended loss of consciousness before being
able to pull the chute. Heck, a loss of consciousness while driving at
highway speeds, something that seems more probable than in an aircraft,
could be just as devastating to one's health.

That was quite an intense experience he had and I wish him the best in his
physical and emotional recovery from it and his yet-to-be resolved brain
tumor.

--
Peter
























----== Posted via Newsfeeds.Com - Unlimited-Uncensored-Secure Usenet News==----
http://www.newsfeeds.com The #1 Newsgroup Service in the World! 120,000+ Newsgroups
----= East and West-Coast Server Farms - Total Privacy via Encryption =----

Ben Jackson
July 5th 05, 10:28 PM
On 2005-07-05, Jose > wrote:
> I just wonder if in retrospect he might have deemed it a better idea to
> not pull the chute, and to instead fly the plane onto a runway

It's that tendancy to reject a known risk in favor of a future risk
(where the outcome could be much worse, but it *could* be much *better*)
that gets a lot of pilots into trouble.

I think it was very prudent to activate the chute after an in-flight
discovery that you have a neurological problem that leads to blackouts
and physical weakness.

--
Ben Jackson
>
http://www.ben.com/

Jose
July 5th 05, 10:48 PM
> I think it was very prudent to activate the chute after an in-flight
> discovery that you have a neurological problem that leads to blackouts
> and physical weakness.

He didn't discover this until the hospital. He just discovered that he
had a blackout, and was a bit weak.

Were it me, I would hope that I would give a bit more thought to the
consequences of pulling the chute.... NOW... vs the alternative (pull it
later, fly it onto a field...). Parachuting a plane onto a fuel farm is
not a very good outcome. However, Cirrus advocates pulling the chute
NOW if there is a problem (specifically a spin) and that's what he did.
I do see that (if the chute has a 130 knot max deployment speed) a
spin could get so developed so quickly that the chute is useless unless
it was pulled immediately. He did what he was (presumably) trained to do.

Nonetheless, I see this as a weakness in the Cirrus, not a strength.

In any case, he had recovered from the unusual attitude. A few moments
reflection would have been prudent; again a weakness of the "pull it
NOW" training that one is reported to receive with the Cirrus.

Jose
--
You may not get what you pay for, but you sure as hell pay for what you get.
for Email, make the obvious change in the address.

Michael182/G
July 5th 05, 11:19 PM
I didn't post this for us as a community to "monday morning
quarterback" this fortunate pilot's decisions. It is not fair for us
to sit in front of a computer in the comfort of your home and think
about what you might have done differently than the guy who lived it in
real time. It does help to read what happened and consider if your own
flying routine would have given you the opportunities to escape this
situation. I don't have a BRS in my plane, but it is very possible that
I could have an off airport landing in or around water. I usually think
of life vests only on a planned extended over-water flight. (Like going
to Oshkosh in a couple of weeks from Farmindale, New York). I also
haven't considered how easy or difficult it would be to escape from a
Cessna 182 that was submerging in the next 4 minutes. I think that I
will plan to have life vests in easy reach on every flight from here
on. In basic PPL training we are taught to open the latches on doors
during a forced landing. Maybe it would be a good idea to open windows
too?

Mike Long
July 5th 05, 11:23 PM
Are we sure this is real? Perhaps it is simply a typing error but you
would think someone familiar with his SR22 would realize it had an
Avidyne system and not Garmin.

Mike

Bob Noel
July 5th 05, 11:25 PM
In article . com>,
"Michael182/G" > wrote:

> I didn't post this for us as a community to "monday morning
> quarterback" this fortunate pilot's decisions...

you asked for reactions. you got reactions.
("I would be interested in your reactions.")

--
Bob Noel
no one likes an educated mule

July 6th 05, 12:40 AM
Michael182/G wrote:

> I didn't post this for us as a community to "monday morning
> quarterback" this fortunate pilot's decisions. It is not fair for us
> to sit in front of a computer in the comfort of your home and think
> about what you might have done differently than the guy who lived it in
> real time.

Sure, it is quite fair. That is the kind of business the NTSB does all the
time, and mostly for prudent pilots to gain insight and knowledge from
other's mistakes, misfortunes, or bad judgments.

You said it right in your original post, and I quote you:

"I would be interested in your reactions"

Jose
July 6th 05, 12:53 AM
> I didn't post this for us as a community to "monday morning
> quarterback" this fortunate pilot's decisions.

Well, actually you asked for our thoughts.

And in any case, my comments were not directed so much at second
guessing the pilot's judgement, but rather, at (yet again) questioning
the wisdom in the design of an airplane whose certification is dependent
on "if something(*) goes wrong, pull the chute NOW" and the requisite
training to do so. The pilot did what he was trained to do.

I am not second guessing the pilot. I am second guessing the design and
training.

(*) ok, the "something" is a spin, but the emphasis on pulling the chute
instead of flying the airplane makes it seem like a panacea which as a
design feature has been thought out from a marketing standpoint far more
than from a piloting standpoint.

Jose
--
You may not get what you pay for, but you sure as hell pay for what you get.
for Email, make the obvious change in the address.

CJS
July 6th 05, 12:55 AM
You would think someone familiar with the Avidyne system would realize that
it is NOT a GPS, but an MFD. And someone familiar with the Cirrus line
would know that they ship with two Garmin GNS430's plus the Avidyne MFD,
plus the Avidyne PFD if it's a newer Cirrus.
The post was riveting. It's rare to hear a full report in the pilot's
own words and not just in quotes or [worse] sound bites.

Conspiracy theories are all around us.
CJS


"Mike Long" > wrote in message
oups.com...
> Are we sure this is real? Perhaps it is simply a typing error but you
> would think someone familiar with his SR22 would realize it had an
> Avidyne system and not Garmin.
>
> Mike
>

Dave S
July 6th 05, 01:08 AM
Michael182/G wrote:
> I didn't post this for us as a community to "monday morning
> quarterback" this fortunate pilot's decisions.

Amen, Mike..

He made a snap decision based on what he thought was the right thing to
do. He lived to tell about it. Nobody else was hurt. Yes.. the plane is
totalled. Yes, that may impact someone elses insurance rates.. but ya
know what? He lived. The BRS did its job.

Could things have been done a bit better? Certainly.

The truth of the matter is... the pilot blacked out and KNEW that he had
blacked out. This happened without warning. He came back around in an
unusual attitude in weather that while not IMC was by his definition
"marginal". He had NO idea if he was about to black out again. It could
have happened at any moment.

How many here would have castigated this guy had he NOT pulled the
chute, blacked out and happened to crash into Indian Point, or spiral
into the fuel farm... or wipe out a playground full of children
somewhere along his path?

I'm glad it worked out "favorably" for him. It sucks loosing the medical
though... (from a medical standpoint, he is right, his flying days are
over... untreated, the tumor predisposes him to sudden incapacitation, a
disqualifying condition... treatment likely will require neurosurgery,
and more times than not, that results in the emergence of a seizure
condition that requires medication.. ALSO a disqualifying condition).

Kudo's to the pilot,
Dave

Wizard of Draws
July 6th 05, 02:06 AM
On 7/5/05 3:14 PM, in article
om, "Michael182/G"
> spewed:

>
> Each pilot has to establish and evaluate their own risk assessment criteria,
> but for me something that has a greater than 50% risk of death, even if
> only 1% of the time, is an unacceptable risk. That's why I bought a
> Cirrus in the first place.
>

While I'm glad this guy made it down relatively safely, I have to wonder
about this statement. It seems that I'm taking a greater risk than I thought
when I started this flying stuff. Is my death actually greater than 50%, 1%
of the time? I'm no math Wiz by any stretch of the imagination, but at ~300
hours, I seem to be living on borrowed time.
--
Jeff 'The Wizard of Draws' Bucchino

Cartoons with a Touch of Magic
http://www.wizardofdraws.com

More Cartoons with a Touch of Magic
http://www.cartoonclipart.com

Peter R.
July 6th 05, 02:25 AM
Michael182/G > wrote:

> I didn't post this for us as a community to "monday morning
> quarterback" this fortunate pilot's decisions.

This *is* Usenet. Reactions of all types is exactly what you should have
expected.


--
Peter
























----== Posted via Newsfeeds.Com - Unlimited-Uncensored-Secure Usenet News==----
http://www.newsfeeds.com The #1 Newsgroup Service in the World! 120,000+ Newsgroups
----= East and West-Coast Server Farms - Total Privacy via Encryption =----

Thomas Borchert
July 6th 05, 08:41 AM
Ben,

> > I just wonder if in retrospect he might have deemed it a better idea to
> > not pull the chute, and to instead fly the plane onto a runway
>
> It's that tendancy to reject a known risk in favor of a future risk
> (where the outcome could be much worse, but it *could* be much *better*)
> that gets a lot of pilots into trouble.
>

I couldn't agree more.

--
Thomas Borchert (EDDH)

Thomas Borchert
July 6th 05, 08:41 AM
Jose,

> Nonetheless, I see this as a weakness in the Cirrus, not a strength.
>
> In any case, he had recovered from the unusual attitude. A few moments
> reflection would have been prudent; again a weakness of the "pull it
> NOW" training that one is reported to receive with the Cirrus.
>

FWIW, I couldn't agree less. The underlying attitude is that "I'm a hero,
I'm THE RIGHT STUFF, I know better, I can handle everything thrown at me,
and damn the torpedoes". Statistics show that a lot of pilots get into a
lot of trouble with this attitude. I would think that this attitude is
very prevalent among pilots, too.

This was the perfect example for the benefit of the chute.

--
Thomas Borchert (EDDH)

Thomas Borchert
July 6th 05, 08:41 AM
Dave,

> . He had NO idea if he was about to black out again. It could
> have happened at any moment.
>

And there's the key point. Pulling the chute was THE ONLY smart option
in that case. It's a perfect example of the benefit of the chute.

--
Thomas Borchert (EDDH)

Travis Marlatte
July 6th 05, 09:17 AM
I think you are right to question the statement. They're numbers taken out
of context. I think it would have been better for him to simply say that he
invested in a BRS to increase the odds of survival. If and when to deploy is
debatable. What is not debatable is that having the chute gives you more
options than not having it.

Anyone else think that two-weeks for that amount of work at the "regular
50-hour inspection" was a lot? I can understand the broken shear coupling.
Probably a manufacturing defect despite FAA certification. Who would have
thought! But a fuel sender and a new gauge? Is there a recall on them or
something? Otherwise, it sounds like the A/P was fishing for a solution or
money.

Kudos to the pilot. He survived without causing injury except to himself or
damage except to his own plane. I think he did the right thing only because
I have no way to second guess him.

What a marketing challenge for Cirrus. People debate the value and emotions
of having the parachutes. People debate the value of using the parachutes
whether the pilot chooses to launch them or not. People debate whether lives
were saved by the chute or if they would have survived anyway. What a mess.

Only those that overcome the emotions and decide to give themselves one last
out will ever benefit. Only those who have faced disaster and pulled the
cord rather than roll the dice can truly understand.

-------------------------------
Travis

"Wizard of Draws" > wrote in
message news:BEF0A6D7.7EB5A%jeffbTAKEOUTALLCAPS@TOEMAILwiz ardofdraws.com...
> On 7/5/05 3:14 PM, in article
> om, "Michael182/G"
> > spewed:
>
>>
>> Each pilot has to establish and evaluate their own risk assessment
>> criteria,
>> but for me something that has a greater than 50% risk of death, even if
>> only 1% of the time, is an unacceptable risk. That's why I bought a
>> Cirrus in the first place.
>>
>
> While I'm glad this guy made it down relatively safely, I have to wonder
> about this statement. It seems that I'm taking a greater risk than I
> thought
> when I started this flying stuff. Is my death actually greater than 50%,
> 1%
> of the time? I'm no math Wiz by any stretch of the imagination, but at
> ~300
> hours, I seem to be living on borrowed time.
> --
> Jeff 'The Wizard of Draws' Bucchino
>
> Cartoons with a Touch of Magic
> http://www.wizardofdraws.com
>
> More Cartoons with a Touch of Magic
> http://www.cartoonclipart.com
>

Thomas Borchert
July 6th 05, 12:26 PM
Travis,

> People debate
>

Ah, no, it's just us Usenet guys ;-) That's not "people". "People" are
buying Cirrii like crazy. That's what people do.

--
Thomas Borchert (EDDH)

Jose
July 6th 05, 04:02 PM
> FWIW, I couldn't agree less. The underlying attitude is that "I'm a hero,
> I'm THE RIGHT STUFF, I know better, I can handle everything thrown at me,
> and damn the torpedoes".

What underlying attitude? One has a blackout, wakes up to find
themselves in a high speed unusual attitude, recovers from it, and
decides to get ou the ground. No hero stuff here.

The question is, under pilot control or under a canopy.

Once the pilot had recovered, the =emergency= was over. It was still a
crisis situation, but time was no longer of the essence. One should
consider all available options, including looking out the window before
pulling the chute if there's time to do so (which there was).

My understanding of the Cirrus (I've never flown one) is that the chute
decision is to be made pretty much instantly (to preclude further
development of the spin for which it is designed). This training leads
to sub-optimal results when the emergency is not a spin.

He was at 1700 feet, no longer descending, and below redline speed.
After a fraction of a second of thought, he pulled the chute. Let's
consider his stated reasons:

> no desire to proceed any further into marginal weather

Not time critical. No heroics involved in making a U-turn.

> concern over the loss of altitude;

Not time critical. He is no longer losing altitude, and 1700 is safe in
that area. (were he still descending, it would be time critical
inasmuch as one needs some altitude for chute deployment to work, even
if it's ballistic).

> concern that the plane's structural integrity was compromised by the
> high speed descent and recovery

This is somewhat valid, but since the plane is still intact I would look
out the window first, and slow the airplane down first. Once the plane
is slowed, the stresses on the airframe are reduced. Also, if the plane
did begin to break up, one could =then= pull the chute (assuming the
pilot didn't get knocked around too much).

> concern that the weakness in my right leg might hinder
> my ability to control the plane down to the runway.

Not time critical. Fly TO the runway and pull the chute over an open
area if you must. In the interim you may find that you could control
the aircraft enough to walk away, even if you couldn't reuse the plane.
I don't see this as heroic either.

There are some situations (in the Cirrus) where one must pull the chute
NOW, but others (such as this one) where this is not the case, and even
five seconds reflection would make a much better outcome. In fact, had
he done everything right, he would have landed right in the middle of
the fuel farm, and there might have been a huge fire and no internet
posting to tell the tale. No heroics, and the chute would have done its
job.

Jose
--
You may not get what you pay for, but you sure as hell pay for what you get.
for Email, make the obvious change in the address.

Ed H
July 7th 05, 12:05 AM
"Peter R." > wrote in message
...
> Jose > wrote:

>
> The author and pilot mentioned his reasoning for pulling the 'chute. He
> questioned the structural integrity of the aircraft after his unusual
> attitude recovery
>

This is a great advertisement for the benefits of acro training.

There is no reason to think that momentarily exceeding Vne would render an
aircraft structurally unsound. Unless he over-G'd the aircraft on recovery,
or experienced severe flutter, there should be no damage to the aircraft.
The cirrus is rated to +3.8G, which means it is engineered to withstand up
to 5.7G before failure. With some acro training, he would easily recognize
the physical sensation of exceeding either of those limits. From what I've
read, any flutter violent enough to cause structural failure would also be
easily recognizable to the pilot. I've accidentally exceeded Vne a couple
of times doing acro, without ill effect to myself or my plane.

So if he recovered from the unusual attitude without experiencing physical
indications of structural failure, the odds are very high that the aircraft
was undamaged and capable of continued flight to land. Balance those odds
against the risks of deploying the parachute at an airspeed much higher than
the rated limit.

As for the physical impairment, if he was capable of recovering from the
unusual attitude, then he was capable of getting the aircraft level, getting
the airspeed under the parachute deployment limit, declaring an emergency,
and taking a few moments to more accurately assess his physical condition.
You know, shake it out a little, see if the leg comes back.

I don't want to armchair quarterback the guy, but it's fairly apparent that
he panicked. That's pretty understandable, given that he had just regained
consciousness. I've been woken from a deep sleep a few times by fairly
alarming events (mortar attack), and the momentary feeling of disorientation
and panic is overwhelming. Had to take a few seconds and shake the cobwebs
out to think straight. Not faulting him or saying he's a bad pilot;
nobody's brain would function clearly right after a seizure.

Once I was flying a Decathlon and my stick locked in the full rear position
as I pulled out of a loop. My first reaction was to bail out. Then I
thought about it and decided I had a few moments to sort out the problem.
Afther thinking it through, I realized my rear seatback had hooked on the
rear stick. I got the aircraft in a stable attitude (not easy), unstrapped,
reached back and freed the controls. A potential disaster became a minor
story.

Good advice for any pilot: take a moment and sort it out before you do
something rash. But I"m glad it worked out well for him.

Wizard of Draws
July 7th 05, 12:33 AM
On 7/6/05 11:02 AM, in article ,
"Jose" > spewed:

>
> Once the pilot had recovered, the =emergency= was over. It was still a
> crisis situation, but time was no longer of the essence. One should
> consider all available options, including looking out the window before
> pulling the chute if there's time to do so (which there was).
>

He had no guarantee that what caused his blackout wouldn't happen again in
the new few moments creating a second, unrecoverable emergency. Pulling the
chute was his best option.
--
Jeff 'The Wizard of Draws' Bucchino

Cartoons with a Touch of Magic
http://www.wizardofdraws.com

More Cartoons with a Touch of Magic
http://www.cartoonclipart.com

Peter R.
July 7th 05, 02:48 AM
Wizard of Draws > wrote:

> He had no guarantee that what caused his blackout wouldn't happen again in
> the new few moments creating a second, unrecoverable emergency. Pulling the
> chute was his best option.

Interestingly the author didn't mention that particular concern in his
account of events as one of the factors that led him to launch the
parachute.

The only health-related concern he mentioned was the weakness in his right
leg.

--
Peter
























----== Posted via Newsfeeds.Com - Unlimited-Uncensored-Secure Usenet News==----
http://www.newsfeeds.com The #1 Newsgroup Service in the World! 120,000+ Newsgroups
----= East and West-Coast Server Farms - Total Privacy via Encryption =----

Wizard of Draws
July 7th 05, 03:06 AM
On 7/6/05 9:48 PM, in article
, "Peter R."
> spewed:

> Wizard of Draws > wrote:
>
>> He had no guarantee that what caused his blackout wouldn't happen again in
>> the new few moments creating a second, unrecoverable emergency. Pulling the
>> chute was his best option.
>
> Interestingly the author didn't mention that particular concern in his
> account of events as one of the factors that led him to launch the
> parachute.
>
> The only health-related concern he mentioned was the weakness in his right
> leg.

I noticed that. Unconscious realization maybe? In any case, not being in the
cockpit at the time, I find it difficult to second-guess the man in light of
the fact that he is still here to write about the incident.
--
Jeff 'The Wizard of Draws' Bucchino

Cartoons with a Touch of Magic
http://www.wizardofdraws.com

More Cartoons with a Touch of Magic
http://www.cartoonclipart.com

July 7th 05, 05:23 AM
> (from a medical standpoint, he is right, his flying days are
over...

His flying days are not over unless he wants them to be. What are over
are his days as PIC. He can still fly with medically qualified and
rated pilots and CFIs. Sure, it's not the same, but it's not chopped
liver, either.

-- dave j

David Dyer-Bennet
July 7th 05, 08:41 AM
"Ed H" > writes:

> As for the physical impairment, if he was capable of recovering from
> the unusual attitude, then he was capable of getting the aircraft
> level, getting the airspeed under the parachute deployment limit,
> declaring an emergency, and taking a few moments to more accurately
> assess his physical condition. You know, shake it out a little, see
> if the leg comes back.

The situation started when he lost consciousness unexpectedly and
without notice. He seems to have decided it might well recur. Can we
really say that's the wrong choice? Under that scenario, delay is
risky.
--
David Dyer-Bennet, >, <http://www.dd-b.net/dd-b/>
RKBA: <http://noguns-nomoney.com/> <http://www.dd-b.net/carry/>
Pics: <http://dd-b.lighthunters.net/> <http://www.dd-b.net/dd-b/SnapshotAlbum/>
Dragaera/Steven Brust: <http://dragaera.info/>

David Dyer-Bennet
July 7th 05, 08:43 AM
Jose > writes:

>> I think it was very prudent to activate the chute after an in-flight
>> discovery that you have a neurological problem that leads to blackouts
>> and physical weakness.
>
> He didn't discover this until the hospital. He just discovered that
> he had a blackout, and was a bit weak.

So he doesn't know it's a neurological problem. He *does* know that
*whatever it is* leads to blackouts and weakness, since he's just
experienced those.
--
David Dyer-Bennet, >, <http://www.dd-b.net/dd-b/>
RKBA: <http://noguns-nomoney.com/> <http://www.dd-b.net/carry/>
Pics: <http://dd-b.lighthunters.net/> <http://www.dd-b.net/dd-b/SnapshotAlbum/>
Dragaera/Steven Brust: <http://dragaera.info/>

Thomas Borchert
July 7th 05, 08:45 AM
Ed,

> if he was capable of recovering from the
> unusual attitude, then he was capable of getting the aircraft level, getting
> the airspeed under the parachute deployment limit, declaring an emergency,
> and taking a few moments to more accurately assess his physical condition.
> You know, shake it out a little, see if the leg comes back.
>
> I don't want to armchair quarterback the guy, but it's fairly apparent that
> he panicked.
>

Well, but you do - in the worst way, IMHO. This guy just got unconcious out of
the friggin blue! He had absolutely NO idea when his next attack of
unconciousness would come. Could be during the "few moments" you recommend
taking. Could be while "you know, shake it out a little". Could be on final.

Again, what you recommend is typical pilot machismo. The kind of pilot machismo
that clearly shows in the statistics.

--
Thomas Borchert (EDDH)

Thomas Borchert
July 7th 05, 08:45 AM
Jose,

> Once the pilot had recovered, the =emergency= was over.

No, it wasn't. The reason for his blackout was completely unknown. The next
blackout could have come any time. He had no idea how likely that was. The
emergency was still in full progress.

As I said in another post, the underlying attitude shown by some here is the
typical pilot machismo we all know so well - from accident statistics.

> My understanding of the Cirrus (I've never flown one) is that the chute
> decision is to be made pretty much instantly (to preclude further
> development of the spin for which it is designed). This training leads
> to sub-optimal results when the emergency is not a spin.

So what was "sub-optimal" in the result of this? The guy lives, no one got
hurt.


--
Thomas Borchert (EDDH)

Thomas Borchert
July 7th 05, 08:45 AM
Peter,

> Interestingly the author didn't mention that particular concern in his
> account of events as one of the factors that led him to launch the
> parachute.
>

Well, consider his situation when writing that, and you might begin to
understand.

--
Thomas Borchert (EDDH)

David Dyer-Bennet
July 7th 05, 08:46 AM
Jose > writes:

>> FWIW, I couldn't agree less. The underlying attitude is that "I'm a
>> hero, I'm THE RIGHT STUFF, I know better, I can handle everything
>> thrown at me, and damn the torpedoes".
>
> What underlying attitude? One has a blackout, wakes up to find
> themselves in a high speed unusual attitude, recovers from it, and
> decides to get ou the ground. No hero stuff here.
>
> The question is, under pilot control or under a canopy.
>
> Once the pilot had recovered, the =emergency= was over. It was still
> a crisis situation, but time was no longer of the essence. One should
> consider all available options, including looking out the window
> before pulling the chute if there's time to do so (which there was).

You are writing off the possibiliy of the blackout repeating, possibly
for a longer period the next time.
--
David Dyer-Bennet, >, <http://www.dd-b.net/dd-b/>
RKBA: <http://noguns-nomoney.com/> <http://www.dd-b.net/carry/>
Pics: <http://dd-b.lighthunters.net/> <http://www.dd-b.net/dd-b/SnapshotAlbum/>
Dragaera/Steven Brust: <http://dragaera.info/>

G. Sylvester
July 7th 05, 10:07 AM
Jose wrote:
> In any case, he had recovered from the unusual attitude....

this isn't only about the unusual attitude. This is about
an unusual blackout, loss of control of a limb and the
pilot facing 204 knots at 1900 feet AGL. If he blacks
out again he has as little as 5-6 seconds to auger it into
the ground (if pointed straight down). That ain't much.
Acro training won't help if he unexplicably blacks out again.
Even if trained in acro, which would you rather do...acro
at below 1900 AGL and already above VNE with a severely compromised
physiologic state and then shoot an approach in low VFR and
possibly IMC or use all available resources and pop the chute.
Now make that decision in seconds when the ground is coming
at you quickly.



Gerald Sylvester

G. Sylvester
July 7th 05, 10:12 AM
Peter R. wrote:
> The only health-related concern he mentioned was the weakness in his right
> leg.

I'm not a trained MD but I'd consider blacking out as a solo PIC as
a health concern.

Gerald Sylvester

Peter R.
July 7th 05, 01:07 PM
Thomas Borchert > wrote:

>> Interestingly the author didn't mention that particular concern in his
>> account of events as one of the factors that led him to launch the
>> parachute.
>>
>
> Well, consider his situation when writing that, and you might begin to
> understand.

Tom, if you followed the thread, you would have discovered that I am
completely on the side of the pilot. I was merely pointing out that the
author did not mention the fact that he blacked out as a deciding factor in
pulling the chute. That's all.

--
Peter
























----== Posted via Newsfeeds.Com - Unlimited-Uncensored-Secure Usenet News==----
http://www.newsfeeds.com The #1 Newsgroup Service in the World! 120,000+ Newsgroups
----= East and West-Coast Server Farms - Total Privacy via Encryption =----

Peter R.
July 7th 05, 01:09 PM
"G. Sylvester" > wrote:

>> The only health-related concern he mentioned was the weakness in his right
>> leg.
>
> I'm not a trained MD but I'd consider blacking out as a solo PIC as
> a health concern.

So would I. However, it is a fact that the author didn't mention this in
his account of the event.

--
Peter
























----== Posted via Newsfeeds.Com - Unlimited-Uncensored-Secure Usenet News==----
http://www.newsfeeds.com The #1 Newsgroup Service in the World! 120,000+ Newsgroups
----= East and West-Coast Server Farms - Total Privacy via Encryption =----

Thomas Borchert
July 7th 05, 02:50 PM
Peter,

> Tom, if you followed the thread, you would have discovered that I am
> completely on the side of the pilot.
>

I know. No attack meant at all.

--
Thomas Borchert (EDDH)

Peter R.
July 7th 05, 03:04 PM
Thomas Borchert > wrote:

>> Tom, if you followed the thread, you would have discovered that I am
>> completely on the side of the pilot.
>>
>
> I know. No attack meant at all.

It's been a rough couple of days from this side of the newsreader. ;)

--
Peter
























----== Posted via Newsfeeds.Com - Unlimited-Uncensored-Secure Usenet News==----
http://www.newsfeeds.com The #1 Newsgroup Service in the World! 120,000+ Newsgroups
----= East and West-Coast Server Farms - Total Privacy via Encryption =----

Ed
July 7th 05, 03:59 PM
Bull****. Pilots have to weigh the relative risks when they decide what to
do in an emergency. Often the choice is between two risky options.
Deploying a BRS above the max deployment speed carries risk, as a recent
fatal Cirrus crash shows.

The pilot would be a fool not to weigh that risk against the risk of a
blackout recurrence. We would all be fools not to look at ALL the facts and
consider all possible pilot actions, so as to be better prepared were
something similar to happen to us.

This is a forum for analysis and learning, not a group hug. If the pilot
wants affirmation, he can buy a dog or go to church.


"Thomas Borchert" > wrote in message
...
>
>
> Again, what you recommend is typical pilot machismo. The kind of pilot
> machismo
> that clearly shows in the statistics.
>
> --
> Thomas Borchert (EDDH)
>

Matt Barrow
July 7th 05, 04:06 PM
> wrote in message
oups.com...
>
> > (from a medical standpoint, he is right, his flying days are
> over...
>
> His flying days are not over unless he wants them to be. What are over
> are his days as PIC. He can still fly with medically qualified and
> rated pilots and CFIs. Sure, it's not the same, but it's not chopped
> liver, either.
>

A few years ago, I could not drive for two weeks due to surgery on my leg.
As a result, my wife had to drive me everywhere I needed to go.

Believe me: IT IS chopped liver. :~)

Maule Driver
July 7th 05, 06:26 PM
My thinking tends towards yours - pilot machismo or not, I'm wired to
keep flying the thing and would *probably* choose to do as you are
suggesting.

However, having spent some time with an epileptic and having witnessed a
few seizures, it's clear to me that recovery from a big epileptic
seizure is not instant. The senses return slowly, particularly the
sense of where you are and what you were doing (note when caring for a
person coming out of a seizure that they may not know where they are,
time of day, etc - telling them where they are, the time, etc is very
reassuring and helpful).

Don't know if a tumor induced seizure is similar or not. I'd be a fool
to second guess but there is a lot to think about here.

Ed wrote:
> Bull****. Pilots have to weigh the relative risks when they decide what to
> do in an emergency. Often the choice is between two risky options.
> Deploying a BRS above the max deployment speed carries risk, as a recent
> fatal Cirrus crash shows.
>
> The pilot would be a fool not to weigh that risk against the risk of a
> blackout recurrence. We would all be fools not to look at ALL the facts and
> consider all possible pilot actions, so as to be better prepared were
> something similar to happen to us.
>
> This is a forum for analysis and learning, not a group hug. If the pilot
> wants affirmation, he can buy a dog or go to church.
>
>
> "Thomas Borchert" > wrote in message
> ...
>
>>
>>Again, what you recommend is typical pilot machismo. The kind of pilot
>>machismo
>>that clearly shows in the statistics.
>>
>>--
>>Thomas Borchert (EDDH)
>>
>
>
>

Maule Driver
July 7th 05, 06:40 PM
There seems to be a sense that consciousness is a binary switch.
Unconscious/Conscious, On/Off. Too many "Man from U.N.C.L.E" and
"Mission Impossible" reruns. See 'epileptic seizures' elsewhere in this
thread.

Despite all the post event analysis by the pilot, perhaps we should
think of him *reacting* to events while in a mental fog. He reacted the
best he could to what he was experiencing and with his brain doing the
best it could.

Jose wrote:
> Once the pilot had recovered, the =emergency= was over. It was still a
> crisis situation, but time was no longer of the essence. One should
> consider all available options, including looking out the window before
> pulling the chute if there's time to do so (which there was).
>

Ed
July 7th 05, 07:07 PM
"Maule Driver" > wrote in message
...

>
> However, having spent some time with an epileptic and having witnessed a
> few seizures, it's clear to me that recovery from a big epileptic seizure
> is not instant. The senses return slowly, particularly the sense of where
> you are and what you were doing (note when caring for a person coming out
> of a seizure that they may not know where they are, time of day, etc

That's my point. It's likely that he made the decision to fire the chute
while still in a mental "fog" from the seizure. He is entirely blameless
and should be congratulated for being alive. But we shouldn't rubberstamp
that action as the correct thing to do, solely out of sympathy for him.

Michael
July 8th 05, 12:46 AM
> having spent some time with an epileptic and having witnessed a
> few seizures, it's clear to me that recovery from a big epileptic
> seizure is not instant. The senses return slowly, particularly the
> sense of where you are and what you were doing

Having lived with an epileptic for about half a year, my experience
matches yours. Recovery from a seizure is anything but instantaneous.
It can take several seconds, or several minutes, or longer. There is
no real consistency. There is invariably a period when the epileptic
is conscious and aware, but not all there - still in a mental fog.
There is also a learned response to curtail action until full mental
acuity returns - but I imagine this is a learned response, not
something one instinctively learns after the first seizure.

In other words - I agree with the other poster. The pilot likely acted
in a mental fog. He was in the mental fog through no fault of his own,
and could not possibly be expected to know that his mental faculties
were diminished at the moment. He is certainly not to blame.

Having said that - I think that it is absolutely legitimate to question
whether he took the correct action (remembering always that if he did
not, he can't possibly be faulted for this given his condition).
However, I'm not all that certain his action was incorrect, even if his
reasons are specious.

> no desire to proceed any further into marginal weather

I can't see that the weather was an issue here - bases at 2000, 2-5 in
haze might be marginal VFR - but it's easy IFR by anyone's definition,
and he was on an IFR flight plan.

> concern over the loss of altitude;

1700 ft isn't terribly high, but it's not low either and that plane
climbs quite well especially with only one aboard. He could have been
back at his assigned altitude of 3000 in 2 minutes of cruise climb or 1
minute in a maximum performance climb.

> concern that the plane's structural integrity was compromised by the
> high speed descent and recovery

Concern regarding the structural integrity of the plane is misplaced -
a momentary overspeed without significant overgee, without the violent
shaking that would accompany flutter, and without any indication of
control problems certainly does not call for parachute activation.

> and concern that the weakness in my
> right leg might hinder my ability to control the plane down to the
> runway

The Cirrus doesn't need much rudder - even a no-rudder landing,
assuming no significant crosswind, would most likely mean no damage -
and certainly no injury.

However, the very quality of the reasoning argues for diminished mental
capacity. Also note that there were only three things he had to do for
a proper parachute activation - reduce airspeed below 130 kts, shut
down the engine, and pull the handle. He got one out of three right.
If that's as well as he was going to do, how well was he going to do
for the next few minutes of flight? Sure, he got better - but he
didn't know he was going to get better. He could have gotten worse.

As it happened, not shutting down the engine served him well - he was
able to use it for steering - but that was luck. It was also luck that
he recovered enough to do this. Had he taken minutes rather than
seconds to recover sufficiently (and I can assure you I've seen
recoveries from even mild epileptic seizures take that long) he might
have gotten himself killed. Had he had another seizure (and I've seen
a relatively brief and mild seizure followed by a minute or so of
relative lucidity followed by a much more prolonged and severe seizure)
he would certainly have been better off under parachute.

What I really have a problem understanding is not the people who say
the pilot is not at fault (I agree) nor the people who say that given
his medical condition, activation made sense (I agree), but the ones
who are somehow trying to claim the reasons he gives are valid, rather
than the result of diminished mental capacity at the time the decision
was made.

Michael

Maule Driver
July 8th 05, 02:48 AM
Exactly what I think.

Michael wrote:

> What I really have a problem understanding is not the people who say
> the pilot is not at fault (I agree) nor the people who say that given
> his medical condition, activation made sense (I agree), but the ones
> who are somehow trying to claim the reasons he gives are valid, rather
> than the result of diminished mental capacity at the time the decision
> was made.
>
> Michael
>

Ed
July 8th 05, 06:14 PM
Me too, but he says it better.

"Maule Driver" > wrote in message
m...
> Exactly what I think.
>
> Michael wrote:
>
>> What I really have a problem understanding is not the people who say
>> the pilot is not at fault (I agree) nor the people who say that given
>> his medical condition, activation made sense (I agree), but the ones
>> who are somehow trying to claim the reasons he gives are valid, rather
>> than the result of diminished mental capacity at the time the decision
>> was made.
>>
>> Michael
>>

July 8th 05, 10:39 PM
Thanks for taking the time to share your story. Lots of food for
thought. I can identify with the "so this is how it ends" moment. Had
one a few years back when I had a hold of 480 volts.
--
Gene Seibel
Tales of Flight - http://pad39a.com/gene/tales.html
Because I fly, I envy no one.

Scott Moore
July 11th 05, 07:06 PM
Michael182/G wrote:
>
> Don't fly a single engine plane that isn't equipped with a
> parachute. Although the chances of actually encountering an emergency
> situation that is worthy of "pulling the chute" are probably small
> to infinitesimal over the course of any given pilot's career, the
> penalty for not having a parachute is almost certain death. Each pilot
> has to establish and evaluate their own risk assessment criteria, but
> for me something that has a greater than 50% risk of death, even if
> only 1% of the time, is an unacceptable risk. That's why I bought a
> Cirrus in the first place.

Utter horse****, and destructive horse**** at that. Now I have
"semiknowledgable" people telling me that clearly you must get an airplane
with a parachute to be safe. Guess what. Airplanes still fly unless you
rip the wings off. Certainly LOC (Loss of Control) followed by CFIT
is real, but its..... Still...... Pilot..... Error.......

Just stop.

Peter R.
July 11th 05, 07:13 PM
Scott Moore > wrote:

> Utter horse****, and destructive horse**** at that. Now I have
> "semiknowledgable" people telling me that clearly you must get an airplane
> with a parachute to be safe.

To be fair, you should indicate that you are responding to the Cirrus
accident pilot, not Michael 182. Michael was merely re-posting the story
for this newsgroup's benefit, but the method in which you quoted the
article makes it appear as if you are replying to Michael.

--
Peter
























----== Posted via Newsfeeds.Com - Unlimited-Uncensored-Secure Usenet News==----
http://www.newsfeeds.com The #1 Newsgroup Service in the World! 120,000+ Newsgroups
----= East and West-Coast Server Farms - Total Privacy via Encryption =----

David Dyer-Bennet
July 14th 05, 03:52 PM
"G. Sylvester" > writes:

> Peter R. wrote:
>> The only health-related concern he mentioned was the weakness in his right
>> leg.
>
> I'm not a trained MD but I'd consider blacking out as a solo PIC as
> a health concern.

Me too -- but Peter is correct that the pilot in question did *not*
mention the possibility of a recurrence of the blackout in his
description of his decision-making process. I think it *should* have
been there!

Also, he seemed awfully willing to go for a water ditching while being
aware of his compromised physical state (weak leg; and he didn't
mention, again, the risk of another blackout) -- and in fact he had
some dificulty getting out because of that, though it came out okay in
the end.
--
David Dyer-Bennet, >, <http://www.dd-b.net/dd-b/>
RKBA: <http://noguns-nomoney.com/> <http://www.dd-b.net/carry/>
Pics: <http://dd-b.lighthunters.net/> <http://www.dd-b.net/dd-b/SnapshotAlbum/>
Dragaera/Steven Brust: <http://dragaera.info/>

Google