Lost comm -- what would you do?

[Roy Smith]

A student and I took off today IFR from HPN. Destination was FWN (Sussex,
NJ). Rhumb line course is 42 NM at 294 degrees.

Clearance was "Westchester 1, RV CMK, CMK 275R to intercept SAX 039R, SAX,
direct FWN, maintain 3000, expect 4000 after 10 minutes".

Departing runway 34, the SID is "climb to 1000, then left turn 295, expect
vectors to departure fix". CMK is 14 miles at 037.

We depart, check in with NY Approach, and get "maintain 4000". Nothing
about heading, so we stay on the SID heading of 295, which conveniently is
pointing us right at our destination.

Here's the question. If you went lost comm, what would you do?
Technically, our next waypoint is still CMK, so "fly the route previously
cleared" would have us head direct CMK then as cleared. But, every mile we
fly on 295 takes us further and further away from CMK, and making a, say,
150 degree, course change to head back to CMK seems pretty dumb. Yet, they
wouldn't have given us such a circuitous route if there wasn't some good
reason they needed to keep us away from the rhumbline.

The route is off-airways, but you note that the VOR-A
(http://204.108.4.16/d-tpp/0511/05412VGA.PDF) MSA is 3100. Assume you're
familiar with the area, and know that 4000 clears all terrain that might
possibly be a factor along any route you might pick.

So, what would you do? Turn back to CMK and proceed from there? Keep on
the 295 heading until you intercept the CMK 275 or the SAX 039, whichever
comes first (assuming that heading even intercepts those at all). Turn
direct SAX? Hit the reset button and start the scenario again?

[Dan Luke]

"Roy Smith" wrote:

> The route is off-airways, but you note that the VOR-A
> (http://204.108.4.16/d-tpp/0511/05412VGA.PDF) MSA is 3100. Assume
> you're
> familiar with the area, and know that 4000 clears all terrain that
> might
> possibly be a factor along any route you might pick.
>
> So, what would you do? Turn back to CMK and proceed from there? Keep
> on
> the 295 heading until you intercept the CMK 275 or the SAX 039,
> whichever
> comes first (assuming that heading even intercepts those at all).
> Turn
> direct SAX? Hit the reset button and start the scenario again?

Turn back to CMK and proceed from there, with an eye on the chart for
obstacle/terrain clearance. Staying on 295 doesn't really assure you of
anything even if you climb to 4,000 because you don't know when or what
the next vector would have been. You can assume that the clearance
after CMK works if you maintain charted IFR minimum altitudes.

--
Dan
C172RG at BFM

[Michael]

>From 91.185 (lost comm): (ii) If being radar vectored, by the direct
route from the point of radio
failure to the fix, route, or airway specified in the vector clearance;


I would argue that since you are told to expect radar vectors to
departure fix, and the first fix is CMK, then by the letter of the
regulation you are supposed to proceed to CMK. It's silly and
inefficient, but I can't see a way around this in the regs.

Practically speaking, this maybe adds a few minutes. If you can afford
the time (lost comm is due to something benign, like audio panel
failure) you might as well do it by the book. If it's more serious,
there's always emergency authority.

The real issue is why you were cleared the way you were, and how
exercising emergency authority could cause you to run afoul of whatever
prompted the roundabout clearance. I find it just a bit surprising you
got that clearance in the first place - around here, short IFR legs in
the close vicinity of a class B are almost always by RADAR vectors. I
have little experience with short IFR legs in your part of the world
(I'm generally either coming or going on long distance legs) so you
need to tell me if a clearance like that is typical in such a
situation.

Assuming it is typical, it probably had to do with traffic - which is
going to be moved away from you as soon as the controllers realize
you're lost comm (likely before you realize it). If that's the case,
no real consequence to taking a shortcut if the comm failure is
accompanied by an emergency. The other (much scarier) possibility
would be the existence of a flight restricted area - temporary or
otherwise - along the direct course, and the unpleasant possibility of
an incompetently handled military interception in IMC (which has
already killed at least one completely innocent pilot and pax legally
operating IFR on a flight plan) or simply a heat seeking missile up the
exhaust. If that's the case, think twice about that shortcut.

Michael

[Jose]

> I would argue that since you are told to expect radar vectors to
> departure fix, and the first fix is CMK, then by the letter of the
> regulation you are supposed to proceed to CMK. It's silly and
> inefficient, but I can't see a way around this in the regs.

Turning towards CMK on your own would also alert them that you've lost
comm (unless by coincidence, they were giving you the clearance at the
same time), in which case the lack of audible response may clue them in.

> and the unpleasant possibility of
> an incompetently handled military interception in IMC (which has
> already killed at least one completely innocent pilot and pax legally
> operating IFR on a flight plan)

When? Post 9-11? Cite? Why hasn't more noise been made?

Jose
--
You can choose whom to befriend, but you cannot choose whom to love.
for Email, make the obvious change in the address.

[Roy Smith]

Michael > wrote: I find it just a
> bit surprising you got that clearance in the first place - around
> here, short IFR legs in the close vicinity of a class B are almost
> always by RADAR vectors.

Yes, it's pretty typical. Sometimes you get cleared "radar vectors
direct", but much more often you get something like what I got. In
fact, this particular clearance is common enough that I use as an
exercise for people learning our GPS. Something like "CMK CMK275R
intercept SAX039R SAX" is one of the few things that's actually easier
to execute with dual VORs than with a GPS.

I agree with you that if you lost comm right off the ground, direct
CMK then as cleared would make sense. The more interesting scenario
is what happens if you check in with Departure (as we did) and he just
leaves you on the SID heading with no further instructions for a
while. At some point, you're 5 miles from SAX and 30 miles from CMK,
and it obviously doesn't make any sense to double back any more. It's
unclear where the dividing line is between those two extremes.

I don't think there's any right answer to this, it's just an
interesting exercise in PIC decision making ability to figure out what
the right thing to do is.

[John Clonts]

> an incompetently handled military interception in IMC (which has
> already killed at least one completely innocent pilot and pax legally
> operating IFR on a flight plan)

I did not hear about this!! What are the details??

--
Thanks,
John Clonts
Temple, Texas
N7NZ

[Michael]

> When? Post 9-11?

Nope, years prior. Can't find the cite anymore. Short version - Baron
on an IFR flight plan over the Gulf, due to crossed wires a fighter is
sent to take a look. Weather is cruddy, pilot botches the intercept
(realize that at 8000 ft, cruise speed for a Baron is just about the
same as stall speed for a fighter) and there's a midair. Fighter pilot
bails out successfully. Baron pilot and his pax go in.

At the time (this was over a decade ago) a huge stink was raised.
There was talk of a lawsuit, but it was squashed via sovereign
immunity. Supposedly, intercept procedures were changed. However, a
friend of mine was flying on a DVFR flight plan from over the Gulf in
his Twin Comanche and looked back, upon hearing a strange noise, to see
an F-16 hanging just off his wing, everything hanging out. Seconds
later, the pilot has do dive away to avoid a stall, coming within
several feet of my friend. So nothing has changed.

Michael

[Steven P. McNicoll]

"Michael" > wrote in message
ups.com...
>
> Nope, years prior. Can't find the cite anymore. Short version - Baron
> on an IFR flight plan over the Gulf, due to crossed wires a fighter is
> sent to take a look. Weather is cruddy, pilot botches the intercept
> (realize that at 8000 ft, cruise speed for a Baron is just about the
> same as stall speed for a fighter) and there's a midair. Fighter pilot
> bails out successfully. Baron pilot and his pax go in.
>
> At the time (this was over a decade ago) a huge stink was raised.
> There was talk of a lawsuit, but it was squashed via sovereign
> immunity. Supposedly, intercept procedures were changed. However, a
> friend of mine was flying on a DVFR flight plan from over the Gulf in
> his Twin Comanche and looked back, upon hearing a strange noise, to see
> an F-16 hanging just off his wing, everything hanging out. Seconds
> later, the pilot has do dive away to avoid a stall, coming within
> several feet of my friend. So nothing has changed.
>

Is this it?



NTSB Identification: ATL83MA084B

Accident occurred Sunday, January 09, 1983 in CHERRY POINT, NC

Aircraft: McDonnell Douglas F4C, registration: AFNG
BEECH D55, registration: N7142N

Injuries: 7 Fatal, 2 Uninjured.

THE TWO ACFT COLLIDED AT ABOUT 9,500 FT MSL 30 MI SOUTH OF CHERRY POINT.
AFTER DEPARTING NASSAU, THE PLT OF THE BE-D55 NEVER ACTIVATED HIS FLT PLAN.
AN ADIZ PENETRATION TIME WAS THEREFORE NEVER ESTABLISHED. WHEN THE
UNIDENTIFIED ACFT ENTERED WARNING AREA W-122, THE USAF CONTACTED FAA ATC FOR
IDENTIFICATION INFO. SINCE FAA WAS NOT CONTROLLING ANY TRAFFIC IN THAT AREA
AN INTERCEPT ORDER WAS ISSUED. AT 1637 FAA GOT A POSITION REPORT FROM THE
BE-D55 & RELAYED IT TO MILITARY CONTROL. HOWEVER, THE TWO FIGHTER ACFT
CONTINUED TO CLOSE IN ON THE TARGET FOR RADAR CONTACT. THE LEAD ACFT WAS TO
CLOSE ABOUT 1,000 FT BELOW THE TARGET AT A PREPLANNED CLOSURE RATE OF 50 KTS
(ACTUAL RATE WAS 127 KTS). SECONDS BEFORE THE COLLISION, THE BE-D55 TURNED
LEFT AS REQUESTED BY FAA ATC THUS TURNING IT INTO THE PATH OF THE OVERTAKING
INTERCEPTOR WHICH ALSO HAD TURNED LEFT TO BREAK OFF THE INTERCEPT. THE
SAFETY BOARD DID NOT DETERMINE THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF THIS ACCIDENT, BUT
OFFERED STATEMENTS OF CAUSE.

[Andrew Gideon]

Roy Smith wrote:

> I don't think there's any right answer to this, it's just an
> interesting exercise in PIC decision making ability to figure out what
> the right thing to do is.

At least you've a fix towards which you can fly. A common clearance out of
CDW towards the west is "180 vectors Lanna V30...". This is even given to
aircraft /U...which would find it tough to fly direct to Lanna.

In practice, we'd fly "SBJ Lanna..." but I still find it an odd clearance.
In fact, I'd go so far as to call it one of my pet peeves regarding
routing.

Similarly odd is a clearance like "STW direct KCDW" or "COATE direct KCDW".
Neither STW nor COATE are initial approach fixs, so what should be done?
In RADAR and COMM, one is vectored to final. But in a communication
failure? Fly to SAX (which is an IAF for CDW's LOC22)?

[Assuming IMC, of course.]

- Andrew

[Michael]

> At some point, you're 5 miles from SAX and 30 miles from CMK,
> and it obviously doesn't make any sense to double back any more.

I'm not sure it ever made sense to double back to CMK. That's not
really the point. The regulation is clear - your next fix is CMK. I'm
not saying that going to CMK is the right thing to do, especially if
you are 5 miles from SAX - merely that it's what the regulation calls
for. Sometimes the regulation is just wrong.

> I don't think there's any right answer to this, it's just an
> interesting exercise in PIC decision making ability to figure out what
> the right thing to do is.

Well, I sort of agree. There really isn't one exact right answer, but
there are reasonable answers and unreasonable ones. One of those
unresonable answers involves actually following the rules when you're 5
miles from SAX. Part of PIC decision making in the real world is
knowing when to bend the rules in a non-emergency situation, and
knowing what you can get away with.

If you talk to an actual practicing center or approach controller, he
will tell you that in the event of lost comm, the best thing for
everyone is for you to get on the ground by the most expeditious route,
since they can't count on you doing anything in particular (more likely
than not your lost comm is associated with a more serious emergency)
and are going to sterilize the airspace around you anyway. In the age
of RADAR capable of seeing primary targets, that's the sensible course
of action. 91.185 hasn't kept pace. It doesn't need to. Lost comm
due to equipment failure is a rare event these days, and lost comm due
to equipment failure not associated with another emergency in IMC has
got to be so rare it's not worth the effort of rewriting the rules. We
torment our instrument students with the minutiae of lost comm rules,
but in reality that's strictly a checkride exercise.

So forget about following the letter of the rules - do something
sensible. Remember - no action is foolproof. A fed who wants to get
you will get you. One who isn't after your hide will accept that you
did something reasonable. Backtracking 40 miles and tying up the
system with your NORDO self for an extra 45 minutes isn't reasonable,
even if that's what the rule calls for (and clearly it does).

Let's say you're changing radios on your audio panel, and due to crappy
soldering and decades of vibration, the switch comes off in your hand.
Everything else still works, but with no audio panel you can't use
either comm. No real emergency - the fan is still turning, the juice
is still flowing, and the nav is still pointing.

If you've established comm with ATC, climbed to your final altitude,
and were left on your DP heading, there's very little chance the
controller had any intention of ever sending you back to CMK. He's
either going to send you direct by RADAR vectors, or have you join the
route somewhere in the middle (or reroute you). I would suggest that a
reasonable thing to do is look at your position relative to your
cleared route, and draw a reasonable intercept course from your present
position to your route. We generally consider 30 degrees to be a
reasonable intercept. If you can make that work, that's what makes
sense. If you're too close to SAX to make that work, you need to go
direct SAX. That's how the controller would put you back on the route
if he had to (due to transponder problems, for example) and that's what
you ought to do.

However, if there's a flight restriction area that prompted the
circuitous clearance, be damn sure your course for getting back on the
cleared route avoids it. If the only way you can assure this is by
backtracking to CMK, well, that's what you do.

It's not an exact right answer, but it does give you some reasonable
guidance on what to do. It's what makes sense in the real world. It
may not play so well on an IFR oral.

Michael

[Guy Elden Jr]

Well this sort of happened to me a few weeks ago. Went out to get some
actual on a low visibility / low ceiling evening from MMU to SWF (about
45 nm flight). I don't remember the exact routing, but it was the
typical one that involves flying to the HUO VOR, then a radial off the
VOR to intercept the IAF for the ILS 27 approach. Winds were strong out
of the SW above 1500 feet, so getting up there took all of 20 minutes.

After I was handed off from the "busy" NY approach freq (127.6) to the
one handling SWF's airspace, I tried for about 3 minutes to check-in on
the new freq. I kept hearing a guy who sounded like an approach
controller, but it sure sounded like Boston center. I was thick in the
soup at 4000, about to make that turn at HUO, and couldn't raise
_anybody_ on the freq. Fortunately the plane I was flying has a Garmin
in it, so I toggled back to the previous frequency, said I couldn't
raise anybody, and finally received the correct frequency to dial in.
(I think the controller messed up, not me, but it's moot at this
point).

So I finally check in with the new controller, and he says I'm about to
overshoot the localizer... which I can plainly see on the GPS. I make
the turn pretty tight, and get lined up for the approach. At this
point, I know now I should have called this approach off and asked for
vectors to get lined back up, because up until this point, I had not
had a chance to brief, get weather, tune radios, or anything... I'd
been dealing with what I thought was a lost comm situation.

Let's just say that the approach was less than optimal, and I
definitely should have been more ahead of the plane than I ended up
being. To top off the stress, I broke out literally 100 feet above
minimums, into a VERY thick fog bank that only allowed me to see the
approach lights, not the actual runway. But, that's legal with an ILS,
so I continued down to minimums, dropped the throttle, dropped in flaps
to 30, and finally saw the runway (at least the first half - SWF has a
10k foot strip). When I got on the ground, I think I let the plane roll
out just a bit longer than usual, just so I could finally get my
bearings fully in place - I definitely scared myself on that approach.

The lesson I learned from that is to constantly evaluate where you are
in relation to where you should be - i.e., should you have gotten the
ATIS by now? Should you have briefed the approach? What about the
missed approach procedure? By the time I got to HUO, I had done none of
those things, and it didn't cross my mind as I was shooting the
approach - I dialed in the ILS and basically locked it in as best I
could while reminding myself what the minimum altitude was. I know I
handled the inadvertant "lost comm" part properly by going back to the
previous controller, and not wasting too much time on the wrong
frequency... but I realize now I should have done more to make sure I
didn't fall so far behind the plane.

--
Guy

[Guy Elden Jr]

> VOR to intercept the IAF for the ILS 27 approach. Winds were strong out

Whoops, meant the ILS 9 approach.

[john smith]

In article >,
"Steven P. McNicoll" > wrote:

> "Michael" > wrote in message
> ups.com...
> >
> > Nope, years prior. Can't find the cite anymore. Short version - Baron
> > on an IFR flight plan over the Gulf, due to crossed wires a fighter is
> > sent to take a look. Weather is cruddy, pilot botches the intercept
> > (realize that at 8000 ft, cruise speed for a Baron is just about the
> > same as stall speed for a fighter) and there's a midair. Fighter pilot
> > bails out successfully. Baron pilot and his pax go in.
> >
> > At the time (this was over a decade ago) a huge stink was raised.
> > There was talk of a lawsuit, but it was squashed via sovereign
> > immunity. Supposedly, intercept procedures were changed. However, a
> > friend of mine was flying on a DVFR flight plan from over the Gulf in
> > his Twin Comanche and looked back, upon hearing a strange noise, to see
> > an F-16 hanging just off his wing, everything hanging out. Seconds
> > later, the pilot has do dive away to avoid a stall, coming within
> > several feet of my friend. So nothing has changed.
> >
>
> Is this it?
>
>
>
> NTSB Identification: ATL83MA084B
>
> Accident occurred Sunday, January 09, 1983 in CHERRY POINT, NC
>
> Aircraft: McDonnell Douglas F4C, registration: AFNG
> BEECH D55, registration: N7142N
>
> Injuries: 7 Fatal, 2 Uninjured.
>
> THE TWO ACFT COLLIDED AT ABOUT 9,500 FT MSL 30 MI SOUTH OF CHERRY POINT.
> AFTER DEPARTING NASSAU, THE PLT OF THE BE-D55 NEVER ACTIVATED HIS FLT PLAN.
> AN ADIZ PENETRATION TIME WAS THEREFORE NEVER ESTABLISHED. WHEN THE
> UNIDENTIFIED ACFT ENTERED WARNING AREA W-122, THE USAF CONTACTED FAA ATC FOR
> IDENTIFICATION INFO. SINCE FAA WAS NOT CONTROLLING ANY TRAFFIC IN THAT AREA
> AN INTERCEPT ORDER WAS ISSUED. AT 1637 FAA GOT A POSITION REPORT FROM THE
> BE-D55 & RELAYED IT TO MILITARY CONTROL. HOWEVER, THE TWO FIGHTER ACFT
> CONTINUED TO CLOSE IN ON THE TARGET FOR RADAR CONTACT. THE LEAD ACFT WAS TO
> CLOSE ABOUT 1,000 FT BELOW THE TARGET AT A PREPLANNED CLOSURE RATE OF 50 KTS
> (ACTUAL RATE WAS 127 KTS). SECONDS BEFORE THE COLLISION, THE BE-D55 TURNED
> LEFT AS REQUESTED BY FAA ATC THUS TURNING IT INTO THE PATH OF THE OVERTAKING
> INTERCEPTOR WHICH ALSO HAD TURNED LEFT TO BREAK OFF THE INTERCEPT. THE
> SAFETY BOARD DID NOT DETERMINE THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF THIS ACCIDENT, BUT
> OFFERED STATEMENTS OF CAUSE.

What isn't said in this narrative is the reason the pilot was in this
predicament in the first place was that he was told to clear customs in
Florida. He didn't like that, so he decided in flight that he would
proceed to New Bern (?) or Wilmington (?) to clear customs because that
was the direction he originally wanted to go.

[Steven P. McNicoll]

"john smith" > wrote in message
...
>
> What isn't said in this narrative is the reason the pilot was in this
> predicament in the first place was that he was told to clear customs in
> Florida. He didn't like that, so he decided in flight that he would
> proceed to New Bern (?) or Wilmington (?) to clear customs because that
> was the direction he originally wanted to go.
>

His destination was Norfolk. There are a few other things not said in this
narrative. The Baron pilot had six passengers in a six place aircraft, he
penetrated an ADIZ without a flight plan, and the intercept was conducted in
IMC.

http://www.airdisaster.com/reports/ntsb/AAR84-07.pdf

[Steven P. McNicoll]

"Roy Smith" > wrote in message
...
>
> A student and I took off today IFR from HPN. Destination was FWN (Sussex,
> NJ). Rhumb line course is 42 NM at 294 degrees.
>
> Clearance was "Westchester 1, RV CMK, CMK 275R to intercept SAX 039R,
> SAX, direct FWN, maintain 3000, expect 4000 after 10 minutes".
>
> Departing runway 34, the SID is "climb to 1000, then left turn 295, expect
> vectors to departure fix". CMK is 14 miles at 037.
>
> We depart, check in with NY Approach, and get "maintain 4000". Nothing
> about heading, so we stay on the SID heading of 295, which conveniently is
> pointing us right at our destination.
>
> Here's the question. If you went lost comm, what would you do?
> Technically, our next waypoint is still CMK, so "fly the route previously
> cleared" would have us head direct CMK then as cleared. But, every mile
> we fly on 295 takes us further and further away from CMK, and making a,
> say,
> 150 degree, course change to head back to CMK seems pretty dumb. Yet,
> they wouldn't have given us such a circuitous route if there wasn't some
> good
> reason they needed to keep us away from the rhumbline.
>
> The route is off-airways, but you note that the VOR-A
> (http://204.108.4.16/d-tpp/0511/05412VGA.PDF) MSA is 3100. Assume you're
> familiar with the area, and know that 4000 clears all terrain that might
> possibly be a factor along any route you might pick.
>
> So, what would you do? Turn back to CMK and proceed from there? Keep on
> the 295 heading until you intercept the CMK 275 or the SAX 039, whichever
> comes first (assuming that heading even intercepts those at all). Turn
> direct SAX? Hit the reset button and start the scenario again?
>

I'd squawk NORDO briefly then return to the assigned beacon code, turn
towards SAX, fly the VOR-A, land.

[Steven P. McNicoll]

"Michael" > wrote in message
oups.com...
>
> The other (much scarier) possibility
> would be the existence of a flight restricted area - temporary or
> otherwise - along the direct course, and the unpleasant possibility of
> an incompetently handled military interception in IMC (which has
> already killed at least one completely innocent pilot and pax legally
> operating IFR on a flight plan) or simply a heat seeking missile up the
> exhaust. If that's the case, think twice about that shortcut.
>

If you're referring to the BE55/F-4C midair near Cherry Point in 1983 there
are a few items you remember incorrectly. That interception wasn't
incompetently handled, the civilian pilot wasn't completely innocent, wasn't
operating legally, and wasn't on an IFR flight plan.

[Michael]

> If you're referring to the BE55/F-4C midair near Cherry Point in 1983 there
> are a few items you remember incorrectly.

Quite possibly.

> That interception wasn't incompetently handled,

The targeted intercept altitude was 1000 ft below the Baron, yet the
intercepting F4C wound up at the same altitude as the Baron. The
targeted closure rate was 50 kts, but the intercepting F4C closed at
120+ kts. I would call that incompetent.

> the civilian pilot wasn't completely innocent

So what crime was he guilty of?

> wasn't operating legally

Really? At the time of impact, he was making a turn as directed by
ATC. He called in and made a position report prior. There is some
question as to whether his flight plan was opened, but he's not here to
defend himself, and my experience is that crossed wires between
different facilities are not all that rare.

I've had search and rescue called out for me because I supposedly
failed to close a DVFR flight plan. It was only after I called the
facility with which I had closed the flight plan after completing my
ADIZ penetration that they admitted that in fact they had a record of
me closing the flight plan - they simply never forwarded it to the
facility responsible for my destination airport.

So given that the pilot made a position report once in range and was
complying with ATC instructions, I think it more likely that there was
a simple snafu rather than willful failure to activate a flight plan.

> and wasn't on an IFR flight plan

That may be true - but he had filed some sort of flight plan, be it IFR
or DVFR.

I've been leery of the possibility of such problems ever since I was
given a clearance through a hot restricted area. That's a no-****ter.
I was vectored for traffic significantly off my route, then was cleared
present position direct destination. I was in and out of IMC, cruising
IFR at 6000 ft, when I realized that the frequency was awfully quiet.
I was unable to raise center on any of the published frequencies for my
area and headed straight for a restricted area (that my original flight
planned route missed by miles). Fortunately, I was able to raise the
tower controller at the military field next to the restricted area, who
then turned me over to the local military approach controller - who
vectored me around the restricted area since it was hot.

I wonder, had I lost comm due to equipment problems rather than poor
radio coverage, if, after I caught a missile up the exhaust pipe,
people would be claiming that I was not operating legally. I'm sure
some fault would be found with what I did, and maybe there would be no
record found of the clearance.

Michael

[[email protected]]

On 30-Nov-2005, "Steven P. McNicoll" > wrote:

> That interception wasn't
> incompetently handled,

I'm not sure of your definition of "incompetently handled" is, but it seems
the NTSB found the collision more the fault of the Phantom Phlyer than the
Baron pilot. Here's the quote from the end of the report you linked us to:



The Nat.ona1 Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause
of this accident was the failure of the F-4C pilot to maintain an
appropriate intercept
c1osir;g speed and a safe separation distance between his airplane and the
Beech Baron.
Contributing to the accident were the Beech Baron pi1o:'s penetration of the
Air Defense
Identification Zone and his faiiure to follow any of several prescribed
procedures which
would have permitted early positive identification after penetration, and
the failure of
the Fertile Controi staff to coordinate information concerning positive
identification of
the Baron in a timely manner, delaying a decision to terminate the intercept
mission.


It must have been awful to find the hair and blood embedded in the Phantom's
wing. I just hope everyone in the Baron died before they even knew what was
happening.
Scott Wilson

[Steven P. McNicoll]

"Michael" > wrote in message
oups.com...
>
> The targeted intercept altitude was 1000 ft below the Baron, yet the
> intercepting F4C wound up at the same altitude as the Baron. The
> targeted closure rate was 50 kts, but the intercepting F4C closed at
> 120+ kts. I would call that incompetent.
>

The interception was less than perfect but certainly did not descend to the
level of incompetent. The collision occurred after the intercept was broken
off and the F-4 turned away from the Baron and began a climb.
Unfortunately, the Center controller had shortly before that directed the
Baron to turn to the left, placing it in the path of the F-4.


>
> So what crime was he guilty of?
>

He was in violation of FAR 99.11. He was operating an aircraft in an ADIZ,
he had not filed or activated a proper flight plan.


>
> Really? At the time of impact, he was making a turn as directed by
> ATC.
>

Right, a turn that put him in the path of the interceptors that ATC knew to
be operating in close proximity. Not a stellar move by the controller.


>
> He called in and made a position report prior. There is some
> question as to whether his flight plan was opened, but he's not here to
> defend himself, and my experience is that crossed wires between
> different facilities are not all that rare.
>

The only flight plan he filed was to Fort Pierce Florida. There's no
question that that flight plan was not opened, the Baron pilot never
established contact with enroute VFR advisory service after departure.


>
> That may be true - but he had filed some sort of flight plan, be it IFR
> or DVFR.
>

Yes, he filed a DVFR flight plan to Fort Pierce. He initially filed a
flight plan to Norfolk. When informed that US regulations required him to
enter the US in Florida he filed a flight plan to Fort Pierce. But after
departing Nassau he headed for Norfolk instead of Fort Pierce and never
activated his filed flight plan. Why would he? His flight plan had him
going to Fort Pierce, but he was going to Norfolk.

[Steven P. McNicoll]

> wrote in message ...
>
> I'm not sure of your definition of "incompetently handled" is, but it
> seems the NTSB found the collision more the fault of the Phantom Phlyer
> than the Baron pilot. Here's the quote from the end of the report you
> linked us to:
>
> The Nat.ona1 Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable
> cause of this accident was the failure of the F-4C pilot to maintain an
> appropriate intercept c1osir;g speed and a safe separation distance
> between his airplane and the Beech Baron.
> Contributing to the accident were the Beech Baron pi1o:'s penetration of
> the Air Defense Identification Zone and his faiiure to follow any of
> several prescribed procedures which would have permitted early positive
> identification after penetration, and the failure of the Fertile Controi
> staff to coordinate information concerning positive identification of the
> Baron in a timely manner, delaying a decision to terminate the intercept
> mission.
>

Here's another quote from that report:

"The National Transportation Safety Board did not determine the probable
cause of this accident and offered the following statements of cause:"

You quoted only the probable cause statement of NTSB members Patricia
Goldman and Patrick Bursley. Member Vernon Grose saw it a bit differently:

"The probable causes of this accident were (a) the unauthorized penetration
of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), (b) ambiguity in
responsibility
between the Air Route Traffic Control Centers (ARTCC) and NORAD
SAGE facilities regarding identification and control of unknown aircraft,
(c) deviation by the Baron pilot from a requirement to activate a previously
filed VFR flight plan and thus declare ADIZ penetration, (d) fsilure [sic]
of the Baron pilot to file and activate an instrument flight plan before
operating in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC), (e) inadequate
tracking sensitivity for both ground and airborne radar for the intended
mission, (f) use of an excessive closure rate between unidentified aircraft
and F4-C while depending on visual identification in IMC, and (g)
continuation of the F-4C intercept mission after identification of the Baron
hed [sic] been established."