ATC says wrong position

[Greg Esres]

When being vectored, and ATC says your 4 miles from X, I noticed
occasionally that they state the wrong X. They confuse the FAF with
the IF. For this reason, I tell students to never rely on ATC's
distance statements to make a descent.

How often do others see this?

[Ron Rosenfeld]

On Wed, 28 Apr 2004 15:06:39 GMT, Greg Esres > wrote:

>When being vectored, and ATC says your 4 miles from X, I noticed
>occasionally that they state the wrong X. They confuse the FAF with
>the IF. For this reason, I tell students to never rely on ATC's
>distance statements to make a descent.
>
>How often do others see this?

I guess I'm not understanding the circumstance clearly, that might lead
someone to use that kind of information as an "OK to descend" point.

If ATC is giving an approach clearance, and you are being radar vectored or
on a random route, you should have received an "altitude to maintain until
...."

If you are approaching an IAF that has a procedure turn, and you are NOT
receiving radar vectors to final, I was taught that being on a published
portion of the approach meant that I had to cross the IAF first.

?????


Ron (EPM) (N5843Q, Mooney M20E) (CP, ASEL, ASES, IA)

[[email protected]]

Greg Esres wrote:

> When being vectored, and ATC says your 4 miles from X, I noticed
> occasionally that they state the wrong X. They confuse the FAF with
> the IF. For this reason, I tell students to never rely on ATC's
> distance statements to make a descent.
>
> How often do others see this?

That's one of the many valuable purposes that a moving map of the MVA
chart would serve. Of course, with GPS, the pilot can, and should be,
the final authority on the distance to the final approach fix or point.

[Teacherjh]

>>
When being vectored, and ATC says your 4 miles from X, I noticed
occasionally that they state the wrong X. They confuse the FAF with
the IF. For this reason, I tell students to never rely on ATC's
distance statements to make a descent.

How often do others see this?
<<

On a VFR approach to Oakland, I was told I was a mile off course when in fact I
was lined up precisely with the runway. The aircraft ahead of me was told the
same thing (but I don't know what his alignment was). I suspect their radar
was a bit off that day.

Jose

--
(for Email, make the obvious changes in my address)

[Greg Esres]

<<I guess I'm not understanding the circumstance clearly, that might
lead someone to use that kind of information as an "OK to descend"
point.>>

When being vectored outside the FAF, ATC will say, "You're 4 miles
from x, turn left heading 210, maintain 2,500 until established,
cleared for the approach".

If you are between the IF and the FAF (as they said you were), then
the published altitude is 2,000. If you are outside the IF, the
published altitude remains 2,500.

If ATC says you're 4 miles outside the FAF, but you're really 4 miles
outside the IF, then if you descend based on that info, you've screwed
up.

[Greg Esres]

<<Of course, with GPS, the pilot can, and should be, the final
authority on the distance to the final approach fix or point.>>

Agreed.

However, this "service" provided by ATC occured (I suppose) long
before we had means to always verify the information. Seems a bit
unsafe.

[[email protected]]

Greg Esres wrote:

> <<Of course, with GPS, the pilot can, and should be, the final
> authority on the distance to the final approach fix or point.>>
>
> Agreed.
>
> However, this "service" provided by ATC occured (I suppose) long
> before we had means to always verify the information. Seems a bit
> unsafe.

Go back to TWA 514 in 1974 and they didn't provide much information at
all with vectors to approach courses.

There have been more unsafe situations resulting from vectors over the
years than anyone really knows. The NASA database is full of them, but
the FAA ignores the issue. Some are controller errors, some are pilot
errors, and some are a combination of the two.

[Tarver Engineering]

> wrote in message ...
>
>
> Greg Esres wrote:
>
> > <<Of course, with GPS, the pilot can, and should be, the final
> > authority on the distance to the final approach fix or point.>>
> >
> > Agreed.
> >
> > However, this "service" provided by ATC occured (I suppose) long
> > before we had means to always verify the information. Seems a bit
> > unsafe.
>
> Go back to TWA 514 in 1974 and they didn't provide much information at
> all with vectors to approach courses.
>
> There have been more unsafe situations resulting from vectors over the
> years than anyone really knows. The NASA database is full of them, but
> the FAA ignores the issue. Some are controller errors, some are pilot
> errors, and some are a combination of the two.

That is because FAA is afraid of opening ATC controllers up to civil
liability. What FAA fails to comprehend is that "gross negligence", or
"restraint of trade", is required to win a lawsuit in such a situation.
Human error is not gross negligence and the issue could be safely addressed.

[Ron Rosenfeld]

On Wed, 28 Apr 2004 16:28:40 GMT, Greg Esres > wrote:

><<I guess I'm not understanding the circumstance clearly, that might
>lead someone to use that kind of information as an "OK to descend"
>point.>>
>
>When being vectored outside the FAF, ATC will say, "You're 4 miles
>from x, turn left heading 210, maintain 2,500 until established,
>cleared for the approach".
>
>If you are between the IF and the FAF (as they said you were), then
>the published altitude is 2,000. If you are outside the IF, the
>published altitude remains 2,500.
>
>If ATC says you're 4 miles outside the FAF, but you're really 4 miles
>outside the IF, then if you descend based on that info, you've screwed
>up.
>
>

OK, I understand now. I'm not an instructor, so I can only repeat back
what I learned years ago. I think my approach would be to emphasize to the
student the importance of situational awareness in all instances, and the
attitude that he is the one flying and responsible.

An intermediate segment is usually at least five miles long. So if all of
a sudden ATC places the pilot 5+ miles from where the pilot thinks he is,
that should trigger an immediate reaction to verify position.

I think students (and advanced pilots) sometimes fall into the trap of
allowing/expecting too much hand-holding from ATC. That may be more true
in certain areas of the country than others. So I think it's extremely
important to emphasize SA, responsibility, and the importance of being on a
published segment of the approach (and knowing exactly where you are)
before beginning a descent.


Ron (EPM) (N5843Q, Mooney M20E) (CP, ASEL, ASES, IA)

[Ron Rosenfeld]

On Wed, 28 Apr 2004 11:42:51 -0700, wrote:

>Go back to TWA 514 in 1974 and they didn't provide much information at
>all with vectors to approach courses.
>

I thought that was more of a training issue. I have been told that up
until that accident, the training at the airlines (at least at TWA) was
that when ATC cleared you for an approach, descent to the initial charted
altitude on the approach plate was safe.

I was undergoing my instrument training at that time, and both I and my
instructor were surprised that TWA descended based on that approach
clearance. It was a number of years later that I discovered that their
descent was in accord with the then current TWA airline procedures.

>There have been more unsafe situations resulting from vectors over the
>years than anyone really knows. The NASA database is full of them, but
>the FAA ignores the issue. Some are controller errors, some are pilot
>errors, and some are a combination of the two.

Concur.


Ron (EPM) (N5843Q, Mooney M20E) (CP, ASEL, ASES, IA)

[Greg Esres]

<<I think my approach would be to emphasize to the student the
importance of situational awareness in all instances, and the
attitude that he is the one flying and responsible...I think students
(and advanced pilots) sometimes fall into the trap of
allowing/expecting too much hand-holding from ATC. >>

I agree with all you said.

I've been aware of this problem with ATC for a while and use it to
illustrate to students how important it is for THEM to be in charge.

I was just curious as to 1) how often others had noticed this, and 2)
who was using this information in order to descend to intermediate
altitudes.

[SeeAndAvoid]

From a controllers point of view, the part about "you're X miles from X"
is just checking a box that needs to be checked. It's probably the one
messed up the most as either 1) you clear aircraft on multiple approaches
to multiple runways (not at the same time usually) and occasionally say
the wrong fix, or 2) you don't vector much for approaches and just
screw it up once in a while. I'm willing to bet all those other items,
(heading, altitude, approach clearance) are fairly accurate most of
the time. If I'm vectoring someone on a 100nm range (200nm from one
side of the scope to the other) and I say 3 miles instead of 3.5 or 4,
I suspect I wont get too much grief over it. If so, well, there's always
arcs and PT's. ;)

>For this reason, I tell students to never rely on ATC's
> distance statements to make a descent.

Unless the mileage is off by some really high amount, I'd agree with
that approach, no pun intended. I assume most of you ignore the first
part of that clearance, as that is the only part of that transmission that
really is NOT a clearance anyway. Now if they give you the wrong
airport, runway, or approach, major warning flag.
But at a big airport with 12 ILS's and even more VOR, NDB, and GPS
approaches, and all the IAF's and FAF's to go along with all of those,
which are often not the same for a given runway - I'd be willing to cut
them some slack every now and then.

Chris

[[email protected]]

Ron Rosenfeld wrote:

> On Wed, 28 Apr 2004 11:42:51 -0700, wrote:
>
> >Go back to TWA 514 in 1974 and they didn't provide much information at
> >all with vectors to approach courses.
> >
>
> I thought that was more of a training issue. I have been told that up
> until that accident, the training at the airlines (at least at TWA) was
> that when ATC cleared you for an approach, descent to the initial charted
> altitude on the approach plate was safe.
>

TWA, the Air Force, and some other operators taught that in training, as you
say. Others did not, but even those who didn't were still often in the lurch
with the ATC radar vector procedures in vogue at the time. With the
clearance TWA 514 received, those "who knew better" would have ended up far
too high to land, unless they could have gotten a fairly weak controller to
step them down on the MVA chart. Also, the approach chart was deficient as
to profile portrayal.

>
> I was undergoing my instrument training at that time, and both I and my
> instructor were surprised that TWA descended based on that approach
> clearance. It was a number of years later that I discovered that their
> descent was in accord with the then current TWA airline procedures.

So, you guys would have probably flown to the FAF at 7,000 then descended to
touchdown (300 feet) in some 5 miles. ;-)

>
>
> >There have been more unsafe situations resulting from vectors over the
> >years than anyone really knows. The NASA database is full of them, but
> >the FAA ignores the issue. Some are controller errors, some are pilot
> >errors, and some are a combination of the two.
>
> Concur.
>
> Ron (EPM) (N5843Q, Mooney M20E) (CP, ASEL, ASES, IA)

[[email protected]]

Tarver Engineering wrote:

>
> >
> > There have been more unsafe situations resulting from vectors over the
> > years than anyone really knows. The NASA database is full of them, but
> > the FAA ignores the issue. Some are controller errors, some are pilot
> > errors, and some are a combination of the two.
>
> That is because FAA is afraid of opening ATC controllers up to civil
> liability. What FAA fails to comprehend is that "gross negligence", or
> "restraint of trade", is required to win a lawsuit in such a situation.
> Human error is not gross negligence and the issue could be safely addressed.

If the controller is reasonably acting within the scope of agency, there is no
way a controller is going to be held personally liable in any civil lawsuit. In
any case, the feds would indemify the controller in such a very unlikely event,
unlike the private sector.

The FAA is far more concerned about the NTSB and the industry "knowing too
much," thus forcing a change in entrenched ATC procedures. The handlers at the
FAA see every challenge at ATC procedures, if succesful, perhaps reducing
"capacity."

It's all about moving traffic and nothing about safety.

[Ron Rosenfeld]

On Wed, 28 Apr 2004 19:49:50 GMT, Greg Esres > wrote:

><<I think my approach would be to emphasize to the student the
>importance of situational awareness in all instances, and the
>attitude that he is the one flying and responsible...I think students
>(and advanced pilots) sometimes fall into the trap of
>allowing/expecting too much hand-holding from ATC. >>
>
>I agree with all you said.
>
>I've been aware of this problem with ATC for a while and use it to
>illustrate to students how important it is for THEM to be in charge.
>
>I was just curious as to 1) how often others had noticed this, and 2)
>who was using this information in order to descend to intermediate
>altitudes.
>

I cannot recall ever hearing ATC give me a "distance from" an incorrect fix
during an approach clearance. 90% of my flying is in the NE receiving
radar services.

Also, my recollection (and I could be wrong here), is that during the times
I get a "maintain ....ft until established" clearance, it's for a precision
approach. For non-precision approaches, I've received a "maintain ...ft
until crossing xyz"


Ron (EPM) (N5843Q, Mooney M20E) (CP, ASEL, ASES, IA)

[Steven P. McNicoll]

> wrote in message ...
>
> Go back to TWA 514 in 1974 and they didn't provide
> much information at all with vectors to approach courses.
>

TWA 514 wasn't vectored for the approach.

[Tarver Engineering]

> wrote in message

> The FAA is far more concerned about the NTSB and the industry "knowing too
> much," thus forcing a change in entrenched ATC procedures. The handlers
at the
> FAA see every challenge at ATC procedures, if succesful, perhaps reducing
> "capacity."

Blakey seems a little less interested in such nonsense. Let us hope there
will be a third zero.


> It's all about moving traffic and nothing about safety.
>

[Ron Rosenfeld]

On Wed, 28 Apr 2004 18:02:26 -0700, wrote:

>So, you guys would have probably flown to the FAF at 7,000 then descended to
>touchdown (300 feet) in some 5 miles. ;-)

I don't have a copy of the approach at hand, and I cannot recall how I
would have flown it. Clearly your supposition is ludicrous. However, I
would NOT have descended from 7,000' until I was on a charted portion of
the approach.

If you have a copy of that approach, I would be able to give you more
precise information.


Ron (EPM) (N5843Q, Mooney M20E) (CP, ASEL, ASES, IA)

[[email protected]]

Ron Rosenfeld wrote:

> Also, my recollection (and I could be wrong here), is that during the times
> I get a "maintain ....ft until established" clearance, it's for a precision
> approach. For non-precision approaches, I've received a "maintain ...ft
> until crossing xyz"
>

"Crossing" is to be used if they vector you to a non-published extension of an
approach course. "Established" is to be used if they vector you onto a
published segment of an approach. Precision or non-precision makes no
difference.

(Ref 711065P, 5-9-1, and all associated notes, and 5-9-4, and all associated
notes.)

[[email protected]]

"Steven P. McNicoll" wrote:

> > wrote in message ...
> >
> > Go back to TWA 514 in 1974 and they didn't provide
> > much information at all with vectors to approach courses.
> >
>
> TWA 514 wasn't vectored for the approach.

Well, technically you're correct. In fact the FAA tried to argue, and lost,
that he was a non-radar arrival. Washington Center vectored him onto the
Armel 301 radial (which eventually became the final approach course) some 35
miles prior to the VOR, told him to maintain 7,000 then handed him off to
approach control. Approach control simply cleared him for the approach
while the flight was still on the non-published portion of the 301 radial,
and the approach clearance contained no altitude restrictions.

If it smells like a vector, it is a vector. It would be more like a
7110.65P 5-9-4 vector than a 5-9-1 vector.

But, your assertion that 514 was not vectored for the approach is pure
Steve-techo-bablle bull****. It was that kind of attitude that created the
atmosphere at the FAA to set the stage for the crash.

[[email protected]]

Ron Rosenfeld wrote:

> On Wed, 28 Apr 2004 18:02:26 -0700, wrote:
>
> >So, you guys would have probably flown to the FAF at 7,000 then descended to
> >touchdown (300 feet) in some 5 miles. ;-)
>
> I don't have a copy of the approach at hand, and I cannot recall how I
> would have flown it. Clearly your supposition is ludicrous. However, I
> would NOT have descended from 7,000' until I was on a charted portion of
> the approach.
>
> If you have a copy of that approach, I would be able to give you more
> precise information.
>
> Ron (EPM) (N5843Q, Mooney M20E) (CP, ASEL, ASES, IA)

It's on alt.binaries.pictures.aviation

And, I stand corrected, there was information in the plan view (that should have
been in the provile view, that would have permitted descent from 7,000 11.6 miles
prior to the FAF. The flight crash 2 or 3 miles prior to ROUND HILL because they
descended to 1,800 prior to ROUND HILL based on their training and use of the
profile view.

[[email protected]]

Ron Rosenfeld wrote:

> On Wed, 28 Apr 2004 18:02:26 -0700, wrote:
>
> >So, you guys would have probably flown to the FAF at 7,000 then descended to
> >touchdown (300 feet) in some 5 miles. ;-)
>
> I don't have a copy of the approach at hand, and I cannot recall how I
> would have flown it. Clearly your supposition is ludicrous. However, I
> would NOT have descended from 7,000' until I was on a charted portion of
> the approach.
>
> If you have a copy of that approach, I would be able to give you more
> precise information.
>
> Ron (EPM) (N5843Q, Mooney M20E) (CP, ASEL, ASES, IA)

It's on alt.binaries.pictures.aviation

And, I stand corrected, there was information in the plan view (that should have
been in the provile view, that would have permitted descent from 7,000 11.6 miles
prior to the FAF. The flight crash 2 or 3 miles prior to ROUND HILL because they
descended to 1,800 prior to ROUND HILL based on their training and use of the
profile view.

[Ron Rosenfeld]

On Thu, 29 Apr 2004 07:01:13 -0700, wrote:

>It's on alt.binaries.pictures.aviation
>
>And, I stand corrected, there was information in the plan view (that should have
>been in the provile view, that would have permitted descent from 7,000 11.6 miles
>prior to the FAF. The flight crash 2 or 3 miles prior to ROUND HILL because they
>descended to 1,800 prior to ROUND HILL based on their training and use of the
>profile view.

Yes, my *hazy* recollection was that there was information on the chart.

Of course, today, they would (hopefully) have been given a safe altitude to
maintain until crossing ROUND HILL.


Ron (EPM) (N5843Q, Mooney M20E) (CP, ASEL, ASES, IA)

[Greg Esres]

<<I'd be willing to cut them some slack every now and then.>>

As I am. I don't think poorly of ATC for making this mistake. Live
humans just aren't good at getting minute details correct on a
continual basis. But it's important that the pilot get a good feel
for all areas in which ATC *might* make a mistake and have a
contingency plan.

Thanks

[John Clonts]

wrote in message >...
> Ron Rosenfeld wrote:
....
> > If you have a copy of that approach, I would be able to give you more
> > precise information.
> >
> > Ron (EPM) (N5843Q, Mooney M20E) (CP, ASEL, ASES, IA)
>
> It's on alt.binaries.pictures.aviation
>

I can't seem to locate that on alt.binaries.pictures.aviation, can you
tell me when and/or what title? I think it may have already scrolled
off of my server.

Would someone please get it and put it on a web page somewhere. I
have googled for it as well, to no avail....

Thanks,
John Clonts
Temple, Texas
N7NZ

[[email protected]]

John Clonts wrote:

> Would someone please get it and put it on a web page somewhere. I
> have googled for it as well, to no avail....
>
> Thanks,
> John Clonts
> Temple, Texas
> N7NZ

It's still there, prior to all the French porno someone loaded later on
today.

[J Haggerty]

I had been a controller 3 years when that mishap occurred, and I recall
that I wondered why the pilot would have descended so low when he hadn't
yet crossed Round Hill, where the 1800 segment began. 2 big clues that
the 1800 wasn't a good altitude are the MSA which is higher and the spot
elevation depicted right about where they were flying showing terrain at
1764 MSL. Nothing on the chart indicates that 1800 is a safe altitude at
that point. (They actually were about 1670' when they hit the ground.)
I do remember that controllers weren't required by 7110.65 (or was it
still FAAH 7110.8 back then) to provide an altitude to maintain until
established on a portion of the approach until after, and as a result of
this accident. It's a good rule, it's just too bad that the need for
that rule wasn't recognized back then.
There's a good article by AOPA on line at
http://www.aopa.org/asf/asfarticles/sp9806.html that shows that other
pilots reacted differently to the same clearance.

JPH

wrote:
>
> Ron Rosenfeld wrote:
>
>
>>On Wed, 28 Apr 2004 18:02:26 -0700, wrote:
>>
>>
>>>So, you guys would have probably flown to the FAF at 7,000 then descended to
>>>touchdown (300 feet) in some 5 miles. ;-)
>>
>>I don't have a copy of the approach at hand, and I cannot recall how I
>>would have flown it. Clearly your supposition is ludicrous. However, I
>>would NOT have descended from 7,000' until I was on a charted portion of
>>the approach.
>>
>>If you have a copy of that approach, I would be able to give you more
>>precise information.
>>
>>Ron (EPM) (N5843Q, Mooney M20E) (CP, ASEL, ASES, IA)
>
>
> It's on alt.binaries.pictures.aviation
>
> And, I stand corrected, there was information in the plan view (that should have
> been in the provile view, that would have permitted descent from 7,000 11.6 miles
> prior to the FAF. The flight crash 2 or 3 miles prior to ROUND HILL because they
> descended to 1,800 prior to ROUND HILL based on their training and use of the
> profile view.
>

[Michael]

Greg Esres > wrote
> When being vectored, and ATC says your 4 miles from X, I noticed
> occasionally that they state the wrong X. They confuse the FAF with
> the IF. For this reason, I tell students to never rely on ATC's
> distance statements to make a descent.
>
> How often do others see this?

All the time. In fact, sometimes when being vectored for the NDB-F at
my home field (EYQ), I get distances from HOCCO, a fix that used to be
charted on the FAC but has been gone for years.

Michael

[[email protected]]

J Haggerty wrote:

> I had been a controller 3 years when that mishap occurred, and I recall
> that I wondered why the pilot would have descended so low when he hadn't
> yet crossed Round Hill, where the 1800 segment began. 2 big clues that
> the 1800 wasn't a good altitude are the MSA which is higher and the spot
> elevation depicted right about where they were flying showing terrain at
> 1764 MSL. Nothing on the chart indicates that 1800 is a safe altitude at
> that point. (They actually were about 1670' when they hit the ground.)
> I do remember that controllers weren't required by 7110.65 (or was it
> still FAAH 7110.8 back then) to provide an altitude to maintain until
> established on a portion of the approach until after, and as a result of
> this accident. It's a good rule, it's just too bad that the need for
> that rule wasn't recognized back then.
> There's a good article by AOPA on line at
> http://www.aopa.org/asf/asfarticles/sp9806.html that shows that other
> pilots reacted differently to the same clearance.
>

As far as the NTSB could determine, one or two airlines besides TWA taught you could
descend to the highest altitude shown in the profile when cleared for an approach. TWA
"learned" it from the Air Force. A Lear Jet a month before did the same thing but
didn't have the strong winds so he cleared the 1675' terrain.

Confusion was rampant at the month-long hearing.

Also, the chart did not comply with government charting specs, in that ROUND HILL was
required to be in the profile. Had ROUND HILL been in the profile, some altitude in
excess of 3,000 would have been charted at ROUND HILL, thus the accident would not have
happened.

And, on the CVR tape one of the crew members raises concern about the higher altitude
coming in from Front Royal. But, finally the TWA training overcomes that concern and
they all end up agreeing. As to the MSA, TWA pilots were never taught to pay much heed
to those as they are intended for someone who is lost off course.

And, speculation has it they wanted to get down because the turbulance was pretty bad.
Also, the very strong head winds made their descent gradient rather steep.

The vastly improved rules and GPWS came out of that accident.