How can we "fix" LEX to prevent wrong runway selection everywhere?

[Jim Carter[_1_]]

I've followed the lengthy and somewhat heated discussion speculating
responsibility in the LEX accident, but I've not seen any thread on
improvements other than a few comments about traffic lights on runways,
or more people added to the system to double-check the double-checkers.
I'm interested in what the industry might do to achieve a technical
solution with relatively small front-end cost and very, very little
operational cost. (As you suspect, I have nothing to do with the
government or any of its agencies).



I find myself wondering what the cost of a low-power ground radar
capable of interpreting transponder codes, coupled to a small (not much
horsepower) computer capable of matching the geo-coords of the txpdr to
the assigned runway (or taxiway) and triggering an alarm if the variance
is too great. This should all be off-the-shelf technology, shouldn't be
considered a "flight critical" or "safety-of-flight" system (so if it
goes down for a few hours only the local information would change), and
shouldn't have to be maintained other than for hardware failures. With
the low-power and digital technology even the non-critical radar could
be maintained by break-fix only. Developed into an appliance type
system, these could be mass produced to lower the cost even more.



It seems to me that by adding traffic lights implies that we now have to
add an additional duty to the ground / flight controller which
introduces the human factor an additional time. Additionally, the
traffic light relies on the crews on parallel runways knowing which
light/runway they are really on - a seeming failure at LEX. Adding more
controllers to the system doesn't yield the best return on investment
either. Non-critical repetitive tasks should be automated where
possible.

[Jose[_1_]]

> I find myself wondering what the cost of a low-power ground radar capable of interpreting transponder codes, coupled to a small (not much horsepower) computer capable of matching the geo-coords of the txpdr to the assigned runway (or taxiway) and triggering an alarm if the variance is too great

It would not help in the case of intersecting runways when the aircraft
is =at= (or close to) the intersection and lined up for the wrong one.
It would not know that the pilot is intending to take off, rather than
simply pausing for traffic. (this means that there could be many false
alarms or many misses, depending on how the software is set up).

> This should all be off-the-shelf technology, shouldn’t be considered a “flight critical” or “safety-of-flight” system (so if it goes down for a few hours only the local information would change)

.... and it may well be down when it's needed. One of the issues with
the LEX incident was that lights were not working properly, and there
was construction on the runway. It shouldn't have mattered (as your
proposed system's down time shouldn't matter) but if the system is
there, and it's relied upon, and it's down, then even though people may
know it's down, it provides a hole in which to bury oneself.

That's why we practice partial panel and such, and why there is a
reaction against all the gee-whiz (moving map, glass) in the cockpit
with some pilots thinking it reduces general pilot competency.

Jose
--
"Never trust anything that can think for itself, if you can't see where
it keeps its brain." (chapter 10 of book 3 - Harry Potter).
for Email, make the obvious change in the address.

[Ron Natalie]

Jim Carter wrote:
> I've followed the lengthy and somewhat heated discussion speculating
> responsibility in the LEX accident,

Lets see... we could paint the runway name with big numbers on the
runway or put little signs next to the runway entrance.

We could put a device in the cockpit that automatically indicates
which direction the aircraft is pointed so the pilot could compare
it with his assigned runway.

We could require that commercial aircraft that are operating at
night use runways that have runway lights.

We could use a moving map that shows the aircraft postition.

[John Godwin]

Ron Natalie > wrote in
:

> Lets see... we could paint the runway name with big numbers on the
> runway or put little signs next to the runway entrance.
>
> We could put a device in the cockpit that automatically indicates
> which direction the aircraft is pointed so the pilot could compare
> it with his assigned runway.
>
> We could require that commercial aircraft that are operating at
> night use runways that have runway lights.
>
> We could use a moving map that shows the aircraft postition.
>
Absolutely a great idea. I'm going to write my congressman, the
president and FAA and see if we can make this happen.

8-)

--

[Sam Spade]

Jim Carter wrote:

> I’ve followed the lengthy and somewhat heated discussion speculating
> responsibility in the LEX accident, but I’ve not seen any thread on
> improvements other than a few comments about traffic lights on runways,
> or more people added to the system to double-check the double-checkers.
> I’m interested in what the industry might do to achieve a technical
> solution with relatively small front-end cost and very, very little
> operational cost. (As you suspect, I have nothing to do with the
> government or any of its agencies).

The fixes are already in place for what happened at LEX.

The concerns of the industry are (correctly) about runway intrusions,
such as happen at places like LAX far too often.

[Jim Carter[_1_]]

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Jose ]
> Posted At: Wednesday, October 04, 2006 9:13 AM
> Posted To: rec.aviation.ifr
> Conversation: How can we "fix" LEX to prevent wrong runway selection
> everywhere?
> Subject: Re: How can we "fix" LEX to prevent wrong runway selection
> everywhere?
>
> > I find myself wondering what the cost of a low-power ground radar
> capable of interpreting transponder codes, coupled to a small (not
much
> horsepower) computer capable of matching the geo-coords of the txpdr
to
> the assigned runway (or taxiway) and triggering an alarm if the
variance
> is too great
>
> It would not help in the case of intersecting runways when the
aircraft
> is =at= (or close to) the intersection and lined up for the wrong one.
> It would not know that the pilot is intending to take off, rather than
> simply pausing for traffic. (this means that there could be many
false
> alarms or many misses, depending on how the software is set up).
>

Good point - the system would have to monitor the aircraft after it was
in position and during the start of the takeoff roll to determine which
intersecting runway was being used.

> > This should all be off-the-shelf technology, shouldn't be considered
a
> "flight critical" or "safety-of-flight" system (so if it goes down for
a
> few hours only the local information would change)
>
> ... and it may well be down when it's needed. One of the issues with
> the LEX incident was that lights were not working properly, and there
> was construction on the runway. It shouldn't have mattered (as your
> proposed system's down time shouldn't matter) but if the system is
> there, and it's relied upon, and it's down, then even though people
may
> know it's down, it provides a hole in which to bury oneself.
>
Another good point - The alarm would have to be in both tower cab and
the cockpit and have to be audible to be effective.

I'm not sure how we can ever reduce the possibility to zero regardless
of the technology we implement. Short of erecting a barrier net on the
inactive runway, there may be no way of keeping humans from making a
mistake and attempting to depart on the wrong runway.

As it is now however, the only checks and balances are all human. I'm
not sure it shouldn't remain that way, but at the same time if some
technical solution isn't developed by the industry then the politicians
and lawyers will develop one for us. We all know how well those work...


> That's why we practice partial panel and such, and why there is a
> reaction against all the gee-whiz (moving map, glass) in the cockpit
> with some pilots thinking it reduces general pilot competency.
>
> Jose
> --
> "Never trust anything that can think for itself, if you can't see
where
> it keeps its brain." (chapter 10 of book 3 - Harry Potter).
> for Email, make the obvious change in the address.

[Jim Carter[_1_]]

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Ron Natalie ]
> Posted At: Wednesday, October 04, 2006 10:08 AM
> Posted To: rec.aviation.ifr
> Conversation: How can we "fix" LEX to prevent wrong runway selection
> everywhere?
> Subject: Re: How can we "fix" LEX to prevent wrong runway selection
> everywhere?
>
> Jim Carter wrote:
> > I've followed the lengthy and somewhat heated discussion speculating
> > responsibility in the LEX accident,
>
> Lets see... we could paint the runway name with big numbers on the
> runway or put little signs next to the runway entrance.
>
> We could put a device in the cockpit that automatically indicates
> which direction the aircraft is pointed so the pilot could compare
> it with his assigned runway.
>
> We could require that commercial aircraft that are operating at
> night use runways that have runway lights.
>
> We could use a moving map that shows the aircraft postition.

I agree completely Ron; we've all flown with those tools for years and
years. I'm sure you will agree that there are a few times that humans
make mistakes -- that makes us all human. Since the only checks and
balances for the "am I on the right runway" decision are all human,
those mistakes continue to be made.

50 years ago the LEX accident would have been declared pilot error and
the media would not have sensationalized the issue like they do today.
I'm worried this sensationalism will end up forcing a new set of
regulations on us that do very little to address the problem.

[Jim Carter[_1_]]

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Sam Spade ]
> Posted At: Wednesday, October 04, 2006 1:48 PM
> Posted To: rec.aviation.ifr
> Conversation: How can we "fix" LEX to prevent wrong runway selection
> everywhere?
> Subject: Re: How can we "fix" LEX to prevent wrong runway selection
> everywhere?
>
> Jim Carter wrote:
>
> > I've followed the lengthy and somewhat heated discussion speculating
> > responsibility in the LEX accident, but I've not seen any thread on
> > improvements other than a few comments about traffic lights on
runways,
> > or more people added to the system to double-check the
double-checkers.
> > I'm interested in what the industry might do to achieve a technical
> > solution with relatively small front-end cost and very, very little
> > operational cost. (As you suspect, I have nothing to do with the
> > government or any of its agencies).
>
> The fixes are already in place for what happened at LEX.
>

Other than the lighting, numbering, signage, and instruments in the
cockpit I'm not sure what "fixes" you might be thinking about. Sam, if
you meant those items I mentioned here, then we have to agree that they
still require passive human interpretation and are still being
overlooked or ignored. My solution isn't 100% complete, but I think it
might be closer than we already are.

> The concerns of the industry are (correctly) about runway intrusions,
> such as happen at places like LAX far too often.

I wonder if this solution could also be used to address runway
incursions by predicting movement of aircraft on the ground. Wouldn't it
be nice to be able to solve 2 problems with 1 relatively inexpensive
solution? That factor alone probably dooms the suggestion to oblivion.

[Jose[_1_]]

> Good point - the system would have to monitor the aircraft after it was
> in position and during the start of the takeoff roll to determine which
> intersecting runway was being used.

.... and then what? The aircraft is rolling on the runway, it takes
maybe thirty seconds to get airborne. It would take five to ten seconds
to ascertain that the wrong (intersectiong) runway was being used.
(remember, aircraft are also cleared to taxi on the "wrong" runway to
get to where they are going; the system needs to know this is an
attempted takeoff). With twenty seconds to go, the system has to notify
the pilot (in a way that doesn't make other pilots who may be doing a
correct concurrent takeoff think the message is for them) and then the
pilot has to hear, evaluate, react, and be able to take corrective action.

It's not as easy as it sounds, and its usefulness is still questionable.

> Another good point - The alarm would have to be in both tower cab and
> the cockpit and have to be audible to be effective.

That's not the point. The point is that if the system itself is down,
there will be no alarm anywhere. Then somebody will propose some other
system that will address the same issue another way, and more money will
be spent on research, development, installation, and supervision, and
the end result will be that the money comes from somewhere - perhaps
draining =other= safety programs.

> ...there may be no way of keeping humans from making a
> mistake and attempting to depart on the wrong runway.

That's for sure.

Jose
--
"Never trust anything that can think for itself, if you can't see where
it keeps its brain." (chapter 10 of book 3 - Harry Potter).
for Email, make the obvious change in the address.

[Hilton]

http://www.hiltonsoftware.com/FeatureSmartTaxi.html

$129.95

-----------------
"Jim Carter" > wrote in message
news:002701c6e7bb$b46227b0$4001a8c0@omnibook6100.. .
I've followed the lengthy and somewhat heated discussion speculating
responsibility in the LEX accident, but I've not seen any thread on
improvements other than a few comments about traffic lights on runways, or
more people added to the system to double-check the double-checkers. I'm
interested in what the industry might do to achieve a technical solution
with relatively small front-end cost and very, very little operational cost.
(As you suspect, I have nothing to do with the government or any of its
agencies).

I find myself wondering what the cost of a low-power ground radar capable of
interpreting transponder codes, coupled to a small (not much horsepower)
computer capable of matching the geo-coords of the txpdr to the assigned
runway (or taxiway) and triggering an alarm if the variance is too great.
This should all be off-the-shelf technology, shouldn't be considered a
"flight critical" or "safety-of-flight" system (so if it goes down for a few
hours only the local information would change), and shouldn't have to be
maintained other than for hardware failures. With the low-power and digital
technology even the non-critical radar could be maintained by break-fix
only. Developed into an appliance type system, these could be mass produced
to lower the cost even more.

It seems to me that by adding traffic lights implies that we now have to add
an additional duty to the ground / flight controller which introduces the
human factor an additional time. Additionally, the traffic light relies on
the crews on parallel runways knowing which light/runway they are really
on - a seeming failure at LEX. Adding more controllers to the system doesn't
yield the best return on investment either. Non-critical repetitive tasks
should be automated where possible.

[Steven P. McNicoll[_1_]]

"Jim Carter" > wrote in message
news:001d01c6e833$26b414f0$4001a8c0@omnibook6100.. .
>
> Another good point - The alarm would have to be in both tower cab and
> the cockpit and have to be audible to be effective.
>

Any "fix" that has to be in the tower cab won't work everywhere.

[Sam Spade]

Jim Carter wrote:
>

>
> 50 years ago the LEX accident would have been declared pilot error and
> the media would not have sensationalized the issue like they do today.
> I'm worried this sensationalism will end up forcing a new set of
> regulations on us that do very little to address the problem.
>
>

The TWA/United mid-air over the Grand Canyon was 50 years ago this past
June. I recently saw some of the original newspaper reports. They
didn't seem much different than what the print media reports these days.

[Sam Spade]

Jim Carter wrote:

>>>government or any of its agencies).
>>
>>The fixes are already in place for what happened at LEX.
>>
>
>
> Other than the lighting, numbering, signage, and instruments in the
> cockpit I'm not sure what "fixes" you might be thinking about. Sam, if
> you meant those items I mentioned here, then we have to agree that they
> still require passive human interpretation and are still being
> overlooked or ignored. My solution isn't 100% complete, but I think it
> might be closer than we already are.
>
I am not certain about the specifics of the FMS installed in the
accident aircraft. Lots of the modern systems show only the selected
runway. Thus, had the crew selected 22 they would have been leaving the
pavement, so to speak, as they begin their roll on 26. Also, had they
set runway heading on their heading "bug" it would have been pointing
some 49 degrees to the left. It has been common practice in air carrier
operations for many years to set the heading bug to runway heading. The
FAA issued a safety alert on September 1st reminding pilots of this
basic aspect of air carrier departure safety check (not to mention the
flight has to fly runway heading for some period of time after takeoff,
being IFR.

But, the fact they elected to roll on a runway without operating runway
edge lights rises to the level where no procedure could protect against
that.
>
>>The concerns of the industry are (correctly) about runway intrusions,
>>such as happen at places like LAX far too often.
>
>
> I wonder if this solution could also be used to address runway
> incursions by predicting movement of aircraft on the ground. Wouldn't it
> be nice to be able to solve 2 problems with 1 relatively inexpensive
> solution? That factor alone probably dooms the suggestion to oblivion.
>
>
Moving map airport diagrams go a long ways to preventing runway
incursions at airports like LAX. I suppose the flight plan/ATC
clearance system could be enhanced to highlight the authorized runway
and to show in red the prohibitd runways. For example handing on 25L at
LAX the runway could be green and 25R could be red. After landing
Runway 25R would turn green only after clearance to cross had been
obstained, But this would require repitious manual controller
intervention, and would almosr certainly fail like the runway traffic
lights tried at various times at various locations.

If the hold-short and crossing instructions were issued by datalink,
then perhaps it woould work reliably. Datalink should have replaced
routine voice communications many years ago. It was promised by the FAA
to be operational in the 1970s.

[Sam Spade]

TheNPC wrote:

> SNIP
>
> The FAA issued a safety alert on September 1st reminding pilots of this
> basic aspect of air carrier departure safety check (not to mention the
> flight has to fly runway heading for some period of time after takeoff,
> being IFR.
>
>
> Oh boy! The Lesbian Bull Dike controlled FAA reacts "AFTER" a terrible
> crash as if they have a handle on anything in America relating to Air
> Safety.
>
> What a joke
>
> "The Tombstone" Agency really gives me a warm fuzzy
>
> Knee-Jerk after the fact ass covering Government Bull**** Fodder
>
> The FAA is famous for that
>
> Stupid people love it

It was a reminder, numb nuts.

[Ron Lee]

TheNPC > wrote:
>>
>> It was a reminder, numb nuts.
>
>Did some one "remind" the FAA to not violate their AT
>staffing orders and leave an ATCT understaffed with just one
>over worked tired controller alone on duty in violation of
>their own ATCT staffing orders?

No one has provided compelling facts to indicate that this was
anything other than a collosal pilot(s) blunder. Look at the airport
diagram. REGARDLESS of taxiway changes or lights or moon phase, the
pilots should have known that they had to completely cross Runway 26
to get to Runway 22. That is not rocket science.

Snip rant

>Or does the American Public need to "Remind" the FAA by
>firing all of them and starting over that Air Safety is
>their primary business rather than politically correct
>social gatherings on the American tax dime while ATCT's are
>understaffed?

I would rather that the NTSB be given regulatory (?) relative to
flight safety.

Ron Lee

[Steven P. McNicoll[_1_]]

"TheNPC" > wrote in message
.. .
>
> Did some one "remind" the FAA to not violate their AT staffing orders and
> leave an ATCT understaffed with just one over worked tired controller
> alone on duty in violation of their own ATCT staffing orders?
>

The ATCT was not understaffed.

[Sam Spade]

Ron Lee wrote:

>
> I would rather that the NTSB be given regulatory (?) relative to
> flight safety.

Why do you think they would regulate any differently than the FAA?

[Stefan Lörchner]

>I find myself wondering what the cost of a low-power ground radar

I don't see anything being necessary.
Accidents will happen in the future and they will always happen if
humans are involved. There is nothing that assures perfect safety.

Maybe a moving map display might prevent an accident like this. However,
there will be another accident that is caused (also) by a malfunctioning
moving map because it was not aligned correctly or an old version or a
bad scan...

Living is always life endangering.

As long as far more people die because of cars and guns we better should
take care of that!

[Steven P. McNicoll[_1_]]

"TheNPC" > wrote in message
.. .
>
> Cars and Guns kill more people because stupid and/or drunk and/or
> unqualified or poorly trained people get a hold of them every day
>
> Air Travel should be perfectly safe because it supposedly involves
> professionally trained people who follow strict guidelines.
>
> But when "Negligence" comes into play, there are mechanisms to insure
> accountability and compensation and problem resolution so it will not
> happen again.
>
> In the case of KLEX, the FAA was "Negligent" with their Air Traffic
> controller workforce staffing that Sunday morning
> at Bluegrass Airport.
>
> You can spin all day like a washing machine and throw out hypothesis after
> hypothesis but the bottom line at LEX the FAA was "Negligent" because they
> violated their Air Traffic staffing orders.
>
> If found the crew was 100 percent at fault it still does not negate the
> fact the FAA was negligent.
>

The LEX tower was not understaffed. The fact that FAA directives required
two people to perform a one-person job had nothing to do with the accident
at LEX.

[Robert Chambers]

I guess that's why this country is a lawyers paradise. Nobody has any
personal accountability anymore, just sue whoever has the largest coffers.

TheNPC wrote:
> Stefan Lörchner wrote:
>
>>> I find myself wondering what the cost of a low-power ground radar
>>
>>
>>
>> I don't see anything being necessary.
>> Accidents will happen in the future and they will always happen if
>> humans are involved. There is nothing that assures perfect safety.
>>
>> Maybe a moving map display might prevent an accident like this. However,
>> there will be another accident that is caused (also) by a malfunctioning
>> moving map because it was not aligned correctly or an old version or a
>> bad scan...
>>
>> Living is always life endangering.
>>
>> As long as far more people die because of cars and guns we better should
>> take care of that!
>
>
> Cars and Guns kill more people because stupid and/or drunk and/or
> unqualified or poorly trained people get a hold of them every day
>
> Air Travel should be perfectly safe because it supposedly involves
> professionally trained people who follow strict guidelines.
>
> But when "Negligence" comes into play, there are mechanisms to insure
> accountability and compensation and problem resolution so it will not
> happen again.
>
> In the case of KLEX, the FAA was "Negligent" with their Air Traffic
> controller workforce staffing that Sunday morning
> at Bluegrass Airport.
>
> You can spin all day like a washing machine and throw out hypothesis
> after hypothesis but the bottom line at LEX the FAA was "Negligent"
> because they violated their Air Traffic staffing orders.
>
> If found the crew was 100 percent at fault it still does not negate the
> fact the FAA was negligent.

[Everett M. Greene[_2_]]

Stefan Lörchner > writes:
> >I find myself wondering what the cost of a low-power ground radar
>
> I don't see anything being necessary.
> Accidents will happen in the future and they will always happen if
> humans are involved. There is nothing that assures perfect safety.
>
> Maybe a moving map display might prevent an accident like this. However,
> there will be another accident that is caused (also) by a malfunctioning
> moving map because it was not aligned correctly or an old version or a
> bad scan...
>
> Living is always life endangering.

Many people seem to forget that fact.

> As long as far more people die because of cars and guns
> we better should take care of that!

Aviation accidents make the news because they're so rare.
Automobile accidents and fatalities are so common that
they aren't always noted except maybe as a "BTW". It
would get very boring if the newspapers and other news
media started every issue with "100 people killed in
auto accidents today in the U.S." A good aircraft crash
with fatalities on the other hand...

[Judah]

Every computer is only as smart as its programmers and operators.

As such, even if there were some sort of automated method for communicating
instructions to the plane, so long as the instructions are being made by
human ATC controllers to human Pilots, the only thing that would have changed
in the case of LEX is that the takeoff clearance was made through something
other than a mic click. Even if the pilots would have had to enter their
takeoff runway into the computer, they could have entered it improperly, or
the system might not have been able to identify their problem in enough time
for them to safely stop in 3000' anyway...

The Star Trek days are yet to come.

"Jim Carter" > wrote in news:001d01c6e833$26b414f0
$4001a8c0@omnibook6100:

>
> As it is now however, the only checks and balances are all human. I'm
> not sure it shouldn't remain that way, but at the same time if some
> technical solution isn't developed by the industry then the politicians
> and lawyers will develop one for us. We all know how well those work...
>

[Sam Spade]

Judah wrote:
> Every computer is only as smart as its programmers and operators.
>
> As such, even if there were some sort of automated method for communicating
> instructions to the plane, so long as the instructions are being made by
> human ATC controllers to human Pilots, the only thing that would have changed
> in the case of LEX is that the takeoff clearance was made through something
> other than a mic click. Even if the pilots would have had to enter their
> takeoff runway into the computer, they could have entered it improperly, or
> the system might not have been able to identify their problem in enough time
> for them to safely stop in 3000' anyway...

If that runway wasn't authorized for their operation, they shouldn't
have been able to retrieve it from the FMS database.

Also, almost anyone can set a heading bug and figure out that a runway
isn't lighted.

>
> The Star Trek days are yet to come.
>
> "Jim Carter" > wrote in news:001d01c6e833$26b414f0
> $4001a8c0@omnibook6100:
>
>
>>As it is now however, the only checks and balances are all human. I'm
>>not sure it shouldn't remain that way, but at the same time if some
>>technical solution isn't developed by the industry then the politicians
>>and lawyers will develop one for us. We all know how well those work...
>>