NTSB final report on Hendrick crash

[Jim Macklin]

PDF from NTSB http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2006/AAB0601.pdf

[Sam Spade]

Jim Macklin wrote:
> PDF from NTSB http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2006/AAB0601.pdf
>
>
>
No surprise there.

[John T[_2_]]

"Peter" > wrote in message

>
> Unless I am missing something obvious, this sort of thing should not
> happen if the pilot has a picture showing his position relative to the
> rest of the place.

The picture doesn't always help. :)

I was once safety pilot for a CFI candidate flying an ILS with a moving map
system. Even though the picture clearly showed the holding pattern, he
nonetheless turned the wrong way to do his course reversal on the wrong side
of the FAC.

My point is this was a simple mistake made by an experienced pilot I trust.
If it can happen to him, it can happen to me - or baseball stars.

Unfortunately, our activity can be quite unforgiving of mistakes.

--
John T
http://sage1solutions.com/blogs/TknoFlyer
Reduce spam. Use Sender Policy Framework: http://openspf.org
____________________

[Jim Macklin]

He had a GPS, but as a high time commuter pilot in a BE1900,
he didn't know how to use it. Their GPS was not current for
IFR, but they were using it. When they crossed the LOM, the
GPS autocycled to the MAP WPT and the crew just did a turn
about a point and flew at the IAP altitude past the airport
and died.




"Peter" > wrote in message
...
|
| "Jim Macklin" > wrote
|
| >PDF from NTSB
http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2006/AAB0601.pdf
| >
|
| Having read a fair few reports of aircraft flown by
professional crew,
| perhaps commercially, it amazes me how many do not have
what one would
| call a moving map GPS.
|
| Unless I am missing something obvious, this sort of thing
should not
| happen if the pilot has a picture showing his position
relative to the
| rest of the place.

[Sam Spade]

John T wrote:

> "Peter" > wrote in message
>
>
>>Unless I am missing something obvious, this sort of thing should not
>>happen if the pilot has a picture showing his position relative to the
>>rest of the place.
>
>
> The picture doesn't always help. :)
>
> I was once safety pilot for a CFI candidate flying an ILS with a moving map
> system. Even though the picture clearly showed the holding pattern, he
> nonetheless turned the wrong way to do his course reversal on the wrong side
> of the FAC.
>
> My point is this was a simple mistake made by an experienced pilot I trust.
> If it can happen to him, it can happen to me - or baseball stars.

Bassball stars are hobby pilots.

This crew was supposed to be highly-trained, experienced professionals.
The gross errors they made were inexcusable.

For a pro who understands the complete system, DME on a LOC makes it
very easy to know where you are at any time. All the essential
information provided by a moving map is provided by a localizer with DME
fixes.

[Maule Driver]

Jim Macklin wrote:
> He had a GPS, but as a high time commuter pilot in a BE1900,
> he didn't know how to use it. Their GPS was not current for
> IFR, but they were using it. When they crossed the LOM, the
> GPS autocycled to the MAP WPT and the crew just did a turn
> about a point and flew at the IAP altitude past the airport
> and died.
>
I'm not familiar with the KLN 90B but fly a Garmin 300XL which I believe
is of similar vintage and function. In addition, my single CDI is wired
so that it would auto-connect to the NAV radio when tuned to a LOC signal.

Using the Garmin on such an approach to function in place of the ADF and
DME, I would have programmed it similarly. However, flying the
approach would require switching it from 'auto-sequence' to 'hold' just
before passing BALES for the holding pattern turn. That would keep
BALES as the next waypoint. Once inbound to BALES, I would have
switched it to auto=sequence.

Does the KLN 90B function similarly? That is, is there a Hold switch?

MauleDriver

[Beavis[_1_]]

In article >,
"Jim Macklin" > wrote:

> He had a GPS, but as a high time commuter pilot in a BE1900,
> he didn't know how to use it.

As someone who flew many hours with the captain of that flight, at the
airline that flew those 1900s, I can say without a doubt that you have
no idea what you're talking about.

Here's a cockpit shot of one of the 1900s he flew:
http://www.airliners.net/open.file/0585758/L/

I'll leave it as an exercise for you to identify the device sitting next
to the copilot's RMI.

[John T[_2_]]

Sam Spade wrote:
>
> This crew was supposed to be highly-trained, experienced
> professionals. The gross errors they made were inexcusable.

I agree. I also suggest this exercise isn't about finding excuses. :)

--
John T
http://sage1solutions.com/TknoFlyer
http://www.pocketgear.com/products_search.asp?developerid=4415
Reduce spam. Use Sender Policy Framework: http://spf.pobox.com
____________________

[Sam Spade]

John T wrote:
> Sam Spade wrote:
>
>>This crew was supposed to be highly-trained, experienced
>> professionals. The gross errors they made were inexcusable.
>
>
> I agree. I also suggest this exercise isn't about finding excuses. :)
>
I hope no one is trying to find excuses.

in·ex·cus·a·ble adjective
unpardonable: impossible to pardon or justify

Encarta® World English Dictionary © & (P) 1999,2000 Microsoft
Corporation. All rights reserved. Developed for Microsoft by Bloomsbury
Publishing Plc.

[Maule Driver]

It's a KLN909b GPS I guess. Granted that the crew knew how to use it
and granted that the dating of the database had no impact, the cause
seems to be a loss of situational awareness due in some part to misuse
of the GPS.

It seems that they 'half used' the GPS for this non-GPS approach and
then 'over relied' on the GPS over use of the radio aids. That is, they
setup the GPS to lead them to the FAF but neglected to press the hold
button before reaching the IAF for the hold. No problem with that as
long as you realize what you are doing and continue to use the DME, ADF,
and RMI for identification of the various fixes.

I'll bet this crew could have turned off the GPS and nailed this
approach 1,000 times in a row without incident, or conversersely used
the GPS exclusively with the Loc and NDB out of service and done the same.

Beavis wrote:
> In article >,
> "Jim Macklin" > wrote:
>
>
>>He had a GPS, but as a high time commuter pilot in a BE1900,
>>he didn't know how to use it.
>
>
> As someone who flew many hours with the captain of that flight, at the
> airline that flew those 1900s, I can say without a doubt that you have
> no idea what you're talking about.
>
> Here's a cockpit shot of one of the 1900s he flew:
> http://www.airliners.net/open.file/0585758/L/
>
> I'll leave it as an exercise for you to identify the device sitting next
> to the copilot's RMI.

[[email protected]]

Maule Driver > wrote:
: It's a KLN909b GPS I guess. Granted that the crew knew how to use it
: and granted that the dating of the database had no impact, the cause
: seems to be a loss of situational awareness due in some part to misuse
: of the GPS.

: It seems that they 'half used' the GPS for this non-GPS approach and
: then 'over relied' on the GPS over use of the radio aids. That is, they
: setup the GPS to lead them to the FAF but neglected to press the hold
: button before reaching the IAF for the hold. No problem with that as
: long as you realize what you are doing and continue to use the DME, ADF,
: and RMI for identification of the various fixes.

: I'll bet this crew could have turned off the GPS and nailed this
: approach 1,000 times in a row without incident, or conversersely used
: the GPS exclusively with the Loc and NDB out of service and done the same.

Unless this an updated version of the NTSB report, it's been out for a few
months now. IIRC they conclude two problems:

- Using the GPS for DME info and having it auto-sequence without their knowledge.
Exiting the hold at a significantly higher altitude than the entry altitude didn't
help either.
- Incorrect missed approach procedure. I think they concluded that had they executed
the missed as published, the turn would have maintained terrain clearance.

Very unfortunate and personally disturbing to me. I flew the LOC/DME into my
home airport of BCB the *previous day* in identical weather... only about 40 miles to
the north of the accident. I broke out in about 500' and 1 mile.

-Cory


--

************************************************** ***********************
* Cory Papenfuss, Ph.D., PPSEL-IA *
* Electrical Engineering *
* Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University *
************************************************** ***********************

[Dan Luke]

"Maule Driver" wrote:

> Using the Garmin on such an approach to function in place of the ADF and
> DME, I would have programmed it similarly. However, flying the approach
> would require switching it from 'auto-sequence' to 'hold' just before
> passing BALES for the holding pattern turn. That would keep BALES as the
> next waypoint. Once inbound to BALES, I would have switched it to
> auto=sequence.
>
> Does the KLN 90B function similarly? That is, is there a Hold switch?

Yes. It has an OBS mode.

--
Dan
C172RG at BFM

[Matt Whiting]

Maule Driver wrote:
>
>
> Jim Macklin wrote:
>
>> He had a GPS, but as a high time commuter pilot in a BE1900, he didn't
>> know how to use it. Their GPS was not current for IFR, but they were
>> using it. When they crossed the LOM, the GPS autocycled to the MAP
>> WPT and the crew just did a turn about a point and flew at the IAP
>> altitude past the airport and died.
>>
> I'm not familiar with the KLN 90B but fly a Garmin 300XL which I believe
> is of similar vintage and function. In addition, my single CDI is wired
> so that it would auto-connect to the NAV radio when tuned to a LOC signal.
>
> Using the Garmin on such an approach to function in place of the ADF and
> DME, I would have programmed it similarly. However, flying the
> approach would require switching it from 'auto-sequence' to 'hold' just
> before passing BALES for the holding pattern turn. That would keep
> BALES as the next waypoint. Once inbound to BALES, I would have
> switched it to auto=sequence.
>
> Does the KLN 90B function similarly? That is, is there a Hold switch?

I can't speak for a KLN 90B, but we have an 89B in our club Arrow. It
doesn't have a hold switch, but if I understand your description above
of the Garmin hold function, it sounds like the OBS function on the
King. You must put the unit in OBS mode prior to making a course
reversal for a procedure turn. You then switch back to auto sequence
mode when approaching the FAF.

I haven't yet flown enough with the GPS to feel comfortable using it for
an approach in actual. I'm not flying enough these days to stay
proficient with it and I find that if I don't fly it at least once a
month, I forget the subtleties.

I think a moving map GPS would be the cat's meow, but the 89B style are
terrible, in my opinion. I can go a year between flying an ILS or VOR
approach and still do a credible approach the first time. I just had an
ICC last Friday and I hadn't flown an approach in more than a year. I
was a little rough on the first VOR approach, but the second one was
spot on as were the two ILS I then flew.

The GPS is just not intuitive at all to use and takes way too much
set-up, cross-checking and effort in my opinion. It is amazing how
complicated they made these devices given how simple a typical ILS or
VOR approach is.


Matt

[Mark Hansen]

On 11/13/06 14:24, Matt Whiting wrote:
> Maule Driver wrote:
>>
>>
>> Jim Macklin wrote:
>>
>>> He had a GPS, but as a high time commuter pilot in a BE1900, he didn't
>>> know how to use it. Their GPS was not current for IFR, but they were
>>> using it. When they crossed the LOM, the GPS autocycled to the MAP
>>> WPT and the crew just did a turn about a point and flew at the IAP
>>> altitude past the airport and died.
>>>
>> I'm not familiar with the KLN 90B but fly a Garmin 300XL which I believe
>> is of similar vintage and function. In addition, my single CDI is wired
>> so that it would auto-connect to the NAV radio when tuned to a LOC signal.
>>
>> Using the Garmin on such an approach to function in place of the ADF and
>> DME, I would have programmed it similarly. However, flying the
>> approach would require switching it from 'auto-sequence' to 'hold' just
>> before passing BALES for the holding pattern turn. That would keep
>> BALES as the next waypoint. Once inbound to BALES, I would have
>> switched it to auto=sequence.
>>
>> Does the KLN 90B function similarly? That is, is there a Hold switch?
>
> I can't speak for a KLN 90B, but we have an 89B in our club Arrow. It
> doesn't have a hold switch, but if I understand your description above
> of the Garmin hold function, it sounds like the OBS function on the
> King. You must put the unit in OBS mode prior to making a course
> reversal for a procedure turn.

To be precise, you need to put it into OBS mode before you reach the
holding/FA fix. If you reach the fix first, the box will assume you are
proceeding inbound and will auto-sequence to the next fix.


> You then switch back to auto sequence
> mode when approaching the FAF.
>
> I haven't yet flown enough with the GPS to feel comfortable using it for
> an approach in actual. I'm not flying enough these days to stay
> proficient with it and I find that if I don't fly it at least once a
> month, I forget the subtleties.
>
> I think a moving map GPS would be the cat's meow, but the 89B style are
> terrible, in my opinion. I can go a year between flying an ILS or VOR
> approach and still do a credible approach the first time. I just had an
> ICC last Friday and I hadn't flown an approach in more than a year. I
> was a little rough on the first VOR approach, but the second one was
> spot on as were the two ILS I then flew.
>
> The GPS is just not intuitive at all to use and takes way too much
> set-up, cross-checking and effort in my opinion. It is amazing how
> complicated they made these devices given how simple a typical ILS or
> VOR approach is.

Agree 100%. Each vendor seems to have it's own way of doing things too,
making it hard to transition from one to the other. I suppose I'll get
used to them after a few years...

>
>
> Matt



--
Mark Hansen, PP-ASEL, Instrument Airplane
Cal Aggie Flying Farmers
Sacramento, CA

[Jim Macklin]

The NTSB said he did not properly fly the approach, that
even though the aircraft was not approved to use the GPS
IFR, the crew obviously was using the GPS to find the LOM
and used it to, in error do the hold, which is why they flew
the approach to their deaths. The crew had just flown over
the LOM and got lost while in a turn.

Read the report, maybe the pilot was skilled, but he
certainly did not exercise good judgment on the flight.




"Beavis" > wrote in message
...
| In article >,
| "Jim Macklin" >
wrote:
|
| > He had a GPS, but as a high time commuter pilot in a
BE1900,
| > he didn't know how to use it.
|
| As someone who flew many hours with the captain of that
flight, at the
| airline that flew those 1900s, I can say without a doubt
that you have
| no idea what you're talking about.
|
| Here's a cockpit shot of one of the 1900s he flew:
| http://www.airliners.net/open.file/0585758/L/
|
| I'll leave it as an exercise for you to identify the
device sitting next
| to the copilot's RMI.

[Beavis[_1_]]

In article >,
"Jim Macklin" > wrote:

> The NTSB said he did not properly fly the approach, that
> even though the aircraft was not approved to use the GPS
> IFR, the crew obviously was using the GPS to find the LOM
> and used it to, in error do the hold...

Oh, I wholeheartedly agree they screwed up and used the GPS improperly.
My issue was with this statement:

> | > He had a GPS, but as a high time commuter pilot in a
> | > BE1900, he didn't know how to use it.

And I maintain that's a ridiculous statement, since I've seen first-hand
he knew very well how to use it, and *practiced* it during his time as a
1900 commuter pilot.

Why he didn't apply that knowledge properly that day, we'll never know.
But your suggestion that 1900 time somehow negates GPS knowledge is a
strange one.

[Scott Skylane]

Beavis wrote:
/snip/
>
> Here's a cockpit shot of one of the 1900s he flew:
> http://www.airliners.net/open.file/0585758/L/
/snip/

On a completely unrelated note, I see there is a vacuum suction gage on
the instrument panel. What is this for? Apparently all of the "gyro"
instruments are electronic. Is this strictly for the de-ice boots?

Happy Flying!
Scott Skylane

[Jay Beckman]

"Jim Macklin" > wrote in message
...
> PDF from NTSB http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2006/AAB0601.pdf

One potential "External Pressure" on this flight that many people may not be
aware of is that Ricky Henderson (the team owner's son who died on that
flight) was slated to work as a spotter for one of the Hendrick cars. By
rule, you can not grid your car if your spotter is not in position on the
roof of the grandstand.

IIRC, the Cup race that day had a 1pm Green Flag so that suggests to me they
were running late. Even with a helo standing by at MTV to ferry everyone
from the airport to the track, they'd have been cutting it close.

Doesn't excuse the way in which the crew botched the approach, but it might
(IMO) suggest perhaps some "Get There-itis."

Just $0.02 worth from someone who works on the NASCAR tour.

Jay Beckman
PP-ASEL
Chandler, AZ
Technician, NASCAR on FOX / NBC / TNT

[Dave S]

The KLN 90B gps has a small moving map in its panel display. The NTSB
report alluded to the standard practice was for a track up orientation.
Given that the moving map screen is fairly short vertically, maybe half
its width, in the track up presentation it may not have been as obvious
that they had overflown their waypoints...

Of course, from an armchair quarterbacking perspective, almost all of my
inflight GPS experience has been behind King products, the KLN 89B, -90B
and KLX-135, and didn't seem to have a problem with the display or
depictions. The display was also not on the center console between the
pilots, facing up (as opposed to on the main panel).

Dave

Peter wrote:
> "Jim Macklin" > wrote
>
>
>>PDF from NTSB http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2006/AAB0601.pdf
>>
>
>
> Having read a fair few reports of aircraft flown by professional crew,
> perhaps commercially, it amazes me how many do not have what one would
> call a moving map GPS.
>
> Unless I am missing something obvious, this sort of thing should not
> happen if the pilot has a picture showing his position relative to the
> rest of the place.

[Dave S]

Maule Driver wrote:
>
>
> Jim Macklin wrote:
>
>
> I'm not familiar with the KLN 90B but fly a Garmin 300XL which I believe
> is of similar vintage and function. In addition, my single CDI is wired
> so that it would auto-connect to the NAV radio when tuned to a LOC signal.

The NTSB indicated that the Pilot's CDI was set up to display NAV even
when GPS was selected on the annunciator. This is typically accomplished
using a multipole relay (like a NAT-80? i think) to enable the NAV
override - its not something switchable on the King Box, its done
downstream. (just fyi.. thats all)


>
> Using the Garmin on such an approach to function in place of the ADF and
> DME, I would have programmed it similarly. However, flying the
> approach would require switching it from 'auto-sequence' to 'hold' just
> before passing BALES for the holding pattern turn. That would keep
> BALES as the next waypoint. Once inbound to BALES, I would have
> switched it to auto=sequence.
>
> Does the KLN 90B function similarly? That is, is there a Hold switch?

I believe the "OBS" button is used to suspend waypoint sequencing in the
King series, but not positive. Sounds like the guys had the ILS tuned,
which displayed on the CDI..

(armchair speculatio)
BUT had the waypoints entered manually in the GPS and then used the
flashing waypoint light in the PIC's scan to indicate when to step down
(cheating essentially...).. they'd prolly done it many times before
(without a PT).. and this time nobody bothered to look down onto the
center console and VERIFY which waypoint it was annunciating (let alone
fly the approach solely as published using LOC/NAV and DME indications)

The profile seems to indicate they flew the approach with descents one
waypoint out of sequence.. With the database being out of date, it
should not have permitted real GPS approach modes (including a GPS
overlay of the Loc/Vor approach.. so the crew had to have manually
entered the points on their flight plan.

[Jim Macklin]

I will apologize if I offended you or some other commuter
pilot. But in my experience with commuter operations, and
pilots, the aircraft are usually only equipped with basic
avionics. Further, the operating profile doesn't
necessarily apply to corporate 1,000 mile trips in a King
Air.

But based on what you have said, it is even more of a puzzle
as to why and how did this accident happen.


"Beavis" > wrote in message
...
| In article >,
| "Jim Macklin" >
wrote:
|
| > The NTSB said he did not properly fly the approach, that
| > even though the aircraft was not approved to use the GPS
| > IFR, the crew obviously was using the GPS to find the
LOM
| > and used it to, in error do the hold...
|
| Oh, I wholeheartedly agree they screwed up and used the
GPS improperly.
| My issue was with this statement:
|
| > | > He had a GPS, but as a high time commuter pilot in a
| > | > BE1900, he didn't know how to use it.
|
| And I maintain that's a ridiculous statement, since I've
seen first-hand
| he knew very well how to use it, and *practiced* it during
his time as a
| 1900 commuter pilot.
|
| Why he didn't apply that knowledge properly that day,
we'll never know.
| But your suggestion that 1900 time somehow negates GPS
knowledge is a
| strange one.

[Dave S]

>>
>>The GPS is just not intuitive at all to use and takes way too much
>>set-up, cross-checking and effort in my opinion. It is amazing how
>>complicated they made these devices given how simple a typical ILS or
>>VOR approach is.
>
>
> Agree 100%. Each vendor seems to have it's own way of doing things too,
> making it hard to transition from one to the other. I suppose I'll get
> used to them after a few years...
>

No disrespect intended.. but once you learn how to use one King.. you
can use em all.. the "switchology" is common across the entire product
line. Nav page 1 is the same across the entire line.. Nav page 5 is the
moving map.. Flight Plan 0 is the active flight plan, The VOR page,
Airport page, NDB pages.. they all have similar functions and data
across the entire product line.

Get the manual and sit there on the ground and play with it.. or "take
it home" with take home mode.. Once you have the skills and confidence
to use your box to its full potential you will be amazed at how "easy"
it seems.. or next time you go flying with another pilot.. let them
fly.. and you just mess with the box.. and get used to it.

Its not as pretty as a Garmin GNS or GNX box, but its still pretty capable.

Dave

[Jim Macklin]

Part of being professional is how you handle those
pressures. I don't know why the crew did what they did and
when they suspected they had a problem. But a climb and a
turn away from obstacles is always a good first step in
getting another chance.
Did the crew assume it was simple and skip the approach
briefing, what were they doing with the GPS? How much
experience did the crew have together and how much in THAT
airplane?

The RMI [ADF], DME and LOC should have been setup as primary
and the GPS was not approved for an approach mode and should
not have been programmed for an approach.

Not trying to slam any pilot, trying to understand why
pilots make mistakes so I don't make the same kind of error.


"Jay Beckman" > wrote in message
...
| "Jim Macklin" > wrote
in message
| ...
| > PDF from NTSB
http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2006/AAB0601.pdf
|
| One potential "External Pressure" on this flight that many
people may not be
| aware of is that Ricky Henderson (the team owner's son who
died on that
| flight) was slated to work as a spotter for one of the
Hendrick cars. By
| rule, you can not grid your car if your spotter is not in
position on the
| roof of the grandstand.
|
| IIRC, the Cup race that day had a 1pm Green Flag so that
suggests to me they
| were running late. Even with a helo standing by at MTV to
ferry everyone
| from the airport to the track, they'd have been cutting it
close.
|
| Doesn't excuse the way in which the crew botched the
approach, but it might
| (IMO) suggest perhaps some "Get There-itis."
|
| Just $0.02 worth from someone who works on the NASCAR
tour.
|
| Jay Beckman
| PP-ASEL
| Chandler, AZ
| Technician, NASCAR on FOX / NBC / TNT
|
|

[Matt Whiting]

Dave S wrote:
>
>>>
>>> The GPS is just not intuitive at all to use and takes way too much
>>> set-up, cross-checking and effort in my opinion. It is amazing how
>>> complicated they made these devices given how simple a typical ILS or
>>> VOR approach is.
>>
>>
>>
>> Agree 100%. Each vendor seems to have it's own way of doing things too,
>> making it hard to transition from one to the other. I suppose I'll get
>> used to them after a few years...
>>
>
> No disrespect intended.. but once you learn how to use one King.. you
> can use em all.. the "switchology" is common across the entire product
> line. Nav page 1 is the same across the entire line.. Nav page 5 is the
> moving map.. Flight Plan 0 is the active flight plan, The VOR page,
> Airport page, NDB pages.. they all have similar functions and data
> across the entire product line.

That is why he said each vendor, not each model. Yes, all Kings are
much the same as are the few Garmin's I've used. I find the Garmin's a
little more intuitive than the King, but the King is certainly capable
as you say, just not as easy to learn.

As an example, conside the hold/OBS discussion. If I'm autosequencing
an approach and need to do a hold for approach entry, having a function
called "hold" seems intuitive to me. Or I can think of it as putting a
"hold" on the autosequence. However, calling that function OBS doesn't
make nearly as much intuitive sense. Small things like that separate
good human factors design from run-of-the-mill design as with King.

Yes, when I was flying the King a lot, I got pretty used to it. The
trouble is how fast you forget all of the nuances. 6 months and I'm
nearly back to ground zero trying to remember whether the outer or inner
ring is needed or when to hit cursor, etc. Whereas, I can go awar from
a VOR or ILS system for 6 months and come back and fly one approach and
I'm pretty comfortable again.

It is a matter of degree, but I think the GPS systems could have been
much better designed.


Matt

[Beavis[_1_]]

In article >,
Scott Skylane > wrote:

> > Here's a cockpit shot of one of the 1900s he flew:
> > http://www.airliners.net/open.file/0585758/L/
>
> On a completely unrelated note, I see there is a vacuum suction gage on
> the instrument panel. What is this for? Apparently all of the "gyro"
> instruments are electronic.

Correct. There are four remote gyroscopes (two attitude gyros, two
heading gyros), all powered by 115-Volt AC power. The really nice thing
about that kind of system is that if one gyro dies, you can route the
signal from the working gyro to both screens, so each pilot still has a
full set of instruments. Pretty neat.

There's also a standby attitude indicator, which has its own internal
battery backup. You can see it above and to the left of the GPS in the
picture linked above.

> Is this strictly for the de-ice boots?

Deice boots, and the operation of the pressurization's outflow valve.
(Suction pulls it open; springs push it closed.) That works fairly well
for a plane that size; larger planes, like the 737, have an
electrically-operated outflow valve.

[Sam Spade]

Jim Macklin wrote:
> I will apologize if I offended you or some other commuter
> pilot. But in my experience with commuter operations, and
> pilots, the aircraft are usually only equipped with basic
> avionics. Further, the operating profile doesn't
> necessarily apply to corporate 1,000 mile trips in a King
> Air.
>
> But based on what you have said, it is even more of a puzzle
> as to why and how did this accident happen.
>
One possibility is that the ship's DME was inoperative, thus confusion
ensued about how to get that particular GPS installation to pinch-hit as
a DME.

This is pure speculation on my part.

What is not speculation on my part is how poorly equipped this
particular King Air was considering the high-value use to which it was
put. The owners simply cannot escape some moral responsibility for the
accident by not having added perhaps a Garmin 530 (or 500 if their
conventional avionics were in good shape). And, with that kind of money
why not a TAWS?

Shortly after the NTSB released the flight track I ran the flight in
both MFSF 2004 with the Reality XP Sandel TAWS and then with my Garmin
296 in the simulator mode.

With any type of readily available terrain warning system, even "just" a
Garmin 296/396/496, these pilots would have received ample terrain warning.

When flight operations get to the sophisticated level of operating a
twin-engine turboprop, things are bound to fall through the cracks
without some competent form of flight operations management.

[Sam Spade]

Beavis wrote:

>
> Deice boots, and the operation of the pressurization's outflow valve.
> (Suction pulls it open; springs push it closed.) That works fairly well
> for a plane that size; larger planes, like the 737, have an
> electrically-operated outflow valve.

And, hot wings, too.

[Sam Spade]

Dave S wrote:

> The KLN 90B gps has a small moving map in its panel display. The NTSB
> report alluded to the standard practice was for a track up orientation.
> Given that the moving map screen is fairly short vertically, maybe half
> its width, in the track up presentation it may not have been as obvious
> that they had overflown their waypoints...
>
> Of course, from an armchair quarterbacking perspective, almost all of my
> inflight GPS experience has been behind King products, the KLN 89B, -90B
> and KLX-135, and didn't seem to have a problem with the display or
> depictions. The display was also not on the center console between the
> pilots, facing up (as opposed to on the main panel).

I work with this technology all the time, from the current air carrier
stuff down to the Garmin line. I find I am very comfortable with the
maps the Garmin 500 series have. I find less comfort level with the
Garmin 400 series (I prefer my handheld 296's map to the 400 series).

I have flown a few times in a Cessna with a King 89 and 90. I find
those moving maps to be virtually useless, and bad human factors, at
least for an occasional user of those devices.

[Robert Chambers]

I bet you one of those AI's is suction driven. That's all you'd have in
the event of an electrical failure.

Scott Skylane wrote:
> Beavis wrote:
> /snip/
>
>>
>> Here's a cockpit shot of one of the 1900s he flew:
>> http://www.airliners.net/open.file/0585758/L/
>
> /snip/
>
> On a completely unrelated note, I see there is a vacuum suction gage on
> the instrument panel. What is this for? Apparently all of the "gyro"
> instruments are electronic. Is this strictly for the de-ice boots?
>
> Happy Flying!
> Scott Skylane

[Sam Spade]

Jim Macklin wrote:

> Part of being professional is how you handle those
> pressures. I don't know why the crew did what they did and
> when they suspected they had a problem. But a climb and a
> turn away from obstacles is always a good first step in
> getting another chance.
> Did the crew assume it was simple and skip the approach
> briefing, what were they doing with the GPS? How much
> experience did the crew have together and how much in THAT
> airplane?
>
> The RMI [ADF], DME and LOC should have been setup as primary
> and the GPS was not approved for an approach mode and should
> not have been programmed for an approach.
>
> Not trying to slam any pilot, trying to understand why
> pilots make mistakes so I don't make the same kind of error.

When you really have to get there and the weather is like it was that
day, you select an airport with a precision approach and plan the ground
logistics accordingly. I recall someone familar with all the NASCAR
issues in play that day said KDAN would have been a good choice, with a
bit of planning when they were preparing to depart.

[Maule Driver]

The implication is that the plan to fly to this airport, in that
weather, with that aircraft flown by those pilots, was a bad decision.
Everything seems fine to me. That situation seems to me to be exactly
why race teams use GA.

Two competent, proficient, experienced pilots just botched it. There
are a lot things to learn from it and avoid having it happen again.

Of all GA users, one might guess that NASCAR race teams understand the
balance between pursuing goals, risk taking, and safety. Nothing is
100% - you simply keep trying to get there.

Sam Spade wrote:
>
> When you really have to get there and the weather is like it was that
> day, you select an airport with a precision approach and plan the ground
> logistics accordingly. I recall someone familar with all the NASCAR
> issues in play that day said KDAN would have been a good choice, with a
> bit of planning when they were preparing to depart.

[Sam Spade]

Maule Driver wrote:

> The implication is that the plan to fly to this airport, in that
> weather, with that aircraft flown by those pilots, was a bad decision.
> Everything seems fine to me. That situation seems to me to be exactly
> why race teams use GA.

For a personal flight it wouldn't be a bad decision at all given the
marginal weather. For a "must arrive" situation it was bad planning.
>
> Two competent, proficient, experienced pilots just botched it. There
> are a lot things to learn from it and avoid having it happen again.

I don't know what the lesson to be learned is, other than they were
certainly not competent and proficient that day.

I've been watching this stuff for a long time, and these kinds of errant
blunders happen over and over. That's why airliners have TAWS these
days, which was an outgrowth of GPWS, whicn in turn came about because
of an air carrier errant blunder.

>
> Of all GA users, one might guess that NASCAR race teams understand the
> balance between pursuing goals, risk taking, and safety. Nothing is
> 100% - you simply keep trying to get there.

[Mark Hansen]

On 11/14/06 03:48, Matt Whiting wrote:
> Dave S wrote:
>>
>>>>
>>>> The GPS is just not intuitive at all to use and takes way too much
>>>> set-up, cross-checking and effort in my opinion. It is amazing how
>>>> complicated they made these devices given how simple a typical ILS or
>>>> VOR approach is.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Agree 100%. Each vendor seems to have it's own way of doing things too,
>>> making it hard to transition from one to the other. I suppose I'll get
>>> used to them after a few years...
>>>
>>
>> No disrespect intended.. but once you learn how to use one King.. you
>> can use em all.. the "switchology" is common across the entire product
>> line. Nav page 1 is the same across the entire line.. Nav page 5 is the
>> moving map.. Flight Plan 0 is the active flight plan, The VOR page,
>> Airport page, NDB pages.. they all have similar functions and data
>> across the entire product line.
>
> That is why he said each vendor, not each model. Yes, all Kings are
> much the same as are the few Garmin's I've used. I find the Garmin's a
> little more intuitive than the King, but the King is certainly capable
> as you say, just not as easy to learn.
>
> As an example, conside the hold/OBS discussion. If I'm autosequencing
> an approach and need to do a hold for approach entry, having a function
> called "hold" seems intuitive to me. Or I can think of it as putting a
> "hold" on the autosequence. However, calling that function OBS doesn't
> make nearly as much intuitive sense. Small things like that separate
> good human factors design from run-of-the-mill design as with King.

As another example, when I'm flying toward the IAF for a procedure,
which happens also to be the FAF (and sometimes even the MAHP, etc.)
the King always selects the fix that is latest in the procedure,
rather than the first one I would hit - and I have to manually change
it.

Yes ... I've read the manual and don't really need a technical explanation
as to *why* it does it this way - it simply doesn't make sense to me.
It is goofyness like this that make practice with the box so important
(because it is so counter-intuitive).

By the way, I can't take the unit home to practice (or even practice
in the plane while on the ramp) because these are club planes, and
they don't allow that. Also, there is no PC-based simulator (good
thinking B/K!).

>
> Yes, when I was flying the King a lot, I got pretty used to it. The
> trouble is how fast you forget all of the nuances. 6 months and I'm
> nearly back to ground zero trying to remember whether the outer or inner
> ring is needed or when to hit cursor, etc. Whereas, I can go awar from
> a VOR or ILS system for 6 months and come back and fly one approach and
> I'm pretty comfortable again.
>
> It is a matter of degree, but I think the GPS systems could have been
> much better designed.
>
>
> Matt



--
Mark Hansen, PP-ASEL, Instrument Airplane
Cal Aggie Flying Farmers
Sacramento, CA

[Maule Driver]

Sam Spade wrote:
> Maule Driver wrote:
>
>> The implication is that the plan to fly to this airport, in that
>> weather, with that aircraft flown by those pilots, was a bad decision.
>> Everything seems fine to me. That situation seems to me to be exactly
>> why race teams use GA.
>
> For a personal flight it wouldn't be a bad decision at all given the
> marginal weather. For a "must arrive" situation it was bad planning.

Someone did suggest that there was some urgency to the flight (urgency
is relative, without urgency, no need to fly). But there's *no*
indication that there was any 'get there-itis' or "must arrive" pressure
involved was there? It appears they pushed on beyond the miss point
because they didn't realize they missed the miss.
>>
>> Two competent, proficient, experienced pilots just botched it. There
>> are a lot things to learn from it and avoid having it happen again.
>
> I don't know what the lesson to be learned is, other than they were
> certainly not competent and proficient that day.
Huh? "How to use and not use a GPS' lessons seems to be written all
over it. But if you just want to knock the pilots, then nothing will be
learned. My personal conclusion and lesson is that you need to stick
with your primary navigation instruments and use the backup as backup.
But that's me.
>
> I've been watching this stuff for a long time, and these kinds of errant
> blunders happen over and over. That's why airliners have TAWS these
> days, which was an outgrowth of GPWS, whicn in turn came about because
> of an air carrier errant blunder.
>
And tomorrow we will be wondering why *anyone* would dare fly a trip
uncoupled from TO to landing or even consider flying in an aircraft with
out a autopilot capable of flying from startup to shutdown. This wasn't
an airline flight and yet they were well equipped and the operation
seemingly well managed.

[Beavis[_1_]]

In article >,
Robert Chambers > wrote:

> I bet you one of those AI's is suction driven. That's all you'd have in
> the event of an electrical failure.

Nope; both primary AI's are painted on CRT screens anyway, and they're
powered by 115VAC, as I mentioned in an earlier post.

Electrical failure is covered by a third electric AI, which has an
independent rechargeable battery backup good for at least 30 minutes.

[Sam Spade]

Maule Driver wrote:
..
>
> Huh? "How to use and not use a GPS' lessons seems to be written all
> over it. But if you just want to knock the pilots, then nothing will be
> learned. My personal conclusion and lesson is that you need to stick
> with your primary navigation instruments and use the backup as backup.
> But that's me.
>

There are no new lessons to be learned from this accident. Because of
the lack of a CVR the NTSB is being speculative about the use of the GPS.

[Jim Macklin]

I've been running the flight in my mind. The crew knew they
were over the LOM as they turned outbound [established in
the hold] and if they had been thinking about the navigation
problem, known that they needed to fly 2-4 minutes outbound
for position. Then they would have been able to descend to
2600 when intercepting the LOC inbound. But they obviously
were flying some avionics and not thinking about their
position and timing. As a result they just did a 360 over
the LOM and then also ignored the RMI indications of the
ADF.

This points out my worry that modern avionics removes the
"thinking" process from piloting. When all we had was a VOR
and an ADF, pilots learned to make a moving map in their own
head. When that "map" worked, they were able to pass a
checkride. Now that the map is on the panel, if you lose
your place, there is a real problem detecting the error.

Also, the missed approach, particularly when a turn is
required, must be done anytime you have the slightest
uncertainty.


"Sam Spade" > wrote in message
...
| Jim Macklin wrote:
| > I will apologize if I offended you or some other
commuter
| > pilot. But in my experience with commuter operations,
and
| > pilots, the aircraft are usually only equipped with
basic
| > avionics. Further, the operating profile doesn't
| > necessarily apply to corporate 1,000 mile trips in a
King
| > Air.
| >
| > But based on what you have said, it is even more of a
puzzle
| > as to why and how did this accident happen.
| >
| One possibility is that the ship's DME was inoperative,
thus confusion
| ensued about how to get that particular GPS installation
to pinch-hit as
| a DME.
|
| This is pure speculation on my part.
|
| What is not speculation on my part is how poorly equipped
this
| particular King Air was considering the high-value use to
which it was
| put. The owners simply cannot escape some moral
responsibility for the
| accident by not having added perhaps a Garmin 530 (or 500
if their
| conventional avionics were in good shape). And, with that
kind of money
| why not a TAWS?
|
| Shortly after the NTSB released the flight track I ran the
flight in
| both MFSF 2004 with the Reality XP Sandel TAWS and then
with my Garmin
| 296 in the simulator mode.
|
| With any type of readily available terrain warning system,
even "just" a
| Garmin 296/396/496, these pilots would have received ample
terrain warning.
|
| When flight operations get to the sophisticated level of
operating a
| twin-engine turboprop, things are bound to fall through
the cracks
| without some competent form of flight operations
management.

[Jim Macklin]

The King Air and 1900's don't use vacuum pump, the weak link
in most GA airplanes. They use P3 air to power a venturi to
get both pressure and vacuum.




"Beavis" > wrote in message
...
| In article >,
| Scott Skylane > wrote:
|
| > > Here's a cockpit shot of one of the 1900s he flew:
| > > http://www.airliners.net/open.file/0585758/L/
| >
| > On a completely unrelated note, I see there is a vacuum
suction gage on
| > the instrument panel. What is this for? Apparently all
of the "gyro"
| > instruments are electronic.
|
| Correct. There are four remote gyroscopes (two attitude
gyros, two
| heading gyros), all powered by 115-Volt AC power. The
really nice thing
| about that kind of system is that if one gyro dies, you
can route the
| signal from the working gyro to both screens, so each
pilot still has a
| full set of instruments. Pretty neat.
|
| There's also a standby attitude indicator, which has its
own internal
| battery backup. You can see it above and to the left of
the GPS in the
| picture linked above.
|
| > Is this strictly for the de-ice boots?
|
| Deice boots, and the operation of the pressurization's
outflow valve.
| (Suction pulls it open; springs push it closed.) That
works fairly well
| for a plane that size; larger planes, like the 737, have
an
| electrically-operated outflow valve.

[Jim Macklin]

In the text of the NTSB report, the GPS display was located
on the center console and would have required looking 90
degrees and down for the pilots to see.



"Peter" > wrote in message
...
|
| Sam Spade > wrote:
|
| >> The KLN 90B gps has a small moving map in its panel
display. The NTSB
| >> report alluded to the standard practice was for a track
up orientation.
| >> Given that the moving map screen is fairly short
vertically, maybe half
| >> its width, in the track up presentation it may not have
been as obvious
| >> that they had overflown their waypoints...
| >>
| >> Of course, from an armchair quarterbacking perspective,
almost all of my
| >> inflight GPS experience has been behind King products,
the KLN 89B, -90B
| >> and KLX-135, and didn't seem to have a problem with the
display or
| >> depictions. The display was also not on the center
console between the
| >> pilots, facing up (as opposed to on the main panel).
| >
| >I work with this technology all the time, from the
current air carrier
| >stuff down to the Garmin line. I find I am very
comfortable with the
| >maps the Garmin 500 series have. I find less comfort
level with the
| >Garmin 400 series (I prefer my handheld 296's map to the
400 series).
| >
| >I have flown a few times in a Cessna with a King 89 and
90. I find
| >those moving maps to be virtually useless, and bad human
factors, at
| >least for an occasional user of those devices.
|
| Interesting read... I have a KLN94 and a KMD550 MFD.
|
| I am UK based and here we have no full GPS approaches, and
there are
| just a few around the rest of Europe. However, most of the
| conventional approaches do have the "overlays" in the Jepp
database.
|
| I have not looked up the approach plate for the airport
under
| discussion here but it sounds like it was a conventional
approach and
| anything that was shown on their GPS would have been the
overlay of
| that conventional approach.
|
| As such I am suprised the GPS did anything much useful and
I am very
| suprised they were relying on it for any sort of waypoint
sequencing.
| The KLN94 still switches from 5nm FS to 1nm FS (within
30nm of the
| runway) even on an overlay, but it doesn't go on to the
0.3nm FS mode.
|
| Personally, when I fly conventional approaches (which as I
say is
| always when flying an IAP) I use the GPS moving map for
lateral
| guidance (especially to establish accurately on the FAT on
NDB
| approaches) and general situational awareness and have
never attempted
| to use it for any waypoint distances.
|
| I don't think this crew were viewing any sort of moving
map; if they
| were they would have noticed that they passed the runway.
However, the
| KLN90 moving map is awful, as is the KLN94 one, so I am
not suprised
| [if] they weren't watching it.
|
| On a slightly different tack, it's good to see that one is
able to
| dissect these accidents and learn from them without
getting jumped on.
| In another forum, this one
|
|
http://www.aaib.dft.gov.uk/sites/aaib/publications/formal_reports/2_2006__g_bomg.cfm
|
| was posted, and when I suggested that the pilot probably
didn't look
| at his altimeter for 1-2 *minutes* while inexplicably not
using his
| autopilot (and descended into the sea) I got severely
jumped on for
| criticising these "low grade aircraft" commercial pilots
(who tend to
| work under poor conditions with zero job security).
|

[pgbnh]

Not clear (to me at least) is WHY they so clearly lost situational
awareness. Based on when they descended to MDA,and when and how they flew
the missed, they obviously thought they were someplace other than where they
were.
But why? Missing the fact that they autosequenced over the NDB might have
caused some confusion when flying the hold, but once inbound, both the GPS
(if they were using it) and the primary nav (presumedly tuned to the LOC
frequency) would both be showing dme to MAP. The gps would count down to
zero, the primary nav would go down to 1. How could either relying on a
potentially unreliable GPS OR missing the autosequencing have caused them to
to fly several miles PAST the MAP thinking that they had not yet reached it?
IIRC, they descended to MDA several miles PAST the MAP. They used the MAP as
the FAF, and seemed to fly a picture perfect approach thereafter. How could
misreading the GPS or NAV cause this??
"Dave S" > wrote in message
nk.net...
> The KLN 90B gps has a small moving map in its panel display. The NTSB
> report alluded to the standard practice was for a track up orientation.
> Given that the moving map screen is fairly short vertically, maybe half
> its width, in the track up presentation it may not have been as obvious
> that they had overflown their waypoints...
>
> Of course, from an armchair quarterbacking perspective, almost all of my
> inflight GPS experience has been behind King products, the KLN 89B, -90B
> and KLX-135, and didn't seem to have a problem with the display or
> depictions. The display was also not on the center console between the
> pilots, facing up (as opposed to on the main panel).
>
> Dave
>
> Peter wrote:
>> "Jim Macklin" > wrote
>>
>>
>>>PDF from NTSB http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2006/AAB0601.pdf
>>>
>>
>>
>> Having read a fair few reports of aircraft flown by professional crew,
>> perhaps commercially, it amazes me how many do not have what one would
>> call a moving map GPS. Unless I am missing something obvious, this sort
>> of thing should not
>> happen if the pilot has a picture showing his position relative to the
>> rest of the place.

[Ron Lee]

Sam Spade > wrote:

>Maule Driver wrote:
>.
>>
>> Huh? "How to use and not use a GPS' lessons seems to be written all
>> over it. But if you just want to knock the pilots, then nothing will be
>> learned. My personal conclusion and lesson is that you need to stick
>> with your primary navigation instruments and use the backup as backup.
>> But that's me.
>>
>
>There are no new lessons to be learned from this accident. Because of
>the lack of a CVR the NTSB is being speculative about the use of the GPS.

Sam that is perhaps the case with most accidents. I hear "We must
learn from this." In most cases yet the mistakes are recurring ones.
Maybe a listing of pilot screwups would help yet I suspect that you
won't reduce accidents much.

Technology can help in some cases. Even a simple Garmin with terrain
functionality, especially if there is an audible alert, may prevent
some accidents yet not flying in those conditions works 100%.

Personally, I would prefer to quit hearing about "We can all learn
from this fatality" and have those experts determine how to prevent
them in the first place.

Ron Lee

[Don Poitras]

pgbnh > wrote:
> Not clear (to me at least) is WHY they so clearly lost situational
> awareness. Based on when they descended to MDA,and when and how they flew
> the missed, they obviously thought they were someplace other than where they
> were.
> But why? Missing the fact that they autosequenced over the NDB might have
> caused some confusion when flying the hold, but once inbound, both the GPS
> (if they were using it) and the primary nav (presumedly tuned to the LOC
> frequency) would both be showing dme to MAP. The gps would count down to
> zero, the primary nav would go down to 1. How could either relying on a
> potentially unreliable GPS OR missing the autosequencing have caused them to
> to fly several miles PAST the MAP thinking that they had not yet reached it?
> IIRC, they descended to MDA several miles PAST the MAP. They used the MAP as
> the FAF, and seemed to fly a picture perfect approach thereafter. How could
> misreading the GPS or NAV cause this??

I'd guess they weren't looking at the DME. The countdown to the FAF and the
countdown to the MAP don't look any different except for the waypoint name.

Once past what they thought was the FAF, they probably set a normal descent
rate, looked at the localizer needle for course, altimeter for MDA and out
the window for the runway and never looked at the GPS again.

--
Don Poitras

[Jose[_1_]]

> Personally, I would prefer to quit hearing about "We can all learn
> from this fatality" and have those experts determine how to prevent
> them in the first place.

Um... that's what we're trying to learn from them.

Jose
--
"Never trust anything that can think for itself, if you can't see where
it keeps its brain." (chapter 10 of book 3 - Harry Potter).
for Email, make the obvious change in the address.

[Ron Lee]

Jose > wrote:

>> Personally, I would prefer to quit hearing about "We can all learn
>> from this fatality" and have those experts determine how to prevent
>> them in the first place.
>
>Um... that's what we're trying to learn from them.
>
>Jose

Um, do you have to have people fly into buildings to know that it is
not a good thing to do?

Fly into Class 5 (?) thunderstorms?

Scud run in the mountains?

Run out of fuel?

Take off on a runway that is too short?

How many unforeseen accident causes do we really see that a competent
pilot with good judgement should know to avoid?

Ron Lee

[Jose[_1_]]

> Um, do you have to have people fly into buildings to know that it is
> not a good thing to do?

I'm glad I read the newsgroups. I just learned that crashing is a Bad
Thing. :)

The question is =why= an otherwise good pilot made a bad mistake. Or
sometimes, why a small mistake turned out really bad this time.

Jose
--
"Never trust anything that can think for itself, if you can't see where
it keeps its brain." (chapter 10 of book 3 - Harry Potter).
for Email, make the obvious change in the address.

[pgbnh]

I thought about it some more and went back and reread the NTSB report. It
would appear that they were relying on the INFORMATION (CDI & DME) from the
GPS, but were not looking at the positional display. If they missed the fact
that they had passed the FAF as part of their aborted hold, AND they missed
the fact that the GPS had sequenced to the MAP, then they flew inbound on
the localizer course thinking they were still outside the FAF. The GPS would
be giving them distance information to MAP - they were seeing it as distance
to FAF. They then flew a pretty good approach - just displaced by 5-6 miles.
They also were pretty obviously navigating by the GPS and not using the
primary NAV - or they were at least depending on GPS for DME and not using
an independent DME. I am not familiar with the King GPS - the Garmin 530 has
a big identifier up on top which shows the waypoint being flown to.

The really scary thing is if two pilots with these qualifications can make
such a mistake, what hope is there for me?
"Don Poitras" > wrote in message
...
> pgbnh > wrote:
>> Not clear (to me at least) is WHY they so clearly lost situational
>> awareness. Based on when they descended to MDA,and when and how they flew
>> the missed, they obviously thought they were someplace other than where
>> they
>> were.
>> But why? Missing the fact that they autosequenced over the NDB might have
>> caused some confusion when flying the hold, but once inbound, both the
>> GPS
>> (if they were using it) and the primary nav (presumedly tuned to the LOC
>> frequency) would both be showing dme to MAP. The gps would count down to
>> zero, the primary nav would go down to 1. How could either relying on a
>> potentially unreliable GPS OR missing the autosequencing have caused them
>> to
>> to fly several miles PAST the MAP thinking that they had not yet reached
>> it?
>> IIRC, they descended to MDA several miles PAST the MAP. They used the MAP
>> as
>> the FAF, and seemed to fly a picture perfect approach thereafter. How
>> could
>> misreading the GPS or NAV cause this??
>
> I'd guess they weren't looking at the DME. The countdown to the FAF and
> the
> countdown to the MAP don't look any different except for the waypoint
> name.
>
> Once past what they thought was the FAF, they probably set a normal
> descent
> rate, looked at the localizer needle for course, altimeter for MDA and out
> the window for the runway and never looked at the GPS again.
>
> --
> Don Poitras

[Matt Whiting]

Mark Hansen wrote:

> By the way, I can't take the unit home to practice (or even practice
> in the plane while on the ramp) because these are club planes, and
> they don't allow that. Also, there is no PC-based simulator (good
> thinking B/K!).

Same here ... club plane and no sim. I'll buy a Garmin given the chance.

Matt

[Don Poitras]

Matt Whiting > wrote:
> Mark Hansen wrote:

> > By the way, I can't take the unit home to practice (or even practice
> > in the plane while on the ramp) because these are club planes, and
> > they don't allow that. Also, there is no PC-based simulator (good
> > thinking B/K!).

> Same here ... club plane and no sim. I'll buy a Garmin given the chance.

89/B simulator can be found here: http://www.bendixking.com/static/simulators/

> Matt

--
Don Poitras

[Sam Spade]

Don Poitras wrote:
> pgbnh > wrote:
>
>>Not clear (to me at least) is WHY they so clearly lost situational
>>awareness. Based on when they descended to MDA,and when and how they flew
>>the missed, they obviously thought they were someplace other than where they
>>were.
>>But why? Missing the fact that they autosequenced over the NDB might have
>>caused some confusion when flying the hold, but once inbound, both the GPS
>>(if they were using it) and the primary nav (presumedly tuned to the LOC
>>frequency) would both be showing dme to MAP. The gps would count down to
>>zero, the primary nav would go down to 1. How could either relying on a
>>potentially unreliable GPS OR missing the autosequencing have caused them to
>>to fly several miles PAST the MAP thinking that they had not yet reached it?
>>IIRC, they descended to MDA several miles PAST the MAP. They used the MAP as
>>the FAF, and seemed to fly a picture perfect approach thereafter. How could
>>misreading the GPS or NAV cause this??
>
>
> I'd guess they weren't looking at the DME. The countdown to the FAF and the
> countdown to the MAP don't look any different except for the waypoint name.

Why would they disregard the DME unless it wasn't working?

[Sam Spade]

pgbnh wrote:

> I thought about it some more and went back and reread the NTSB report. It
> would appear that they were relying on the INFORMATION (CDI & DME) from the
> GPS, but were not looking at the positional display. If they missed the fact
> that they had passed the FAF as part of their aborted hold, AND they missed
> the fact that the GPS had sequenced to the MAP, then they flew inbound on
> the localizer course thinking they were still outside the FAF. The GPS would
> be giving them distance information to MAP - they were seeing it as distance
> to FAF. They then flew a pretty good approach - just displaced by 5-6 miles.
> They also were pretty obviously navigating by the GPS and not using the
> primary NAV - or they were at least depending on GPS for DME and not using
> an independent DME. I am not familiar with the King GPS - the Garmin 530 has
> a big identifier up on top which shows the waypoint being flown to.
>
> The really scary thing is if two pilots with these qualifications can make
> such a mistake, what hope is there for me?

Don't beat yourself up.

Their operation that day was very incompetent.

[Mark Hansen]

On 11/14/06 16:19, Don Poitras wrote:
> Matt Whiting > wrote:
>> Mark Hansen wrote:
>
>> > By the way, I can't take the unit home to practice (or even practice
>> > in the plane while on the ramp) because these are club planes, and
>> > they don't allow that. Also, there is no PC-based simulator (good
>> > thinking B/K!).
>
>> Same here ... club plane and no sim. I'll buy a Garmin given the chance.
>
> 89/B simulator can be found here: http://www.bendixking.com/static/simulators/
>
>> Matt
>

Yes, I was aware of that one, but we use the KLN 94, which I found to be quite
a bit different from the 89B.


--
Mark Hansen, PP-ASEL, Instrument Airplane
Cal Aggie Flying Farmers
Sacramento, CA

[Matt Whiting]

Mark Hansen wrote:
> On 11/14/06 16:19, Don Poitras wrote:
>
>>Matt Whiting > wrote:
>>
>>>Mark Hansen wrote:
>>
>>>>By the way, I can't take the unit home to practice (or even practice
>>>>in the plane while on the ramp) because these are club planes, and
>>>>they don't allow that. Also, there is no PC-based simulator (good
>>>>thinking B/K!).
>>
>>>Same here ... club plane and no sim. I'll buy a Garmin given the chance.
>>
>>89/B simulator can be found here: http://www.bendixking.com/static/simulators/
>>
>>
>>>Matt
>>
>
> Yes, I was aware of that one, but we use the KLN 94, which I found to be quite
> a bit different from the 89B.
>
>

Yes, I tried that one also, but found it less than useful.

Matt