flying low...military video

[gatt]

Wild.

http://www.glumbert.com/media/flylow

[Larry Dighera]

On Tue, 2 Jan 2007 10:24:57 -0800, "gatt"
> wrote in
>:

>Wild.
>
>http://www.glumbert.com/media/flylow
>

Your tax dollars at work. :-(

Only the military is exempt from operations at speeds in excess of 250
knots below 10,000'. The kill a civilian in the US now and then due
to not being able to see-and-avoid at those speeds, but oh well....

Do you think you could see-and-avoid military aircraft on a MTR?

[gatt]

"Larry Dighera" > wrote in message
...
> On Tue, 2 Jan 2007 10:24:57 -0800, "gatt"
> > wrote in
> >:
>
>>Wild.
>>
>>http://www.glumbert.com/media/flylow
>>
>
> Your tax dollars at work. :-(

What kind of planes are they? Doesn't look like MY tax dollars at work.

-c

[Paul Riley]

"gatt" > wrote in message
...
> Wild.
>
> http://www.glumbert.com/media/flylow
>

Looks like the "zoomies" finally learned how to really fly--from Army
Aviators!!!! :-)))))))

Just kidding guys, typical inter service rivalry!! :-)))))))))

Paul
(retired Master Army Aviator)

[BT]

I've done my share of low level high speed flying (B-52 340KTAS and B-1
540KTAS and higher)
and I've done my share of dodging low altitude GA aircraft (500-1000ft AGL)
I do not want to know how many I did not see, but those I did were far
enough to miss with a Level-S.

BT

"Larry Dighera" > wrote in message
...
> On Tue, 2 Jan 2007 10:24:57 -0800, "gatt"
> > wrote in
> >:
>
>>Wild.
>>
>>http://www.glumbert.com/media/flylow
>>
>
> Your tax dollars at work. :-(
>
> Only the military is exempt from operations at speeds in excess of 250
> knots below 10,000'. The kill a civilian in the US now and then due
> to not being able to see-and-avoid at those speeds, but oh well....
>
> Do you think you could see-and-avoid military aircraft on a MTR?
>

[Newps]

gatt wrote:

> "Larry Dighera" > wrote in message
> ...
>
>>On Tue, 2 Jan 2007 10:24:57 -0800, "gatt"
> wrote in
>:
>>
>>
>>>Wild.
>>>
>>>http://www.glumbert.com/media/flylow
>>>
>>
>>Your tax dollars at work. :-(
>
>
> What kind of planes are they? Doesn't look like MY tax dollars at work.

Those aren't your tax dollars. That's an old video and is from a
foreign country.

[Bob Noel]

In article >,
Larry Dighera > wrote:

> Only the military is exempt from operations at speeds in excess of 250
> knots below 10,000'.

That's not true.

91.117 Aircraft speed.

[snip]

(d) If the minimum safe airspeed for any particular operation is greater than
the maximum speed prescribed in this section, the aircraft may be operated at
that minimum speed.


And the USAF has its own rules which basically mirror the FAA requirements on
civilian aircraft wrt airspeed limits. Not that it's an exception rather than
an exemption.

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
AIR FORCE INSTRUCTION 11-202, VOLUME 3
16 FEBRUARY 2005
Flying Operations
GENERAL FLIGHT RULES

5.7. Aircraft Speed.
5.7.1. Supersonic Flight. The PIC will not allow the aircraft to operate at or
above Mach l except as specified in AFI 13-201. Inadvertent flights above Mach
will be handled IAW AFI 13-201.

5.7.2. In the NAS. The PIC will:

5.7.2.1. Not allow their aircraft to exceed 250 knots indicated airspeed (KIAS)
below 10,000 ft. MSL unless the MAJCOM has approved a higher speed IAW paragraph
5.7.5., FAA Speed Authorization.

5.7.2.2. Not allow their aircraft to exceed 200 KIAS at or below 2,500 ft. AGL
within 4 NMs of the primary airport of a Class C or Class D airspace area unless
authorized or required by ATC, or required to maintain the minimum safe
maneuvering airspeed specified in the aircraft T.O.

5.7.2.3. Not allow their aircraft to exceed 200 KIAS in the airspace underlying
a Class B airspace area designated for an airport or in a VFR corridor
designated through Class B airspace area, unless required to maintain the
minimum safe maneuvering airspeed specified in the aircraft T.O.

[snip]

5.7.5. FAA Speed Authorization. The FAA recognizes that certain military
operations and training requirements cannot be met under the terms of the FAR
91.117, Aircraft Speed, and has therefore granted a speed authorization. The
authorization grants an exception to aircraft having flight characteristics that
preclude safe operations at speeds below 250 KIAS by providing that if the
minimum safe airspeed for any particular operation is greater than the maximum
speed prescribed, the aircraft may be operated at the minimum safe speed.

5.7.5.1. When the Authorization Applies. Air Force pilots may operate their
aircraft below 10,000 ft. MSL, within US airspace, in excess of 250 KIAS only
under the following conditions:

5.7.5.1.1. Within restricted areas.

5.7.5.1.2. Within Military Operating Areas (MOAs).

5.7.5.1.3. When operating within MAJCOM approved large-scale exercises or
short-term special missions.

5.7.5.1.4. Within published IFR MTRs.

5.7.5.1.5. Within published VFR MTRs. (Exception. Aircraft will not exceed 250
KIAS on SR routes)

5.7.5.1.6. Within defined areas or routes that have been coordinated and
concurred on by the proper MAJCOM and FAA regions, but have not yet been
published. This provision is intended to accommodate speed requirements on an
interim basis until the area/route can be published.

5.7.5.1.7. When the aircraft T.O. requires or recommends a higher speed in order
to maintain safe maneuverability. If the safe maneuvering airspeed in the T.O.
is listed as a range, fly the slowest speed practical in that range, based on
weight and configuration. This provision is primarily to accommodate
climbs/descents and terminal area operations.

NOTE: Airspeeds applicable to this exemption must be published in the aircraft
T.O. (Dash-1). A MAJCOM supplement or MDS specific Volume 3 does not constitute
the aircraft flight manual as referenced in the FAA exemption.

--
Bob Noel
Looking for a sig the
lawyers will hate

[John T]

Larry Dighera wrote:
>
> Your tax dollars at work. :-(

I'm with Gatt on this one. I very seriously doubt any of my tax dollars were
spent on the equipment in this video.

> Do you think you could see-and-avoid military aircraft on a MTR?

Do you have an alternative to MTRs?

--
John T
http://sage1solutions.com/TknoFlyer
Reduce spam. Use Sender Policy Framework: http://spf.pobox.com
____________________

[LWG]

This video has been around for a while. The last go 'round I think the
consensus was that it was the South African airforce. I would still love it
even if it were my tax dollars. The only problem is it ain't me.

"Larry Dighera" > wrote in message
...
> On Tue, 2 Jan 2007 10:24:57 -0800, "gatt"
> > wrote in
> >:
>
>>Wild.
>>
>>http://www.glumbert.com/media/flylow
>>
>
> Your tax dollars at work. :-(
>
> Only the military is exempt from operations at speeds in excess of 250
> knots below 10,000'. The kill a civilian in the US now and then due
> to not being able to see-and-avoid at those speeds, but oh well....
>
> Do you think you could see-and-avoid military aircraft on a MTR?
>

[[email protected]]

On 2-Jan-2007, "gatt" > wrote:

> What kind of planes are they? Doesn't look like MY tax dollars at work.
>
> -c

Most of the jets in the video are Mirage F.1s and there is one quick scene
tpward the end of three Alpha Jets making a low pass over an airfield. A
lot of Air Forces in the world fly both types, but not the U.S.
Scott Wilson

[Jose[_1_]]

> unless the MAJCOM has approved a higher speed

What is MAJCOM, and what precludes them from blanket approval?

> 5.7.5.1.4. Within published IFR MTRs.
> 5.7.5.1.5. Within published VFR MTRs. (Exception. Aircraft will not exceed 250
> KIAS on SR routes)

This is useful. It tells me why MTRs are published.

Jose
--
He who laughs, lasts.
for Email, make the obvious change in the address.

[Bob Noel]

In article >,
Jose > wrote:

> > unless the MAJCOM has approved a higher speed
>
> What is MAJCOM,

Major Command. The USAF organization that "owns" the aircraft.

>and what precludes them from blanket approval?

Don't know off the top of my head. There is probably a relationship
between the MAJCOM and the Air Force Flight Safety Agenecy. But
I'd have to look through a whole bunch of Air Force Policy Directives
and Air Force Instruction (and probably PMDs), to figure it out.

--
Bob Noel
Looking for a sig the
lawyers will hate

[BT]

5.7.5.1.7. When the aircraft T.O. requires or recommends a higher speed in
order
to maintain safe maneuverability. If the safe maneuvering airspeed in the
T.O.
is listed as a range, fly the slowest speed practical in that range, based
on
weight and configuration. This provision is primarily to accommodate
climbs/descents and terminal area operations.

B-1 climb out, 300-360kias transition to Mach .81
B-1 descent, 300knts max below 10K MSL, Gear/Flap speed was 240, min
approach with no flaps normally about 210kias
BT

"Bob Noel" > wrote in message
...
> In article >,
> Larry Dighera > wrote:
>
>> Only the military is exempt from operations at speeds in excess of 250
>> knots below 10,000'.
>
> That's not true.
>
> 91.117 Aircraft speed.
>
> [snip]
>
> (d) If the minimum safe airspeed for any particular operation is greater
> than
> the maximum speed prescribed in this section, the aircraft may be operated
> at
> that minimum speed.
>
>
> And the USAF has its own rules which basically mirror the FAA requirements
> on
> civilian aircraft wrt airspeed limits. Not that it's an exception rather
> than
> an exemption.
>
> SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
> AIR FORCE INSTRUCTION 11-202, VOLUME 3
> 16 FEBRUARY 2005
> Flying Operations
> GENERAL FLIGHT RULES
>
> 5.7. Aircraft Speed.
> 5.7.1. Supersonic Flight. The PIC will not allow the aircraft to operate
> at or
> above Mach l except as specified in AFI 13-201. Inadvertent flights above
> Mach
> will be handled IAW AFI 13-201.
>
> 5.7.2. In the NAS. The PIC will:
>
> 5.7.2.1. Not allow their aircraft to exceed 250 knots indicated airspeed
> (KIAS)
> below 10,000 ft. MSL unless the MAJCOM has approved a higher speed IAW
> paragraph
> 5.7.5., FAA Speed Authorization.
>
> 5.7.2.2. Not allow their aircraft to exceed 200 KIAS at or below 2,500 ft.
> AGL
> within 4 NMs of the primary airport of a Class C or Class D airspace area
> unless
> authorized or required by ATC, or required to maintain the minimum safe
> maneuvering airspeed specified in the aircraft T.O.
>
> 5.7.2.3. Not allow their aircraft to exceed 200 KIAS in the airspace
> underlying
> a Class B airspace area designated for an airport or in a VFR corridor
> designated through Class B airspace area, unless required to maintain the
> minimum safe maneuvering airspeed specified in the aircraft T.O.
>
> [snip]
>
> 5.7.5. FAA Speed Authorization. The FAA recognizes that certain military
> operations and training requirements cannot be met under the terms of the
> FAR
> 91.117, Aircraft Speed, and has therefore granted a speed authorization.
> The
> authorization grants an exception to aircraft having flight
> characteristics that
> preclude safe operations at speeds below 250 KIAS by providing that if the
> minimum safe airspeed for any particular operation is greater than the
> maximum
> speed prescribed, the aircraft may be operated at the minimum safe speed.
>
> 5.7.5.1. When the Authorization Applies. Air Force pilots may operate
> their
> aircraft below 10,000 ft. MSL, within US airspace, in excess of 250 KIAS
> only
> under the following conditions:
>
> 5.7.5.1.1. Within restricted areas.
>
> 5.7.5.1.2. Within Military Operating Areas (MOAs).
>
> 5.7.5.1.3. When operating within MAJCOM approved large-scale exercises or
> short-term special missions.
>
> 5.7.5.1.4. Within published IFR MTRs.
>
> 5.7.5.1.5. Within published VFR MTRs. (Exception. Aircraft will not exceed
> 250
> KIAS on SR routes)
>
> 5.7.5.1.6. Within defined areas or routes that have been coordinated and
> concurred on by the proper MAJCOM and FAA regions, but have not yet been
> published. This provision is intended to accommodate speed requirements on
> an
> interim basis until the area/route can be published.
>
> 5.7.5.1.7. When the aircraft T.O. requires or recommends a higher speed in
> order
> to maintain safe maneuverability. If the safe maneuvering airspeed in the
> T.O.
> is listed as a range, fly the slowest speed practical in that range, based
> on
> weight and configuration. This provision is primarily to accommodate
> climbs/descents and terminal area operations.
>
> NOTE: Airspeeds applicable to this exemption must be published in the
> aircraft
> T.O. (Dash-1). A MAJCOM supplement or MDS specific Volume 3 does not
> constitute
> the aircraft flight manual as referenced in the FAA exemption.
>
> --
> Bob Noel
> Looking for a sig the
> lawyers will hate
>

[Larry Dighera]

On Tue, 2 Jan 2007 14:40:16 -0800, "BT" > wrote
in >:

>I've done my share of dodging low altitude GA aircraft (500-1000ft AGL)
>I do not want to know how many I did not see,

Is there any equipment on board military aircraft to augment human
vision in deconflicting the airspace on MTRs?

[Larry Dighera]

On Tue, 02 Jan 2007 18:28:09 -0500, Bob Noel
> wrote in
>:

>That's not true.

Thanks for the research.

Perhaps you are able to provide some examples of non-military aircraft
that are exempt from the speed limit below 10,000'.

[Larry Dighera]

On Tue, 2 Jan 2007 18:31:41 -0500, "John T"
> wrote in
>:

>
>Do you have an alternative to MTRs?

I believe the aircraft causing the hazard to aerial navigation, by
virtue of their exemption from FARs, should shoulder the _entire_
burden of deconflicting their airspace. Currently, it is my belief
that MTR aircraft are not required to employ any on-board radar
equipment for that purpose, nor are they required to be TCAS equipped.
That is inequitable and negligent, IMNSHO.

[Peter Clark]

On Wed, 03 Jan 2007 11:16:10 GMT, Larry Dighera >
wrote:

>On Tue, 02 Jan 2007 18:28:09 -0500, Bob Noel
> wrote in
>:
>
>>That's not true.
>
>Thanks for the research.
>
>Perhaps you are able to provide some examples of non-military aircraft
>that are exempt from the speed limit below 10,000'.

747, 777, etc at MGTW.

[Larry Dighera]

On Tue, 02 Jan 2007 18:28:09 -0500, Bob Noel
> wrote in
>:

>Not[e] that it's an exception rather than an exemption.

Are you able to articulate how the distinction in semantics you note
above is significant?

Are you able to provide the link address to the military regulations
data you provided?

Are you aware of a Missed Approach Procedure being published for MTRs?

Thanks.

[Bob Noel]

In article >,
Larry Dighera > wrote:

> >Not[e] that it's an exception rather than an exemption.
>
> Are you able to articulate how the distinction in semantics you note
> above is significant?

"significant"? nah, but to me exceptions are more restrictive than
exemptions.

>
> Are you able to provide the link address to the military regulations
> data you provided?

Yes, but it won't do you any good. The DoD nows restricts access to
..mil websites unless you have a CAC card. I doubt you have one.

>
> Are you aware of a Missed Approach Procedure being published for MTRs?

Nope.

--
Bob Noel
Looking for a sig the
lawyers will hate

[John T]

"Larry Dighera" > wrote in message

>
>> Do you have an alternative to MTRs?
>
> I believe the aircraft causing the hazard to aerial navigation, by
> virtue of their exemption from FARs, should shoulder the _entire_
> burden of deconflicting their airspace. Currently, it is my belief
> that MTR aircraft are not required to employ any on-board radar
> equipment for that purpose, nor are they required to be TCAS equipped.
> That is inequitable and negligent, IMNSHO.

So, the direct answer to my question is "no", correct?

Just so we're clear, what is your understanding of the definition and
purpose of "MTR's"?

--
John T
http://sage1solutions.com/blogs/TknoFlyer
Reduce spam. Use Sender Policy Framework: http://openspf.org
____________________

[Larry Dighera]

On Wed, 03 Jan 2007 06:59:19 -0500, Peter Clark
> wrote in
>:

>
>>Perhaps you are able to provide some examples of non-military aircraft
>>that are exempt from the speed limit below 10,000'.
>
>747, 777, etc at MGTW.

What is the recommended speed for those aircraft on departure below
10,000'?

[Larry Dighera]

On Wed, 03 Jan 2007 07:13:23 -0500, Bob Noel
> wrote in
>:

>> Are you aware of a Missed Approach Procedure being published for MTRs?
>
>Nope

I believe that lack of a MTR MAP may have been a factor in the
November 16, 2000 MAC in which a flight of two F-16s descended into
Class B & C airspace without the required ATC clearance. I find it
difficult to understand why a military instructor would consciously
decided to violate regulations. Perhaps there was no published
alternative?

[Larry Dighera]

On Wed, 3 Jan 2007 07:18:50 -0500, "John T"
> wrote in
>:

>"Larry Dighera" > wrote in message

>>
>>> Do you have an alternative to MTRs?
>>
>> I believe the aircraft causing the hazard to aerial navigation, by
>> virtue of their exemption from FARs, should shoulder the _entire_
>> burden of deconflicting their airspace. Currently, it is my belief
>> that MTR aircraft are not required to employ any on-board radar
>> equipment for that purpose, nor are they required to be TCAS equipped.
>> That is inequitable and negligent, IMNSHO.
>
>So, the direct answer to my question is "no", correct?

Oh please. That kind of attitude isn't constructive. At least I
proposed an idea that may serve to reduce the hazard caused by low
level Military Training Routs. What constructive information have you
provided?

>Just so we're clear, what is your understanding of the definition and
>purpose of "MTR's"?

Why is that significant?

[John T]

"Larry Dighera" > wrote in message

>
> Oh please. That kind of attitude isn't constructive.

No less so than evading a direct answer to a simple question, but that's
what we've come to expect from you, so it's good to see you're consistent.

> At least I
> proposed an idea that may serve to reduce the hazard caused by low
> level Military Training Routs.

This is precisely why I asked my follow-up question. Your proposal
demostrates a lack of understanding of the purpose and use of MTRs.

> What constructive information have you provided?

I'm trying to lead a horse to water. You have no trouble digging up the most
inane anti-government/anti-military minutiae, but you won't bother to
research a key piece of NAS architecture. As I said, at least you're
consistent.

>> Just so we're clear, what is your understanding of the definition and
>> purpose of "MTR's"?
>
> Why is that significant?

This is key to understanding why your "proposal" is counter-productive. Come
back when you've done your homework.

--
John T
http://sage1solutions.com/blogs/TknoFlyer
Reduce spam. Use Sender Policy Framework: http://openspf.org
____________________

[Larry Dighera]

On Wed, 3 Jan 2007 07:53:57 -0500, "John T"
> wrote in
>:

>"Larry Dighera" > wrote in message

>>
>> Oh please. That kind of attitude isn't constructive.
>
>No less so than evading a direct answer to a simple question,

Please tell me how "an alternative to MTRs" is more constructive than
suggesting specific changes to military regulations that may result in
more diligence in military flyers concerns for deconfliction.

>but that's what we've come to expect from you, so it's good to see you're consistent.

You make that sound like you speak for more than yourself alone. Who
else do you count as being among the "we" you mention?

>> At least I
>> proposed an idea that may serve to reduce the hazard caused by low
>> level Military Training Routs.
>
>This is precisely why I asked my follow-up question. Your proposal
>demostrates a lack of understanding of the purpose and use of MTRs.

Are you able to articulate that alleged "lack of understanding"?

>> What constructive information have you provided?
>
>I'm trying to lead a horse to water. You have no trouble digging up the most
>inane anti-government/anti-military minutiae, but you won't bother to
>research a key piece of NAS architecture.

If you characterize these representative military-civil MACs as inane
minutiae, it is you who needs to consider a more humane attitude
toward civil flyers.


Civil aircraft to the right of military aircraft:
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20050126X00109&key=1

F-16s lacked required ATC clearance:
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20001212X22313&key=1

A6 pilot expected to exit MTR eight minutes after route closure:
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20001211X12242&key=1

A6 hit glider that had right of way:
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20001213X33340&key=1


As you can see, it is the civil pilot who usually loses his life at
the hands of military pilots operating on low-level MTRs. My proposal
is designed to provide additional impetus to those military pilots to
exercise caution in their deconfliction and decision making.

I would think military pilots would be supportive of measures designed
to enhance air safety. If there are design flaws in the system, is it
wrong to attempt to address them?

>As I said, at least you're consistent.
>
>>> Just so we're clear, what is your understanding of the definition and
>>> purpose of "MTR's"?
>>
>> Why is that significant?
>
>This is key to understanding why your "proposal" is counter-productive. Come
>back when you've done your homework.

As currently implemented, Military Training Routes are joint-use
airspace. To expect that airspace to be free of non-military aircraft
is unrealistic and contrary to federal civil and military regulations.
Just so we all understand the definition of a MTR:

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/airspace.htm
A Military Training Route, or MTR, is basically a long,
low-altitude [joint use] corridor that serves as a flight path to
a particular destination [with aircraft speeds up to mach 1]. The
corridor is often 10 miles wide, 70 to 100 miles long [although
it's not charted that way], and may range from 500 to 1,500 feet
above ground level [and unrealistically relies solely upon
see-and-avoid for collision avoidance in VMC]; occasionally, they
are higher. MTRs are designed to provide realistic low-altitude
training conditions for pilots. In times of conflict, to avoid
detection by enemy radar, tactical fighter aircraft are often
called upon to fly hundreds of miles at low altitude over varying
terrain. Obviously, navigation is extremely difficult on
high-speed low-altitude flights. That's why it is imperative that
fighter pilots have ample opportunity to practice these necessary
and demanding skills [even if it endangers the lives of the
public].

Okay, now lets hear your reasoning as to why you believe my proposal
is counter productive, please.

I'm expecting to see some sincere, constructive, thoughtful, reasoning
from you. If you choose to continue to bait me with innuendo and
insincere arguments, you will have publicly demonstrated your true
reasons for participating in this message thread.

[Gig 601XL Builder]

"Newps" > wrote in message
. ..
>
>
> gatt wrote:
>
>> "Larry Dighera" > wrote in message
>> ...
>>
>>>On Tue, 2 Jan 2007 10:24:57 -0800, "gatt"
> wrote in
>:
>>>
>>>
>>>>Wild.
>>>>
>>>>http://www.glumbert.com/media/flylow
>>>>
>>>
>>>Your tax dollars at work. :-(
>>
>>
>> What kind of planes are they? Doesn't look like MY tax dollars at work.
>
> Those aren't your tax dollars. That's an old video and is from a foreign
> country.
>
>

I can't believe the one shot of him head down reading a map at that
altitude. Especially since he wasn't lead.

[Blueskies]

They really are not going all that fast...


"gatt" > wrote in message ...
: Wild.
:
: http://www.glumbert.com/media/flylow
:
:

[Larry Dighera]

On Tue, 2 Jan 2007 14:28:17 -0800, "gatt"
> wrote in
>:

> Doesn't look like MY tax dollars at work.

As Usenet is a worldwide forum, it guess it depends on your country of
citizenship.

[John T]

"Larry Dighera" > wrote in message

>
> I believe that lack of a MTR MAP may have been a factor in the
> November 16, 2000 MAC in which a flight of two F-16s descended into
> Class B & C airspace without the required ATC clearance. I find it
> difficult to understand why a military instructor would consciously
> decided to violate regulations. Perhaps there was no published
> alternative?

How so? The NTSB report you listed makes no mention of the -16s attempting
any landing much less an instrument approach. There was also no mention of a
military instructor only an ATC instructor.

--
John T
http://sage1solutions.com/blogs/TknoFlyer
Reduce spam. Use Sender Policy Framework: http://openspf.org
____________________

[John T]

"Larry Dighera" > wrote in message

>
> My proposal is designed to provide additional impetus
> to those military pilots to exercise caution in their
> deconfliction and decision making.

The best alternative here is to make MTR non-joint use by making them
restricted areas. This would give the military the training routes they need
while protecting low-flying civilians. However, this is a fairly draconian
action and I think the current charting of "here be dragons" is a good
compromise between this option and the opposite end of doing away with MTRs
altogether.

Your proposal for "deconflicting" this airspace takes away key training
options and makes it harder to give military pilots realistic training.
Combat missions are not often flown with active radar to avoid alerting the
enemy so requiring pilots training here to always use radar takes away
combat realism. Your idea of TCAS relies on transponder signals which are
not available from many aircraft including half of those you listed. It also
relies on radio signals that, like radar, could disclose the location of
aircraft to an enemy so its use is also unrealistic training.

Here is your linked text (from an anti-US military site, BTW) in its
unedited form:
> http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/airspace.htm
> A Military Training Route, or MTR, is basically a long,
> low-altitude corridor that serves as a flight path to
> a particular destination. The
> corridor is often 10 miles wide, 70 to 100 miles long, and
> may range from 500 to 1,500 feet
> above ground level; occasionally, they
> are higher. MTRs are designed to provide realistic low-altitude
> training conditions for pilots. In times of conflict, to avoid
> detection by enemy radar, tactical fighter aircraft are often
> called upon to fly hundreds of miles at low altitude over varying
> terrain. Obviously, navigation is extremely difficult on
> high-speed low-altitude flights. That's why it is imperative that
> fighter pilots have ample opportunity to practice these necessary
> and demanding skills.

Even this site admits "it is imperative that fighter pilots have ample
opportunity to practice" high speed, low altitude flights. MTRs are vital to
training military pilots in simulated wartime conditions. This may include
activities hazardous to other aircraft including night flight without
navigation lights or flying nap-of-the-earth without active radar. I'm not
prepared to take away this key training tool.

These routes are charted and defined for pilots to know of them. If you're
not comfortable with the safety margins, avoid them. They really do
constitute a tiny percentage of the US NAS.

> Okay, now lets hear your reasoning as to why you believe my proposal
> is counter productive, please.

Done.

--
John T
http://sage1solutions.com/blogs/TknoFlyer
Reduce spam. Use Sender Policy Framework: http://openspf.org
____________________

[Larry Dighera]

On Wed, 3 Jan 2007 11:06:26 -0500, "John T"
> wrote in
>:

>"Larry Dighera" > wrote in message

>>
>> My proposal is designed to provide additional impetus
>> to those military pilots to exercise caution in their
>> deconfliction and decision making.
>
>The best alternative here is to make MTR non-joint use by making them
>restricted areas. This would give the military the training routes they need
>while protecting low-flying civilians. However, this is a fairly draconian
>action and I think the current charting of "here be dragons" is a good
>compromise between this option and the opposite end of doing away with MTRs
>altogether.

We both agree that the high-speed military operations conducted in
joint-use MTRs below 10,000' feet create a significant hazard to civil
operation appropriate for containment within formal Restricted Areas.
Good. That's a step toward understanding the issue.

>Your proposal for "deconflicting" this airspace takes away key training
>options and makes it harder to give military pilots realistic training.

My proposal was for the military to exclusively shoulder the
responsibility for the hazard they cause. Here is what I proposed:

I believe the aircraft causing the hazard to aerial navigation, by
virtue of their exemption from FARs, should shoulder the _entire_
burden of deconflicting their airspace. Currently, it is my
belief that MTR aircraft are not required to employ any on-board
radar equipment for that purpose, nor are they required to be TCAS
equipped. That is inequitable and negligent, IMNSHO.

>Combat missions are not often flown with active radar to avoid alerting the
>enemy so requiring pilots training here to always use radar takes away
>combat realism.

So you're justifying the deaths of those civil pilots killed by
military aviators on MTRs in the name of realistic training
conditions? I hope not! If so, let's put your progeny in the path of
a blazing F-16, and see if your attitude changes.

>Your idea of TCAS relies on transponder signals which are
>not available from many aircraft including half of those you listed.

Perhaps. But I'd be happy if the military pilot operating on a MTR
were alerted to _my_ transponder. ATC radar can't see me in
uninhabited desert areas down close to the terrain

If that's not an option, perhaps an AWACS could call out conflicting
traffic to those military airmen operating on low-level MTRs.

If that's not to the military's liking, or too expensive, why not have
inexpensive, portable FLARMlike <http://www.flarm.com/index_en.html>
devices available for military pilot use on low-level MTRs? That
would certainly be preferable to killing civilian pilots in the name
of realistic military training. Who knows; it might save some
military pilots too.

If I were tasked to fly MTRs, be assured I would be _formally_
demanding such safety measures from my superiors.

>It also
>relies on radio signals that, like radar, could disclose the location of
>aircraft to an enemy so its use is also unrealistic training.

Putting the public at risk, so that realistic military training can be
conducted, is reprehensible, shortsighted and stupid (not to mention
probably illegal). There's got to be a better way.

Title 49's number one priority is air safety, and the main concern
after that is commerce; it looks like the law of the land places
military training in third place at best.

>Here is your linked text (from an anti-US military site, BTW) in its
>unedited form:

(What makes you characterize that site as "anti-US military"? It
seems to be neutral and unbiased to me.

Apparently the site's author was once affiliated with The Federation
of American Scientists. Here's what they have to say about
themselves:

http://www.fas.org/static/about.jsp
The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) was formed in 1945 by
atomic scientists from the Manhattan Project who felt that
scientists, engineers and other innovators had an ethical
obligation to bring their knowledge and experience to bear on
critical national decisions, especially pertaining to the
technology they unleashed - the Atomic Bomb.)

>> http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/airspace.htm
>> A Military Training Route, or MTR, is basically a long,
>> low-altitude corridor that serves as a flight path to
>> a particular destination. The
>> corridor is often 10 miles wide, 70 to 100 miles long, and
>> may range from 500 to 1,500 feet
>> above ground level; occasionally, they
>> are higher. MTRs are designed to provide realistic low-altitude
>> training conditions for pilots. In times of conflict, to avoid
>> detection by enemy radar, tactical fighter aircraft are often
>> called upon to fly hundreds of miles at low altitude over varying
>> terrain. Obviously, navigation is extremely difficult on
>> high-speed low-altitude flights. That's why it is imperative that
>> fighter pilots have ample opportunity to practice these necessary
>> and demanding skills.
>
>Even this site admits "it is imperative that fighter pilots have ample
>opportunity to practice" high speed, low altitude flights. MTRs are vital to
>training military pilots in simulated wartime conditions. This may include
>activities hazardous to other aircraft including night flight without
>navigation lights or flying nap-of-the-earth without active radar. I'm not
>prepared to take away this key training tool.

I have no issue with the military's necessity for realistic training.

But necessity is no excuse for negligence, and finding the civil pilot
to have been a cause of a MAC due to his inability to see-and-avoid at
the closing speeds involved on MTRs is arrogance beyond belief.

The NAS was designed with a 250 knot speed limit below 10,000' for a
reason; operations in excess of that limit are impudent. To fault a
civil pilot for his inability to see-and-avoid at speeds twice that
limit (as has occurred) is unreasonable. It's not the civil pilot
who's causing the hazard, nor is he trained to the same standards as
the military pilots.

>These routes are charted and defined for pilots to know of them.

Are you aware of the number of military pilots who are unaware that
low-level MTRs are within joint-use airspace? Many military pilots
believe they have exclusive right to that _partially_ charted
airspace. (Only the centerlines of ten mile wide MTRs are charted!)

>If you're not comfortable with the safety margins, avoid them.

There are flight missions that make that line of reasoning nearly
impossible; pipeline patrol and low-level aerial photography come to
mind.

Have you ever personally attempted to learn the current operational
status of a MTR from FSS? My experience has been an exercise in
frustration. When I am going to conduct a low-level mission, I
attempt to contact the military authority charged with the operation
of the MTRs involved. But it's often difficult to find the correct
military phone numbers and the contact correct personnel. It has been
my experience, that contacting FSS, as mentioned in the AIM, is not a
reliable alternative. That should change also.

>They really do constitute a tiny percentage of the US NAS.

I hope you're not trying to rationalize the hazard created by
Low-level Military Training Routes on that basis. Try telling that to
the widows and daughters of those civil pilots who were killed by
military pilots operating on low-level MTRs.

>> Okay, now lets hear your reasoning as to why you believe my proposal
>> is counter productive, please.
>
>Done.

Really? I don't see where you address my proposal that the military
should bear full and exclusive responsibility for the hazard they
create. Perhaps you'd be good enough to point out that portion of
your response. Thank you.

[[email protected]]

I'd believe that they were SAAF aircraft, but I also wonder if they are
French? The French have had a presence in Dijibouti, Chad, and various
desert like west African countries. I remember reading that they
conducted combat ops in Chad at one point in the 80's.
Could this be old French video from West Africa? (Mauritania, Mali)

[John T]

"Larry Dighera" > wrote in message

>
> We both agree that the high-speed military operations conducted in
> joint-use MTRs below 10,000' feet create a significant hazard to civil
> operation appropriate for containment within formal Restricted Areas.

It's good you see reason from time to time. So, let's agree to make MTRs
"Restricted" and call it day, shall we?

> So you're justifying the deaths of those civil pilots killed by
> military aviators on MTRs in the name of realistic training
> conditions? I hope not!

No, I'm not "justifying" any such deaths, but you're deflecting the
argument. I merely highlighted how your proposal takes away realism from
military training.

> If so, let's put your progeny in the path of
> a blazing F-16, and see if your attitude changes.

This is the typical specious argument posed in similar discussions. For the
record, my attitude has not changed.

> If that's not an option, perhaps an AWACS could call out conflicting
> traffic to those military airmen operating on low-level MTRs.

Decent idea. Do you know they don't?

> If that's not to the military's liking, or too expensive, why not have
> inexpensive, portable FLARMlike <http://www.flarm.com/index_en.html>
> devices available for military pilot use on low-level MTRs?

This device, like TCAS, broadcasts a radio signal. This negates realism (by
emitting a beacon that would not be used in combat). Once again, the best
option remains making the MTR "Restricted" to separate civil from military
traffic.

> If I were tasked to fly MTRs, be assured I would be _formally_
> demanding such safety measures from my superiors.

I have absolutely no doubt about that.

> Putting the public at risk, so that realistic military training can be
> conducted, is reprehensible, shortsighted and stupid (not to mention
> probably illegal). There's got to be a better way.

We've already agreed there is: Restricted airspace.

By the way, were those four incidents you listed the only ones you found in
the NTSB database? Statistically, it seems the threat of low flying military
aircraft is much lower than that posed by other GA aircraft.

> (What makes you characterize that site as "anti-US military"? It
> seems to be neutral and unbiased to me.

That doesn't surprise me in the least. Other readers will reach their own
conclusions - some will even agree with you.

> But necessity is no excuse for negligence, and finding the civil pilot
> to have been a cause of a MAC due to his inability to see-and-avoid at
> the closing speeds involved on MTRs is arrogance beyond belief.

If the pilot were in a "hot" MTR and made no effort to confirm the status of
the airspace, then they at least contributed to the incident.

> Are you aware of the number of military pilots who are unaware that
> low-level MTRs are within joint-use airspace?

I never claimed such awareness, but it does beg the question: Are you?

> Many military pilots
> believe they have exclusive right to that _partially_ charted
> airspace.

Can you back up this claim?

> (Only the centerlines of ten mile wide MTRs are charted!)

Only the centerlines of VOR airways are charted. Do you not know their
bounds? Why would determining the bounds of MTRs be so much more onerous?

>> If you're not comfortable with the safety margins, avoid them.
>
> There are flight missions that make that line of reasoning nearly
> impossible; pipeline patrol and low-level aerial photography come to
> mind.

The folks flying these missions must be doing something right as none of the
incidents you've quoted involved them. I submit few such missions expose
their pilots to additional risk as I doubt many pipelines or photo subjects,
for example, run with MTRs.

> Have you ever personally attempted to learn the current operational
> status of a MTR from FSS? My experience has been an exercise in
> frustration. ... That should change also.

No disagreement here, but this is unrelated to your proposal.

>> They really do constitute a tiny percentage of the US NAS.
>
> I hope you're not trying to rationalize the hazard created by
> Low-level Military Training Routes on that basis. Try telling that to
> the widows and daughters of those civil pilots who were killed by
> military pilots operating on low-level MTRs.

I doubt this conversation would be any more difficult than discussing a
GA-GA MAC - and appears to happen far less frequently, too.

> Really? I don't see where you address my proposal that the military
> should bear full and exclusive responsibility for the hazard they
> create. Perhaps you'd be good enough to point out that portion of
> your response. Thank you.

See above (re: Restricted areas). You're welcome.

--
John T
http://sage1solutions.com/blogs/TknoFlyer
Reduce spam. Use Sender Policy Framework: http://openspf.org
____________________

[John T]

"Larry Dighera" > wrote in message

>
> I'm proposing that MTRs should have MAPs, so that the airmen
> who find themselves in a situation as Parker did will know what to do
> when they can't find the MTR entry point.

So you're defining "MAP" as "missed MTR entry approach procedure"?

> The MAC occurred while the flight lead, Parker, was attempting to
> enter the MTR. If there had been a MTR MAP, perhaps he'd have
> executed it instead of choosing to descend into congested Class B
> terminal airspace ...

My understanding is Parker was not aware he was descending into Class B/C
airspace so, while he chose to descend, I'm not convinced he chose to
descend into Class B airspace. The AIB reinforces this. If you have a quote
contradicting this, please point it out.

As it stands, he was miles away from where he thought he was. I'm not
convinced a "MTR-MAP" would have done much to prevent this scenario.

> Actually, all three pilots involved in this MAC were flight
> instructors.

Check your facts.

> You might find the USAF AIB report enlightening.

It was (I've actually read it before).

> (But please don't try to explain away Parker's culpability as being
> due to equipment error until you have a chart of the airspace marked
> with actual and indicated locations (and times) of all three aircraft
> involved. Anything less is a deliberate attempt to cover up this
> travesty.)

I will agree to your conditions as soon as you refuse to blame him until
after flying his route with his conditions. Anything less is a deliberate
attempt to smear a fellow citizen willing to place himself in harm's way to
defend our ability to have this conversation.

--
John T
http://sage1solutions.com/blogs/TknoFlyer
Reduce spam. Use Sender Policy Framework: http://openspf.org
____________________

[Larry Dighera]

As I see you have nothing constructive to add to the debate, I'll
retire my discussion with you on this topic. Thanks for the
opportunity to air this onerous issue.


There is no expedient to which a man will not resort
to avoid the real labor of thinking.
-- Sir Joshua Reynolds

[Peter Clark]

On Wed, 03 Jan 2007 12:28:06 GMT, Larry Dighera >
wrote:

>On Wed, 03 Jan 2007 06:59:19 -0500, Peter Clark
> wrote in
>:
>
>>
>>>Perhaps you are able to provide some examples of non-military aircraft
>>>that are exempt from the speed limit below 10,000'.
>>
>>747, 777, etc at MGTW.
>
>What is the recommended speed for those aircraft on departure below
>10,000'?

I don't have a number off the top of my head, but about 280-285KIAS
clean at MGTW rings a bell. They won't exceed 250KIAS unless heavy
enough that their maneuvering margin requires it.

[Larry Dighera]

On Wed, 3 Jan 2007 15:47:42 -0500, "John T"
> wrote in
>:

>"Larry Dighera" > wrote in message

>>
>> I'm proposing that MTRs should have MAPs, so that the airmen
>> who find themselves in a situation as Parker did will know what to do
>> when they can't find the MTR entry point.
>
>So you're defining "MAP" as "missed MTR entry approach procedure"?

Hey, you're catching on. :-)

What is the proper procedure if the pilot fails to locate the MTR
entry point? Do you know? Is it published?

>> The MAC occurred while the flight lead, Parker, was attempting to
>> enter the MTR. If there had been a MTR MAP, perhaps he'd have
>> executed it instead of choosing to descend into congested Class B
>> terminal airspace ...
>
>My understanding is Parker was not aware he was descending into Class B/C
>airspace so, while he chose to descend, I'm not convinced he chose to
>descend into Class B airspace.

Visibility was >10 miles at the time of the mishap. Parker had just
attempted to contact Tampa Approach, and failed because he was given
the wrong frequency by ATC, and because he failed to accurately input
into his radio the frequency he was given.

Any thinking person can easily understand, that if he needed a
clearance to descend into Class B airspace, canceling IFR would not
remove that requirement. It's just logical. Regardless of Parker's
failure to brief terminal airspace prior to departing as required by
USAF regulations (it's in the AIB report), it's easy to see a large
international airport on the ground below from 13,000', and appreciate
that they are most always surrounded by a sixty mile diameter Class B
airspace. If Parker didn't know that, he had no business leading a
flight.

I asked you not to try to defend Parker's decision to descend, without
plotting out the aircraft positions on a chart, but you chose to
ignore my request. I have done that, and I'm prepared to discuss
Parker's culpability further with you when you have also. On-line
Terminal Area Charts are available here: http://skyvector.com/

If you truly desire to exonerate Parker, you'll do the requisite
research work to make your position credible. If you're too lazy or
ignorant to do that, further discussion is pointless.

>The AIB reinforces this. If you have a quote contradicting this, please point it out.

Parker and the AIB are/were both employed by the same entity, the
USAF, and facing a wrongful death/civil law suit. If you truly
believe there was impartiality in the Scott's decision, you are more
naïve than I expect. If you plot the aircraft positions, you'll come
to the same conclusion I did: the navigational errors alleged in the
AIB report work against Parker's defense, not for it.

>As it stands, he was miles away from where he thought he was.

How many miles? In what direction did the equipment's navigational
error indicate, and by how many miles. In what direction and by how
many miles did Parker's erroneous operation of his navigational
equipment place him? What is the size of the Class B airspace. Where
is the MTR entry point located?

How long after the mishap was the medical examination of Parker
conducted? How likely is it that the navigational equipment, that was
fully functional in the sortie before lunch, would fail after lunch?
:-)

>I'm not convinced a "MTR-MAP" would have done much to prevent this scenario.

My reasoning is that it would have provided Parker with a specific
course of action, that may have saved him some face in the eyes of his
wingman who he lead into the fatal collision with the C-172 operating
under positive control in Class C airspace. I'm just trying to think
creatively and constructively of anything that might make MTR
operations safer for all airmen. Are you capable of similar
constructive thinking?

>> Actually, all three pilots involved in this MAC were flight
>> instructors.
>
>Check your facts.

Re-read the AIB report, or you not truly interested enough in this
subject to perform the work necessary to discuss it intelligently? I'm
done doing your research for you.

>> You might find the USAF AIB report enlightening.
>
>It was (I've actually read it before).

It's over six years old. You need to refresh your memory, or admit
that you've forgotten many of the facts contained in it.

>> (But please don't try to explain away Parker's culpability as being
>> due to equipment error until you have a chart of the airspace marked
>> with actual and indicated locations (and times) of all three aircraft
>> involved. Anything less is a deliberate attempt to cover up this
>> travesty.)
>
>I will agree to your conditions as soon as you refuse to blame him until
>after flying his route with his conditions.

If you can arrange training in an F-16 for me, and an opportunity to
fly his route, I'll gladly comply with your absurd condition.

>Anything less is a deliberate attempt to smear a fellow citizen willing
>to place himself in harm's way to defend our ability to have this conversation.

I have no idea of Parker's military record? Did he ever actually see
combat? Do you have any information that substantiates your
allegation of his willingness to place himself in harm's way? Please
provide some supporting evidence if you are able.

Please don't get me wrong. I have great respect and admiration for
military pilots who are responsible and do not bring dishonor upon
their fellows.

I have no desire to smear anyone (Please notice that I haven't
mentioned ATC abominable contribution to this mishap). Rather, I
desire to expose what appears to me as a military cover up, and make
low-level flight safer for all airmen.

There is also a bit of injustice toward the dead fellow airman who is
unable to defend himself that I find particularly repugnant.

It is you who seem to be willing to defend an incompetent solely
because he is/was a military pilot. Are all military pilots incapable
of being incompetent and irresponsible in your mind solely by virtue
of their military affiliation? Or are you just attempting to defend a
fellow regardless of the facts?

[Larry Dighera]

On Wed, 03 Jan 2007 17:06:37 -0500, Peter Clark
> wrote in
>:

>On Wed, 03 Jan 2007 12:28:06 GMT, Larry Dighera >
>wrote:
>
>>On Wed, 03 Jan 2007 06:59:19 -0500, Peter Clark
> wrote in
>:
>>
>>>
>>>>Perhaps you are able to provide some examples of non-military aircraft
>>>>that are exempt from the speed limit below 10,000'.
>>>
>>>747, 777, etc at MGTW.
>>
>>What is the recommended speed for those aircraft on departure below
>>10,000'?
>
>I don't have a number off the top of my head, but about 280-285KIAS
>clean at MGTW rings a bell. They won't exceed 250KIAS unless heavy
>enough that their maneuvering margin requires it.

Fair enough.

So the numbers you cite indicate an ~11% speed increase by airliners
over that prescribed by 91.117 (250 knots), unlike the ~43% (441 KCAS)
mentioned in the F-16's AIB report. That works out to the F-16
exceeding the 250 knot airspeed limit by about four times more than
what the airliners do.

Given those numbers, I'm inclined to believe that the speeds at which
the military routinely operates on MTRs is considerably more
significant (by about a factor of four) than that at which airliners
operate in terminal airspace under positive control and separated from
all other aircraft by ATC in Class B airspace.

MTR flights are not provided radar services by ATC in most instances,
because FAA radars do not provide coverage at near ground level out in
the desert where most MTRs are located.

Thanks for the data point.

[John T]

"Larry Dighera" > wrote in message

>
>> So you're defining "MAP" as "missed MTR entry approach procedure"?
>
> Hey, you're catching on. :-)

It's hard when you're making up terms on the fly.

> What is the proper procedure if the pilot fails to locate the MTR
> entry point? Do you know? Is it published?

Others have answered that question, but VMC prevailed and they were
operating VFR. I expect normal VFR to apply.

> Any thinking person can easily understand, that if he needed a
> clearance to descend into Class B airspace, canceling IFR would not
> remove that requirement. It's just logical.

It's just as logical that if one believes he is not entering the airspace he
would not need a clearance.

> I asked you not to try to defend Parker's decision to descend, without
> plotting out the aircraft positions on a chart, but you chose to
> ignore my request.

That's a bold statement. Do you *know* I didn't?

>>> Actually, all three pilots involved in this MAC were flight
>>> instructors.
>>
>> Check your facts.
>
> Re-read the AIB report, or you not truly interested enough in this
> subject to perform the work necessary to discuss it intelligently? I'm
> done doing your research for you.

I did re-read the AIB you posted (before posting my response). Your
assertion is incorrect. Check your facts.

> Do you have any information that substantiates your
> allegation of his willingness to place himself in harm's way?

Yes. He was piloting an F-16 while serving in the US Air Force.

> Rather, I desire to expose what appears to me as a military cover
> up...[snip]

This appears to be the basis of your participation in this entire thread. I
admit a predisposition to give the highly trained professionals in the cadre
of military pilots the benefit of the doubt. You, on the other hand, appear
predisposed to the opposite. Further discussion on this is pointless -
despite your pathetic attempt to take the high road in your other response.

--
John T
http://sage1solutions.com/blogs/TknoFlyer
Reduce spam. Use Sender Policy Framework: http://openspf.org
____________________

[BT]

not on heavy Bomber aircraft..
fighter type aircraft may engage their air-to-air radar mode when not using
it for ground avoidance
but then pick the air target out of the ground clutter,
BT

"Larry Dighera" > wrote in message
...
> On Tue, 2 Jan 2007 14:40:16 -0800, "BT" > wrote
> in >:
>
>>I've done my share of dodging low altitude GA aircraft (500-1000ft AGL)
>>I do not want to know how many I did not see,
>
> Is there any equipment on board military aircraft to augment human
> vision in deconflicting the airspace on MTRs?

[BT]

> So the numbers you cite indicate an ~11% speed increase by airliners
> over that prescribed by 91.117 (250 knots), unlike the ~43% (441 KCAS)
> mentioned in the F-16's AIB report. That works out to the F-16
> exceeding the 250 knot airspeed limit by about four times more than
> what the airliners do.
>
> Given those numbers, I'm inclined to believe that the speeds at which
> the military routinely operates on MTRs is considerably more
> significant (by about a factor of four) than that at which airliners
> operate in terminal airspace under positive control and separated from
> all other aircraft by ATC in Class B airspace.
>
> MTR flights are not provided radar services by ATC in most instances,
> because FAA radars do not provide coverage at near ground level out in
> the desert where most MTRs are located.
>
> Thanks for the data point.

Larry, I routinely flew in MTRs at 540KTAS or greater, (but not over .95M),
540knts was the "programmed training speed" for the B-1, program speed for
the B-52 was 340KTAS.
BT

[Larry Dighera]

On Wed, 3 Jan 2007 16:51:11 -0800, "BT" > wrote
in >:

>I routinely flew in MTRs at 540KTAS or greater, (but not over .95M),
>540knts was the "programmed training speed" for the B-1, program speed for
>the B-52 was 340KTAS.

Many thanks for your input. At last, someone who has firsthand MTR
experience.

What would you suggest to keep the fast-movers from splattering the
low-level civil flyers?

Do any of the suggestions I proposed in this message thread make any
sense to you?

[BT]

Larry, the idea of a MAP or Missed Abort Procedure (or what ever) does not
make sense.
I have flown as instructor and evaluator on many MTRs and have had to abort
more than a few, either for hazardous weather (TRW) or an aircraft system
problem. There is already a standard procedure used to abort a low level
run. (climb, avoid weather if possible, call ATC) In the instance you
describe (I believe it was the F-16s in Florida) it would have made no
difference on the abort procedure, the abort procedure would be predicated
on knowing where you are to begin with. And in this instance the F-16s did
not know where they were, so they would not know to avoid certain airspace
if they did not already know they were close to it.

Remember, when I aborted low level, it was pitch to 30degrees nose high,
starting at 540KTAS and going to full AB, we would punch above 10K MSL in a
heart beat and have to push over to remain below Class A while we tried to
get ARTCC to answer up. If we hit VMC on the way up we tried to maintain VMC
until back with ATC. Some times we had to climb higher because ATC had poor
coverage in our area. (Out West) An abort out of low level was an emergency
procedure. Remember, I flew MTR (IR routes) in actual IMC and with TF
engaged. No, my radar was not good at picking out LBFs from the ground
clutter.

How to avoid slow moving LBFs? Before we go "Flame on", I fly LBFs and
Gliders. Primary method is the Mk-1 CEB (Mark-1 Calibrated EyeBall). Ask the
LBFs to stay away from MTRs, or know the altitudes of the MTR (yes there is
a "top" to it, if you need to cross it), cross at 90 degrees and know from
which way the fast mover is coming and keep your eyes out. Normal low level
routes are 500-1000ft AGL, fly higher than that. The MTRs are charted, but
altitudes are not provided. Min and Max altitudes are found in FLIP General
Planning AP/1B. I will also agree that the LBF in this instance was "away"
from the MTR and the F-16s were not where they should have been.

I've had a Cessna cross under me in the Nebraska cornfields, he must have
known we fly that area at 500AGL, he was below that, or he was just lucky.
We've gotten NOTAMs for crop dusters in the known MTRs asking us to bump the
min altitude up from 400ft to 1000ft AGL in their areas during dusting
season. No problem, happy to oblige.

TCAS was not available then, it was not even a consideration, now only the
"military cargo" aircraft have TCAS capability, but it is spreading to more
cockpits.,It is a "space" issue on the panel and software revision issue in
most installations. TCAS "may" have helped in your F-16 scenario, but one
can never be sure. Most fighter/bomber aircraft did not have TCAS. I've been
retired a few years, so they may have something now.

What can be said, accidents happen, we train every day to mitigate and
reduce the risk. If you stop to consider the number of military aircraft
flying low level in MTRs in the US every day, we have an excellent safety
record. Granted one "ah sh%^" can ruin the whole day.

As a warfighter, I'd rather be learning how to fly low fast and tactical in
"friendly airspace" then doing it for the first time in combat. That's why
we have big airspace areas out west, Red Flags in a MOA. But not everyone
can get out west on a regular basis for training, and still keep the fighter
coverage on the east coast for that next Terrorist event.

You would be surprised at the number of civil aircraft that will cross a MOA
without talking to anyone, and you've got a 100 aircraft combat practice
going on, and the safety officer calls "knock it off" when the LBF
penetrates the MOA and goes blindly across at 120knts. Meanwhile 100
aircraft spin to safety zones waiting for the LBF to clear.

Yes, MOAs are "joint use", but at least call up the controlling agency and
find out if its HOT!!
BT (stepping down from soap box)
"Larry Dighera" > wrote in message
...
> On Wed, 3 Jan 2007 16:51:11 -0800, "BT" > wrote
> in >:
>
>>I routinely flew in MTRs at 540KTAS or greater, (but not over .95M),
>>540knts was the "programmed training speed" for the B-1, program speed for
>>the B-52 was 340KTAS.
>
> Many thanks for your input. At last, someone who has firsthand MTR
> experience.
>
> What would you suggest to keep the fast-movers from splattering the
> low-level civil flyers?
>
> Do any of the suggestions I proposed in this message thread make any
> sense to you?
>

[Jose[_1_]]

> Your proposal for "deconflicting" this airspace takes away key training
> options and makes it harder to give military pilots realistic training.
> Combat missions are not often flown with active radar to avoid alerting the
> enemy so requiring pilots training here to always use radar takes away
> combat realism.

Combat missions are also not usually flown over friendly airspace. They
are flown in wartime. IF they want to train over friendly airspace (and
I agree that they should), they must make some accomodations. The
military is not there for their own amusement, they are there to protect
us, and they should do so here as well as there.

> [MTRs] constitute a tiny percentage of the US NAS.

Yes, but they carve it up.

Jose
--
He who laughs, lasts.
for Email, make the obvious change in the address.

[Larry Dighera]

BT, thank you for your firsthand input on this issue.

My comments in-line below:


On Wed, 3 Jan 2007 20:30:12 -0800, "BT" > wrote
in >:

>Larry, the idea of a MAP or Missed Abort Procedure (or what ever) does not
>make sense.
>I have flown as instructor and evaluator on many MTRs and have had to abort
>more than a few, either for hazardous weather (TRW) or an aircraft system
>problem. There is already a standard procedure used to abort a low level
>run. (climb, avoid weather if possible, call ATC)

Okay. I was hoping the designers of the MTR system addressed the
issue of how to proceed if the MTR entry point was not acquired, and
from the information you have provided, it appears that is currently
in place.

Isn't this what Ninja Flight Lead Parker should have done instead of
descending into terminal airspace without the required ATC clearance?
If not, what do you think would have been appropriate for him to have
done?

>In the instance you
>describe (I believe it was the F-16s in Florida) it would have made no
>difference on the abort procedure, the abort procedure would be predicated
>on knowing where you are to begin with. And in this instance the F-16s did
>not know where they were, so they would not know to avoid certain airspace
>if they did not already know they were close to it.

First let me say, I'm not angry nor disrespectful, but I do speak with
complete candor, so please don't take my words personally.

My motivation in addressing this subject is to reduce the hazard to
civil aviation caused by MTR operations, and place the responsibility
for safety on those who cause the hazard. That's not to say that the
slower GA pilot should not scan for conflicting traffic, but if a MAC
should occur, placing full see-and-avoid responsibility for the mishap
on the PIC who caused the hazard to exist, by virtue of taking
exception to the 250 knot speed limit below 10,000', is the only
equitable remedy for that issue in my opinion.

With regard to Parker's alleged loss of positional awareness, I find
it difficult (if not impossible) to believe, that a highly trained and
experienced military flyer who had just, immediately before, attempted
to contact ATC for clearance to descend into Class B airspace, with
>10 mile meteorological visibility, could possibly be unaware that his
descent would place him within congested terminal airspace.

All airman are aware that Class B areas are 60 miles in diameter, and
Parker must have been able to see Miami International below him from
his position at that time. I therefore must conclude that Parker
consciously chose to descend without regard for the hazard to civil
air traffic he and his wingman would cause.

You have stated that you disagree with that conclusion. Other than
the Parker's statement about loss of situational awareness contained
in the AIB report, how do _you_ account for his decision to descend?

Please, before you blame the navigational equipment error, and
Parker's erroneous navigational input errors, do plot the positions of
the aircraft and the MTR entry point. (You'll find on-line charts
available here: http://www.skyvector.com)

Here is some of what is contained in the accident reports that
pertains to the navigation equipment errors:


(2) Ninja flight took off for their second sortie at 1513
The takeoff, rejoin, and climbout to 25,000 ft mean sea level (MSL)
were uneventful. Ninja 2 accomplished a targeting pod check on the
Taylor TACAN and confirmed that the flight was navigating correctly
to that steer point. With the exception of Ninja 2’s check on the
Taylor TACAN, neither flight member recalled confirming their INS
system accuracy with ground based navigational aids. Enroute to
the Lakeland TACAN, Ninja flight was cleared direct to the VR-1098
start route point by Miami Center. The flight then received
step-down altitude clearances for their descent to low level.


(3) At some time, between when Ninja 1’s aircraft tape
recorder was turned off on the first sortie to when the aircraft
tape was turned on during the second sortie, Ninja 1’s Inertial
Navigation System (INS) had developed a 9-11 NM error. The true
extent of the INS position error could only be determined in
post-mishap flight review of aircraft components and tapes.
The error was such that following INS steering to a selected point
would place the aircraft 9-11 NM south of the desired location.
Ground radar plots of the flight’s ground track during the medium
altitude cruise revealed no significant course deviations. Ninja 1
pointed out landmarks to Ninja 2 during the medium altitude
portion of the flight, reinforcing the fact that Ninja flight
seemed to be navigating properly.


(4) Also during this time period, a cursor slew of
approximately 26 NM and 20-30 degrees of right bias had been input
to the General Avionics Computer. In certain ground-attack
steering modes, this cursor bias is added to the current INS steer
point and repositions various avionics symbology, including the
Heads Up Display (HUD) steering cues. In short, the cursor bias
adjusts navigation symbology. Normally, cursor inputs are used to
correct for small position errors, refine attack steering, and aid
in target acquisition. It is possible, however to inadvertently
enter cursor biases. The cursor switch is a multifunction switch
dependent on the specific avionics mode and location of the sensor
of interest. Therefore, it is possible to enter unintentional
cursor slews when changing between modes and sensors. A
crosscheck of system indications is required so that
unintentional slews are recognized and zeroed out. These errors
came into play later when Ninja flight began maneuvering for
low-level entry.


(5) Miami Center cleared Ninja flight to 13,000 ft and
directed them to contact Tampa Approach on radio frequency 362.3.
The use of this frequency for Tampa Approach was discontinued in
August 2000. Ninja 1 thought he was given frequency 362.35 and
attempted contact there. In either case, Ninja 1 would have been
on the wrong frequency for Tampa Approach. After his unsuccessful
attempt to contact Tampa Approach, Ninja 1 returned to the
previous Miami Center frequency. Ninja 1 then determined that the
flight was rapidly approaching the low-level route start point and
they needed to descend soon for low-level entry. At 1544:34,
Ninja 1 cancelled IFR with Miami Center. Miami Center
acknowledged the IFR cancellation and asked if he wanted flight
following service, which Ninja 1 declined. Miami Center then
terminated radar service and directed Ninja 1 to change his Mode
III transponder code to a VFR 1200 code. Miami Center also gave
Ninja flight a traffic advisory on a Beech aircraft 15 NM away at
10,000 ft MSL, which Ninja acknowledged. Ninja flight started a
descent and maneuvered to the west in order to de-conflict with
that traffic. Ninja 1 was above the Class B airspace at the time
he cancelled IFR.


(6) At 1540:59, Sarasota Tower cleared Cessna 829 for
takeoff. The pilot, Mr. Jacques Olivier, was the only person
onboard the aircraft. The Cessna’s planned profile was a VFR
flight at 2,500 ft MSL to Crystal River Airport. Shortly after
departure, Cessna 829 contacted Tampa Approach, and the
controller called Cessna 829 radar contact at 1545:23.


(7) At 1545:42, Ninja flight descended into Tampa Class B
airspace, approximately 15 NM northeast of Sarasota-Bradenton
International Airport, without clearance from Tampa Approach.
Since Ninja 1 had already cancelled IFR and was unaware that he
was in Tampa airspace, he directed the flight to change to UHF
channel 20 (frequency 255.4, Flight Service Station) in
preparation for entry into VR-1098). Ninja flight then
accomplished a G-awareness exercise. This exercise involves
maneuvering the aircraft under moderate gravitational (G)
loads for 90-180 degrees of turn to ensure pilots are prepared to
sustain the G forces that will be encountered during the tactical
portion of the mission . Ninja flight accelerated to
approximately 440 knots calibrated airspeed (KCAS) and
accomplished two 90-degree turns while continuing their
descent. Following the G-awareness exercise, Ninja 1
directed his wingman to a fighting wing position.


(8) At 1547, Ninja 1 turned the flight to center up the INS
steering cues for the low-level start route point. As previously
mentioned, the INS had a 9-11 NM position error. Ninja 1’s
airspeed was decreasing through approximately 390 KCAS. Ninja 1
thought he was due north and within 9 NM of the start route point,
which was Manatee Dam. In reality, he was approximately 5 NM west
of the steer point. Also at 1547, Tampa Approach directed Cessna
829 to turn left to a heading of 320-degrees and then follow the
shoreline northbound. Tampa also directed a climb to 3,500 ft MSL.
Cessna 829 acknowledged and complied with the instructions.


(9) Ninja 1 next called for a “fence check,” directing the
flight to set up the appropriate switches and onboard avionic
systems for the tactical phase of the mission. Shortly after
calling “fence check,” Ninja 1 entered Sarasota Class C airspace
in a descent through 4,000 ft MSL. During the descent, Ninja 1
called “heads up, birds,” alerting his wingman of birds flying in
their vicinity. As part of his “fence check,” Ninja 1 changed
from a navigational mode to an air-to-ground attack mode. This
mode adjusted the system steering 20 degrees right, commanding a
new heading of approximately 180-degrees. This steering was the
result of the cursor slew bias that had previously been input to
the system. The HUD also displayed a range of approximately 35
NM. Ninja 1 turned to follow the steering cues .


(10) In addition, this air-to-ground mode displays a metric of
navigational system accuracy when the system determines anything
less than “high” accuracy. When Ninja 1 switched to this mode,
the system showed a navigational system accuracy of “medium”,
which eventually degraded to “low” prior to the collision. Ninja
1 did not notice this degradation in system accuracy. Ninja 2
thought they were on course and close to the start route
point. However, he did not recall specifically checking his own
INS steering to confirm they were on track to the point.


(11) At 1547:39, approximately 30 seconds prior to the
midair collision, the Tampa Approach radar system generated an
initial Mode C Intruder (Conflict) Alert between Cessna 829 and
Ninja 1’s 1200 code. Between 1547:55 and 1548:05, Tampa Approach
communicated with Miami Center and discussed the altitude of Ninja
1. No safety alert was ever transmitted to Cessna 829.


(12) At 1548:09, Ninja 2 and Cessna 829 collided near
Bradenton, Florida. The collision happened approximately 6 NM
from the Sarasota-Bradenton International Airport at approximately
2000 ft, within the confines of the Sarasota Class C airspace.
Ninja 1 was not aware that the flight was in Class C airspace when
the collision occurred. Ninja 1’s displayed airspeed at the time
of the midair was 356 KCAS with a heading of 178 degrees. Ninja
1’s attention was focused on finding the start route point and
looking where the HUD steering was pointed. Again, these
indications were incorrect due to the INS position error and
cursor slew, neither of which was recognized by the pilot. Ninja
1 was unable to find the start route in front of his aircraft
because it was actually about 5 NM at his left eight-o’clock.
Ninja 1 looked over his left shoulder at approximately one
second prior to impact and saw the Cessna in a turn just in front
of his wingman.


(13) Ninja 2 was looking in the direction of Ninja 1,
anticipating a left turn for entry into the low-level route. He
was clearing his flight path visually, primarily looking for
birds. He was flying about 60-degrees aft of his flight lead and
3,000-5,000 feet in trail. Ninja 2 saw a white flash that
appeared to travel from low left ten- to eleven-o’clock and
simultaneously felt a violent impact. There are conflicting
witness statements about the flight attitude of Cessna 829
immediately prior to the midair. The nearest witnesses on the
ground stated that they saw no evasive maneuvering by the Cessna
immediately prior to the collision. Other witnesses, including
Ninja 1, perceived that Cessna 829 turned or banked immediately
prior to the collision.


(14) Also at 1548:09, Tampa Approach issued Cessna 829 a
traffic advisory on Ninja 1’s position. Ninja 1’s INS was steering
him 9-11 NM south of the actual turn point so Manatee Dam was, in
reality, several miles to his left.

-----------------

Lockheed Martin examined the download data from the crash
survivable flight data recorder (CSFDR), the SDR, data printouts
from the general avionics computer (GAC), the global positioning
system (GPS), the inertia navigation system (INS) and the AVTR
tapes from the flight lead's airplane. Lockheed Martin's
examination report stated that M Aero stated that GPS "was removed
from the navigation solution at some time prior to the midair. It
cannot be determined from the data why the GPS was removed from
the navigation solution." The report added: "A position error of
approximately 9-11 nm was entered into the navigation system at
some time on the mishap flight prior to the video recording. It
can not be determined from the data what caused this position
error."

The flight lead stated during an interview conducted by the Air
Force Accident Investigation Board that he did not perform an INS
update before the accident flight. He stated that navigation along
their planned route was conducted in the NAV mode and that they
were steering off INS steer points. He added that no INS en route
updates were accomplished. The flight lead stated that he not
detect any NAV problems on the return flight to Moody Air Force
Base after the accident. He stated that he thought the navigation
system was functioning correctly and giving him accurate
information. He stated, "I had no suspicion at all that there was
a navigation system problem."


Based on radar data in the official accident reports, my understanding
is that the Ninja flight was southbound north of Miami when Parker
chose to descend. His navigation equipment was indicating his
position as being about 10 miles _north_ of his true position, so if
the navigational display depicted him and Miami International on its
screen, he could not have thought he wouldn't bust terminal airspace
by descending. I have no idea what the navigational display looks
like nor the information it displays, but If it doesn't show airports
and the location of the aircraft relative to them, I doubt it would be
very useful.

So Please enlighten me about those factors I may have overlooked that
may mitigate Parker's choice of action.

>Remember, when I aborted low level, it was pitch to 30degrees nose high,
>starting at 540KTAS and going to full AB, we would punch above 10K MSL in a
>heart beat and have to push over to remain below Class A while we tried to
>get ARTCC to answer up. If we hit VMC on the way up we tried to maintain VMC
>until back with ATC.

I suppose that abort procedure is reasonable for IFR flights;
presumably ATC was familiar with the MTR abort procedure, and was able
to track your flight (once it was high enough for radar coverage) and
was in radio contact, as it would be with any civil IFR flight, so ATC
could vector known traffic around your flight. And unless you were
within Class G airspace in IMC, there shouldn't be any other IFR
traffic that posed a collision hazard (as is normal). In VMC, of
course, the MkI CEBs would provide see-and-avoid separation as usual.
>Some times we had to climb higher because ATC had poor
>coverage in our area. (Out West)

I presume you are referring to radar coverage, not communications
coverage. Wouldn't climbing into Class A airspace without benefit of
the required clearance be a violation of regulations? Or am I
overlooking something?

Out of curiosity, where "out west" was that?

>An abort out of low level was an emergency procedure.

So you invoked the PIC's right to deviate from regulations in
emergency situations?

>Remember, I flew MTR (IR routes) in actual IMC and with TF
>engaged. No, my radar was not good at picking out LBFs from the ground
>clutter.

Yes. Other military flyers have also voiced that lamentable fact
regarding the on-board radars' inapplicability for deconfliction.


[i]
>How to avoid slow moving LBFs? Before we go "Flame on", I fly LBFs and
>Gliders. Primary method is the Mk-1 CEB (Mark-1 Calibrated EyeBall).

I have no intention of going "flame on", so please don't infer my
comments as personal remarks.

It would seem you are ideally qualified to comment on this issue given
your broad civil and military flight experience.

With regard to employing visual deconfliction methods at high closing
speeds, please see my comments below.

>Ask the LBFs to stay away from MTRs, or know the altitudes of the MTR

That's is the present situation as I understand it. The MTRs are
charted, and GA pilots should be aware of the hazard created there
when MTRs are active. The problem is, there is no regulation that
_requires_ this, and it is not easy to _accurately_ determine the
activity status of MTR routs for a number of reasons:

* The military will often erroneously inform FSS that MTRs are hot
continuously when in fact they are not. This abuse fosters distrust
of the system among GA flyers.

* FSS personnel are inexperienced with MTR NOTAMS, and can't find
the current data.

* Contacting the military person responsible for scheduling MTR
activity is often very difficult. There is the issue of finding what
authority is responsible, locating the correct telephone number, etc,
and it often requires several calls, and transfers among military
personnel.

* It may be necessary to contact several such military personnel if
many MTR routs are to be penetrated on a given mission. That can be
very cumbersome.

* Military operations on MTRs may fall outside the NOTAMED hot time
given to FSS.

* ...

>(yes there is a "top" to it, if you need to cross it), cross at 90 degrees
>and know from which way the fast mover is coming and keep your eyes out.

Right.

I presume the suggestion for crossing the MTR at right angles is to
reduce the exposure time to a minimum.

Keeping a sharp lookout may not be very effective for separating slow
moving aircraft with PICs trained to civil flight standards and tested
to civil medical standards. More about this below.

What is the best way for a GA airman to determine from which way to
expect MTR traffic to be headed? The sole bit of MTR information
contained within the Airport/Facilities Directory is this Special
Notice:

MILITARY TRAINING ROUTES
The DOD Flight Information Publication AP/1B provides textural and
graphic descriptions and operating instructions for all military
training routes (IR, VR, SR)and refueling tracks/anchors.
Completed and more comprehensive information relative to policy
and procedures for IRs and VRsis published in FAA Handbook 7610.4
(Special Military Operations) which is agreed to by the DOD and
therefore directive for all military flight operations. The AP/1B
is the official source of route data for military users.

FAA Handbook 7610.4 is available on-line here:
http://www.faa.gov/airports_airtraffic/air_traffic/publications/at_orders/media/mil.pdf


The Aeronautical Information Manual advises the following:

AIM 3-5-2 (b): The routes at 1,500 feet AGL and below and
generally developed to be flown under VFR.

(c) Generally, MTR's are established below 10,000 feet MSL for
operations at speeds in excess of 250 knots.

(2) VFR Military Training Routes (VR): Operations on these routes
are conducted in accordance with VFR except flight visibility
shall be 5 miles or more; and flights shall not be conducted below
a ceiling of less than 3,000 feet AGL.

d. Military training routes will be identified and charted as
follows:

1. Route Identification
(a) MTR's with no segment above 1,500 feet AGL shall be identified
by four number characters; e.g. IR206, VR207.

(b) MTR's that include one or more segments above 1,500 feet shall
be identified by number characters; e.g. IR206, VR206.

2. (f) Nonparticipating aircraft are not prohibited from flying
within an MTR, however, extreme vigilance should be exercised when
conducting flight through or near these routes. Pilots should
contact FSSs within 100 NM of a particular MTR to obtain current
information or route usage in their vicinity. Information
available includes times of scheduled activity, altitudes in use
on each route segment, and actual route width. Route width varies
for each MTR and can extend several miles on either side of the
charted MTR centerline. Route width information for IR and VR
MTR's is also available in the FLIP AP/1B along with additional
MTR (SR/AR) information. When requesting MTR information, pilots
should give the FSS their position, route of flight, and
destination in order to reduce frequency congestion and permit the
FSS specialist to identify the MTR which could be a factor.


>Normal low level routes are 500-1000ft AGL, fly higher than that.
>The MTRs are charted, but >altitudes are not provided. Min and Max
>altitudes are found in FLIP General Planning AP/1B.

Unfortunately, I've never seen FLIPs available for sale in civilian
pilot shops, and they were not even mentioned during my flight
training. I purchase my charts here http://www.avshop.com/category/58
but I don't see FLIPs offered there either. Indeed, it appears that
civilians can't be trusted with FLIPs:

http://avn.faa.gov/index.asp?xml=naco/ecom
Notice: On November 18, 2004, the National Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency announced in the Federal Register their intent to remove
Department of Defense (DoD) Flight Information Publications
(FLIPs), Digital Aeronautical Flight Information File (DAFIF), and
related aeronautical safety of navigation digital and hardcopy
publications from public sale and distribution. When this action
is implemented, the Federal Aviation Administration will no longer
be permitted to sell and distribute DoD aeronautical charts and
publications to the public. The proposed implementation date is
October 1, 2005. See the Special Notice and Federal Register
Excerpt for complete information.

The FAA, National Aeronautical Charting Office <http://naco.faa.gov>
doesn't sell FLIPs. And indeed, there is a notice in the Federal
Register:

http://avn.faa.gov/content/naco/SpecialNotices/FR-04-25631.pdf
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Office of the Secretary
Announcement of Intent To Initiate the
Process To Remove Aeronautical
Information From Public Sale and
Distribution
AGENCY: National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency (NGA), Department
of Defense.
ACTION: Notice.
SUMMARY: The National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency (NGA) intends to
remove its Flight Information
Publications (FLIP), Digital Aeronautical
Flight Information File (DAFIF), and
related aeronautical safety of navigation
digital and hardcopy publications from
public sale and distribution. ...

I guess there's no good way for civil airmen to know which way the MTR
aircraft are going along the route anymore. Perhaps the charting
office should start putting little arrow heads along the charted MTR
routes.

>I will also agree that the LBF in this instance was "away"
>from the MTR and the F-16s were not where they should have been.

This brings up a few issues:

1. The VR-1098 MTR entry point is located approximately 12 NM
northeast of the Sarasota-Bradenton International Airport at an
altitude between 500 ft above ground level (AGL) and 1,500 ft AGL. At
Point A, the route extends 3 NM southwest (right) of centerline,
slightly penetrating the Sarasota Class C airspace, and 8 NM northeast
(left) of centerline, underlying the Tampa Class B airspace.

This would seem to violate Air Force Instruction 11-202 5.7.5.1.5:

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
AIR FORCE INSTRUCTION 11-202, VOLUME 3
16 FEBRUARY 2005
Flying Operations
GENERAL FLIGHT RULES

5.7.5.1. When the Authorization Applies. Air Force pilots may
operate their aircraft below 10,000 ft. MSL, within US airspace,
in excess of 250 KIAS only under the following conditions:

5.7.5.1.5. Within published VFR MTRs.


How is it possible for a military airman intending to enter the
VR-1099 MTR to comply with the above AF Instructions if they must
accelerate _BEFORE_ entering the MTR? They are not considered "within
published VFR MTR" until they pass the entry point, right?

2. The AIB report states:

Ninja flight did, in fact, accelerate to 441 KCAS to start their
G-awareness exercise in Class B airspace ...

I presume Parker did the G-awareness exercise as prescribed by USAF
policy/regulations. Doesn't this practice also violate the above AF
Instructions? Shouldn't the G-awareness exercise, that requires
high-speed to be effective, have been performed above 10,000' to
comply with AF Instructions?

But apparently it is military practice to accelerate well beyond the
minimum for the military aircraft well before actually entering the
MTR; this practice violates the military exception to the 250 knot
speed limit, doesn't it?

[snip good information]

>TCAS "may" have helped in your F-16 scenario, but one can never be sure.

If there's no room in the F-16 cockpit to install TCAS equipment, it's
moot.

Perhaps the best method or preventing MTR MACs is some sort of
AWACSlike radar orbiting the flight, and advising the MTR flight of
conflicting traffic. It may be expensive, but I'll bet it's cheaper
than the court settlements and loss of military aircraft from MTR
MACs.

>Most fighter/bomber aircraft did not have TCAS. I've been retired a few
>years, so they may have something now.

It seems that the training aircraft at Moody AFB (coincidentally, the
Ninja flight was based there) are about to be equipped with TCAS. And
another airman said:

The T1's at Columbus AFB, MS have TCAS - I would assume all of the
T1 airframes have TCAS installed.

So apparently the USAF is aware of the issue, and attempting to
respond by equipping some of their aircraft with TCAS.

>What can be said, accidents happen, we train every day to mitigate and
>reduce the risk.

I'm sorry, but, with all due respect, the "accident's happen"
dismissal of the issues raised by the Ninja MAC seems to be a lazy
attempt to dodge the work of gleaning useful safety information from
this mishap. Certainly the phrase is true, but implicit in such
utterances is the notion that nothing can be learned and/or done to
reduce the hazard caused by MTRs. I don't believe that is true.

>If you stop to consider the number of military aircraft
>flying low level in MTRs in the US every day, we have an excellent safety
>record. Granted one "ah sh%^" can ruin the whole day.

Agreed; the incidents of military/civil MACs is low, but I believe the
hazard can be reduced through analysis, systems re-design, reformed
regulations, and implementation of them. Isn't it worth a little
effort to save the life of a fellow airman?

>As a warfighter, I'd rather be learning how to fly low fast and tactical in
>"friendly airspace" then doing it for the first time in combat.

I don't question the benefits and necessity of MTR training. I just
think there are a number of ways the hazards it poses to the public
can be mitigated with a little thought. For example, installing a
forward facing bright strobe light on, or other conspicuity
enhancements, to aircraft operating on MTRs might help. The FAA
instructs GA flyers to burn a landing light in congested airspace to
increase conspicuity. Certainly _something_ can be done to increase
military aircraft conspicuity while operating on MTRs.

But there are some fundamental flaws in the MTR system as it is
currently implemented that need to be brought to light. I personally
believe that it is virtually impossible for the average GA pilot to
see-and-avoid fast-movers. Relying on see-and-avoid for air traffic
separation is unreasonable for non military trained pilots at the
speeds Parker's flight was moving. The AOPA has this to say:

"An experimental scan training course conducted
with military pilots found the average time
needed to conduct the operations essential
to flying the airplane was 20 seconds –- 17 seconds
for the outside scan, and three seconds for
the panel scan. Without the benefit of intensive
military training, most [civil] pilots will need more time than
this. But as demonstrated by the military pilots,
considerably more time should be spent on the external
scan than the panel scan."

As you can doubtless appreciate, the pilot of a 130 knot airplane must
scan much more of the sky than the fast-movers to effectively see
conflicting traffic in time to avoid it. Fighter aircraft are painted
to camouflage them, and their frontal area is small, but they must be
spotted a long distance off for see-and-avoid to work for the GA
flyer. For these reasons and others, it is unreasonable to expect GA
aircraft to successfully comply with the see-and-avoid regulations in
the case of high-speed MTR operations. It's just not physically
possible in most instances, IMO.

For that reason, I believe the military (and ATC where applicable)
should shoulder _ALL_ the responsibility of traffic separation for MTR
operations. This might prompt the military and FAA to enhance the
conspicuity of MTR participants, find a way to equip MTR aircraft with
collision avoidance systems, restrict the hazard caused by MTR
operations to fewer more distant routs, etc.

>That's why we have big airspace areas out west, Red Flags in a MOA.
>But not everyone can get out west on a regular basis for training,
>and still keep the fighter coverage on the east coast for that next
>Terrorist event.

For the next terrorist event?

I'm not sure I follow that line of reasoning. Surely you're not
suggesting that nap-of-the-earth military operations would be required
to down a hijacked airliner, or other terrorist occupied aircraft, are
you?

>You would be surprised at the number of civil aircraft that will cross a MOA
>without talking to anyone, and you've got a 100 aircraft combat practice
>going on, and the safety officer calls "knock it off" when the LBF
>penetrates the MOA and goes blindly across at 120knts. Meanwhile 100
>aircraft spin to safety zones waiting for the LBF to clear.

I'm glad you brought that up.

I can understand your frustration with inconsiderate GA pilots failing
to coordinate their transition with the MOA controlling authority.
They place themselves and those participating in military exercises at
risk with seemingly little regard for the hazard they create. While
such mindless operation conforms to the letter of federal regulations,
it is just plane dumb.

However, it is not a violation of regulations, and if the military
doesn't want it to continue, they should take official action to
change the regulations. Personally, I see no reason why regulations
couldn't require the military controller on duty for the MOA to
coordinate the GA aircraft's transition via radio communications; but
the aircraft not equipped with electrical systems would be barred from
operating in vast chunks of airspace (probably as it should be) if
such a regulation were implemented.

>Yes, MOAs are "joint use", but at least call up the controlling agency and
>find out if its HOT!!
>BT (stepping down from soap box)

I agree completely.

Can you provide a good procedure for determining how to contact the
controlling agency? I would just contact the closest ARTC Center, and
hope they know what to do.

I know I've covered a lot more than either one of us probably wanted
to in this post, but it's not an easy issue. Please feel free to take
as long as you like compose responses to those parts you feel will be
most helpful, and post them in individual messages if you like. I know
it's a lot of work, but rest assured that I and many others reading
this message thread will be most grateful for your knowledgeable
input.



PS:

There is a MTR issue I'd prefer to discuss with you privately. Can
you send me an e-mail message > so that we can make
contact that way? I'll e-mail a copy of this to you, but I'm not
exactly sure how to decode your munged e-mail address, so you may not
receive it. Thanks.

[John T]

Jose wrote:
>
> Combat missions are also not usually flown over friendly airspace. They
> are flown in wartime.

As you mention in your following comment, we're discussing training and the
training we're discussing is for combat. I suspect anybody who's served in
the armed forces has heard the phrase "train like you fight, fight like you
train". Translated, this means the training needs to be as close to combat
as possible without actually firing weapons. (The phrase is closely related
to a civilian counterpart: The Law of Primacy.)

> IF they want to train over friendly
> airspace (and I agree that they should), they must make some
> accomodations. The military is not there for their own amusement,
> they are there to protect us, and they should do so here as well as
> there.

No doubt. However, there are systems in place to handle this accomodation.
MTRs are charted for all to see. Their bounds are known by trained pilots.
VFR rules apply to military pilots (when operating VFR). While not
necessarily efficient (and gets my vote for improvement area with the
highest "bang/buck ratio"), procedures exist to inform FSS of the status of
these routes which can be queried by pilots near them.

I want to avoid reducing combat realism in military training.

>> [MTRs] constitute a tiny percentage of the US NAS.
>
> Yes, but they carve it up.

True, but only within certain vertical and horizontal limits (typically
<1500 AGL). Is it asking too much for GA aircraft to climb to 3000 AGL near
MTRs (adding a 1500' safety margin)? I submit this is not burdensome in most
cases. I'm sure there are several cases where it isn't practical - like
landing/departing under an MTR - but I expect most aircraft/flights have no
problem achieving 3K AGL.

The next best option I see is to make MTRs restricted, but this option would
carve up the NAS much more than they do now and, frankly, with having to
deal with the DC ADIZ on every flight I make, I'm not much of a proponent of
more restricted airspace.

--
John T
http://sage1solutions.com/TknoFlyer
Reduce spam. Use Sender Policy Framework: http://spf.pobox.com
____________________

[Jose[_1_]]

> While not
> necessarily efficient (and gets my vote for improvement area with the
> highest "bang/buck ratio"), procedures exist to inform FSS of the status of
> these routes which can be queried by pilots near them.

It's not a question of efficiency. It's a question of effectiveness. I
am often unable to determine the status of a route or area by calling
the FSS, or Center, or whatever is printed on my charts. IN fact, I
often get a response that they know nothing about it. Lots of good that
does me crossing a mountainous area with an overcast crossed by an MTR
filled with camoflauged fast aircraft backed by military lawyers who, if
"contact" occurs, will be sure to blame me for "not looking", and to
smear my reputation as surely as my airplane.

> I want to avoid reducing combat realism in military training.

I don't.

I want to avoid UNNECESSARILY reducing combat realism. I think that
this reduction in realism is necessary.

> Is it asking too much for GA aircraft to climb to 3000 AGL near
> MTRs (adding a 1500' safety margin)?

Yes. Sometimes the aircraft cannot climb that high. Sometimes there
are clouds or ice in the way. And sometimes the route is empty but we
can't tell. Then we have to unnecessarily alter our operations, just
like you folks don't like to unnecessarily alter yours when a pilot
transits an MOA uncoordinated.

Jose
--
He who laughs, lasts.
for Email, make the obvious change in the address.

[Bob Noel]

In article >,
Jose > wrote:

> > I want to avoid reducing combat realism in military training.
>
> I don't.
>
> I want to avoid UNNECESSARILY reducing combat realism. I think that
> this reduction in realism is necessary.

You base your conclusion on what?

You have evidence to show the decrease in combat effectiveness is
worth it?

--
Bob Noel
Looking for a sig the
lawyers will hate

[Jose[_1_]]

> You base your conclusion on what?

My desire to not be skewered by a camoflauged F-16, and blamed for it.

Jose
--
He who laughs, lasts.
for Email, make the obvious change in the address.

[BT]

Wow.. Larry.. a lot of information there... you have obviously done your
research,
I'll only comment on a few areas..

INS 26nm off and the did not know it? It happens.. people bust check rides
for that. We have to take one every 18 months. I've busted people on check
rides for missing the IR entry point by 5nm. They did not know where they
are.

Flying in an IR Route (MTR) is an IFR Clearance and provides IFR seperation
from other IFR operations. Having to abort out of an IR Route is an
emergency proceedure, and I envoke all rights entitled to deviate from an
IFR clearance, and when finding VMC will maintain VMC until I can get back
with ATC.

No, We do not "bust" Class A, we can normally contact ATC anywhere in the
continental US at 17,500.
Radar and Communication coverage with ATC in the IR Route structure is
spotty.

Out "West" is anywhere west of the Mighty Mississipi. Mostly Kansas,
Nebraska, Texas, Wyoming, Montana, Colorado, Idaho, Nevada, Arizona, Texas
and New Mexico. I have also flown IR Routes in the Applilacians (IR-075)

I need to run off for a flying meeting, I'll look at the rest of your post
later.

BT

[Jose[_1_]]

> Flying in an IR Route (MTR) is an IFR Clearance and provides IFR seperation
> from other IFR operations.

I was told (here) that while this is nominally true, the military after
starting out IFR gets some sort of blanket "do what you want for a
while, report back", and when done with their mission, reports back and
returns home in the system. It's that part in the middle that concerns us.

Jose
--
He who laughs, lasts.
for Email, make the obvious change in the address.

[John T]

"Jose" > wrote in message
. net
>
> I am often unable to determine the status of a route or area by
> calling the FSS, or Center, or whatever is printed on my charts. IN
> fact, I often get a response that they know nothing about it.

We agree this is a problem. Changing the behavior of military aircraft in
airspace designated for their use doesn't resolve this issue.

> Lots
> of good that does me crossing a mountainous area with an overcast
> crossed by an MTR filled with camoflauged fast aircraft backed by
> military lawyers who, if "contact" occurs, will be sure to blame me
> for "not looking", and to smear my reputation as surely as my
> airplane.

Your insurance company's lawyers would surely attempt the opposite and I'm
sure would mention the right-of-way rules governing VFR aircraft (assuming
VMC under that overcast you mentioned).

>> I want to avoid reducing combat realism in military training.
>
> I don't. I want to avoid UNNECESSARILY reducing combat realism. I think
> that
> this reduction in realism is necessary.

Which reduction?

>> Is it asking too much for GA aircraft to climb to 3000 AGL near
>> MTRs (adding a 1500' safety margin)?
>
> Yes. Sometimes the aircraft cannot climb that high. Sometimes there
> are clouds or ice in the way. And sometimes the route is empty but we
> can't tell.

"Sometimes." We agree climbing over an MTR is not always convenient or
possible, but "sometimes" doesn't equate to "most cases" which I think is
still a reasonable assumption.

> Then we have to unnecessarily alter our operations, just
> like you folks don't like to unnecessarily alter yours when a pilot
> transits an MOA uncoordinated.

Which "folks"? :)

--
John T
http://sage1solutions.com/blogs/TknoFlyer
Reduce spam. Use Sender Policy Framework: http://openspf.org
____________________

[Jose[_1_]]

> We agree this is a problem. Changing the behavior of military aircraft in
> airspace designated for their use doesn't resolve this issue.

That depends on what you consider "the issue" to be.

> Your insurance company's lawyers would surely attempt the opposite and I'm
> sure would mention the right-of-way rules governing VFR aircraft (assuming
> VMC under that overcast you mentioned).

Whether they would succeed is a crapshoot, based on the accident that
started this whole thing, and a more recent (non-military) case
involving a pilot who, when having problems with the landing gear, was
blamed for the collision of two unrelated aircraft. Such cases, while
anecdotal, strongly inhibit my faith in the legal system to come up with
a fair conclusion. Follow the money. And in any case, I'm still
speared on an F-16.

>>I think that this reduction in realism is necessary.
> Which reduction?

The putative reduction caused by having military pilots use airborne
radar to avoid civilians, when in a real battle they would have the
radar off to avoid detection. (That is, presuming that airborne radar
would be the solution of choice).

> "Sometimes." We agree climbing over an MTR is not always convenient or
> possible, but "sometimes" doesn't equate to "most cases" which I think is
> still a reasonable assumption.

I don't think I said "most cases", and it doesn't matter anyway.
Covering the entire western desert with restrictted airspace won't
affect "most flights"; that is not a valid reason to do it, or not to
object to it.

Jose
--
He who laughs, lasts.
for Email, make the obvious change in the address.

[Bob Noel]

In article >,
Jose > wrote:

> > You base your conclusion on what?
>
> My desire to not be skewered by a camoflauged F-16, and blamed for it.

What combat losses would you figure would be okay?

--
Bob Noel
Looking for a sig the
lawyers will hate

[John T]

"Jose" > wrote in message
om
>
>> "Sometimes." We agree climbing over an MTR is not always convenient
>> or possible, but "sometimes" doesn't equate to "most cases" which I
>> think is still a reasonable assumption.
>
> I don't think I said "most cases", and it doesn't matter anyway.
> Covering the entire western desert with restrictted airspace won't
> affect "most flights"; that is not a valid reason to do it, or not to
> object to it.

No, I said "most cases" when suggesting GA flights climb over MTRs. You
seemed to object to that idea with "sometimes" exceptions - which I admitted
were going to exist. Either way, I think we agree adding more restricted
airspace isn't an ideal goal.

However, it would tend to keep civil and military craft separated.

--
John T
http://sage1solutions.com/blogs/TknoFlyer
Reduce spam. Use Sender Policy Framework: http://openspf.org
____________________

[Jose[_1_]]

>>My desire to not be skewered by a camoflauged F-16, and blamed for it.
>
>
> What combat losses would you figure would be okay?

All of them. That's what they are there for. Really - if I had to
choose between =my= being skewered, and somebody else dying in combat,
that's an easy choice.

However, the question becomes one of "how valuable is my life" vs "how
valuable is a soldier's life", and that's not one I'm prepared to answer
here. It's also not one that's really relevant.

The question is - who should take responsibility for (and therefore
mitigate the likelihood of) a collision when the contestants are a spam
can piloted by a civil pilot well below the speed limit and doing his
best to be seen, and a fighter pilot trained to military standards
travelling well above the speed limit in a camoflauged aircraft trying
his best to =not= be seen?

I contend it is primarily the military pilot in the swift and stealthy
aircraft. Do you disagree?

If we agree here, then the question becomes one of how to mitigate the
risk of collision while preserving our rights to fly in our airspace.
Ceding the airspace to the military is not a solution that is acceptable
to me.

--
He who laughs, lasts.
for Email, make the obvious change in the address.

[[email protected]]

First of all, the jets in the video are French Air Force Mirage F-1s in
Chad. Mostly clips from an excellent video showing a complete mission
by those Mirages, along with a Transall tanker and the Puma helicopters
(seen in the foreground on some low passes) - it's somewhere else
online (was the subject of a thread on RAM, I think).

Next, this whole argument about the "military threat" to gen av on MTRs
is getting tiresome, especially when Larry digs out his pet midair.
Larry, the F-16s were lost, then had a midair - it's called an
accident, deal with it! Or do civilian pilots never get lost, or run
into each other, or fill their fuel tanks with air, or try to sneak in
"under the weather" and hit mountains, or spin into a building on Long
Island trying to do a 180?

I started flying bugsmashers in highschool; I've been there in the fast
movers (2000hrs as an F-4 WSO); and I've dodged my share of fighters,
airliners, and Cezznas in my 2000 hrs of flying gliders crosscountry.
Know what? - everybody is responsible for avoiding midairs when
airborne! And from personal observation, fighter pilots in the
dangerous low level environment are acutely aware of the mid air
collision potential - much more so than the average spamcan driver.

The majority of small, hard to see fast movers using the MTR system
(F-15/16/18) have air-to-air radar capable of detecting most slow-mover
traffic, many have IFF interrogators that let them detect transponders
(similar to TCAS without the advisory function). Plus they are usually
flying in a formation that is designed to improve the ability to see
traffic. And they train to detect and avoid traffic. There are
exceptions - I would be very careful near the large AF and Navy
training bases (T-38s and T-45s don't have radar, and have students
trying to learn the trade, so heads up when they are around!)

The big movers using the MTR system are BIG! If you can't see a Buff,
Bone, or Herk coming at you in the weeds, when you know what direction
they will be coming from, then I suggest you find a new hobby!

Better yet, think of the MTR as a busy highway, and you want to cross
it on your bicycle. Sure, you can legally pick a hole and try to make
it across, but doesn't it make more sense to use the pedestrian/cycle
bridge that is right next to you? So if you know you are going to be
crossing a route, even if you can't find out whether it's hot or not -
just climb above it - say to about 3000 agl or so, and you will be
above the threat!

But if you insist on sightseeing down in the weeds at 500' or so in the
middle of an MTR, then I would say the burden of avoiding a collision
would be on shoulders just as much as on the jocks training to keep you
from having to learn arabic...

By the way, FLARM is a cooperative sytem only (in other words, it only
detects other FLARM - equipped aircraft) - and it is specifically
prohibited from being used in the US and Canada. Thank you lawyers...

Larry, if you are really interested in saving some gen av lives, put
your energy into having a FLARM type system mandated for all aircraft
flying in the US (or anywhere, for that matter). For about $500,
everybody would have a basic collision warning system, not requiring
ATC, transponders, TCAS, etc. Hell, for the cost of one midair, you
could probably equip the entire gen av fleet!

Oh, and tell everybody to quit playing with their fancy glass cockpit
toys and LOOK OUT THE F*****G WINDOW!

Kirk

[[email protected]]

First of all, the jets in the video are French Air Force Mirage F-1s in
Chad. Mostly clips from an excellent video showing a complete mission
by those Mirages, along with a Transall tanker and the Puma helicopters
(seen in the foreground on some low passes) - it's somewhere else
online (was the subject of a thread on RAM, I think).

Next, this whole argument about the "military threat" to gen av on MTRs
is getting tiresome, especially when Larry digs out his pet midair.
Larry, the F-16s were lost, then had a midair - it's called an
accident, deal with it! Or do civilian pilots never get lost, or run
into each other, or fill their fuel tanks with air, or try to sneak in
"under the weather" and hit mountains, or spin into a building on Long
Island trying to do a 180?

I started flying bugsmashers in highschool; I've been there in the fast
movers (2000hrs as an F-4 WSO); and I've dodged my share of fighters,
airliners, and Cezznas in my 2000 hrs of flying gliders crosscountry.
Know what? - everybody is responsible for avoiding midairs when
airborne! And from personal observation, fighter pilots in the
dangerous low level environment are acutely aware of the mid air
collision potential - much more so than the average spamcan driver.

The majority of small, hard to see fast movers using the MTR system
(F-15/16/18) have air-to-air radar capable of detecting most slow-mover
traffic, many have IFF interrogators that let them detect transponders
(similar to TCAS without the advisory function). Plus they are usually
flying in a formation that is designed to improve the ability to see
traffic. And they train to detect and avoid traffic. There are
exceptions - I would be very careful near the large AF and Navy
training bases (T-38s and T-45s don't have radar, and have students
trying to learn the trade, so heads up when they are around!)

The big movers using the MTR system are BIG! If you can't see a Buff,
Bone, or Herk coming at you in the weeds, when you know what direction
they will be coming from, then I suggest you find a new hobby!

Better yet, think of the MTR as a busy highway, and you want to cross
it on your bicycle. Sure, you can legally pick a hole and try to make
it across, but doesn't it make more sense to use the pedestrian/cycle
bridge that is right next to you? So if you know you are going to be
crossing a route, even if you can't find out whether it's hot or not -
just climb above it - say to about 3000 agl or so, and you will be
above the threat!

But if you insist on sightseeing down in the weeds at 500' or so in the
middle of an MTR, then I would say the burden of avoiding a collision
would be on shoulders just as much as on the jocks training to keep you
from having to learn arabic...

By the way, FLARM is a cooperative sytem only (in other words, it only
detects other FLARM - equipped aircraft) - and it is specifically
prohibited from being used in the US and Canada. Thank you lawyers...

Larry, if you are really interested in saving some gen av lives, put
your energy into having a FLARM type system mandated for all aircraft
flying in the US (or anywhere, for that matter). For about $500,
everybody would have a basic collision warning system, not requiring
ATC, transponders, TCAS, etc. Hell, for the cost of one midair, you
could probably equip the entire gen av fleet!

Oh, and tell everybody to quit playing with their fancy glass cockpit
toys and LOOK OUT THE F*****G WINDOW!

Kirk

[Larry Dighera]

On 4 Jan 2007 20:54:47 -0800, wrote in
m>:

[...]

>everybody is responsible for avoiding midairs when
>airborne! And from personal observation, fighter pilots in the
>dangerous low level environment are acutely aware of the mid air
>collision potential - much more so than the average spamcan driver.

(I prefer not to characterize this issue as military-verses-civil;
it's primarily an air safety issue.) However, it is the military
pilot who usually walks away from a military-civil MAC regardless. One
of the regulars in this newsgroup put it this way:

For instance, a pilot who has no fear of a mid-air is an idiot.
A pilot who flies without being constantly aware that he/she is
the main aspect of the mid-air avoidance equation is misguided.
--Dudley Henriques

>The majority of small, hard to see fast movers using the MTR system
>(F-15/16/18) have air-to-air radar capable of detecting most slow-mover
>traffic,

Other military pilots have said that it's difficult for them to pick
out targets from the background clutter. Are you saying, that in your
experience, that's not an issue?

Is there any USAF regulation mandating the use of that radar for
deconfliction on MTRs? If not, why not?

>many have IFF interrogators that let them detect transponders
>(similar to TCAS without the advisory function).

What does 'IFF' stand for?

Is there any USAF regulation mandating the use of IFF interrogators on
aircraft so equipped for deconfliction on MTRs? Or is an oversight?

>Plus they are usually
>flying in a formation that is designed to improve the ability to see
>traffic. And they train to detect and avoid traffic. There are
>exceptions - I would be very careful near the large AF and Navy
>training bases (T-38s and T-45s don't have radar, and have students
>trying to learn the trade, so heads up when they are around!)

Any PIC who isn't 'heads-up' 17 seconds out of every 20 is asking for
it.

I fly in the Los Angeles basin and vicinity, and it's just plane
foolhardy to get complacent about traffic here. Even VFR I'm _always_
with ATC receiving radar traffic advisories and burning all the
high-intensity lighting with which the aircraft is equipped. Believe
me, I've had enough close calls over the decades to make me keep
myself and my passengers maintain a continuous scan for traffic.

Out in the seemingly empty Mojave desert, one tends to think he can
relax a bit, but the sky just isn't that big any more, and it's going
to get more and more congested as time goes by.

>The big movers using the MTR system are BIG! If you can't see a Buff,
>Bone, or Herk coming at you in the weeds, when you know what direction
>they will be coming from, then I suggest you find a new hobby!

With FLIPs no longer available to civilians, how is a pilot to know
which direction to expect traffic on MTRs?

In your opinion, wouldn't it be prudent to depict the direction of MTR
operations on aeronautical charts. It's a positive step in the right
direction (NPI), and wouldn't increase chart clutter significantly. If
you who are familiar with MTR operations think the idea workable, I'll
suggest it to the charting office.

>Better yet, think of the MTR as a busy highway, and you want to cross
>it on your bicycle. Sure, you can legally pick a hole and try to make
>it across, but doesn't it make more sense to use the pedestrian/cycle
>bridge that is right next to you?

I understand your point of view, but your analogy is flawed. A busy
highway is virtually jammed with traffic 24 hours a day; MTRs see a
few aircraft once in a while.

Suppose your mission is to observe/photograph geological formations or
cultural artifacts on the ground at low level? Staying above 1,500'
isn't appropriate in many cases, and I haven't even mentioned dusters
and patrol missions.

>So if you know you are going to be
>crossing a route, even if you can't find out whether it's hot or not -
>just climb above it - say to about 3000 agl or so, and you will be
>above the threat!

I agree. For point A to point B cross country commuting, that makes
very good sense. But it fails to address the issue of high-speed
military aircraft operating above the MTR ceiling at MTR entry and
exit times.

And what about the times I want to loiter down low to observe surface
artifacts? ATC can't provide radar coverage for traffic advisories
down that low. The military's record of accurately communicating MTR
activity to FSS is spotty, and FSS personnel are frequently inept and
clueless when it comes to MTR status. I'm not sure how much lead time
the military is required to provide for MTR NOTAMs, but it makes
scheduling difficult.

Now that LocMart has the FSS contract, perhaps they can take a look at
that issue.

>But if you insist on sightseeing down in the weeds at 500' or so in the
>middle of an MTR, then I would say the burden of avoiding a collision
>would be on shoulders just as much as on the jocks training to keep you
>from having to learn arabic...

There is no question, that the more eyeballs on the deconfliction task
the better, but I'm not convinced that it's realistic to expect GA
flights, that must scan a larger area of the windscreen than
fast-movers, and whose maneuvering ability is limited compared to that
of an F-16, to actually have the necessary time to see-and-avoid at
the closing speeds involved on MTRs.

With regard to responsibility in the event of a MAC, given the
limitations on GA maneuvering ability mentioned above, and the fact
that the high-speed aircraft operating on MTRs contrary to the 250
knot speed limit the NAS designers chose to implement, I would say
that it is only equitable that the military should be solely culpable.

>By the way, FLARM is a cooperative sytem only (in other words, it only
>detects other FLARM - equipped aircraft) -

I'm not familiar with FLARM at all. Thank you for that information.

>and it is specifically prohibited from being used in the US and Canada.
>Thank you lawyers...

There's probably a way to work around that issue, if the need can be
demonstrated, but if both aircraft have to FLARM equipped, it's not
the right choice.

>Larry, if you are really interested in saving some gen av lives, put
>your energy into having a FLARM type system mandated for all aircraft
>flying in the US (or anywhere, for that matter). For about $500,
>everybody would have a basic collision warning system, not requiring
>ATC, transponders, TCAS, etc. Hell, for the cost of one midair, you
>could probably equip the entire gen av fleet!

I would think the military would see the economy of providing AWACS
like radar for MTR operations. That wouldn't require re-equipping the
entire civil and military fleets.

>Oh, and tell everybody to quit playing with their fancy glass cockpit
>toys and LOOK OUT THE F*****G WINDOW!

Here here. According the military study I cited in a previous post,
only three seconds out of every 20 (15%) are supposed to be spent on
tasks other than scanning for traffic.

>Kirk

Thank you for the information you have provided.

[Larry Dighera]

On 4 Jan 2007 20:54:49 -0800, wrote in
. com>:

>
>Next, this whole argument about the "military threat" to gen av on MTRs
>is getting tiresome, especially when Larry digs out his pet midair.
>Larry, the F-16s were lost, then had a midair - it's called an
>accident, deal with it!

If my discourse on this subject has been biased, or even strident at
times, I apologize. But you can rest assured my dogged pursuit of
this issue is fueled by a sincere sense of horror as a result of the
mental image I formed of the shameful carnage that occurred on
November 16, 2000. The respected Airline Transport Pilot, working
flight instructor, former Rotary Club of Inverness president, pilot of
the Cessna, the late Mr. Jacques Olivier, was departing Class C like a
moth fluttering over the freeway waiting for the next oncoming
windshield, then suddenly raining down like ... It's just to gruesome
to ponder.

If you fail to appreciate, or are unaware of the facts in this case, I
suggest you do a GoogleGroups search for his name and the word
'disintegrated'. Here 're a few links to firsthand witness accounts:

http://www.sptimes.com/News/111700/TampaBay/Midair_crash_kills_1.shtml
http://www.sptimes.com/News/112200/news_pf/Citrus/Friends_say_a_final_a.shtml
http://www.geocities.com/howard_unger/pilot.html


>Or do civilian pilots never get lost, or run
>into each other, or fill their fuel tanks with air, or try to sneak in
>"under the weather" and hit mountains, or spin into a building on Long
>Island trying to do a 180?

Attempting to deflect the focus of this discussion toward a military
verses civil pilot focus changes the facts in this case not a whit.

What I want to know is why the military took eight days to perform a
medical examination of Parker?


--------------------------------------------------------

http://polkonline.com/stories/012603/sta_faults.shtml
While Air Force investigators acknowledged that their pilots were not
where they were supposed to be, were flying too fast and were not in
contact with air traffic controllers as they should have been, they
said Olivier and air traffic controllers had to share responsibility.

Olivier, they said, had violated a basic tenet of fair-weather flying,
to see and avoid other aircraft.





From ABC News.com:

Cessna ‘Disintegrated’
At the Rosedale Golf and Country Club, witness Bob
Morrow, a golf instructor, saw two military jets
flying one behind the other while he was giving a lesson.
“They flew overhead. Then all of a sudden, boom,”
said Morrow. “Debris started falling,” he said, describing seeing
parts of the fuselage, motor and wings scattering over three or
four acres and hitting some homes.

Witness Don McIlwain said he saw two F-16s flying south and a
smaller plane heading east that looked as if it would cross the
military jets’ path. McIlwain said he remembered thinking, “I
hope it’s high enough.”

“Just as I said that, he went right through it,” McIlwain told the
Sarasota Herald Tribune. “The small plane just disintegrated.”


Saturday, March 31, 2001
Associated Press
Olivier died instantly in the crash, his Cessna scattered over a
Bradenton country club.


http://www.cnn.com/2000/US/11/16/florida.planes.crash/
Sean Grosso, a pro-shop assistant at the Rosedale Golf and Country
Club in Bradenton, said he witnessed the collision. "We have debris
all over the course," he said.


Saturday, March 31, 2001
Associated Press
BRADENTON — The lead F-16 pilot involved in a crash that killed a
civilian pilot was cleared of criminal wrongdoing Friday and will
retire Saturday.

Air Force officials said the mistakes Lt. Col. Parker made leading
up to the crash over Manatee County deserved only "administrative
action" — a written or verbal reprimand. He will also retain his
officer's pension.

Citing confidentiality laws, Air Force officials would not
elaborate on what form of administrative action was taken. They
also would not say which of the mistakes he made the day of the
crash led to the reprimand, the Sarasota Herald-Tribune reported
for Saturday editions.




The Sarasota Herald-Tribune

Date: Thursday, March 08, 2001
Edition: All
Section: A SECTION
Page: A1
Illustration: PHOTO (3C) GRAPHIC

Source: By Howard M. Unger STAFF WRITER
Pilots briefed on danger
A report says two F-16 pilots were warned about trouble spots; one jet
hit a Cessna over Manatee.
The November morning he took off from his Georgia air base, Capt. Greg
Kreuder made sure the lead pilot on that day's mission knew the
dangers of flying their chosen route, VR1098.

Neither of the F-16 pilots had ever flown the route, which requires
jets to brush by Tampa and Sarasota-Bradenton international airports
on their way to a bombing range.

So, Kreuder meticulously highlighted landmarks on a map to keep them
on course and away from potential danger spots -- places where
civilian planes were likely to be flying.
They knew there were other routes that didn't come as close to
civilian airports. But VR1098 allows more low-level maneuvering, a
skill Kreuder wanted to practice.

At the end of a pre-mission briefing, Kreuder reminded the lead pilot,
Lt. Col. James Parker, of the dangers, according to his interview with
an Air Force panel investigating the Nov. 16 crash.

"I did have one thing I wanted to add, and that was that while flying
along VR1098, we had to be especially vigilant for civilian aircraft
operating near highways," Kreuder reportedly said.

The radar system in F-16s is so sensitive that automobiles can clutter
the radar and mask other planes.

But Kreuder's caution did not prevent a series of mistakes by the two
pilots and by Florida air traffic controllers. Those mistakes ended
with Kreuder's F-16 colliding with a Cessna over Manatee County.

Cessna pilot Jacques Olivier died instantly. Kreuder ejected safely,
receiving few injuries.

The day before the crash, Parker told Kreuder that he preferred flying
a different low-level training route farther north.

While Parker was at a meeting, however, Kreuder scheduled them to fly
VR1098, a route that planes from Moody Air Force Base pick up in east
Manatee and follow to Avon Park. Moody is in Valdosta, Ga.

Kreuder would later tell an Air Force investigation panel that VR1006,
Parker's preferred route, was a longer route that would have used too
much fuel. VR1006, however, would have taken the two over Central
Florida and near no major cities.

According to a 500-plus page military report obtained by the
Herald-Tribune, there were warning signs during the pilots' flight, as
well. Well into their flight, both pilots began suspecting that Miami
and Tampa air traffic controllers were miscommunicating about where
the pilots were and where they were heading.

Kreuder said he started to feel uncertain after the two jets came
within 10 miles of a low-flying Beechcraft south of Gainesville and
after Miami controllers asked where and why they were flying.

"I was starting to get the feeling that perhaps Miami wasn't sure of
.... what we were going to do that day," Kreuder told a board of Air
Force investigators.

"There didn't seem to be good understanding," Parker told the board.

When Kreuder and Parker were nearing the range covered by Tampa
controllers, the two were directed by Miami to set their radios to a
frequency that had not been used by Tampa controllers for more than a
year.

When Parker failed twice to reach Tampa, the two pilots switched their
radio frequencies back to Miami, a decision that played heavily in the
death of Olivier, a 57-year-old pilot from Hernando County.

The two F-16s, heading directly towards Olivier, were communicating
with an air traffic controller more than 250 miles away from the one
talking to Olivier and doing it on a different radio frequency.

The military report also details how the two experienced F-16 pilots
had no idea they were only miles away from Sarasota-Bradenton
International Airport.

Parker's on-board computer led the F-16s off course, about nine to 11
miles south of where they should have been.

While the F-16s were unknowingly flying off course, Olivier remained
in contact with Tampa. When Tampa controllers received a warning on
their radars that the Cessna might collide with one of the F-16s, they
had to contact Miami to get the altitudes of the fighter jets.

In a matter of 30 seconds, the lapse in communication ended in
disaster: Parker's jet flew directly in front of Olivier and, within
seconds, Kreuder crashed into the Cessna.

"I'd say it was less than a second," Parker told investigators. "I've
asked myself a hundred times: Did I have time to make a radio call?
And I just don't feel like I had. By the time I processed the
information, I didn't have enough time to say anything."

While a National Transportation Safety Board report -- expected to be
released next month -- will further detail the actions of air traffic
controllers that may have contributed to the crash, the Air Force
report focuses on the military pilots' actions.

The Air Force attempted to interview Federal Aviation Administration
personnel for its review, but did not receive cooperation from air
traffic controllers.

Staff writer Howard M. Unger can be contacted at 742-6163 or
.

Caption: Wreckage of the F-16, above, landed near the Home Depot on
University Parkway. Parts of the Cessna, below, piloted by Jacques
Olivier, left, were scattered over Rosedale Country Club.

FILE PHOTO MARK A. SKUKOWSKI

PHOTO/U.S. AIR FORCE

An Air Force panel investigating the Nov. 16 air collision reports
that a pair of F-16 fighter jets strayed from the normal military
training route into Sarasota-Bradenton International Airport's
airspace. Moments later, the second military aircraft in the formation
(the wing man) collided with Jacques Oliver's Cessna.

STAFF GRAPHIC







You could be next:
http://www.airdisaster.com/news/0500/24/news3.shtml

Close call between AA jet, F-16s.
The Associated Press May 24, 2000

Two U.S. Air Force F-16 fighter jets returning from an air show came
too close to an American Airlines jet and a small private plane this
week outside Washington, authorities said on Tuesday. The incidents
occurred on Monday shortly after the Thunderbirds display team left
Andrews Air Force Base in Maryland for their home base in Nevada.
William Shumann, a spokesman for the Federal Aviation Administration,
said two of the eight Thunderbirds came within 700 feet vertically and
0.9 miles horizontally from an American Airlines (AMR.N) MD-80 flight
from Dallas to Dulles airport in northern Virginia.

``We have filed pilot deviations against the two pilots'' of
Thunderbird aircraft, Shumann said. The same F-16 aircraft also came
within 100 feet vertically and 1.8 miles horizontally of a privately
operated four-seat Mooney. FAA regulations generally call for a
minimum three miles horizontally or 1,000 feet vertically between
planes in airspace near airports.

The agency said it took the incidents seriously but any disciplinary
action would be up to the Air Force. ``All we do is tell the Air Force
'we think your pilots screwed up here,' then it's up to them to deal
with it,'' Shumann said. Air Force spokesman Maj. Jon Anderson said
close passes were inadvertent and occurred as an air traffic
controller helped guide the planes back into their formation after
losing visibility in low clouds. Speaking of the American Airlines
encounter, Anderson agreed the distance was below FAA minimums but
said: ``It wasn't right outside the window.'' The Air Force was
investigating, he said.

[Larry Dighera]

On Thu, 4 Jan 2007 17:49:59 -0800, "BT" > wrote
in >:

>Wow.. Larry.. a lot of information there... you have obviously done your
>research,
>I'll only comment on a few areas..
>
>INS 26nm off and the did not know it? It happens.. people bust check rides
>for that. We have to take one every 18 months. I've busted people on check
>rides for missing the IR entry point by 5nm. They did not know where they
>are.

I'm not questioning Parker's failure to detect the navigational
equipment errors. I'm questioning Parker's judgment in choosing to
descend given the navigational indications he was receiving. You'll
see what I mean once you have time to diagram it.

>Flying in an IR Route (MTR) is an IFR Clearance and provides IFR seperation
>from other IFR operations.

Really? Down that low? How is separation provided?

Out in the Mojave Desert I sincerely doubt ATC radars are able to
provide low-level coverage.