Re: #1 piston fighter?

[Peter Stickney]

In article >,
"The Enlightenment" > writes:
>
> "ArtKramr" > wrote in message
> ...
>> Yeah. we got hit by a 262 one day. It didn't seem very well flown and did
> no
>> damage and was gone.
>
> Some Me262B (the fighter bomber version as opposed to the pure Me262A)
> pilots were converted bomber pilots who didn't think like fighter pilots.

Let's also not overlook that there are a couple of other factors,
here. One is that the 262 had quite a few flight limitations. You
couldn't just horse it around in teh sky, sawing the throttle back &
forth. The engines, and their fuel feed systems were very sensitive
to -G fuel starvation, and required very tender handling even in the
most benign conditions to keep teh engines within their operatin
limits. (The penalty for exceeding those limits, BTW, being not just
a failed engine, but an explosion and fire, or teh turbine wheel
coming apart and throwing shards of itself though the airplane.

The other factor is that transitiong to jets, even if you're an
experienced fighter pilot, requires a big change in perspective. The
airplane doesn't want to speed up (Slow throttle resonce, and low
thrust compared to a propeller at low speeds) and it doesn't want to
slow down. (Pull the throttle back, and that slippery shape keeps
going and going - an idling prop produces a lot of drag). You also
need to develop a different sense of the speeds adn distances
involved. Closure rates are very high, and the turning circles are
big. These adjustments take time to make. And they aren't affected
by skill level. When Frank Gabreski started flying F-86s in Korea, he
had the same problems, despite being one of the all-time greats.


--
Pete Stickney
A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many
bad measures. -- Daniel Webster

[JonB]

"Edward French" > wrote in message >...
> Hello All,
>
> Ok, is there a singular Numero Uno air-to-air ww2 pistoned-fighter?
>
> I figure that "reliable performance with lethality" has gotta be considered
> 60% of the truth. Ease of manufacture, versatility, easy to pilot,
> durability, etc. making up the 40%.
>
> I'm hearing that, in all altitudes, the FW190 did the job best. How about
> the HELLCAT?
>
>
> --hug the day

After their unacceptable failure in protecting bomber squadrons an
angry Goring visited his fighter squadrons in France and spoke to his
Air-general about it.

Herman Goring: "What can I do to help you?"
Adolf Galland: "Get me Spitfires for my wing"

Not quite conclusive, but it is an interesting opinion.

[outsider64]

The Spitfire comment from Galland has an interesting context. Galland was
referring to the fact that Spitfires, with their tighter turning circles and
lateral maneuverability, were better suited for the close escort role,
whereas the Bf 109's were more suited to the free chase hunter role. He was
not simply labeling the Spitfire as the better fighter plane, although I
suspect he also enjoyed tweaking Goring with that statement!

Ken


"JonB" > wrote in message
om...
> "Edward French" > wrote in message
>...
> > Hello All,
> >
> > Ok, is there a singular Numero Uno air-to-air ww2 pistoned-fighter?
> >
> > I figure that "reliable performance with lethality" has gotta be
considered
> > 60% of the truth. Ease of manufacture, versatility, easy to pilot,
> > durability, etc. making up the 40%.
> >
> > I'm hearing that, in all altitudes, the FW190 did the job best. How
about
> > the HELLCAT?
> >
> >
> > --hug the day
>
> After their unacceptable failure in protecting bomber squadrons an
> angry Goring visited his fighter squadrons in France and spoke to his
> Air-general about it.
>
> Herman Goring: "What can I do to help you?"
> Adolf Galland: "Get me Spitfires for my wing"
>
> Not quite conclusive, but it is an interesting opinion.

[Drazen Kramaric]

On Mon, 16 Jun 2003 22:53:22 -0400, "Lawrence Dillard"
> wrote:


>The German system allowed Hartmann, Marseilles, Roedel and company to run up
>some admirable individual scores (and more power to them). However, the
>efforts of none of these experten was of much use to the Reich.

Now you only have to prove these "experts" were somehow responsible
for Reich's ultimate failure.


>The major question, to my mind, when assessing fighter aircraft and "Aces"
>is: what contribution did their collective (as opposed to individual)
>successes or failures make toward the achievment of their nation's war
>aims?

I'd say you fail to asses how much Germany's war aims were realistic
or feasible before proclaiming German "aces" as noworthy.

>When it came to crunch time, the Allies (albeit at times barely) almost
>always seemed to marshall their fighter forces in such a way as to achieve
>their goals, despite not having a Barkhorn or Sakai amongst them, while
>frustrating the Axis' aims at practically every turn.

Probably because Allies had a whole lot more of them. Something that
German aces can hardly be blamed for.

>Something basic was faulty about the manner in which the Axis fielded their
>forces:

Which, of course, has nothing to do with the individual pilot's combat
performance. I guess, an NBA players like Malone or Barkley who never
won the NBA championship were worse than some obscure guys who
happened to share the lockroom with Jordan.

>1) The Germans could not gain air superiority over Great Britain, despite
>investing considerable resources, including the most modern of fighters.
>Hence, no invasion, despite ballyhooed aces.

These same aces handled RAF pretty roughly over France. In order for
Sea Lion to succeed, Luftwaffe needed much more than well trained
fighter pilots. The problem with your argument is that you already
know why Luftwaffe could not create preconditions for successful Sea
Lion and you also know German aces could not win that battle.

>2) The Germans could not sustain air superiority over the Soviets despite
>investment of considerable resources and the creation of several ballyhooed
>aces flying a/c deemed to be "superior" to the opposition.

Luftwaffe sustained air superiority over Soviet Union long enough for
Heer to lose every chance of winning. You also know how Soviets
outproduced Germans, you know the story about the Lend Lease, you know
about the growing Luftwaffe commitments outside Soviet Union, so I ask
why are you deliberately blame combat pilots for unrealistic goals of
German leadership?
>
>3) The Germans could not gain air superiority over the DAF and later over
>the Allied air forces over N Africa and the Med, despite investment of
>considerable resources and astonishing individual aerial victory claims.
>Hence a sad end to operations, with the Tunisian surrender.

Because British deployed more aircraft to the theatre. That's why.

>4) The Germans could not hold air superiority over the continent in the face
>of escorted daylight raids, despite investment of considerable resources and
>the inevitable presence of the vaunted experten. On D-Day, the Germans
>managed maybe a couple hundred sorties, while the Allies managed thousands
>of sorties from dawn to dusk. The beginning of the end.

See above, but include Americans as well.
>
>One link between all the above is that even as the Reich was producing
>prodigies in terms of fighter aces, in not one instance did the successes of
>the various aces have a jot to do with abetting the achievment of the
>Reich's aims or with frustrating the Allies from achieving their objectives.
>In every instance, the Luftwaffe found itself face to face with a task for
>which it had neither adequate planning nor adequate means with which to
>successfully compete.

Than why did you start this post with a diatribe against combat
pilots? They were not to blame for idiotic politics of their civil and
military leadership. These young men joined Luftwaffe for the same
reason young men are becoming fighter pilots today.


Drax

[Drazen Kramaric]

On Tue, 17 Jun 2003 19:17:24 GMT, (The
Revolution Will Not Be Televised) wrote:


>Sure. But then let's throw in all the other pilots and let's also
>include the Italians who provided the majority of Axis aircrew in the
>theatre until Torch, not that they figure in the
>Luftwaffe-exceptionalist appreciation of the North African air war
>which reduces the totality of that conflict to the inanity of the
>fighter superheroes *to the exclusion of all else* .

What was the contribution of Regia Aeronautica to the air war over the
Western Desert prior to appearance of Luftwaffe?

By the way, what is generally known about the fighter pilots of French
air force who shot down quite a few Germans (Moelders among them) in
English language works? It's always RAF, RAF, RAF until Pearl Harbor.


>Indeed, but his death, along with the loss of other experten at the
>same time, was a watershed for that unit.

Well, it got rotated, like German divisions of fighter groups, it was
a different system than Allied.


>That's precidely my point. Marseille did not exist in isolation, but
>the impact of his death (and the other experten in the same unit lost
>in the summer of 1942) was disproportionate.

Had Luftwaffe had the numbers to contest the skies over Egypt, his
death wouldn't have been so important (if it actually was). But
Germans did not have the pilots, nor the aircraft nor the fuel to keep
adequate air force in the air. Whether it was Marseille who shot down
130 aircraft, or four Fritzes with 30 victories each, the outcome
would have been the same.


>The British had similar problems of overstretch at that time
>(deploying fighter units from the UK, Malta, Middle East across Asia
>to India and Burma). They managed an air force in an attritional
>conflict more effectively, primarily by recognising the extent of
>aircrew training and development demanded by an attritional conflict
>in a manner the Luftwaffe didn't.

British could afford to have such air force by having Red Army to
engage German army. If it were one-on-one, I doubt RAF by itself would
have ever won the air supremacy in Europe. Granted, war is not a sport
event, but Luftwaffe should not be blamed for failing to prepare for
war it could never win.


Drax

[Drazen Kramaric]

On Sat, 14 Jun 2003 06:28:26 -0400, Cub Driver
> wrote:


>You are being overly generous here, in my opinion :)
>
>It is not a matter of whether to subtract 2 or 5 or 10 kills from a
>given score, but which figure to use as a divisor.

But since this mustbe valid for every air force composed of human
beings, Erich Hartmann still remains the world's highest scoring ace
in the history. Whether it was 350, 250 or 150, it's really less
rellevant.

The real question is whether the such reduced number of claims (by two
thirds) actually matches the number of aircraft lost to air combat.

By your method of counting, on the day Marseille claimed 17 aircraft,
he really shot down no more than 6, right?


Drax

[Gordon]

>Hartmann, Marseilles, Roedel and company to run up
>>some admirable individual scores (and more power to them).

Roedel? Whoinheckizat? Do you mean Rudel, the Stuka pilot?

>However, the
>>efforts of none of these experten was of much use to the Reich.

Rudel destroyed over 500 Soviet tanks. How "much use" is one soldier supposed
to be to his country? Hartmann and Marseille destroyed the equivelent of an
enemy fighter wing between them. That's "some use" at least.

>>The major question, to my mind, when assessing fighter aircraft and "Aces"
>>is: what contribution did their collective (as opposed to individual)
>>successes or failures make toward the achievment of their nation's war
>>aims?

All fighter pilots are tactical assets and by nature will have few
opportunities to turn the course of the war by themselves.

>despite not having a Barkhorn or Sakai amongst them, while
>>frustrating the Axis' aims at practically every turn.

You're for forgetting Basil Embry and Col Don Blakeslee, among MANY others,
that at least matched or exceeded the combat /leadership abilities of the two
fine aviators that you mention.

v.r
Gordon
<====(A+C====>
USN SAR Aircrew

"Got anything on your radar, SENSO?"
"Nothing but my forehead, sir."

[Gordon]

>
>By the way, what is generally known about the fighter pilots of French
>air force who shot down quite a few Germans (Moelders among them) in
>English language works? It's always RAF, RAF, RAF until Pearl Harbor.

That's how it works. In French works, you get a predominance of French heroes;
in Russian-language books, its nearly always leaned toward the Great Patriotic
Struggle, "and the Americans did some bombing as well, after the Soviets
crushed all German resistance." Historical writing, in general, is weighted
toward the heroes that spoke the same language as the author and the intended
readers. Go into an American bookstore and you'll find rows of books on US and
British aircraft and airmen and a lower percentage of titles about other teams.
Its nature, not a slight against the heroic, brief stand of the French Air
Force.

v/r
Gordon

[phil hunt]

On 6 Jul 2003 10:51:40 -0700, JonB > wrote:
>
>After their unacceptable failure in protecting bomber squadrons an
>angry Goring visited his fighter squadrons in France and spoke to his
>Air-general about it.
>
>Herman Goring: "What can I do to help you?"
>Adolf Galland: "Get me Spitfires for my wing"

I wonder how good the He 112 or He 100 would have been against the
Spitfire?

--
Phil
"If only sarcasm could overturn bureaucracies"
-- NTK, commenting on www.cabalamat.org/weblog/art_29.html

[The Revolution Will Not Be Televised]

On Tue, 08 Jul 2003 19:04:27 GMT,
(Drazen Kramaric) wrote:

>>Sure. But then let's throw in all the other pilots and let's also
>>include the Italians who provided the majority of Axis aircrew in the
>>theatre until Torch, not that they figure in the
>>Luftwaffe-exceptionalist appreciation of the North African air war
>>which reduces the totality of that conflict to the inanity of the
>>fighter superheroes *to the exclusion of all else* .
>
>What was the contribution of Regia Aeronautica to the air war over the
>Western Desert prior to appearance of Luftwaffe?

The RA *was* the air war over the Western Desert prior to the arrival
of the Luftwaffe and remained the major contributor into 1942. If the
British performance against the Axis in the air is going to be judged,
it needs to be done against the whole context involved, not just
against one component of the Axis air effort in isolation, no matter
what qualitative qualifications might be required between the
different national efforts. Marseille and his colleagues shot down a
lot of fighters while they were attacking Axis bombers or other Axis
fighters: removing the Italians from the equation simply distorts the
reality in favour of Luftwaffe performance, just like various posters
who like to exclude German bomber losses from the BoB loss figures to
inflate Bf109 success. Why is this kind of distortion required in the
first place?

>By the way, what is generally known about the fighter pilots of French
>air force who shot down quite a few Germans (Moelders among them) in
>English language works? It's always RAF, RAF, RAF until Pearl Harbor.

There is very little in English (and not a lot in French until
recently, I gather) about the French in 1940. Nevertheless, the
French - no matter how good they were - were not in a position to
directly contribute to the air war against Germany after June 1940
(except those exiles who fought in the RAF, ironically), whereas the
RAF was. When it comes to it, the Dutch destroyed and damaged a lot
of Luftwaffe aircraft in 1940 and don't get much credit, while
disproportionate focus on RAF operations is more than matched by the
successively disproportionate focus on USAAF operations after Pearl
Harbor in English language works. So I don't think the RAF is
benefitting from this kind of approach in isolation. The Soviets have
a real grievance here, as well, in terms of having their contribution
recognised in English sources.

>>Indeed, but his death, along with the loss of other experten at the
>>same time, was a watershed for that unit.
>
>Well, it got rotated, like German divisions of fighter groups, it was
>a different system than Allied.

It wasn't rotated until it had its most effective members gutted.
This certainly happened to allied units on occasion, but the minority
"stars" didn't seem to account for the same critical proportion of
their unit combat effectiveness, although this is just a personal
opinion on my part.

>>That's precidely my point. Marseille did not exist in isolation, but
>>the impact of his death (and the other experten in the same unit lost
>>in the summer of 1942) was disproportionate.
>
>Had Luftwaffe had the numbers to contest the skies over Egypt, his
>death wouldn't have been so important (if it actually was). But
>Germans did not have the pilots, nor the aircraft nor the fuel to keep
>adequate air force in the air.

Their own fault, I'm afraid. The British, and then Americans, and
even the Soviets, faced and overcame the problems of logistical
overstretch over large geographical areas and swingeing operational
attrition while generally improving the size and quality of their air
force. The Luftwaffe did not.

>Whether it was Marseille who shot down
>130 aircraft, or four Fritzes with 30 victories each, the outcome
>would have been the same.

The Germans and Italians still had to be beaten: a pile of aircraft
sitting around in factory depots doesn't defeat the enemy by itself.
Any material superiority (and this wasn't by any margin decisively in
the British favour in 1941-42 in North Africa) has to be translated
into operational success, and that requires the efforts of the aircrew
and air force organisation involved.

>>The British had similar problems of overstretch at that time
>>(deploying fighter units from the UK, Malta, Middle East across Asia
>>to India and Burma). They managed an air force in an attritional
>>conflict more effectively, primarily by recognising the extent of
>>aircrew training and development demanded by an attritional conflict
>>in a manner the Luftwaffe didn't.
>
>British could afford to have such air force by having Red Army to
>engage German army.

The British had their own problems of overstretch in the air, quite
seperate from any ground operations against the mass of the German
army. You might not agree, but I know for a fact from relevant
planning documents in 1941-42 than aircraft and aircrew availability
against their various commitments were a critical issue for them at
the time. The British aircraft production effort was predicated by
the need to fight and win the next Batlle of Britain, and had little
to do with facing the German army direct. These dynamics can be seen
long before Barbarossa.

>If it were one-on-one, I doubt RAF by itself would
>have ever won the air supremacy in Europe.

And I can say the same about every national air force, but this
doesn't do much other than conclude an argument oriented around
nationalistic posturing.

>Granted, war is not a sport
>event, but Luftwaffe should not be blamed for failing to prepare for
>war it could never win.

The potential enemies were well-known, and the war was launched on a
German timetable, as Adolf certainly wasn't responding to external
agression. Meanwhile the British, Americans and Soviets had war
imposed on them, including the attrition endured in several major
defeats (especially in the Russian case) yet still managed to beat the
people who set the agenda. While I'm sure the individual Luftwaffe
pilots, groundstaff and aircrew did everything that could reasonably
expected, the higher direction and staff work of the Luftwaffe was
observably inferior to that achieved by their enemies. I agree with
Mr Dillard amout this issue, I'm afraid. They controlled the
development of hostilities in every case, and they lost in the end.

The heroic Siegfried myth of the Wagnerian hero facing insurmountable
hordes of untermenschen in inferior machines doesn't account for their
failure, while that failure clearly exists and needs to be accounted
for.

Gavin Bailey


--

"...this level of misinformation suggests some Americans may be
avoiding having an experience of cognitive dissonance."
- 'Poll shows errors in beliefs on Iraq, 9/11'
The Charlotte Observer, 20th June 2003

[Keith Willshaw]

"The Revolution Will Not Be Televised" > wrote in
message ...
> On Tue, 08 Jul 2003 19:04:27 GMT,
> (Drazen Kramaric) wrote:
>

>
> The potential enemies were well-known, and the war was launched on a
> German timetable, as Adolf certainly wasn't responding to external
> agression. Meanwhile the British, Americans and Soviets had war
> imposed on them, including the attrition endured in several major
> defeats (especially in the Russian case) yet still managed to beat the
> people who set the agenda. While I'm sure the individual Luftwaffe
> pilots, groundstaff and aircrew did everything that could reasonably
> expected, the higher direction and staff work of the Luftwaffe was
> observably inferior to that achieved by their enemies. I agree with
> Mr Dillard amout this issue, I'm afraid. They controlled the
> development of hostilities in every case, and they lost in the end.
>

Something graphically demonstrated during the Hague
conference of Sept 3 1940 where Goering , Kesselring etc
basically declared victory over the RAF annoincing that they
weredown to their last 100 fighters and all that was needed to
finish the job was a series of raids on London to flush out the
last reserves.

<Quote>
My fellow commanders, we are now on the brink of victory. An assault and an
invasion of England is now more promising than ever before. Our intelligence
has now informed us that the RAF is now down to less than a hundred fighter
aircraft, the airfields protecting London are out of action because of the
superb and accurate bombing of our bomber forces, their communications are
in disarray, and now we are told, their air commanders are arguing with each
other.
</Quote>

Only Sperle who had actually spoken to the aircrews engaged in combat
and knew of the true losses of the Luftwaffe demurred .

Keith

[Lawrence Dillard]

Drax, we have a small problem in communication. See below.
"Drazen Kramaric" > wrote in message
...
> On Mon, 16 Jun 2003 22:53:22 -0400, "Lawrence Dillard"
> > wrote:
>
>
> >The German system allowed Hartmann, Marseilles, Roedel and company to run
up
> >some admirable individual scores (and more power to them). However, the
> >efforts of none of these experten was of much use to the Reich.
>
> Now you only have to prove these "experts" were somehow responsible
> for Reich's ultimate failure.

NO, I do not. That was not my intention or the point I am making. I do not
contend that the "experts" were responsible for the Reich's ultimate
military failure. Instead, I contend that in despite of the undeniable
accomplishments of the very succesful airmen, their efforts went to
waste--not because their prowess was somehow nugatory, but because the
SYSTEM which allowed their success failed to allow their successes to have a
real impact on the course of operations.

> >The major question, to my mind, when assessing fighter aircraft and
"Aces"
> >is: what contribution did their collective (as opposed to individual)
> >successes or failures make toward the achievment of their nation's war
> >aims?
>
> I'd say you fail to asses how much Germany's war aims were realistic
> or feasible before proclaiming German "aces" as noworthy.

Not at all. I hoped that that very assessment was implicit in my discussion.
If I gave any other impression, I apologize to the ng and to you.

> >When it came to crunch time, the Allies (albeit at times barely) almost
> >always seemed to marshall their fighter forces in such a way as to
achieve
> >their goals, despite not having a Barkhorn or Sakai amongst them, while
> >frustrating the Axis' aims at practically every turn.
>
> Probably because Allies had a whole lot more of them. Something that
> German aces can hardly be blamed for.

I assign no blame to the German aces for the failure of the Reich's military
endeavors. I am concerned in that DESPITE having such exemplars, no real
advantage ever obtained to the Reich as a consequence. As I wrote
immediately below:
> >Something basic was faulty about the manner in which the Axis fielded
their
> >forces:
>
> Which, of course, has nothing to do with the individual pilot's combat
> performance.

Precisely. Somehow, the Reich failed to lucratively exploit the successes of
those extraordinary performers.

I guess, an NBA players like Malone or Barkley who never
> won the NBA championship were worse than some obscure guys who
> happened to share the lockroom with Jordan.

Not at all, of course; BUT if Malone or Barkley is not supported by or
properly exploited by his organization, neither he nor his organization will
obtain the Glittering Prizes. That's what seemed to have happened with the
German superstars.

>
> >1) The Germans could not gain air superiority over Great Britain, despite
> >investing considerable resources, including the most modern of fighters.
> >Hence, no invasion, despite ballyhooed aces.
>
> These same aces handled RAF pretty roughly over France. In order for
> Sea Lion to succeed, Luftwaffe needed much more than well trained
> fighter pilots. The problem with your argument is that you already
> know why Luftwaffe could not create preconditions for successful Sea
> Lion and you also know German aces could not win that battle.

Uh, uh. But I am left at a loss to understand how, given the availability of
such superstars, success was not achieved. I am leaning toward assigning the
responsibility for this to the system, not to the pilots. In GB at the time,
the situation was regarded as most serious; there were moments of doubt
during the BoB. It simply was not known whether the Luftwaffe would or could
generate a campaign which could exploit Britain's weaknesses and set the
stage for an invasion.
>
> >2) The Germans could not sustain air superiority over the Soviets despite

> >investment of considerable resources and the creation of several
ballyhooed
> >aces flying a/c deemed to be "superior" to the opposition.
>
> Luftwaffe sustained air superiority over Soviet Union long enough for
> Heer to lose every chance of winning. You also know how Soviets
> outproduced Germans, you know the story about the Lend Lease, you know
> about the growing Luftwaffe commitments outside Soviet Union, so I ask
> why are you deliberately blame combat pilots for unrealistic goals of
> German leadership?

I don't do that. But I do question the utility to the Reich's military
efforts in laying the groundwork for such spectacular successes and then
being unable to reap the expected rewards thereform.

> >
> >3) The Germans could not gain air superiority over the DAF and later over
> >the Allied air forces over N Africa and the Med, despite investment of
> >considerable resources and astonishing individual aerial victory claims.
> >Hence a sad end to operations, with the Tunisian surrender.
>
> Because British deployed more aircraft to the theatre. That's why.

That certainly didn't hurt. However, I do believe that ultimaely Lord Tedder
and his US counterparts organized or designed their forces' performance so
as to help their nations attain the goals sought. For whatever reasons,
however, the Reich could not do so, despite having certain human materiel
who performed to a quite high standard. German successes in fighter vs
fighter combat somehow did not translate into victory.

>
> >4) The Germans could not hold air superiority over the continent in the
face
> >of escorted daylight raids, despite investment of considerable resources
and
> >the inevitable presence of the vaunted experten. On D-Day, the Germans
> >managed maybe a couple hundred sorties, while the Allies managed
thousands
> >of sorties from dawn to dusk. The beginning of the end.
>
> See above, but include Americans as well.


> >
> >One link between all the above is that even as the Reich was producing
> >prodigies in terms of fighter aces, in not one instance did the successes
of
> >the various aces have a jot to do with abetting the achievment of the
> >Reich's aims or with frustrating the Allies from achieving their
objectives.
> >In every instance, the Luftwaffe found itself face to face with a task
for
> >which it had neither adequate planning nor adequate means with which to
> >successfully compete.
>
> Than why did you start this post with a diatribe against combat
> pilots?

I don't believe that I did. I have, in fact, a sneaking admiration for many
of the German experts. I find them to be impressive. But I can find no
evidence that their extraordinary accomplishments had any real impact of the
outcomes of many an operation. And, to me, at least, a soldier at war is
there in the first place to see to the accomplishment of his commanders'
objectives. A system which cannot capitalize on Marseilles' talents and
success, for example, did not garner the Glittering Prizes, which was all
that truly mattered.

They were not to blame for idiotic politics of their civil and
> military leadership. These young men joined Luftwaffe for the same
> reason young men are becoming fighter pilots today.

I suppose so. I personally lay no blame at their doorsteps. But I am
inclined to believe, still, that their efforts were wasted. Impressive, yes,
but not decisive. Their impresive efforts had no leavening effect on their
cohorts' performances, and were not decisive in their impact on operations,
as in general, the Allies were able to impose their will over the
battlefields.

[Gordon]

>
>Thats the reality that King Leonidas discovered in Thermoplyae, Confederates
>during Civil War and Germans during WWII.

Wow, Drax. Incredible that you got those three forces into the same context!
Good job, and good point :)

v/r
Gordon

[Lawrence Dillard]

"Denyav" > wrote in message
...

SNIP

> Having a pound by pound superior military force is not a guarantee for
success
> if your opponent has vastly bigger "numericals".
> Thats the reality that King Leonidas discovered in Thermoplyae,
Confederates
> during Civil War and Germans during WWII.

There are at least two things to remember about taking on a fight against
odds.

Never pick a fight against a bigger, meaner foe.
The other one was recounted by Emperor Napoleon: "God is on the side of the
bigger battalions."

Speaking of the latter two "causes", in both cases, they "ran wild", on the
offensive against befuddled opposition, for approximately three years, or
less. After that, it was all a downhill slide into abject defeat .
In both cases it is hard to find any redeeming qualities in the causes for
which they fought, albeit certain individuals fought for the causes with
considerable elan.

[Jan]

Sad to see that the simple question for the #1 fighter plane turns
into a battle that reveals the inability of some poeple to get along
with any kind of different opinion:

Person 1: What is the #1 fighter plane?
P2: the Mustang
P3: you're damn right man!!
p2: it's a pleasure to talk to you
p4: i think there could be... perhaps.... different plane....???
p2: what do you know
p3: exactly get lost you revisionist nazi
p2: shXX up or we come back and get the job finished

and so on

With respect to the question: there isn't any best fighter. Every type
had its shortcomings. The soviet La7 and Yak3 were pretty much
superior to everything else down low but not competitive at alt. The
late Spitfires and FW's were probably better than the Mustang 1on1 but
with limited range.

Don't trust anybody saying this is the winner hands down.
It's just his sole opinion and nobody here flew one of these planes in
combat.

regards

Jan Fuhrmann


"Edward French" > wrote in message >...
> Hello All,
>
> Ok, is there a singular Numero Uno air-to-air ww2 pistoned-fighter?
>
> I figure that "reliable performance with lethality" has gotta be considered
> 60% of the truth. Ease of manufacture, versatility, easy to pilot,
> durability, etc. making up the 40%.
>
> I'm hearing that, in all altitudes, the FW190 did the job best. How about
> the HELLCAT?
>
>
> --hug the day

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: #1 piston fighter?
>From: (Jan)
>Date: 7/10/03 4:55 PM Pacific Daylight Time
>Message-id:

>on't trust anybody saying this is the winner hands down.
>It's just his sole opinion and nobody here flew one of these planes in
>combat.
>
>regards
>
>Jan Fuhrmann

TaDaaaa!


Arthur Kramer
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[Corey C. Jordan]

On 10 Jul 2003 16:55:05 -0700, (Jan) wrote:

>
>With respect to the question: there isn't any best fighter. Every type
>had its shortcomings. The soviet La7 and Yak3 were pretty much
>superior to everything else down low but not competitive at alt. The
>late Spitfires and FW's were probably better than the Mustang 1on1 but
>with limited range.
>
>Don't trust anybody saying this is the winner hands down.
>It's just his sole opinion and nobody here flew one of these planes in
>combat.


Well, the P-51H was a significant improvement on the P-51D.
Indeed, the La-7 was a monster down low.

Maybe few if any here have actually flown these aircraft.
However, you can fly them via some extraordinary simulators.

Go to the Hitech Creations website listed in my sigfile and download
the free software. That's right, it's free. You can fly offline all you want.
You can fly online for two weeks at no charge. You'll be able to compare
the best WWII fighters head to head using the most accurate flight models
in the PC flight sim industry. And, it'll cost you nothing but your time.

My regards,
Widewing (C.C. Jordan)
http://www.worldwar2aviation.com
http://www.netaces.org
http://www.hitechcreations.com

[Keith Willshaw]

"Corey C. Jordan" > wrote in message
...
> On 10 Jul 2003 16:55:05 -0700, (Jan) wrote:
>

>
> Well, the P-51H was a significant improvement on the P-51D.
> Indeed, the La-7 was a monster down low.
>
> Maybe few if any here have actually flown these aircraft.
> However, you can fly them via some extraordinary simulators.
>

Captain Eric 'Winkle' Brown flew one and his view of the aircraft
was as follows

<Quote>
The La-7 was to me a complete revelation with regard to its
handling characteristics and performance which were quite superb.

It had all the qualities necessary for a fine combat fighter but not
the equipment. Its firepower and sighting equipment were below
par, its wooden construction would have withstood little punishment,
the pilot was poorly protected and the blind flying and navigation
instrumentation was appalingly basic.

Having flown nine contemporary Russian front line aircraft
I began to understand how the Luftwaffe pilots on the eastern
front clocked up such huge victory scores, but in the case of the
La-7 they would have had to work hard for their money.
</Quote>

Source: Testing For Combat

Keith

[Corey C. Jordan]

On Fri, 11 Jul 2003 22:13:17 +0100, "Keith Willshaw"
> wrote:

>
>"Corey C. Jordan" > wrote in message
...
>> On 10 Jul 2003 16:55:05 -0700, (Jan) wrote:
>>
>
>>
>> Well, the P-51H was a significant improvement on the P-51D.
>> Indeed, the La-7 was a monster down low.
>>
>> Maybe few if any here have actually flown these aircraft.
>> However, you can fly them via some extraordinary simulators.
>>
>
>Captain Eric 'Winkle' Brown flew one and his view of the aircraft
>was as follows
>
><Quote>
>The La-7 was to me a complete revelation with regard to its
>handling characteristics and performance which were quite superb.
>
>It had all the qualities necessary for a fine combat fighter but not
>the equipment. Its firepower and sighting equipment were below
>par, its wooden construction would have withstood little punishment,
>the pilot was poorly protected and the blind flying and navigation
>instrumentation was appalingly basic.
>
>Having flown nine contemporary Russian front line aircraft
>I began to understand how the Luftwaffe pilots on the eastern
>front clocked up such huge victory scores, but in the case of the
>La-7 they would have had to work hard for their money.
></Quote>
>
>Source: Testing For Combat
>
>Keith
>
>

Lavochkin used alloy wing spars (I believe they were actually box spars) to
add strength and reduce weight. Windtunnel testing of the La-5FN showed
that refinements to the fighter's aerodynamics could significantly improve
performance (which was pretty good as it was). Thus was born the La-7.
Below 5,000 feet, its over-all performance was only exceeded by the Grumman
F8F Bearcat and the Hawker Tempest Mk.V.

History shows that the Lavochkins proved to be very durable and battle damage
repairs were easier and required less technically skilled personnel.

My regards,
Widewing (C.C. Jordan)
http://www.worldwar2aviation.com
http://www.netaces.org
http://www.hitechcreations.com