Re: KC-767 ????

[John Halliwell]

In article >, Cub Driver
> writes
>It's a great PR coup for Boeing!

Some people consider it a subsidy because it allows Boeing to keep the
767 line running, and that without the deal they might have to close it.

--
John

[Mary Shafer]

On Thu, 3 Jul 2003 02:25:03 +0100, John Halliwell
> wrote:

> In article >, Tarver Engineering >
> writes
> >Even better still Gord, the MD-11's type certificate says it is a DC-10.
>
> Was that because they would otherwise have had problems certifying it
> against the current regulations?

Certifying a new model of an already-certified airplane is easier than
certifying a new airplane. The MD-11 certainly qualifies, after all.

Mary

--
Mary Shafer Retired aerospace research engineer

"Turn to kill, not to engage." LCDR Willie Driscoll, USN

[David Lesher]

Cub Driver > writes:


>>The designation KC-767A was officially allocated to the Boeing 767 tankers
>>which are to be leased by the U.S. Air Force. The out-of-sequence design
>>number was allocated against the recommendation of the USAF Nomenclature
>>Office. The correct designation would have been KC-42A (see article about
>>Non-Standard DOD Aircraft Designations for some background information).

>It's a great PR coup for Boeing!


Now you are getting the range. There are LOTS of questions as to how
this sweetheart deal suddenly appeared. The answer is likely the
familiar one:
Follow the money....

--
A host is a host from coast to
& no one will talk to a host that's close........[v].(301) 56-LINUX
Unless the host (that isn't close).........................pob 1433
is busy, hung or dead....................................20915-1433

[David Lesher]

"Gord Beaman" ) writes:

>For instance, why
>change the complete 'name' of a DC-10, which most people know and
>can recognise, to MD-11?. Makes no good sense to me. Why not
>MD-10, if McDonnell Douglas wanted their 'name' on them?, then us
>older guys with fewer memory cells would have some chance.

The DC-10 has such a bad reputation that the new owners wanted to
sever the connection. (Hello., ValueJet....errr ATA)

Of course, it looks like the MD-11 was a dog of a different color,
but still barked; did it ever meet the performance guarantees? I
think not, which is how they ended up in freighter/tanker service,
including the one pronged in Hong Kong in ?99.
--
A host is a host from coast to
& no one will talk to a host that's close........[v].(301) 56-LINUX
Unless the host (that isn't close).........................pob 1433
is busy, hung or dead....................................20915-1433

[Darrell A. Larose]

Cub Driver ) writes:
>>>It's a great PR coup for Boeing!
>>
>>Some people consider it a subsidy because it allows Boeing to keep the
>>767 line running, and that without the deal they might have to close it.
>
> How does designating the a/c KC-767 serve to subsidize Boeing?
>
> *Leasing* the a/c may be a subsidy (though not as immediate a one as
> buying them), but calling them 767 is merely a PR coup.
>
I would not expect the USAF to buy or lease an Airbus Tanker. Supporting a
USA manufacturer is what the US Government should do.

[[email protected]]

David Lesher > wrote:

>"Gord Beaman" ) writes:
>
>>For instance, why
>>change the complete 'name' of a DC-10, which most people know and
>>can recognise, to MD-11?. Makes no good sense to me. Why not
>>MD-10, if McDonnell Douglas wanted their 'name' on them?, then us
>>older guys with fewer memory cells would have some chance.
>
>The DC-10 has such a bad reputation that the new owners wanted to
>sever the connection. (Hello., ValueJet....errr ATA)
>
>Of course, it looks like the MD-11 was a dog of a different color,
>but still barked; did it ever meet the performance guarantees? I
>think not, which is how they ended up in freighter/tanker service,
>including the one pronged in Hong Kong in ?99.

The DC-10 had a bad name?...they had a door problem 'way back,
one had a bad fire...what else?...I didn't know that ValuJet(sic)
used DC-10's. Seems to me if the military used them for tankers
that there couldn't have been that much wrong with them...care to
clue me in?...
--

-Gord.

[Jack G]

A couple of DC-10's were lost due to problems with the thrust bearing - one
major crash at Chicago - I don't have a reference handy for the others.
Lots of people refused to fly on DC-10's after the Chicago crash - prompting
the bumper sticker "If it's not Boeing, I'm not going".

Jack



"Gord Beaman" > wrote in message
...
> David Lesher > wrote:
>
> >"Gord Beaman" ) writes:
> >
> >>For instance, why
> >>change the complete 'name' of a DC-10, which most people know and
> >>can recognise, to MD-11?. Makes no good sense to me. Why not
> >>MD-10, if McDonnell Douglas wanted their 'name' on them?, then us
> >>older guys with fewer memory cells would have some chance.
> >
> >The DC-10 has such a bad reputation that the new owners wanted to
> >sever the connection. (Hello., ValueJet....errr ATA)
> >
> >Of course, it looks like the MD-11 was a dog of a different color,
> >but still barked; did it ever meet the performance guarantees? I
> >think not, which is how they ended up in freighter/tanker service,
> >including the one pronged in Hong Kong in ?99.
>
> The DC-10 had a bad name?...they had a door problem 'way back,
> one had a bad fire...what else?...I didn't know that ValuJet(sic)
> used DC-10's. Seems to me if the military used them for tankers
> that there couldn't have been that much wrong with them...care to
> clue me in?...
> --
>
> -Gord.

[[email protected]]

"Jack G" > wrote:

>A couple of DC-10's were lost due to problems with the thrust bearing - one
>major crash at Chicago - I don't have a reference handy for the others.
>Lots of people refused to fly on DC-10's after the Chicago crash - prompting
>the bumper sticker "If it's not Boeing, I'm not going".
>
>Jack
>
>
>
The thrust bearing?...what thrust bearing?...I sure never heard
of that one and I've heard of pretty well all of them. "The one
at Chicago" is likely the one (in 79) which lost the nr one
engine?...no fault of the a/c, that was improper engine/pylon
removal/installation which cracked the mounting flanges.

Surely you aren't referring to that?...if you are then what other
10 crashed from that problem?...Huh?.

It really bothers me when people lash out with vague halfbaked
reasons for trashing an aircraft. "Oh!...it's very unsafe",
"Why?", "Dunno, it just is". Freaking brilliant.
--

-Gord.

[Steven P. McNicoll]

"Jack G" > wrote in message
...
>
> A couple of DC-10's were lost due to problems with the thrust bearing -
one
> major crash at Chicago - I don't have a reference handy for the others.
> Lots of people refused to fly on DC-10's after the Chicago crash -
prompting
> the bumper sticker "If it's not Boeing, I'm not going".
>

Thrust bearing? The only major DC-10 crash I can recall at Chicago was in
1979 and was due to faulty maintenance procedures.

[Tom Mosher]

"Gord Beaman" ) wrote in message >...
> "Jack G" > wrote:
>
> >A couple of DC-10's were lost due to problems with the thrust bearing - one
> >major crash at Chicago - I don't have a reference handy for the others.
> >Lots of people refused to fly on DC-10's after the Chicago crash - prompting
> >the bumper sticker "If it's not Boeing, I'm not going".
> >
> >Jack
> >
> >
> >
> The thrust bearing?...what thrust bearing?...I sure never heard
> of that one and I've heard of pretty well all of them. "The one
> at Chicago" is likely the one (in 79) which lost the nr one
> engine?...no fault of the a/c, that was improper engine/pylon
> removal/installation which cracked the mounting flanges.
>
> Surely you aren't referring to that?...if you are then what other
> 10 crashed from that problem?...Huh?.
>
> It really bothers me when people lash out with vague halfbaked
> reasons for trashing an aircraft. "Oh!...it's very unsafe",
> "Why?", "Dunno, it just is". Freaking brilliant.

Where the hell did he come up with a bad thrust bearing? It was a bad
maintenance practice. AA at Tulsa M&E decided to shorten the
engine/pylon removal process by pulling the engine and pylon at the
same time. Unfortunately, it put stress in the wrong place and cracked
the structure. Eventually, the engine separated with catastrophic
results.

Tom Mosher

[Ralph Savelsberg]

Jack G wrote:

> A couple of DC-10's were lost due to problems with the thrust bearing - one
> major crash at Chicago - I don't have a reference handy for the others.
> Lots of people refused to fly on DC-10's after the Chicago crash - prompting
> the bumper sticker "If it's not Boeing, I'm not going".
>
> Jack
>

It had and apparently still has a bad reputation. A couple of highly
publicised crashes (due to different reasons) just after an aircraft
enters service seems to have that result. However, there is a big
difference between it having a bad public reputation and it actually
being a bad aircraft.
Hundreds of the things have operated without any major problems for
years. I don't know the exact figures, but I doubt its overall safety
record being much different from that of, say, the Boeing 747.

Regards,
Ralph Savelsberg

[Keith Willshaw]

"Ralph Savelsberg" > wrote in message
...
>
>
> Jack G wrote:
>
> > A couple of DC-10's were lost due to problems with the thrust bearing -
one
> > major crash at Chicago - I don't have a reference handy for the others.
> > Lots of people refused to fly on DC-10's after the Chicago crash -
prompting
> > the bumper sticker "If it's not Boeing, I'm not going".
> >
> > Jack
> >
>
> It had and apparently still has a bad reputation. A couple of highly
> publicised crashes (due to different reasons) just after an aircraft
> enters service seems to have that result. However, there is a big
> difference between it having a bad public reputation and it actually
> being a bad aircraft.
> Hundreds of the things have operated without any major problems for
> years. I don't know the exact figures, but I doubt its overall safety
> record being much different from that of, say, the Boeing 747.
>
> Regards,
> Ralph Savelsberg
>

From the statistics on the aviation safety site

http://aviation-safety.net/statistics/aircraft.html

It would seem the DC-10 has a better record than the Boeing 737-200
but worse than the 747, the MD-11 does better than the 747
but its a pretty safe aircraft overall.

Keith

[[email protected]]

Mary Shafer > wrote:

>On 3 Jul 2003 23:14:00 -0700, (Tom Mosher)
>wrote:
>
>> Where the hell did he come up with a bad thrust bearing? It was a bad
>> maintenance practice. AA at Tulsa M&E decided to shorten the
>> engine/pylon removal process by pulling the engine and pylon at the
>> same time. Unfortunately, it put stress in the wrong place and cracked
>> the structure. Eventually, the engine separated with catastrophic
>> results.
>
>Actually, the problem wasn't that they were removing and replacing
>both, it was that they were using a _forklift_ to do so.
>
>Said so in the accident report.l
>
>Mary

Yes, that and lack of disseminating information to other
operators and the FAA.
--

-Gord.

[David Lesher]

"Keith Willshaw" > writes:


>> The DC-10 has such a bad reputation that the new owners wanted to
>> sever the connection. (Hello., ValueJet....errr ATA)

>Valuejet didnt operate DC-10's, they used DC-9's which are a rather
>different aircraft.

Didn't say they did. Clue: there are 2 name changes discussed....
both cases had GREAT reps....



>The MD-11 was renamed because there were substantial
>differences from the DC-10 including a glass cockpit, redesigned wings
>and tail, new engines and its longer carrying around 50 more pax than a
>DC-10.

Yep, sure thing.... no PR angle at all.... either prefix
or suffix.



>http://aviation-safety.net/database/1999/990822-0.htm

I went through HKG a few weeks later, and got a jumpseat visit. The
crew was discussing the above. HKG apparently has nasty, unpredictable
low level [below DH] winds. Further, 642 barely missed landing atop
another aircraft on the adjacent taxiway. And best of all, the
Chinese Army wanted the wreck out of sight ASAP, so they blew it
apart and picked up the pieces...





--
A host is a host from coast to
& no one will talk to a host that's close........[v].(301) 56-LINUX
Unless the host (that isn't close).........................pob 1433
is busy, hung or dead....................................20915-1433

[David Lesher]

"Steven P. McNicoll" > writes:



>Thrust bearing? The only major DC-10 crash I can recall at Chicago was in
>1979 and was due to faulty maintenance procedures.

Turkish Airways....

--
A host is a host from coast to
& no one will talk to a host that's close........[v].(301) 56-LINUX
Unless the host (that isn't close).........................pob 1433
is busy, hung or dead....................................20915-1433

[David Bromage]

David Lesher wrote:
> "Steven P. McNicoll" > writes:
>>Thrust bearing? The only major DC-10 crash I can recall at Chicago
was in
>>1979 and was due to faulty maintenance procedures.
>
> Turkish Airways....

Turkish Airlines lost TC-JAV at Bois d'Ermenonville (just out of Orly)
in 1974.

There were two DC-10 losses in Chicago. American Airlines lost N110AA in
a crash in 1979 and American Trans Air lost N184AT in a cabin fire on
the ground in 1986.

Cheers
David

[Keith Willshaw]

"David Lesher" > wrote in message
...
> "Steven P. McNicoll" > writes:
>
>
>
> >Thrust bearing? The only major DC-10 crash I can recall at Chicago was
in
> >1979 and was due to faulty maintenance procedures.
>
> Turkish Airways....
>

In France not Chicago and a result of a failed cargo door IRC

Keith

[Keith Willshaw]

"David Bromage" > wrote in message
.. .
> David Lesher wrote:
> > "Steven P. McNicoll" > writes:
> >>Thrust bearing? The only major DC-10 crash I can recall at Chicago
> was in
> >>1979 and was due to faulty maintenance procedures.
> >
> > Turkish Airways....
>
> Turkish Airlines lost TC-JAV at Bois d'Ermenonville (just out of Orly)
> in 1974.
>
> There were two DC-10 losses in Chicago. American Airlines lost N110AA in
> a crash in 1979 and American Trans Air lost N184AT in a cabin fire on
> the ground in 1986.
>

The latter was hardly a fault of the aircraft, the loss report reads

<Quote>
The DC-10 was unloaded following a charter flight. Company maintenance
personnel had placed damaged passenger seatbacks (incorporating solid-state
chemical oxygen generators) in the forward cargo hold with seat covers and
oil. A company mechanic examined the seatbacks to find a serviceable unit.
He encountered a loose oxygen generator, which he handled improperly by its
oxygen hose. The generator went off by accident, generating a 430deg C heat.
Seat covers ignited and the fire eventually burned through the cabin floor.
The cabin was soon engulfed in flames.
</Quote>

Keith

[Pooh Bear]

David Lesher wrote:

> "Steven P. McNicoll" > writes:
>
> >Thrust bearing? The only major DC-10 crash I can recall at Chicago was in
> >1979 and was due to faulty maintenance procedures.
>
> Turkish Airways....

Faulty maintenance again. Ok, the cargo handler 'forced' the door, but the
latching mechanism adjustment was intended to stop that. It was adjusted the
wrong way.

PB

[Pooh Bear]

Keith Willshaw wrote:

> "David Lesher" > wrote in message
> ...
> > "Steven P. McNicoll" > writes:
> >
> >
> >
> > >Thrust bearing? The only major DC-10 crash I can recall at Chicago was
> in
> > >1979 and was due to faulty maintenance procedures.
> >
> > Turkish Airways....
> >
>
> In France not Chicago and a result of a failed cargo door IRC
>
> Keith

Correct on both counts.

Although why MD chose not to fit pressure blowout valves is a mystery.. The
cargo compartment de-pressurised and brought the pax floor down onto the
control lines. From then on it was uncontrollable.

PB

[Pooh Bear]

John Mullen wrote:

> "David Lesher" > wrote in message
> ...
> > "Jack G" > writes:
> >
> > >A couple of DC-10's were lost due to problems with the thrust bearing -
> one
> > >major crash at Chicago - I don't have a reference handy for the others.
>
> I suggest that's because they never happened!
>
> > >Lots of people refused to fly on DC-10's after the Chicago crash -
> prompting
> > >the bumper sticker "If it's not Boeing, I'm not going".
>
> The DC-10 was always more sinned against than sinning. In most of its many
> well-publicised crashes, the aircraft itself was not really to blame, more
> the way it was flown or maintained. The Paris crash was the only exception
> to this I can think of off-hand.

I've heard that was effectively maintenance too. 747s have had problems with
the latching mechanisms on the front cargo door too ( UA811 ).

> Plenty of Boeings have crashed too. Even
> (very rarely) an Airbus!
>
> John

Kinda what I've heard too.

The DC-10 had a number of high profile incidents directly after entry into
service. Rumour has it that MD fixed all the latent problems so well that it
was eventually the safest wide body of its day. Still didn't save its
reputation though. Ppl have long memories.

PB

[David Lesher]

"John Mullen" > writes:


>The DC-10 was always more sinned against than sinning. In most of its many
>well-publicised crashes, the aircraft itself was not really to blame, more
>the way it was flown or maintained. The Paris crash was the only exception
>to this I can think of off-hand.

And N1819U (46618/118) July 19th 1989, Sioux City, IA;
the aircraft design was blame-free?






--
A host is a host from coast to
& no one will talk to a host that's close........[v].(301) 56-LINUX
Unless the host (that isn't close).........................pob 1433
is busy, hung or dead....................................20915-1433

[Keith Willshaw]

"David Lesher" > wrote in message
...
> "John Mullen" > writes:
>
>
> >The DC-10 was always more sinned against than sinning. In most of its
many
> >well-publicised crashes, the aircraft itself was not really to blame,
more
> >the way it was flown or maintained. The Paris crash was the only
exception
> >to this I can think of off-hand.
>
> And N1819U (46618/118) July 19th 1989, Sioux City, IA;
> the aircraft design was blame-free?
>

Uncontained engine failures arent supposed to happen and
can kill any airplane, the Boeing 737 crash at Manchester
was caused by the same thing and killed a LOT of people
when engine parts ripped open and ignited the fuel tanks

Keith

[Keith Willshaw]

"Pooh Bear" > wrote in message
...
> John Mullen wrote:
>

> >
> > The DC-10 was always more sinned against than sinning. In most of its
many
> > well-publicised crashes, the aircraft itself was not really to blame,
more
> > the way it was flown or maintained. The Paris crash was the only
exception
> > to this I can think of off-hand.
>
> I've heard that was effectively maintenance too. 747s have had problems
with
> the latching mechanisms on the front cargo door too ( UA811 ).
>

While there were indeed maintenance problems, specifically adjustmens
to the lock limit warning switches were made incorrectly there
were also a number of design faults.

If the lock actuator shaft failed to extend correctly, which it did, it
was possible to bend the locking pins, making the door appear locked
when it wasnt, without using excessive force. All the load was them put on
the
actuator attachment bolts which failed as the pressure difference increased
with altitude.

The latching mechanism was redesigned after the crash and blowout panels
installed in the floor to prevent a collapse in the event of cargo hold
depressurisation

Keith

[John Mullen]

"David Lesher" > wrote in message
...
> "John Mullen" > writes:
>
>
> >The DC-10 was always more sinned against than sinning. In most of its
many
> >well-publicised crashes, the aircraft itself was not really to blame,
more
> >the way it was flown or maintained. The Paris crash was the only
exception
> >to this I can think of off-hand.
>
> And N1819U (46618/118) July 19th 1989, Sioux City, IA;
> the aircraft design was blame-free?

Yes. In fact I'd go further and say that but for the 10's sturdy design (and
of course the heroism of the crew and the deadheading pilot who helped them)
nobody would have survived.

John

[Ron Parsons]

In article >,
Pooh Bear > wrote:

>Keith Willshaw wrote:
>
>> "David Lesher" > wrote in message
>> ...
>> > "Steven P. McNicoll" > writes:
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > >Thrust bearing? The only major DC-10 crash I can recall at Chicago was
>> in
>> > >1979 and was due to faulty maintenance procedures.
>> >
>> > Turkish Airways....
>> >
>>
>> In France not Chicago and a result of a failed cargo door IRC
>>
>> Keith
>
>Correct on both counts.
>
>Although why MD chose not to fit pressure blowout valves is a mystery.. The
>cargo compartment de-pressurised and brought the pax floor down onto the
>control lines. From then on it was uncontrollable.

This happened over Windsor,Ontario as the aircraft climbed out of DTW.
It should have been uncontrollable, but for Capt. McCormick who brought
it back missing only the coffin which had shifted in turbulence and hit
the door enough for it to pop open.

--
Ron

[John Mullen]

"Keith Willshaw" > wrote in message
...
>
> "Pooh Bear" > wrote in message
> ...
> > John Mullen wrote:
> >
>
> > >
> > > The DC-10 was always more sinned against than sinning. In most of its
> many
> > > well-publicised crashes, the aircraft itself was not really to blame,
> more
> > > the way it was flown or maintained. The Paris crash was the only
> exception
> > > to this I can think of off-hand.
> >
> > I've heard that was effectively maintenance too. 747s have had problems
> with
> > the latching mechanisms on the front cargo door too ( UA811 ).
> >
>
> While there were indeed maintenance problems, specifically adjustmens
> to the lock limit warning switches were made incorrectly there
> were also a number of design faults.
>
> If the lock actuator shaft failed to extend correctly, which it did, it
> was possible to bend the locking pins, making the door appear locked
> when it wasnt, without using excessive force. All the load was them put on
> the
> actuator attachment bolts which failed as the pressure difference
increased
> with altitude.
>
> The latching mechanism was redesigned after the crash and blowout panels
> installed in the floor to prevent a collapse in the event of cargo hold
> depressurisation

Spot on. There were also staff training isues as the DC 10 had been rushed
into service somewhat, leading to the guy who was checking the cargo door
not really knowing what he was looking for.

Might have been a good idea to fix this issue when the Windsor incident took
place a few months before, hundreds of lives could have been saved...

(ref Macarthur Job - Air Disaster vol whatever)

John

[Pooh Bear]

Ron Parsons wrote:

> In article >,
> Pooh Bear > wrote:
>
> >Keith Willshaw wrote:
> >
> >> "David Lesher" > wrote in message
> >> ...
> >> > "Steven P. McNicoll" > writes:
> >> >
> >> >
> >> >
> >> > >Thrust bearing? The only major DC-10 crash I can recall at Chicago was
> >> in
> >> > >1979 and was due to faulty maintenance procedures.
> >> >
> >> > Turkish Airways....
> >> >
> >>
> >> In France not Chicago and a result of a failed cargo door IRC
> >>
> >> Keith
> >
> >Correct on both counts.
> >
> >Although why MD chose not to fit pressure blowout valves is a mystery.. The
> >cargo compartment de-pressurised and brought the pax floor down onto the
> >control lines. From then on it was uncontrollable.
>
> This happened over Windsor,Ontario as the aircraft climbed out of DTW.
> It should have been uncontrollable, but for Capt. McCormick who brought
> it back missing only the coffin which had shifted in turbulence and hit
> the door enough for it to pop open.
> --
> Ron

I hadn't heard of that additional one - do you have a cite / flight number ?

Many thanks, PB

[Pooh Bear]

Keith Willshaw wrote:

> "Pooh Bear" > wrote in message
> ...
> > John Mullen wrote:
> >
>
> > >
> > > The DC-10 was always more sinned against than sinning. In most of its
> many
> > > well-publicised crashes, the aircraft itself was not really to blame,
> more
> > > the way it was flown or maintained. The Paris crash was the only
> exception
> > > to this I can think of off-hand.
> >
> > I've heard that was effectively maintenance too. 747s have had problems
> with
> > the latching mechanisms on the front cargo door too ( UA811 ).
> >
>
> While there were indeed maintenance problems, specifically adjustmens
> to the lock limit warning switches were made incorrectly there
> were also a number of design faults.
>
> If the lock actuator shaft failed to extend correctly, which it did, it
> was possible to bend the locking pins, making the door appear locked
> when it wasnt, without using excessive force. All the load was them put on
> the
> actuator attachment bolts which failed as the pressure difference increased
> with altitude.

But wasn't UA811 very similar ?

In that case IIRC - the over-cam lock didn't work as advertised.

> The latching mechanism was redesigned after the crash and blowout panels
> installed in the floor to prevent a collapse in the event of cargo hold
> depressurisation

Quite ! Wise move. I've still heard that the manual inspection panels for the
lock positions on old models can be 'ambiguous'.

> Keith

Regds, Graham

[Pooh Bear]

Keith Willshaw wrote:

> "David Lesher" > wrote in message
> ...
> > "John Mullen" > writes:
> >
> >
> > >The DC-10 was always more sinned against than sinning. In most of its
> many
> > >well-publicised crashes, the aircraft itself was not really to blame,
> more
> > >the way it was flown or maintained. The Paris crash was the only
> exception
> > >to this I can think of off-hand.
> >
> > And N1819U (46618/118) July 19th 1989, Sioux City, IA;
> > the aircraft design was blame-free?
> >
>
> Uncontained engine failures arent supposed to happen and
> can kill any airplane, the Boeing 737 crash at Manchester
> was caused by the same thing and killed a LOT of people
> when engine parts ripped open and ignited the fuel tanks
>
> Keith

Whoops, I nearly fell into a trap !

I'll divide this into 2 parts after realising what Keith was saying.

Keith was referring to the British Airtours 737 that 'blew' a combustion
chamber on a JT8D ? on an old 737. Failure to evacuate the a/c quickly
contributed very significantly to the death toll.

On the other hand - the BMI crash at Kegworth ( nearby ) has been covered
by a superbly excellent documentary programe here in the Uk.

It *was not* an uncontained engine failure - although engine failure was the
cause - and if you check with the CAA - you will find that to be so.

The Kegworth crash was a classic 'systems failure' in many ways. Not least
failure to re-train flight crews in the reliability of new cockpit warning
systems. It was a brand new - 400 model IIRC and the crew were used to the
'non glass cockpit' of previous models together with their limitations.

Just shows - accidents will happen !

I could talk much more about this one.


regds, PB

[Larry Doering]

In article >,
Pooh Bear > wrote:
>Ron Parsons wrote:
>
>> In article >,
>> Pooh Bear > wrote:
>>
>> >Keith Willshaw wrote:
>> >
>> >> "David Lesher" > wrote in message
>> >> ...
>> >> > "Steven P. McNicoll" > writes:
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> > >Thrust bearing? The only major DC-10 crash I can recall at Chicago was
>> >> in
>> >> > >1979 and was due to faulty maintenance procedures.
>> >> >
>> >> > Turkish Airways....
>> >> >
>> >>
>> >> In France not Chicago and a result of a failed cargo door IRC
>> >>
>> >> Keith
>> >
>> >Correct on both counts.
>> >
>> >Although why MD chose not to fit pressure blowout valves is a mystery.. The
>> >cargo compartment de-pressurised and brought the pax floor down onto the
>> >control lines. From then on it was uncontrollable.
>>
>> This happened over Windsor,Ontario as the aircraft climbed out of DTW.
>> It should have been uncontrollable, but for Capt. McCormick who brought
>> it back missing only the coffin which had shifted in turbulence and hit
>> the door enough for it to pop open.
>
>I hadn't heard of that additional one - do you have a cite / flight number ?

There's a short description of the incident (American Airlines flight 96,
near Windsor, Ontario on 12 June 1972) at

<http://aviation-safety.net/database/1972/720612-0.htm>

Every account I've seen blames this on the cargo door latch mechanism,
not on shifting cargo. It's true that a casket that was in the cargo
compartment went out the rear door as the aircraft depressurized, but
that wasn't the cause.

The cabin floor over the bulk cargo compartment partially collapsed,
damaging the elevator and rudder control cables which ran under the
floor and causing loss of throttle control to the number 2 engine.
The crew had no rudder and only limited elevator control, but managed
to land the aircraft successfully at Detroit Metro.

This is essentially the same thing that happened to the Turkish
Airlines DC-10 near Paris -- the difference was that the seating
density in the Turkish aircraft was higher (the American DC-10 had
a "piano bar" lounge area in the rear of the cabin), and the added
weight on the cabin floor made the collapse worse, leaving the crew
with no elevator control at all.


ljd

[Larry Doering]

In article >,
Pooh Bear > wrote:
>Keith Willshaw wrote:
>[i]
>> > I've heard that was effectively maintenance too. 747s have had problems
>> > with the latching mechanisms on the front cargo door too ( UA811 ).
>>
>> While there were indeed maintenance problems, specifically adjustmens
>> to the lock limit warning switches were made incorrectly there
>> were also a number of design faults.
>>
>But wasn't UA811 very similar ?
>
>In that case IIRC - the over-cam lock didn't work as advertised.

That was the NTSB's original conclusion, but they reopened the
investigation into UA 811 when the missing cargo door was
recovered from the bottom of the Pacific by the U.S. Navy
18 months after the accident.

The revised probable cause was that a faulty switch or a wiring
problem had caused the electrically actuated door latches to move
partway towards the unlatched position after the door was closed
but before takeoff.

The original NTSB report (AAR-90/01) can be found at the Embry-Riddle
Aeronautical University library web site at:

<http://amelia.db.erau.edu/reports/ntsb/aar/AAR-90-01.pdf

and the 1992 report which supersedes AAR-90/01 at:

<http://amelia.db.erau.edu/reports/ntsb/aar/AAR-92-02.pdf



ljd

[John Halliwell]

In article >, John
Mullen > writes
>Might have been a good idea to fix this issue when the Windsor incident took
>place a few months before, hundreds of lives could have been saved...

IIRC the Turkish ship was on the line when the Windsor incident took
place and missed the modification. It was then in line for it but the
accident happened before it was fixed. Or something like that, haven't
the exact details to hand.

--
John

[John Halliwell]

In article >, Pooh Bear <rabbitsfriendsand
> writes
>Keith was referring to the British Airtours 737 that 'blew' a combustion
>chamber on a JT8D ? on an old 737. Failure to evacuate the a/c quickly
>contributed very significantly to the death toll.

It's not as simple as that, the investigation found serious problems
with the layout which hampered a quick evacuation, particularly the
width of the aisle as it passed through the forward galley IIRC.

That and one front door took about a minute to open, which didn't leave
passengers with many doors. The rear two were in the fire and I think
only the port over wing exit and starboard front door were accessible
until very late in the evacuation.

--
John

[Pooh Bear]

John Halliwell wrote:

> In article >, Pooh Bear <rabbitsfriendsand
> > writes
> >Keith was referring to the British Airtours 737 that 'blew' a combustion
> >chamber on a JT8D ? on an old 737. Failure to evacuate the a/c quickly
> >contributed very significantly to the death toll.
>
> It's not as simple as that, the investigation found serious problems
> with the layout which hampered a quick evacuation, particularly the
> width of the aisle as it passed through the forward galley IIRC.
>
> That and one front door took about a minute to open, which didn't leave
> passengers with many doors. The rear two were in the fire and I think
> only the port over wing exit and starboard front door were accessible
> until very late in the evacuation.
>
> --
> John

Been a while since I read it up but certainly the port doors were no good
since that was the side of the fire.

Wasn't implying any negligence regarding evacuation - simply that it took too
long - hence the death toll.

Wasn't it this accident that led to the floor lighting for evacuation ?

Very definitely it raised the question of smoke hoods. To this day the CAA /
FAA insist on flotation collars in the event of downing in water - as if the
a/c would survive intact, yet deny the usefulness of smoke hoods. Curious
priorities.


Graham

[Pooh Bear]

Larry Doering wrote:

> In article >,
> Pooh Bear > wrote:
> >Ron Parsons wrote:
> >
> >> In article >,
> >> Pooh Bear > wrote:
> >>
> >> >Keith Willshaw wrote:
> >> >
> >> >> "David Lesher" > wrote in message
> >> >> ...
> >> >> > "Steven P. McNicoll" > writes:
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> > >Thrust bearing? The only major DC-10 crash I can recall at Chicago was
> >> >> in
> >> >> > >1979 and was due to faulty maintenance procedures.
> >> >> >
> >> >> > Turkish Airways....
> >> >> >
> >> >>
> >> >> In France not Chicago and a result of a failed cargo door IRC
> >> >>
> >> >> Keith
> >> >
> >> >Correct on both counts.
> >> >
> >> >Although why MD chose not to fit pressure blowout valves is a mystery.. The
> >> >cargo compartment de-pressurised and brought the pax floor down onto the
> >> >control lines. From then on it was uncontrollable.
> >>
> >> This happened over Windsor,Ontario as the aircraft climbed out of DTW.
> >> It should have been uncontrollable, but for Capt. McCormick who brought
> >> it back missing only the coffin which had shifted in turbulence and hit
> >> the door enough for it to pop open.
> >
> >I hadn't heard of that additional one - do you have a cite / flight number ?
>
> There's a short description of the incident (American Airlines flight 96,
> near Windsor, Ontario on 12 June 1972) at
>
> <http://aviation-safety.net/database/1972/720612-0.htm>
>
> Every account I've seen blames this on the cargo door latch mechanism,
> not on shifting cargo. It's true that a casket that was in the cargo
> compartment went out the rear door as the aircraft depressurized, but
> that wasn't the cause.
>
> The cabin floor over the bulk cargo compartment partially collapsed,
> damaging the elevator and rudder control cables which ran under the
> floor and causing loss of throttle control to the number 2 engine.
> The crew had no rudder and only limited elevator control, but managed
> to land the aircraft successfully at Detroit Metro.
>
> This is essentially the same thing that happened to the Turkish
> Airlines DC-10 near Paris -- the difference was that the seating
> density in the Turkish aircraft was higher (the American DC-10 had
> a "piano bar" lounge area in the rear of the cabin), and the added
> weight on the cabin floor made the collapse worse, leaving the crew
> with no elevator control at all.
>
> ljd

Yes, that makes perfect sense. They must have been damn lucky to land it. The
Turkish a/c was 'in the hands of God' once the cabin floor collapsed.

Still don't understand why pressure vents weren't installed. Anyone got an idea ?


Regds, Graham

[Pooh Bear]

Larry Doering wrote:

> The original NTSB report (AAR-90/01) can be found at the Embry-Riddle
> Aeronautical University library web site at:
>
> <http://amelia.db.erau.edu/reports/ntsb/aar/AAR-90-01.pdf
>
> and the 1992 report which supersedes AAR-90/01 at:
>
> <http://amelia.db.erau.edu/reports/ntsb/aar/AAR-92-02.pdf

They seem to be dead links. Can you assist ?

Regds, Graham

[Ron Parsons]

In article >,
Pooh Bear > wrote:

>Ron Parsons wrote:
>
>> In article >,
>> Pooh Bear > wrote:
>>
>> >Keith Willshaw wrote:
>> >
>> >> "David Lesher" > wrote in message
>> >> ...
>> >> > "Steven P. McNicoll" > writes:
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> > >Thrust bearing? The only major DC-10 crash I can recall at Chicago was
>> >> in
>> >> > >1979 and was due to faulty maintenance procedures.
>> >> >
>> >> > Turkish Airways....
>> >> >
>> >>
>> >> In France not Chicago and a result of a failed cargo door IRC
>> >>
>> >> Keith
>> >
>> >Correct on both counts.
>> >
>> >Although why MD chose not to fit pressure blowout valves is a mystery.. The
>> >cargo compartment de-pressurised and brought the pax floor down onto the
>> >control lines. From then on it was uncontrollable.
>>
>> This happened over Windsor,Ontario as the aircraft climbed out of DTW.
>> It should have been uncontrollable, but for Capt. McCormick who brought
>> it back missing only the coffin which had shifted in turbulence and hit
>> the door enough for it to pop open.
>> --
>> Ron
>
>I hadn't heard of that additional one - do you have a cite / flight number ?
>
>Many thanks, PB
>
>

Don't recall the flight number, just knew the crew.

--
Ron

[Ron Parsons]

In article >,
(Larry Doering) wrote:

>Every account I've seen blames this on the cargo door latch mechanism,
>not on shifting cargo. It's true that a casket that was in the cargo
>compartment went out the rear door as the aircraft depressurized, but
>that wasn't the cause.

The latch design and poor quality control were the causes. The slight
bump from the shifting coffin was simply the last straw.

>
>The cabin floor over the bulk cargo compartment partially collapsed,
>damaging the elevator and rudder control cables which ran under the
>floor and causing loss of throttle control to the number 2 engine.
>The crew had no rudder and only limited elevator control, but managed
>to land the aircraft successfully at Detroit Metro.

When the floor collapsed, there was on flight attendant left hanging in
the hole until rescued by others.

The aircraft type was new to service and both pilots had less than 50
hrs in type.

However, the captain had been unhappy with the all power, no manual
flight controls all the way through training. He spent many extra hours
in the simulator trying out various flight control and engine power
combinations to see what would work when something else didn't.

They had just departed DTW and elected to return there since they were
familiar with the current conditions which weren't all that good. As I
recall, it was about 300 3/4 with snow and a snow covered runway.

They did a complete flight controlability test while descending to
determine just what they could and couldn't do with the aircraft.

The rudder pedals were jammed with one full in and the other full out.
Only one elevator was working. Stabalizer trim was at half speed. #2
engine was stuck at 80% N1. Their only control of it was to shut it down
after touchdown.

Capt. McCormack went to his grave saying that he had failed because at
the end of the landing roll, the aircraft drifted off the runway and he
got mud on once set of tires.

But the reality is that at the time, there was only one pilot in the
world who could have flown that aircraft and he happened to be sitting
in it.

>
>This is essentially the same thing that happened to the Turkish
>Airlines DC-10 near Paris -- the difference was that the seating
>density in the Turkish aircraft was higher (the American DC-10 had
>a "piano bar" lounge area in the rear of the cabin), and the added
>weight on the cabin floor made the collapse worse, leaving the crew
>with no elevator control at all.

The Windsor incident had been kept pretty quiet. After the Turkish
aircraft went down, things got serious about the problem.

--
Ron

[David Lesher]

Ron Parsons > writes:


>>As for AA191, was there not a finding that lack of an interlock
>>between slats contributed to the crash? Again, from memory, the
>>other two jumbos had interlocks, and/or redundant hydraulic|pneumatic
>>systems that the DC10 lacked

>You have merged two separate incidents in your memory.

>Windsor was cargo door. Chicago was pylon separation which resulted in
>one slat retracting.

I have NOT merged them. Windsor & Turkish Airways was the cargo door
& {un}AD. 191 was the pylon/slats/interlock.

Both were lots of dead people and DC-10s. That's my overall point.

And was not 191 found survivable if not for the slats issue?

In case it was not clear from the closing paragraph of my previous
post; it's because of my [casual] relationship{s} with some victims
that I cross the street rather than take a -10.



--
A host is a host from coast to
& no one will talk to a host that's close........[v].(301) 56-LINUX
Unless the host (that isn't close).........................pob 1433
is busy, hung or dead....................................20915-1433

[John Halliwell]

In article >, Pooh Bear <rabbitsfriendsand
> writes
>Wasn't it this accident that led to the floor lighting for evacuation ?

Yes, and also the water mist system trials which seemed very successful
in improving cabin survivability.

>Very definitely it raised the question of smoke hoods. To this day the CAA /
>FAA insist on flotation collars in the event of downing in water - as if the
>a/c would survive intact, yet deny the usefulness of smoke hoods. Curious
>priorities.

The smoke hood reasons were mainly that they'd prefer passengers to
concentrate evacuating the aircraft rather than trying to put on smoke
hoods in the time available. Other problems were foreseen, basically
that the hoods would disappear from the aircraft after the flight as
passengers realised they'd help in hotel fires as well. Not only does
this add cost (replacing them all), but in a situation where some
passengers had hoods and some didn't, fighting may break out for those
that were available.

--
John

[David Lesher]

"M22315" > writes:

>> And was not 191 found survivable if not for the slats issue?

>Not really. One of the major conclusions in the report was that three major
>factors contributed to the loss of control/crash following pylon separation:
>"the retraction of the left wing's outboard leading edge slats; the loss of
>the slat diagreement warning system; and the loss of the stall warning
>system --all resulting from the separation of the engine pylong assembly.
>Each by itself would not have caused a qualified flight crew to lose control
>of its aircraft, but together during a critical portion of [flight], they
>created a situation which afforded the flight crew an inadequate opportunity
>to recognize and prevent the ensuing stall of the aircraft." p. 55 NTSB
>Final Report AAR79-17.

Maybe I'm reading that differently, but that seems to indict the slats system
to me!

I recall something about the stall warning. Was it that it was not
on the emergency power bus? Or that there was only one with no
backup...?

A old cow orker assembled L-1011's (I believe that was contemporaneously
with 191 but it's been a while...) and his comment was:

{They} [i.e. L1011 &747] cost roughly $10 million more than
the DC-10 -- what did Mac-D leave out that Boeing and Lockheed
didn't?

From memory, each had more redundancy in hydraulics/pneumatics than the -10.

--
A host is a host from coast to
& no one will talk to a host that's close........[v].(301) 56-LINUX
Unless the host (that isn't close).........................pob 1433
is busy, hung or dead....................................20915-1433

[M22315]

"David Lesher" > wrote in message
...
> "M22315" > writes:
>
> >> And was not 191 found survivable if not for the slats issue?
>
> >Not really. One of the major conclusions in the report was that three
major
> >factors contributed to the loss of control/crash following pylon
separation:
> >"the retraction of the left wing's outboard leading edge slats; the loss
of
> >the slat diagreement warning system; and the loss of the stall warning
> >system --all resulting from the separation of the engine pylong assembly.
> >Each by itself would not have caused a qualified flight crew to lose
control
> >of its aircraft, but together during a critical portion of [flight], they
> >created a situation which afforded the flight crew an inadequate
opportunity
> >to recognize and prevent the ensuing stall of the aircraft." p. 55 NTSB
> >Final Report AAR79-17.
>
> Maybe I'm reading that differently, but that seems to indict the slats
system
> to me!
>

As one of several factors. Go back to the source of the chain of
events - the engine pylon loss due to poor maintenance practices. Without
the poor maintenance practices, the pylon doesn't come off. If the pylon
doesn't come off, the hydraulics don't rupture, allowing the slats to remain
extended. Additionally, if the pylon doesn't come off, you don't lose the
generator powering the slats disagree and the stall warning system (the loss
of slats changed the stall speed for the outboard portion of the wing).
Calling the slats failure the reason the plane went down is greatly
overstating it. Poor maintenance procedures, leading to the loss of the
engine and the subsequent cascade of systemic failures (possibly related to
a vulnerable design), led to the crash. In theory, pilots who understood
clearly the sequence of events in the crash and who had stall warning
available to them in the simulator were able to save the aircraft.

> I recall something about the stall warning. Was it that it was not
> on the emergency power bus? Or that there was only one with no
> backup...?

Considering the rapid series of multi-systemic failures that followed
the loss of the engine, the flight engineer and pilots had their hands full
trying to assess the scope of the situation and the appropriate response.
As it happens, the pilots followed the engine out procedures from American
(climb at V2), however, the V2 speed was below the stall speed of the
outboard wing after the slats retracted.

>
> A old cow orker assembled L-1011's (I believe that was contemporaneously
> with 191 but it's been a while...) and his comment was:
>
> {They} [i.e. L1011 &747] cost roughly $10 million more than
> the DC-10 -- what did Mac-D leave out that Boeing and Lockheed
> didn't?
>

I would expect the 747 to cost somewhat more than the DC-10. The L-1011, I
would expect to cost the same. Of course, it could come down to economies
of scale. If at the time McD had a more robust aircraft manufacturing base
than did Lockheed (as I recall, Lockheed was making pretty much just the
L-1011 as a commercial aircraft in addition to its military aircraft), then
McD could take less money per plane than Lockheed. As I recall, McD made
around twice as many DC-10s than Lockheed made L-1011s. There's economies
of scale at play there, too.


> From memory, each had more redundancy in hydraulics/pneumatics than
the -10.

[Larry Doering]

In article >,
Pooh Bear > wrote:
>
>Larry Doering wrote:
>
>> The revised probable cause was that a faulty switch or a wiring
>> problem had caused the electrically actuated door latches to move
>> partway towards the unlatched position after the door was closed
>> but before takeoff.
>
>Interesting. Thanks for that Larry.
>
>So that means the position indicators that were post-installed to be checked by
>ground crews weren't the answer ?

Dunno about that.

>Dare I say this ? but some ppl have suggested this / similar cause for TWA 800
>too !

If you're referring to John Barry Smith's website at www.corazon.com,
he seems to believe that failure of the forward cargo door was the
cause of the loss of both TWA 800 and Air India 182. Problem is,
there's no evidence of a cargo door failure in the wreckage of TWA
800 (and plenty of evidence of a fuel-air explosion in the aicraft's
center fuel tank), and there is conclusive evidence that Air India
182 was destroyed by a bomb.

Deteriorating wiring is thought to have been the most likely ignition
source for the explosion that brought down TWA 800, but the forward
cargo door was found with other fuselage wreckage and its latches
were intact and in the closed position.

>Didn't realise that the wiring prob had been *officially* recognised in
>the way you mention. I've seen an interesting example of wire bundle fraying
>myself as it happens ( auto not a/c - but surprised me ) .

As I understand it, an electrical problem was thought to be the
cause based on examination of United 813's cargo door (the latches
were attached to the door, so were not available for accident
investigators to look at during the initial investigation.) I
don't believe investigators actually found a "smoking gun" in the
form of deteriorated wiring or damaged electrical components.


ljd

[Larry Doering]

In article >,
Pooh Bear > wrote:
>Larry Doering wrote:
>
>> The original NTSB report (AAR-90/01) can be found at the Embry-Riddle
>> Aeronautical University library web site at:
>>
>> <http://amelia.db.erau.edu/reports/ntsb/aar/AAR-90-01.pdf
>>
>> and the 1992 report which supersedes AAR-90/01 at:
>>
>> <http://amelia.db.erau.edu/reports/ntsb/aar/AAR-92-02.pdf
>
>They seem to be dead links. Can you assist ?

Whoops, the filenames on the website don't contain the first hyphen.

<http://amelia.db.erau.edu/reports/ntsb/aar> will get you a
directory listing, and the files are AAR90-01.pdf and AAR92-02.pdf.


ljd

[Larry Doering]

In article >,
Ron Parsons > wrote:
>In article >,
> (Larry Doering) wrote:
>
>>Every account I've seen blames this on the cargo door latch mechanism,
>>not on shifting cargo. It's true that a casket that was in the cargo
>>compartment went out the rear door as the aircraft depressurized, but
>>that wasn't the cause.
>
>The latch design and poor quality control were the causes. The slight
>bump from the shifting coffin was simply the last straw.

Do you have a source for this detail? Like I said, none of the
material I've seen regarding this incident claims that loose
cargo was the cause of the cargo door failure.


ljd

[Pete]

"Mary Shafer" > wrote
>
> Give me a break. They were changing engines with a _forklift_.
> Design is not the issue. Inappropriate maintenance procedures are.
>
> Considering that a forklift was used to raise and lower the engine and
> pylon, I don't think design is much of an issue. I've never seen a
> calibrated forklift. Nor have I seen one that was so precise it could
> be used in spaces with tight tolerances.

Compare a standard forklift with a bomb lift truck or trailer. The MJ-1 and
MHU-83 used on fighters, or the MHU-123 and -173 trailers used on B-52's.
Really, just long, low forklifts. None 'calibrated'. Just levers to actuate
the hydraulics, or a remote control for the -173.

Installation of a pivot pylon on the F-111, using an MJ-1. No one would ever
call a jammer a calibrated item, yet the install clearances on the pylon are
sub 1/4". Same with weapons, and preloaded pylons. Very close tolerances.
With lift trucks that have notoriously sloppy controls.

With an experienced operator, they can be quite precise. With a hamhanded
fool...any tool is dangerous.

The forklift may not have been the approved, tested item. But with a
reasonable operator, using a forklift would be no different than any other
lift tool.

Pete

[Guy Alcala]

Pete wrote:

<snip>

> Compare a standard forklift with a bomb lift truck or trailer. The MJ-1 and
> MHU-83 used on fighters, or the MHU-123 and -173 trailers used on B-52's.
> Really, just long, low forklifts. None 'calibrated'. Just levers to actuate
> the hydraulics, or a remote control for the -173.
>
> Installation of a pivot pylon on the F-111, using an MJ-1. No one would ever
> call a jammer a calibrated item, yet the install clearances on the pylon are
> sub 1/4". Same with weapons, and preloaded pylons. Very close tolerances.
> With lift trucks that have notoriously sloppy controls.
>
> With an experienced operator, they can be quite precise. With a hamhanded
> fool...any tool is dangerous.
>
> The forklift may not have been the approved, tested item. But with a
> reasonable operator, using a forklift would be no different than any other
> lift tool.

Depends on the forklift, too. Some are easy to make very precise adjustments
with. Others are almost hopeless (raising; lowering is rarely a a problem,
although really stiff controls can make even lowering an on/off, jerky event).

Guy

[Ron Parsons]

In article >,
(Larry Doering) wrote:

>In article >,
>Ron Parsons > wrote:
>>In article >,
>> (Larry Doering) wrote:
>>
>>>Every account I've seen blames this on the cargo door latch mechanism,
>>>not on shifting cargo. It's true that a casket that was in the cargo
>>>compartment went out the rear door as the aircraft depressurized, but
>>>that wasn't the cause.
>>
>>The latch design and poor quality control were the causes. The slight
>>bump from the shifting coffin was simply the last straw.
>
>Do you have a source for this detail? Like I said, none of the
>material I've seen regarding this incident claims that loose
>cargo was the cause of the cargo door failure.

No source that you can check. Just in-house conversations and briefings
at the time.

--
Ron

[Longtailedlizard]

>Give me a break. They were changing engines with a _forklift_.
>Design is not the issue. Inappropriate maintenance procedures are.
>
>Considering that a forklift was used to raise and lower the engine and
>pylon, I don't think design is much of an issue. I've never seen a
>calibrated forklift. Nor have I seen one that was so precise it could
>be used in spaces with tight tolerances.
>
>We always removed and installed our engines on special engine carts,
>not forklifts. The USAF and USN used the engine carts, not forklifts,
>too. And Lockheed didn't use forklifts to change out L-1011 engines,
>either.
>
>As the corollary to Capt. Murphy's Law tells us: "Build something
>that's foolproof and a bigger fool will come along."
>
>Mary
>
>--
>Mary Shafer FIRED aerospace research engineer



Give me a break I specifically said that statement was from a engineering
website!!!!


http://www.tsgc.utexas.edu/archive/general/ethics/aacrash.html

[Longtailedlizard]

>>Mary Shafer FIRED aerospace research engineer


Ok, I admit it, that was a cheap shot that Mary did'nt deserve, I apologize.
But alot of times Mary comes off as this almighty aviation guru. Sure, she is
very smart and knowlegable.
But as a licensed mechanic for over 20 years. I was a Navy mechanic,
ex-Lockheed, 2 years GA, and the last 12 years in the airlines. Me or any other
mechanic who spends anytime on the hangar floor, knows that engineers are very
far from the "real" aircraft. The days of Kelly Johnson were over along time
ago.
Todays engineers deal with paper airplanes, the only time you see them is
when something they designed, built or modify doesn't work or fit.
Overworked underpayed, who knows.
But when Mary comes off saying I've never seen this or I never seen that, or
the Navy doesn't do this or the Air Force does that.
Sorry Mary, unless your different from the 99.9% of the other engineers, you
only know what you read or maybe see on the hangar floor when your walking by
on your way to your office.
Because,,,, you don't know what really happens on the floor, unless your out
there turning a wrench.
When I was on the hangar deck Mary, we did what we had todo, yep I"VE seen a
J-52 stuff into an A-4E, via a froklift. Wrong?? you betcha.
Also, we mechanics are NOT allowed to deviated from the FAR's no matter
what!!
ALL deviations come via engineering approval.
When they screw up, you see the results.