Re: #1 Jet of World War II

[Christopher]

Hi the Meteor was used to shoot down V1 missiles it was quite good at it!
too so it was band from front line service i think until the end of the war.
"Gordon" > wrote in message
...
> >They were so confident
> >in the Meteor that they wouldn't put it in combat against the 262.
> >I have read that the British were afraid the Germans might gain the
> >advanced technology if one was shot down. I've alway wonder what
> >advanced technology was being referred to.
>
> Agree, Walt! The Me 262 A-1a with 24 R4Ms and an EZ42 revi installed was
a
> monster in comparison to the Mk 1 Meteors. No RAF pilot I have spoken
with has
> expressed doubts in this regard, including men who flew both.
>
> v/r
> Gordon
> <====(A+C====>
> USN SAR Aircrew
>
> "Got anything on your radar, SENSO?"
> "Nothing but my forehead, sir."

[The Revolution Will Not Be Televised]

On 29 Jun 2003 15:59:14 GMT, (Gordon) wrote:

>>They were so confident
>>in the Meteor that they wouldn't put it in combat against the 262.
>>I have read that the British were afraid the Germans might gain the
>>advanced technology if one was shot down. I've alway wonder what
>>advanced technology was being referred to.
>
>Agree, Walt! The Me 262 A-1a with 24 R4Ms and an EZ42 revi installed was a
>monster in comparison to the Mk 1 Meteors. No RAF pilot I have spoken with has
>expressed doubts in this regard, including men who flew both.

Did the Mk III's with 616 Squadron in Belgium in 1945 have Wellands or
Derwents? (I know the first few Mk IIIs had Wellands, but some of them
were re-engined later). It's not really a fair comparison to use the
Mk 1 (20 produced, only ever used for anti-V1 patrols operationally)
against the 262. The RAF were prepared to use the Mk III over German
territory in April 1945, so there was a point at which they were
prepared to risk contact with the 262. It might, just, possibly have
been an engine issue (why give the Germans engines with the compressor
blades and rare alloys they needed when the inevitable losses took
place?), but that's speculation on my part.

The war was almost over whatever happened with one or at most two
squadrons of Meteors amongst the hundreds of allied piston-engined
fighters roaming over German territory. In that respect, I personally
believe blue-on-blue was a bigger risk than the 262 or anything else.
The one time 616 Squadron did move into position to attack some 190's,
they attracted unwelcome attention from some Spitfires doing the the
same thing.

Nobody could guarantee meeting the 262 in combat: the RAF didn't see
much of them in general, so the real risks to the Meteor were from
German piston-engined fighters and most of all, flak. It certainly
didn't have the range to go beyond the normal Spitfire operational
radius, so I don't think it would have met anything other than what
the other conventional fighters of 2 TAF encountered. On those
grounds, I doubt the British restricted it's use on the grounds of
prestige, but it's a possibility.

On another subject, you couldn't give me a realistic cruising speed
for B.IX/B.XVI mossies in '44'45, could you? I mean a real one,
including bombload, etc? Many thanks if you can, if not don't worry
about it.

Gavin Bailey
--

"...this level of misinformation suggests some Americans may be
avoiding having an experience of cognitive dissonance."
- 'Poll shows errors in beliefs on Iraq, 9/11'
The Charlotte Observer, 20th June 2003

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: #1 Jet of World War II
>From: (The Revolution Will Not Be Televised)
>Date: 7/4/03 6:57 AM Pacific Daylight Time
>Message-id:

>Nobody could guarantee meeting the 262 in combat: the RAF didn't see
>much of them in general, so the r

We damn well did see them. They weren't exactly invisible.

Arthur Kramer
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[Peter Glasø]

"ArtKramr" > skrev i melding
...
> >Subject: Re: #1 Jet of World War II
> >From: (The Revolution Will Not Be Televised)
> >Date: 7/4/03 6:57 AM Pacific Daylight Time
> >Message-id:
>
> >Nobody could guarantee meeting the 262 in combat: the RAF didn't see
> >much of them in general, so the r
>
> We damn well did see them. They weren't exactly invisible.

I just read "War in the air" by Stephen Coonts,in it is a chapter where
Adolf Galland describes his last sortie of the war - leading 6 Me-262s
against a formation of Mauraders on April 26.

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: #1 Jet of World War II
>From: "Peter Glasø" pgglaso@ broadpark.no
>Date: 7/4/03 9:14 AM Pacific Daylight Time

> just read "War in the air" by Stephen Coonts,in it is a chapter where
>Adolf Galland describes his last sortie of the war - leading 6 Me-262s
>against a formation of Mauraders on April 26.

Thanks. I read that account in Galland's "The First and the Last". Good book
by. Glad it wasn't our group he hit that day.(sigh)

Arthur Kramer
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: #1 Jet of World War II
>From: (The Revolution Will Not Be Televised)
>Date: 7/4/03 11:41 AM Pacific

>er, if you did, and you served in the RAF in
>the 2nd Tactical Air Force at the time in question, please pass on the
>information.

No. I served in the 344th Bomb Group, 494th Bomb Squadron of the 99th wing of
the 9th Air force, But you see the Luftwaffe was a very democraticc
organization They didn't restrict their hits to the RAF 2nd Tactical Air
Force. They would hit anybody any time. , The Luftwaffe was an equal
opportunity hitter.

..
Arthur Kramer
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[Gordon]

>
>Hi the Meteor was used to shoot down V1 missiles it was quite good at it!
>too so it was band from front line service i think until the end of the war.

True - it's straight line speed was perfect for the running chase. In this
footrace, its lack of maneuverability was not a hindrance. Later marks of the
fighter were quite an improvement and by all accounts corrected their earlier
faults.

v/r
Gordon

[Gordon]

>On another subject, you couldn't give me a realistic cruising speed
>for B.IX/B.XVI mossies in '44'45, could you? I mean a real one,
>including bombload, etc? Many thanks if you can, if not don't worry
>about it.

If you give me some time to pull it off GEE mission logs, surely. Other choice
to ask Mark Huxtable at Mossie.org - he is building an overly large-scale Mk IX
and is quite the expert.

v/r
Gordon

[Lawrence Dillard]

"machf" > wrote in message
...
> On Sat, 28 Jun 2003 14:11:47 -0500, Alan Minyard >
wrote:
>
> >On 28 Jun 2003 07:07:11 -0700, (Kenneth
> >Williams) wrote:
> >
> >>The Gloster Meteor, of course!
> >>
> >>The Jerrys may have had many of aviation's "firsts" with their jets
> >>but lacked anything good enough to last beyond a few years. The Meteor
> >>lived well beyond the war and established itself quite well.
> >>
> >>Too bad you Yanks had such misfortune with that horrid XP-59 and
> >>troublesome XP-80 aircraft.

Keith, you are not really being fair to the US jet a/c you mentioned.

Remember that the P-59 was ordered as a "proof of concept" a/c, to
demonstrate that US forms could adapt to the new technology with respect to
manufacturing procedures, etc. The P-59 was outfitted with direct copies of
a "weak" (so to speak--1st generation) Whittle turbojet. Because of its
experimental nature, it was terrifically overbuilt (and hence noticeably
overweight). If you can locate the performance figures for the 1st batch of
P-59s and compare them to the same for the first batch of "Meatboxes", you
will find close similarities. Later P-59s had more powerful engines, but
featured little or no change in weight because no effort was expended in
productionizing the bird. In short, the P-59 was never intended for combat
use. There was no "misfortune" involved with the P-59 for the USAAF,
although Bell Aircraft may have missed the boat with a too-conservative
approach to its design and development. Bell ignored suggestions to "prove
the concept" by simply fitting a pair of the Whittles to the undersurfaces
of a P-39's wings, then asking for a contract to develop a serious fighter.

I believe also that you mischaracterize the P-80. It was constructed in a
remarkable short time during 1943 to take an Halford engine, then in short
order essentially re-designed and enlarged in order to take a more powerful
engine, also adapted from the British.

The major "problem" associated with its early use was overconfidence on the
part of the first pilots who flew them. A second was a flaw in the
fabrication of early turbine blades, which came from the factory with
impurities near the tips which weakened their structure, and hence would
fail at normal operating temperatures. Another flaw was the fuel system,
again drawn from British practice, which took power via gears from the
powerplant. It was discovered that at max throttle, such as used at takeoff,
this system could not always guarantee sufficient fuel flow sustain
combustion, leading to flameouts; a simple solution was to fit an auxiliary
fuel pump, which was supposed to be engaged by the pilot prior to takeoff,
and during the landing approach, as a precaution. On a number of occasions,
crash investigation discovered that the pilot had failed to engage the aux
pump.

Meeting and overcoming unanticipated development problems is part and parcel
of making a warplane operational. The contrast in time-frames between the
Me-262's initiation and its "readiness" for combat and that of the P-80's is
remarkable. By 1945, the P-80 demonstrated docile engine characteristics,
the ability to operate at 39-40,000 ft altitude, reliable powered ailerons,
no controllability problems, high overall quality control, an efficient
laminar-flow wing, and the ability to take off on a mission, climb to cruise
altitude, fly 500 miles, drop tip-tanks, and fight at 100 per cent power for
15 minutes before having to return to base, with enough fuel remaining for
one missed approach.

The basic design, hailing from 1943, proved adaptable of taking engines of
from 4,000 to in excess of 6,000 lbs thrust; of being the basis for a very
successful two-seat land-based trainer; the basis for a two-seat
radar-equipped rocket-firing all-weather interceptor; of being adapted for
carrier-borne pilot training; and of accepting afterburning for increased
acceleration and climb. The F-80 gave excellent service in the Korean
conflict, obtaining the first victory in all-jet combat, downing a
Soviet-built Mig-15.


> >>
> >>Kenneth Williams
> >
> >Actually the P-80, in its various iterations, served quite long and
> >well.
> >
> I'm not sure, but I think the Bolivian Air Force still has (or had until
very
> recently) its T-33s in service.
>
> --
> __________ ____---____ Marco Antonio Checa Funcke
> \_________D /-/---_----' Santiago de Surco, Lima, Peru
> _H__/_/ http://machf.tripod.com
> '-_____|(
>
> remove the "no_me_j." and "sons.of." parts before replying

[The Revolution Will Not Be Televised]

On 04 Jul 2003 18:55:13 GMT, (ArtKramr) wrote:

>>er, if you did, and you served in the RAF in
>>the 2nd Tactical Air Force at the time in question, please pass on the
>>information.
>
>No. I served in the 344th Bomb Group, 494th Bomb Squadron of the 99th wing of
>the 9th Air force,

So you didn't serve in 2nd TAF or experience operations on the 2nd
TAF area of operations? If not, why are you commenting on such
operations which you did not personally experience, given your own
views about such an approach, as posted to this group on numerous
occasions?

>But you see the Luftwaffe was a very democraticc
>organization

I was unaware that the Luftwaffe was a democratic organisation.

>They didn't restrict their hits to the RAF 2nd Tactical Air
>Force.

Again, who said they did?

If you want to criticise the points I'm making, it would help your
case if you could discern what they were in the first place instead of
making up all these straw men of your own and attributing them to me.


In the remote chance that you actually are interested in responding to
the points I have made, I again direct you to the comments and points
you have already refused to answer in the "Re: #1 Piston Fighter was
British" thread.

>They would hit anybody any time. , The Luftwaffe was an equal
>opportunity hitter.

By all means post your experience of combat with Me 262's if you want,
but if you're doing so in a followup to my post, criticising the point
about the prevalence of contact with Me 262s for the Gloster Meteors
in 616 Squadron in 1945, please reference your direct personal
experience of precisely such operations. Otherwise you're laying
yourself open to accusations of hypocrisy, just as you are when
talking about teaching Chaucer when you never personally experienced
the events involved in The Canterbury Tales or even spoke Middle
English to a native Middle English speaker.

Gavin Bailey
--

"...this level of misinformation suggests some Americans may be
avoiding having an experience of cognitive dissonance."
- 'Poll shows errors in beliefs on Iraq, 9/11'
The Charlotte Observer, 20th June 2003

[Cub Driver]

> the P-59 was never intended for combat
>use.

Hap Arnold certainly thought he was getting a combat airplane in the
P-59A (not to be confused with the never-built P-59). If he'd wanted a
test-bed, he could have ordered something on the order of the Gloster
Carter Farter or the little Heinkel.

This thread is a bit silly. There was only one jet fighter in WWII,
and that was the Me 262. Getting there too late for combat (P-80)
doesn't count. Chasing V-1s (Meteor) doesn't count. Being deemed
unsuitable for combat (P-59A) doesn't count. The only thing that
counts is shooting down enemy aircraft.

Anyone who has followed my postings on the German air force knows that
I'm not a greater admirer of its war-fighting record. But in the case
of the Me-262, the Germans built a handsome, innovative, and
terrifying war machine. We can all be grateful that it came too late
to make any difference in how the air battle over Germany worked out.

all the best -- Dan Ford (email: info AT danford.net)

see the Warbird's Forum at http://www.danford.net/index.htm
Vietnam | Flying Tigers | Pacific War | Brewster Buffalo | Piper Cub

[The Revolution Will Not Be Televised]

On Sat, 05 Jul 2003 06:09:22 -0400, Cub Driver >
wrote:

>This thread is a bit silly. There was only one jet fighter in WWII,
>and that was the Me 262. Getting there too late for combat (P-80)
>doesn't count. Chasing V-1s (Meteor) doesn't count. Being deemed
>unsuitable for combat (P-59A) doesn't count. The only thing that
>counts is shooting down enemy aircraft.

The Meteors did force down a Storch.... That's a little unfair, they
also made several strafing claims. They were too late to have any
significance, but this also applies (to a lesser extent) to the 262 as
you point out.

Gavin Bailey
--

"...this level of misinformation suggests some Americans may be
avoiding having an experience of cognitive dissonance."
- 'Poll shows errors in beliefs on Iraq, 9/11'
The Charlotte Observer, 20th June 2003

[ArtKramr]

>ubject: Re: #1 Jet of World War II
>From: (The Revolution Will Not Be Televised)
>Date: 7/5/03 1:39 AM Pacific Daylight Time
>Message-id: >

>the 2nd Tactical Air Force at the time in question, please pass on the
>>>information.
>>
>>No. I served in the 344th Bomb Group, 494th Bomb Squadron of the 99th wing
>of
>>the 9th Air force,

>So you didn't serve in 2nd TAF or experience operations on the 2nd
>TAF area of operations? If n

I would be interested in your experiences with the 2nd TAF. Y'know basic simple
stuff .Missions flown. Targets attacked. Y'know, simple stuff. We guys who led
the charge flying the tip of the spear gotta stick together.It's only right.

Arthur Kramer
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[The Revolution Will Not Be Televised]

On 05 Jul 2003 12:59:18 GMT, (ArtKramr) wrote:

>>If you really want to play with your own straw men so much, tell me
>>about your personal, first-hand knowledge of Geoffrey Chaucer. It's
>>only right.
>>
>>Gavin Bailey
>
>You tell me yours. I'll tell you mine.

I have no-first hand experience of Geoffrey Chaucer in person
whatsoever.

Your turn.

Gavin Bailey

--

"...this level of misinformation suggests some Americans may be
avoiding having an experience of cognitive dissonance."
- 'Poll shows errors in beliefs on Iraq, 9/11'
The Charlotte Observer, 20th June 2003

[Steven P. McNicoll]

"Cub Driver" > wrote in message
...
>
> This thread is a bit silly. There was only one jet fighter in WWII,
> and that was the Me 262. Getting there too late for combat (P-80)
> doesn't count. Chasing V-1s (Meteor) doesn't count.
>

Why doesn't chasing V-1s count?


>
> Being deemed
> unsuitable for combat (P-59A) doesn't count. The only thing that
> counts is shooting down enemy aircraft.
>

Why isn't the V-1 an enemy aircraft?

[Gordon]

>We can all be grateful that it came too late
>to make any difference in how the air battle over Germany worked out.

Agreed, Dan. As Hap Arnold said a few days after the war as he watched a
captured Me 262 thunder past him at an Allied airfield, "We really got
lucky..."

v/r
Gordon

[Frank May]

Probably 'cause it's considered a "flying bomb" or an early cruise
missile. Technically, it IS an enemy aircraft since it has wings &
flies, but it wasn't piloted & wasn't much of an adversary in that
aspect.

[Lawrence Dillard]

"Gordon" > wrote in message
...
> >We can all be grateful that it came too late
> >to make any difference in how the air battle over Germany worked out.
>
> Agreed, Dan. As Hap Arnold said a few days after the war as he watched a
> captured Me 262 thunder past him at an Allied airfield, "We really got
> lucky..."
>

"Hap" Arnold was at times given to hyperbole. For example, upon seeing a
demonstration for the first time of an early-model Mosquito, he blurted,
"We've (the Allies) won the war!" Perhaps he meant that remark in terms of
qualitave measures.

That the Me-262 was not a sgnificant a/c had exactly nothing to do with
luck. Allied depredations against the sources of proper materiels for its
turbine construction (and against all other German jet engines to boot)
combined with relentless bombing attacks on its formal production facilities
and fuel sources as well as the lines of communication from factory to
airfield meant that no more than perhaps 200 such underdeveloped,
short-ranged a/c were ever available to the Luftwaffe on a given day.

The great majority of Me-262s were either bombed to bits at their factories
or strafed into ribbons on their airfields. If either side were "lucky" it
was Germany, not the Allies, because the latter elected not to seriously
explore applications of jet-propulsion until some point in 1943.

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: #1 Jet of World War II
>From: Bill Shatzer
>Date: 7/5/03 11:17 PM Pacific Daylight Time
>Message-id: >
>
>
>
>
>
>On Sun, 6 Jul 2003, Mike Dargan wrote:
>
>> Frank May wrote:
>
>> >Probably 'cause it's considered a "flying bomb" or an early cruise
>> >missile. Technically, it IS an enemy aircraft since it has wings &
>> >flies, but it wasn't piloted & wasn't much of an adversary in that
>> >aspect.
>
>> Pretty scary to shoot at--especially if you manage to set of a ton of
>> high explosive right in front of you.
>
>Hardly scarier than shooting at a bomber with 3 to 6 tons (or more) of
>explosives on board.
>
>And, unlike a V-1, the bomber can shoot back.
>
>Cheers and all,
>

Like everything else in war, you are not supposed to like it , you are just
supposed to do it .If it belongs to the enemy, you kill it.


Arthur Kramer
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[Lawrence Dillard]

"Cub Driver" > wrote in message
...
>
> >If either side were "lucky" it
> >was Germany, not the Allies, because the latter elected not to seriously
> >explore applications of jet-propulsion until some point in 1943.
>
> This would come as a great surprise to Frank Whittle, the Gloster
> company, and the Air Ministry, and even Hap Arnold, GE, and Bell in
> the United States, all of whom were vigorously pursuing turbojet
> fighters by the end of 1941. The Germans had a bit of an edge (and
> they did take it more seriously before September 1939), but they
> exploited the edge to better effect than the Allies did. Even today,
> the Me-262 is a very impressive airplane.
>
Point well-taken, Cub Driver,...except...,that in comparison to the monies
involved in perfecting piston engines and airframes to which to fit them,
the Allies had not placed turbine propulsion on the front burner. Lockheed,
for example, was rebuffed when it approached the USAAC with its earliest
jet-fighter proposal (a stainless steel, cannon-amed twin-axial-flow
turbojet employing boundary-layer control and a front-mounted canard with
operating altitudes upwards of 50,000 ft and speed of about 625 mph or so).

Instead, Bell AC was awarded the first development contracts, and the result
was the P-59, an overweight, underpowered a/c with little scope for
development.

Lockheed had to wait until 1943 before being given the go-ahead on what
became the P-80, employing a British-designed centrifugal-flow turbojet and
was never provided funding for the r&d on either its propietary axial-flow
turbojet engine or its airframe.

Where I can't agree with you yet is over whether the Me-262 is impressive.
Seems to me that a fighter which has trouble getting airborne, trouble
staying airborne for more than 25 minutes and which is unable to complete a
turn while over a single county was of any real use to the Reich. The
victory claims (as you, especially, have reason to understand) attributed to
this a/c were highly inflated. The a/c's airframe and engines were
underdeveloped, and as a consequence it was as much of a threat to its
pilots as was enemy action.

I read Mr. Whittle's bio a few years ago. IIRC, all he needed was official
backing (i.e., money) and he could have produced and perfected his gem far
earlier than historically.

[Cub Driver]

> The a/c's airframe and engines were
>underdeveloped, and as a consequence it was as much of a threat to its
>pilots as was enemy action.

I suppose that I (and other Me-262 fans) are overwhelmed by its good
looks. More than any other WWII, with the exception of the Zero, it
looks sinister. (The Zero was also a bit of a threat to its pilot :)

>I read Mr. Whittle's bio a few years ago. IIRC, all he needed was official
>backing (i.e., money) and he could have produced and perfected his gem far
>earlier than historically.

Well, every genius thinks he's unappreciated.

It's true, he didn't get the money until September 1939, and that may
be a major reason why the Germans were ahead of him.

For all that, I suspect that the Whittle Unit was a dead end. It looks
like a collection of tin cans from a scrap drive. No other turbojet
looks remotely like it. Did even GE stick with the contraption very
long?


all the best -- Dan Ford
email: www.danford.net/letters.htm#9

see the Warbird's Forum at http://www.danford.net/index.htm
Vietnam | Flying Tigers | Pacific War | Brewster Buffalo | Piper Cub

[Keith Willshaw]

"Cub Driver" > wrote in message
...
>
> > The a/c's airframe and engines were
> >underdeveloped, and as a consequence it was as much of a threat to its
> >pilots as was enemy action.
>
> I suppose that I (and other Me-262 fans) are overwhelmed by its good
> looks. More than any other WWII, with the exception of the Zero, it
> looks sinister. (The Zero was also a bit of a threat to its pilot :)
>
> >I read Mr. Whittle's bio a few years ago. IIRC, all he needed was
official
> >backing (i.e., money) and he could have produced and perfected his gem
far
> >earlier than historically.
>
> Well, every genius thinks he's unappreciated.
>
> It's true, he didn't get the money until September 1939, and that may
> be a major reason why the Germans were ahead of him.
>
> For all that, I suspect that the Whittle Unit was a dead end. It looks
> like a collection of tin cans from a scrap drive. No other turbojet
> looks remotely like it. Did even GE stick with the contraption very
> long?
>
>

The Mig-15 was powered by Whittle type jet with a centrifugal
compressor and is considered to have been a rather significant
aircraft.

Axial flow engines were certainly the way ahead but centrifugal
engines were easier to build and around for quite a while.

Keith

[Steven P. McNicoll]

"Keith Willshaw" > wrote in message
...
>
> Axial flow engines were certainly the way ahead but centrifugal
> engines were easier to build and around for quite a while.
>

They are still around.

[Gordon]

>Where I can't agree with you yet is over whether the Me-262 is impressive.
>Seems to me that a fighter which has trouble getting airborne, trouble
>staying airborne for more than 25 minutes and which is unable to complete a
>turn while over a single county

Hmmmm... can't agree with those statements. It had a far better takeoff
accident rate than the 109 and other than requiring a hard-surfaced runway, the
greatest difficulty in getting airborne was fighting their way through the
Mustangs over their base. As for its flight duration, 25 minutes was nothing
close to their sortie length. Logbooks I have seen suggest that four or five
times that was most common. The last comment, concerning their
maneuverability, is not true - while not as nimble as a P-51 or Yak, its good
to remember that neither of those fine aircraft were as nimble as a Po-2, or a
Sopwith triplane for that matter. When an aircraft possesses a speed advantage
that causes the enemy aircraft to "hang in the air as if motionless", such an
advantage will quite likely cause it to suffer somewhat in other performance
areas. Maneuverability isn't what kills you - that's usually a defensive skill
- its speed that kills. That, and overwhelming numbers!

v/r
Gordon

[Gordon]

>
>I suppose that I (and other Me-262 fans) are overwhelmed by its good
>looks.

I think my fascination with it, and the Mosquito, were that they both were the
best each respective nation could field during the conflict. No other aircraft
over Europe, on their own, caused as much consternation among their foes or
brought as much terror to their intended targets. Goebbels mentions the hated
Mosquito in every diary entry he made in the last three months of his life,
with few exceptions. The RAF and many US heavy bomber crews were mortified
when they came under Me 262 attack. "Turbos" and Mossies raised the bar and
looked damned impressive while doing it.

v/r
Gordon

[Peter Stickney]

In article >,
(Gordon) writes:
>>
>>Hi the Meteor was used to shoot down V1 missiles it was quite good at it!
>>too so it was band from front line service i think until the end of the war.
>
> True - it's straight line speed was perfect for the running chase. In this
> footrace, its lack of maneuverability was not a hindrance. Later marks of the
> fighter were quite an improvement and by all accounts corrected their earlier
> faults.

In the case of the Meteor vs. V-1 situation, it's not jet a matter of
speed, so much, as the altitude at which you could reach that speed.
Jets, by and large, and most definitely, in the case of the Meteor,
develop their maximum thrust at sea level, and it begins to drop
immediately as you gain altitude. (Although not as quickly as a piston
engine above its Critical Altitude) The piston-engined fighters named
all had supercharged engines, and developed their maximum power at
heights well above Sea Level. In other words, 1000 HP at Sea Level,
and 1000 HP at 20,000' would generate teh same amount of thrust for
any particular speed. (See my previous posts on the Speed/Power
relationship). This biases the performance of the piston-powered
airplane toward the higher altitudes. A particularly germane example
is from a chart of Level Speed Performance for several types of
aircraft, from a Central Flying Establishment Report from July 12,
1946. Two of the aircraft being comared are the Meteor III and the DH
Hornet I. (Perhaps the ultimate Brit Recip fighter).
The Hornet is about 7 moh faster at 24,000 ft, and has a speed
advantage from about 22,500' through 33,000'. But a sea level, the
Meteor has an advantage of nearly 70 mph, (465 mph vs. 398.) The
other Piston fighters ahare the same basic characteristic curve,
although mot as fast as the Hornet. For example, a Mustang III, with
a V1650-7 at Military power (61"/3000R) turn in about 348 mph @ SL,
and 438 @ 27.500'. (Oh, and to be complete, the Spit XIV clocked 360
@ SL, and 448 @ 26,000'. (Griffon 65, +18 boost (67"). So,
basically, the Meteor, and, in fact, any jet, had a tremendous speed
advantage at low altitudes, even if it was at a disadvantage at high
altitude. That's what made the Meteor so useful as a V-1 interceptor.
(BTW, all of the piston fighters outclimbed the Metor III - that's why
I need to rebuild things to check on the case of high altitude Mossies
vs. Me 262s.)


--
Pete Stickney
A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many
bad measures. -- Daniel Webster

[Lawrence Dillard]

"Gordon" > wrote in message
...
> >Where I can't agree with you yet is over whether the Me-262 is
impressive.
> >Seems to me that a fighter which has trouble getting airborne, trouble
> >staying airborne for more than 25 minutes and which is unable to complete
a
> >turn while over a single county
>
> Hmmmm... can't agree with those statements. It had a far better takeoff
> accident rate than the 109 and other than requiring a hard-surfaced
runway,

The earliest Me-262s suffered from notoriously weak and unreliable
nose-wheels assemblies, which led to a number of fatal accidents. It was a
fault of fabrication, not design.The proper materiel in the proper numbers
weren't available. A trainer version was recognized as an urgent necessity
early in the a/c's development.

The Me-109 is acknowledged to have had a poor landing-gear design,
compromised due to the desire to obtain maximum streamlining.

the
> greatest difficulty in getting airborne was fighting their way through the
> Mustangs over their base.

I suggest instead that the greatest difficulty lay in simply getting the
engines started without a "hot start" occurring. Then the pilot was wise to
keep a keen ear to his radio while accelerating or climbing out for
"Achtung! Tempests!", etc. warnings, and also be alert for a flameout in one
or the other engine. Then, if he reached altitude, he was wise to pray for
smooth engine operation, without a flameout, which could have any of several
causes, no matter how carefully he managed his throttles.

As for its flight duration, 25 minutes was nothing
> close to their sortie length. Logbooks I have seen suggest that four or
five
> times that was most common.

Perhaps in the "Experten" squadron. Available to that organization was
presumably the best ground-crew and selected replacement parts, etc.
Otherwise, most Me-262s seemed to have to rtb early on account of
malfunctions usually related to the engines, which generally could not be
re-started in the air.

The last comment, concerning their
> maneuverability, is not true - while not as nimble as a P-51 or Yak, its
good
> to remember that neither of those fine aircraft were as nimble as a Po-2,
or a
> Sopwith triplane for that matter. When an aircraft possesses a speed
advantage
> that causes the enemy aircraft to "hang in the air as if motionless", such
an
> advantage will quite likely cause it to suffer somewhat in other
performance
> areas.

Unless the pilot of the opposing a/c is in a fighter, and is reasonably
alert. A typical USAAF tactic, if approached from the rear by an Me-262, was
to allow him to commit to a pursuit curve, then turn hard in one direction
or another. The Me-262 was found to be resistant to entering hard turns and
found to be all but impossible to reverse in turn without using up a lot of
sky, and would scream by, momentarily placing itself in tow of the US
fighter's guns, and rapidly bleed off speed to boot. In general, the
Me-262's preferred not to tangle with Allied escorts if at all possible.
They were supposed to bring down bombers, which were actually hurting
Germany, not insignificant Jabos, anyway.

I think it is fair to say that typically an Me-262 pilot had to devote so
much attention, upon becoming airborne, simply to a/c management, especially
wrt his engines, that his efficiency as a weapons system was severely
degraded.

Maneuverability isn't what kills you - that's usually a defensive skill
> - its speed that kills. That, and overwhelming numbers!

In general, the maximum number of Me-262s available at peak numbers was
about 200. Too little. An unperfected airframe and engines. Too little
range. Susceptible to being downed by prop-driven Allied a/co. Too late in
arrival to be other than a "flash in the pan".

[Steven P. McNicoll]

"Lawrence Dillard" > wrote in message
...
>
> The earliest Me-262s suffered from notoriously weak and unreliable
> nose-wheels assemblies, which led to a number of fatal accidents. It was a
> fault of fabrication, not design.
>

The earliest Me 262s did not have nosewheel assemblies.

[Steven P. McNicoll]

"Frank May" > wrote in message
...
>
> Probably 'cause it's considered a "flying bomb" or an early cruise
> missile. Technically, it IS an enemy aircraft since it has wings &
> flies, but it wasn't piloted & wasn't much of an adversary in that
> aspect.
>

Exactly. Air combat is combat which takes place in the air, shooting down a
V-1 is obviously air combat.

[Lawrence Dillard]

Steven P. McNicoll" > wrote in message
thlink.net...
>
> "Lawrence Dillard" > wrote in message
> ...
> >SNIP

> > The earliest Me-262s suffered from notoriously weak and unreliable
> > nose-wheels assemblies, which led to a number of fatal accidents. It was
a
> > fault of fabrication, not design.
> >
>
> The earliest Me 262s did not have nosewheel assemblies.

OK, make that the earliest "operational" Me-262s. Thanks for the correction.
>
>

[Bill Shatzer]

On Mon, 7 Jul 2003, Steven P. McNicoll wrote:

> "Frank May" > wrote in message
> ...

> > Probably 'cause it's considered a "flying bomb" or an early cruise
> > missile. Technically, it IS an enemy aircraft since it has wings &
> > flies, but it wasn't piloted & wasn't much of an adversary in that
> > aspect.

> Exactly. Air combat is combat which takes place in the air, shooting down a
> V-1 is obviously air combat.

How does that differ from downing a target drone?

Does one get a victory credit for a towed target sleeve?

[David P Benjamin]

Bill Shatzer ) wrote:




: On Mon, 7 Jul 2003, Steven P. McNicoll wrote:

: > "Frank May" > wrote in message
: > ...

: > > Probably 'cause it's considered a "flying bomb" or an early cruise
: > > missile. Technically, it IS an enemy aircraft since it has wings &
: > > flies, but it wasn't piloted & wasn't much of an adversary in that
: > > aspect.

: > Exactly. Air combat is combat which takes place in the air, shooting down a
: > V-1 is obviously air combat.

: How does that differ from downing a target drone?

One ton of high explosive?

: Does one get a victory credit for a towed target sleeve?

Do target sleeves blow up? I did not know that.


--
David Benjamin

[Cub Driver]

>Exactly. Air combat is combat which takes place in the air, shooting down a
>V-1 is obviously air combat.

What about shooting down the Piper Cub? I suppose there were a couple
of Blond Knights of Chermany who made ace on the L-4.

And what about the airman with a PPL at the console controlling the
Predator drone? He must be engaged in air combat too. (There was at
least one such incident, although the drone lost.)

Let me guess: you guys are flight simmers, right?


all the best -- Dan Ford
email: www.danford.net/letters.htm#9

see the Warbird's Forum at http://www.danford.net/index.htm
Vietnam | Flying Tigers | Pacific War | Brewster Buffalo | Piper Cub

[Cub Driver]

>Of course it is, don't be ridiculous.

Flight simmer, right?

all the best -- Dan Ford
email: www.danford.net/letters.htm#9

see the Warbird's Forum at http://www.danford.net/index.htm
Vietnam | Flying Tigers | Pacific War | Brewster Buffalo | Piper Cub

[Steven P. McNicoll]

"Bill Shatzer" > wrote in message
...
>
> How does that differ from downing a target drone?
>

Ours or theirs?

[Steven P. McNicoll]

"Cub Driver" > wrote in message
...
>
> What about shooting down the Piper Cub? I suppose there were a couple
> of Blond Knights of Chermany who made ace on the L-4.
>

An enemy aircraft is an enemy aircraft.


>
> And what about the airman with a PPL at the console controlling the
> Predator drone? He must be engaged in air combat too. (There was at
> least one such incident, although the drone lost.)
>

Yup.


>
> Let me guess: you guys are flight simmers, right?
>

Not me, just driven by logic.

[Gordon]

>Too late in
>arrival to be other than a "flash in the pan".

That "flash" turned out to be the death kneal for several entire classes of
aircraft, that only months previously were considered the best in the world.
Prop combat aircraft of all types were on notice that they now represented
antiquated technology. It signalled to all the other nations that what used to
be good enough was now entirely obsolete - a watershed moment in aviation
history.

v/r
Gordon
<====(A+C====>
USN SAR Aircrew

"Got anything on your radar, SENSO?"
"Nothing but my forehead, sir."

[vincent p. norris]

>>Exactly. Air combat is combat which takes place in the air, shooting down a
>>V-1 is obviously air combat.

Seems a bit odd to call it "combat" when the V-1 can't shoot back, or
even maneuver.
>
>What about shooting down the Piper Cub? I suppose there were a couple
>of Blond Knights of Chermany who made ace on the L-4.

I've never been in that situation, Dan, nor have I seen any
statistics, but I suspect it was pretty darn hard to shoot down a Cub
that could fly so slowly and maneuver with such agility.

I do recall reading, at the time, of a case in which a liaison pilot
induced a Luftwaffe fighter pilot to fly into the ground.

And in _To War in a Stringbag_, a Swordfish pilot tells of
accidentally killing a fellow RNAS pilot the same way.

vince norris

[Lawrence Dillard]

Just define "fighting" as doing damage to or having the potential to do
damage to an enemy during an engagement. If you are fired on by an enemy a/c
and he misses, aren't you nonetheless in combat? A missile or a Mg bullet or
a cannon shell does the fighting for its pilot.

(This may be a reach, and certainly a tad off-ng, but if a ship were fired
on by a torpedo, that would certainly constitute peril to that ship, and
combat, wouldn't it? During an engagement in the Pacific, an IJN pilot who
had just taken off alertly noted a US torpedo wake heading for his 'carrier.
He promptly sacrificed his life by diving his a/c into the water just ahead
of the torpedo (allegedly, several US witnesses to this) and saved his ship
from certain punishment. Man vs an inanimate but certainly very deadly
object. I suggest that this incident was combat.) By analogy, a pilot who
downed a robot bomb without necessarily hurting or killing himself also
engaged in combat. Whether the bomb could protect itself is not truly
relevant. The only relevant thing, I suggest, is that if left unmolested,
the device could harm your side. Any action taken to prevent its successful
conduct should be called combat.


"vzlion" > wrote in message
...
> Don't you have to have an adversary to have any kind of combat.
> By definition combat is fighting, A missile doesn't fight, it just
> flies along until it hits something, Right?
>
> Walt
> On Mon, 07 Jul 2003 15:31:33 GMT, "Steven P. McNicoll"
> > wrote:
>

[vzlion]

On Tue, 08 Jul 2003 11:35:19 GMT, "Steven P. McNicoll"
> wrote:

>
>"vincent p. norris" > wrote in message
...
>>
>> Seems a bit odd to call it "combat" when the V-1 can't shoot back, or
>> even maneuver.
>>
>
>Well, then, an RAF bomber shot down by an unseen night fighter would be a
>non-combat loss as well.
>
Well, the difference is that the bomber has the potential to detect
the enemy night fighter and fight back, the V-1 doesn't. It just flies
along until it quits or is shot down. BTW weren't a number of V-1s
destroyed by tipping them over and destroying the gyroscopes
effectiveness.
The pilots who destroyed the V-1s did an outstanding job and deserve
all our respect. Thay had a job to do and they did it, and very
effectively. And I'm sure they wouyld rather have been downing a
manned fighter or bomber. My hat is off to them. But, it's just not
the same as combat with something that can shoot back at you.

Walt



-----= Posted via Newsfeeds.Com, Uncensored Usenet News =-----
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[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: #1 Jet of World War II
>From: vzlion
>Date: 7/8/03 7:49 AM Pacific Daylight Time

>My hat is off to them. But, it's just not
>the same as combat with something that can shoot back at you.
>
>Walt

The subject is not "you" It is defending your country from attack while
destroying enemy assets. They did all that.

Arthur Kramer
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[[email protected]]

(Gordon) wrote:

>>Too late in
>>arrival to be other than a "flash in the pan".
>
>That "flash" turned out to be the death kneal for several entire classes of
>aircraft, that only months previously were considered the best in the world.
>Prop combat aircraft of all types were on notice that they now represented
>antiquated technology. It signalled to all the other nations that what used to
>be good enough was now entirely obsolete - a watershed moment in aviation
>history.
>
>v/r
>Gordon

Masterfully put Gordon (not quite as well spelled but what the
hay) :)

I particularly like your last sentence. One must give credit
where due and the Germans certainly did themselves proud in this
ground-breaking mechanical engineering feat.
--

-Gord.

[Gordon]

> Gordon (not quite as well spelled but what the
>hay) :)

Dammit, my spelling poodle must have dozed off again. Would you believe I now
type with a central Texas twang...? No...? Not buying it, are we. ? Shoot.

>One must give credit
>where due and the Germans certainly did themselves proud in this
>ground-breaking mechanical engineering feat.

I think the 262, like the X-1, are on a par in level of importance. The X-1
was capable, marginally, of supersonic flight but only for a brief period. So
what? It signalled to all that supersonic flight was viable and the way to the
future. In the same manner, the Me was the historical dividing line for
fighter aircraft, the machine that proved jet fighters were a viable and
superior alternative to propeller-driven machines. From that moment on, prop
fighters were an anachronism and every Allied pilot that saw one knew it.

If it was a Grumman product, I'd love it even more. Perhaps thats why I love
the Panther as well! :))

v/r
Gordon

[The Revolution Will Not Be Televised]

On 08 Jul 2003 18:29:09 GMT, (Gordon) wrote:

>If it was a Grumman product, I'd love it even more. Perhaps thats why I love
>the Panther as well! :))

Just think of the lovely fuel bills....

Gavin Bailey

--

"...this level of misinformation suggests some Americans may be
avoiding having an experience of cognitive dissonance."
- 'Poll shows errors in beliefs on Iraq, 9/11'
The Charlotte Observer, 20th June 2003

[phil hunt]

On Sat, 05 Jul 2003 20:42:14 GMT, Steven P. McNicoll > wrote:
>
>Why isn't the V-1 an enemy aircraft?

It doesn't have a pilot. It was a missile, not an aircraft.

--
Phil
"If only sarcasm could overturn bureaucracies"
-- NTK, commenting on www.cabalamat.org/weblog/art_29.html

[phil hunt]

On Sun, 06 Jul 2003 11:07:56 GMT, The Revolution Will Not Be Televised > wrote:
>On Sun, 06 Jul 2003 06:08:42 -0400, Cub Driver >
>wrote:
>
>>Shooting down V-1s, Piper Cubs, and unarmed transports may be a worthy
>>war-winning goal, like typing up the morning report, but it's not what
>>makes a fighter pilot--or plane.
>
>Few people risked death typing up morning reports. Pilots did die as
>consequences of Anti-Diver patrols. The level of risk is not
>equivalent.

True but irrelevant; we were discussing the Meteor's ability as a
fighter aircraft, for which what is relevant is its record in combat
with other aircraft, especially fighters and bombers with a
capability to fight back.

--
Phil
"If only sarcasm could overturn bureaucracies"
-- NTK, commenting on www.cabalamat.org/weblog/art_29.html

[Pooh Bear]

Keith Willshaw wrote:

> "Steven P. McNicoll" > wrote in message
> rthlink.net...
> >
> > "vzlion" > wrote in message
> > ...
> > >
> > > Well, the difference is that the bomber has the potential to detect
> > > the enemy night fighter and fight back, the V-1 doesn't. It just flies
> > > along until it quits or is shot down.
> > >
> >
> > But if the bomber doesn't detect the enemy fighter it won't fight back.
> It
> > will just fly along until it is shot down.
>
> And in the case of the Mosquito had no guns to shoot back with.
>
> Keith

Emphasis on the word *back* of course !

:-) PB

[Gordon]

>
>> > But if the bomber doesn't detect the enemy fighter it won't fight back.
>> It
>> > will just fly along until it is shot down.
>>
>> And in the case of the Mosquito had no guns to shoot back with.
>>
>> Keith
>
>Emphasis on the word *back* of course !

The Mosquito bomber had no guns to shoot with, front or back, PB. The FB did,
but that is not what Keith was referring to.

v/r
Gordon
<====(A+C====>
USN SAR Aircrew

"Got anything on your radar, SENSO?"
"Nothing but my forehead, sir."

[John Keeney]

vzlion > wrote in message
...
> The pilots who destroyed the V-1s did an outstanding job and deserve
> all our respect. Thay had a job to do and they did it, and very
> effectively. And I'm sure they wouyld rather have been downing a
> manned fighter or bomber. My hat is off to them. But, it's just not
> the same as combat with something that can shoot back at you.

I don't know...
Seems to me when you're trying to blow up that much high-explosive,
at fairly close range, it might as well be shooting back.

[Keith Willshaw]

"Pooh Bear" > wrote in message
...
> Keith Willshaw wrote:
>

>
> Emphasis on the word *back* of course !
>

The pure bomber variants had no guns at all , they
dropped the forward firing weapons in favor of a
glazed nose

Keith

[Keith Willshaw]

"Gordon" > wrote in message
...
>
> The Mosquito bomber had no guns to shoot with, front or back, PB. The FB
did,
> but that is not what Keith was referring to.
>

Indeed, I recall a Mosquito observer who had previously been on
Blenheims who described his shock on being told that the squadron's
new aircraft would be completely unarmed.

Of course when their loss rate dropped dramatically
when they started flying missions they changed their tune.

Keith

[ArtKramr]

>ubject: Re: #1 Jet of World War II
>From: "John Keeney"
>Date: 7/8/03 11:32 PM Pacific

>I don't know...
>Seems to me when you're trying to blow up that much high-explosive,
>at fairly close range, it might as well be shooting back.

Be careful what you wish for....(grin)


Arthur Kramer
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[Steven P. McNicoll]

"phil hunt" > wrote in message
. ..
>
> It doesn't have a pilot. It was a missile, not an aircraft.
>

The definition of "aircraft" includes "pilot"?

[The Revolution Will Not Be Televised]

On Tue, 8 Jul 2003 23:17:08 +0100, (phil hunt)
wrote:

>>>Shooting down V-1s, Piper Cubs, and unarmed transports may be a worthy
>>>war-winning goal, like typing up the morning report, but it's not what
>>>makes a fighter pilot--or plane.
>>
>>Few people risked death typing up morning reports. Pilots did die as
>>consequences of Anti-Diver patrols. The level of risk is not
>>equivalent.
>
>True but irrelevant;

No, I believe the parallels Dan Ford introduced are not in fact
proportionately equivalent, and as such the level of risk in
intercepting V-1s is relevant. Apparently I'm not alone in this
opinion, as other contributors on the validity of anti-V-1 air combat
seem to agree.

>we were discussing the Meteor's ability as a
>fighter aircraft, for which what is relevant is its record in combat
>with other aircraft

Not if it's deployment is in a context where little or no meaningful
combat with enemy fighters occurred, in which case there aren't the
neccessary grounds for a reasonable judgement.

If you think judging the Meteor on it's first operational deployment
alone [i.e. against V-1s] is valid, compare it to the 262 in the *same
context*. What does that reveal? Kommando Nowotny being withdrawn
from combat. That doesn't look like much of a success story to me.

Note that I'm not actually bashing the 262 and seeking to inflate the
reputation of the Meteor beyond the supportable facts: I would just
prefer to see some rational objectivity involved instead of this weird
competitiveness which seeks to look at both types in some bizarre
polarized and binary contest.

Gavin Bailey


--

"...this level of misinformation suggests some Americans may be
avoiding having an experience of cognitive dissonance."
- 'Poll shows errors in beliefs on Iraq, 9/11'
The Charlotte Observer, 20th June 2003

[The Enlightenment]

(The Revolution Will Not Be Televised) wrote in message >...
> On Tue, 8 Jul 2003 23:17:08 +0100, (phil hunt)
> wrote:
>[i]
> >>>Shooting down V-1s, Piper Cubs, and unarmed transports may be a worthy
> >>>war-winning goal, like typing up the morning report, but it's not what
> >>>makes a fighter pilot--or plane.
> >>
> >>Few people risked death typing up morning reports. Pilots did die as
> >>consequences of Anti-Diver patrols. The level of risk is not
> >>equivalent.
> >
> >True but irrelevant;
>
> No, I believe the parallels Dan Ford introduced are not in fact
> proportionately equivalent, and as such the level of risk in
> intercepting V-1s is relevant. Apparently I'm not alone in this
> opinion, as other contributors on the validity of anti-V-1 air combat
> seem to agree.
>
> >we were discussing the Meteor's ability as a
> >fighter aircraft, for which what is relevant is its record in combat
> >with other aircraft
>
> Not if it's deployment is in a context where little or no meaningful
> combat with enemy fighters occurred, in which case there aren't the
> neccessary grounds for a reasonable judgement.
>
> If you think judging the Meteor on it's first operational deployment
> alone is valid, compare it to the 262 in the *same
> context*. What does that reveal? Kommando Nowotny being withdrawn
> from combat. That doesn't look like much of a success story to me.
>
> Note that I'm not actually bashing the 262 and seeking to inflate the
> reputation of the Meteor beyond the supportable facts: I would just
> prefer to see some rational objectivity involved instead of this weird
> competitiveness which seeks to look at both types in some bizarre
> polarized and binary contest.
>
> Gavin Bailey


There is a story in a recent (1 yo) Air Enthusiast of A British
Gloster Meteor Pilot flying to a German airfield by arrangement (prior
to the cessation of hostilities) and being given a test flight/taxi
run in a Me262 while the Germans examined the meteor. (newagent
browse, never brought the mag)

He seemed impressed with the 262 but pointed out that the build
quality and materials of the meteor was much higher. The only thing
on the Meteor that he seemed to think was clearly superior was the
Meteors electric start vs the 2 stroke reidel motor in the 262.

The Me 262 had a EZ 42 computing gyro gun sight, a FuG 244 ranging
radar that could via the "Elfe" computer inject the firing solution
into the gun sight for the cannon and I believe unguided R4M 55mm
misiles as well. It could even set the timer fuses and fire the
larger unguided missile (100mm) the germans were developing that had a
forward facing conical fragmentation pattern)

It was an awesome weapons system.

All of the Me262s more serious engine problems could be traced to a
lack of refractory alloys Nickel and Chromium which were available in
very limited quantities from Finland and Turkey respectively.

The axial compressors of the German engines were while more efficient
also more difficult to control. That however would lead only to flame
outs. One of the major causes of jumo 004B failure was the
translating exhaust nozzle cone of the engine. Because this was mild
steel not stainless steel it softend and distorted under head and
would fall out to lodge in the exhaust oriface.

[Dave Kearton]

"The Enlightenment" > wrote in message
om...
|
|
| There is a story in a recent (1 yo) Air Enthusiast of A British
| Gloster Meteor Pilot flying to a German airfield by arrangement (prior
| to the cessation of hostilities) and being given a test flight/taxi
| run in a Me262 while the Germans examined the meteor. (newagent
| browse, never brought the mag)
|
| He seemed impressed with the 262 but pointed out that the build
| quality and materials of the meteor was much higher. The only thing
| on the Meteor that he seemed to think was clearly superior was the
| Meteors electric start vs the 2 stroke reidel motor in the 262.
|
| The Me 262 had a EZ 42 computing gyro gun sight, a FuG 244 ranging
| radar that could via the "Elfe" computer inject the firing solution
| into the gun sight for the cannon and I believe unguided R4M 55mm
| misiles as well. It could even set the timer fuses and fire the
| larger unguided missile (100mm) the germans were developing that had a
| forward facing conical fragmentation pattern)




Similar article in "Flightpath" last year about Tony Gaze, Australian WWII
Spitfire and Meteor pilot, post war F1 driver.


Typical underachiever. ;-)


Landed as Schleswig and said "G'day" . Was offered a 262 flight, but
politely declined because at that stage 262's were still inviting unwanted
attention from Mustangs and Typhoons.


Interesting read.


Cheers

Dave Kearton

[Gordon]

>The Me 262 had a EZ 42 computing gyro gun sight,

Well, a few of them did. Not a large percentage at all. Look at it this way -
not one of the few survivor airframes were fitted with an EZ42, and 90% of Me
262 pilots never saw one.

> a FuG 244 ranging
>radar that could via the "Elfe" computer

Never entered service. No 262 flew a single sortie with this device.

> inject the firing solution
>into the gun sight for the cannon and I believe unguided R4M 55mm
>misiles as well.

Galland et al always maintained they used the standard Revi gunsight for
sighting the R4Ms.

> It could even set the timer fuses and fire the
>larger unguided missile (100mm) the germans were developing that had a
>forward facing conical fragmentation pattern)

X-4 or that X- or XS-100? Either way, the 262 didn't "have" the system, it was
only a proposal. Another dance of the mayflies for the Germans as they
frittered away the last days.

>It was an awesome weapons system.

That it was.

v/r
Gordon
<====(A+C====>
USN SAR Aircrew

"Got anything on your radar, SENSO?"
"Nothing but my forehead, sir."

[phil hunt]

On 10 Jul 2003 14:45:23 GMT, Gordon > wrote:
>> It could even set the timer fuses and fire the
>>larger unguided missile (100mm) the germans were developing that had a
>>forward facing conical fragmentation pattern)
>
>X-4 or that X- or XS-100?

X-4 was a guided missile IIRC.

--
Phil
"If only sarcasm could overturn bureaucracies"
-- NTK, commenting on www.cabalamat.org/weblog/art_29.html

[The Enlightenment]

(Gordon) wrote in message >...
> >The Me 262 had a EZ 42 computing gyro gun sight,
>
> Well, a few of them did. Not a large percentage at all. Look at it
> this way -
> not one of the few survivor airframes were fitted with an EZ42, and 90% of Me
> 262 pilots never saw one.
>
> > a FuG 244 ranging
> > radar that could via the "Elfe" computer
>
> Never entered service. No 262 flew a single sortie with this device.
>
> > inject the firing solution
> >into the gun sight for the cannon and I believe unguided R4M 55mm
> >misiles as well.
>
> Galland et al always maintained they used the standard Revi gunsight for
> sighting the R4Ms.

How did the aim and at what range. Was it a ripple fire weapon? Did
they stand of outside 50 caliber range? It seems to have been very
effective?


>
> > It could even set the timer fuses and fire the
> >larger unguided missile (100mm) the germans were developing that had a
> >forward facing conical fragmentation pattern)
>
> X-4 or that X- or XS-100?

I think XS-100.

The X-4 was a guided missile. It used two 0.22mm stainless steel
insulated pianowires trailing from the missile and simultaneously the
aircraft. It was guide by a joystick CLOS (Command Line Of Sight)

Another version was unpowered (or boost and coast maybe) and used an
accoustic homing warhead. As the whole missile rotated to simplify
control laws and require only 1 gyro it anyway it was only necessary
to add an of axis microphone to the nose which opperated the
flaperon/dragerlons as the missile rotated to home in on the propellor
sounds. If the target was strainght ahead the sound level would be
equaly balanced.

An accousitc fuse which opperated on the doppler shift as the missile
passed by the bombers propellors was to be installed in both. I think
the dveice were called kranich and dogge.

The XS-100 (I'm not sure about that name: its mentioned in a Monograph
book called Arado 234 blitz bomber) is a different unguided missile of
100mm diameter which nevertheless had a timer fuse and a powerfull
forward facing conical framnentation pattern warhead.

The Elfe computer in concert with a radar ranging device in the Me262
nose was supposed to set the fuse as well as prime the EZ 42 gyro
sight and presumably bracket the target with a salvo of these unguided
missiles and their rather nasty warheads but the missile was still
optically aimed albeit with the lead computed and the pilot relieved
of towsiting knobs to find the range optically.

Now I do know that there was supposed to be an elefe and elfe-3
computer which was meant to find its way into the Arado 234P (4 jet
engined BMW003 night fighter version of the Arado 234 jet bomber) In
concert with the Fug244 Berlin N3 radar it was supposed to take over
the aircraft via the autopilot and set the fuse and fire the XS-100
[SIC] fully automatically.

They were consciously heading towards fully automatic interceptions
for night fighters. I don't think this is far fetched because the
late war Bernhard/Bernhardine navigation system had shown itself
capable of delivering jam resistant location information and more
pertinently telemetary to night fighter aircraft.

The Germans seemed to have developed relay powered computers instead
of valves. Althought this sounds primitive the relays are actualy
more reliable than valves and less relays (1/4th I think) are required
to perform the same function.

> Either way, the 262 didn't "have" the system, it was
> only a proposal. Another dance of the mayflies for the Germans as they
> frittered away the last days.

In their desperation and material shortages the Germans were sometimes
technically magnificent and were often only months to a year away from
deployment. Realistically one can find lots of clever allied
projects: the miles supersonic jet with its escape pod and the various
allied guided missiles like BAT but in many areas the German did lead
the way. Certainly they were the most technicaly matched opponent the
allies ever encountered.

Their attempts at stealth in the Go229, the fast type XXI subs and
their clever passive ranging sonar set, the assault rifles and the
dozens of sometimes farsighted innovations seen on Luft46

>
> >It was an awesome weapons system.
>
> That it was.

Mig 15s seemed to have pushed B29s out of the sky over korea because
the US lacked a suitable escort. I think the Me262 would have done
the same "if" it had of been deployed earlier. Its development was I
think the end of the long range 4 engined slow bomber defended by guns
which is why it is so interesting.

[Gordon]

>> Galland et al always maintained they used the standard Revi gunsight for
>> sighting the R4Ms.
>
>How did the aim and at what range. Was it a ripple fire weapon?

Yes.

Did
>they stand of outside 50 caliber range?

No, they couldn't loiter off and trundle up to take a rocket shot like the
earlier rocket shooters, due to the escorts. So the preferred method was to
come in astern and let the rockets go from between 1,500 down to 800 yards,
aiming for any overlapping targets they could find.

> It seems to have been very
>effective?

The pilots that used this configuration (Galland, Steinhof, Bar, etc) agree
that with the addition of the R4Ms, they now had a weapon perfectly capable of
sweeping the US heavies from the sky. Poodles of course, but that is what they
thought at the time.

>> > It could even set the timer fuses and fire the
>> >larger unguided missile (100mm) the germans were developing that had a
>> >forward facing conical fragmentation pattern)
>>
>> X-4 or that X- or XS-100?
>
>I think XS-100.

I am always a bit perturbed about that particular one, because I can find so
little mention of it in German wartime documents. I am not a big fan of books
and try to keep my studies to the original documents which keeps at least one
layer of 'interpretation' from clouding the commentary.

<snipabit>

>An accousitc fuse which opperated on the doppler shift as the missile
>passed by the bombers propellors was to be installed in both. I think
>the dveice were called kranich and dogge.

The sure loved those gadgets.

>The XS-100 (I'm not sure about that name: its mentioned in a Monograph
>book called Arado 234 blitz bomber) is a different unguided missile of
>100mm diameter which nevertheless had a timer fuse and a powerfull
>forward facing conical framnentation pattern warhead.
>
>The Elfe computer in concert with a radar ranging device in the Me262
>nose was supposed to set the fuse as well as prime the EZ 42 gyro
>sight and presumably bracket the target with a salvo of these unguided
>missiles and their rather nasty warheads but the missile was still
>optically aimed albeit with the lead computed and the pilot relieved
>of towsiting knobs to find the range optically.

But the pilots were having a dickens of a time adjusting their tactics to fit
the EZ42. KG 51 pilots hated it and were instructed to turn it off and use it
as a standard optical site. Conversely, JG 300 Bf 109 pilots that tested it in
combat _loved_ it and gave much credit for their success during the trials to
the new gunsight.

>Now I do know that there was supposed to be an elefe and elfe-3
>computer which was meant to find its way into the Arado 234P (4 jet
>engined BMW003 night fighter version of the Arado 234 jet bomber) In
>concert with the Fug244 Berlin N3 radar it was supposed to take over
>the aircraft via the autopilot and set the fuse and fire the XS-100
>[SIC] fully automatically.

I have all the Arado files regarding the nightfighter from BAMA and the PRO and
I think this didn't actually represent a planned production aircraft - its one
of dozens of proposals advanced by the engineers, desperate to keep a pencil in
their hands and not a Panzerfaust.

>They were consciously heading towards fully automatic interceptions
>for night fighters.

Agree - for lots of reasons.

> I don't think this is far fetched because the
>late war Bernhard/Bernhardine navigation system had shown itself
>capable of delivering jam resistant location information and more
>pertinently telemetary to night fighter aircraft.

Combined with the K-22 three-axis autopilot, I think the Bernardine-equipped
aircraft would eventually be intended to have a fully blind landing capability.
The Schlechtwetterjäger variant of the 262, precursor to all later "all
weather" aircraft, was a primative attempt to create a day fighter with
enhanced navigation, but the later Arado nightfighter projects as well as the
Me 262 B-2a were going to benefit from the K-22 and other advancements that
showed how agressively the bad guys were working on a true all weather a/c.

>> Either way, the 262 didn't "have" the system, it was
>> only a proposal. Another dance of the mayflies for the Germans as they
>> frittered away the last days.
>
>In their desperation and material shortages the Germans were sometimes
>technically magnificent and were often only months to a year away from
>deployment. Realistically one can find lots of clever allied
>projects: the miles supersonic jet with its escape pod and the various
>allied guided missiles like BAT but in many areas the German did lead
>the way. Certainly they were the most technicaly matched opponent the
>allies ever encountered.

It was truly a wizard's war in the night skies over Germany.

>Their attempts at stealth in the Go229, the fast type XXI subs and
>their clever passive ranging sonar set, the assault rifles and the
>dozens of sometimes farsighted innovations seen on Luft46

Thankfully, they were led by utter morons.

>>
>> >It was an awesome weapons system.
>>
>> That it was.
>
>Mig 15s seemed to have pushed B29s out of the sky over korea because
>the US lacked a suitable escort. I think the Me262 would have done
>the same "if" it had of been deployed earlier. Its development was I
>think the end of the long range 4 engined slow bomber defended by guns
>which is why it is so interesting.

It certainly signaled the end of the prop escort fighter!

v/r
Gordon
<====(A+C====>
USN SAR Aircrew

"Got anything on your radar, SENSO?"
"Nothing but my forehead, sir."

[Peter Stickney]

In article >,
(The Revolution Will Not Be Televised) writes:
> On 29 Jun 2003 15:59:14 GMT, (Gordon) wrote:
> On another subject, you couldn't give me a realistic cruising speed
> for B.IX/B.XVI mossies in '44'45, could you? I mean a real one,
> including bombload, etc? Many thanks if you can, if not don't worry
> about it.

Best range cruise speed fpr any type of Mosquito would be 'bout 170
kts/196 mph IAS. At 20,000' that would be a bit over 266 mph TAS, at
25,000', it would be 290 IAS, and at 30,000' it would be 320 mph TAS.
At a slight cost in range, you could bump these speeds by about 15-20
mph - the Mossie had a fairly flat L/D curve.

Best cruise speed is largely independant of the engine power
installed. What's most important is the drag on the airframe, and the
point on the Drag Polar plot that shows the point of minumum drag.


--
Pete Stickney
A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many
bad measures. -- Daniel Webster

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: #1 Jet of World War II
>From: (Peter Stickney)
>Date: 7/14/03 6:36 PM Pacific Daylight Time
>Message-id:

>Best range cruise speed fpr any type of Mosquito would be 'bout 170
>kts/196 mph IAS.

That is a very interesting number. I can't help but compare it to the B-26
which got its best range at 180 IAS loaded with steel plate armor and bristling
with machine guns and carrying a crew of 6. Take off the armor, take off the
guns and top turret and cut the crew to two and the B-26 may well have
outperformed the Mosquito by a large margin..

Arthur Kramer
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[Peter Stickney]

In article >,
(ArtKramr) writes:
>>Subject: Re: #1 Jet of World War II
>>From: (Peter Stickney)
>>Date: 7/14/03 6:36 PM Pacific Daylight Time
>>Message-id:
>
>>Best range cruise speed fpr any type of Mosquito would be 'bout 170
>>kts/196 mph IAS.
>
> That is a very interesting number. I can't help but compare it to the B-26
> which got its best range at 180 IAS loaded with steel plate armor and bristling
> with machine guns and carrying a crew of 6. Take off the armor, take off the
> guns and top turret and cut the crew to two and the B-26 may well have
> outperformed the Mosquito by a large margin..

Well, not quite, perhaps. :)
To a certain extent, best economical cruise speed was independant of
the top speed. Best economical cruise is the airspeed that gives the
minumum power required to maintain level flight at that altitude. Max
Speed depends on the total power available. That being said, a
cleaned-up B-26 would go pretty danged fast. According to the USAAF
Characteristics Summary for teh B-26C, which is derived from flight
test data, a combat-equipped 'C' topped out at 282 mph TAS at
15,000', or about 225 IAS. That's quite a bit over the 180 IAS cruise
that you guys used. As I remember it, one pf the postwar Bendix
Racers was a cleaned-up Martin B-26C (For you kids, the Bendix was an
Unlimited Transcontinental Air Race. ) I don't recall how it fared.
Given the way things went at that time, the winner that year would
have been either Paul Mantz in his slicked-up P-51 (No pylons, no drop
tanks, and the gun and ammunition bays in the wings sealed and used
fro more fuel, allowing a non-stop trancontinental flight at Maximum
Continuous Power). But for an old lady (A prewar design, after all,
the B-26 could really move, when it needed to.

I just double checked, he numbers I gave are a bit muddied-up, too.
I've two Pilot's Handbooks for the Mosquito, one for the FB.6
(Fighter-Bomber) from 1950, and one for the various single-stage
Merlin Night Fighters, published in 1945. The numbers I quoted were
from the FB.6 handbook, and the NF.12 handbook is different. The NF.12
book lists best cruise as 220 mph IAS, which is nudging 330 TAS at
25,000'. and 360 TAS at 30,000'. It's possible that the FB.6 numbers
are for an airplane carrying external bombs and rockets, but it
doesn't say.
Of course, these a Brit P.O.H.s, and the philosopy there is a bit
different. The sum total of cruise instructions are "Try to fly at
this airspeed, withoug exceeding that power setting. Yo should get
thus fuel consumption." The equivalent American -1 would have an
entire chapter of graphs, charts, formulae, and tables to precisely
duplicate every condition. (You'd asked about differences in Aircrew
Training. It could well be we've stumbled onto one). Which method is
better? Who knows. The U.S.Anian one is certainly more exact, but
the natural variation between aircraft, especially after they've been
bashed around for a while, makes that level of precision a bit
dubious.

And just what is Max Speed for a bomber, anyway? 5 Minutes of War
Emergency Power doesn't make too much sense, or even 15 minutes at
Military Power. You can get some amazing numbers that way, that will
never show up in real life.
An example would be the Italian Breda 88 Attac Bomber. It was a
damned serious looking twin engine light bomber that went into service
with a fantastic reputation. The prototype set quite a number of
speed/load/distance records, and it sure seemed fierce. When they
were finally issued to the Regia Aeronautica units in North Africa,
they discovered that they had an airplane that couldn't climb out of
ground effect on takeoff with a full fuel load, and was in danger of
colliding with the Libyan sand dunes.

--
Pete Stickney
A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many
bad measures. -- Daniel Webster

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: #1 Jet of World War II
>From: (Gordon)
>Date: 7/14/03 9:18 PM Pacific Daylight Time
>Message-id: >
>
>>>Best range cruise speed fpr any type of Mosquito would be 'bout 170
>>>kts/196 mph IAS.
>>
>>That is a very interesting number. I can't help but compare it to the B-26
>>which got its best range at 180 IAS
>
>
>
>I'd have to wornder, what was that "best range"? I was under the impression
>that the Mosquito could fly several times as far as the B-26 with a full
>4,000
>pound bombload.
>
>>Take off the armor, take off the
>>guns and top turret and cut the crew to two and the B-26 may well have
>>outperformed the Mosquito by a large margin..
>
>Art, the Mosquito was designed to save strategic materials, so factor that in
>as well. How well would the B-26 perform if it were made out of wood? I
>think
>its quite difficult to accurately compare widely dissimilar aircraft, with
>different design constraints and resource restrictions, unless grant some
>leeway in your bias toward the B-26. Its natural and I'm not saying you are
>wrong in being a fan of the Marauder, but there WAS a B-26 version without
>the
>turret and armor, and a crew of two or three -- its performance was such that
>it was determined most useful to the AAF and USN in the role of target tugs.
>
>v/r
>Gordon
>


The way the USAAC operated planes that were unarmored and unarmed were of no
value. We flew into flak in broad daylight and depended on armor and guns for
defence, And we carried 4,000 pounds of bombs every time.

Arthur Kramer
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Peter Stickney wrote in message ...

>I just double checked, he numbers I gave are a bit muddied-up, too.
>I've two Pilot's Handbooks for the Mosquito, one for the FB.6
>(Fighter-Bomber) from 1950, and one for the various single-stage
>Merlin Night Fighters, published in 1945. The numbers I quoted were
>from the FB.6 handbook, and the NF.12 handbook is different. The NF.12
>book lists best cruise as 220 mph IAS, which is nudging 330 TAS at
>25,000'. and 360 TAS at 30,000'. It's possible that the FB.6 numbers
>are for an airplane carrying external bombs and rockets, but it
>doesn't say.

Sounds like the time to add the information from the book Mosquito
by Sharpe and Bowyer.

The FB6 used Merlin 21/22/23/25, the NF12 merlin 21/23.

Appendix 8, performance of the B35 (merlin 114) versus the FB6
(merlin 25).

B35, 22,000 pounds, bomb load 1,500 pounds including 2 x 500
pounds bombs under the wings, 539 gallons of fuel, still air range
1,600 miles at 25,000 feet at 300 mph TAS, 1,250 miles at 37,000
feet at 375 mph TAS. Top speed 425 mph at 30,500 feet.

FB6 21,700 pounds, bomb load 1,500 pounds including 2 x 500
pounds bombs under the wings, 453 gallons of fuel, still air range
1,120 miles at sea level at 250 mph TAS, 960 miles at sea level
at 296 mph TAS. Top speed 378 mph at 13,200 feet.

The Merlin 72/73 or 76/77 versions (VII, IX and XIV) outward
recommended cruising speed 220 mph IAS, economic cruise
in clean condition was 295 mph TAS at 20,000 feet and 350
mph at 30,000+ feet, maximum continuous cruising, clean,
349 mph TAS at 20,000 feet, 378 mph TAS at 30,000 feet.

For the merlin 21/22/23/31 equipped versions maximum
continuous cruise was 341 mph TAS at 20,000 feet but this
fell to 329 mph at 25,000 feet, I assume in clean condition.
Again outward bound recommended cruise was 220 mph
IAS at around 25,000 feet.

The return flight recommendation was for around a 5% reduction
in cruise speed compared with outbound, 210 mph IAS.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

[Bill Shatzer]

On 15 Jul 2003, ArtKramr wrote:

> The way the USAAC operated planes that were unarmored and unarmed were of no
> value.

Well, certainly the recce, weather, and cargo aircraft were of some
considerable value? I seem to dimly recall that Eisenhower proclaimed
the unarmored and unarmed C-47 as one of the three most important weapons
of WW2 (along with the jeep and the M-1 rifle, IIRC).

And, didn't LeMay end up stripping his B-29 of all their armament
save the tail guns?

Cheers and all,

[Bill Shatzer]

On 15 Jul 2003, ArtKramr wrote:

> That is a very interesting number. I can't help but compare it to the B-26
> which got its best range at 180 IAS loaded with steel plate armor and bristling
> with machine guns and carrying a crew of 6. Take off the armor, take off the
> guns and top turret and cut the crew to two and the B-26 may well have
> outperformed the Mosquito by a large margin..

But, as you say, an unarmed and unarmored B-26 would have been of
"no value".

OTOH, the Brits found the Mosquito of some considerable value in a
variety of roles. As did the USAAF which acquired quite a number of
mosquitoes.

Cheers and all,

[Guy Alcala]

Peter Stickney wrote:

<snip>

> I just double checked, he numbers I gave are a bit muddied-up, too.
> I've two Pilot's Handbooks for the Mosquito, one for the FB.6
> (Fighter-Bomber) from 1950, and one for the various single-stage
> Merlin Night Fighters, published in 1945. The numbers I quoted were
> from the FB.6 handbook, and the NF.12 handbook is different. The NF.12
> book lists best cruise as 220 mph IAS, which is nudging 330 TAS at
> 25,000'. and 360 TAS at 30,000'. It's possible that the FB.6 numbers
> are for an airplane carrying external bombs and rockets, but it
> doesn't say.

This site should clear up some of the confusion (you need to scroll down quite a
ways):

http://www.home.gil.com.au/~bfillery/mossie02.htm

"Recommended" cruise is 220 IAS outbound, 210 IAS return, for both single and
two-stage a/c. The post-war limits (weight etc.) seem to have been dialed back
considerably from wartime.

Guy

[The Revolution Will Not Be Televised]

Thanks for the references, Geoffrey and Guy.

Gavin Bailey


--

"...this level of misinformation suggests some Americans may be
avoiding having an experience of cognitive dissonance."
- 'Poll shows errors in beliefs on Iraq, 9/11'
The Charlotte Observer, 20th June 2003

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: #1 Jet of World War II
>From: Bill Shatzer
>Date: 7/14/03 11:19 PM Pacific Daylight Time

>And, didn't LeMay end up stripping his B-29 of all their armament
>save the tail guns?
>
>Cheers and all,

But he sure didn't use them over Germany.

Arthur Kramer
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: #1 Jet of World War II
>From: (Gordon)
>Date: 7/14/03 9:39 PM Pacific Daylight Time
>Message-id: >
>
>>>>That is a very interesting number. I can't help but compare it to the B-26
>>>>which got its best range at 180 IAS
>>>
>>>I'd have to wonder, what was that "best range"? I was under the impression
>>>that the Mosquito could fly several times as far as the B-26 with a full
>>>4,000
>>>pound bombload.
>>>
>>>>Take off the armor, take off the
>>>>guns and top turret and cut the crew to two and the B-26 may well have
>>>>outperformed the Mosquito by a large margin..
>
><snip my own questions in reply to Art's>
>
>>The way the USAAC operated planes that were unarmored and unarmed were of no
>>value.
>
>Recce and Met Flights would be of at least some value, I'd hope. Same with
>those legends of supply a/c.
>
>> We flew into flak in broad daylight and depended on armor and guns
>>for
>>defence.
>
>A great strategy, too; no denying that the B-26 was exactly what the air
>corps
>needed in a medium bomber. The Mosquito did the same for the RAF, but used
>its
>speed in the same way you used your armor and guns. Price per unit was
>pretty
>good too.
>
>> And we carried 4,000 pounds of bombs every time.
>
>I previously asked, how far? If a B-26 was tasked to fly from central England
>to Berlin, what would its bomb load have been? I checked B26.com but
>haven't
>found what I am looking for, because I am really interested in how these two
>machines stack up.
>
>v/r
>Gordon
>


We had an 1100 mile range fully loaded. What it would have been stripped of
armor with the guns and turret removed and the crew of 6 stripped down to a
crew or 2, I don't know, but I can well imagine that its range and cruising
speed would have been dramaticaly increased. But I sure wouldn't wanted to have
flown one into German flak in broad daylight. I guess our air generals felt
the same way. When they compared the Mosquito to the Marauder, they went with
the Marauder, And for that I sincerely thank them all.

Arthur Kramer
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[Gordon]

> When they compared the Mosquito to the Marauder, they went with
>the Marauder, And for that I sincerely thank them all.

yep, it was definitely just what the air corps needed, for its style of attack.

v/r
Gordon

[Peter Stickney]

In article >,
"Geoffrey Sinclair" > writes:
> Peter Stickney wrote in message ...
>
>>I just double checked, he numbers I gave are a bit muddied-up, too.
>>I've two Pilot's Handbooks for the Mosquito, one for the FB.6
>>(Fighter-Bomber) from 1950, and one for the various single-stage
>>Merlin Night Fighters, published in 1945. The numbers I quoted were
>>from the FB.6 handbook, and the NF.12 handbook is different. The NF.12
>>book lists best cruise as 220 mph IAS, which is nudging 330 TAS at
>>25,000'. and 360 TAS at 30,000'. It's possible that the FB.6 numbers
>>are for an airplane carrying external bombs and rockets, but it
>>doesn't say.
>
> Sounds like the time to add the information from the book Mosquito
> by Sharpe and Bowyer.
>
> The FB6 used Merlin 21/22/23/25, the NF12 merlin 21/23.

True, but, in the case of long range cruise, irrelevant. The Merlin
XX/20 series were essentially identical in anything other than the
Combat Emergency (5 Minute) Ratings.
Merlin 21 & 23 were rated at 3000RPM/+14 in Low Blower, and
3000RPM/+14 in High Blower, corresponding to Horsepowers and altitudes
of 1460 HP at 6250' and 1435 HP at 11500', repectively. The Merlin 25
was rated for 3000RPM/+18 in both gears, giving 1640HP @ 2000', and
1550HP @ 9500'. Climb Power (2850 RPM/+9) and Continuous Power
(2650RPM/+7) ratings were the same for all angines. Well, with one
variation - Merlin 21s had a Max Lean Mixture power setting of 2650
RPM/+4, and the later engines had a Max Lean rating of 2650R/+7, due
to better carburation. In the case of cruise speeds, the particualr
engine mark is irrelevant. (And as far as the RAF was concerned, the
F.Mk II, NF. Mk XII/XIII, and NF Mk XVII were interchangable.

> Appendix 8, performance of the B35 (merlin 114) versus the FB6
> (merlin 25).
>
> B35, 22,000 pounds, bomb load 1,500 pounds including 2 x 500
> pounds bombs under the wings, 539 gallons of fuel, still air range
> 1,600 miles at 25,000 feet at 300 mph TAS, 1,250 miles at 37,000
> feet at 375 mph TAS. Top speed 425 mph at 30,500 feet.
>
> FB6 21,700 pounds, bomb load 1,500 pounds including 2 x 500
> pounds bombs under the wings, 453 gallons of fuel, still air range
> 1,120 miles at sea level at 250 mph TAS, 960 miles at sea level
> at 296 mph TAS. Top speed 378 mph at 13,200 feet.
>
> The Merlin 72/73 or 76/77 versions (VII, IX and XIV) outward
> recommended cruising speed 220 mph IAS, economic cruise
> in clean condition was 295 mph TAS at 20,000 feet and 350
> mph at 30,000+ feet, maximum continuous cruising, clean,
> 349 mph TAS at 20,000 feet, 378 mph TAS at 30,000 feet.
>
> For the merlin 21/22/23/31 equipped versions maximum
> continuous cruise was 341 mph TAS at 20,000 feet but this
> fell to 329 mph at 25,000 feet, I assume in clean condition.
> Again outward bound recommended cruise was 220 mph
> IAS at around 25,000 feet.
>
> The return flight recommendation was for around a 5% reduction
> in cruise speed compared with outbound, 210 mph IAS.

As I explained in my other post in this thread tonight, the
differnence in Cruise True Airspeeds is due to the higher critical
altitudes of the two-stage (60, 70, and 100 series) engines. The
Cruise IAS stays the same.

--
Pete Stickney
A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many
bad measures. -- Daniel Webster

[The Revolution Will Not Be Televised]

On Thu, 17 Jul 2003 00:04:08 -0400, (Peter
Stickney) wrote:

[snip]

>Actually, engine power doesn't affect the speed for best cruise (L/D
>Max) at all. Gavin, I don't know what you don't know, so bear with me
>- I'm not trying to be patronizing, but I/m looking for a good way to
>explain.

Thanks for the explanation: I freely admit to being a total ignoramus
when it comes to maths and engineering. However, I'm not sure we're
quite approaching the issue from the same angle. The instance I was
referring to was practically the same airframe between the Spitfire V
and IX (with some notable differences on the part of the IX, e.g.
marginally increased drag, increased weight, different propeller) with
a different engine, producing more power at precisely the same engine
settings and altitudes (rpm and boost) due to a different
supercharging regime *above the full throttle height of the engine*.
[Note hasty addition of qualifiers to mask the full extent of the
original ignorant assertions].

I appreciate that the airframe is a critical factor, but in the
instances I have in mind (the Spit V/IX and Mossie B.IV and IX) the
same airframes (or at least a close as it would be possible to get
with the two different engines - Merlin 20/45 variants vs. Merlin 60
variant - being used.

These latter aircraft, with almost identical airframes, had higher
speeds both at maximum and cruise, and I feel the only credible
explanation is the higher power being developed on the same engine
settings at the same (or similar) operational heights.

>Note that, as far as the speed to fly is concerned, engine ratings
>don't enter into it. Most reciprocating engines burn about the same
>amount of fuel per horsepower (all other things, like mixture being
>equal) no matter what.

Sure, but if you're flying at the same engine settings in a Spitfire V
and a Spitfire IX at the same altitude (above FTH for the M46), the IX
will go faster, even when the FS supercharger is almost identical
(Merlin 46 vs Merlin 61). The cruising regime was governed by engine
rpm and supercharger boost, and different engines produced different
outputs at different heights at the expense of differing fuel
consumption. In this case, I know this would be down to differences
in the height at which higher boost pressures could be maintained.

>So the idea is to fly a particular Indicated
>Airspeed that gives you the least drag.

Interesting. My (ignorant) assumptions were that the fundamental
basic factor was engine fuel consumption, with the airframe governing
exactly how fast the associated power output happened to take the
airframe concerned. For example, the Hurricane I and Spitfire I
attained different speeds with precisely the same engine, purely down
to airframe differences and weight. My point was that sticking a more
powerful engine in the same airframe increased speed all-round,
including cruising speed (albeit within the specific envelope where
the engine concerned actually *did* produce more power: in this case,
in the right altitude band). I appreciate the point you make in
another followup about IAS vs TAS, but I was originally after the TAS
cruising speed of the Mossie on operations. I should have been
specific about the height, but I assumed this would follow from the
operational profile of the relevant LNSF operations.

> In the Mosquito B.35's case, Full Throttle Height for the
>minumum fuel consumption power setting is 25,000'. For the Max
>Continuous power setting, which is at a higher RPM setting than
>minimum consumption, (and so therefore the supercharger compressors
>can compress more,) it's at 37,000'. What it comes down to is a
>long-winded way of saying that the higher range cruise speed of
>2-stage supercharged Spitfires and Mosquitos over their lesser-lunged
>brethren is due to the higher altiitudes that the engines can develop
>the required power at, not that the engines develop more power.

I agree for the Mosquitos (not that my agreement is required for your
post to be entirely correct), but the Spit V/IX example is complicated
by the MS gear the Merlin 60's had. For my purposes, I was interested
at the cruising speed at operational height, which for most comparable
Mosquitos (e.g. those in the LNSF which fielded B.IVs and then B.IX
and XVIs on the same kind of operations) cruised above the FTH of the
Merlin 20's (so above the barometric governor), where attainable boost
level was falling away. I don't think the cruising speed of the
FB.VIs or NF. versions would be wildly different, bar the differences
in drag, due to the generally lower operating heights.

To return to my original assumption, I'm not bothered that the
increasing power *at altitude* was entirely due to the two-stage
supercharging above the level attainable from the single-stage
supercharger. What counted to me was the increased power output at
the same height (regardless of the source), and the assumptive link
between that and the higher cruising speed apparently attainable as a
consequence.

Another factor I just thought of would be the power being soaked up by
a second mechanical supercharger at lower heights, which would affect
the relative efficiency (well, it would do that at all heights, but I
presume the inefficiency concerned would be maximised at lower
atltitudes where the full supercharging wasn't required to reach the
maximum pressure permitted for full power. Another assumption...).

Where I think your information really comes into play for me is the
effect of supercharging below the FTH of the engine: for example, the
factors involved in the performance of the lower-altitude supercharger
peaks in the Merlin 66 (against the 61/63/64 variants). I presume
that the 66 simply passes the barometric limitations earlier in the
climb, allowing higher supercharging levels to be used sooner: but
based on what you've said, I assume this is only going to be relevant
for the highest output settings (cruising settings not involving high
rpm & high boost) where high levels of boost (e.g. +7 psi to +12 psi
or more) were attainable. Thus I'm not sure what advantage (if any)
the Merlin 66/266 variants actually had a lower altitude at engine
settings below the rich-mixture/high revs profiles. Based on what
you've been saying, I'd have to guess none: i.e. a Spit LF IX would
cruise at the same TAS as a Spit IX, although the IX would be able to
sustain +4 psi to a higher height for maximum continuous cruise. This
assumes that the 66 and 61 variants shared the same maximum boost
level, e.g. +15 psi.

Not to mention the deviation in FTH between different individual
engines of the same type... But I digress too far: neither that nor
the engine settings for maximum continuous climb were relevant to my
original post and your response.

>Oh, yeah, one other thing that may seem counterintuitive. For a given
>shape, (CdF, e, and AR being the same), the nest cruise speed for a
>havier airplane will be faster than that for a lighter one. That's
>becase more Lift needs to be generated, so Induced Drag is higher. It
>still falls off quickly, which is why weight doesn't affect top speed
>very much, but the point where the Profile Drag increse exceed teh
>Induced Drag decrease is shifted a bit to the high-speed side of the
>curve. That's why the "Out" speed for a laden airplane is 10 mph
>higher than the return speed for one that's released its load, and
>burned half its fuel.

That's interesting, and it does seem to contradict what little I know
abut the subject - I recall from log entries that Lancasters returning
from raids with Bomber Command cruised slightly faster than they did
on the way out on the same engine settings, although I suspect this
had something to do with the height operating band: they were
stuggling to make operating height on full load when this was over
20,000 feet.

On the other hand, I have seen log entries which give route timings
which can only be explained by atypically strong tail-winds, or more
likely the crew either cutting corners en route or increasing the revs
to get home quicker with a little polite fiction in the records for
when the squadron navigator leader became suspicious about their
marginally early returns. So I need to factor in the original context
before making some more characteristic sweeping assertions.

Thanks for the informative response meanwhile.

Gavin Bailey
--

"...this level of misinformation suggests some Americans may be
avoiding having an experience of cognitive dissonance."
- 'Poll shows errors in beliefs on Iraq, 9/11'
The Charlotte Observer, 20th June 2003

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: #1 Jet of World War II
>From: John Halliwell
>Date: 7/17/03 3:50 PM Pacific Daylight Time

>All it needed was enough speed to hold a single seat
>fighter at bay long enough for the latter to run out of fuel (having
>already had to climb to altitude at full throttle). In this case, short
>bursts of extra speed were significant.
>

Especially if there was a cloud nearby.

Arthur Kramer
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[Gordon]

>
>Hienze Knocke (sp?), however, demonstrated by his successful low-altitude
>interception of a Mossie, that if the Mossie used stereotyped tactics once
>too often, an experienced Luftwaffe pilot could, with the proper tactics and
>positioning, exploit that lapse even while flying a standard, unmodified
>aircraft.

....although I can't find a missing Mosquito for the claim made by Knoke, I
think its likely to some day be found that he either got the date wrong (as he
certainly did in other places of his book) or the Mosquito he claimed equates
to some other a/c type, or finally, it WAS a Mosquito, but from an
unconventional source (since it doesn't turn up as a loss from a normal
squadron).

> Wise mossie pilots varied their flight profiles on a regular
>basis.

Same is true of F-117 pilots. :)

>I've read that the only German interceptor which reliably had a decent
>chance at intercepting the Mossie was the Me-262, which had the speed
>capability from level flight to run down a Mossie from behind.

I call that "Chapter 6". :) Two years ago, I was honored to host the first
postwar reunion for Kdo Welter, so I will have to agree with your view,
coincidentally shared by Galland and several others, like Speer and that
rat-fink Goebbels.

>The Swallow's
>good climb rate to altitude and even higher cruising speed made an
>interception of a Mossie a less problematical affair, with the proviso that
>an alert mossie crew could generally easily maneuver inside the Me's turning
>circle long enough to locate cloud cover or to cause the Me to have to rtb
>in consideration of fuel usage.

It was even more of a challenge under the stars.

v/r
Gordon
Stormbirds.com/recon
<====(A+C====>
USN SAR Aircrew

"Got anything on your radar, SENSO?"
"Nothing but my forehead, sir."

[Gordon]

>If I were a Luftwaffe Sector Controller, or the Sector Commander, my
>nightmare would be a squadron or more of Mosquitos flying through my
>sector spaced about 1 minute apart. Using hand plotting and voice
>comms, my command an dcontrol system would be well & truly saturated.

Peter, for 36 nights in a row (Feb-Mar 45), the RAF sent forces of 20-120
Mosquito bombers to hit Berlin in a morale-crushing exhibition of the tactics
you present. As you predicted, the Grossgefechtstand at Doberitz was well and
truly saturated, managing only a handfull of successful interceptions
throughout this period. Perhaps the most successful was the March 27th
interception of Pathfinder Andre van Amsterdam and his nav, Harry Forbes by a
Kdo Welter Me 262 pilot - the B. XVI was destroyed directly over the command
station, with wreckage landing on the site. Even then, the Battle Opera Hourse
and the dedicated anti-Mosquito ILO could only give the interceptor jet pilot
vague directions until the Mossie blundered into his path. Mosquito
interceptions were absolutely the most frustrating propositions for the NJG
corps.

v/r
Gordon

[Corey C. Jordan]

On Thu, 17 Jul 2003 23:50:38 +0100, John Halliwell >
wrote:

>In article >, Peter Stickney
> writes
>>And just what is Max Speed for a bomber, anyway? 5 Minutes of War
>>Emergency Power doesn't make too much sense, or even 15 minutes at
>>Military Power. You can get some amazing numbers that way, that will
>>never show up in real life.
>
>The Mossie used speed as a defence, and I believe it could accelerate
>very quickly. All it needed was enough speed to hold a single seat
>fighter at bay long enough for the latter to run out of fuel (having
>already had to climb to altitude at full throttle). In this case, short
>bursts of extra speed were significant.
>
>--
>John

Inasmuch as acceleration correlates closely with climb, I don't think
that the Mossie could out-accelerate any single engine Luftwaffe fighter
of the time.

Consider that the Bf-109G-10 could maintain a climb rate of nearly double that
of a Mosquito, you can be absolutely certain that the Mosquito would get chased
down very quickly should one bleed off its speed. Mossies needed to stay high
and fly at fast cruise speeds to avoid interception. Getting the Mosquito slow
was to get it dead.

As it was, most models were not especially fast when compared to the day
fighters of the time.

To veer off topic a bit....

I still shake my head in amazement when I hear the advocates of the Mossie as
a strategic bomber blubber on about how the Mosquito could have replaced
the American heavy bombers because they were fast enough to avoid
interception. Utter rubbish.

They seem to forget that it would take huge formations of Mosquitos to put
enough bombs on a target to match that delivered by the heavies. individual
Mossies could evade detection, evan small groups could be hard to locate.
But, hundreds of them would be easy to detect early in their flight. That meant
the Luftwaffe would be waiting high above them in strength. Without any
defensive or offensive guns whatsoever, the Mosquitos would be scattered and
very much chewed to pieces.

My regards,

Widewing (C.C. Jordan)
http://www.worldwar2aviation.com
http://www.netaces.org
http://www.hitechcreations.com

[Sunny]

"Corey C. Jordan" > wrote in message
<snip>
> They seem to forget that it would take huge formations of Mosquitos to put
> enough bombs on a target to match that delivered by the heavies.
individual
> Mossies could evade detection, evan small groups could be hard to locate.
> But, hundreds of them would be easy to detect early in their flight. That
meant
> the Luftwaffe would be waiting high above them in strength. Without any
> defensive or offensive guns whatsoever, the Mosquitos would be scattered
and
> very much chewed to pieces.

Just as an aside, the Mossie could actually carry a bigger bomb load than
the B17. :-)

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: #1 Jet of World War II
>From: (Corey C. Jordan)
>Date: 7/18/03 5:55 PM Pacific Daylight Time
>Message-id: >
>

> still shake my head in amazement when I hear the advocates of the Mossie as
>a strategic bomber blubber on about how the Mosquito could have replaced
>the American heavy bombers because they were fast enough to avoid
>interception. Utter rubbish.

>hey seem to forget that it would take huge formations of Mosquitos to put
>enough bombs on a target to match that delivered by the heavies. individual
>Mossies could evade detection, evan small groups could be hard to locate.
>But, hundreds of them would be easy to detect early in their flight. That
>meant
>the Luftwaffe would be waiting high above them in strength. Without any
>defensive or offensive guns whatsoever, the Mosquitos would be scattered and
>very much chewed to pieces.
>
Let's do some numbers. The B--17 carried a 5,000 lb. bomb load on most of its
mssions. The B-26 carried a 4,000 bomb load on most of its mssions.

But a max effort of B-17's was about 22 planes. A max effort of B-26's was 56
planes. The B-17's would drop 110,000 lbs on the target, the B-26's would dump
224,000 lbs on the target and did so it from a much lower altitude and with
far greater accuracy. Now you figure what plane can replace the B-17 best. And
it sure as hell wasn't the Mosquito.

Arthur Kramer
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: #1 Jet of World War II
>From: "Sunny"
>Date: 7/18/03 6:52 PM Pacific Daylight Time
>Message-id: >
>
>
>"Corey C. Jordan" > wrote in message
><snip>
>> They seem to forget that it would take huge formations of Mosquitos to put
>> enough bombs on a target to match that delivered by the heavies.
>individual
>> Mossies could evade detection, evan small groups could be hard to locate.
>> But, hundreds of them would be easy to detect early in their flight. That
>meant
>> the Luftwaffe would be waiting high above them in strength. Without any
>> defensive or offensive guns whatsoever, the Mosquitos would be scattered
>and
>> very much chewed to pieces.
>
>Just as an aside, the Mossie could actually carry a bigger bomb load than
>the B17. :-)
>
>


But not very far and not very fast.

Arthur Kramer
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[John Halliwell]

In article >, Corey C. Jordan
> writes
>Inasmuch as acceleration correlates closely with climb, I don't think
>that the Mossie could out-accelerate any single engine Luftwaffe fighter
>of the time.

It doesn't have to be able to out accelerate the fighter, just
accelerate enough to reduce the closing speed for long enough. Somewhere
(not here) I have a copy of the RAF test report on the 'fighting'
abilities of the Mossie, it mentioned good acceleration, have to dig it
out.

>As it was, most models were not especially fast when compared to the day
>fighters of the time.

Reports I've read suggested that Mossies from the first raids flew home
followed by numerous FW190s, none of which managed to close enough to
get a shot in.

--
John

[Steve Hix]

In article >,
"Sunny" > wrote:

> "Corey C. Jordan" > wrote in message
> <snip>
> > They seem to forget that it would take huge formations of Mosquitos to put
> > enough bombs on a target to match that delivered by the heavies.
> individual
> > Mossies could evade detection, evan small groups could be hard to locate.
> > But, hundreds of them would be easy to detect early in their flight. That
> meant
> > the Luftwaffe would be waiting high above them in strength. Without any
> > defensive or offensive guns whatsoever, the Mosquitos would be scattered
> and
> > very much chewed to pieces.
>
> Just as an aside, the Mossie could actually carry a bigger bomb load than
> the B17. :-)

But how far?

[Corey C. Jordan]

On Sat, 19 Jul 2003 01:52:50 GMT, "Sunny" > wrote:

>Just as an aside, the Mossie could actually carry a bigger bomb load than
>the B17. :-)
>
>

Indeed, it certainly could over the longer ranges required to reach Germany.
However, for missions into eastern France, the B-17 could and was rigged
with under-wing racks and would drag as much as 12,000 lbs to the target.

Oh yeah, the B-24 was actually the more numerous of the two and it had
a considerably greater load capability (B-17s were limited by the size of the
bomb bay, a throwback to the middle 1930s when loads of 2,000 lbs
were considered adequate).

B-17s would haul five 1,000 lbs bombs or eight 500 lb bombs on a typical
mission over Germany. As an interesting comparison, Charles Lindbergh
demonstrated to the Marines that they could lift three and even four 1,000 lb
bombs with their F4U-1As.

My regards,

Widewing
Widewing (C.C. Jordan)
http://www.worldwar2aviation.com
http://www.netaces.org
http://www.hitechcreations.com

[Gordon]

>
>>As it was, most models were not especially fast when compared to the day
>>fighters of the time.

Still, they were the fastest bombers of the day, and the speed they possessed
was more than adequate to outstrip all but their most determined pursuers.

>Reports I've read suggested that Mossies from the first raids flew home
>followed by numerous FW190s, none of which managed to close enough to
>get a shot in.

That's true. I also have a few anecdotes from LW pilots and upper echelon
types that make it clear that the Mosquito was practically untouchable. No
other aircraft in the Allied arsenal caused nearly as much consternation among
the Nazi leadership - a quick scan through Goebbels' diaries shows that he
mentions Mosquitos by name in every single daily entry for the last two months
of his life. No other type of a/c is even mentioned by name, not even once.
Mosquitos. Verdammt Mosquitos. Even a success over a single Mosquito was
worthy of mention. "Moskitoschriek" (Mosquito Panic) was actually a term
among German nightfighter men that was used during the last months of the war
to describe the physical condition caused by extended periods of sleep
deprivation and knawing dread due to too many nights on operations, facing
their nemesis, the RAF intruder and nightfighter Mosquitos. I have plenty of
examples of this phrase being used, by NJG airmen as well as Galland, Göring,
and Willi Messerschmitt. My evaluation of the Mosquito matches Galland's and
Göring's opinion - that the Mosquito was the only air threat that conventional
forces were simply never able to overcome.

v/r
Gordon
<====(A+C====>
USN SAR Aircrew

"Got anything on your radar, SENSO?"
"Nothing but my forehead, sir."

[Gordon]

>
>Consider that the Bf-109G-10 could maintain a climb rate of nearly double
>that
>of a Mosquito, you can be absolutely certain that the Mosquito would get
>chased
>down very quickly should one bleed off its speed.

>True of any bomber, then or now.
>Mossies needed to stay high
>and fly at fast cruise speeds to avoid interception.

418 Squadron, among several others making life hell for the German
nightfighters, proved that they could operate nearly untouched over the
continent, and usually at very low altitude.

>Getting the Mosquito slow
>was to get it dead.

Again, true.

>I still shake my head in amazement when I hear the advocates of the Mossie as
>a strategic bomber blubber on about how the Mosquito could have replaced
>the American heavy bombers because they were fast enough to avoid
>interception. Utter rubbish.

I doubt that anyone could carry that argument very far, regardless of how much
the Mosquito fans would like. Hell, I love the a/c, but it was never capable
of area bombing. In that regard, it was clearly incapable of replacing the
B-17, Lancs or any other type of "viermot" (generic term "four motor" used to
describe heavy bombers).


>They seem to forget that it would take huge formations of Mosquitos to put
>enough bombs on a target to match that delivered by the heavies.

But, unlike the heavies, the Mosquito could and did flatten pin-point strategic
targets with apparent ease, without sacrificing the entire neighborhood.

>individual
>Mossies could evade detection, evan small groups could be hard to locate.
>But, hundreds of them would be easy to detect early in their flight.

That is a GOOD thing, in fact the RAF depended on it. When spoof raids reached
their final incarnation, they featured window-dropping Mosquitos, "Grand Tour"
Mosquitos, Pathfinders, etc., including dedicated nightfighters - in short,
they represented a threat that the Germans had no choice but to react. The
result? German nightfighters responding to the "Mosquito raids" often found
themselves facing few if any bombers, and too many Mossie nightfighters for
them to handle.

As for early detection of Mosquitos, remember the time frame - by 1944,
jamming, intrusion and interference of several types were making it nearly
impossible for the GAF to paint an accurate picture of raids assembling over
England - the main reason they could react to heavy bombers was their bloody
slow speed in getting it together and transiting to their target. Mosquitos
didn't require a tight defensive formation and could have easily swamped German
defenses by doing it all 'their way' - go over at "Mosquito height" (>30K) and
approach the target from several directions.

>That meant
>the Luftwaffe would be waiting high above them in strength.

That was tried, with limited success. 10./JG 300 among several other units
tasked with exactly this duty. They had greater success than more normal
squadrons, but it was little more than a drop in the bucket.

>Without any
>defensive or offensive guns whatsoever, the Mosquitos would be scattered and
>very much chewed to pieces.

Why wouldn't this force operate at night and in company with FB or NF
Mosquitos? The only time a force of Mosquitos was hit hard enough to justify
this assertion was during Operation Clarion, when essentially every strong
point of this aircraft was ignored and it was sent over the continent in
droves, in daylight, against fully alerted defenses - along with over 7,000
other Allied a/c. Not surprisingly, their loss rate for that date was quite
costly - on the order of 1/5th of the other Allied participants.

v/r
Gordon
<====(A+C====>
USN SAR Aircrew

"Got anything on your radar, SENSO?"
"Nothing but my forehead, sir."

[Gordon]

>
> Let's do some numbers. The B--17 carried a 5,000 lb. bomb load on most of
>its
>mssions. The B-26 carried a 4,000 bomb load on most of its mssions.

So did most of the Mosquitos striking Berlin in late 44-45. They called it a
"cookie" - the Germans called it a "vaccuum bomb", due to the concussion
effects.>
>But a max effort of B-17's was about 22 planes. A max effort of B-26's was 56
>planes. The B-17's would drop 110,000 lbs on the target, the B-26's would
>dump
> 224,000 lbs on the target and did so it from a much lower altitude and with
>far greater accuracy. Now you figure what plane can replace the B-17 best.
>And
>it sure as hell wasn't the Mosquito.

Art, no offense, but the B-26 could not strike Berlin with a 4,000 # bombload,
from any altitude, from England. The Mosquito and B-17 both could. At the
lower altitude that made the B-26 so accurate, it would have been slaughtered
by the flak and fighters over Berlin. The fact that the B-26 was used on
relatively short range missions, usually in areas where the US held near-total
air supremacy, speaks volumes. The Mosquito and B-17 went hundreds of miles
into the heart of the Nazi defenses at a time when no one in their right mind
would think of sending a force of Marauders after the same target.

I think this is getting silly - all three of these aircraft, and dozens of
other types, cooperated to help overwhelm the LW. There is no need to belittle
one excellent aircraft to bolster the reputation of another excellent aircraft!

v/r
Gordon

[Greg Hennessy]

On 19 Jul 2003 05:29:09 GMT, (Gordon) wrote:

>that the Mosquito was the only air threat that conventional
>forces were simply never able to overcome.

One wonders about the potential of the Douglas Mixmaster for the very same
reasons.


greg

--
$ReplyAddress =~ s#\@.*$##; # Delete everything after the '@'
Alley Gator. With those hypnotic big green eyes
Alley Gator. She'll make you 'fraid 'em
She'll chew you up, ain't no lie

[Keith Willshaw]

"Sunny" > wrote in message
...
>
> "Corey C. Jordan" > wrote in message
> <snip>
> > They seem to forget that it would take huge formations of Mosquitos to
put
> > enough bombs on a target to match that delivered by the heavies.
> individual
> > Mossies could evade detection, evan small groups could be hard to
locate.
> > But, hundreds of them would be easy to detect early in their flight.
That
> meant
> > the Luftwaffe would be waiting high above them in strength. Without any
> > defensive or offensive guns whatsoever, the Mosquitos would be scattered
> and
> > very much chewed to pieces.
>
> Just as an aside, the Mossie could actually carry a bigger bomb load than
> the B17. :-)
>

No it couldnt

a late model Mosquito with a bulged bay could carry a 4000 lb bomb load,
most Mosquito's carried 2000 lb bomb loads

The max load a B-17G could carry was 9,600 lbs with a more
normal load being 6000 lbs

Keith

[hlg]

"Keith Willshaw" > wrote in message
...
>
<snip>

> >
> > Just as an aside, the Mossie could actually carry a bigger bomb load
than
> > the B17. :-)
> >
>
> No it couldnt
>
> a late model Mosquito with a bulged bay could carry a 4000 lb bomb load,
> most Mosquito's carried 2000 lb bomb loads


Quite right.

The Mosquito was originally designed to carry 1000 lb (2 x 500 lb). It was
quickly found that by cropping the vanes of the 500 lb bomb, they could fit
four of these into the Mosquito's bomb bay, so this was the standard load of
the B. Mk IV. (Some development models could also carry a 500 lb bomb under
each wing, but these did not see service with the RAF.)

The B Mk IX and B Mk XVI were converted from 1943 onwards with the bulged
bomb bay doors which allowed them to carry one 4000 lb "Cookie" (basically a
big explosive-filled drum, with no vanes or fins).

The FB Mk VI could carry two of the cropped 500 lb bombs, as the forward
part of the bomb bay was taken up with the 20 mm cannon breeches and
ammunition feeds. They could also carry 4 rockets or one 500 lb bomb under
each wing. However, since the FB versions had no bomb aimer, they could bomb
only at low level. Rocket or cannons were the preferred weapons.

>
> The max load a B-17G could carry was 9,600 lbs with a more
> normal load being 6000 lbs
>
> Keith
>
>

[Gordon]

>.The fact that the B-26 was used on
>>relatively short range missions, usually in areas where the US held
>>near-total
>>air supremacy, speaks volumes.
>
>Bull****!

Which part of that did you find disagreeable?

>> The Mosquito and B-17 went hundreds of miles
>>into the heart of the Nazi defenses at a time when no one in their right
>mind
>>would think of sending a force of Marauders after the same target.
>

No comment at all on that. Well, I guess that is the same as agreement, since
what I said was true.

>>I think this is getting silly - all three of these aircraft, and dozens of
>>other types, cooperated to help overwhelm the LW.
>
>This is a discussion group. And comparing aircraft is what this thread is all
>about. In fact it is what most posts here are all about. Get used to it.

After six years posting here, I am 'used to it'. What is difficult to get used
to is your opinion that yours is the only view that can possibly be correct or
valid, so you have to take out your aggression on whoever disagrees, however
politely they do so. I guess there is no point in trying to explain it, but
what occurs is that folks are less and less willing to even discuss things with
you. Just sad, because I for one would enjoy a meaningful dialogue with
someone of your experience without being insulted every time we don't agree
with you.

> There is no need to
>>belittle
>>one excellent aircraft to bolster the reputation of another excellent
>>aircraft!
>
>That is just what you have done in your post above.

Its precisely what you have been doing for as long as I've been here. I was
replying point by point to your comments, ALL belittling the Mosquito and any
other type that doesn't fit in your log book.

The B-26 remains my favorite US bomber of the war. It was a great aircraft,
with limitations that were well understood. So was the Mosquito.

I need to pay attention to the way you deal with folks because in the future,
I'll be in the same situation - people will be asking for my opinion about
things in the aviation side of the cold war, and I have to weigh my personal
experiences against the information I was not privy to at the time. On top of
that, I will have to weigh my biases carefully, in order to provide the next
generation of 'wannabees' and 'you weren't theres' with a source of information
that doesn't demean someone simply for not sharing my particular life
experience.

v/r
Gordon

[Gordon]

>
>>that the Mosquito was the only air threat that conventional
>>forces were simply never able to overcome.
>
>One wonders about the potential of the Douglas Mixmaster for the very same
>reasons.

Well, that one does prove that the jerries didn't have the market cornered on
aerial oddities!

v/r
Gordon

[Gordon]

I apologize, Art. That was not intended as a posting and my intent was to
email that to you directly.

Gordon

[Greg Hennessy]

On 19 Jul 2003 17:54:40 GMT, (Gordon) wrote:

>>
>>>that the Mosquito was the only air threat that conventional
>>>forces were simply never able to overcome.
>>
>>One wonders about the potential of the Douglas Mixmaster for the very same
>>reasons.
>
>Well, that one does prove that the jerries didn't have the market cornered on
>aerial oddities!

Interesting design, one wonders how that large contra set @ the tail would
have handled flak damage though.


greg

--
$ReplyAddress =~ s#\@.*$##; # Delete everything after the '@'
Alley Gator. With those hypnotic big green eyes
Alley Gator. She'll make you 'fraid 'em
She'll chew you up, ain't no lie

[Guy Alcala]

Mike Dargan wrote:

>
>
> Keith Willshaw wrote:
>
>> "Sunny" > wrote in message
>> ...
>>
>> > "Corey C. Jordan"
>> > > wrote in
>> > message
>> >
>> > <snip>
>> >
>> > Just as an aside, the Mossie could actually carry a
>> > bigger bomb load than
>> > the B17. :-)
>> >
>> >
>> > No it couldnt
>> >
>> > a late model Mosquito with a bulged bay could carry a
>> > 4000 lb bomb load,
>> > most Mosquito's carried 2000 lb bomb loads
>> >
>> > The max load a B-17G could carry was 9,600 lbs with a
>> > more
>> > normal load being 6000 lbs
>> >
> Wasn't the maximum, I presume with limited fuel, crew, and
> weapons, 17,600 lbs?

Well, theoretically it could carry 20,800 lb., and
supposedly did so on a few missions (Caidin makes that claim
in "Flying Forts," but I've never seen a more reputable
source back that up). The total you mention equates to 6 x
1,600 lb. AP bombs internally, plus a pair of 4,000 GP bombs
externally, carried one per wing root rack. I very much
doubt such a load was ever carried operationally -- on the
few occasions where a pair of 4,000 lb. GP bombs were
carried (or the 4,500 lb. AP Disney Rocket bombs), that was
the entire load and it was to fairly short range targets.

The reason it could carry 6 (actually, eight) x 1,600 lb.
bombs internally was because they were AP, and thus much
slimmer than an equivalent weight GP or MC bomb. It could
(probably; there's some dispute about whether the racks were
later modified) only carry a pair of 2,000 lb GP bombs
internally, due to rack and space limits. More typical
loads for German targets would be up to twelve 500 lb. GP or
up to six 1,000 lb. GP internally, or a bunch of
incendiaries, plus one or two smoke marker bombs if lead or
deputy lead of a squadron/group/wing. Early on in the ETO
they were still using the older 300/600/1,100 lb. M30 series
bombs, but they quickly used those up (although IIRR, ETO
B-26s were still using the 300 lbers into the third quarter
of 1943. Anyone with Roger Freemans' "Mighty Eighth War
Diary" can confirm the date of last use) and they used the
more modern 250/500/1,000 lb M40 series after that. For
most longer range missions to heavily defended industrial
targets a B-17 would normally carry a bombload of 4-5,000
lb. Early 8th AF ops to French targets might carry eight
600 lbers. And of course, when attacking airfields or
similar targets, they'd carry a bunch of lighter frag bombs.

Guy

P.S. Text only, please.

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Guy Alcala wrote in message >...
>Mike Dargan wrote:


On B-17s,

>> Wasn't the maximum, I presume with limited fuel, crew, and
>> weapons, 17,600 lbs?
>
>Well, theoretically it could carry 20,800 lb., and
>supposedly did so on a few missions (Caidin makes that claim
>in "Flying Forts," but I've never seen a more reputable
>source back that up). The total you mention equates to 6 x
>1,600 lb. AP bombs internally, plus a pair of 4,000 GP bombs
>externally, carried one per wing root rack. I very much
>doubt such a load was ever carried operationally -- on the
>few occasions where a pair of 4,000 lb. GP bombs were
>carried (or the 4,500 lb. AP Disney Rocket bombs), that was
>the entire load and it was to fairly short range targets.
>
>The reason it could carry 6 (actually, eight) x 1,600 lb.
>bombs internally was because they were AP, and thus much
>slimmer than an equivalent weight GP or MC bomb. It could
>(probably; there's some dispute about whether the racks were
>later modified) only carry a pair of 2,000 lb GP bombs
>internally, due to rack and space limits. More typical
>loads for German targets would be up to twelve 500 lb. GP or
>up to six 1,000 lb. GP internally, or a bunch of
>incendiaries, plus one or two smoke marker bombs if lead or
>deputy lead of a squadron/group/wing. Early on in the ETO
>they were still using the older 300/600/1,100 lb. M30 series
>bombs, but they quickly used those up (although IIRR, ETO
>B-26s were still using the 300 lbers into the third quarter
>of 1943. Anyone with Roger Freemans' "Mighty Eighth War
>Diary" can confirm the date of last use) and they used the
>more modern 250/500/1,000 lb M40 series after that.

Freeman notes the old style bombs were largely used by
September 1942 and were replaced by the Army Navy
AN series, the M30 100 pounds, M31 300 pounds, M43
500 pounds, M44 1,000 pounds, M34 2,000 pounds.
In late 1943 came the M57 250 pounds, M64 500 pounds,
M65 1,000 pounds and M66 2,000 pounds.

There were a small number of M56 4,000 pound bombs
but "there is no record of M56s being delivered on combat
missions" by the 8th Air Force.

In the war diary Freeman usually gives the types of bombs
dropped until the end of 1943, a quick skim indicates the
heavies last used them on 9 September 1943, the mediums
on 9 October 1943, assuming usage stopped in 1943.

The USAAF statistical digest contradicts the Freeman
figures, table 138, bombs dropped by type of bomb
1943 to 1945 in the war against Germany says the USAAF
did not use the 300 pound bomb in Europe from 1 January
1943 onward and only 712 600 pound bombs, all in 1943.
If the digest is correct the USAAF dropped more Soviet 550
pound bombs, 1,645 in 1944.

Of the 6,284,271 HE bombs recorded as being used 156
were 4,500 pounds, 48,575 were 2,000 pounds.

There were 1,122 Armour Piercing 1,600 pound bombs
used, all in 1944.

In table 139, bombs dropped by type versus Japan HE
bombs include 1,220 4,000 pound, all in 1945, 750 300
pound, 688 in 1945 (yes 5), 188,198 550 pound, yes 550.

Of the 1,677,749 bombs recorded as being used 581,977
were 100 pounds.

No 1,600 pound bombs used against Japan, but 31 2,000
pound torpedoes were used in 1945.

Back to Freeman, gives an example for the B-17F and G bomb
load as 6 1,600 pound bombs internally and 2 4,000 pound
bombs externally,. Freeman's bomb bay diagram indicates
8 1,600 pound bombs could be stowed, which presumably
means someone somewhere took off with 20,800 pounds
of bombs, and probably little else, hence the confusion over
maximum bombloads. His reproductions of Boeing diagrams
show indicate there were 42 bomb shackles in 4 racks inside
the bomb bay. Shackles10 and 31 were able to carry 2,000
pound bombs, 8, 11,16, 20, 29, 32, 37, 41 for 1,600 pound
bombs. See the B-17 Flying Fortress Story, Freeman and
David Osborne.

B-17 recommended cruise in the 8th air force 150 to 160
mph IAS, the B-24 was 170 to 175 mph IAS.

The late model Mosquitoes could carry up to 5,000 pounds of
bombs. In theory they could carry this to Berlin from England,
at most economical cruise and with minimal fuel reserves.
Hence the use of the wing stations for fuel tanks. The weight
with 4,000 bomb load and 2 50 gallon underwing fuel tanks
came out at 24,152 pounds, and some versions with H2S
fitted look like they topped out at 25,501 pounds. For the
mark XVI the LNSF recommendation was maximum take
off weight 25,200 pounds on a 1,600 yard runway.

> For
>most longer range missions to heavily defended industrial
>targets a B-17 would normally carry a bombload of 4-5,000
>lb. Early 8th AF ops to French targets might carry eight
>600 lbers. And of course, when attacking airfields or
>similar targets, they'd carry a bunch of lighter frag bombs.

Using the USAAF statistical digest, the heavy bombers
in the European theatre of operations dropped 714,719 tons
of bombs in the course of 274,921 effective sorties., or 2.6
tons per sortie, 5,200 pounds average bomb load. Also
according to the digest 1,520,209 out of the 6,284,291
bombs the USAAF dropped from 1943 in the war against
Germany were 100 pounders. In addition to the HE bombs
some 756,304 120 pound fragmentation clusters were used,
as well as incendiaries, individual fragmentation bombs and
so on.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

[Guy Alcala]

Geoffrey Sinclair wrote:

> Guy Alcala wrote in message >...
> >Mike Dargan wrote:
>
> On B-17s,
>
> >> Wasn't the maximum, I presume with limited fuel, crew, and
> >> weapons, 17,600 lbs?
> >
> >Well, theoretically it could carry 20,800 lb., and
> >supposedly did so on a few missions (Caidin makes that claim
> >in "Flying Forts," but I've never seen a more reputable
> >source back that up). The total you mention equates to 6 x
> >1,600 lb. AP bombs internally, plus a pair of 4,000 GP bombs
> >externally, carried one per wing root rack. I very much
> >doubt such a load was ever carried operationally -- on the
> >few occasions where a pair of 4,000 lb. GP bombs were
> >carried (or the 4,500 lb. AP Disney Rocket bombs), that was
> >the entire load and it was to fairly short range targets.
> >
> >The reason it could carry 6 (actually, eight) x 1,600 lb.
> >bombs internally was because they were AP, and thus much
> >slimmer than an equivalent weight GP or MC bomb. It could
> >(probably; there's some dispute about whether the racks were
> >later modified) only carry a pair of 2,000 lb GP bombs
> >internally, due to rack and space limits. More typical
> >loads for German targets would be up to twelve 500 lb. GP or
> >up to six 1,000 lb. GP internally, or a bunch of
> >incendiaries, plus one or two smoke marker bombs if lead or
> >deputy lead of a squadron/group/wing. Early on in the ETO
> >they were still using the older 300/600/1,100 lb. M30 series
> >bombs, but they quickly used those up (although IIRR, ETO
> >B-26s were still using the 300 lbers into the third quarter
> >of 1943. Anyone with Roger Freemans' "Mighty Eighth War
> >Diary" can confirm the date of last use) and they used the
> >more modern 250/500/1,000 lb M40 series after that.
>
> Freeman notes the old style bombs were largely used by
> September 1942 and were replaced by the Army Navy
> AN series, the M30 100 pounds, M31 300 pounds, M43
> 500 pounds, M44 1,000 pounds, M34 2,000 pounds.
> In late 1943 came the M57 250 pounds, M64 500 pounds,
> M65 1,000 pounds and M66 2,000 pounds.

Thanks for the details. The M60 series, according to Friedman ("U.S. Naval
Weapons"), were essentially the M40 series with some modifications (improved
waterproofing?) so they could be used as depth bombs when given the appropriate
fuses.

> There were a small number of M56 4,000 pound bombs
> but "there is no record of M56s being delivered on combat
> missions" by the 8th Air Force.

Couldn't remember for sure if there'd been any combat use in the ETO. ISTR
Freeman had a photo showing a pair mounted on a B-17.

> In the war diary Freeman usually gives the types of bombs
> dropped until the end of 1943, a quick skim indicates the
> heavies last used them on 9 September 1943

Last used which?

> , the mediums
> on 9 October 1943, assuming usage stopped in 1943.

What date were the mediums reassigned from 8th Support Command to 9th AF (and
thus no longer appear in Freeman)?

> The USAAF statistical digest contradicts the Freeman
> figures, table 138, bombs dropped by type of bomb
> 1943 to 1945 in the war against Germany says the USAAF
> did not use the 300 pound bomb in Europe from 1 January
> 1943 onward and only 712 600 pound bombs, all in 1943.

I wonder what that "350" lb. bomb used in 1945 (only 12) was; possibly a typo. I
suspect Freeman may be right in the case of the 300 lbers. IIRR there's a late
1943 or early '44 issue of "Impact" which describes 8th AF B-26 missions in 1943,
and clearly states the number of 300 lb. bombs dropped on the target (might have
been one of the missions to the Le Trait shipyards. I'll have to get to the
library to find the details). Then again, IIRR the "300 lb. bomb" weighed less
than 300 lb. while the "250 lb. bomb" weighed more than 250 lb., so maybe the two
types were combined in the table.

> If the digest is correct the USAAF dropped more Soviet 550
> pound bombs, 1,645 in 1944.

The latter presumably on the shuttle missions.

> Of the 6,284,271 HE bombs recorded as being used 156
> were 4,500 pounds, 48,575 were 2,000 pounds.
>
> There were 1,122 Armour Piercing 1,600 pound bombs
> used, all in 1944.

I'd sure like to know what the targets were for the AP bombs. I doubt they'd
have enough penetration for sub pens, and I don't think we ever attacked armored
ships with them (which is what they were designed for, by the Navy). Underground
factories or maybe railway tunnels?

> In table 139, bombs dropped by type versus Japan HE
> bombs include 1,220 4,000 pound, all in 1945, 750 300
> pound, 688 in 1945 (yes 5), 188,198 550 pound, yes 550.

I'm guessing a typo in one or more of these tables.

> Of the 1,677,749 bombs recorded as being used 581,977
> were 100 pounds.
>
> No 1,600 pound bombs used against Japan, but 31 2,000
> pound torpedoes were used in 1945.
>
> Back to Freeman, gives an example for the B-17F and G bomb
> load as 6 1,600 pound bombs internally and 2 4,000 pound
> bombs externally,. Freeman's bomb bay diagram indicates
> 8 1,600 pound bombs could be stowed, which presumably
> means someone somewhere took off with 20,800 pounds
> of bombs, and probably little else, hence the confusion over
> maximum bombloads.

Personally, I very much doubt that anyone ever took off with this load. I
suspect it's more of a theoretical "well, if we loaded every station with the
maximum possible load, it would total this much" nonsense that is still common
today. I'd sure like to know exactly what the load is that allows an F-18A-D to
carry 17,000 lb. of ordnance.

> His reproductions of Boeing diagrams
> show indicate there were 42 bomb shackles in 4 racks inside
> the bomb bay. Shackles10 and 31 were able to carry 2,000
> pound bombs, 8, 11,16, 20, 29, 32, 37, 41 for 1,600 pound
> bombs. See the B-17 Flying Fortress Story, Freeman and
> David Osborne.

I think that's the same B-17F "Bomb Release Sequence Diagram" reproduced in
Jablonski's book "Flying Fortress", which is what I based my comments on. I have
this vague memory that the G shackles may have been different, but may be
thinking of the B-24 instead.

> B-17 recommended cruise in the 8th air force 150 to 160
> mph IAS, the B-24 was 170 to 175 mph IAS.

Agrees with pilot comments elsewhere.


> The late model Mosquitoes could carry up to 5,000 pounds of
> bombs. In theory they could carry this to Berlin from England,
> at most economical cruise and with minimal fuel reserves.

<snip rest>

And AFAIK never did.

Guy

[Peter Stickney]

In article >,
Peter Twydell > writes:
> In article >, Geoffrey Sinclair
> > writes
>>Guy Alcala wrote in message >...
>>>Mike Dargan wrote:
>>
>>
>>On B-17s,
>>
> <snip>
>>If the digest is correct the USAAF dropped more Soviet 550
>>pound bombs, 1,645 in 1944.
>>
> <snip>
>
> Why were the USAAF using bombs from the USSR?

I'd expect that to be during the Shuttle Raids in '44, when
U.S. heavies from England or (IIRC) Italy), instead of returning to
their hme bases, pushed East to land at Soviet airfields tp refuel,
ream, and hit otherwise inaccessable targets on the way back.
It dodn't always work out so well. On one raid, teh B-17 formation
was shadowed by a German Ju 88, which pinpointed one of the turnaround
bases. It got well & truly plastered by hte Luftwaffe that night,
with the destruction of 30 some-odd B-17s,

> Was it one of these that exploded in Austria last week, killing two EOD
> personnel? I thought that the journalist had made a mistake when
> referring to a US 550 pounder, but it looks as though they were right.

It's possible. It's also possible that it was a Soviet bomb dropped
by Soviet aircraft, since they were flying in the area in 1945. It's
also possible that the reporter flubbed a lbs/kg conversion, or used
the nearest metric equivalent. Euro Reporters are no more numerate or
"fact-tight" than ours are.

--
Pete Stickney
A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many
bad measures. -- Daniel Webster

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: #1 Jet of World War II
>From: "Geoffrey Sinclair"
>Date: 7/20/03 11:33 PM Pacific

>Back to Freeman, gives an example for the B-17F and G bomb
>load as 6 1,600 pound bombs internally and 2 4,000 pound
>bombs externally,. Freeman's bomb bay diagram indicates
>8 1,600 pound bombs could be stowed, which presumably

No reference to Jellied Gasoline (Nepalm ) loads?. We flew at least one mission
with the Jellied gasoline drums in our bomb bay.


Arthur Kramer
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[av8r]

> I undesrtand that there was a later model Mosquito on the drawing boards in
> 1944 that could carry 100,000 pounds of bombs with a 10,000 mile range at 1500
> miles per hour all the way. I understand one prototype was built , took off on
> a test flight in 1944 and is still up there. But I don't really believe that
> last part.Do you?


Well Art, funny you should mention that. I was out on the porch the
other night sucking back on a beer when the damned thing came flying by
at Mach 2. Coulda swore they waved at me too !!!!

Cheers...Chris

[Paul J. Adam]

In message >, Peter Twydell
> writes
>Even further OT, does anyone know why the He 111 had its bombs stowed
>nose up?

Don't know.

Guess is "to fit in available volume" given that a big space of the
He111 was originally devoted to low-density passenger accommodation, and
the space for "bulky luggage / bombload" is limited by CG constraints.

As bombs got bigger and engines more powerful, the airframe could carry
more load, but there was no way to extend the bomb-bay aft (guessing!)
so "more bombs" had to be carried vertically around a precise datum to
pack more ordnance around the existing centre-of-pressure. You couldn't
add bombs aft at all, adding them forward made the aircraft unflyable,
but rigging the bombs vertically around the CG meant adding more was
easier, so 'increasing density' by carrying bombs vertically rather than
horizontally might help.

Speculation only.

--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam

[Paul J. Adam]

In message >, ArtKramr
> writes
>I undesrtand that there was a later model Mosquito on the drawing boards in
>1944 that could carry 100,000 pounds of bombs with a 10,000 mile range at 1500
>miles per hour all the way. I understand one prototype was built , took off on
>a test flight in 1944 and is still up there. But I don't really believe that
>last part.Do you?

I saw it go overhead this evening. Mind you, it was being chased by the
"Berlin Bomber Marauder", the "Moscow Patrol Spitfire (from Thorney
Island)", the US "Surrender Or Else" B-29, and the German "We Won The
War, No, We Mean It!" Me-262 among many other types. All of them had
serious influence on post-war debate. None of them really existed.


It would be a very committed or foolish person who decided that
Marauders and Mosquitos were interchangeable. Mosquitoes carried more
bombs further, but a Marauder formation had many guns to fire at
attacking fighters and were much better able to survive fighter attacks
or flak, fired at a tight formation. (Mossies lived by being too quick
for the enemy)

The speciality Marauder missions (attacking bridges comes particularly
to mind) would have been suicide for Mosquitos, just as Marauders would
have performed poorly in a night bomber stream.

Key point... by the end, the enemy had to fight B-17s, B-24s, B-25s and
B-26 formations during the day, then fight Halifax, Lancaster and
Mosquito raids at night, across the whole range of targets, while also
dealing with all the fighters who had been told to expend their
ammunition on enemy targets (the US and allies has such a swarm of
fighters that finding airborne targets is a routine problem?)

Just how do you write tactics to answer that? Especially while the
medium bombers are ripping your transport infrastructure to pieces,
while the heavies are depriving you of the fuel to move your forces or
fight them once in theatre?

Airpower may have been oversold lately, but that doesn't change its
fundamental value.

--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: #1 Jet of World War II
>From: "Emmanuel Gustin"
>Date: 7/21/03 12:59 PM Pacific Daylight Time
>Message-id: >
>
>"ArtKramr" > wrote in message
...
>
>> I undesrtand that there was a later model Mosquito on the drawing boards
>in
>> 1944
>
>What was on the drawing boards in 1944 was the Canberra,
>of course. The formal spec was issued in 1945 and called for
>the highest max continuous cruise speed at 40,000 feet, but not
>less than 440 knots (506 mph) and a ceiling of at least 50,000 ft;
>a short range was undesirable but the RAF was willing to accept
>1400 nautical miles (1610 statute miles) with a 6,000 lb bomb
>load if nothing better was on offer. By the standards of the day,
>that was ambitious enough...
>
>--
>Emmanuel Gustin
>Emmanuel.Gustin -rem@ve- skynet.be
>Flying Guns Page: http://users.skynet.be/Emmanuel.Gustin/
>
>
>
Who said Belgians have no sense of humor? (grin)

Arthur Kramer
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[Peter Stickney]

In article >,
Peter Twydell > writes:
> In article >, Peter Stickney
> > writes
>>In article >,
>> Peter Twydell > writes:
> Thanks, Peter. I asked the question before I'd had any coffee, and
> realised the probable answer after breakfast, while reading the latest
> He 111 In Action. It mentioned the Russian Front, and the realisation
> dawned.
>
> Thinking about it a bit more, the inference is that the suspension and
> arming systems were compatible, which seems unlikely.

Oh, I don't know. The Soviets had a _lot_ of A-20s, and B-25s. I
don't ever recall hearing about them getting different racks when they
were prepped for delivery.

> Even further OT, does anyone know why the He 111 had its bombs stowed
> nose up?

It was the only way they could fit them in the bomb bay area. The He
111 started life as a dual-role Airliner/Clandestine Bomber, back
before the German reamament program of teh late 1930s was announced.
The bomb hay area was originally a sepate "Smoking Room" between the
wing spars. With the spars situated the way they were, there was no
way to make a longer bay without cpmpromising the stuctural integrity
of the airplane. Since the bay was taller than it was long, it was
easier to hang the bombs by their noses & drop 'em out tail first.
It couldn't have done the accuracy much good - the bombs don't just
drop out & stabilize, but wobble all over the place until they settle
down. While they're wobbling, they're flying - those streamlines
shapes will develop lift, so teh more the bomb flops around, the more
it deviates unpredictabply from the point of aim.

>
>>> Was it one of these that exploded in Austria last week, killing two EOD
>>> personnel? I thought that the journalist had made a mistake when
>>> referring to a US 550 pounder, but it looks as though they were right.
>>
>>It's possible. It's also possible that it was a Soviet bomb dropped
>>by Soviet aircraft, since they were flying in the area in 1945. It's
>>also possible that the reporter flubbed a lbs/kg conversion, or used
>>the nearest metric equivalent. Euro Reporters are no more numerate or
>>"fact-tight" than ours are.

> "Ours" being your side of the pond? They're no better (or worse) here.
> The only European newspapers I read are Dutch, and they're usually
> pretty bad on matters aeronautical.

One of the universal traits of human nature. Some are Performers, and
some are Spectators. Some couldn't be arsed to even think about what
their eyes are seeing. Last year, there was a crash just offshore
of Cape Cod (Guy tried to make the beach, didn't quite) in shallow
water. (Not shallow enough, IIRC, there were fatalities) One of the
local television reporters was rattling on about a "Twin Engine
Beechvraft" while standing with his camera crew showing them winching
a single-engine airplane with "Cessna" painted on the tail fin out of
the drink. (And yes, I'm a bit more sophisticated/anorak than that.
It was apparantly a 182 - Short fuselage, wing struts, fixed gear, and
a big spinner over the constant-speed prop hub) And that a "National
Guard" helicopter had repsonded on scene, while showing file footage
of a Coast Guard helicopter searching for survivors. (The National
Guard is a part of the Army or Air Foce, and their equipment is in
camouflage with subdued markings. The Coast Guard, who has primary
responsibility for Search and Rescue, flies white helicopers with
great huge red high visibility markings, (If they don't paint the
whole thing orange) and have "USCG" emplazoned on it in 18" (0.5M)
characters, and, for the Hard of Thinking, "United States Coast Guard"
painted on the side in 12" (0.33+) letters.

And these are the folks who are telling you what's going on.


--
Pete Stickney
A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many
bad measures. -- Daniel Webster

[Peter Stickney]

In article >,
(ArtKramr) writes:
>>Subject: Re: #1 Jet of World War II
>>From: (Gordon)
>>Date: 7/21/03 10:22 AM Pacific Daylight Time
>>Message-id: >
>
>>>> The late model Mosquitoes could carry up to 5,000 pounds of
>>>> bombs. In theory they could carry this to Berlin from England,
>>>> at most economical cruise and with minimal fuel reserves.
>>>
>
> I undesrtand that there was a later model Mosquito on the drawing boards in
> 1944 that could carry 100,000 pounds of bombs with a 10,000 mile range at 1500
> miles per hour all the way. I understand one prototype was built , took off on
> a test flight in 1944 and is still up there. But I don't really believe that
> last part.Do you?

Well, you see, it ran out of gas, and therefore couldn't land. The
last transmission from the pilot was "If you can't get liquid petrol
up to me I'll never play t eviolin again - it's a petrol driven
violin, you know!"

--
Pete Stickney
A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many
bad measures. -- Daniel Webster

[Peter Stickney]

In article >,
Greg Hennessy > writes:
> On 19 Jul 2003 05:29:09 GMT, (Gordon) wrote:
>
>>that the Mosquito was the only air threat that conventional
>>forces were simply never able to overcome.
>
> One wonders about the potential of the Douglas Mixmaster for the very same
> reasons.

The airplane that begins to look rather unreal would be a bomber
version of the F-12 Rainbow. (About th emost beutiful airplane ever
built). The F-12 was intended to be a long range high altitude photo
and radar recon airplane, and was capable of _cruising_ at 400 mph TAS
at 40,000', while carrying a 10,000# payload. for about 1500 miles.
It would have taken something like a Sabre to intercept it.

--
Pete Stickney
A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many
bad measures. -- Daniel Webster

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: #1 Jet of World War II
>From: (Peter Stickney)
>Date: 7/21/03 7:26 PM Pacific Daylight Time
>Message-id: >
>
>In article >,
> (ArtKramr) writes:
>>>Subject: Re: #1 Jet of World War II
>>>From: (Gordon)
>>>Date: 7/21/03 10:22 AM Pacific Daylight Time
>>>Message-id: >
>>
>>>>> The late model Mosquitoes could carry up to 5,000 pounds of
>>>>> bombs. In theory they could carry this to Berlin from England,
>>>>> at most economical cruise and with minimal fuel reserves.
>>>>
>>
>> I undesrtand that there was a later model Mosquito on the drawing boards in
>> 1944 that could carry 100,000 pounds of bombs with a 10,000 mile range at
>1500
>> miles per hour all the way. I understand one prototype was built , took off
>on
>> a test flight in 1944 and is still up there. But I don't really believe
>that
>> last part.Do you?
>
>Well, you see, it ran out of gas, and therefore couldn't land. The
>last transmission from the pilot was "If you can't get liquid petrol
>up to me I'll never play t eviolin again - it's a petrol driven
>violin, you know!"


That violin has strings attached you know.

Arthur Kramer
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: #1 Jet of World War II
>From: (Peter Stickney)
>Date: 7/21/03 7:35 PM Pacific Daylight Time
>Message-id: >

>The airplane that begins to look rather unreal would be a bomber
>version of the F-12 Rainbow. (About th emost beutiful airplane ever
>built).

I found that the most beautiful planes ever built were the ones that showed up
to give us top cover.

Arthur Kramer
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

This will probably appear out of place thanks to a poorly
performing local news server.

Guy Alcala wrote in message >...
>Geoffrey Sinclair wrote:

>> In the war diary Freeman usually gives the types of bombs
>> dropped until the end of 1943, a quick skim indicates the
>> heavies last used them on 9 September 1943
>
>Last used which?

300 pound bombs, used on strikes on French airfields on that
date by the B-24s of 44th, 93rd, 389th and 392nd groups.

>> , the mediums
>> on 9 October 1943, assuming usage stopped in 1943.
>
>What date were the mediums reassigned from 8th Support Command to 9th
> AF (and thus no longer appear in Freeman)?

Good point, 16 October 1943 was the transfer date, and 9
October the last mission under 8th Air Force, so clearly
there could have been other missions using 300 pound bombs
after 9 October. I missed the transfer date.

>> The USAAF statistical digest contradicts the Freeman
>> figures, table 138, bombs dropped by type of bomb
>> 1943 to 1945 in the war against Germany says the USAAF
>> did not use the 300 pound bomb in Europe from 1 January
>> 1943 onward and only 712 600 pound bombs, all in 1943.
>
>I wonder what that "350" lb. bomb used in 1945 (only 12) was; possibly a typo. I
>suspect Freeman may be right in the case of the 300 lbers. IIRR there's a late
>1943 or early '44 issue of "Impact" which describes 8th AF B-26 missions in 1943,
>and clearly states the number of 300 lb. bombs dropped on the target (might have
>been one of the missions to the Le Trait shipyards. I'll have to get to the
>library to find the details). Then again, IIRR the "300 lb. bomb" weighed less
>than 300 lb. while the "250 lb. bomb" weighed more than 250 lb., so maybe the two
>types were combined in the table.

Freeman notes for the 300 pound M31 "the average type weights
differed from the classification by as much as 40 pounds" So if
this was downwards the 300 pounds becomes 260 pounds.

Why the difference in weight? Change in explosive or case or just
a classification decision, the bomb never was 300 pounds?

>> There were 1,122 Armour Piercing 1,600 pound bombs
>> used, all in 1944.
>
>I'd sure like to know what the targets were for the AP bombs. I doubt they'd
>have enough penetration for sub pens, and I don't think we ever attacked armored
>ships with them (which is what they were designed for, by the Navy). Underground
>factories or maybe railway tunnels?

Or simply a case of the supply situation becoming strained
so they used what they had, there were supply problems in
1944 thanks to the tempo of operations. Freeman notes an
attempt to use 1,600 pound bombs in 1942.

>> In table 139, bombs dropped by type versus Japan HE
>> bombs include 1,220 4,000 pound, all in 1945, 750 300
>> pound, 688 in 1945 (yes 5), 188,198 550 pound, yes 550.
>
>I'm guessing a typo in one or more of these tables.

It worries me that the Statistical Digest seems to have major
differences with other sources, thinks like fighter kill claims
as well as types of bombs dropped.

>> The late model Mosquitoes could carry up to 5,000 pounds of
>> bombs. In theory they could carry this to Berlin from England,
>> at most economical cruise and with minimal fuel reserves.
>
>And AFAIK never did.

Correct, it would have required cruising at B-17 speeds at B-26
heights and minimal headwinds. One of those theoretical
performance figures.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

[Peter Twydell]

In article >, ArtKramr
> writes
>>Subject: Re: #1 Jet of World War II
>>From: "Emmanuel Gustin"
>>Date: 7/21/03 12:59 PM Pacific Daylight Time
>>Message-id: >
>>
>>"ArtKramr" > wrote in message
...
>>
>>> I undesrtand that there was a later model Mosquito on the drawing boards
>>in
>>> 1944
>>
>>What was on the drawing boards in 1944 was the Canberra,
>>of course. The formal spec was issued in 1945 and called for
>>the highest max continuous cruise speed at 40,000 feet, but not
>>less than 440 knots (506 mph) and a ceiling of at least 50,000 ft;
>>a short range was undesirable but the RAF was willing to accept
>>1400 nautical miles (1610 statute miles) with a 6,000 lb bomb
>>load if nothing better was on offer. By the standards of the day,
>>that was ambitious enough...
>>
>>--
>>Emmanuel Gustin
>>Emmanuel.Gustin -rem@ve- skynet.be
>>Flying Guns Page: http://users.skynet.be/Emmanuel.Gustin/
>>
>>
>>
> Who said Belgians have no sense of humor? (grin)
>
They do, but the problem is their accents! :-)

>Arthur Kramer
>Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
>http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer
>

--
Peter

Ying tong iddle-i po!

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: #1 Jet of World War II
>From: "Geoffrey Sinclair"
>Date: 7/21/03 10:37 PM Pacific Daylight Time

>No, none of the 9 diagrams showing different bomb bay load
>configurations includes one for napalm, not even incendiaries
>are shown, just HE and AP bombs.
>
>I presume the napalm is listed under class C-Fire in the USAAF
>statistical digest, 12,200 used, they came in 50, 75, 100 to 110
>and 150 to 165 gallon sizes.
>
>Geoffrey Sinclair
>Remove the nb for email.
>
>

I remember the morning we flew that Nepalm mission. They scared the **** out
of us.We never heard of jellied gasoline and we were instructed that it was a
very dangerous load and under no circuimstances were we to bring it back. If it
hung up in the bombays and we couldn't salvo it, we were to bail out rather
than try to land with it. Felt good to get the green bombay light at bombs
away, feel Willie lift, and get Griego's report that the bombay was clear...
and home we went to Florennes. Never so glad to get rid of a bomb load in my
life.




Arthur Kramer
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[The Revolution Will Not Be Televised]

On Mon, 21 Jul 2003 10:19:11 GMT, Guy Alcala
> wrote:

>> The USAAF statistical digest contradicts the Freeman
>> figures, table 138, bombs dropped by type of bomb
>> 1943 to 1945 in the war against Germany says the USAAF
>> did not use the 300 pound bomb in Europe from 1 January
>> 1943 onward and only 712 600 pound bombs, all in 1943.
>
>I wonder what that "350" lb. bomb used in 1945 (only 12) was; possibly a typo. I
>suspect Freeman may be right in the case of the 300 lbers. IIRR there's a late
>1943 or early '44 issue of "Impact" which describes 8th AF B-26 missions in 1943,
>and clearly states the number of 300 lb. bombs dropped on the target (might have
>been one of the missions to the Le Trait shipyards. I'll have to get to the
>library to find the details).

The 300 lb bomb appears in "Impact" a few times in 1943*, but seems to
vanish in 1944. [* e.g. "Littorio Yards and Airfield", July 1943,
"Mediums over West Europe", Merville on 15th September]

Gavin Bailey
--

"...this level of misinformation suggests some Americans may be
avoiding having an experience of cognitive dissonance."
- 'Poll shows errors in beliefs on Iraq, 9/11'
The Charlotte Observer, 20th June 2003

[The Revolution Will Not Be Televised]

On Fri, 18 Jul 2003 01:04:53 -0400, (Peter
Stickney) wrote:

[snip more useful info]

>I've just been poring over a stack of A&AEE Test Reports on various
>Spitfire V adn Spitfire IX variants, and one fact quickly becomes
>apparant. Both versions of the Spitfire had their most efficient
>cruise speed between 160 and 170 mph IAS. The difference in True
>Airspeeds comes from the fact that the 2-stage supercharger of a 60 or
>70 series Merlin allowed that 170 mph IAS to be maintained at about
>30,000', rather than 16000'. RPM for RPM, adn lb of boost for lb of
>boost, the 2-stage engine wasn't as powerful as the single stage. The
>extra compressor did allow that lower power to be maintained to a much
>higher altitude, though, which made a difference.

There's also the possibility of increasing boost below FTH, e.g. with
higher-octane fuels for chasing V-1s in 1944 (e.g. Merlin 66's being
uprated to +25 psi from +15 psi). But none of that applies to
cruising speed settings, and for all I know such pressures might be
attainable by de-restricted single-stage engines like the Merlin 45,
when the cropped impeller version could go up to +18 psi from +12 psi,
and also when this had already been done with the move from +9 psi to
+12 psi with the introduction of 100 octane on the Merlin III.

>> Sure, but if you're flying at the same engine settings in a Spitfire V
>> and a Spitfire IX at the same altitude (above FTH for the M46), the IX
>> will go faster, even when the FS supercharger is almost identical
>> (Merlin 46 vs Merlin 61). The cruising regime was governed by engine
>> rpm and supercharger boost, and different engines produced different
>> outputs at different heights at the expense of differing fuel
>> consumption. In this case, I know this would be down to differences
>> in the height at which higher boost pressures could be maintained.
>
>Ah, but you're not flying at the same engine settings above the Merlin
>46's FTH. The Merlin 46 can maintain +7 lbs of boost to about
>18,000'.

Yeah, but I was thinking of crusing speed settings (typically 2,650
rpm, + 3.75 or +4 psi for max continuous weak mixture cruise). This
setting is common between the Merlin 45/46 and Merlin 61/63/66, and
could be maintained over 20,000 feet (albeit not much over 20,000
feet) for the Merlin 45 (with the lowest FTH and lowest supercharger
peak of the lot).

>True Airspeed at that point will be about 215 mph. Above
>that height, boost, and thus power, drop off.

Sure, I can percieve the criticality of the attainable boost level,
which indicates the level which the supercharger can compress air
beyond the natural density at that height.

>A Merlin 61 powered Mk IX can maintain +7 up to about 33500', where
>that same 170 mph IAS is now a True Airspeed of nearly 300 moh TAS.
>You;re not getting more power, you're getting more altitude. That may
>sound like splitting hairs, but at altitudes below the single-stage
>engine's Full Throttle Height, the performacne for minimum fuel
>consumption is the same.

The 2,650 rpm +4 psi regime is quoted as returning 56 gallons per hour
on the Merlin 45/56 Spitfire V Pilot's notes, and 71 gallons per hour
on the Mk VII/VIII/IX Merlin 61/63 pilot's notes. There's a slight
differential in that the Merlin 45 boost figure is actually 3.75 psi,
but otherwise the consumption figures seem higher than I would expect
even including the extra power being sucked up from the crank output
by the second stage impeller. But this is speculative on my part. I
assume thanks to your explanation that the height would provide the
missing factor here, and the Merlin 63-engined Spit IX would cruise at
those settings, but higher and faster than the Spit V: same or
similar IAS, but different TAS.



> You can increase boost, using the excess supercharger
>capacity to develop more boost, and thus more power at lower
>altitudes, but you have to be careful about that, or the engine
>becomes unglued pretty quickly. The usual solution was to introduce a
>lower supercharger drive speed, as outlined in my example of the
>COrsair engine at the beginning of the post.

Or the Merlin 20 series.

> This led to the 40 series Merlins
>for the Spitfire V, which were basically Merlin XIIs with the
>supercharger and high-speed gearset of teh Merlin XX.

Actually, my impression was that there were two varieties of Merlin 40
series: the Merlin 45, which was a Merlin III with Hooker's more
efficient Merlin XX supercharger inlet housing on a Merlin III, and
the Merlin 46 with the Merlin XX supercharger housing and gearing, but
with the MS or low-altitude supercharger gear deleted. This lead to a
slightly different FTH and output against height for the two variants.
Not that this changes anything in your explanation.

> It was felt
>that the low altitude penalty in the SPitfire V with a Merlin 45
>wouldn't be that bad. In the event, engaging 109Fs across the Channel
>and in North Africa, it was found that they needed more power at low
>altitudes, and the engines were re-rated accordingly, from 3000 RPM/+9
>originally, with an FTH of about 18,000', to 3000 RPM/+12, and later,
>3000 RPM/+16, which gave 1470 HP, but at onlu 9300'. The two-speed
>engines allowed you to have your cake and eat it, too.

The +9 to +12 psi increment was in 1940, with release of 100 octane
fuel to Fighter Command, while the next step seems to be in 1942-43
with +15 and then +18 psi becoming attainable, both down to the supply
of higher-octane rich-mixture PIN fuel.
[i]
>> Another factor I just thought of would be the power being soaked up by
>> a second mechanical supercharger at lower heights, which would affect
>> the relative efficiency (well, it would do that at all heights, but I
>> presume the inefficiency concerned would be maximised at lower
>> atltitudes where the full supercharging wasn't required to reach the
>> maximum pressure permitted for full power. Another assumption...).
>
>A good one,

I got there in the end......

One of the things this brings into focus is the actual operational
performance of the Spitfire V. One of the little-publicised reasons
they had a hard time on offensive operations in 1941-42 (aside from
the obvious issues of tactical positioning and advantage) was that
they were flying at relatively low speeds, and the low-revs, weak
mixture cruising speed of the Mk V was similar or even slower than the
Mk I or II. The power advantages it had over the earlier Merlins were
only apparent at higher altitude or rich-mixture, high rpm settings
which were only relevant once combat had been initiated and weren't
relevant to the relative tactical positioning beforehand. This
changed over time, as the RAF formalised higher cruising speeds as a
tactical doctrine by 1942-43.

[Merlin 66 vs 61]

>Yep. There's another factor, too. SInce the gear ratios of teh
>Merlin 66 supercharger are lower, it's overall pressure rise is lower.

Ah! Yes! Precisely what I was searching for, thanks. The gearing
issue is also germaine to the Merlin 45/46 differential I was on about
earlier.

[Lanc altitude on ops]

>While it doesn't get talked about much, the Lancaster was a fairly
>height-limited machine. The usual heights on a raid into Germany were
>between 15,000, and 20,000', depending on the amount of fuel burned,
>and the particuar airplane.

By the winter of 1943-44, planned height bands for Lanc squadrons in 5
Group (which I have researched) were often 20-22,000 feet. The actual
bombing height was rarely much over 20,000 feet, and often a lot
lower, depending on weather and individual aircraft characteristics.
On operational conditions, with a full load, and winter weather to
deal with, they really did have difficulty getting over 20,000 feet.
The most common bombing heights (excluding exceptions like the
Peenemunde raid) seem to have been around 18,000 feet.

> After shedding the 5-7 tons that it was
>delivering over the target, it would certainly have been able to
>return at a much higher altitude than it went in.

Hence early jettisoning of bombs to reach bombing height, or climbing
after bombing. This is the sort of real context that tends to get
ignored in the interminable and ahistoric B-17 vs Lancaster
nationalist posturing. One of the trade-offs for the Lanc's higher
bombload was lower operating altitude [although this was also down to
the different engine outputs at different hieghts].

>> On the other hand, I have seen log entries which give route timings
>> which can only be explained by atypically strong tail-winds, or more
>> likely the crew either cutting corners en route or increasing the revs
>> to get home quicker with a little polite fiction in the records for
>> when the squadron navigator leader became suspicious about their
>> marginally early returns. So I need to factor in the original context
>> before making some more characteristic sweeping assertions.
>
>Well, there's always the oldest truism of Air Combat: "On the way in,
>I'm working for the Air Force. On the way out, I'm working for
>myself". Since the night bombers didn't hold to any formation, and
>the higher you were, the harder for the interceptors and flak to find
>you, I'm sure they made for Breakfast and Bed in th emost expedient
>manner. I'd say they earned it, too.

Not that I'd push this too far, but at least one squadron ORB shows
that the more experienced crews were clearly learning to cut corners
on the egress route as their tours progressed (demonstrated by
returning several minutes earlier than the preceding aircraft, e.g.
taking off as the ninth and returning first or second consistently
with time on target within expectation - i.e. making up any time on
the egress route, not on the way in), and this might have been a
factor in their higher survival rates. Sitting on the fringe of the
stream was dangerous as you began to lose window and RCM coverage, but
equally cutting corners and increasing speed made you a slightly more
difficult intercept proposition for nightfighters which had precious
little speed advantage and were directed to the head of the main
stream.

Gavin Bailey

--

"...this level of misinformation suggests some Americans may be
avoiding having an experience of cognitive dissonance."
- 'Poll shows errors in beliefs on Iraq, 9/11'
The Charlotte Observer, 20th June 2003

[Peter Stickney]

In article >,
(The Revolution Will Not Be Televised) writes:
> On Fri, 18 Jul 2003 01:04:53 -0400, (Peter
> Stickney) wrote:
>
> [snip more useful info]
>
>>I've just been poring over a stack of A&AEE Test Reports on various
>>Spitfire V adn Spitfire IX variants, and one fact quickly becomes
>>apparant. Both versions of the Spitfire had their most efficient
>>cruise speed between 160 and 170 mph IAS. The difference in True
>>Airspeeds comes from the fact that the 2-stage supercharger of a 60 or
>>70 series Merlin allowed that 170 mph IAS to be maintained at about
>>30,000', rather than 16000'. RPM for RPM, adn lb of boost for lb of
>>boost, the 2-stage engine wasn't as powerful as the single stage. The
>>extra compressor did allow that lower power to be maintained to a much
>>higher altitude, though, which made a difference.
>
> There's also the possibility of increasing boost below FTH, e.g. with
> higher-octane fuels for chasing V-1s in 1944 (e.g. Merlin 66's being
> uprated to +25 psi from +15 psi). But none of that applies to
> cruising speed settings, and for all I know such pressures might be
> attainable by de-restricted single-stage engines like the Merlin 45,
> when the cropped impeller version could go up to +18 psi from +12 psi,
> and also when this had already been done with the move from +9 psi to
> +12 psi with the introduction of 100 octane on the Merlin III.

If I may, I'd like to put a bit of context to the above paragraphs.
I've been noting that you may have a misapprehension about what "Full
Throttle Height is. There is no single Full Throttle Height for any
engine, or airplane. The Full Throttle Height is the height that, for
an airplane with fixed-speed supercharger drives, like, say, a Merlin,
or an Allison, that it's no longer necessary to restrict the flow from
teh supercharger into the engine to prevent it from over-boosting.
(Also called teh Critical Altitude). The pressure ratio of a
supercharger impeller is dependant on the speed at the impeller rim.
The power consumed by the supercharger is a function of its Pressure
Rise and the amount of air flowing through it. The supercharger, by
virtue of it being driven at a fixed ratio of the engine speed, will
try to compress the incoming air to its Pressure Rise for that speed
no matter what. FOr example, the low speed gear of a Merlin 24
produces +18 psi of boost at 2,000'. At sea level, it would produce a
bit more than 20 psi boost, but the flow is restricted to keep the
boost at +18 at sea level for takeoff. Of course, the power consumed
by the supercharger is the same that it would be at 2,000', so there's
a net decrease in available power, due in the most part to the higher
air temperatures at lower altitudes, in a throttled, supercharged,
engine. (Merlin 24, +18/3000R at Sea Level, 1620 HP, +18/3000R at
2,000', 1640 HP.)
The pressure ratio for the Merlin 24 supercharger in low gear (MS
Gear), was about 2.3. In high gear, the same blower produced a
pressure ratio of a bit more than 3, but at the cost of about 140 HP.
So excess compression in a supercharger isn't a good thing. It eats
up power that would otherwise go to the propeller.

What happens is that when you increase boost, all other things being
equal, you decrease the FTH for the new power setting.

The reason for the cropped supercharger impellers, BTW, was that it
was a simple way to reduce the amount of power required to run the
supercharger at low altitudes. At low altitudee, the excess
compression of a high-altitude supercharger requires quite a lot of
restriction, so there's a lot of power going to waste. As I mentioned
above, power is proportional to pressure ratio, and pressure ratio
depends on rim speed, which is a function of the impeller diameter and
its rotational speed. Slowing the impeller down (lower gear) is one
way to get more power at low altitudes (At or below the new, lower,
FTH) Changing supercharger gears is a rebuild depot job, though, and
the gears themselves are difficult to make. Replacing an existing
supercharger impeller with a smaller one is something that can be done
at an airbase's engine shops.

Oh, one other thing. It wasn't used very much, but the Merlin 24/25
was also re-rated to use +25 boost with 150 PN fuel. For the low
supercharger gear, the critical altitude would have been about 1,000'
below sea level - It didn't have the pressure ratio to deviver more
than +20 boost at sea level -, but the High Blower gear could make +25
at, iirc, something around 5,000'. There was some thought of
re-rating V-1 chasing Mosquito Nightfighters to take advantage of
this, but the increased likelyhood of an engine failure was deemed too
hazardous to risk at night, and/or in bad weather, so they were rated
to Merlin 24/25 levels, at +18.

>>> Sure, but if you're flying at the same engine settings in a Spitfire V
>>> and a Spitfire IX at the same altitude (above FTH for the M46), the IX
>>> will go faster, even when the FS supercharger is almost identical
>>> (Merlin 46 vs Merlin 61). The cruising regime was governed by engine
>>> rpm and supercharger boost, and different engines produced different
>>> outputs at different heights at the expense of differing fuel
>>> consumption. In this case, I know this would be down to differences
>>> in the height at which higher boost pressures could be maintained.
>>
>>Ah, but you're not flying at the same engine settings above the Merlin
>>46's FTH. The Merlin 46 can maintain +7 lbs of boost to about
>>18,000'.
>
> Yeah, but I was thinking of crusing speed settings (typically 2,650
> rpm, + 3.75 or +4 psi for max continuous weak mixture cruise). This
> setting is common between the Merlin 45/46 and Merlin 61/63/66, and
> could be maintained over 20,000 feet (albeit not much over 20,000
> feet) for the Merlin 45 (with the lowest FTH and lowest supercharger
> peak of the lot).

At +4, a Merlin 45 would peak at about 18,000', a Merlin 46 at about
22,000. That _4 leam mixture cruise isn't a given, though.
Later 20 series Merlins, the 22, 23, 24, and 25, and their Packard
equivalents, had carburetors that would allow max lean mixture
operation at +7. The 60 series Merlins did as well. You're right
about the 40 series engines, but the 50 series sengines had new carbs,
(Which, among other things, weren't susceptible to the -G cutout of
the earlier engines, and may have been able to cruise at the higher
boosts.

>>True Airspeed at that point will be about 215 mph. Above
>>that height, boost, and thus power, drop off.
>
> Sure, I can percieve the criticality of the attainable boost level,
> which indicates the level which the supercharger can compress air
> beyond the natural density at that height.
>
>>A Merlin 61 powered Mk IX can maintain +7 up to about 33500', where
>>that same 170 mph IAS is now a True Airspeed of nearly 300 moh TAS.
>>You;re not getting more power, you're getting more altitude. That may
>>sound like splitting hairs, but at altitudes below the single-stage
>>engine's Full Throttle Height, the performacne for minimum fuel
>>consumption is the same.
>
> The 2,650 rpm +4 psi regime is quoted as returning 56 gallons per hour
> on the Merlin 45/56 Spitfire V Pilot's notes, and 71 gallons per hour
> on the Mk VII/VIII/IX Merlin 61/63 pilot's notes. There's a slight
> differential in that the Merlin 45 boost figure is actually 3.75 psi,
> but otherwise the consumption figures seem higher than I would expect
> even including the extra power being sucked up from the crank output
> by the second stage impeller. But this is speculative on my part. I
> assume thanks to your explanation that the height would provide the
> missing factor here, and the Merlin 63-engined Spit IX would cruise at
> those settings, but higher and faster than the Spit V: same or
> similar IAS, but different TAS.

Right. What it comes down to, in terms of range, is Miles Per
Gallon. A 2-stage Spit is burning more fuel per hour, but its
covering more ground. (Actually, as far as range goes, I think that
it's a wash - the higher fuel consumption gets countered by the higher
cruise, so MPG stays about the same.)
>
>
>
>> You can increase boost, using the excess supercharger
>>capacity to develop more boost, and thus more power at lower
>>altitudes, but you have to be careful about that, or the engine
>>becomes unglued pretty quickly. The usual solution was to introduce a
>>lower supercharger drive speed, as outlined in my example of the
>>COrsair engine at the beginning of the post.
>
> Or the Merlin 20 series.

Just so, or teh Merlin X before that, which was basically a bomber
engine (Whitley and Wellington, and some Halifaxes). As to why they
just didn't build one type, I suspect that it comes down to allocation
of resources. The supercharger gearsets are hard to build. They have
to be very precise, and they're under a lot of stress. Single-speed
engines mean half the gears. The bombers needed the extra low
altitude power for takeoff, so they got the 2-speed engines. They
also were the first recipients of variable pitch and constant-speed
prepellers for the same reason - they needed the performance, and
there just weren't enough to go around.

>> This led to the 40 series Merlins
>>for the Spitfire V, which were basically Merlin XIIs with the
>>supercharger and high-speed gearset of teh Merlin XX.
>
> Actually, my impression was that there were two varieties of Merlin 40
> series: the Merlin 45, which was a Merlin III with Hooker's more
> efficient Merlin XX supercharger inlet housing on a Merlin III, and
> the Merlin 46 with the Merlin XX supercharger housing and gearing, but
> with the MS or low-altitude supercharger gear deleted. This lead to a
> slightly different FTH and output against height for the two variants.
> Not that this changes anything in your explanation.

Essentially true - but as I remember it, there were a lot of new-build
Merlin 45s, so it wasn't just conversion.

>> It was felt
>>that the low altitude penalty in the SPitfire V with a Merlin 45
>>wouldn't be that bad. In the event, engaging 109Fs across the Channel
>>and in North Africa, it was found that they needed more power at low
>>altitudes, and the engines were re-rated accordingly, from 3000 RPM/+9
>>originally, with an FTH of about 18,000', to 3000 RPM/+12, and later,
>>3000 RPM/+16, which gave 1470 HP, but at onlu 9300'. The two-speed
>>engines allowed you to have your cake and eat it, too.
>
> The +9 to +12 psi increment was in 1940, with release of 100 octane
> fuel to Fighter Command, while the next step seems to be in 1942-43
> with +15 and then +18 psi becoming attainable, both down to the supply
> of higher-octane rich-mixture PIN fuel.

I've a number of A&AEE reports on verious Spitfire V tests, most
conducted in '41, and they all use 3000/+9 as the Maximum rating.
I also have A&AEE Report ref: 4493/-A.S.56/42, released in November
'42, on testing the Spit V/Merlin 45 combination re-rated to +16
boost from +9. The test flying was done from July-Sept 1942.

It is true that Merlin XIIs, the engine on the Spit II, were re-rated
from +9 Max to +12 in late '40. It didn't happen in the Merlin 40s
until later.
[i]
>>> Another factor I just thought of would be the power being soaked up by
>>> a second mechanical supercharger at lower heights, which would affect
>>> the relative efficiency (well, it would do that at all heights, but I
>>> presume the inefficiency concerned would be maximised at lower
>>> atltitudes where the full supercharging wasn't required to reach the
>>> maximum pressure permitted for full power. Another assumption...).
>>
>>A good one,
>
> I got there in the end......
>
> One of the things this brings into focus is the actual operational
> performance of the Spitfire V. One of the little-publicised reasons
> they had a hard time on offensive operations in 1941-42 (aside from
> the obvious issues of tactical positioning and advantage) was that
> they were flying at relatively low speeds, and the low-revs, weak
> mixture cruising speed of the Mk V was similar or even slower than the
> Mk I or II. The power advantages it had over the earlier Merlins were
> only apparent at higher altitude or rich-mixture, high rpm settings
> which were only relevant once combat had been initiated and weren't
> relevant to the relative tactical positioning beforehand. This
> changed over time, as the RAF formalised higher cruising speeds as a
> tactical doctrine by 1942-43.
>
> [Merlin 66 vs 61]
>
>>Yep. There's another factor, too. SInce the gear ratios of teh
>>Merlin 66 supercharger are lower, it's overall pressure rise is lower.
>
> Ah! Yes! Precisely what I was searching for, thanks. The gearing
> issue is also germaine to the Merlin 45/46 differential I was on about
> earlier.
>
> [Lanc altitude on ops]
>
>>While it doesn't get talked about much, the Lancaster was a fairly
>>height-limited machine. The usual heights on a raid into Germany were
>>between 15,000, and 20,000', depending on the amount of fuel burned,
>>and the particuar airplane.
>
> By the winter of 1943-44, planned height bands for Lanc squadrons in 5
> Group (which I have researched) were often 20-22,000 feet. The actual
> bombing height was rarely much over 20,000 feet, and often a lot
> lower, depending on weather and individual aircraft characteristics.
> On operational conditions, with a full load, and winter weather to
> deal with, they really did have difficulty getting over 20,000 feet.
> The most common bombing heights (excluding exceptions like the
> Peenemunde raid) seem to have been around 18,000 feet.

Weather being the presence of clouds. The airplane will, in general,
perform better with lower temperatures. Of course, at altitude, the
temperature is going to be about the same, no matter where in the
world you are. (Well, somewhere around 35-37,000', but the differences
are a lot less marked at 20,000' than they are at Sea Level) There
was a not unreasonable view among Bomber Command crews that the higher
you flew, the safer you were. Even with an assigned height, they'd do
everything they could to get as high as they could. A fully-loaded
Lanc or Halifax would generally start cruising somewhere around
15,000', drifting up as fuel burned off. I could easily see some
crews in the less-well performing airplanes shedding some weight, if
only to not be the lowest bloke in the bomber stream. As we say in
the North Woods, "I don't have to outrun that bear, I just have to
outrun _you!_."

>> After shedding the 5-7 tons that it was
>>delivering over the target, it would certainly have been able to
>>return at a much higher altitude than it went in.
>
> Hence early jettisoning of bombs to reach bombing height, or climbing
> after bombing. This is the sort of real context that tends to get
> ignored in the interminable and ahistoric B-17 vs Lancaster
> nationalist posturing. One of the trade-offs for the Lanc's higher
> bombload was lower operating altitude [although this was also down to
> the different engine outputs at different hieghts].

Right. The Night Bombers, not having to hold a formation out & back,
also could end up being a bit more efficient, as far as cruise goes.
Formation flying, especially if it becomes necessary to jockey
around. (Evasive maneuvering, or the leader's not being smooth) makes
it tough, with a lot of power changes. You're also limited to the
performance of the slowest/lowest/thirstiest ship in the formation.
But... That was the only way to go by day, and that sort of formation
flying was impossible at night. Both the U.S.A.A.F. and the RAF ended
up with just what they needed, in order to perform complimentary tasks.

>>> On the other hand, I have seen log entries which give route timings
>>> which can only be explained by atypically strong tail-winds, or more
>>> likely the crew either cutting corners en route or increasing the revs
>>> to get home quicker with a little polite fiction in the records for
>>> when the squadron navigator leader became suspicious about their
>>> marginally early returns. So I need to factor in the original context
>>> before making some more characteristic sweeping assertions.
>>
>>Well, there's always the oldest truism of Air Combat: "On the way in,
>>I'm working for the Air Force. On the way out, I'm working for
>>myself". Since the night bombers didn't hold to any formation, and
>>the higher you were, the harder for the interceptors and flak to find
>>you, I'm sure they made for Breakfast and Bed in th emost expedient
>>manner. I'd say they earned it, too.
>
> Not that I'd push this too far, but at least one squadron ORB shows
> that the more experienced crews were clearly learning to cut corners
> on the egress route as their tours progressed (demonstrated by
> returning several minutes earlier than the preceding aircraft, e.g.
> taking off as the ninth and returning first or second consistently
> with time on target within expectation - i.e. making up any time on
> the egress route, not on the way in), and this might have been a
> factor in their higher survival rates. Sitting on the fringe of the
> stream was dangerous as you began to lose window and RCM coverage, but
> equally cutting corners and increasing speed made you a slightly more
> difficult intercept proposition for nightfighters which had precious
> little speed advantage and were directed to the head of the main
> stream.

Quite so.

--
Pete Stickney
A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many
bad measures. -- Daniel Webster

[The Revolution Will Not Be Televised]

On Wed, 23 Jul 2003 00:24:11 -0400, (Peter
Stickney) wrote:

>If I may, I'd like to put a bit of context to the above paragraphs.
>I've been noting that you may have a misapprehension about what "Full
>Throttle Height is.

No, I was trying to distinguish between FTH (end of barometric
throttle limitations designed to prevent over-boosting at low
altitudes in denser air) and peak supercharger efficiency - as I did
for the Merlin 45. However, I wasn't doing it consistently, so you're
quite correct to pick me up on it where I don't.

>There is no single Full Throttle Height for any
>engine, or airplane. The Full Throttle Height is the height that, for
>an airplane with fixed-speed supercharger drives, like, say, a Merlin,
>or an Allison, that it's no longer necessary to restrict the flow from
>teh supercharger into the engine to prevent it from over-boosting.
>(Also called teh Critical Altitude).

I'm afraid I don't follow that - my understanding is that the
regulation will vary between engines (due to manufacturing tolerances,
etc) and climatic conditions (e.g. with climatic variation in air
density over altitude), but that the same type of engine with the same
baromatric restrictor will hit the FTH at approximately the same
height.

> FOr example, the low speed gear of a Merlin 24
>produces +18 psi of boost at 2,000'. At sea level, it would produce a
>bit more than 20 psi boost, but the flow is restricted to keep the
>boost at +18 at sea level for takeoff.

This is where the higher octane fuel comes in: overboosting becoming
tolerable within certain limits when predetonation of the fuel can be
avoided.

>The pressure ratio for the Merlin 24 supercharger in low gear (MS
>Gear), was about 2.3. In high gear, the same blower produced a
>pressure ratio of a bit more than 3, but at the cost of about 140 HP.
>So excess compression in a supercharger isn't a good thing. It eats
>up power that would otherwise go to the propeller.

I suspect this is why the Merlin 46 never totally replaced the Merlin
45, and it's why the Merlin 60 series was re-geared to produce the 66.
An "automatic" gearing might have been a better solution, although I
suspect that's my ignorance speaking.

>The reason for the cropped supercharger impellers, BTW, was that it
>was a simple way to reduce the amount of power required to run the
>supercharger at low altitudes.

I see that. Same as changing the rear sprocket on my motorbike
instead of changing the gear ratios in the gearbox.

> Replacing an existing
>supercharger impeller with a smaller one is something that can be done
>at an airbase's engine shops.

The LF Vbs seemed to get their modified engines from MU's or from RR
at Hucknall. Or Cosford, thinking about it.

>Oh, one other thing. It wasn't used very much, but the Merlin 24/25
>was also re-rated to use +25 boost with 150 PN fuel.

I didn't know that.

>>>Ah, but you're not flying at the same engine settings above the Merlin
>>>46's FTH. The Merlin 46 can maintain +7 lbs of boost to about
>>>18,000'.
>>
>> Yeah, but I was thinking of crusing speed settings (typically 2,650
>> rpm, + 3.75 or +4 psi for max continuous weak mixture cruise). This
>> setting is common between the Merlin 45/46 and Merlin 61/63/66, and
>> could be maintained over 20,000 feet (albeit not much over 20,000
>> feet) for the Merlin 45 (with the lowest FTH and lowest supercharger
>> peak of the lot).
>
>At +4, a Merlin 45 would peak at about 18,000',

In terms of power output? I'd agree, which is why they cruised slower
at 20,00 feet than the Merlin 60 variants did.... which is where I
came in..... :-)

>a Merlin 46 at about
>22,000. That _4 leam mixture cruise isn't a given, though.
>Later 20 series Merlins, the 22, 23, 24, and 25, and their Packard
>equivalents, had carburetors that would allow max lean mixture
>operation at +7.

I'm not sure how often this was used, though. The "minimum revs,
maximum boost" mantra seems to have left +4 as the most
commonly-referred-to option on operations, but that's just based on my
own readings, which I can't claim to be authoritative.

> The 60 series Merlins did as well. You're right
>about the 40 series engines, but the 50 series sengines had new carbs,
>(Which, among other things, weren't susceptible to the -G cutout of
>the earlier engines, and may have been able to cruise at the higher
>boosts.

Some of the 45's and 46's got them (RAE and SU negative G carbs) as
post-production tests, with unimpressive results.

>> The 2,650 rpm +4 psi regime is quoted as returning 56 gallons per hour
>> on the Merlin 45/56 Spitfire V Pilot's notes, and 71 gallons per hour
>> on the Mk VII/VIII/IX Merlin 61/63 pilot's notes. There's a slight
>> differential in that the Merlin 45 boost figure is actually 3.75 psi,
>> but otherwise the consumption figures seem higher than I would expect
>> even including the extra power being sucked up from the crank output
>> by the second stage impeller. But this is speculative on my part. I
>> assume thanks to your explanation that the height would provide the
>> missing factor here, and the Merlin 63-engined Spit IX would cruise at
>> those settings, but higher and faster than the Spit V: same or
>> similar IAS, but different TAS.
>
>Right. What it comes down to, in terms of range, is Miles Per
>Gallon. A 2-stage Spit is burning more fuel per hour, but its
>covering more ground.

Higher crusing speed on the same engine settings *at a different
altitude* giving a similar range but shorter endurance.

> (Actually, as far as range goes, I think that
>it's a wash - the higher fuel consumption gets countered by the higher
>cruise, so MPG stays about the same.)

The approx 6 air m.p.g. figures in the Pilot's Notes for several
Merlin-engined types seems to confirm this.

[Low altitude supercharger gears]

>Just so, or teh Merlin X before that, which was basically a bomber
>engine (Whitley and Wellington, and some Halifaxes).
As to why they
>just didn't build one type, I suspect that it comes down to allocation
>of resources.

The critical and ever-pressing need to maintain exisiting production
lines with minimum alteration to ensure overall output didn't fall too
far. Hence the Merlin 45 (keep building Merlin III's with the same
supercharger gearing, just slap Hooker's new impeller housing on
them), the Merlin 46 (grab some Merlin XXs and do the same thing), the
Merlin 61 (stick a Vulture supercharger impeller in series with a
Merlin 20). Obviously, there were prop reduction gear changes,
different gearings, and so on, but the introduction of new types when
maximum output was required was a real problem.

One thing you might know about and I wanted to ask was the "built for
100 octane" label applied in certain documents to the Merlin X and
XII. Apart from possibly higher compression ratios at lower altitudes
following from increasing supercharger boost figures, what else would
this involve?

>Essentially true - but as I remember it, there were a lot of new-build
>Merlin 45s, so it wasn't just conversion.

They just kept one of the Merlin III production lines at Derby
running, I suspect.

>> The +9 to +12 psi increment was in 1940, with release of 100 octane
>> fuel to Fighter Command, while the next step seems to be in 1942-43
>> with +15 and then +18 psi becoming attainable, both down to the supply
>> of higher-octane rich-mixture PIN fuel.
>
>I've a number of A&AEE reports on verious Spitfire V tests, most
>conducted in '41, and they all use 3000/+9 as the Maximum rating.

I've seen the same ones, I suspect, but Quill gives a figure of +12
for 100 octane, and although I can't substantiate this from my own
notes yet, I believe this was mentioned as one of the specific
production reasons for the Merlin XII. However, all the figures I
have seen from A&AEE and even RAE reports in the same period give +9
(I can find higher pressures mentioned, but only in 1943 or at the
earliest 1942). However, these seem to concentrate on speed at height
and maximum continuous climb ratings, and I'm not sure they indicate
anything conclusive about higher boost pressures being used lower
down. I think the boost control had to be manually over-ridden to
achieve that. I'll comment further if and when I can actually produce
something to back this up in the months ahead.

>It is true that Merlin XIIs, the engine on the Spit II, were re-rated
>from +9 Max to +12 in late '40. It didn't happen in the Merlin 40s
>until later.

That might be it, and I might be confusing the two, but I'm convinced
I've seen a reference for the Merlin III being similarly adapted in
1940.

> A fully-loaded
>Lanc or Halifax would generally start cruising somewhere around
>15,000', drifting up as fuel burned off. I could easily see some
>crews in the less-well performing airplanes shedding some weight, if
>only to not be the lowest bloke in the bomber stream. As we say in
>the North Woods, "I don't have to outrun that bear, I just have to
>outrun _you!_."

A relative served in 61 Sqn at that time, and the bombing altitudes
over Berlin seem to have been about 18,000 - 19,000 feet, and I'm sure
they would have gone higher if they could. They also had a long, slow
climb across the enemy coast and into enemy-occupied Europe before
getting anywhere near that altitude, at a rate of climb of less than
100 feet per minute. Not something I'd like to try.

>Right. The Night Bombers, not having to hold a formation out & back,
>also could end up being a bit more efficient, as far as cruise goes.
>Formation flying, especially if it becomes necessary to jockey
>around. (Evasive maneuvering, or the leader's not being smooth) makes
>it tough, with a lot of power changes.

Not to mention the lenghty assembly phases over England, which tend to
understate the Fort's capacity by consuming useful load (fuel) and
affect endurance and range in a manner the night bombers didn't. [OK,
they often had climbing legs routed over the land, but nothing like to
the extent that the day bombers did.]

>You're also limited to the
>performance of the slowest/lowest/thirstiest ship in the formation.
>But... That was the only way to go by day, and that sort of formation
>flying was impossible at night. Both the U.S.A.A.F. and the RAF ended
>up with just what they needed, in order to perform complimentary tasks.

They evolved that way, from roughly similar airframes as a starting
point. Lancasters flying by day would soon develop heavier armour,
especially around the engines, less bombload in exchange for more fuel
to burn for higher height on the ingress route, and heavier armament
like .50 calibres in the rear turret - all of which they were adopting
by 1945, which cut into their bombload margin over the B-17.

>> Not that I'd push this too far, but at least one squadron ORB shows
>> that the more experienced crews were clearly learning to cut corners
>> on the egress route as their tours progressed ...

>Quite so.

I did like the "following wind" claims in one log book where the same
crew had resorted to dog-legging across the route track on the way in,
evidently to reduce their ground speed and arrive on target at the
right time. Not something you'd do facing the sort of headwind they
would have needed to produce the kind of tailwind that got them home
20 minutes early.... with an aiming-point photograph.

Gavin Bailey

--

"...this level of misinformation suggests some Americans may be
avoiding having an experience of cognitive dissonance."
- 'Poll shows errors in beliefs on Iraq, 9/11'
The Charlotte Observer, 20th June 2003

[Guy Alcala]

Geoffrey Sinclair wrote:

> This will probably appear out of place thanks to a poorly
> performing local news server.
>
> Guy Alcala wrote in message >...
> >Geoffrey Sinclair wrote:
>
> >> In the war diary Freeman usually gives the types of bombs
> >> dropped until the end of 1943, a quick skim indicates the
> >> heavies last used them on 9 September 1943
> >
> >Last used which?
>
> 300 pound bombs, used on strikes on French airfields on that
> date by the B-24s of 44th, 93rd, 389th and 392nd groups.

Seems about right. Checking the relevant issues of "Impact," the last dates I could
find mentioned for heavy use of 300 lbers. were B-17 raids on 13/5/43 on the Potez
factory at Meaulte (88 B-17s dropped 863 - 500 lb. and 16 - 300 lb.), and on 16/8/43
on Le Bourget (2,655 - 300 lbers dropped).

<snip B-26 8th Sup. Command to 9th AF transfer info>


> >> The USAAF statistical digest contradicts the Freeman
> >> figures, table 138, bombs dropped by type of bomb
> >> 1943 to 1945 in the war against Germany says the USAAF
> >> did not use the 300 pound bomb in Europe from 1 January
> >> 1943 onward and only 712 600 pound bombs, all in 1943.
> >
> >I wonder what that "350" lb. bomb used in 1945 (only 12) was; possibly a typo. I
> >suspect Freeman may be right in the case of the 300 lbers. IIRR there's a late
> >1943 or early '44 issue of "Impact" which describes 8th AF B-26 missions in 1943,
> >and clearly states the number of 300 lb. bombs dropped on the target (might have
> >been one of the missions to the Le Trait shipyards. I'll have to get to the
> >library to find the details). Then again, IIRR the "300 lb. bomb" weighed less
> >than 300 lb. while the "250 lb. bomb" weighed more than 250 lb., so maybe the two
> >types were combined in the table.
>
> Freeman notes for the 300 pound M31 "the average type weights
> differed from the classification by as much as 40 pounds" So if
> this was downwards the 300 pounds becomes 260 pounds.

Given the info about B-26 and B-24 300 lber use you give above, the B-17 use of same
mentioned in "Impact" and the B-26 comments also from Impact, viz,

4/9/43, Lille, 33 B-26 dropped 330 - 300 lb. bombs.

15/9/43, Merville 34 B-26 dropped 339 - 300 lb. bombs (btw, on the Le Trait mission I
was thinking of, 33 B-26s dropped 160 - 500 lb. bombs)

The statistical digest table definitely appears to be in error.

> Why the difference in weight? Change in explosive or case or just
> a classification decision, the bomb never was 300 pounds?

In most cases, the latter. The same is true today. FWIW, in just about the only
source I have which gives many of the U.S. WW2 bomb weights, the M57A1 250 lb. GP bomb
is listed at 261 lb., incl. 132 lb. HE (Tritonal, Amatol, TNT).

> >> There were 1,122 Armour Piercing 1,600 pound bombs
> >> used, all in 1944.
> >
> >I'd sure like to know what the targets were for the AP bombs. I doubt they'd
> >have enough penetration for sub pens, and I don't think we ever attacked armored
> >ships with them (which is what they were designed for, by the Navy). Underground
> >factories or maybe railway tunnels?
>
> Or simply a case of the supply situation becoming strained
> so they used what they had, there were supply problems in
> 1944 thanks to the tempo of operations. Freeman notes an
> attempt to use 1,600 pound bombs in 1942.

Perhaps, but the small HE load and more difficult production of the AP bomb would make
it the absolute bomb of last resort for any target susceptible to GP/MC/Incendiary
bombs. In the case of the AP Bomb Mk. 1 (the 1,600 lber), out of a total weight of
1,590 lb. only 209 lb. is HE (Explosive D according to the only source I have which
specifies the type of HE and the loading). The run-of the-mill M65A1 1,000 lb. GP
bomb contains a nominal 572 lb. of HE (Tritonal, Amatol, TNT, or Composition B) out of
a total nominal weight of 1,081 lb -- even the contemporary M64A1 500 lb. GP has more
HE (262 lb. out of a total of 535 lb.). So you'd really need to be desperate to use
an AP bomb on any target that was suitable for a GP/MC/HC bomb. I'm thinking maybe
underground factories (or Crossbow sites like Watten?).

> >> In table 139, bombs dropped by type versus Japan HE
> >> bombs include 1,220 4,000 pound, all in 1945, 750 300
> >> pound, 688 in 1945 (yes 5), 188,198 550 pound, yes 550.
> >
> >I'm guessing a typo in one or more of these tables.
>
> It worries me that the Statistical Digest seems to have major
> differences with other sources, thinks like fighter kill claims
> as well as types of bombs dropped.

<snip>

On the rare occasions when you see two official statistical sources in complete
agreement, it's just about a sure thing that one of them is using the data from the
other. Otherwise, there are always small differences in any large data set, owing to
revised information, other sources, differing reporting standards, etc.

Guy

[Guy Alcala]

The Revolution Will Not Be Televised wrote:

> On Mon, 21 Jul 2003 10:19:11 GMT, Guy Alcala
> > wrote:

<snip>

> >I wonder what that "350" lb. bomb used in 1945 (only 12) was; possibly a typo. I
> >suspect Freeman may be right in the case of the 300 lbers. IIRR there's a late
> >1943 or early '44 issue of "Impact" which describes 8th AF B-26 missions in 1943,
> >and clearly states the number of 300 lb. bombs dropped on the target (might have
> >been one of the missions to the Le Trait shipyards. I'll have to get to the
> >library to find the details).
>
> The 300 lb bomb appears in "Impact" a few times in 1943*, but seems to
> vanish in 1944. [* e.g. "Littorio Yards and Airfield", July 1943,
> "Mediums over West Europe", Merville on 15th September]

Right, by '44 they seem to be using exclusively 250 lbers (which agrees with Art's
memory that he never dropped a 300 lb. bomb). As I said previously, they appear to
have used them up by the 3rd or 4th quarter of '43. From my memory of Freeman, they
ran out of the 600 and 1,100 lb. bombs much earlier.

Guy

[Guy Alcala]

The Revolution Will Not Be Televised wrote:

> On Fri, 18 Jul 2003 01:04:53 -0400, (Peter
> Stickney) wrote:

<snip much>

> [Lanc altitude on ops]
>
> >While it doesn't get talked about much, the Lancaster was a fairly
> >height-limited machine. The usual heights on a raid into Germany were
> >between 15,000, and 20,000', depending on the amount of fuel burned,
> >and the particuar airplane.
>
> By the winter of 1943-44, planned height bands for Lanc squadrons in 5
> Group (which I have researched) were often 20-22,000 feet. The actual
> bombing height was rarely much over 20,000 feet, and often a lot
> lower, depending on weather and individual aircraft characteristics.
> On operational conditions, with a full load, and winter weather to
> deal with, they really did have difficulty getting over 20,000 feet.
> The most common bombing heights (excluding exceptions like the
> Peenemunde raid) seem to have been around 18,000 feet.

Odd that you should mention that, as Middlebrook ("The Nuremberg Raid") says
that a/c of all the Groups on the mission (with the exception of No. 1 GP;
see below), whether Lanc or Halifax, were evenly assigned to one of four
cruise heights -- 20, 21, 22, or 23 thousand feet. Naturally, some a/c were
unable to get that high or anywhere close to it. One crew flying a very sick
or tired Lanc couldn't struggle above 12,000 ft. but pressed on regardless;
as it turned out it probably saved them on that mission because the fighters
were up in the stream several thousand feet higher. A few a/c proved capable
of much better when the Jagdwaffe got into the stream and the experienced
crews decided that rigid adherence to assigned altitudes was stupid under the
circumstances, and decided to get the hell out of it by climbing (and more
than a few got rid of some bombs to lighten the a/c). One crew in a
brand-new Halifax (like all Halifaxes by that time, carrying an
all-incendiary and thus lighter load than the Lancs, to improve their
altitude performance) was delighted to discover that they were able to get up
to 26,000, and cruised happily along over the carnage a few thousand feet
below. The exception was 1 Group, whose philosophy was to carry max. bomb
loads on every mission, and who asked if they could fly at 13-16,000 feet to
take advantage of some predicted cloud at that level. They were granted
permission to do so until IIRR they reached the Rhine, at which point they
were supposed to climb to the same heights that everyone else was (supposed)
to be at. Unfortunately for them, the predicted cloud didn't show up.

> > After shedding the 5-7 tons that it was
> >delivering over the target, it would certainly have been able to
> >return at a much higher altitude than it went in.
>
> Hence early jettisoning of bombs to reach bombing height, or climbing
> after bombing. This is the sort of real context that tends to get
> ignored in the interminable and ahistoric B-17 vs Lancaster
> nationalist posturing. One of the trade-offs for the Lanc's higher
> bombload was lower operating altitude [although this was also down to
> the different engine outputs at different hieghts].

In addition to the engine differences, there's the considerable difference in
fixed weights (carried both to and from the target) due to extra crew, armor,
guns, turrets etc., and the extra fuel required for formation assembly (an
extra 1/2 to 2 hours before setting out), climb to higher cruise altitude and
flying in formation (throttle jockeying). When Pete and I went through the
exercise of turning the RAF heavies into day bombers a few years back, it was
apparent that using Lancs in formation by day against the same targets that
U.S. heavies were attacking, and with the same equipment, procedures and
tactics, would require a decrease in bombload of between 2,000-5,000 lb. to
reflect this, even assuming we refit them with two-stage Merlins to give them
sufficient power at altitude (and those engines each weigh ca. 200 lb. more
than the single stage jobs, which decreases the useful load for the same
MTOW, or requires an increase in MTOW and thus a decrease in climb
performance, higher accident rates, etc.). In short, design and equip them
to do the same job and they'll do it with payloads within a couple of hundred
pounds (either way) of each other. The whole Lanc vs. B-17 argument is just
ludicrous.

Guy

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: #1 Jet of World War II
>From: Guy Alcala
>Date: 7/23/03 3:39 AM Pacific Daylight Time
>Message-id:

>Right, by '44 they seem to be using exclusively 250 lbers (which agrees with
>Art's
>memory that he never dropped a 300 lb. bomb). As I said previously, they
>appear to
>have used them up by the 3rd or 4th quarter of '43. From my memory of
>Freeman, they
>ran out of the 600 and 1,100 lb.

Sounds like 600 pound bombs and 1100 pound bombs are just typos. We carried
100, 250 amd 500 pounders. pounds. Also some missions where we carried
incendiaries and one mission where we carried Jellied Gasoline (Nepalm). Also a
few missions where we carried four 1,000 pounders.I seem to remember that the
missions where we carried the 1,000 pounders were to the Ruhre Valley.
Magdeburg?

Arthur Kramer
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: #1 Jet of World War II
>From: Guy Alcala
>Date: 7/23/03 4:40 AM Pacific Daylight Time
>Message-id:

> Hence early jettisoning of bombs to reach bombing height, or climbing
>> after bombing. This is the sort o


You mean they had to dump their bombs to get to bombing altitude?? Once they
had no bombs what is the point of getting to bombing altitude???

>> After shedding the 5-7 tons that it was
>> >delivering over the target, it would certainly have been able to
>> >return at a much higher altitude than it went in.

Only if they had enough fuel left to burn up in a climb. We rarely did.


Arthur Kramer
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[John Halliwell]

In article >, The Revolution Will Not
Be Televised > writes
>They evolved that way, from roughly similar airframes as a starting
>point. Lancasters flying by day would soon develop heavier armour,
>especially around the engines, less bombload in exchange for more fuel
>to burn for higher height on the ingress route, and heavier armament
>like .50 calibres in the rear turret - all of which they were adopting
>by 1945, which cut into their bombload margin over the B-17.

Interesting point, any sources for this. I haven't heard about
increasing armour for daylight ops, or trading bomb load for fuel. The
B1 Specials had virtually everything not nailed down stripped out, lost
their armour and most of their guns. The Lanc achieved its greatest
bombload in 1944-5 by daylight.

The 50s in the rear turrets were IIRC fitted only as a pair instead of
the quad 303s.

--
John

[Guy Alcala]

ArtKramr wrote:

> >Subject: Re: #1 Jet of World War II
> >From: Guy Alcala
> >Date: 7/23/03 3:39 AM Pacific Daylight Time
> >Message-id:
>
> >Right, by '44 they seem to be using exclusively 250 lbers (which agrees with
> >Art's
> >memory that he never dropped a 300 lb. bomb). As I said previously, they
> >appear to
> >have used them up by the 3rd or 4th quarter of '43. From my memory of
> >Freeman, they
> >ran out of the 600 and 1,100 lb.
>
> Sounds like 600 pound bombs and 1100 pound bombs are just typos.

No, as mentioned earlier in the thread the M30 series 600 and 1,100 lb. bombs were
in use in 1942 and maybe into the early part of 1943 (don't remember for sure).

Guy

[John Halliwell]

In article >, Guy Alcala
> writes
>In short, design and equip them
>to do the same job and they'll do it with payloads within a couple of hundred
>pounds (either way) of each other. The whole Lanc vs. B-17 argument is just
>ludicrous.

The crucial point though, is that you're assuming the Lanc would have to
follow US practises and fly in the big box formations. Whilst this may
have suited the B-17 with machine guns sprouting everywhere (although I
don't think it was appropriate before P-51D escorts were available), it
may not have suited the Lanc. You simply can't enforce US practises on
UK types in an attempt to 'equate' them with one another.

One Halifax squadron removed the nose and mid-upper turrets, armour,
flame dampers and various other bits, the lighter weight and less
restricted engines flew higher, faster and their losses were reduced
significantly.

--
John

[The Revolution Will Not Be Televised]

On Wed, 23 Jul 2003 11:40:46 GMT, Guy Alcala
> wrote:

[Lanc bombing height]

>> The most common bombing heights (excluding exceptions like the
>> Peenemunde raid) seem to have been around 18,000 feet.
>
>Odd that you should mention that, as Middlebrook ("The Nuremberg Raid") says
>that a/c of all the Groups on the mission (with the exception of No. 1 GP;
>see below), whether Lanc or Halifax, were evenly assigned to one of four
>cruise heights -- 20, 21, 22, or 23 thousand feet.

This was common practice: although I was suprised to see 3 Group
getting the lower height bands even as they started to re-equip with
Lancasters in early 1944. The raids I researched may not be
representative, however, and I think those might have included some
late Stirling raids, which would explain it, although they were
normally banded by Group and by type within that, just like the wave
timings for TOT.

As it happens, the bombing height for the crew in question varied from
aircraft to aircraft, and seemingly independent of the assigned height
bands. The highest bombing altitude recorded was 21,500 ft (30/31 Jan
44, Berlin) otherwise 20,000 -20,500 ft (27/28 Sep 43, Nuremburg; 3/4
Sep 43, Berlin) and a lot of 18,000 -19,000 ft (31 Aug/1 Sep 43,
Berlin; Munchengladbach 30/31 Sep 43, etc, etc).

>In addition to the engine differences, there's the considerable difference in
>fixed weights (carried both to and from the target) due to extra crew, armor,
>guns, turrets etc., and the extra fuel required for formation assembly (an
>extra 1/2 to 2 hours before setting out), climb to higher cruise altitude and
>flying in formation (throttle jockeying).

Yeah, I've just exhumed that one myself.

[snipadoodledo]
> In short, design and equip them
>to do the same job and they'll do it with payloads within a couple of hundred
>pounds (either way) of each other. The whole Lanc vs. B-17 argument is just
>ludicrous.

Agreed. Still, it beats doing the housework.

Gavin Bailey

--

"...this level of misinformation suggests some Americans may be
avoiding having an experience of cognitive dissonance."
- 'Poll shows errors in beliefs on Iraq, 9/11'
The Charlotte Observer, 20th June 2003

[The Revolution Will Not Be Televised]

On Wed, 23 Jul 2003 13:49:11 +0100, John Halliwell
> wrote:

>>They evolved that way, from roughly similar airframes as a starting
>>point. Lancasters flying by day would soon develop heavier armour,
>>especially around the engines, less bombload in exchange for more fuel
>>to burn for higher height on the ingress route, and heavier armament
>>like .50 calibres in the rear turret - all of which they were adopting
>>by 1945, which cut into their bombload margin over the B-17.
>
>Interesting point, any sources for this. I haven't heard about
>increasing armour for daylight ops, or trading bomb load for fuel.

Look at the trend evident in the Rose turreted B.1/B.IIIs, and the
engine installation in the Lanc IV which directly influenced the
Lincoln (two-stage Merlins with armoured, annular radiators), let
alone the massively increased armament in the Lincoln (e.g. twin 20mm
Hispanos in the mid-upper turret). The only way to get more fuel in
the Lanc for Tiger Force operations was in the bomb-bay, which had
obvious implications for the bombload carried. This just represents a
gradual and evolutionary change in operational emphasis.

> The
>B1 Specials had virtually everything not nailed down stripped out, lost
>their armour and most of their guns.

And consisted of one squadron. Two, if you count 9 Squadron.

>The Lanc achieved its greatest
>bombload in 1944-5 by daylight.

But I think the future development pattern was clear, and in favour of
increased defensive resources.

>The 50s in the rear turrets were IIRC fitted only as a pair instead of
>the quad 303s.

Sure, but this still represented an increase in effectiveness at
daylight engagement ranges.

Gavin Bailey
--

"...this level of misinformation suggests some Americans may be
avoiding having an experience of cognitive dissonance."
- 'Poll shows errors in beliefs on Iraq, 9/11'
The Charlotte Observer, 20th June 2003

[The Revolution Will Not Be Televised]

On Wed, 23 Jul 2003 14:00:12 +0100, John Halliwell
> wrote:

>The crucial point though, is that you're assuming the Lanc would have to
>follow US practises and fly in the big box formations.

Standard RAF practice was to tighen up daylight formations around
three-plane elements in vics. This was not as tight as a USAAF combat
box, but under a heavier fighter threat it probably would have evolved
further in that direction.

>Whilst this may
>have suited the B-17 with machine guns sprouting everywhere (although I
>don't think it was appropriate before P-51D escorts were available), it
>may not have suited the Lanc. You simply can't enforce US practises on
>UK types in an attempt to 'equate' them with one another.

Close formation flying both increased the concentration of the bomb
pattern and the effectiveness of return fire from the gunners. The
RAF were extolling this in 1939 with Wellingtons over Heligoland
Bight, and continued to do so in "large-scale" daylight ops (e.g. the
Lancasters in the Augsburg raid).

>One Halifax squadron removed the nose and mid-upper turrets, armour,
>flame dampers and various other bits, the lighter weight and less
>restricted engines flew higher, faster and their losses were reduced
>significantly.

This works at night, where difficulty of interception is the primary
defence. It would have been a lot less effective when some measure of
resiliance and defensive capacity was required, which is why the RAF
stuck self-sealing tanks, protective armour and increased armament on
their bombers after their daylight experiences in 1939. Increasing
height and cruising speed at night made it harder for night-fighters
with a marginal performance advantage to achieve an interception,
particularly within a context where there were easier targets at
slower speeds and lower height to engage first. The same dynamic
doesn't neccessarily apply in daytime, in fact loose formations and
seperation from the main body positively attract enemy fighter
attention in those circumstances.

Gavin Bailey
--

"...this level of misinformation suggests some Americans may be
avoiding having an experience of cognitive dissonance."
- 'Poll shows errors in beliefs on Iraq, 9/11'
The Charlotte Observer, 20th June 2003

[Keith Willshaw]

"The Revolution Will Not Be Televised" > wrote in
message ...
> On Wed, 23 Jul 2003 14:00:12 +0100, John Halliwell
> > wrote:
>
> >The crucial point though, is that you're assuming the Lanc would have to
> >follow US practises and fly in the big box formations.
>
> Standard RAF practice was to tighen up daylight formations around
> three-plane elements in vics. This was not as tight as a USAAF combat
> box, but under a heavier fighter threat it probably would have evolved
> further in that direction.
>

More likely reverted to night bombing. Without air superiorty
over the target daylight bombing created too many losses.

> >Whilst this may
> >have suited the B-17 with machine guns sprouting everywhere (although I
> >don't think it was appropriate before P-51D escorts were available), it
> >may not have suited the Lanc. You simply can't enforce US practises on
> >UK types in an attempt to 'equate' them with one another.
>
> Close formation flying both increased the concentration of the bomb
> pattern and the effectiveness of return fire from the gunners. The
> RAF were extolling this in 1939 with Wellingtons over Heligoland
> Bight, and continued to do so in "large-scale" daylight ops (e.g. the
> Lancasters in the Augsburg raid).
>


Which were unmitigated disasters. The Heligoland raid had 50%
losses and during the Augsburg raid 97 squadron lost 7 out of 12
aircraft. Bottom line is the .303 was worfully inadequate against
fighters armed with 20 and 30 mm cannon and unescorted daylight
raids were unsustainable.

> >One Halifax squadron removed the nose and mid-upper turrets, armour,
> >flame dampers and various other bits, the lighter weight and less
> >restricted engines flew higher, faster and their losses were reduced
> >significantly.
>
> This works at night, where difficulty of interception is the primary
> defence. It would have been a lot less effective when some measure of
> resiliance and defensive capacity was required, which is why the RAF
> stuck self-sealing tanks, protective armour and increased armament on
> their bombers after their daylight experiences in 1939. Increasing
> height and cruising speed at night made it harder for night-fighters
> with a marginal performance advantage to achieve an interception,
> particularly within a context where there were easier targets at
> slower speeds and lower height to engage first. The same dynamic
> doesn't neccessarily apply in daytime, in fact loose formations and
> seperation from the main body positively attract enemy fighter
> attention in those circumstances.
>

Sure but as both the USAAF and RAF learned the hard way
tdeep penetration daylight raids were NOT sustainable without
fighter escort. Once air superiority had been gained the major risk
came from flak and in that case a tight formation may be a liability

ISTR that during late 44/45 daylight raids 617 squadron deliberately
flew in loose gaggle of aircraft rather than a tight box as this presented
a more dispersed target for the flak.

Keith

[The Revolution Will Not Be Televised]

On Wed, 23 Jul 2003 15:35:11 +0100, "Keith Willshaw"
> wrote:

>> Standard RAF practice was to tighen up daylight formations around
>> three-plane elements in vics. This was not as tight as a USAAF combat
>> box, but under a heavier fighter threat it probably would have evolved
>> further in that direction.
>
>More likely reverted to night bombing.

Of course.

>Without air superiorty
>over the target daylight bombing created too many losses.

No disagreement here.

>> Close formation flying both increased the concentration of the bomb
>> pattern and the effectiveness of return fire from the gunners. The
>> RAF were extolling this in 1939 with Wellingtons over Heligoland
>> Bight, and continued to do so in "large-scale" daylight ops (e.g. the
>> Lancasters in the Augsburg raid).
>
>Which were unmitigated disasters.

Of course they were. The point is that the RAF when flying in
daylight, did rely on some extent to formation flying and gun defence.
This was known to be inadequate in the absence of air superiority, and
I'm not claiming otherwise.

>The Heligoland raid had 50%
>losses and during the Augsburg raid 97 squadron lost 7 out of 12
>aircraft. Bottom line is the .303 was worfully inadequate against
>fighters armed with 20 and 30 mm cannon and unescorted daylight
>raids were unsustainable.

The .5in-armed B-17's suffered from the same dynamic. Given the
ranges at night were generally closer, the .303s were more effective
as a night defensive armament than by day. Even so, the main value of
a night bomber gunner was as a lookout to initiate evasive action.

>Sure but as both the USAAF and RAF learned the hard way
>tdeep penetration daylight raids were NOT sustainable without
>fighter escort.

Of course not, and I'm not contending otherwise. I'm just pointing
out how the late-war Lanc family evolved in the operational climate of
1944-45, which was permissive enough to allow daylight bombing to be
resumed and a certain level of adaption for that role in terms of
aircraft equipment to be utilised.

>ISTR that during late 44/45 daylight raids 617 squadron deliberately
>flew in loose gaggle of aircraft rather than a tight box as this presented
>a more dispersed target for the flak.

Formation flying in fully-laden B.1S Lancs was never a practicable
proposition - there was almost no margin of available power in hand
for formating.

Gavin Bailey

--

"...this level of misinformation suggests some Americans may be
avoiding having an experience of cognitive dissonance."
- 'Poll shows errors in beliefs on Iraq, 9/11'
The Charlotte Observer, 20th June 2003

[Joe Osman]

Peter Stickney wrote:
>
> In article >,
> Guy Alcala > writes:
> > Cub Driver wrote:
> >
> >> >I shall have to re-play my tape of a UK airshow that Douglas Bader narrates
> >> >and tells of his first flight in a jet it went something like "Well, there I
> >> >sat in the cockpit ready for my first flight and braced myself.....and you
> >> >know, the thing took off down the runway like an old lorry!"
> >>
> >> That sounds about right. The B-47 had the advantage of peacetime
> >> development, but its engines were so slow to spool up that the plane
> >> had to land under power with a parachute. Lacking the power, it would
> >> crash if it had to go around.
> >
> > While correct about the B-47, you're talking about two separate issues. The
> > Meteor's (and all early jets) slow accel time on take-off had nothing to do with
> > spool-up time, as they'd already be spooled up prior to takeoff, and everything
> > to do with their relatively low power to weight ratios and low thrust at low
> > speeds. I will now make way for Mr. Stickney, who I trust will be along any
> > moment now to give his thrust vs. power lecture, much as it must irritate him to
> > have to constantly repeat it ;-)
>
> To quote Lazlo, the Human Cannon Ball, "Once more into the Breech!"
>
> I'm going to make this a bit elementary, in some ways. Not
> patronizing, by any means, but it's kinda late, and I'm a bit
> Elementary right now myself. I just want to keep the context clear.
>
> So, let's define what our terms are. What's Power? Power is the
> amount of force required to move a certain mass a certain distance in
> a certain time. The usual measure is Horsepower, which corresponds to
> the effort required to lift 550 lbs 1 foot in 1 second, or, to put it
> another way, 550 lbs-ft/sec. (You metric folks would read this as
> about 0.75 Kilowatts.)
<snip>
> --
> Pete Stickney
> A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many
> bad measures. -- Daniel Webster

Actually, power is the product of the amount of force
required to move a certain mass a certain distance in a
certain time times that distance and the reciprocal of that
time.

Joe


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[Guy Alcala]

John Halliwell wrote:

> In article >, Guy Alcala
> > writes
> >In short, design and equip them
> >to do the same job and they'll do it with payloads within a couple of hundred
> >pounds (either way) of each other. The whole Lanc vs. B-17 argument is just
> >ludicrous.
>
> The crucial point though, is that you're assuming the Lanc would have to
> follow US practises and fly in the big box formations.

No, I'm saying that _if_ you followed US practises etc., the Lanc's performance
would be within a few % either way of the B-17's. Nowhere did I say that you had
to do so, but that is the variable that is always left out of the Lanc vs. B-17
threads, so that they wind up comparing apples and oranges.

> Whilst this may
> have suited the B-17 with machine guns sprouting everywhere (although I
> don't think it was appropriate before P-51D escorts were available), it
> may not have suited the Lanc. You simply can't enforce US practises on
> UK types in an attempt to 'equate' them with one another.

See above.

> One Halifax squadron removed the nose and mid-upper turrets, armour,
> flame dampers and various other bits, the lighter weight and less
> restricted engines flew higher, faster and their losses were reduced
> significantly.

And so did B-17 and B-24 groups operating by day at various times and places, and
that's my point - it's ludicrous to compare two aircraft designed and equipped for
totally different missions and claim that one is "superior" to the other, by
looking _only_ at the mission for which one of them is optimised. In the B-17 vs.
Lanc argument, this method is routinely used to 'prove' that the Lanc had a better
payload/radius than the B-17, by comparing the Lanc's performance operating singly
at night, with the B-17's performance operating in formation by day at higher
altitudes. Basing a conclusion on such an 'analysis' is a prime example of GIGO.

Guy

[Guy Alcala]

The Revolution Will Not Be Televised wrote:

> On Wed, 23 Jul 2003 13:49:11 +0100, John Halliwell
> > wrote:
>
> >>They evolved that way, from roughly similar airframes as a starting
> >>point. Lancasters flying by day would soon develop heavier armour,
> >>especially around the engines, less bombload in exchange for more fuel
> >>to burn for higher height on the ingress route, and heavier armament
> >>like .50 calibres in the rear turret - all of which they were adopting
> >>by 1945, which cut into their bombload margin over the B-17.
> >
> >Interesting point, any sources for this. I haven't heard about
> >increasing armour for daylight ops, or trading bomb load for fuel.
>
> Look at the trend evident in the Rose turreted B.1/B.IIIs, and the
> engine installation in the Lanc IV which directly influenced the
> Lincoln (two-stage Merlins with armoured, annular radiators), let
> alone the massively increased armament in the Lincoln (e.g. twin 20mm
> Hispanos in the mid-upper turret). The only way to get more fuel in
> the Lanc for Tiger Force operations was in the bomb-bay, which had
> obvious implications for the bombload carried. This just represents a
> gradual and evolutionary change in operational emphasis.

<snip>

> >The 50s in the rear turrets were IIRC fitted only as a pair instead of
> >the quad 303s.
>
> Sure, but this still represented an increase in effectiveness at
> daylight engagement ranges.

And let's remember that each .50 weighed 65 lb., while each .303 weighed 24
lb. As a perfect example of the apples to oranges comparison I'm talking
about, the 8 .303s carried by the typical Lanc weigh a total of 192 lb.
while the 13 .50s carried by the typical (in late '43) B-17G weigh 845 lb.
Oops, there goes 653 lb. of bombs/fuel right there, and then we've got to
carry extra fuel to haul that extra weight back from the target. And we're
ignoring the extra weight and drag of a ball turret and waist guns plus the
gunners and their equipment, which means carrying extra fuel to haul all
this extra weight both ways, which the night bombers didn't have).

Guy

[Keith Willshaw]

"Joe Osman" > wrote in message
...
> Peter Stickney wrote:
> >

>
> Actually, power is the product of the amount of force
> required to move a certain mass a certain distance in a
> certain time times that distance and the reciprocal of that
> time.
>
> Joe

Huh

If the body is in steady motion then neglecting friction the power
requirement would be zero, since friction varies enormously this
is clearly NOT a valid definition

Quite simply power is a measure of energy production per unit
time or put another way the rate of doing work

The velocity of the engine or the vehicle its mounted in is irrelevant.

Keith

[John Halliwell]

In article >, Guy Alcala
> writes
>No, I'm saying that _if_ you followed US practises etc., the Lanc's performance
>would be within a few % either way of the B-17's.

But why drag the performance of an aircraft down by using it in a way
that is clearly inefficient? All this discussion has confirmed to me is
how inefficient the big box formations actually were. Dragging the
performance of a heavy bomber down to the point where it is carrying a
similar load to a Mossie, whilst remaining considerably vulnerable (and
with a crew of ten), doesn't make much sense to me.

A couple of Mossies with a light load, perhaps 2,000lbs each start to
sound more and more promising. Small, fast formations may have been very
effective.

> Nowhere did I say that you
>had
>to do so, but that is the variable that is always left out of the Lanc vs. B-17
>threads, so that they wind up comparing apples and oranges.

The B-17 bomb bay was not the best arrangement for carrying large loads.
As such had it been used in night ops, the range/payload may not have
been able to be improved to compensate for lighter fuel (or fewer
guns/crew) loads. On that basis, it's easier to drag the Lanc down by
hampering it with US practises than boost the B-17 by using RAF
practises.

--
John

[Guy Alcala]

John Halliwell wrote:

> In article >, Guy Alcala
> > writes
> >No, I'm saying that _if_ you followed US practises etc., the Lanc's performance
> >would be within a few % either way of the B-17's.
>
> But why drag the performance of an aircraft down by using it in a way
> that is clearly inefficient? All this discussion has confirmed to me is
> how inefficient the big box formations actually were. Dragging the
> performance of a heavy bomber down to the point where it is carrying a
> similar load to a Mossie, whilst remaining considerably vulnerable (and
> with a crew of ten), doesn't make much sense to me.

Who says it was inefficient, under the prevailing circumstances? Clearly, the RAF
heavies would have suffered much heavier losses than U.S. heavies if they had tried
to operate by day, in formation, in the same time frame (especially before air
superiority had been won). Out of formation, they would have been slaughtered on an
even more routine basis than the U.S. heavies were, because they had no effective
daytime defensive armament, lacked armor, altitude performance, co-pilots etc. etc.
And they would have been knocked out of formation much more easily, lacking all the
above.

> A couple of Mossies with a light load, perhaps 2,000lbs each start to
> sound more and more promising. Small, fast formations may have been very
> effective.

Small 'formations' for point targets, sure. For large industrial targets covered by
smoke and clouds, almost certainly not. A Mossie could carry at most 6 x 500 lb.
bombs (2 external), while a B-17 could carry twice that internally, i.e triple the
bmb load you recommend. If the Mossie's extra speed prevents more intercepts and it
can bomb from a lower altitude, it may well be more efficient than carrying more
bombs and dropping from higher up, but it's by no means certain that's the case
(unlike some on the NG, I don't rule out the possibility, but the only way to find
out for sure would have been to actually try it, and that didn't happen).

Now, could a B-17's performance be improved by removing some or all of the defensive
armament? Sure, which was done starting mid-44. At first, they removed the radio
room gun and left one of the waist gunners behind; less ammo was usually carried as
well. By 1945, one combat wing ordered one of its groups to remove the ball turret
from their a/c, another group the chin turrets and the third group both waist guns
(and their gunners). A different group in '45 was given permission to remove the
chin turret, ball turret AND either both waist guns or the top turret (forget
which). It boosted cruise speed by about 25 mph, or allowed a tradeoff of fuel,
bombload, and/or height. But it was possible (and made sense to do so) because by
then the fighter threat was rapidly shrinking. Defensive armament doesn't help
against flak, which was the primary threat in that period, but speed and altitude
do.

> > Nowhere did I say that you
> >had
> >to do so, but that is the variable that is always left out of the Lanc vs. B-17
> >threads, so that they wind up comparing apples and oranges.
>
> The B-17 bomb bay was not the best arrangement for carrying large loads.

Certainly (the same was true to a lesser extent with the B-24), but that was due to
the structural design decisions made, not an inherent effect of design for day vs.
night bombing. Just look at the B-29 and B-36. I don't know why U.S. heavy bomber
designers pre-war went for short and tall bomb bays rather than long and shallow
oones like the RAF's; FAIK it was considered to give a better bomb pattern, or maybe
there was some different reason. It certainly wasn't universal among U.S.
bomber/attack a/c, as I can attest having had to slide over the wing spar (just like
a Lanc) to go from fore to aft in a P-2 Neptune.


> As such had it been used in night ops, the range/payload may not have
> been able to be improved to compensate for lighter fuel (or fewer
> guns/crew) loads. On that basis, it's easier to drag the Lanc down by
> hampering it with US practises than boost the B-17 by using RAF
> practises.

The question is, what was the typical load actually carried by Lancs? In 1943, it
was about 8,000 lb. (effective bombload was something like 7,450 lb. The difference
represents aborts and a/c shot down before bombing ). In 1944 and '45 it increased,
both because there were more short-range tactical missions (to more lightly defended
targets), the defenses were lighter, and because friendly terrain was closer
(allowing more fuel efficient flight profiles and more divert possibilities if low
on fuel, i.e. less reserve fuel needed to be carried). Can a B-17 carry 8 x 1,000
lb. bombs in the bomb bay? There seems some question about that - it could
definitely carry 6 (the B-24 could carry 8), and could carry a pair externally.
Could a British heavy carry more individually larger bombs internally? Yes (with
the possible exception of the Stirling), but again that was a design decision, not
an inherent effect of the type of bombing to be done.

Guy

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: #1 Jet of World War II
>From: Guy Alcala
>Date: 7/23/03 7:33 PM Pacific Daylight Time
>Message-id: >

>bombs and dropping from higher up, but it's by no means certain that's the
>case
>(unlike some on the NG, I don't rule out the possibility, but the only way to
>find
>out for sure would have been to actually try it, and that didn't happen).
>

I guess it is possible to destroy Berlin one house at a time, But that isn't
the best way to get the job done.

Arthur Kramer
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[Guy Alcala]

The Revolution Will Not Be Televised wrote:

> On Wed, 23 Jul 2003 15:35:11 +0100, "Keith Willshaw"
> > wrote:

>>> <John H.>

<snip>

> >> Close formation flying both increased the concentration of the bomb
> >> pattern and the effectiveness of return fire from the gunners. The
> >> RAF were extolling this in 1939 with Wellingtons over Heligoland
> >> Bight, and continued to do so in "large-scale" daylight ops (e.g. the
> >> Lancasters in the Augsburg raid).
> >
> >Which were unmitigated disasters.
>
> Of course they were. The point is that the RAF when flying in
> daylight, did rely on some extent to formation flying and gun defence.

And immediately after the Heligoland mission, when it was found that the nose
and tail turrets were unable to bear to the sides where Mfighters were
deliberately making high deflection passes, the RAF added waist guns to their
Wimpeys before going over to night bombing. IIRR, some of the early 9 Sq. a/c
had a sliding hatch on the top of the fuselage with a gun deployable from it,
but this was removed in later production. As it happened, the .303 was pretty
useless when facing cannon-armed (and armored) fighters, but there was at least
some deterrent value in the tracer, and they could always get lucky.

Guy

[The Revolution Will Not Be Televised]

On Thu, 24 Jul 2003 02:33:56 GMT, Guy Alcala
> wrote:

[snip agreed points]

>The question is, what was the typical load actually carried by Lancs? In 1943, it
>was about 8,000 lb. (effective bombload was something like 7,450 lb. The difference
>represents aborts and a/c shot down before bombing ).

Actually, that's valid for the Berlin raids, but shorter distance
tonnages were higher, even before 1944-45. Middlebrook gives figures
of 10,000 - 13,000 lbs bombloads for the Hamburg raids in 1943,
against approximately 5,000 lbs for the B-17s which seems relatively
constant regardless of the penetration (e.g. mentioned again for the
first Berlin raid, according to Ethell & Price). The B-17s also had a
reduction in percentage of bombload carried to target due to losses,
even if the use of air spares reduced the abort percentage.

[snip other agreed points]

Another point is the actual numbers of bombs on target; daylight raids
were preferable to both forces, when this was regarded as practicable,
even with weather and visual constraints (smokes screens & dust).

Gavin Bailey

--

"...this level of misinformation suggests some Americans may be
avoiding having an experience of cognitive dissonance."
- 'Poll shows errors in beliefs on Iraq, 9/11'
The Charlotte Observer, 20th June 2003

[Guy Alcala]

ArtKramr wrote:

> >Subject: Re: #1 Jet of World War II
> >From: Guy Alcala
> >Date: 7/23/03 7:33 PM Pacific Daylight Time
> >Message-id: >
>
> >bombs and dropping from higher up, but it's by no means certain that's the
> >case
> >(unlike some on the NG, I don't rule out the possibility, but the only way to
> >find
> >out for sure would have been to actually try it, and that didn't happen).
> >
>
> I guess it is possible to destroy Berlin one house at a time, But that isn't
> the best way to get the job done.

That assumes that destroying German houses was our (the U.S.A.A.F.) avowed policy
and doctrine. It wasn't, although as a practical matter the U.S. stopped worrying
about doing area bombing with the heavies from the fall of 1943 on to the end of
the war. If we could see to bomb visually, great; otherwise, we'd bomb by radar
or other radio navaids with a 2 or 3 mile CEP, which is area bombing by anyone's
standard. Of course, even when the heavies could bomb visually, 'precision' was
relative. Here's Elmer Bendiner, a B-17 Nav. in the 379th BG(H), talking about
the June '43 mission against the I.G. Farben synthetic rubber plant at Huls, in
the Ruhr. Writing some 35 years later, he says:

"Our losses, including those of the main and diversionary forces, amounted to 20
planes, two hundred men, roughly ten percent. Nevertheless, our superiors were
pleased with us because we had dropped 422 tons bombs and, according to the
reconnaissance photos, only 333.4 tons had been wasted on homes, streets, public
parks, zoos, department stores and air-raid shelters. This passed for precision.

"Actually Huls might have been put out of comission permanently if there had been
a follow-up. After our mission the city went almost unscathed right to the end of
the war. We had devastated buidlings and shaken morale, but tire production,
although on a limited scale, was resumed within a month. Synthetic-rubber
production suffered perhaps six months but soon was reaching new peaks. I have
searched the records and find no explanation for our failure to return and finish
the job. The Germans were astonished at the time. After the war American
scholars of our air strategy were surprised, but nobody nitpicks a victory. A
cold analysis of the balance sheet at Huls indicates that the lives lost that day
-- American and German, in the air, on the ground, and in shelters underground --
had not brought closer the end of the war or of Hitler. But at the time we did
not know the price and thought we had a bargain."

As Bendiner writes, the Huls raid was considered by us at the time to have
achieved excellent bombing results. IIRR, "Impact" devoted an article to the
mission.

Guy

[Guy Alcala]

The Revolution Will Not Be Televised wrote:

> On Wed, 23 Jul 2003 11:40:46 GMT, Guy Alcala
> > wrote:
>
> [Lanc bombing height]
>
> >> The most common bombing heights (excluding exceptions like the
> >> Peenemunde raid) seem to have been around 18,000 feet.
> >
> >Odd that you should mention that, as Middlebrook ("The Nuremberg Raid") says
> >that a/c of all the Groups on the mission (with the exception of No. 1 GP;
> >see below), whether Lanc or Halifax, were evenly assigned to one of four
> >cruise heights -- 20, 21, 22, or 23 thousand feet.
>
> This was common practice: although I was suprised to see 3 Group
> getting the lower height bands even as they started to re-equip with
> Lancasters in early 1944. The raids I researched may not be
> representative, however, and I think those might have included some
> late Stirling raids, which would explain it, although they were
> normally banded by Group and by type within that, just like the wave
> timings for TOT.

The other cause may be that 3 Group had a couple of Lanc Mk. II squadrons in
roughly that period, 115 and 514. Come to think of it, 61 Squadron had a single
Lanc Mk. II flight early in the a/c's career, but I don't know if the crew you
were studying was flying Merlin or Hercules-engined a/c. The latter seem to have
had a service ceiling a two or three thousand feet lower than the Merlin-engined
a/c, so possibly that explains it.

Guy

[The Revolution Will Not Be Televised]

On Thu, 24 Jul 2003 07:27:35 GMT, Guy Alcala
> wrote:

>> Actually, that's valid for the Berlin raids, but shorter distance
>> tonnages were higher, even before 1944-45.
>
>The 7,450 lb. figure was apparently the average effective Lanc load over all missions for
>1943, and was the one used by Freeman (the Air Marshal, not Roger) when justifying use of
>the Mossie for the LNSF.

That's interesting, as "four tons" seems to be the normal planning and
statistical summary of the average Lanc bombload that I've seen.
Nevertheless, they were carrying more than 8,000 lbs from the very
beginning, e.g. to the Ruhr and on mining ops. Even in 1943 I suspect
this was a conservative estimate, but nonetheless a reasonable one for
planning purposes.

>With a 4,000 lb. cookie, the Mossie would have an average
>effective load of 3,735 lb given the assumed abort/loss rate.

This must date to the end of 1943, then. I suppose that might be
consistent with the lower tonnages on the deep penetration raids the
Lancs were then bearing the brunt of.

> Hamburg is a bit of a special case, as like Emden and the other
>coastal ports most of the cruise part of flight could be made over the North Sea,
>allowing a much more gradual climb profile and more limited exposure time to the
>defenses.

The loads seem to be similar for raids on the Ruhr and higher for
occupied Europe. Even for the Battle of Berlin Middlebrook gives an
average over over 8,000 lbs for the participating Lancasters (8 Group
excluded).

>> Another point is the actual numbers of bombs on target; daylight raids
>> were preferable to both forces, when this was regarded as practicable,
>> even with weather and visual constraints (smokes screens & dust).
>
>Yes, if you could see the target the bombing accuracy was higher, and (pilotage)
>navigation tended to be better by day as well.

BC could minimise some of the inherent inaccuracies of night bombing,
e.g. by refreshed and off-set ground and sky marking along with radio
raids, and in the process achieve some degree of all-weather
capability, but even with looser formations and a bigger inherent
spread of bomb concentration they wanted to bomb by day if they could.
Even fractional glimpses of ground references through heavy overcast
was a critical navigational advantage largely lost on night operations
when basics like drift and groundspeed were much harder to calculate
accurately.

Gavin Bailey

--

"...this level of misinformation suggests some Americans may be
avoiding having an experience of cognitive dissonance."
- 'Poll shows errors in beliefs on Iraq, 9/11'
The Charlotte Observer, 20th June 2003

[Keith Willshaw]

"John Halliwell" > wrote in message
...
> In article >, Guy Alcala
> > writes
> >No, I'm saying that _if_ you followed US practises etc., the Lanc's
performance
> >would be within a few % either way of the B-17's.
>
> But why drag the performance of an aircraft down by using it in a way
> that is clearly inefficient? All this discussion has confirmed to me is
> how inefficient the big box formations actually were. Dragging the
> performance of a heavy bomber down to the point where it is carrying a
> similar load to a Mossie, whilst remaining considerably vulnerable (and
> with a crew of ten), doesn't make much sense to me.
>

Its a good job they didnt do that then isnt it ?

> A couple of Mossies with a light load, perhaps 2,000lbs each start to
> sound more and more promising. Small, fast formations may have been very
> effective.
>

In daylight they would have suffered excessive losses. The Mosquitoes
of Bomber Command were excellent night bombers but unless
you have long range fighter escorts they would not have survived
over Germany in 1943.

The Mosquito's that were used in daylight raids were mostly
the FB variety typically carrying 1000lb bomb loads and
making relatively shallow penetration raids into France
and the low countries


> > Nowhere did I say that you
> >had
> >to do so, but that is the variable that is always left out of the Lanc
vs. B-17
> >threads, so that they wind up comparing apples and oranges.
>
> The B-17 bomb bay was not the best arrangement for carrying large loads.
> As such had it been used in night ops, the range/payload may not have
> been able to be improved to compensate for lighter fuel (or fewer
> guns/crew) loads. On that basis, it's easier to drag the Lanc down by
> hampering it with US practises than boost the B-17 by using RAF
> practises.
>

Not really. Discarding the waist gunners and fairing over the positions
would have saved several hundred pounds and cruising at 30,000 ft
the B-17 would have been a tough target for German nightfighters.

Indeed bomber command used Fortress III's (B-17G) in 214
squadron in the Radio countermeasures role. Their operational loss
rate was 1.1%

Keith

[Lawrence Dillard]

"Joe Osman" > wrote in message
...
> Peter Stickney wrote:
> >
> > In article >,
> > Guy Alcala > writes:
> > > Cub Driver wrote:

SNIP

> > >> That sounds about right. The B-47 had the advantage of peacetime
> > >> development, but its engines were so slow to spool up that the plane
> > >> had to land under power with a parachute. Lacking the power, it would
> > >> crash if it had to go around.

This is not accurate. However, I once saw a British-produced video dealing
with the Comet/Nomrod in which this canard apparently first appeared. The
narration suggested that US jetengine was so deficient that the B-47
NEEDED JATO assist for ALL takeoffs, and confused the use of drag 'chutes
for reduced landing distances with a lack of power for a go-around.

The B-47 used six engines approximately the same as the four used for
supplementary power on B-36s; as fas as spool-up times are concerned, in the
typical useage by the B-36, the pilots would start and bring the four
engines up to speed even as the a/c was in its takeoff roll under the power
of its six piston engines. By the time the B-36 reached takeoff speed, all
four jets were at maximum thrust. Not a long spool-up time at all.

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: #1 Jet of World War II
>From: Guy Alcala
>Date: 7/24/03 12:45 AM Pacific Daylight Time
>Message-id: >
>
>ArtKramr wrote:
>
>> >Subject: Re: #1 Jet of World War II
>> >From: Guy Alcala
>> >Date: 7/23/03 7:33 PM Pacific Daylight Time
>> >Message-id: >
>>
>> >bombs and dropping from higher up, but it's by no means certain that's the
>> >case
>> >(unlike some on the NG, I don't rule out the possibility, but the only way
>to
>> >find
>> >out for sure would have been to actually try it, and that didn't happen).
>> >
>>
>> I guess it is possible to destroy Berlin one house at a time, But that
>isn't
>> the best way to get the job done.
>


I see the analogy sauled way over your head unrecogniosed for what it was.


s a practical matter the U.S. stopped
>worrying
>about doing area bombing with the heavies from the fall of 1943 on to the end

Stopped worrying? What does that ,mean exactly?
>of


>the war. If we could see to bomb visually, great; otherwise, we'd bomb by
>radar
>or other radio navaids with a 2 or 3 mile CEP, which is area bombing by
>anyone's
>standard. Of course, even when the heavies could bomb visually, 'precision'
>was
>relative. Here's Elmer Bendiner, a B-17 Nav. in the 379th BG(H), talking
>about
>the June '43 mission against the I.G. Farben synthetic rubber plant at Huls,
>in
>the Ruhr. Writing some 35 years later, he says:
>
>"Our losses, including those of the main and diversionary forces, amounted to
>20
>planes, two hundred men, roughly ten percent. Nevertheless, our superiors
>were
>pleased with us because we had dropped 422 tons bombs and, according to the
>reconnaissance photos, only 333.4 tons had been wasted on homes, streets,
>public
>parks, zoos, department stores and air-raid shelters. This passed for
>precision.
>
>"Actually Huls might have been put out of comission permanently if there had
>been
>a follow-up. After our mission the city went almost unscathed right to the
>end of
>the war. We had devastated buidlings and shaken morale, but tire production,
>although on a limited scale, was resumed within a month. Synthetic-rubber
>production suffered perhaps six months but soon was reaching new peaks. I
>have
>searched the records and find no explanation for our failure to return and
>finish
>the job. The Germans were astonished at the time. After the war American
>scholars of our air strategy were surprised, but nobody nitpicks a victory.
>A
>cold analysis of the balance sheet at Huls indicates that the lives lost that
>day
Huls raid was considered by us at the time to have
>achieved excellent bombing results. IIRR, "Impact" devoted an article to the
>mission.
>
>Guy

You seem to miss the point of the air war over Europe. Let me explain ., It
was to hit he enemy and hurt him all the time every time. In good weather and
bad. With high losses or low losses. But never ever stop the raids. Some were
more successful than others. Some were more accurate than others. But never the
less the missions would be flown, the losses taken and we would never stop.
Your petty backbighting criticism made up of 100% hindsight takes no
recognition of the determinantion we had to erase Germany. And in all the
missions you criticise with such contempt I doubt if you could have doe any
better than we did under the circumstances. In fact there is no evidence that
you could even have made the cut as aircrew at all. So replace your attacks on
our performance and just say thank you and let it go at that...



Arthur Kramer
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: #1 Jet of World War II
>From: Guy Alcala
>Date: 7/24/03 10:18 AM Pacific Daylight Time
>Message-id:

>No, the point of the war was to fly the missions at a cost we could afford
>(preferably the lowest cost to ourselves) and the highest co

You live in a dream world of unreality. Many missions had to be flown no
matter what the cost. And we flew them. And paid the price.

Arthur Kramer
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[Guy Alcala]

ArtKramr wrote:

> >Subject: Re: #1 Jet of World War II
> >From: Guy Alcala
> >Date: 7/24/03 10:18 AM Pacific Daylight Time
> >Message-id:
>
> >No, the point of the war was to fly the missions at a cost we could afford
> >(preferably the lowest cost to ourselves) and the highest co
>
> You live in a dream world of unreality. Many missions had to be flown no
> matter what the cost. And we flew them. And paid the price.

Whatever, Art, I'm not going to waste any more energy arguing with you.

Guy

[John Halliwell]

In article >, Keith Willshaw <keithNoSpa
> writes
>In daylight they would have suffered excessive losses. The Mosquitoes
>of Bomber Command were excellent night bombers but unless
>you have long range fighter escorts they would not have survived
>over Germany in 1943.

I was assuming long range fighter escort as that was the only way
daylight bombing was ever going to work. Without it, losses would be
high as they were with all other types.

>Not really. Discarding the waist gunners and fairing over the positions
>would have saved several hundred pounds and cruising at 30,000 ft
>the B-17 would have been a tough target for German nightfighters.

On that basis, removing the waste guns (of questionable use anyway) and
fairing over might have been a better idea for daylight ops.

--
John

[Peter Stickney]

In article >,
"Lawrence Dillard" > writes:
>
> "Joe Osman" > wrote in message
> ...
>> Peter Stickney wrote:
>> >
>> > In article >,
>> > Guy Alcala > writes:
>> > > Cub Driver wrote:
>
> SNIP
>
> > > >> That sounds about right. The B-47 had the advantage of peacetime
>> > >> development, but its engines were so slow to spool up that the plane
>> > >> had to land under power with a parachute. Lacking the power, it would
>> > >> crash if it had to go around.
>
> This is not accurate. However, I once saw a British-produced video dealing
> with the Comet/Nomrod in which this canard apparently first appeared. The
> narration suggested that US jetengine was so deficient that the B-47
> NEEDED JATO assist for ALL takeoffs, and confused the use of drag 'chutes
> for reduced landing distances with a lack of power for a go-around.
>
> The B-47 used six engines approximately the same as the four used for
> supplementary power on B-36s; as fas as spool-up times are concerned, in the
> typical useage by the B-36, the pilots would start and bring the four
> engines up to speed even as the a/c was in its takeoff roll under the power
> of its six piston engines. By the time the B-36 reached takeoff speed, all
> four jets were at maximum thrust. Not a long spool-up time at all.

The B-47 did have, as they say today, some "issues" with taking off
and landing. The airplane was entirely opimized for cruising at 'bout
500 kts/35,000', with all other considerations being very much
secondary. This meant that it had a pretty small wing/high wing
loading, very low drag, and even more than most other early jets, was
seriously underpowered at low speeds. It didn't matter what the
engine spoolup times were (About 8-12 seconds, IIRC). The biggest
probelm were wer getting the thing to speed up at all at low speeds,
or takeoff, and getting it to slow down. (The bicycle gear, which
meant that you couldn't adjust AOA on takeoff or landing didn't help,
either.) A B-47 certainly could take off withoug JATO, it just took,
for a B-47E, about 10,500' of ground run to do so. the JATO buttle cut
about 3500' off of that. (Standard day, don't try it in the summer.)
The lack of drag was a problem in the approach and landing. The
airplane didn't respond well to power changes. You could haul the
throttles all the way back, and it just kept going. Maintaining
proper speeds in the pattern (And, with that bicycle gear, you only
landed at the exact right speed - too fast, and you'd either glide the
length of the runway or bounce it off the nose truck) made things
rather tough. The solution was to carry and stream an "Approach
Chute", a 16 diameter parachute that added enough drag that it would
actually slow down when you chopped the throttles. The Braking Chute
was a 32' job. (Ground roll was 4600' without the Brake Chute, and
2600' with. If you could take it off from a field, you could land it.
(All numbers from the B-47E-IV SAC Chart, Feb. 1966)
The difficulties of getting a B-47 off of, and onto the ground, and
the very dicey takeoff behavior of the Comet I (A Comet I had to be
rotated to an AOA of 10 degrees at exactly the right spot in the
takeoff run. At 9 degrees, it wouldn't fly from any runway known to
Man, God, or Republic Aviation (Who knew a lot about long ground runs)
At 11 degrees, you generated so much induced drag that you'd never
reach takeoff speed. Most of the COmet accidents were takeoff
crashes, not the two in-flight breakups. (Nearly half the Comet I/IAs
wer written off) U.S. airlines rather suspicious of jet airliners in
general. It took live demonstrations of tbe Boeing 367-80 to convince
the airlines that a jet airliner that flew like an airliner was possible.

That being said, it does sound like the Brit Documentary makers were
waxing a bit hyperbolic. Not that USAnian documentarists are any
better.

--
Pete Stickney
A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many
bad measures. -- Daniel Webster

[Guy Alcala]

John Halliwell wrote:

> In article >, Keith Willshaw <keithNoSpa
> > writes
> >In daylight they would have suffered excessive losses. The Mosquitoes
> >of Bomber Command were excellent night bombers but unless
> >you have long range fighter escorts they would not have survived
> >over Germany in 1943.
>
> I was assuming long range fighter escort as that was the only way
> daylight bombing was ever going to work. Without it, losses would be
> high as they were with all other types.
>
> >Not really. Discarding the waist gunners and fairing over the positions
> >would have saved several hundred pounds and cruising at 30,000 ft
> >the B-17 would have been a tough target for German nightfighters.
>
> On that basis, removing the waste guns (of questionable use anyway) and
> fairing over might have been a better idea for daylight ops.

No real need to fair over the waist hatches, as they either already have
removable hatches (pre-B-17G) or fixed windows with the ball mount for the
..50 installed in it. As I noted in another post, removing the waist guns
and/or gunners was done from mid-44 on in the ETO. ETO B-24s, about the
same time, removed the ball turret and the gunners were sent to the MTO.
the other advantage of removing guns/gunners aft of the wing was that it
allowed the Cg to move back forward, closer to where it was supposed to be.
Like most a/c, weight had been constantly added, and it usually seems to be
added behind the Cg. This was a problem with both the B-17 and B-24, making
them less stable and more difficult to fly in formation/on instruments.

Guy

[The Revolution Will Not Be Televised]

On Fri, 25 Jul 2003 00:11:48 GMT, Guy Alcala
> wrote:

>As to that, I've seen loads like a cookie plus a 4,000 lb. incendiary cluster being a fairly
>typical load.

The standard area-bombing load throughout most of the war as one 4,000
lb HC "Cookie" and various Small Bomb Containers making up the rest of
the useable bombload, mostly with 4 lb stick incendiaries.

>On the low-level daytime Lanc raid on Augsburg in 1942, admittedly an unusual
>case, the a/c apparently only carried 4 x 1,000 lb. bombs each.

I think they were still playing around with the maximum all-up weight.
Mason in his book on the Lanc quoted a 44 Sqn pilot who lost the
wing-tips and had to perform a crash landing when carrying six 1,500
lb mines in that period after the all-up weight had been raised to
allow that load, which prompted Chadwick himself to turn up and
question the crew before beginning correctional airframe
strengthening.

>One thing Middlebrook or maybe it was Max Hastings noted was that at some point during the
>Battle of Berlin, the bomb loads were increased.

They seem to be for some groups. 1 Group certainly took advantage of
a further increase in all-up wieght (to 65,000 lbs IIRC) to hang yet
more bombs on their Lancs, to the detriment of the handling,
performance and inevitably the attrition rate as a consquence.

>The Jagdwaffe noticed this because there was
>an immediate increase in the shootdown rate, presumably because the a/c were cruising at lower
>altitudes and/or were less maneuverable and more highly stressed, making them easier pickings.

I think this is what Bennett's criticism of Cookies being jettisoned
over the North Sea, which he saw with his own eyes, refers to. Having
said that, 5 Group's loads remained relatively stable at the lower
AUW, but their losses also increased over the period. So the German
defences were adapting to the Hamburg era tactics and improving over
time (more SN-2 sets becoming operational, Stirlings disappearing with
their ability to soak up the easist initial interceptions, etc) but
there's no doubt increasing the bombload at that stage carried too big
a performance penalty, with a consequent increase in losses and
decrease in morale.

Gavin Bailey

--

"...this level of misinformation suggests some Americans may be
avoiding having an experience of cognitive dissonance."
- 'Poll shows errors in beliefs on Iraq, 9/11'
The Charlotte Observer, 20th June 2003

[Peter Stickney]

In article >,
(The Revolution Will Not Be Televised) writes:
> On Thu, 24 Jul 2003 07:52:14 GMT, Guy Alcala
> > wrote:
>
>>> This was common practice: although I was suprised to see 3 Group
>>> getting the lower height bands even as they started to re-equip with
>>> Lancasters in early 1944.
>>
>>The other cause may be that 3 Group had a couple of Lanc Mk. II squadrons in
>>roughly that period, 115 and 514. Come to think of it, 61 Squadron had a single
>>Lanc Mk. II flight early in the a/c's career, but I don't know if the crew you
>>were studying was flying Merlin or Hercules-engined a/c.
>
> Merlins, the Herc-engines ones in 61 Sqn went to 3 Group fairly
> swiftly and before 1944. The aircraft involved were a mixture of B.1s
> and IIIs (W4950, ED314, EE176, EE186, ME310 and LM310, although I
> suspect the odd transposition in the serials) .
>
>> The latter seem to have
>>had a service ceiling a two or three thousand feet lower than the Merlin-engined
>>a/c, so possibly that explains it.
>
> That would indeed explain it, but I believed this was a bit later on
> when they were getting Merlin-engined variants (15 and 622 Sqn) even
> though the IIs were still operational at the time.
>
> Then again, given the legitibility of my own notes, they might have
> been allocated 26 - 28,0000 feet for all I know....

As a somewhat side note. I have some doubts about the reputation of
the Lancaster II wrt having a lower ceiling than the Lanc I/III.
The power available at height isn't really all that much different,
and you don't see a similar disparity, (or, for that matter, an
absolute difference) between the Merlin-powered Halifaxes (Which used
the same engine as the Lanc I), and the Herculese engined
aircraft. (Which used the same engine as the Lanc II).

I've nearly rebuilt my analysis tools that were lost when that hard
drive failed (And don't lecture me on backups - the lack of restorable
backups was part of the trigger for the upgrade in the first place.
Sometimes cascading failures can fork you over real good), adn I'll
make the Lancs II and Lanc III my test cases. We'll see how
Historical References stack up against the Fundamentals of
Werodynamics.

It wouldn't be the first time that the accepted references are
repeating bogus data. For example, I see the incorrect numbers for
the Merlin XX-23 series that were published in the '45-'46
_Jane's_All_the_World's_Aircraft repeated all over the place.

--
Pete Stickney
A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many
bad measures. -- Daniel Webster

[Peter Stickney]

In article >,
Guy Alcala > writes:
> John Halliwell wrote:
>
>> In article >, Guy Alcala
>> > writes
>> >In short, design and equip them
>> >to do the same job and they'll do it with payloads within a couple of hundred
>> >pounds (either way) of each other. The whole Lanc vs. B-17 argument is just
>> >ludicrous.
>>
>> The crucial point though, is that you're assuming the Lanc would have to
>> follow US practises and fly in the big box formations.
>
> No, I'm saying that _if_ you followed US practises etc., the Lanc's performance
> would be within a few % either way of the B-17's. Nowhere did I say that you had
> to do so, but that is the variable that is always left out of the Lanc vs. B-17
> threads, so that they wind up comparing apples and oranges.
>
>> Whilst this may
>> have suited the B-17 with machine guns sprouting everywhere (although I
>> don't think it was appropriate before P-51D escorts were available), it
>> may not have suited the Lanc. You simply can't enforce US practises on
>> UK types in an attempt to 'equate' them with one another.
>

I've just come across my notes from the Day Bomber Lanc thread, and
here's some stuff that didn't make it into the thread that may be
germane to this discussion. With reference to armor weight.
Wartime Lancasters didn't have a whole lot of armor. The only armor,
in fact, was the Pilot's seatback, and a bulkhead over the main wing
spar, where it crosses the fuselage. Figure about 150# of armor.
It did have self-sealing tanks. (I don't know if it was for all
tanks, though. If not, you lose about 7% fuel capacity, and 3/4# for
every gallon protected.
U.S.A.A.F. day bombers carried armor at all crew positions, except
Bombardier 9Can't se through armor, after all) and the rule of thumb
was 100# per position, doubled in the case of the cockpit, which was
armored both to the rear, and to the front. Each oil cooler or
radiator that was armored cost 80#, Turret weights, less guns, are
about the same. A .50 cal gun weights as much as 2 .30s, so the tail
turret doesn't change, but the nose and top turrets gain 65#. A ball
turret, with guns, or its equivalent in a remotely sighted turret,
plus the extra crewman to operate it, is 1200#.

So - added weight for a day-bomber Lanc. (This will have to come out
of fuel or bombs), we'll assume similar ammunition wieghts

Armor for nose, tail, and top turrets: 300#
Armor for cockpit, pilot only 200#
Addition of lower turret 1200#
upgrade guns to .50 cal 130#
Armored Oil Coolers 320#
Armored Radiators 320#
That's a total of 2470#

Note that a co-pilot is a good thing
if adding a copilot, add 370#
(170# crewman, more armor)
Total oe 2840#

Note that that isn't adding stuff like waist guns.
THere's another area of vulnerability. Liquid-cooled engines are much
less tolerant of damage, even if teh cooling system is protected. A
single substantial hit (.50 cal & up) on the blcok of a liquid cooled
engine _will_ crack the block, causing coolant and oil leaks. The
air-cooled radials are much more tolerant of this kind of damage. You
can remove entire cylinders, and the engine may run well enough to get
home. There's a substantial extra safety margin, there.

>> One Halifax squadron removed the nose and mid-upper turrets, armour,
>> flame dampers and various other bits, the lighter weight and less
>> restricted engines flew higher, faster and their losses were reduced
>> significantly.

There's an old story we tell up here in the North Woods. Two friends
are out hiling, and they spot a very angry Black Bear. (Black Bears,
btw, while smaller than Grizzlies, are much better tree climbers.)
One hiker immediately drops his pack, and pulls out a pair of sneakers.
(Trainers, for you U.K. blokes) His companion inquires "What are you
doing? You can't outrun that bear!" The reply was "Don't have to
outrun the bear. I just have to outrun _you_!"
The point is, you want to be faster and higher than somebody else,
making _them_ the easier target.
>
> And so did B-17 and B-24 groups operating by day at various times and places, and
> that's my point - it's ludicrous to compare two aircraft designed and equipped for
> totally different missions and claim that one is "superior" to the other, by
> looking _only_ at the mission for which one of them is optimised. In the B-17 vs.
> Lanc argument, this method is routinely used to 'prove' that the Lanc had a better
> payload/radius than the B-17, by comparing the Lanc's performance operating singly
> at night, with the B-17's performance operating in formation by day at higher
> altitudes. Basing a conclusion on such an 'analysis' is a prime example of GIGO.

Concur.

--
Pete Stickney
A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many
bad measures. -- Daniel Webster

[Peter Stickney]

In article >,
John Halliwell > writes:
> In article >, The Revolution Will Not
> Be Televised > writes
>>They evolved that way, from roughly similar airframes as a starting
>>point. Lancasters flying by day would soon develop heavier armour,
>>especially around the engines, less bombload in exchange for more fuel
>>to burn for higher height on the ingress route, and heavier armament
>>like .50 calibres in the rear turret - all of which they were adopting
>>by 1945, which cut into their bombload margin over the B-17.
>
> Interesting point, any sources for this. I haven't heard about
> increasing armour for daylight ops, or trading bomb load for fuel. The
> B1 Specials had virtually everything not nailed down stripped out, lost
> their armour and most of their guns. The Lanc achieved its greatest
> bombload in 1944-5 by daylight.

The BI(Specials) had 1500# stripped out to them, _and_ a special
clearance for a maximum weight of 72,000# vs. 65,000#, and Merlin 24
engines vs. the normal Merlin 22s to allow them to get off the ground
with a 22,000# Grand Slam on board. The Grand Slam missions were all
fairly short-ranged, and very heavily escorted. The missions, and the
aircraft that flew them, should not be confused with normal daylight
operations.

>
> The 50s in the rear turrets were IIRC fitted only as a pair instead of
> the quad 303s.

And were much more effective, being both harder hitting and
longer-ranged. Late model Lancasters, notably the Tiger FOrce
aircraft intended for the invasion of Japan, and the Canadian Mk X,
also had 2 .50 cals in a Martin top turret, as well.

--
Pete Stickney
A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many
bad measures. -- Daniel Webster

[Guy Alcala]

Peter Stickney wrote:

> In article >,
> (The Revolution Will Not Be
> Televised) writes:
> > On Thu, 24 Jul 2003 07:52:14 GMT, Guy Alcala
> > > wrote:

<snip>

> >>The other cause may be that 3 Group had a couple of Lanc
> Mk. II squadrons in
> >>roughly that period, 115 and 514. Come to think of it,
> 61 Squadron had a single
> >>Lanc Mk. II flight early in the a/c's career, but I
> don't know if the crew you
> >>were studying was flying Merlin or Hercules-engined a/c.
>
> >
> > Merlins, the Herc-engines ones in 61 Sqn went to 3 Group
> fairly
> > swiftly and before 1944. The aircraft involved were a
> mixture of B.1s
> > and IIIs (W4950, ED314, EE176, EE186, ME310 and LM310,
> although I
> > suspect the odd transposition in the serials) .
> >
> >> The latter seem to have
> >>had a service ceiling a two or three thousand feet lower
> than the Merlin-engined
> >>a/c, so possibly that explains it.
> >
> > That would indeed explain it, but I believed this was a
> bit later on
> > when they were getting Merlin-engined variants (15 and
> 622 Sqn) even
> > though the IIs were still operational at the time.
> >
> > Then again, given the legitibility of my own notes, they
> might have
> > been allocated 26 - 28,0000 feet for all I know....
>
> As a somewhat side note. I have some doubts about the
> reputation of
> the Lancaster II wrt having a lower ceiling than the Lanc
> I/III.
> The power available at height isn't really all that much
> different,
> and you don't see a similar disparity, (or, for that
> matter, an
> absolute difference) between the Merlin-powered Halifaxes
> (Which used
> the same engine as the Lanc I), and the Herculese engined
> aircraft. (Which used the same engine as the Lanc II).

What I'd like to know is if the Mk. IIs _really_ had a lower
MTOW (63 vs. 65,000) than the Merlin jobs, as virtually
every reference states. I've never understood the reason
for this. I've wondered if the longer bomb bay might have
been a factor in decreasing the structural strength, but
some Merlin-engined models also had that, so that's out.
The other thought I had was that the Hercules engines were
significantly heavier and may have somehow put more stress
on the wings, but neither theory seems all that likely.

Re the Merlin vs. Hercules Halifaxes, don't forget that the
latter had another 6 feet (IIRR) added to the wingspan (and
a commensurate increase in area), as well as having the nose
considerably cleaned up

> I've nearly rebuilt my analysis tools that were lost when
> that hard
> drive failed (And don't lecture me on backups - the lack
> of restorable
> backups was part of the trigger for the upgrade in the
> first place.
> Sometimes cascading failures can fork you over real good),
> adn I'll
> make the Lancs II and Lanc III my test cases. We'll see
> how
> Historical References stack up against the Fundamentals of
>
> Werodynamics.

Please do.

> It wouldn't be the first time that the accepted references
> are
> repeating bogus data. For example, I see the incorrect
> numbers for
> the Merlin XX-23 series that were published in the '45-'46
>
> _Jane's_All_the_World's_Aircraft repeated all over the
> place.

That's why I wonder about the Lanc II's MTOW. It seems more
likely to me that the lower weight refers to an earlier
version, and was probably increased later, but someone
(Green, for a bet) had the specs for an earlier version of
the Mk. II, but those for later versions of the
Merlin-engined varieties.

Guy

[Guy Alcala]

Peter Stickney wrote:

<snip>

> I've just come across my notes from the Day Bomber Lanc thread, and
> here's some stuff that didn't make it into the thread that may be
> germane to this discussion. With reference to armor weight.
> Wartime Lancasters didn't have a whole lot of armor. The only armor,
> in fact, was the Pilot's seatback, and a bulkhead over the main wing
> spar, where it crosses the fuselage. Figure about 150# of armor.
> It did have self-sealing tanks. (I don't know if it was for all
> tanks, though. If not, you lose about 7% fuel capacity, and 3/4# for
> every gallon protected.
>

> U.S.A.A.F. day bombers carried armor at all crew positions, except
> Bombardier 9Can't se through armor, after all) and the rule of thumb
> was 100# per position, doubled in the case of the cockpit, which was
> armored both to the rear, and to the front.

Later, they removed much of the crew armor and replaced it with flak curtains, as the
latter was considerably lighter and only slightly less effective.

> Each oil cooler or
> radiator that was armored cost 80#, Turret weights, less guns, are
> about the same. A .50 cal gun weights as much as 2 .30s, so the tail
> turret doesn't change, but the nose and top turrets gain 65#.

More: 65 vs 24lb (some sources give 22, but that may be the fixed variety).

> A ball
> turret, with guns, or its equivalent in a remotely sighted turret,
> plus the extra crewman to operate it, is 1200#.
>
> So - added weight for a day-bomber Lanc. (This will have to come out
> of fuel or bombs), we'll assume similar ammunition wieghts
>
> Armor for nose, tail, and top turrets: 300#
> Armor for cockpit, pilot only 200#
> Addition of lower turret 1200#
> upgrade guns to .50 cal 130#
> Armored Oil Coolers 320#
> Armored Radiators 320#
> That's a total of 2470#
>
> Note that a co-pilot is a good thing
> if adding a copilot, add 370#
> (170# crewman, more armor)
> Total oe 2840#

And then you can add all the extra fuel for formating, close formation, climbing higher,
and hauling all of it there and back.

I've read it somewhere that the single-pilot B-25s and B-26s saved about 300 lb., but
ISTR that the inference was that this was due to the emoval of dual controls/instruments
plus the armored seat, i.e. not counting the co-pilot's weight or any other armor.
There's also some minor additional weight for the extra oxygen tanks/regulators/lines
and the intercom lines for each additional crewman. And then there's the ammo weight.
I've seen 'typical' loads quoted as 13,000 rounds for a Lanc, 6,500 rounds for a B-17.
Belted .50 cal. weighs roughly three times as much as .30 cal. For long, deep daytime
missions beyond fighter range in 1943, that 6,500 rounds might grow to 10 or even 12,000
depending on the crew's inclinations and what the pilot would allow (some crewmen were
wont to build 'cocoons' for themselves out of extra flak vests; tail gunners who did
this could cause serious Cg problems). BTW, I don't recall seeing a photo or reading
that the Brit bomber crews wore flak vests and helmets, at least by night. I imagine
they might have adopted them if they went over to day bombing, but does anyone know for
a fact?

Guy

[Guy Alcala]

The Revolution Will Not Be Televised wrote:

> On Fri, 25 Jul 2003 00:11:48 GMT, Guy Alcala
> > wrote:

<snip>

> >On the low-level daytime Lanc raid on Augsburg in 1942, admittedly an unusual
> >case, the a/c apparently only carried 4 x 1,000 lb. bombs each.
>
> I think they were still playing around with the maximum all-up weight.
> Mason in his book on the Lanc quoted a 44 Sqn pilot who lost the
> wing-tips and had to perform a crash landing when carrying six 1,500
> lb mines in that period after the all-up weight had been raised to
> allow that load, which prompted Chadwick himself to turn up and
> question the crew before beginning correctional airframe
> strengthening.

The other likely reason for the light load on that particular mission is that they were probably
cruising at much higher power settings and IAS than would be typical at night (I sure as hell would
be, down on the deck in daylight with no escort), requiring more fuel.

> >One thing Middlebrook or maybe it was Max Hastings noted was that at some point during the
> >Battle of Berlin, the bomb loads were increased.
>
> They seem to be for some groups. 1 Group certainly took advantage of
> a further increase in all-up wieght (to 65,000 lbs IIRC) to hang yet
> more bombs on their Lancs, to the detriment of the handling,
> performance and inevitably the attrition rate as a consquence.

1 GP also seems to have gone light on ammo, again to boost the bombload.

Guy

[Guy Alcala]

Peter Stickney wrote:

> In article >,
> John Halliwell > writes:
> > In article >, Guy Alcala
> > > writes
> >>No, I'm saying that _if_ you followed US practises etc., the Lanc's performance
> >>would be within a few % either way of the B-17's.
> >
> > But why drag the performance of an aircraft down by using it in a way
> > that is clearly inefficient? All this discussion has confirmed to me is
> > how inefficient the big box formations actually were. Dragging the
> > performance of a heavy bomber down to the point where it is carrying a
> > similar load to a Mossie, whilst remaining considerably vulnerable (and
> > with a crew of ten), doesn't make much sense to me.
>
> That depends on your definition of inefficiency, I suppose. Tight
> formations tend to use more fuel, especially for the trailing
> aircraft, and can be fatigueing to fly. And, yes, it takes time to
> form up & get moving. And you're limited to the speed of the slowest
> individual airplane. But... If it is going to get you more airplanes
> over teh target, and more coming home, after, than the benefits
> outweight the costs. A tight formation attacks, and defends itself,
> as a single unit. A loose formation, or stragglers, is a series of
> individual battles with the advantage all on the side of the
> interceptors. A loose formation, or a set of loose formations, is
> easier to intercept, like unconvoyed ships. Not only are they spread
> out all over the map, but the individ=ual elemants can be attacked by
> smaller units.
>
> > A couple of Mossies with a light load, perhaps 2,000lbs each start to
> > sound more and more promising. Small, fast formations may have been very
> > effective.
>
> During daylight? If you're intent is to irritate teh Home Defense
> fighters, yes. If you're planning to take a whack at the
> Messerschmitt Factory at Regensburg, no. (And, in fact, you might
> want to leave the escort fighters at home - adding them increases the
> size and movement within the formation, which are the prime ways to
> get spotted. Pairs of Mosquitos down low, flying at Max Continuous
> power (About 275 mph TAS, on the deck) are going to be damned hard to
> catch. They'll do fine if you're trying to hit Gestapo Headquarters,
> but they'll be lousy for pasting somethig of any size.

Well here, I think I might say 'not necessarily.' Bombs on target is the crucial
point, not how many you haul to the general vicinity. Bomber Mossies, lacking
defensive guns (personally, I'd give them a pair of fixed, forward-firing .50s for
deterrence), have no reason to fly inclose formation except possibly on the bomb run
-- a much looser formation that allows more room for evasive action will do fine, and
their speed won't decrease as much either. The Mossies would be immune to
rocket-firing twins, while head-on attacks would be considerably more difficult to
achieve and less accurate owing to the higher closure (and gutsy bomber pilots could
go head-to-head with the fighters with their fixed guns, decreasing the fighter's
accuracy even more (likely increasing the chance of collisions, though). Second
passes wouldn't be an option, either. I'd also note that the Mossie's speed will
extend the range of the escorts, as they have little or no need to weave.

The biggest question is what tactics to use on the bomb run. Hogg has stated that
both sides lack of medium caliber (ca 50-60mm) AA left a gap for fast a/c at
altitudes between roughly 6-10,000 feet. The effectiveness of the light AA (<= 40mm)
at these heights was very low, while the heavy AA (>= 88mm) was unable to
elevate/traverse (or set fuses) rapidly enough, meaning that only barrage fire was
possible. I'd think that a high altitude high speed cruise enroute, with a high
speed dive from the IP to get into this altitude range for bombing, might work.

So, should the Mossies bomb in level flight while in tight formation (ala U.S.
bombers), but much lower (better target acquisition) and faster, or should they glide
bomb in trail or something similar (even more improvement in accuracy)? Either way,
a far higher percentage of the bombs should fall in the target area rather than being
wasted outside it, as would be the case when dropping from 20,000 feet plus, and each
Mossie lost is only two guys instead of nine or ten. Another advantage I can see is
that there's also less time for target smoke screens to take effect, again improving
accuracy.

Of course, this all assumes that Mossie production could be vastly increased, and
that would almost certainly require redesign in metal. Changing to radials would
also be a thought, but that might have to be traded off against range and speed
loss. Essentially, we're talking about an A-20 with the Mossie's speed, altitude
capability, range and bomb load, but minus the flexible defensive guns. The original
turbocharged variant (once the bugs were worked out) would do the trick for speed and
altitude, so it's a question of getting the range and bombload. Wing tanks, and the
belly tank added to later variants will handle the range, so getting 4 x 500 lb.
bombs to fit in the bay would be the issue.

It doesn't seem to have ever been tried, probably because there were never enough of
Mossies to go around. But, if FB Mossies could go in on the deck to hit point
targets, then surely bomber Mossies could attack area targets from low-medium
altitudes with considerably lower (and acceptable) loss rates, at some loss in
accuracy, but still far above what the heavies could achieve from high altitude.

Guy

[Gordon]

>
>The airplane that begins to look rather unreal would be a bomber
>version of the F-12 Rainbow. (About th emost beutiful airplane ever
>built).

For those without a handy photo, think of a B-29, crossed with Flash Gordon's
ship. About the sexiest WWII-era aircraft I've seen.

v/r
Gordon
PS, Pete, I have three very cool photos of it, if you'd like to see scans?

[Gordon]

>
>>From: (Gordon)
>>Date: 7/21/03 10:22 AM Pacific Daylight Time
>>Message-id: >
>
>>>> The late model Mosquitoes could carry up to 5,000 pounds of
>>>> bombs. In theory they could carry this to Berlin from England,
>>>> at most economical cruise and with minimal fuel reserves.
>>>
>
>I undesrtand that there was a later model Mosquito on the drawing boards in
>1944 that could carry 100,000 pounds of bombs with a 10,000 mile range at
>1500
>miles per hour all the way. I understand one prototype was built , took off
>on
>a test flight in 1944 and is still up there. But I don't really believe
>that
>last part.Do you?
>
>Arthur Kramer
>Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
>http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

I have a more pertinent question - why did you attribute the posting to me? I
didn't write it.

Gordon

[IBM]

(Peter Stickney) wrote in
:

[snip]

> I'd be delighted. On my next trip to the University library, one of
> my missions is to re-copy the engineering analysis of the F-12 written
> for them by Alexander Kartveli. I'll trade, if you'd like, and also
> throuw in the in-depth article on the Mosquito done by _Aviation_ (The
> precursor to AvLeak) in '44.

Trouble is, I see it and I think... French....
Seriously, it looks like some of the early post war French efforts.

IBM

__________________________________________________ ____________________
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[Gordon]

>I have three very cool photos of it, if you'd like to see scans?
>
>I'd be delighted.

Consider it half-completed :)

I'll pull and scan them in the next couple days - a bit hectic with the move
and all.

v/r
Gordon

[Peter Stickney]

In article >,
Guy Alcala > writes:
> Peter Stickney wrote:
>> As a somewhat side note. I have some doubts about the
>> reputation of
>> the Lancaster II wrt having a lower ceiling than the Lanc
>> I/III.
>> The power available at height isn't really all that much
>> different,
>> and you don't see a similar disparity, (or, for that
>> matter, an
>> absolute difference) between the Merlin-powered Halifaxes
>> (Which used
>> the same engine as the Lanc I), and the Herculese engined
>> aircraft. (Which used the same engine as the Lanc II).
>
> What I'd like to know is if the Mk. IIs _really_ had a lower
> MTOW (63 vs. 65,000) than the Merlin jobs, as virtually
> every reference states. I've never understood the reason
> for this. I've wondered if the longer bomb bay might have
> been a factor in decreasing the structural strength, but
> some Merlin-engined models also had that, so that's out.
> The other thought I had was that the Hercules engines were
> significantly heavier and may have somehow put more stress
> on the wings, but neither theory seems all that likely.

From what I've been able to dig up, the Max Weight of teh Merlin
engined lancasters was determined by 1-engine out Rate of Climb on
takeoff. Merlin XX airplanes had a Max Weight of 61,500, Merlin 22
airplanes had this raised to 63,000#, and Merlin 24 airplanes were
limited to 68,000#, fir regular aircraft, and 72,000# on the Grand
Slam carriers. I doubt that it was a strength issue. The Lancaster
center section was virtually unchanged in the Lincoln, which tipped
the scales at 82,000#, and the Shackleton, which was somewher on the
order of 100,000#.

> Re the Merlin vs. Hercules Halifaxes, don't forget that the
> latter had another 6 feet (IIRR) added to the wingspan (and
> a commensurate increase in area), as well as having the nose
> considerably cleaned up
>
>> I've nearly rebuilt my analysis tools that were lost when
>> that hard
>> drive failed (And don't lecture me on backups - the lack
>> of restorable
>> backups was part of the trigger for the upgrade in the
>> first place.
>> Sometimes cascading failures can fork you over real good),
>> adn I'll
>> make the Lancs II and Lanc III my test cases. We'll see
>> how
>> Historical References stack up against the Fundamentals of
>>
>> Werodynamics.
>
> Please do.

In process, results as soon as I have them.
>
>> It wouldn't be the first time that the accepted references
>> are
>> repeating bogus data. For example, I see the incorrect
>> numbers for
>> the Merlin XX-23 series that were published in the '45-'46
>>
>> _Jane's_All_the_World's_Aircraft repeated all over the
>> place.
>
> That's why I wonder about the Lanc II's MTOW. It seems more
> likely to me that the lower weight refers to an earlier
> version, and was probably increased later, but someone
> (Green, for a bet) had the specs for an earlier version of
> the Mk. II, but those for later versions of the
> Merlin-engined varieties.

SOmebody must have a Pilot's Handbook for the thing.

--
Pete Stickney
A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many
bad measures. -- Daniel Webster

[Peter Stickney]

In article >,
(The Revolution Will Not Be Televised) writes:
> On Sat, 26 Jul 2003 22:21:00 -0400, (Peter
> Stickney) wrote:
>
>>As a somewhat side note. I have some doubts about the reputation of
>>the Lancaster II wrt having a lower ceiling than the Lanc I/III.
>>The power available at height isn't really all that much different,
>
> Even with the difference between the Hercules VI and XVI versions?

No dofference in ratings between the Hercules VI and XVI. The
difference between the engine models was that the XVI used a Pressure
Carburetor, like the U.S. Bendix-Stromberg. (Although I think the
Hercules used a Skinner Union pressure carb.)

> Aircrew flying the II certainly gave the Merlin engined-variants a
> higher bombing altitude, although the difference doesn't seem to be
> massive (@ 21,000 ft vs @20,000 ft). The II certainly climbed faster,
> but I suspect the supercharging (at least on the Hercules VI-engined
> variants) led to the superior takeoff power falling away with height
> much more quickly. They also consumed more fuel, although I don't
> know how much of that was down to airframe drag (via the Hercules
> engine installations) and how much to the engine consumption at
> similar cruising settings. I also vaguely recall a dramatic increase
> in consumption with the Hercules being referred to after cooling vanes
> were opened by a Lanc II crewman in Middlebrook somewhere, although
> this might be a fault of memory on my part.

The difference in horsepower performance at height between a XX series
Merlin and a VI/XVI series Hercules wasn't all that great. I'll have
hard nimbers for you tomorrow.
>
>>and you don't see a similar disparity, (or, for that matter, an
>>absolute difference) between the Merlin-powered Halifaxes (Which used
>>the same engine as the Lanc I), and the Herculese engined
>>aircraft. (Which used the same engine as the Lanc II).
>
> The Halifax IIIs definately had a higher ceiling than the Lanc II. In
> my ignorance I thought this was down to a larger wing area (greater
> span) and initially a lower all-up weight. The Merlin-engined
> Halifaxes were certainly poorer at altitude than the Lancs of both
> varieties, but then I can't remember offhand if the Halifaxes had
> Merlin 20-series engines or just Merlin X's.

Again, I'm not too certain about the published numbers for the Lanc
II. I've seen figures bandies about that just don't add up, such as
below the critical altitude of the high speed blower. Something's
fishy. WHen I get the chance to run the numbers, we'll be able to
throw some stuff right out (Such as ficure requiring 120% Ram
Recovery, as an example) adn make soem more educated guesses about
what's what.

The first series of Halifax Is had Merlin Xs, later Mk Is, and all the
other Merlin-engined Halibags had Merlin XX series engines. (XX and
22, I don't _think_ any of them got Merlin 24s, but there wasn't any
technical reason why they couldn't have them.
>
> [snip The Backup Blues]
>
> I can't laugh about that, given my own various episodes of
> catastrophic incompetance* in the world of IT. [* aka "creative
> innovation" or "clearing away the extraneous detail to focus on the
> priority tasks" at management project meetings]

The ironic part is that I'm the Backup Police. One of my professional
functions is writing Disaster/Catastrophe Mitigation and Recovery
Plans. My high-volume backup media crapped out, and it was time for
an upgrade. It was a bog-simple replacement, and the old data drive
was being transferred and cleaned at my leisure. Since the Data Gods
don't like things to go that smooth, they threw a new one on me. The
drive motor (The spinup one, integral with the platter spindle)seized.
Solid. Not even a scraping sound. Of course, the internal wiring
didn't like this, and melted down. It was most impressive, in a way.
Just when you think you've sen averything...

--
Pete Stickney
A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many
bad measures. -- Daniel Webster

[The Revolution Will Not Be Televised]

On Mon, 4 Aug 2003 00:27:40 -0400, (Peter Stickney)
wrote:

>> Even with the difference between the Hercules VI and XVI versions?
>
>No dofference in ratings between the Hercules VI and XVI.

Which ones had the improved supercharger [centrifugal
eyelet-whatsit-mumble-mumble? Or was that the 100 series Hercules?

>The difference in horsepower performance at height between a XX series
>Merlin and a VI/XVI series Hercules wasn't all that great. I'll have
>hard nimbers for you tomorrow.

Please do not lower the tone of usenet discourse by injecting facts
into the debate.

>Again, I'm not too certain about the published numbers for the Lanc
>II. I've seen figures bandies about that just don't add up, such as
>below the critical altitude of the high speed blower. Something's
>fishy.

I haven't seen any auw figures for the III over time, just what was
given in early 1943. I suspect they would have gone up over time,
just like the B.I/III weights did. I thought a direct comparison with
the Halifax III might have been useful, bearing in mind airframe
differences.

> Of course, the internal wiring
>didn't like this, and melted down.

My favourite is the discreet power-supply blow-up. The kind where you
reset the server and then realise that things have suddenly become
very quiet as a faint tinge of burning insulation comes to your
nostrils. Ah, happy memories.

> It was most impressive, in a way.
>Just when you think you've sen averything...

Just to drift off-topic a little, one of my favourite memories of
system administration was working for an IT manager who spent the
whole disaster-recovery budget on a fire-proof (and everything up to
nuclear detonation-proof) safe but failed to renew the fire insurance
on the servers as a consequence..... The data on the tapes was at
least secure, even if there was only going to be a pile of smouldering
ash to restore it to.

Gavin Bailey

--

"...this level of misinformation suggests some Americans may be
avoiding having an experience of cognitive dissonance."
- 'Poll shows errors in beliefs on Iraq, 9/11'
The Charlotte Observer, 20th June 2003

[John Halliwell]

In article >, Dave Eadsforth
> writes
>Take off and straight flying...........................63,000 lbs
>(For Lancaster ASR MkIII...............................64,000 lbs
>(For aircraft with Mod 503 or 518
> Mod 588 or 598
> Mod 811 or SI/RDA 600 and Mod 1004..65,000 lbs
>(For aircraft fitted with Merlin 24 or 224,
> paddle-type blades, Lincoln-type undercarriage,
> and Mod 1195 tyres, and only to be used on runways....72,000 lbs

Anybody know what the MTO was on the aircraft used for the Tirpitz
missions from Lossiemouth? I believe they swapped the engines out for
Merlin 24s 'borrowed from other units a better description'. The extra
fuel they added left them 2 tons over MTO according to Brickhill in the
Dam Busters, although there's no mention of the actual weight or MTO
referred to (although I suspect one of the earlier lighter weights).

--
John

[Guy Alcala]

The Revolution Will Not Be Televised wrote:

> On Mon, 4 Aug 2003 00:27:40 -0400, (Peter Stickney)
> wrote:

<snip>

> >The difference in horsepower performance at height between a XX series
> >Merlin and a VI/XVI series Hercules wasn't all that great. I'll have
> >hard nimbers for you tomorrow.
>
> Please do not lower the tone of usenet discourse by injecting facts
> into the debate.

The last week has given me time to order and read Middlebrook's "The Battle
of Hamburg" and "The Berlin Raids," both full of good info re loads.
Here's some typical bomb and fuel loads he gives for the first raid on
Hamburg, from the former book:

Lanc I and III: 9,840 - 13,280 lb., 1,600 (presumably Imperial) gallons.

Lanc II: 7,600 - 9,200 lb., 1,700 gallons.

Halifax II and V: 5,960 - 7,960 lb., 1,775 gallons.

Stirling I and III: 4,788 - 5,136 lb., 1,875 gallons.

Wellington X: 2,640 - 4,000 lb., 900 gallons.

This first raid had a track distance of 980 (1 Gp.) to 1,020 (6 Gp.) miles
depending on the Group, fairly direct routing. The Lanc IIs were in 3 and
6 Groups. The extra fuel weight carried by the Lanc IIs (poorer mpg)
amounts to 720 lbs., which is considerably less than the difference in
bombload weights, implying that the remainder of the difference was due to
a need to improve the ceiling to equal the Merlin Lancs, and/or a
difference in MTOW. "The Berlin Raids" contains a statement by a pilot
mentioning that the (Merlin, IIRR) Lancs had their MTOWs increased from 63
to 65,000 lb. during that period (i.e. post-Hamburg). I'll need to find it
again.

What is also interesting are the stats Middlebrook provides for the Battle
of berlin, wherein the loss rates of different heavy bomber types are
inversely proportional to their operating ceilings:

Lancaster, 5.2%.

Halifax, 7.7%.

Stirling, 13.2%.

Oh, with reference to Pete's and my attempt to redesign the Lanc (and
Bomber Command) for day use a few years back at the order of Air Chief
Marshal "Butch" Kramer, and how long the process was likely to take
starting from the fall of 1943 ("Butch" was loathe to accept our estimate
of 6 months minimum to convert enough a/c to high-altitude engines to
supply a single squadron, with a year more likely for an entire group with
all the other mods needed), serendipitously Middlebrook includes the
following (pg. 96):

"But the [PRO] contains an interesting correspondence concerning a request
made by Bomber Command for six special Lancasters, one for each of the
Pathfinder heavy squadrons, to be used by future Master Bombers. The date
of the first letter is 24 September 1943. The request was for a Lancaster
with uprated Merlin engines which could fly higher than existing types,
presumably to allow the Master Bomber to circle the target safely above the
bomber force. Initially, Lancaster Mark IVs were expected, but the best
that could be managed were Mk. Is fitted with Merlin 85 engines [Guy note:
Packard-built, equivalent to the R-R Merlin 68, i.e the V-1650-3]. an
initial delivery date of the first aircraft to Rolls-Royce at Hucknall for
final modification before handing over to the Pathfinders was given as 15
November -- again just in time for the late November non-moon bombing
period -- with the other five aircraft arriving at regular intervals up to
the end of February. In fact, the first aircraft did not arrive at
Hucknall until 5 December, and then required a further six weeks of work
before it was delivered to the Pathfinders, eventually arriving in time for
the last raid of the Battle of Berlin [Guy Note: 24/25 March 1944]."


> >Again, I'm not too certain about the published numbers for the Lanc
> >II. I've seen figures bandies about that just don't add up, such as
> >below the critical altitude of the high speed blower. Something's
> >fishy.
>
> I haven't seen any auw figures for the III over time, just what was
> given in early 1943. I suspect they would have gone up over time,
> just like the B.I/III weights did. I thought a direct comparison with
> the Halifax III might have been useful, bearing in mind airframe
> differences.

<snip>

Interestingly enough, "The Berlin Raids" states that the Halifax IIIs
(after the II/Vs had all been removed from Berlin missions) still had a
higher loss rate than the Lancs. I'm looking for the exact quote, but I
think this was true regardless of Lanc type.

Guy

[Peter Stickney]

In article >,
Dave Eadsforth > writes:
> In article >, Peter Stickney
> > writes
>>In article >,
>> Guy Alcala > writes:
>>>
>>>> It wouldn't be the first time that the accepted references
>>>> are
>>>> repeating bogus data. For example, I see the incorrect
>>>> numbers for
>>>> the Merlin XX-23 series that were published in the '45-'46
>>>>
>>>> _Jane's_All_the_World's_Aircraft repeated all over the
>>>> place.
>>>
>>> That's why I wonder about the Lanc II's MTOW. It seems more
>>> likely to me that the lower weight refers to an earlier
>>> version, and was probably increased later, but someone
>>> (Green, for a bet) had the specs for an earlier version of
>>> the Mk. II, but those for later versions of the
>>> Merlin-engined varieties.
>>
>>SOmebody must have a Pilot's Handbook for the thing.
>>
>
> I have not been following this part of the thread with any concentration
> to date, but hope the following might help:
>
> From Pilot's Notes dated May 1944 but reprinted April 1945.
>
>
> Maximum weights
>
> Take off and straight flying...........................63,000 lbs
> (For Lancaster ASR MkIII...............................64,000 lbs
> (For aircraft with Mod 503 or 518
> Mod 588 or 598
> Mod 811 or SI/RDA 600 and Mod 1004..65,000 lbs
> (For aircraft fitted with Merlin 24 or 224,
> paddle-type blades, Lincoln-type undercarriage,
> and Mod 1195 tyres, and only to be used on runways....72,000 lbs

Thanks, Dave. But I should have been more explicit. The Merlin
engined Lancs are fiarly consistantly documented. The one that seems
off is the Hercules powered Lancaster II. There's been a lot of stuff
published about it that doesn't make sense, and an accurate context
for the numbers that do exist is hard to come by.

Interesting bit about the "Lincoln-Type" landing gear, though.
The numbers that you've posted also explain why some sources are off.
They seem to be quoting the number for the modified aircraft.

--
Pete Stickney
A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many
bad measures. -- Daniel Webster

[Guy Alcala]

Peter Stickney wrote:

> In article >,
> Dave Eadsforth > writes:
> > In article >, Peter Stickney
> > > writes
> >>In article >,
> >> Guy Alcala > writes:
> >>>
> >>>> It wouldn't be the first time that the accepted references
> >>>> are
> >>>> repeating bogus data. For example, I see the incorrect
> >>>> numbers for
> >>>> the Merlin XX-23 series that were published in the '45-'46
> >>>>
> >>>> _Jane's_All_the_World's_Aircraft repeated all over the
> >>>> place.
> >>>
> >>> That's why I wonder about the Lanc II's MTOW. It seems more
> >>> likely to me that the lower weight refers to an earlier
> >>> version, and was probably increased later, but someone
> >>> (Green, for a bet) had the specs for an earlier version of
> >>> the Mk. II, but those for later versions of the
> >>> Merlin-engined varieties.
> >>
> >>SOmebody must have a Pilot's Handbook for the thing.
> >>
> >
> > I have not been following this part of the thread with any concentration
> > to date, but hope the following might help:
> >
> > From Pilot's Notes dated May 1944 but reprinted April 1945.
> >
> >
> > Maximum weights
> >
> > Take off and straight flying...........................63,000 lbs
> > (For Lancaster ASR MkIII...............................64,000 lbs
> > (For aircraft with Mod 503 or 518
> > Mod 588 or 598
> > Mod 811 or SI/RDA 600 and Mod 1004..65,000 lbs
> > (For aircraft fitted with Merlin 24 or 224,
> > paddle-type blades, Lincoln-type undercarriage,
> > and Mod 1195 tyres, and only to be used on runways....72,000 lbs
>
> Thanks, Dave. But I should have been more explicit. The Merlin
> engined Lancs are fiarly consistantly documented. The one that seems
> off is the Hercules powered Lancaster II. There's been a lot of stuff
> published about it that doesn't make sense, and an accurate context
> for the numbers that do exist is hard to come by.
>
> Interesting bit about the "Lincoln-Type" landing gear, though.

I believe that applied to the "Specials" for Grand Slam (and probably Tallboy
as well), and no others. The weight's right.

>
> The numbers that you've posted also explain why some sources are off.
> They seem to be quoting the number for the modified aircraft.

I'm still trying to find the quote in Middlebrook, but IIRR one senior pilot
mentioned that the MTOW was boosted from 63,000 to 65,000 during the Battle of
Berlin, and the implication I took away (possibly wrong) was that the boost
was purely a paperwork okay, rather than one involving airframe
strengthening. The latter mods probably came along afterwards. Once I find
the quote I'll be able to confirm or deny.

Guy

[The Revolution Will Not Be Televised]

On Tue, 05 Aug 2003 02:24:43 GMT, Guy Alcala
> wrote:

>The last week has given me time to order and read Middlebrook's "The Battle
>of Hamburg" and "The Berlin Raids," both full of good info re loads.
>Here's some typical bomb and fuel loads he gives for the first raid on
>Hamburg, from the former book:

Good books, and it's worth getting the other two in the series
(Peenemunde and Nuremburg Raids), but there is the odd good-faith
discrepancy, due I suspect to Squadron ORBs and aircrew logs varying
for some reason from Group returns to BC HQ and the subsequent BC raid
reports.

>difference in MTOW. "The Berlin Raids" contains a statement by a pilot
>mentioning that the (Merlin, IIRR) Lancs had their MTOWs increased from 63
>to 65,000 lb. during that period (i.e. post-Hamburg). I'll need to find it
>again.

I remember that: I think this was 1 Group again.

>Oh, with reference to Pete's and my attempt to redesign the Lanc (and
>Bomber Command) for day use a few years back at the order of Air Chief
>Marshal "Butch" Kramer, and how long the process was likely to take
>starting from the fall of 1943 ("Butch" was loathe to accept our estimate
>of 6 months minimum to convert enough a/c to high-altitude engines to
>supply a single squadron, with a year more likely for an entire group with
>all the other mods needed), serendipitously Middlebrook includes the
>following (pg. 96):

I don't think two-stage merlin production was sufficient until well
intop 1944 for seriously considering two-stage engines for production
Lancasters en mass. They were too badly needed for Mustangs,
Spitfires and Mosquitos first.

>"But the [PRO] contains an interesting correspondence concerning a request
>made by Bomber Command for six special Lancasters, one for each of the
>Pathfinder heavy squadrons, to be used by future Master Bombers.

Yes, and I believe these became Lanc VIs subsequently. They weren't
used particularly heavily, so far as I can see, and there was no
effort to replace them over time, although they would seem like a good
idea. I suspect PFF abandoning the Master Bomber technique on big
area raids (see Middlebrook's comments on the early Berlin raids which
had allocated Master Bombers) immediately after they appeared had
something to do with this.

> an
>initial delivery date of the first aircraft to Rolls-Royce at Hucknall for
>final modification before handing over to the Pathfinders was given as 15
>November -- again just in time for the late November non-moon bombing
>period -- with the other five aircraft arriving at regular intervals up to
>the end of February. In fact, the first aircraft did not arrive at
>Hucknall until 5 December, and then required a further six weeks of work
>before it was delivered to the Pathfinders, eventually arriving in time for
>the last raid of the Battle of Berlin [Guy Note: 24/25 March 1944]."

This would tie in with Saward's hi-jacking of six H2S Mk III sets from
Coastal Command, although I think the Lanc VIs arrived too late to be
considered for fitting the radar too, and they ended up in Lanc IIIs
instead.

>Interestingly enough, "The Berlin Raids" states that the Halifax IIIs
>(after the II/Vs had all been removed from Berlin missions) still had a
>higher loss rate than the Lancs. I'm looking for the exact quote, but I
>think this was true regardless of Lanc type.

It may well be true, but overall loss rates for the war for the B.III
were significantly less than the B.II and V versions and even better
than the Lancs according to Bingham's book on the Halifax. Of course,
the level of resistance would affect this, but the IIIs were active in
the end of 43 and throughout 44 when casualties were high enough to
give them a valid comparison to the Lancs on the same raids.

Gavin Bailey

--

"...this level of misinformation suggests some Americans may be
avoiding having an experience of cognitive dissonance."
- 'Poll shows errors in beliefs on Iraq, 9/11'
The Charlotte Observer, 20th June 2003

[Guy Alcala]

The Revolution Will Not Be Televised wrote:

> On Tue, 05 Aug 2003 02:24:43 GMT, Guy Alcala
> > wrote:
>
> >The last week has given me time to order and read Middlebrook's "The Battle
> >of Hamburg" and "The Berlin Raids," both full of good info re loads.
> >Here's some typical bomb and fuel loads he gives for the first raid on
> >Hamburg, from the former book:
>
> Good books, and it's worth getting the other two in the series
> (Peenemunde and Nuremburg Raids), but there is the odd good-faith
> discrepancy, due I suspect to Squadron ORBs and aircrew logs varying
> for some reason from Group returns to BC HQ and the subsequent BC raid
> reports.

I've read the Nuremberg and maybe the Peenemunde ones, and have the
Schweinfurt-Regensburg one on order just for comparison. I've been a
Middlebrook fan ever since I first read "First Day on the Somme" umpteen years
ago.

> >difference in MTOW. "The Berlin Raids" contains a statement by a pilot
> >mentioning that the (Merlin, IIRR) Lancs had their MTOWs increased from 63
> >to 65,000 lb. during that period (i.e. post-Hamburg). I'll need to find it
> >again.
>
> I remember that: I think this was 1 Group again.

Found it and you're right, it was a 1 Gp. CO. specifically, Wg. Cdr. G.A.
Carey-Foster, 101 Sq. at Ludford Magna (don't remember if A.B.C. was in service
yet). Middlebrook quotes from Carey-Foster's diary, apparently on or around
18/19 November 1943:

"All-up weight has been increased to 65,000 pounds for the first time";
Middlebrook comments that 'this would allow each Lancaster to carry up to half a
ton more bombs. But the move was not as effective as might appear. It was soon
apparent that more crews were jettisoning part of their bomb loads in the North
Sea to retain some maneuverability if attacked by a night fighter before
reaching the target.'

The diary quote is more ambiguous than I thought. To me it's at least implied
that this was an administrative rather than structural increase, but from the
quote I can't say that's definitely the case.

> >Oh, with reference to Pete's and my attempt to redesign the Lanc (and
> >Bomber Command) for day use a few years back at the order of Air Chief
> >Marshal "Butch" Kramer, and how long the process was likely to take
> >starting from the fall of 1943 ("Butch" was loathe to accept our estimate
> >of 6 months minimum to convert enough a/c to high-altitude engines to
> >supply a single squadron, with a year more likely for an entire group with
> >all the other mods needed), serendipitously Middlebrook includes the
> >following (pg. 96):
>
> I don't think two-stage merlin production was sufficient until well
> intop 1944 for seriously considering two-stage engines for production
> Lancasters en mass. They were too badly needed for Mustangs,
> Spitfires and Mosquitos first.

That was part of our reasoning, along with engine mount and airframe
compatibility design issues and modifying the a/c production lines. Actually,
ACM Kramer really wanted us to use radials, but we pointed out that the only way
to get a significant high altitude daylight force into service within a year
using _British-designed_ heavies was to use two-stage Merlins, because there was
no high-altitude version of the Hercules in production. We were trying to find
out more info on the turbocharged Hercules models that had been used for the
pressurized Wellingtons, but lacking any detailed info on that engine we assumed
that considerably more engine development as well as production tooling would be
required to get those into mass production and service. Personally, I've since
come to the conclusion that the simplest approach would have been for the
proposed (in Art's alternate universe) day RAF heavy bomber force to use B-24s.
This would require some re-scheduling of U.S. Bomb Group training and
deployment, but would eliminate the need to cut down the training times (first
one month, then another) for U.S. replacement crews that took place in the late
fall of '43 owing to the high loss rates. We'd figured 3 Gp. was the best Group
to convert first. 3 Gp. would have been the best to start with because of their
location in the same general area as 8th BC, and because the Stirling was the
least useful night bomber. Taking them off ops to retrain and convert, whether
replaced with B-24s, Lancs or Halifax IIIs, would cause the least negative
effect to the night force.

> >"But the [PRO] contains an interesting correspondence concerning a request
> >made by Bomber Command for six special Lancasters, one for each of the
> >Pathfinder heavy squadrons, to be used by future Master Bombers.
>
> Yes, and I believe these became Lanc VIs subsequently. They weren't
> used particularly heavily, so far as I can see, and there was no
> effort to replace them over time, although they would seem like a good
> idea.

Right, it appears there were only 10 or so.

> I suspect PFF abandoning the Master Bomber technique on big
> area raids (see Middlebrook's comments on the early Berlin raids which
> had allocated Master Bombers) immediately after they appeared had
> something to do with this.

Slightly before they appeared, actually, only bringing it back later. Then 5
Gp. started to use Mossies at low level for this role, exactly opposite to 8
Group's ideas.

> > an
> >initial delivery date of the first aircraft to Rolls-Royce at Hucknall for
> >final modification before handing over to the Pathfinders was given as 15
> >November -- again just in time for the late November non-moon bombing
> >period -- with the other five aircraft arriving at regular intervals up to
> >the end of February. In fact, the first aircraft did not arrive at
> >Hucknall until 5 December, and then required a further six weeks of work
> >before it was delivered to the Pathfinders, eventually arriving in time for
> >the last raid of the Battle of Berlin [Guy Note: 24/25 March 1944]."
>
> This would tie in with Saward's hi-jacking of six H2S Mk III sets from
> Coastal Command, although I think the Lanc VIs arrived too late to be
> considered for fitting the radar too, and they ended up in Lanc IIIs
> instead.

Right, the H2S Mk. IIIs went into regular PFF a/c.

> >Interestingly enough, "The Berlin Raids" states that the Halifax IIIs
> >(after the II/Vs had all been removed from Berlin missions) still had a
> >higher loss rate than the Lancs. I'm looking for the exact quote, but I
> >think this was true regardless of Lanc type.
>
> It may well be true, but overall loss rates for the war for the B.III
> were significantly less than the B.II and V versions and even better
> than the Lancs according to Bingham's book on the Halifax.

They'd certainly be better than the Halifax II/Vs.

> Of course,
> the level of resistance would affect this, but the IIIs were active in
> the end of 43 and throughout 44 when casualties were high enough to
> give them a valid comparison to the Lancs on the same raids.

Unfortunately, books on the Halifax are almost non-existent in this country (not
that Lanc books are very thick on the ground), so I'm having to work through
peripheral sources like Middlebrook. I'll have to re-read it, but I'm pretty
sure Middlebrook shows the IIIs had a worse loss rate in "The Berlin Raids"
period than the Lancs, when both were on the same mission. Many of the raids to
Berlin only used Lancs, so that skews the Lanc losses. After the invasion it
probably made little difference what you were flying, as the loss rate had
dropped so low (and many of the missions were flown by day). And you did have a
better chance of bailing out of a Halifax in an emergency.

Guy

[Guy Alcala]

The Revolution Will Not Be Televised wrote:

> On Tue, 5 Aug 2003 00:28:15 -0400, (Peter Stickney)
> wrote:

<snip>

> >As you can see, at cruise, they're about even. While I wouldn't be
> >surprised it the Lanc II was a bit more draggy, and possibly heavier,
> >(Each Hercules weighed 500# more dry than the 20 series Merlin, but
> >that doesn't include the Merlin's radiators and coolant.)
>
> I've seen comparisons that give about 250lbs extra per engine to the
> Hercules version in early 1943, presumably when compared to the
> fully-equipped Merlin versions, but this comes from a secondary source
> (Holmes) and without context, and so it doesn't address the comparison
> over time properly as the I/III auw was raised.

FWIW, Tubbs says that each of the Lanc Merlins had between 11 and 12.5 gallons, presumably
Imperial, of 70/30 water/glycol coolant. I have no idea what glycol weighs, so assuming
straight water you're talking ca. 100-125 pounds per engine of coolant.

Guy

[The Revolution Will Not Be Televised]

On Tue, 05 Aug 2003 20:18:05 GMT, Guy Alcala
> wrote:

[Hercules engine weights]

>FWIW, Tubbs says that each of the Lanc Merlins had between 11 and 12.5 gallons, presumably
>Imperial, of 70/30 water/glycol coolant. I have no idea what glycol weighs, so assuming
>straight water you're talking ca. 100-125 pounds per engine of coolant.

Holmes, using a starting point of a 60,000 lb auw at the beginning of
service (Jan 42 for the B.I, Sep 42 for the B.II), gives them the
following figures:

Structure: 17064 lbs for both.
Powerplant: 10,720 lbs for the B.I; 12,335 lbs for the B.II
Fuel & Oil tanks: 1,796 lbs for both.
Empty weight: 29,580 lbs for the B.I; 31,195 lbs for the B.II
Fixed Military load: 4,120 lbs for both.
Tare weight: 33,700 lbs vs 35,315 lbs.
Crew, bombload, fuel, etc: 26,300 lbs vs 24,685 lbs.

It's notable that the increase to 63,000 lbs for the B.I auw in Nov
'42 comes with the following increments:

Structure: 17,776 lbs.
Power plant: 11,304 lbs.
Fuel & oil tanks : 1,990 lbs.
Empty weight: 31,070 lbs.
Fixed military load: 4,334 lbs.

Tare weight: 35,404 lbs.
Crew, bombs, etc: 27,596 lbs.

Whatever this increment consisted of, I don't think it would include
the H2S and radome at that point in time.

May '44 and the next increase to 65,000 lbs auw:

Structure: 18,033 lbs.
Power plant: 11,610 lbs.
Fuel & oil tanks : 1,999 lbs.
Empty weight: 31,642 lbs.
Fixed military load: 5,169 lbs.

Tare weight: 36,811 lbs.
Crew, bombs, etc: 28,189 lbs.

Normal disclaimers apply,

Gavin Bailey

--

"...this level of misinformation suggests some Americans may be
avoiding having an experience of cognitive dissonance."
- 'Poll shows errors in beliefs on Iraq, 9/11'
The Charlotte Observer, 20th June 2003

[Greg Hennessy]

On Wed, 06 Aug 2003 10:46:57 GMT, (The Revolution
Will Not Be Televised) wrote:


>Yes. That's about as realistic a prospect as my own Lancaster
>fantasy: Sabre-engined Lancasters [with four and not the originally
>mooted two Sabre-Manchester profile]. Stop laughing for a minute

:-), Well if you are going down that route :-). how about a centaurus engine'd Lanc.

Did anyone any thoughts to using P&Ws finest radials @ potential
replacements for the hercules ?

A lanc with 4 x 2800s and paddle blade props.... now theres a thought. :-).



greg


--
$ReplyAddress =~ s#\@.*$##; # Delete everything after the '@'
Alley Gator. With those hypnotic big green eyes
Alley Gator. She'll make you 'fraid 'em
She'll chew you up, ain't no lie

[ANDREW ROBERT BREEN]

In article >,
Greg Hennessy <nntp> wrote:
>On Wed, 06 Aug 2003 10:46:57 GMT, (The Revolution
>Will Not Be Televised) wrote:
>
>>Yes. That's about as realistic a prospect as my own Lancaster
>>fantasy: Sabre-engined Lancasters [with four and not the originally
>>mooted two Sabre-Manchester profile]. Stop laughing for a minute
>
>:-), Well if you are going down that route :-). how about a centaurus engine'd Lanc.
>
>Did anyone any thoughts to using P&Ws finest radials @ potential
>replacements for the hercules ?
>
>A lanc with 4 x 2800s and paddle blade props.... now theres a thought. :-).

Why be modest? Given that the basic Lancaster (and certainly the Lincoln)
wing had the strength, there's scope for adding rather a lot more power.
ISTR the Nene was test flown in early 1944 (someone will know for sure),
so how about four Nenes in pairs on the inboard stations (a la Avro
Ashton) and either Sabres, Griffons or Centaurii on the outboard stations.
The Nenes would take care of getting the whole affair off the ground in
the first place, for increasing altitude and for higher speeds over
hostile territory, while cruise under relatively safe circumstances could
be on the props only.

It's alright. I'll go back to the nice padded room..

More seriously, wht wasn't a 4xGriffon fit considered - higher-priority
calls for the engines, I guess, same reason as the griffon-mosquito
didn't happen.

--
Andy Breen ~ Interplanetary Scintillation Research Group
http://users.aber.ac.uk/azb/
"Time has stopped, says the Black Lion clock
and eternity has begun" (Dylan Thomas)

[John Halliwell]

In article >, ANDREW ROBERT BREEN
> writes
>More seriously, wht wasn't a 4xGriffon fit considered - higher-priority
>calls for the engines, I guess, same reason as the griffon-mosquito
>didn't happen.

I always thought it a pity Barnes Wallis didn't get the go ahead for his
Victory bomber. Not sure which engines he'd have used though.

--
John

[ANDREW ROBERT BREEN]

In article >,
John Halliwell > wrote:
>In article >, ANDREW ROBERT BREEN
> writes
>>More seriously, wht wasn't a 4xGriffon fit considered - higher-priority
>>calls for the engines, I guess, same reason as the griffon-mosquito
>>didn't happen.
>
>I always thought it a pity Barnes Wallis didn't get the go ahead for his
>Victory bomber. Not sure which engines he'd have used though.

Then there's the Bristol 100 - the eight-Centaurii, pusher brute, that
later led to the Brabazon airliner design, and which would have been
a beast to try to intercept at altitude. There's also the earlier
Supermarine design for a Lancaster/Halibag alternative, though I'm
doubtful whether it'd have matched the claimed performance in the metal..

--
Andy Breen ~ Interplanetary Scintillation Research Group
http://users.aber.ac.uk/azb/
"Time has stopped, says the Black Lion clock
and eternity has begun" (Dylan Thomas)

[M. J. Powell]

In message >, ANDREW ROBERT BREEN
> writes

snip

>Why be modest? Given that the basic Lancaster (and certainly the Lincoln)
>wing had the strength, there's scope for adding rather a lot more power.
>ISTR the Nene was test flown in early 1944 (someone will know for sure),
>so how about four Nenes in pairs on the inboard stations (a la Avro
>Ashton)

Ooh! An Ashton! I flew in one once at Farnborough. I didn't appreciate
the rarity of the aircraft at the time though.

Mike
--
M.J.Powell

[Peter Stickney]

In article >,
Greg Hennessy > writes:
> On Wed, 06 Aug 2003 10:46:57 GMT, (The Revolution
> Will Not Be Televised) wrote:
>
>
>>Yes. That's about as realistic a prospect as my own Lancaster
>>fantasy: Sabre-engined Lancasters [with four and not the originally
>>mooted two Sabre-Manchester profile]. Stop laughing for a minute
>
>:-), Well if you are going down that route :-). how about a centaurus engine'd Lanc.
>
> Did anyone any thoughts to using P&Ws finest radials @ potential
> replacements for the hercules ?
>
> A lanc with 4 x 2800s and paddle blade props.... now theres a thought. :-).

Well, in out thought experiment, we did briefly consider something
like that. The problem is, you don't get the sort of altitude
performance that we were looking for without 2-stage supercharging.
In the R2800 case, the only viable alternative for a 25,000' cruise
would have been using a turbosupercharger as the Aux Stage, with a
severe penalty in terms of wight and bulk, (Nostly bulk). In order to
make a minumum change version, the only likely alternatives were
2-stage Merlins, Bristol Hercules 100s, which weren't quite ready yet,
and Wright R2600s, of which there had been, on the original A-20s,
turbosupercharged.
What we ended up with was a Lancaster with 2-stage Merlins, .50 cal
guns, Crew armor, and extended tips to give a boost in cruise
ceiling. Basically, what we did was re-invent the Lincoln.

As Guy said elsewhere, probably the best solution would have been to
switch to B-24s. That resolves nearly all the problems, and had quite
good performance. (Climb? Not a problem. There you are, tootling
along at 25,000', and you dial in the turbos and climb like a bird!" -
unknown 100 Sqn B-24 pilot describing his airplane's performance to a
Sterling pilot.


--
Pete Stickney
A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many
bad measures. -- Daniel Webster

[Greg Hennessy]

On Thu, 7 Aug 2003 00:00:49 -0400, (Peter Stickney)
wrote:

> (Climb? Not a problem. There you are, tootling
>along at 25,000', and you dial in the turbos and climb like a bird!" -
>unknown 100 Sqn B-24 pilot describing his airplane's performance to a
>Sterling pilot.

The face of the stirling pilot must have been a picture.


greg
--
$ReplyAddress =~ s#\@.*$##; # Delete everything after the '@'
Alley Gator. With those hypnotic big green eyes
Alley Gator. She'll make you 'fraid 'em
She'll chew you up, ain't no lie

[Guy Alcala]

Geoffrey Sinclair wrote:

> Guy Alcala wrote in message >...

<snip>

> >"All-up weight has been increased to 65,000 pounds for the first time";
> >Middlebrook comments that 'this would allow each Lancaster to carry up to half a
> >ton more bombs. But the move was not as effective as might appear. It was soon
> >apparent that more crews were jettisoning part of their bomb loads in the North
> >Sea to retain some maneuverability if attacked by a night fighter before
> >reaching the target.'
> >
> >The diary quote is more ambiguous than I thought. To me it's at least implied
> >that this was an administrative rather than structural increase, but from the
> >quote I can't say that's definitely the case.
>
> From Avro Lancaster by Harry Holmes.
>
> B I, maximum take off weight, 63,000 pounds November 1942, 65,000
> pounds May 1944, 72,000 pounds February 1945. Top speeds 287
> mph at 11,500 feet, 275 mph at 15,000 feet, 260 mph at 19,400 feet.
> Service ceiling 23,000 feet, absolute ceiling 24,500 feet. No weights
> given.
>
> B I empty weight January 1942 29,580 pounds, fixed military load
> 4,120 pounds, so tare weight 33,700 pounds. Gross weight 60,000
> pounds, 5,120 HP take off power.

<snip much good stuff>

He doesn't happen to list just what is included in the fixed military load, does he?
Guns, radios, bombsights, O2, armor?

<Snip details of Lanc VI and Master Bomber discussion. Thanks.>

> >Unfortunately, books on the Halifax are almost non-existent in this country (not
> >that Lanc books are very thick on the ground), so I'm having to work through
> >peripheral sources like Middlebrook. I'll have to re-read it, but I'm pretty
> >sure Middlebrook shows the IIIs had a worse loss rate in "The Berlin Raids"
> >period than the Lancs, when both were on the same mission. Many of the raids to
> >Berlin only used Lancs, so that skews the Lanc losses. After the invasion it
> >probably made little difference what you were flying, as the loss rate had
> >dropped so low (and many of the missions were flown by day). And you did have a
> >better chance of bailing out of a Halifax in an emergency.
>
> Bomber Command War Diaries usually give the strength and losses
> of the attacking force by aircraft type, which gives overall percentages.
>
> Bomber Command War Losses gives you the details by individual
> aircraft.
>
> What level of detail is wanted?

Loss rates of Merlin-engined Lancs, Hercules-engined same and Halifax IIIs on the
same mission would be helpful.

TIA,

Guy

[Guy Alcala]

The Revolution Will Not Be Televised wrote:

> On Tue, 05 Aug 2003 20:10:27 GMT, Guy Alcala
> > wrote:
>
> [Warning: several hobby-horses are not just ridden in this post, but
> actively flogged to death. Continue at your own peril.]

Saddle up and ride ;-)

<snip the minutes of the Anglo-American Martin Middlebrook fan club, A.B.C. info>

> Holmes doesn't list any A&AEE testing for the higher weight of
> 65,000lbs, unlike things like further increases associated with the
> overloaded Gland Slam specials at 72,000 lbs auw or 12,000lb HC bombs,
> so I suspect it was an administrative initiative. Holmes gives the
> 65,000 lbs weight for production aircraft by May 1944, and a 63,000
> lbs auw for Is in November 1942, but the only II auw he gives dates
> from September 1942 at 60,000lbs, which is identical with the January
> 1942 Lanc I auw. I suspect that the I and III benefitted from a
> continual increment in auw over time which is not reflected in the
> commonly-understood figures for the II, although I have no reason to
> suspect it might not have benefitted from the same process which just
> hasn't been popularised in the same way. On the other hand, the Lanc
> II was being phased out by May 1944, so if the 65,000 lbs auw was
> promulgated beyond 1 Group and across the whole command at that point
> (as the differential bombloads Middlebrook gives for 5 Group, who seem
> to have stuck to a lower auw during the Battle of Berlin, would
> suggest], then they might have missed it.

Seems reasonable.

> The altitude issue [Herc engined bombers] is difficult to assess, and
> I've just read an account from a 6 Group pilot in Garbett & Goulding
> which indicates that the Halifax III had a much higher (@ 24,000 ft)
> usable operational bombing height than generally given. How this
> squares with the lower heights associated with the Lanc II is beyond
> me.

Probably due to all-incendiary (lighter) loads for the Halifaxes, of whatever mark.

> [Daylight Lancs]
>
> >That was part of our reasoning, along with engine mount and airframe
> >compatibility design issues and modifying the a/c production lines.
>
> Well, there are some things beyond reasonable modification, and
> whatever daylight bombing BC fantasies we entertain, they were going
> to have to be entertained on what was realistically possible with the
> production resources available at the time.

That was how we limited our alternate 1943.

> So, regardless of
> anything else, I don't think two-stage Merlins would be on the cards,
> so even if the "daylight Lancs" surrendered bombload in exchange for
> better defensive resources (armour, guns, ammo, etc), they would be
> flying lower than the B-17s and B-24s and would be at a commensurately
> higher risk from flak. The same applies to the Hercules XVI-engined
> "daylight Halifax" or [God forbid] a "daylight Stirling".

The plan was to transition BC over gradually, with the realisation that the early
missions would have to be to less well-defended targets in France or the low
countries owing to lack of ceiling and defensive guns etc. Ideally, we'd transition
either Packard or R-R over to two-stage production entirely.

Failing B-24s, I leaned towards Halifax IIIs, for whatever slight advantage their
four gun top turrets would give them, and the relative ease of mounting a flexible
..50cal in the nose given some local strengthening (as was done with B-17s), giving
them at least _some_ useful head-on armament. We could probably have begged or
borrowed enough .50s from 8th AF or elsewhere for that, even if we couldn't get an
adequate supply for the rest of the positions (not to mention the time needed to
redesign the turrets) before late '44 or so. We'd already had a hell of a time
convincing Butch that using 20mm was really not on in any reasonable time, given the
weight, strength, and Cg issues.


> Having said
> that, the Stirling had a beefy enough reserve of structural weight to
> compete with the Fort for robustness, but it would sure as hell need
> it if it was going to fly across the Ruhr in daylight straining to get
> over 15,000 feet.

The Stirling has always been my personal favorite among the three for looks (other
than the original top turret), and if I had my druthers they'd have stuck the
proposed 110-foot wing on them and maybe shortened the gear. But there was no way
that they could have been produced in adequate numbers.


> >Actually,
> >ACM Kramer really wanted us to use radials, but we pointed out that the only way
> >to get a significant high altitude daylight force into service within a year
> >using _British-designed_ heavies was to use two-stage Merlins, because there was
> >no high-altitude version of the Hercules in production.
>
> Even then, the numbers would not have been available; he would be
> stuck with Lanc I and Halifax IIIs as the basic starting point.

Exactly what we figured, although we were hoping to try out the Lanc II as well.

> I
> think there might be a case for a subsidiary daylight force working in
> tandem with the 8th AF, hitting the easier and shallower-penetration
> targets[with better Fighter Command escort coverage via adapted

> Spitfire VIIIs with the rear-fuselage tanks that eventually turned up
> in the Spit XVI], but as a strategic alternative to the whole striking
> force of Bomber Command I just think it's too implausible. The whole
> RAF bomber force was not viable as a major daylight force until the
> Luftwaffe daylight fighter force had been decimated and the available
> escort coverage was sufficient. The best that could be done with
> armament and armour adaptions would have been a poor man's B-17:
> maybe with a slightly higher bombload, but with a lower ceiling and
> still far more vulnerable to damage.

You've arrived at pretty much the same conclusions we did, although we said either
the Spit Mk. VIII or else the IX with the VIII's leading edge tanks as a start. We
told Supermarine to put more development effort into the rear tank, even if it held
up the Mk. XIV. We realised that Fighter Command was likely to scream over any
slowdown in production of the Mk. IX in the run up to the Invasion, so figured this
would need to be decided at Air Ministry/MAP or higher level. As it was, since
Arnold was already twisting Portal's arm to get him to give up the RAF's allocation
of 300 Merlin-Mustangs for the immediate future so that they could be used by the 8th
and 9th AF, we might have been able to swap for P-47s which would at least allow us
to escort to 375 miles or so by spring, even if we couldn't get the Spits we needed.

<snip Sabre and turbo-Hercules musings>

> > Personally, I've since
> >come to the conclusion that the simplest approach would have been for the
> >proposed (in Art's alternate universe) day RAF heavy bomber force to use B-24s.
> >This would require some re-scheduling of U.S. Bomb Group training and
> >deployment, but would eliminate the need to cut down the training times (first
> >one month, then another) for U.S. replacement crews that took place in the late
> >fall of '43 owing to the high loss rates. We'd figured 3 Gp. was the best Group
> >to convert first. 3 Gp. would have been the best to start with because of their
> >location in the same general area as 8th BC, and because the Stirling was the
> >least useful night bomber. Taking them off ops to retrain and convert, whether
> >replaced with B-24s, Lancs or Halifax IIIs, would cause the least negative
> >effect to the night force.
>
> Actually, bizarrely enough, I believe it was originally planned to use
> 3 Group to fly B-24's [albeit at night] in the halcyon pipe-dream days
> of the RAF bomber fantasists 1941 when the British were harassing the
> Americans for bigger Lend-lease allocations of increased heavy-bomber
> production. IIRC this fell through due to USAAF requirements after
> Pearl Harbour, but to be frank I don't think the production would have
> been there to consider this as a realistic into 1944, which leaves the
> Allies with the problem of making the best with what was actually
> available. And a single-BC-group daylight bombing effort cannot
> compare to the scale and depth of resources the 8th AF deployed and
> were fully required to sustain the heavy and ongoing attritional
> losses required for a meaningful, long-term, deep-penetration daylight
> strategic bombing effort.

3 Gp. was only the initial contingent; most of the force would transition over
eventually. If we could have gotten B-24s then 6 Gp. would probably be next, even
though we'd probably have had to do an airfield swap with 1 Gp. That way the
Canadians could train in the U.S. or Canada, and then fly their own a/c over.

> As an alternative, given these constraints, I suggest expanding 2
> Group as a daylight bomber force.

An option, although I'm not familiar with where they were based at the time, and
whether their base infrastructure would support heavies.

<snip a fair amount of agreement.


> >Unfortunately, books on the Halifax are almost non-existent in this country (not
> >that Lanc books are very thick on the ground), so I'm having to work through
> >peripheral sources like Middlebrook.
>
> Bignham is a reasonable start, but nowhere near as good as Francis
> Mason's work on the Lancaster [which I can never find second-hand], or
> Bowyer's on the Stirling.

I'd really like to see a good source on the Stirling, given my affection for it.

<snip some Lanc vs. Halifax III stuff>

> > Many of the raids to
> >Berlin only used Lancs, so that skews the Lanc losses.
>
> But I believe the Halifaxes to be dropped from deep penetration raids
> in early 1944 were only the Merlin-engined variants, so the 1944
> picture isn't as skewed as that would suggest.

True, but the Halifaxes going to Berlin and elsewhere at the time, even the IIIs,
were carrying incendiary only loads.

> >After the invasion it
> >probably made little difference what you were flying, as the loss rate had
> >dropped so low (and many of the missions were flown by day). And you did have a
> >better chance of bailing out of a Halifax in an emergency.
>
> Yes, but following the same Dysonesque approach to counter-factual
> speculation, how much better would the loss rates have been if the top
> and front turrets were deleted and cruising speeds increased to the
> maximum*? Even better, exchange the 4 Merlins for 4 Sabres.... OK,
> OK, the men in white coats have now arrived and I shall go quietly.
>
> [* full effect: the rear-gunner was still vital as a look-out and for
> covering the most dangerous approach path for night-fighters - even
> Schrage Muzak** attacks, which still often relied on a low stern-chase
> approach before manoevring below the target, so I say keep him, but
> give him four .50 calibres, with less ammo. If he does need to use
> the armament, it's now more than twice as effective, and if it's not
> over in 20 seconds no amount of further ammo will help the situation.
> Meanwhile there should still be a net gain from losing the weight of
> the top and front turrets, not to mention lower drag. Couple that
> with higher cruise speed engine settings and the Me 110 becomes a much
> more marginal night-fighter, and stern chase intercepts into the
> bomber-stream become even more difficult.]

The higher cruise speed at night was actually suggested by a British OR type in WW2 ,
but not taken up. For night use, I agree completely about losing the mid-upper (and
the nose turret if fitted), changing it for a streamlined nose ala' Halifax II/III.

Guy

[The Revolution Will Not Be Televised]

On Fri, 08 Aug 2003 09:40:56 GMT, Guy Alcala
> wrote:

>The Stirling has always been my personal favorite among the three for looks (other
>than the original top turret), and if I had my druthers they'd have stuck the
>proposed 110-foot wing on them and maybe shortened the gear. But there was no way
>that they could have been produced in adequate numbers.

Still too heavy for my likings. Like you, I think the Halifax B.III
was the best contender, with the Lancs second.

More on LR Spits in my other response.

>and 9th AF, we might have been able to swap for P-47s which would at least allow us
>to escort to 375 miles or so by spring, even if we couldn't get the Spits we needed.

The P-47s would probably be out: the RAF wanted them to replace
Hurricanes for Tactical support in the Far East by mid-1944, but IIRC
they didn't get significant deliveries until early 1945. The USAAF
(quite rightly) had first call on lend-lease aircraft, and I can't see
the RAF getting P-47s until the USAAF was happy with the numbers it
had available. The Mustang was a different issue, given the
importance of the British contribution to getting it and the Packard
Merlin into production in the first place.

[3 Group flying B-24s]

>3 Gp. was only the initial contingent; most of the force would transition over
>eventually.

I just don't think the numbers would be available for that in 1944.
Again, the USAAF would have first call (alongside the USN and
Churchill's personal transport/cigar ferry....). One, maybe two
Groups might have been usable in the context of heavy attritional
losses, but I can't see the RAF replacing the whole of the 2,000
Lancasters and Halifaxes Bomber Command had on strength by the end of
1944. Personally, I suspect 205 Group only really got them due to the
fact that they'd lucked into enough to equip one squadron* before
Pearl Harbour and the following ramping-up of USAAF lend-lease
allocations.

[* Not actually operating B-24s in December 1941, but able to
mysteriously hold on to their initial allocation which actually made
it out to Egypt in the spring of 1942 before the Halverson force and
the 12th AF Libs arrived to suck up all the following B-24s that
followed.]

>> As an alternative, given these constraints, I suggest expanding 2
>> Group as a daylight bomber force.
>
>An option, although I'm not familiar with where they were based at the time, and
>whether their base infrastructure would support heavies.

They had some in East Anglia, and could be allocated more. Just like
3 Group (and 8 Group), they were adjacent to USAAF bases, so the fuel
pipeline and rail links would have been available. I think the B-25
is a contender here: it had the range for shallow penetration raids
to the Ruhr, reasonable defensive armament and a good bombload. I
suggest phasing out the Boston in 2 Group and replacing it with the
Mitchell, and using the six to eight squadrons in 2 Group for daylight
strategic bombing. Further expansion could follow if the aircraft
were available.

>I'd really like to see a good source on the Stirling, given my affection for it.

Try "The Stirling Bomber", by M. J. F. Bowyer, Faber & Faber, London
1980. ISBN 0 571 11101 7. It's not as comprehensive as I'd like
[most books aren't], but it's the best reference I've found for the
Stirling.

[snip gratuitous, sickening and totally uncalled-for agreement on
other points]

Gavin Bailey

--

"...this level of misinformation suggests some Americans may be
avoiding having an experience of cognitive dissonance."
- 'Poll shows errors in beliefs on Iraq, 9/11'
The Charlotte Observer, 20th June 2003

[Guy Alcala]

The Revolution Will Not Be Televised wrote:

> On Fri, 8 Aug 2003 11:03:12 +0100, "Keith Willshaw"
> > wrote [well, Guy did, the last
> quoted material is from Keith]:
>
> [long-range Spits for a daylight BC effort]
>
> >> You've arrived at pretty much the same conclusions we did, although we
> >said either
> >> the Spit Mk. VIII or else the IX with the VIII's leading edge tanks as a
> >start.
>
> Given that Mk VII/VIII production was underway at the end of 1942,
> there's no reason they couldn't have been made available with
> rear-fusleage tanks as the 1945 production IXs and XVIs were: Fighter
> Command were actively against it due to C of G issues affecting
> manoeverability, but in this instance I think they would have been
> over-ruled if a decision was made at Air Staff level to pursue
> daylight strategic operations [just like they got the LR Mk IIs and
> had to use them to escort the Knapsack Blenheim raid in Ausgust 1941].
>
> Frankly, even Mk Vs would have been useful with a 75-gallon rear tank
> and 90-gallon slipper tanks. This would have increased endurance over
> normal internal fuel capacity to a total of 250 gallons or about 300%.
> They would have been uncomfortably unstable on take-off, but the 8th
> AF overcame similar problems with the rear-fuselage tank for the P-51B
> (deleted by the RAF in their Mustang IIIs for the same manoeverability
> prejudice). This would have improved a little with the large chord Mk
> VIII tailplane.
>
> My contention here is that Fighter Command would still get the IXs as
> fast as they could be produced, while older Vc airframes were fitted
> with the rear fuselage tank, meaining no impact on Mk IX supplies in
> the short term. A similar process of getting the most out of older
> airframes can be seen in the conversion of stock Vbs to LF Vbs in the
> summer of 1943, so I don't think this is too implausible.

I think you may be underestimating the difficulty re the Mk V. Quill, in His
"Spitfire: A Test Pilot's Story," devotes an entire chapter to "Longitudinal
Stability and Increased Range." He describes the weight additions and Cg
problems that led to the installation of bobweights on the Mk. Vs, as well as the
first fitting of a 75 gallon tank to a Mk. IX (ML 186), which he flew from
Salisbury Plain to the Moray Firth and back at low altitude and economical cruise
-- this a/c had a bob-weight in the elevator system plus an enlarged horn
balance. Quill writes that "the aeroplane was unstable to start with but as soon
as I had used up the rear fuselage fuel the handling was back to normal . . ."

While he and Joe Smith felt that some longitudinal instability at the start of
the flight was acceptable (as with the Mustang), the margins seem to have been
much smaller in the case of the Spit. The Mustang's stability was judged
acceptable once the rear tank was down to somewhere between 25 and 50% (opinions
differ), and if you want to extend the escort range it's the amount of fuel you
can carry internally to fight and return on that determines escort radius, no
matter how much fuel you hang externally to boost endurance.

Talking about the development of the Mk. XIV into the Mk. XVIII, Quill writes
that "the basic stability margins of this aircraft, with its more forward center
of gravity due to its heavier engine, and with the latest standard of modified
elevator and the larger vertical tail surfaces, were thought likely to be
adequate to enable the aircraft to be cleared for long-range escort duties
accepting some instability in the early stages. However, we had more difficulty
than we anticipated in reaching an acceptable standard of handling with the rear
tank in use and the war was over before it was possible to clear the aircraft
with the rear tank in full operation."

"The next and final stage in the longitudinal stability story was the
incorporation of what came to be known as the 'Spiteful' tail. This had greatly
enlarged (27 %) horizonta and vertical tail surfaces and was fitted to some Mk.
22s, all Mk. 24s, some Seafire 46s and all Seafire 47s and all Spitefuls and
Seafangs."

"It was a major production change and, had the pressures of war permitted its
earlier introduction, for instance on the Mk. XIVs and Mk. XVIII, the Spitfire
would have become a very fine long-range escort fighter. As it was, although the
Seafire 47 and Spitfire 24 were both very long-range aeroplanes compared with the
early marks of Spitfire, the fact is that throughout the period of Spitfire
wartime operations problems of longitudinal stability imposed a severe limitation
on its range."

The two-stage Merlin was shorter and lighter than the Griffon, but was still
about 6" longer (second stage supercharger case) and 200 lb. heavier than the
single stage Merlins, and the Mk. Vs had already been suffering from overstess
breakups due to too far aft Cg prior to the fitting of bobweights. I don't think
Mk. Vs would have worked.

> The next stage would have been Mk VIIIs with the same rear-fuselage
> tank, with the leading-edge tankage helping to offset their higher
> fuel consumption to give a broadly similar endurance and range. I
> don't doubt that there wouldn't have been enough rear fuselage tanks
> to equip full production, but Fighter Command and the overseas
> commands would still get the shorter-range, umodified VIIIs and IXs.
> Speaking of which, the extra range would have been very popular in
> Australia, Burma and Italy. At any rate, overall production would not
> suffer, as only a minority of airframes could be fitted as rear
> fuselage tank production started, and this could be done to them while
> in storage at Maintenance Units after delivery from the factory.

If Mk. VIII airframes were available we would have taken them as is, and asked
for more. Even the unmodified Mk. VIII would get us to the Ruhr at least,
probably a bit further.

> We
> >> told Supermarine to put more development effort into the rear tank, even
> >if it held
> >> up the Mk. XIV.
>
> No need to - the supply of two-stage Griffons was the main bottleneck
> for Mk XIV production, and there would still be unmodified Mk VIII
> airframes available by the end of 1943 for conversion to Mk XIVs as
> the Griffons came along.

Lots of Mk.VIIIs were what we needed, not the Mk. XIV, so we would have grabbed
those airframes. The delay in the Mk. XIV would have been a question of
development manpower available. They were still working out the bugs on the Mk.
XIV at the time, and we would have told them to put that on the back burner and
get tanks into the leading edges of Mk. IXs, convert over to Mk. VIII production,
and/or devote much more effort to qualifying a rear fuselage tank.

> I suspect Boulton Paul would have ended up
> working with Supermarine for the internal tanks (just like they did in
> 1942 for the external Spitfire drop tanks), but I don't know what
> would have had to give way at either firm in 1943 to allow the
> increased internal tankage to be developed.

> I suspect F.21
> development would have been held up at Supermarine, as the Mk VIII
> airframe (which was the basis of the Mk XIV) was already in series
> production. This just means the RAF don't get two squadrons worth of
> F.21s in spring 1945, after interminable airframe development work
> throughout most of 1944 delays them anyway. No great loss there,
> methinks.

See comments above.

> >>We realised that Fighter Command was likely to scream
> >over any
> >> slowdown in production of the Mk. IX in the run up to the Invasion, so
> >figured this
> >> would need to be decided at Air Ministry/MAP or higher level.
>
> Absolutely. But this is worth dwelling on. A couple of wings of LR
> Spit Vcs operating out of Coltishall or Ludham escorting 8th missions
> *as they did historically* in the summer of 1943, alongside the 8th FC
> P-47s, and escorting deeper-penetration 2 Group B-25 raids would have
> proved their worth within a couple of months, and would have increased
> 8th AF effectiveness (allowing deeper B-24 penetrations due to an
> expanded escort force). Obviously, the LR Vcs would not be optimal,
> but even they could prove to be useful escorts, helping to supress
> bomber losses and having much greater opportunities for combat at
> their initiative than the rest of FC Spit units on Circus operations
> to the Pas de Calais.

See my comments on Spit V Cg problems above. In 1943, with lots of Mk. IXs not
able to do much, I think the effort needed to go there or into the Mk. VIII. The
Spit V was just too inferior at B-17/24 heights, even assuming it could carry the
fuel (better than nothing, I grant you, but I expect fighter squadron morale
would have been the pits). As it was, RAF Spits (Vs and I suspect mostly IXs)
were able to escort to Antwerp. Extending that to Emden, the Ruhr and much of
France would have had a ripple effect, making more P-47 groups available to go
deeper, and then use the P-38s and P-51s for TARCAP.

> The logic of upgrading and expanding the 12 Group LR Spit escort force
> would have been inescapable, even if the RAF were less wedded to
> demonstrating the potential of daylight strategic bombing than the
> USAAF was. The same dynamic as affected the RAF Mustang IIIs
> historically (doing anything particularly effective? No? Then escort
> 8th AF raids.). The critical factor is that an embronic LR escort
> force operating out of 12 Group would not neccessarily prejudice 11
> Groups supplies of Spit IXs for any potential Battle of Britain Mk II
> which was their trump card for annihilating the needs of other
> commands for the best fighter currently in production at the strategic
> planning level.
>
> [At the Air Ministry, Air Staff Meeting for the Planning of Offensive
> Fighter Operations, 30th July 1943.]
>
> AOC 11 Group: "These Spits handle like dogs with the rear tanks full.
> Rate of climb is reduced, and they wallow about like pregnant cows. I
> will not ask my pilots to fight under this disadvantage."
>
> AOC 12 Group: "We wire the rear fuselage tank filler cap shut when on
> defensive operations. No disadvantage there. And our pilots empty
> their rear tanks first when on operations. We don't even need to fill
> them full for sweeps over eastern Holland and the German border, just
> enough to cover the climb and initial cruise to the enemy coast. No
> disadvantage there. And my long-range Spitfire squadrons are making
> more claims than most of AOC 11 Group's wings: perhaps this might be
> why all his best Squadron and Wing leaders are trying to transfer to
> those squadrons."
>
> AOC 11 Group: "That's all very well, but I will not suffer a
> reduction of Spitfire IX deliveries to benefit 12 Group's operations
> at the expense of the defence of the south-east of England and
> London."
>
> Vice-Chief of the Air Staff: "12 Group haven't received any Spitfire
> IXs at this point. AOC 12 Group is using converted Spitfire Vs."
>
> AOC 12 Group: "In view of our success, we would ask the CAS to
> release Spitfire VIIIs as they are produced from my M.U.s to convert
> in the same manner."
>
> Director Fighter Operations Overseas "What about our promised
> deliveries of VIIIs to Australia and Burma. They need the range just
> as much as AOC 12 Group?."
>
> AOC 12 Group: "Clearly other commands want the LR Spitfire as well.
> I suggest the VCAS recommends increased tankage production and the MAP
> is instructed accordingly."

And that's what we planned to push for: Mk. VIIIs or Mk. IXs with VIII tanks,
plus whatever extra fuel Supermarine could make work until the Mustangs were
available in sufficient numbers. Ideally, we wanted the Mk. XVI a year earlier.

> As it was,
> >since
> >> Arnold was already twisting Portal's arm to get him to give up the RAF's
> >allocation
> >> of 300 Merlin-Mustangs for the immediate future so that they could be used
> >by the 8th
> >> and 9th AF, we might have been able to swap for P-47s which would at least
> >allow us
> >> to escort to 375 miles or so by spring, even if we couldn't get the Spits
> >we needed.
>
> I don't think the British were willing to compromise over their
> allocations of Mustang IIIs, although they historically were willing
> to make cutbacks in their allocations in favour of the 8th AF when
> they were suffering heavy losses (e.g. 20-25% of their I.E. Mustang
> strength per month in spring 1944).

That's what I'm talking about. In the fall of '43, Arnold got Portal to give up
his Mustangs for a few months, in exchange for P-47s.

> But with an expanding force of
> longer-ranged Spits escorting from East Anglia to the Ruhr, the
> pressures would have been less. The P-38 and Mustang were still going
> to be required for deep-penetration missions, but the Spits could have
> provided a major and obvious benefit.

Sure, we agree on this.

> This is worth dwelling on, as the real key to a successful RAF
> daylight bombing offensive was winning air superiority using escort
> fighters more than it lay in increasing the defensive capacity of the
> bombers themselves. I see the two as complimentary, but with a large
> enough force of "rear-tank" Spit Vs and then VIIIs, the RAF could have
> bombed the Ruhr successfully in daylight with their existing night
> bombers by 1944. They would have required heavier escorts, and
> probably could only have operated in tandem with deeper-penetration
> B-17 raids taking on the brunt of the resistance, but they would have
> been a practicable proposition, albeit with higher risks of
> disasterous losses on individual missions if the Luftwaffe got to
> them. On the plus side, their all-weather bombing capability on
> large-scale industrial and area targets was probably superior to the
> 8th AF at that point, and this would have increased the overall
> effectiveness of the bombing campaign as a whole.
>
> Just my opinion, though.

Agrees with our reasoning exactly, with the reservations stated re the Mk. V.

Guy

[Paul J. Adam]

In message >, ArtKramr
> writes
>You fly where you are told to fly. Nobody will ever ask you for "your
>definition" of anything.

The operational analyst will, these days. (If he didn't splice some
recording gear into your aircraft anyway)

Got to get as much info on what works and what doesn't, as you can:
there's a lot less margin for error these days.

--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBox<at>jrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Guy Alcala wrote in message >...
>Geoffrey Sinclair wrote:
>
>> From Avro Lancaster by Harry Holmes.

>> B I empty weight January 1942 29,580 pounds, fixed military load
>> 4,120 pounds, so tare weight 33,700 pounds. Gross weight 60,000
>> pounds, 5,120 HP take off power.
>
><snip much good stuff>
>
>He doesn't happen to list just what is included in the fixed military load, does he?
>Guns, radios, bombsights, O2, armor?

No break down of fixed military load.

After giving the tare weight (airframe plus fixed military load) comes
the rest of the load, "Crew, removable military load, fuel and oil, bombs
and carriers".

>> Bomber Command War Diaries usually give the strength and losses
>> of the attacking force by aircraft type, which gives overall percentages.
>>
>> Bomber Command War Losses gives you the details by individual
>> aircraft.
>>
>> What level of detail is wanted?
>
>Loss rates of Merlin-engined Lancs, Hercules-engined same and Halifax IIIs on the
>same mission would be helpful.
>
>TIA,


Well the war losses gives the loss by serial number, including
summary tables in the appendix by mark, but not the sortie totals.

The war diaries gives the basic types in a particular mission,
Lancaster, Stirling, Halifax etc, but not the sortie totals by
mark number. So overall it is a case of counting the numbers
to give the losses by aircraft mark, and overall losses by
aircraft design. The two references would show the losses on
other operations on a given night, like minelaying, so these can
be removed to give an overall percentage loss rate for a given
target.

Also if you want percentages then presumably you want to know
the abort rates and the overall number and type of aircraft that
were credited with attacking the target. I expect this will require
trips to the PRO.

There is the situation about Halifax mark numbers, marks I, II, V,
merlin engines, the rest were hercules. The hercules versions had
the extended wingtips, 1,275 square feet if wing area versus
1,250 square feet. During the mark II/V production run the mid
upper turret was changed from 2 to 4 guns.

The rectangular tail was introduced in mid 1943 and included
modification of existing aircraft. Many of the earlier types had
ended up operating at around the mark III weights, as a result
squadrons started to take weight out of the aircraft, including turrets.

Mark I series 1 (no mid upper turret, empty 34,000, max 55,000 pounds,
12,000 pound maximum bomb load, merlin X, service ceiling 22,000 feet)
Mark I series 2 (series 2 and 3 empty 35,000, max 60,000 pounds)
Mark I series 3 (series 3 had 1,220 HP engines versus 1,130 HP)

Mark II series 1 (mid upper turret, empty 35,800, max 60,000 pounds,
merlin XX, 1,220 HP)
Mark II series 1 special (empty 35,000 pounds, no nose turret, 13,000
pound bomb load)
Mark II series 1a, most with rectangular vertical tail, glazed nose,
merlin 22, introduced the 4 gun mid upper turret.

Mark V series 1, mark Vs were effectively mark II with dowty undercarriage.
Mark V series 1 special (no nose and often mid upper turret, 36,000 and
61,500 pounds, service ceiling 22,000 feet)
Mark V series 1a, rectangular vertical tail, glazed nose, service ceiling
21,000 feet.

In January 1944 the merlin engined types were permanently suspended
from operations against German targets, the mark III began arriving in
squadrons in November 1943. So presumably what is wanted as a first
look are the November 1943 to February 1944 losses. One point the
RAAF history makes is it could make a big difference where you were
in the bomber stream. The most famous incidence is at Peenemunde,
only the last wave was intercepted.

Mark III, extended wings, rectangular tail, glazed nose, 38,332 pounds
empty, 65,000 pounds loaded, often with H2S fitted, service ceiling
20,000 feet, 13,000 pound bomb load
Mark VII, mark III with different version of hercules engines, bomb
load 12,000 pounds.
Mark VI as per mark III but some cleared to 68,000 pounds, bomb
load 12,000 pounds.

One point is some of the merlin engined types were fitted with 4
bladed propellers, which added 1,000 feet to the service ceiling
with better high altitude rate of climb, and helped on long endurance
flights, seems to be mainly mark V aircraft.

Most of the above from Halifax at War by Brian J Rapier, which is
mainly stories of the men who flew the aircraft.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

[Peter Stickney]

In article >,
Dave Eadsforth > writes:
> In article >, Peter Stickney
> > writes

Sorry for the late reply - I've been busy at work, and we took
advantage of the non-monsoon weather yesterday to effect a Vehicle
Recovery Operation (Hauling my brother's 1932 Fird 1-1/2 ton out of
the Hornet (both Yellowjecket and White-Faced - The White-Faced are
Evil - they live in underground nests, which they defend vigorously
with red-hot 18" Japanese Bayonets) and grapevine (Didn't know that
grape vines can get 1" in diameter - stuff's as strong as a steel
cable, too) Alder thicket (Those are the ones with 4" thorns), with
the surrounding ground too soft to use the heavy trucks or teh dozer
to pull. (At least we don't have Snakes, Venomous, Lethal, 47
variation, here in NH), Needless to say, you don't feel like posting
much, after that.

>>In article >,
>> Dave Eadsforth > writes:
>>Thanks, Dave. But I should have been more explicit. The Merlin
>>engined Lancs are fiarly consistantly documented. The one that seems
>>off is the Hercules powered Lancaster II.
>
> Beg your pardon, I should have been more attentive...
>
>> There's been a lot of stuff
>>published about it that doesn't make sense, and an accurate context
>>for the numbers that do exist is hard to come by.
>>
>>Interesting bit about the "Lincoln-Type" landing gear, though.
>>The numbers that you've posted also explain why some sources are off.
>>They seem to be quoting the number for the modified aircraft.
>>
> Yes, a study of AVRO production line management in 1945 could be
> interesting.

Not a problem at all, and I'm glad to get the info you posted. Good
info never hurts, even if it wasn't what you were originally looking
for.

--
Pete Stickney
A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many
bad measures. -- Daniel Webster

[Guy Alcala]

Peter Stickney wrote:
<snip>

> Andm, for thh definitions of "Fixed" vs "Removable" Military load, I
> haven't found any explicit definitions, but I do happen to have the
> Erection adn Maintenance Manuals for the Night-fighter Mosquitos, and
> the CG computation tables list items considered to be "Removable"

<snip Mossie list>

> At a guess, Removable Military Load is whatever can be pulled at an
> airfield without special equipment. The Fixed Military Load must be
> things like Armo(u)r Plate, and self-sealing fuel tanks, which would
> require that the airplane be taken apart to some extent to remove.

Presumably just the hard to get to armor, as much of it is in plain sight
and easily accessible (like the seat back in a Lanc, or the armor
protecting the waist gunners in a B-17 or B-24).

BTW, Amazon lists an outfit called Crecy Publications Ltd. in the UK,
which supposedly has the reprints of the Stirling (1/III/IV, Halifax and
Lanc I/III/X Pilot's notes; however no prices are given, and they are all
unavailable. Going to Crecy's website none are listed, so does anyone know
if they ever did publish them, or is this some vaporware?

Guy

[John Halliwell]

In article >, Guy Alcala
> writes
>BTW, Amazon lists an outfit called Crecy Publications Ltd. in the UK,
>which supposedly has the reprints of the Stirling (1/III/IV, Halifax and
>Lanc I/III/X Pilot's notes; however no prices are given, and they are all
>unavailable. Going to Crecy's website none are listed, so does anyone know
>if they ever did publish them, or is this some vaporware?

This thread has had an awful lot of weights listed for various types not
all clear as to what they include. Does anybody know the original
bomb/fuel load for the B.1 Lanc?

I'm trying to find out how big the bomb load could have been for a full
fuel load, and a fuel load for max bomb load (working on 14,000lbs).

--
John

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

John Halliwell wrote in message ...
>In article >, Guy Alcala
> writes
>>BTW, Amazon lists an outfit called Crecy Publications Ltd. in the UK,
>>which supposedly has the reprints of the Stirling (1/III/IV, Halifax and
>>Lanc I/III/X Pilot's notes; however no prices are given, and they are all
>>unavailable. Going to Crecy's website none are listed, so does anyone know
>>if they ever did publish them, or is this some vaporware?
>
>This thread has had an awful lot of weights listed for various types not
>all clear as to what they include. Does anybody know the original
>bomb/fuel load for the B.1 Lanc?
>
>I'm trying to find out how big the bomb load could have been for a full
>fuel load, and a fuel load for max bomb load (working on 14,000lbs).


Lancaster fuel tankage was 2,154 British gallons, the UK oil official
history notes 315 gallons of 100 octane avgas weighed 2,240 pounds,
other avgas grades were heavier, 300 gallons weighing 2,240 pounds.
So a full fuel load was around 16,000 pounds.

You could add 400 more gallons in overload tanks in the fuselage.

The early Lancasters were cleared to 60,000 pounds of which
26,300 pounds was available for the "removable load", figure
around 250 pounds per crew member, body, clothing, parachute,
oxygen, the removable load probably included the machine guns
as well as their ammunition.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

[The Revolution Will Not Be Televised]

On Sat, 09 Aug 2003 07:52:50 GMT, Guy Alcala
> wrote:

[snip unacceptable tirade of rational discourse]

[3 Group flying B-24s]

>Remember, though, that the U.S. phased out B-24 production at 3 of the 5 factories
>making them (Douglas Tulsa, Convair Fort Worth, and North American in Dallas) during
>1944, as Ford and Consolidated San Diego were able to produce sufficient numbers for U.S.
>requirements. Even so, according to Joe Baugher's website the RAF received 1,600 B-24H, J
>and Ls between Spring '44 and August '45, so there was clearly excess capacity
>available.

OK, I can accept the increased B-24 availability in 1944, but what do
we lose as a consequence, and what do we do in 1943 meanwhile?

>> They had some in East Anglia, and could be allocated more. Just like
>> 3 Group (and 8 Group), they were adjacent to USAAF bases, so the fuel
>> pipeline and rail links would have been available.
>
>I was thinking more of runway/taxiway/ hardstand length and strength, as well as hangar
>size, bomb dumps, accomodations etc. All would likely need upgrading.

They'd just re-allocate the bases to the relevant groups. Swap a
grass strip for an asphalt one in another Group. I don't think it's a
major issue.

>> I think the B-25
>> is a contender here: it had the range for shallow penetration raids
>> to the Ruhr, reasonable defensive armament and a good bombload. I
>> suggest phasing out the Boston in 2 Group and replacing it with the
>> Mitchell, and using the six to eight squadrons in 2 Group for daylight
>> strategic bombing. Further expansion could follow if the aircraft
>> were available.
>
>Nah, same limitations of range and ceiling as the B-26s, with a smaller bombload.

Really? I thought it had a better range and bombload, but I'm no
expert. I saw it fulfilling a diversionary/supporting role, hitting
airfields and less-heavily defended targets outside the major heavy
Flak belts and giving the Luftwaffe controllers headaches trying to
identify the main raiding force formations. In other words, doing for
the B-24s in 3 Group what the 2nd Bomb Division B-24s did for the
B-17s in the rest of the 8th AF historically at this point.

> Hell,
>the mediums were operating down below Stirling height (both the R-2600s in the B-25 and
>the R-2800s in the B-26 had single-stage two-speed supercharging, optimized for about
>15,000 feet) which is okay for relatively lightly defended tactical targets but a really
>bad idea going after German industrial targets. If they wanted to go to Germany from
>England it had to be with heavies, or the unavailable in sufficient numbers Mossie.

The tactical bombers had to face the Flak when operating over western
Germany in 1945, and it was suvivable given adequate support and
decent planning. And many of the tactical targets they did hit had
substantive flak defence (albeit nowhere near 1943 Ruhr levels, let
alone 1945 Politz levels). Even so, I wouldn't suggest using them as
a deep-penetration strategic force.

>Well, if it would help get things back to normal around here, whenever one of us chooses
>to present and discuss factual data that contradicts hoary old myth and one-sided
>perceptions, the other could accuse him of belittling the accomplishments, bravery and/or
>importance of various aircrew nationalities/theaters/periods.

At last, a contribution in this thread which reaches beyond
rationality to advocate a return to the traditional and time-honoured
mode of usenet discourse.

>How much civil discussion,
>analysis and argument can r.a.m. stand? ;-)

Of course, the key difference between a USAAF daylight strategic
bombing effort and an RAF one would be the greater efficiency of the
latter. I mean, once we factor out all those ludicrous PX
requirements for Coca-Cola, ice-cream and signed movie star's
underwear, we should free up about 50% extra import capacity for bombs
and replacement aircraft.....

Gavin Bailey


--

Another user rings. "I need more space" he says.
"Well, why not move to Texas?", I ask. - The ******* Operator From Hell

[retinfla]

The most exciting takeoff was in a contest between an F-8F and, as I
remember it, an F-9F. They left the start at the same time and a couple of
hundred feet later the F-8 went straight up. It was at a couple of thousand
feet (maybe not quite that high) before the F-9 left the ground.

"Guy Alcala" > wrote in message
. ..
> Cub Driver wrote:
>
> > >I shall have to re-play my tape of a UK airshow that Douglas Bader
narrates
> > >and tells of his first flight in a jet it went something like "Well,
there I
> > >sat in the cockpit ready for my first flight and braced myself.....and
you
> > >know, the thing took off down the runway like an old lorry!"
> >
> > That sounds about right. The B-47 had the advantage of peacetime
> > development, but its engines were so slow to spool up that the plane
> > had to land under power with a parachute. Lacking the power, it would
> > crash if it had to go around.
>
> While correct about the B-47, you're talking about two separate issues.
The
> Meteor's (and all early jets) slow accel time on take-off had nothing to
do with
> spool-up time, as they'd already be spooled up prior to takeoff, and
everything
> to do with their relatively low power to weight ratios and low thrust at
low
> speeds. I will now make way for Mr. Stickney, who I trust will be along
any
> moment now to give his thrust vs. power lecture, much as it must irritate
him to
> have to constantly repeat it ;-)
>
> Guy
>
> P.S. Say, Pete and Urban, this is the sort of thing that definitely
belongs in
> the FAQ. That will save lots of typing (and teeth-gnashing) in future.
>

[Guy Alcala]

Let's just say my reply has been delayed, but here goes.


The Revolution Will Not Be Televised wrote:

> On Sat, 09 Aug 2003 18:50:48 GMT, Guy Alcala
> > wrote:

<snip>

> [rear fuselage tanks in Spit Vcs]
>
> >I think you may be underestimating the difficulty re the Mk V. Quill, in His
> >"Spitfire: A Test Pilot's Story," devotes an entire chapter to "Longitudinal
> >Stability and Increased Range."
>
> Yes, but a close reading of that source and others leads me to the
> conclusions which follow.

Ah, now we can compare close readings and interpretations of same. Onward.

> He describes the weight additions and Cg
> >problems that led to the installation of bobweights on the Mk. Vs, as well as the
> >first fitting of a 75 gallon tank to a Mk. IX (ML 186), which he flew from
> >Salisbury Plain to the Moray Firth and back at low altitude and economical cruise
> >-- this a/c had a bob-weight in the elevator system plus an enlarged horn
> >balance. Quill writes that "the aeroplane was unstable to start with but as soon
> >as I had used up the rear fuselage fuel the handling was back to normal . . ."
>
> Precisely the same condition as experienced with the rear fuselage
> tank in the P-51B. I'll admit upfront that the CoG issues with the
> Spit Vc/IX airframe were more serious, but this was not a binary
> issue: it came down to what level of initial instability with a full
> rear tank the institution concerned was prepared to tolerate.

> I suggest, on the balance of evidence I've seen (which I admit is not
> comprehensive), the RAF were far more sensitive to this than the USAAF
> was. A case in point is the rear fusleage tank in the P-51B/Mustang
> III. The instability caused by a full 85-gallon rear fuselage tank
> was no different between Mustangs in RAF colours and those in USAAF
> colours, the critical difference was the institutional appreciation
> involved, which saw the RAF delete it entirely while the USAAF adopted
> it happily. I suggest that the USAAF approach to rear-fuselage tanks
> was materially different, and a similar need for long-range escorts
> for a daylight strategic bombing strategy on the part of the RAF would
> have entailed a similar approach as the USAAF adopted: i.e. the
> instability would have been accepted in order to achieve the desired
> operational aim.

Perhaps so, but again we're talking about the Spit, not the Mustang, and the former,
as you agree, had more problems with this.

> I won't go into the institutional differences in detail here, but the
> whole counter-factual only works if we adopt a USAAF-like commitment
> to daylight strategic bombing. Absent that commitment, with all that
> it entailed in terms of forcing long-range escort capacity regardless
> of the difficulties (such as CoG issues with increased internal
> tankage), and there wouldn't be any RAF daylight bombing effort to
> start with. Without one, the other does not follow, but if we're
> positing the first, we need to accept that this would modifiy
> historical RAF fighter procurement and equipment beyond the historical
> norm. In short, attitudes to things like the acceptable level of
> temporary instability in a Spitfire with full rear-fuselage tanks
> would have to change.

We agree on all the above, but I posit that the commitment would result in a shift to
Mk. VIIIs (or Mk. IXs with similar tankage), accepting the likely temporary decrease
in production.

> >While he and Joe Smith felt that some longitudinal instability at the start of
> >the flight was acceptable (as with the Mustang), the margins seem to have been
> >much smaller in the case of the Spit. The Mustang's stability was judged
> >acceptable once the rear tank was down to somewhere between 25 and 50% (opinions
> >differ),
>
> Much like the behaviour of the actual Mk IX/XVIs with rear-fuselage
> tanks in 1945.

True, but those Mk.IX/XVIs also had extra fuel in the regular fuselage tanks (ca.
94-96 gallons, depending on the source) forward of the datum. And correct me if I'm
wrong, but ISTR that only those a/c with cut-down rear fuselages got the aft tanks;
the aft fuselage of those a/c should have been lighter. Add in that the regular Mk.
IX was carrying around fixed ballast in the tail, and had CGs in the 4-5.0" aft of
datum range, when the Mk. Vs were in the 8-9" range. See

http://www.fourthfightergroup.com/eagles/ab197.html

as well as various Mk.V data from the same source:

http://www.fourthfightergroup.com/eagles/spittest.html

> >and if you want to extend the escort range it's the amount of fuel you
> >can carry internally to fight and return on that determines escort radius, no
> >matter how much fuel you hang externally to boost endurance.
>
> Agreed. This is why the rear-fuselage tankage issue is critical to
> this speculation.

Not for combat radius/return, unless you can use rear fuselage tankage for that;
otherwise you're just extending the endurance and ferry range. The Mustang could only
retain a fraction (ca. 25-50%) of that rear tank fuel to use for combat without being
dangerously unstable, with the contemporary Spit possibly (probably?) being unable to
retain any of it; at best, it could retain the same fraction as the Mustang. The
Mustang with rear tank didn't have 269 U.S. gallons to fight and return on; it had
somewhere between 205 and 227, depending on what fraction of the aft tank capacity
allowed acceptable combat handling.

To be an acceptable long-range escort, the Spit still needed the extra forward
fuselage fuel of the later Mk. IXs and the Mk. VIIIs, plus the leading edge tanks of
the latter. The Mk. VIII carried 124 Imperial gallons internally (149 U.S), ALL of
which was usable in combat, plus whatever extra fuel usable in combat (if any) a rear
tank provided.


> They key difference between the Mustang and the Spitfire here, I
> suggest, is institutional, and not just a matter of engineering. The
> two Mk IXs with internal capacity enlarged by Wright Field at the same
> time (July 1944) are a similar example: the RAF turned them down,
> while the USAAF were clearly prepared to tolerate engineering
> trade-offs (such as changes to the wing structure) that the RAF
> wasn't. I suggest this gives us an indication of the approach
> differential involved on an institutional basis which transcends the
> engineering problems.

In the case of the Spit wing it seems to have been a strength issue, at least
according to Quill

> I fully accept that the Spit had less CoG margins to play with, but I
> still believe the required engineering solutions were at hand. On a
> chronological basis, the bob-weight issue first came into focus when
> Tony Bartley returned to operations with 65 Squadron after a spell
> working under Quill as a test pilot at Supermarine, in February 1942
> (as mentioned in the memoirs of Quill, Bartley and the other flight
> commander in 65 Sqn at the time, Geoff Wellum).
>
> The bob weights were an immediate answer to the failure of squadrons
> to properly maintain the equipped CoG of their aircraft. I suggest
> that a greater institutional emphasis on maintaining correct CoG
> weighting would have had an impact on this. More relevantly,
> solutions to this issue which gave a much greater margin of CoG
> movement were at hand, as Quill states in the same chapter, with the
> trial and testing of an improved Westland elevator (October 1942) and
> an increased elevator horn balance (tested early 1943). In addition,
> long-range reinforcement flights from Gibraltar to Malta in October
> 1942 actually involved the use of a 29-gallon rear fuselage tank in
> addition to the 170 gallon drop tank used in the Vcs involved. So I
> suggest basic experience of rear-fuselage tankage, and measures to
> combat the worst CoG issues resulting were at hand in plenty of time
> to have an impact on the postulated fitting of rear-fuselage tanks in
> the summer of 1943.

The difference being that the flights to Gibraltar were ferry flights, and no
formation maneuvering or combat flying with the aft tanks full was required. The
Mustangs didn't do so either, except by mistake; SOP on long missions was to take off
on the left wing tank (it had the fuel return line, so some fuel needed to be drained
from it or it would dump overboard), then switch to the aft tank once sufficient
height was reached, burn that down to an acceptable level for combat handling, then
switch to the drops and empty them before going back to the rear tank, and only then
to the main tanks.


> >Talking about the development of the Mk. XIV into the Mk. XVIII, Quill writes
> >that "the basic stability margins of this aircraft, with its more forward center
> >of gravity due to its heavier engine, and with the latest standard of modified
> >elevator and the larger vertical tail surfaces, were thought likely to be
> >adequate to enable the aircraft to be cleared for long-range escort duties
> >accepting some instability in the early stages. However, we had more difficulty
> >than we anticipated in reaching an acceptable standard of handling with the rear
> >tank in use and the war was over before it was possible to clear the aircraft
> >with the rear tank in full operation."
>
> In the end, even the RAF cleared the rear-fuselage tanks for
> production usage in 1945, and they were happy enough to fit half of
> the tankage in the FR XIV and the full thing in the XVIII.

Again, both a/c with cut-down rear fuselages. Getting to our respective readings and
conclusions on Quill, I note that he says in the case of the Mk. 21 that he disagreed
with A&AEE on whether the Mk. 21's handling was acceptable at a certain point, and
that he felt that such handling deficiencies could be accepted to get an a/c with
superior performance into the field (he's also man enough to admit that he may have
been overconfident by this point that average squadron pilots wouldn't have had
serious difficulties, based on his own skills). Now, it may just be a question of him
not thinking to mention it, or the way he worded it, but he maentions no such
disagreement between himself and A&AEE regarding the handling of the rear fuselage
tank-equipped a/c; he just says that the handling wasn't acceptable for a long time,
and required a lot of development.

I'm certainly not going to claim, based on such flimsy evidence, that this is
definitive proof that the a/c couldn't have been flown in operations with an aft tank
with accceptable handling much earlier given sufficient motivation, especially given
your comments re the prevailing attitude of the A&AEE. But I do think it at least
suggests that the Cg problems were real and agreed to be so by both the A&AEE _and_
Quill. And that's as far as I'm prepared to gaze into my crystal ball. Your reading
may well be different.


> I suggest
> with the equivalent of Eaker, Spaatz and Arnold lighting fires under
> people's arses to increase range in 1943, this would have happened
> earlier.

Not Eaker or Spaatz; it was Arnold through Giles. From "To Command the Sky":

"Under the pressure of events in Europe, in June 1943 Arnold gave Barney Giles [DCAS]
6 months 'to get a fighter that can protect our bombers. Whether you use an existing
type or have to start from scratch is your problem. Get to work on this right now
because by January '44, I want fighter escort for all our bombers from U.K. into
Germany.'"

As to someone lighting fires for the R.A.F., that was what Pete and I were
postulating, only for the Spit IX/VIII, with the highest priority to getting increased
range British fighters in the U.K. soonest, with all other Spit improvements pushed
back. Grabbing available Mk. VIIIs first (the MTO and CBI/PTO will just have to suck
it up for a while), at the cost of MK.XII/XIV production, then either expanding Mk.
VIII production at the cost of the Mk. IX or (if possible) transitioning to Mk. IXs
with the extra leading edge tanks of the VIII, with aft fuselage tanks and whatever
airframe mods required to pack usable _combat_ fuel in.


>I'm happy to accept that the Vc would have had proportionately more

> CoG problems than the Mustang, but the overall problem seems
> identical. Allowing for some flexibility in terms of the final
> compromise (maybe a tank size between the 29-gallon ferry tank of 1942
> and the 75-gallon rear tank of 1945) would seem reasonable, but
> dismissing the option altogether goes too far, I think. Operational
> neccessity was a powerful advocate. Absent the need to escort their
> own bombers in long-range daylight raids, the RAF had no need to
> pursue the issue with the same vigour and tolerance for compromises
> that the USAAF had, so I don't think we can take their historical
> behaviour absent this need in the first place as the ultimate
> determinant factor when we speculate on their behaviour in a scenario
> where this factor exists.

I agree, but see my comments re the difference between ferry fuel and combat fuel.

> [Spiteful tail]
>
> I suggested the larger Mk VIII tail for similar reasons, given that it
> actually was produced in a relevant timescale. Increasing the tail
> area was a significant issue, and there were moves afoot to do so in
> production long before the Spiteful tail. Again, not an optimal
> solution, but an improvement that works towards operational utility in
> the timescale involved without major production issues coming into
> play.

Sure, and that with an aft tank was next on the agenda after boosting production of
the standard Mk. VIII/leading-edge tank Mk. IX. Either of the latter should have given
us an escort radius of 250-300 miles.


> >The two-stage Merlin was shorter and lighter than the Griffon, but was still
> >about 6" longer (second stage supercharger case) and 200 lb. heavier than the
> >single stage Merlins, and the Mk. Vs had already been suffering from overstess
> >breakups due to too far aft Cg prior to the fitting of bobweights. I don't think
> >Mk. Vs would have worked.
>
> Well, I appreciate your point, but I have to disagree. Remedial
> measures were in hand - Quill attributes the bob-weights and horn
> balance eliminated the overstressing issue, and these were in play
> before the time-scale in question in the summer of 1943.
>
> The Mk V would clearly not be optimal as a long-range escort on
> performance grounds, but then neither was any wartime mark of Spitfire
> on other grounds. The key issue for the adoption of the Mk V is
> availability, and again, as I suggest, this would be played out at an
> institutional level. We have to arrive at some manner of execution
> which addresses known historical factors which work against this
> speculation and the biggest of these, beyond the engineering problems
> involved, was the doctrinal reluctance of RAF high command to tolerate
> range increases rightly or wrongly perceived as coming at the expense
> of combat performance. Without eliminating or at least addressing
> that intangible, the whole scenario is a non-starter.

It's interesting to see in the Mk. IX weight and loading chart I referenced above that
the a/c (AB 197) weight includes "Ballast consisting of 5 x 17.5 lb. standard weights
is permanently fitted on a bar situated in the fuselage adjacent to the tail wheel."

Unfortunately, a similar chart for a Mk. V doesn't seem to be available on the site,
but I have my doubts that the Mk. V was carrying around any such ballast in 1943, or
if it did, so far aft. Of course, AB197 was a very early Spit IX (the report date
seems to be June 10th, 1942), so that ballast was probably reduced as more operational
equipment was added, but it at least suggests (combined with the Mk. V's further aft
Cg vs.the Mk. IX as reported in various tests on the site) that the Mk. V was pretty
much at the limit, while the Mk. IX had considerably more Cg range available.


> >If Mk. VIII airframes were available we would have taken them as is, and asked
> >for more. Even the unmodified Mk. VIII would get us to the Ruhr at least,
> >probably a bit further.
>
> This would have impacted on IX production, specifically at Castle
> Bromwich, which hadn't fully gone over to the IX until October 1943.
> I fully appreciate the operational benefit of the VIII vs IX in this
> situation, but I fear you underestimate the pressures for maximal
> production which argue against converting all IX production to VIII
> airframe standard. There were major political ramifications to
> cutting back IX availability while there was a world-wide need for
> them, including lend-lease supply to the USA and Soviets, and even
> more the internal RAF requirements for offsetting wastage and
> re-equipping units in combat over the Channel and in the MTO.

I don't underestimate the pressures, I just think (as you mentioned a few paragraphs
above) that if the decision had been made to go over to daylight, fighter range
extension would have increased in priority and changes would have to have been
accepted, whatever the disruption elsewhere. Because otherwise, it wasn't going to
work.

> >> No need to - the supply of two-stage Griffons was the main bottleneck
> >> for Mk XIV production, and there would still be unmodified Mk VIII
> >> airframes available by the end of 1943 for conversion to Mk XIVs as
> >> the Griffons came along.
> >
> >Lots of Mk.VIIIs were what we needed, not the Mk. XIV, so we would have grabbed
> >those airframes.
>
> The Mk XIV was settled long before production started in October 1943,
> the number of airframe's you'd be losing in that year (six for
> development work most of which didn't need massive work for Mk XIV
> testing and ended up testing contra-props instead, maybe 20 for
> delivery to operational squadrons) is trivial. Simply cutting out the
> Mk VIII airframe allocation to the Mk XII production might free twice
> as many as that.

And we'll be happy to take them, and we'll just have to accept the occasional FW-190
Jabo getting through. But we'll also take the airframes that became 610 Squadron's
Mk. XIVs in January 1944.

> If we're talking about an operational need in the summer of 1943,

No, the postulated date of the decision (to go over to days) was sometime in the fall
of '43, although the exact date was a bit unclear. It seemed to be in the
September/October timeframe, but we were unable to get ACM Kramer to be more precise.

> as I
> am, then Mk XIV production isn't a bottleneck in terms of Mk VIII
> supply until early 1944, by which time minor contractors (e.g.
> Westland) could have been added to the Mk VIII production line even if
> it wasn't possible to have Castle Bromwich churning them out full-time
> in the short term to the exclusion of all else.
>
> If you're positing a earlier beginning to this, e.g. at the end of
> 1942, then the industrial variables change, but so do the political
> ones. Frankly, I can't see the RAF even attempting anything like a
> significant daylight strategic campaign until the USAAF showed the way
> in the spring and summer of 1943.

Agreed.

> > The delay in the Mk. XIV would have been a question of
> >development manpower available. They were still working out the bugs on the Mk.
> >XIV at the time, and we would have told them to put that on the back burner and
> >get tanks into the leading edges of Mk. IXs, convert over to Mk. VIII production,
> >and/or devote much more effort to qualifying a rear fuselage tank.
>
> I don't think the Mk XIV is as big an issue as you feel it is in terms
> of design load, nor the rear-fuselage tankage.

Lacking better data, we'll have to disagree on this point.


> What really counted
> would have been converting all IX production to VIII-standard, and for
> that you'd need Castle Bromwich to join Eastleigh in producing Mk
> VIIIs at a time when I just can't see the whole of Spitfire supply,
> world-wide, being permitted to be disrupted to facilitate one
> campaign. If you have CBAF converting to Mk VIII production from July
> or August 1943, you'll have no shortage of airframes for the Mk XIV
> and Mk VIII production in 1944. There was a further institutional
> concern with maintaining the competitiveness of the Spitfire after the
> experience of the Mk V at the MAP in 1942, and this would beed to be
> addressed with the Mk XIV (and this would have been useful in 1944
> anyway).
>
> >> I suspect F.21
> >> development would have been held up at Supermarine, as the Mk VIII
> >> airframe (which was the basis of the Mk XIV) was already in series
> >> production. This just means the RAF don't get two squadrons worth of
> >> F.21s in spring 1945, after interminable airframe development work
> >> throughout most of 1944 delays them anyway. No great loss there,
> >> methinks.
> >
> >See comments above.
>
> I think we disagree over what precisely Supermarine were working on at
> the end of '43 and which would subsequently have been affected by the
> LR development required.

Right.

> Frankly, I don't think much development was
> required to field a usable (albeit sub-optimal) LR Spitfire in 1943,
> and the things which I believe would have been affected by any
> prioritisation would have been the F.21 and the Seafire. It was all
> just a question of priority.

No question about it.

> >See my comments on Spit V Cg problems above. In 1943, with lots of Mk. IXs not
> >able to do much, I think the effort needed to go there or into the Mk. VIII.
>
> Ideally, yes. But I suggest we have to work closely within the
> context of what was likely given the RAF's preconceptions and
> requirements at the time. Frankly, I think no LR escort force was
> going to impinge upon new production Mk IX supply until the concept
> had been proven. Hence the movement of the existing Vc force in 12
> Group (which did historical do USAAF daylight escorting) into an LR
> mode.

RAF Spits had been escorting U.S. a/c from 1942, so IMO there was no question as to
operational utility, just a question of priority.


> The
> >Spit V was just too inferior at B-17/24 heights, even assuming it could carry the
> >fuel (better than nothing, I grant you, but I expect fighter squadron morale
> >would have been the pits).
>
> The key here is having the Vs unshackled from their range limitations.
> They were not the best escorts, but they would have been the most
> likely to be available. There's no question in my mind that VIIIs/IXs
> or even P-47s would have been better. But a 1943 LR effort was not
> going to suffer the same critical limitations the RAF and the Spitfire
> V force endured over the Pas de Calais in 1941-42, in terms of
> operational scope and endurance. Actually escorting a bomber force
> the Germans were compelled to consider attacking would have been a
> major advantage by itself. The tactical background was going to be
> different, and more in their favour, than it was over the Channel on
> short-range operations. As it was, in the summer of 1943 the V force
> operating over Holland with Vs don't seem to have been demoralised. I
> tend to be a little sceptical of Caldwellesque claims in this respect.
>
> They were still in for a hard time, though, I agree. But as a
> component part of a diffuse deep-penetration escort, they wouldn't be
> carrying the burden alone. And most of all, the Luftwaffe wouldn't
> have the freedom to avoid engagement en masse whenever they couldn't
> get the tactical advantage, as they could with shorter-ranged Circus
> operations.

Good points, and I don't disagree about the utility of the Mk. V as 'certainly better
than nothing,' and better to lose people one at a time rather 7 or 8 at a time Again,
my main concern with the V is whether they could in fact have been given the radius
(not range).

<snip various areas of agreement>

> >> AOC 12 Group: "Clearly other commands want the LR Spitfire as well.
> >> I suggest the VCAS recommends increased tankage production and the MAP
> >> is instructed accordingly."
> >
> >And that's what we planned to push for: Mk. VIIIs or Mk. IXs with VIII tanks,
> >plus whatever extra fuel Supermarine could make work until the Mustangs were
> >available in sufficient numbers. Ideally, we wanted the Mk. XVI a year earlier.
>
> I don't think the early XVIs actually had the rear-fuselage tankage
> when they first came off the production lines (September 1944),

Right, I should have said the rear fuselage tank (and I think they only came in with
the cut-down rear fuselage) about 16-18 months early, as i forget just when those
versions came out, but I think it was only in '45.

> but I
> think the main reason the tanks didn't appear earlier has far more to
> do with institutional preconceptions than the real engineering
> problems involved. When it comes to it, if we push the tankage issue
> for Spits, there's no reason for them to delete the rear-fuselage
> tanks in their Mustangs, either.

Well, if they didn't need them for their own purposes, why carry the weight around?

<snip more agreement>

> >> Just my opinion, though.
> >
> >Agrees with our reasoning exactly, with the reservations stated re the Mk. V.
>
> Please desist from this moderate rationality or I will complain to
> your ISP.

Did I mention that I have INCONTROVERTIBLE PROOF that the U.K. government has been
testing UFOs ( and dissecting ALIEN CORPSES) at their base at Machrihanish, cleverly
disguising test flights of same as those by Aurora and, in times past, SR-71s? Wait,
I hear the black helicopters coming to get me. I can feel the beams as they try to
alter my brain. Excuse me while I done my tinfoil hat.

Guy

[Guy Alcala]

The Revolution Will Not Be Televised wrote:

> On Sat, 09 Aug 2003 07:52:50 GMT, Guy Alcala
> > wrote:
>
> [snip unacceptable tirade of rational discourse]
>
> [3 Group flying B-24s]
>
> >Remember, though, that the U.S. phased out B-24 production at 3 of the 5 factories
> >making them (Douglas Tulsa, Convair Fort Worth, and North American in Dallas) during
> >1944, as Ford and Consolidated San Diego were able to produce sufficient numbers for U.S.
> >requirements. Even so, according to Joe Baugher's website the RAF received 1,600 B-24H, J
> >and Ls between Spring '44 and August '45, so there was clearly excess capacity
> >available.
>
> OK, I can accept the increased B-24 availability in 1944, but what do
> we lose as a consequence, and what do we do in 1943 meanwhile?

The RAF loses very little. The USAAF slows down the formation of B-24 groups slightly, but
mainly doesn't need to cut training time for its heavy crews owing to high loss rates, as the
RAF crews will be taking up much of the slack.

> >> They had some in East Anglia, and could be allocated more. Just like
> >> 3 Group (and 8 Group), they were adjacent to USAAF bases, so the fuel
> >> pipeline and rail links would have been available.
> >
> >I was thinking more of runway/taxiway/ hardstand length and strength, as well as hangar
> >size, bomb dumps, accomodations etc. All would likely need upgrading.
>
> They'd just re-allocate the bases to the relevant groups. Swap a
> grass strip for an asphalt one in another Group. I don't think it's a
> major issue.

Not quite that simple, if you want to base them close to the U.S. daytime units. Who's going
to use the grass strips 2 Gp. would be giving up? The heavies aren't.

> >> I think the B-25
> >> is a contender here: it had the range for shallow penetration raids
> >> to the Ruhr, reasonable defensive armament and a good bombload. I
> >> suggest phasing out the Boston in 2 Group and replacing it with the
> >> Mitchell, and using the six to eight squadrons in 2 Group for daylight
> >> strategic bombing. Further expansion could follow if the aircraft
> >> were available.
> >
> >Nah, same limitations of range and ceiling as the B-26s, with a smaller bombload.
>
> Really? I thought it had a better range and bombload, but I'm no
> expert.

Slightly (but not significant in a tactical sense) better range, but only 3,000 lb. vs. 4,000
lb. bombload. Going into the Ruhr by day in 1943/early '44 at 10-15,000 feet (vs. the 20,000
feet plus of the heavies) would be a 'really bad idea' (tm).

> I saw it fulfilling a diversionary/supporting role, hitting
> airfields and less-heavily defended targets outside the major heavy
> Flak belts and giving the Luftwaffe controllers headaches trying to
> identify the main raiding force formations. In other words, doing for
> the B-24s in 3 Group what the 2nd Bomb Division B-24s did for the
> B-17s in the rest of the 8th AF historically at this point.

The mediums were doing what you say, but at shorter ranges, and there was never much doubt by
the Luftwaffe who they were owing to the very different cruise and bombing altitudes.

> > Hell,
> >the mediums were operating down below Stirling height (both the R-2600s in the B-25 and
> >the R-2800s in the B-26 had single-stage two-speed supercharging, optimized for about
> >15,000 feet) which is okay for relatively lightly defended tactical targets but a really
> >bad idea going after German industrial targets. If they wanted to go to Germany from
> >England it had to be with heavies, or the unavailable in sufficient numbers Mossie.
>
> The tactical bombers had to face the Flak when operating over western
> Germany in 1945, and it was suvivable given adequate support and
> decent planning.

In 1945, when much of the defense was in a state approaching collapse, and where our airpower
was overwhelming.

> And many of the tactical targets they did hit had
> substantive flak defence (albeit nowhere near 1943 Ruhr levels, let
> alone 1945 Politz levels). Even so, I wouldn't suggest using them as
> a deep-penetration strategic force.

Seems we agree on that, then.


> >Well, if it would help get things back to normal around here, whenever one of us chooses
> >to present and discuss factual data that contradicts hoary old myth and one-sided
> >perceptions, the other could accuse him of belittling the accomplishments, bravery and/or
> >importance of various aircrew nationalities/theaters/periods.
>
> At last, a contribution in this thread which reaches beyond
> rationality to advocate a return to the traditional and time-honoured
> mode of usenet discourse.
>
> >How much civil discussion,
> >analysis and argument can r.a.m. stand? ;-)
>
> Of course, the key difference between a USAAF daylight strategic
> bombing effort and an RAF one would be the greater efficiency of the
> latter. I mean, once we factor out all those ludicrous PX
> requirements for Coca-Cola, ice-cream and signed movie star's
> underwear, we should free up about 50% extra import capacity for bombs
> and replacement aircraft.....

Ha! And if we could eliminate all the manhours lost/opportunites missed to morning and
afternoon tea/brewing up, we could have won the war in 1944 at the latest;-)

Guy

[Peter Stickney]

I've been delayed my own self, but I'll invite myself back in...

In article >,
(The Revolution Will Not Be Televised) writes:
> On Sat, 09 Aug 2003 18:50:48 GMT, Guy Alcala
> > wrote:
>
> [snip isolated points of contention in a torrent of otherwise
> dispicably rational discussion and nauseating agreement]
>
> [rear fuselage tanks in Spit Vcs]
>
>>I think you may be underestimating the difficulty re the Mk V. Quill, in His
>>"Spitfire: A Test Pilot's Story," devotes an entire chapter to "Longitudinal
>>Stability and Increased Range."
>
> Yes, but a close reading of that source and others leads me to the
> conclusions which follow.
>
> He describes the weight additions and Cg
>>problems that led to the installation of bobweights on the Mk. Vs, as well as the
>>first fitting of a 75 gallon tank to a Mk. IX (ML 186), which he flew from
>>Salisbury Plain to the Moray Firth and back at low altitude and economical cruise
>>-- this a/c had a bob-weight in the elevator system plus an enlarged horn
>>balance. Quill writes that "the aeroplane was unstable to start with but as soon
>>as I had used up the rear fuselage fuel the handling was back to normal . . ."
>
> Precisely the same condition as experienced with the rear fuselage
> tank in the P-51B. I'll admit upfront that the CoG issues with the
> Spit Vc/IX airframe were more serious, but this was not a binary
> issue: it came down to what level of initial instability with a full
> rear tank the institution concerned was prepared to tolerate.

I have to respectfully disagree. I took some time to dig up figures
on the CG range of various model Spitfires and U.S. fighters.
Sources, in this case being A&AEE Reports in the case of the Spits and
the Mustang I, and U.S. Federal Aviation Agency Type Certificate Data
Sheets for the others.

The Spit, especially the small tailed Mk V, had a very narrow CG
range. Something on the order of 1.6". The later aircraft, both the
2-stage Merlin powered VIII, IX, and XVIs, and the various Griffon
models, also had a narrow range, but had the advantage of a heavier
engine way up front to even things out. It'a also teh case that
retracting the gear on a Spit translated the CG aft nearly half of its
range. That's teh problem with dainty little airplanes - it doesn't
take much to upset 'em.

In contrast, a P-51A has a CG range of 5.4", and a B has a CG range of
a bit over 7". Witn no noticable CG shift gear up or down.
A Spit, loaded to, or just beyond the aft CG limit is going to be
displaying a really nasty pitchup just after takeoff when the gear
comes up. It couldn't come at a worse time.
Other U.S. fighters that I could dig up in short order are the P-40,
with a CG range of 8.9", and the P-63 with a range of 5.4". On first
analysis, stuffing an aft fuel tank into a Spit V is a much more dicey
proposition that doing the same with a P-51.

Actually, if you're looking for a fairly long-ranged Medium/Low
altitude escort fighter already in RAF hands in 1942, might I suggest
the Allison-engined Mustang I, IA< and II. They're long legged, adn
while they don't climb as well as a normally loaded Spit V, they're
danged fast, accelerate well, and can meet an Fw 190A on fairly equal
terms. Mustang Is were the first RAF fighters over Germany, after teh
fall of France, and they spent a lot of time stooging around in the
same areas that are being proposed as Medium Bomber targets.

> I suggest, on the balance of evidence I've seen (which I admit is not
> comprehensive), the RAF were far more sensitive to this than the USAAF
> was. A case in point is the rear fusleage tank in the P-51B/Mustang
> III. The instability caused by a full 85-gallon rear fuselage tank
> was no different between Mustangs in RAF colours and those in USAAF
> colours, the critical difference was the institutional appreciation
> involved, which saw the RAF delete it entirely while the USAAF adopted
> it happily. I suggest that the USAAF approach to rear-fuselage tanks
> was materially different, and a similar need for long-range escorts
> for a daylight strategic bombing strategy on the part of the RAF would
> have entailed a similar approach as the USAAF adopted: i.e. the
> instability would have been accepted in order to achieve the desired
> operational aim.

Perhaps. It's also the case that the RAF were never really in the
Long Range Escort business. Most of their missions didn't require
flying Combat Air Patrols over German airfields near Prague. The aft
fuel tank didn't provide a whole lof of gain for the RAF.

> I won't go into the institutional differences in detail here, but the
> whole counter-factual only works if we adopt a USAAF-like commitment
> to daylight strategic bombing. Absent that commitment, with all that
> it entailed in terms of forcing long-range escort capacity regardless
> of the difficulties (such as CoG issues with increased internal
> tankage), and there wouldn't be any RAF daylight bombing effort to
> start with. Without one, the other does not follow, but if we're
> positing the first, we need to accept that this would modifiy
> historical RAF fighter procurement and equipment beyond the historical
> norm. In short, attitudes to things like the acceptable level of
> temporary instability in a Spitfire with full rear-fuselage tanks
> would have to change.

Just my opinion, mind, but I think the thing that really would have
crimped an RAF long range day bombing effort would have been pilot
availability. The RAF Night Heavies (Except, I think, for the
Sirling), were 1 pilot airplanes. That's not enough if you expect to
be getting shot at by people wh actually can see what they're shooting
at. You're going to want copilots, and where are you going to get
them? The Empire Air Training Scheme was a tremendous achievement,
but it was pretty stretched supplying the pilots that the RAF needed
in real life. And you'll have to divert even more pilots to be
instructors.


>>While he and Joe Smith felt that some longitudinal instability at the start of
>>the flight was acceptable (as with the Mustang), the margins seem to have been
>>much smaller in the case of the Spit. The Mustang's stability was judged
>>acceptable once the rear tank was down to somewhere between 25 and 50% (opinions
>>differ),
>
> Much like the behaviour of the actual Mk IX/XVIs with rear-fuselage
> tanks in 1945.
>
>>and if you want to extend the escort range it's the amount of fuel you
>>can carry internally to fight and return on that determines escort radius, no
>>matter how much fuel you hang externally to boost endurance.
>
> Agreed. This is why the rear-fuselage tankage issue is critical to
> this speculation.
>
> They key difference between the Mustang and the Spitfire here, I
> suggest, is institutional, and not just a matter of engineering. The
> two Mk IXs with internal capacity enlarged by Wright Field at the same
> time (July 1944) are a similar example: the RAF turned them down,
> while the USAAF were clearly prepared to tolerate engineering
> trade-offs (such as changes to the wing structure) that the RAF
> wasn't. I suggest this gives us an indication of the approach
> differential involved on an institutional basis which transcends the
> engineering problems.

Again, I must disagree. The cold, hard numbers say that the Spit was
a lot less tolerant of stuffing weight behind the wings. It's
intersting to note that the Wright Field modified Spits got a big
chunk of their extra capacity by stuffing fuel into the wing leading
edges, which not only didn't upset the CG as much, but moved it in the
forward (good) direction, somewhat counterbalancing the tank behind
the cockpit.
>
> I fully accept that the Spit had less CoG margins to play with, but I
> still believe the required engineering solutions were at hand. On a
> chronological basis, the bob-weight issue first came into focus when
> Tony Bartley returned to operations with 65 Squadron after a spell
> working under Quill as a test pilot at Supermarine, in February 1942
> (as mentioned in the memoirs of Quill, Bartley and the other flight
> commander in 65 Sqn at the time, Geoff Wellum).

Much less, according to the reports. To increase the CG range of a Mk
V enough to fit a rear tank, you'll need a bigger tail, and ballast in
the nose. At that point, it stops being a Field Conversion, and
starts looking like a remanufacturing job.

> I'm happy to accept that the Vc would have had proportionately more
> CoG problems than the Mustang, but the overall problem seems
> identical. Allowing for some flexibility in terms of the final
> compromise (maybe a tank size between the 29-gallon ferry tank of 1942
> and the 75-gallon rear tank of 1945) would seem reasonable, but
> dismissing the option altogether goes too far, I think. Operational
> neccessity was a powerful advocate. Absent the need to escort their
> own bombers in long-range daylight raids, the RAF had no need to
> pursue the issue with the same vigour and tolerance for compromises
> that the USAAF had, so I don't think we can take their historical
> behaviour absent this need in the first place as the ultimate
> determinant factor when we speculate on their behaviour in a scenario
> where this factor exists.

If I get a chance, I'll run some numbers for how much fuel it would
take to get a Spit V to its rear limit. At a first guess, I'd say
"Not Much". The rearward shift when the gear comes up is a problem.

--
Pete Stickney
A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many
bad measures. -- Daniel Webster

[Gregg Germain]

Alan Minyard > wrote:

: Actually, the death knell was sounded by the P-80 and the Meteor. They
: were developed into the future of aviation, while the Me-262 was a
: dead end project.

: Al Minyard

Hi Al,

Not arguing with you, but I'd be curious to know what rationale you
use to arrive at the conclusion that the ME-262 was a dead end
project.



--- Gregg
"Improvise, adapt, overcome."

Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics
Phone: (617) 496-1558

[Tex Houston]

"Gregg Germain" > wrote in message
...
> Alan Minyard > wrote:
>
> : Actually, the death knell was sounded by the P-80 and the Meteor. They
> : were developed into the future of aviation, while the Me-262 was a
> : dead end project.
>
> : Al Minyard
>
> Hi Al,
>
> Not arguing with you, but I'd be curious to know what rationale you
> use to arrive at the conclusion that the ME-262 was a dead end
> project.
>
>
>
> --- Gregg

Has there been a follow-on project?

Tex

[Bill Shatzer]

On Tue, 26 Aug 2003, Tex Houston wrote:

> "Gregg Germain" > wrote in message
> ...
> > Alan Minyard > wrote:

> > : Actually, the death knell was sounded by the P-80 and the Meteor. They
> > : were developed into the future of aviation, while the Me-262 was a
> > : dead end project.

> > Hi Al,

> > Not arguing with you, but I'd be curious to know what rationale you
> > use to arrive at the conclusion that the ME-262 was a dead end
> > project.

> Has there been a follow-on project?

Soviet Sukhoi Su-9 and Su-11.

Japanese Nakajima "Kikka".

Arguably, the Czech S.92.

Cheers and all,

[Keith Willshaw]

"Tex Houston" > wrote in message
...
>
> "Bill Shatzer" > wrote in message
> ...
> > > Has there been a follow-on project?
> >
> > Soviet Sukhoi Su-9 and Su-11.
> >
> > Japanese Nakajima "Kikka".
> >
> > Arguably, the Czech S.92.
> >
> > Cheers and all,
>
> Gee, none of these sound like a German aircraft. Oh, well.
>

Well the Germans were rather discouraged from building new
jet fighters between 1945 and the mid-50's

Keith

[The Enlightenment]

"Emmanuel Gustin" > wrote in message >...
> "Tex Houston" > wrote in message
> ...
>
> > > > Has there been a follow-on project?
> >
> > Gee, none of these sound like a German aircraft. Oh, well.
>
> Messerschmitt jet design followed several tracks. One track
> was the development of the 'HG' (Hochgeschwindigkeit, high
> speed) versions of the basic Me 262. These involved sweeping
> back the wings and tail to get a better transsonic performance,
> and,

> in the HG III project, moving the engine nacelles to the
> wing roots.

The HG III used He S11 engines which I believe would have better
resistence to turbulent flows. This was meant to be the original
position.


> These designs were intended as heavy fighters or nightfighters.
>
> The more important, for in the long term much more influential,
> development track was the P.1101 series. These were swept-wing
> jet fighters from start, and directly provided the inspiration for
> post-war designs such as the F-86 Sabre. (The P.1101 looked
> like a cross between a Sabre and a Saab J29.)
>
> As far as I know the Me 262 HG design never got beyond the
> wind tunnel stage, while metal was cut on the P.1101 projects.
> (The P.1101 development aircraft was constructed and shipped
> to the USA after the war; Bell derived the variable-sweep X-5
> from it.) So in practical terms the Me 262 was not a basis for
> significant further development; the Germans did not have the
> resources left to build the Me 262 HG designs anyway. The
> German influence on post-war jet fighter design was very great,
> but it came from the more advanced Messerschmitt and
> Focke-Wulf projects, not from the Me 262.
>
> But the Me 262 was not any more a 'dead end' than the Meteor
> or the P-80. The first jet fighters were simply a poor basis for
> further development, because new aerodynamic concepts were
> imposing themselves. The design teams did try, of course, but it
> was much better to start with a clean sheet of paper. The exception
> was the F-97, aka F-94C, which was derived from the basic
> F-80/F-94 design as a stopgap nightfighter, and for which speed
> of development was the overriding factor.


The Arado 234 is often neglected. The 4 engined (BMW 003) Arado 234C
was easily the fastest jet of WW2 (3 entered troop testing I believe)
at some 568 mph. (this was mach limited: the aircraft could excede
its own mach limit in level flight!)

It's designer Kosin (first name Rainer I think) came up with the idea
of lofting the Ar 234 wing on a computer to join rivets and spars at
points of equal curvature instead of equal chord. This produced an
incredubly smooth surface that is essential in high speed aircraft
swept wings or not. This method was orderd to be studied by the
other German designers.

The 4 engined Ar 234C also had the first modular engine installation.

Kosins reasearch also influenced the double delta seen on the RAAFs
Victor bomber.

Also quite influencial were the German Jet engine designers such as
Franz Anselm (designer of the Me 262a Jumo 004 and T53 for Allison,
Pabst von Ohain Himself and Max Bentley.

The term "after burner" is a derivative of the german "nach-brenner".
The British still often use their own term "reheat". I believe the
jumo 004E was the first afterburning engine to run.

[Alan Minyard]

On 26 Aug 2003 14:26:00 -0400, Gregg Germain
> wrote:

>Alan Minyard > wrote:
>
>: Actually, the death knell was sounded by the P-80 and the Meteor. They
>: were developed into the future of aviation, while the Me-262 was a
>: dead end project.
>
>: Al Minyard
>
> Hi Al,
>
> Not arguing with you, but I'd be curious to know what rationale you
>use to arrive at the conclusion that the ME-262 was a dead end
>project.
>
>
>
>--- Gregg
> "Improvise, adapt, overcome."

>Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics
>Phone: (617) 496-1558
>
The fact that there were no follow on aircraft. Of course the fact
that Germany lost the war was a major factor in this, but it is still
a fact. The 262 was the first and last jet fighter of its linage.

Al Minyard

[Gordon]

>
>The Kikka was a copy, not a follow on, and very few were produced. The
>Sukhoi SU-9 was a single engine, delta wing design in no way related
>to the 262, while I fail to see any relationship of the SU-11 to the
>Me.

Al, there was an earlier Sukhoi with the same designation that was scotched by
Stalin personally, as he was convinced it was nothing more than a 262 copy
(which it was).

>I am unfamiliar with the S.92, and I cannot find it in any of my
>references or Google. Please let me know where I can research it.

Its a Czech version of the 262. The Nazis built some of their 262s in
waldwerks and in other out of the way places, distributing production to escape
Allied bombing (didn't work, btw - quality control was absolutely awful and
many of these a/c were "completed" but never flew). Towards the end, the trend
was reversed and gigantic, protected shelters were built to house factories
underground - made no difference of course, there were means available to
penetrate such structures as Kahla, etc.

At any rate, some of the production was shifted to Czechoslovakia and when the
curtain fell on Hitler's insane 15 minutes of fame, the Czechs found themselves
with a country littered with Nazi hardware and small production facilities.
Included in this bonanza were production lines for the 262, as well as quite a
few examples and piles of spares. These parts were assembled postwar into the
CS 92 (2-seater equating to the Me 262 B-1a dual control trainer - NOT a
nightfighter as some think) and the S-92 singleseat nightfighter. Before you
correct me as to its status as a 'follow on', I wouldn't suggest that it was -
these were essentially parts-birds. Two examples remain at the Kbely aviation
museum, I believe.

Getting back to the earlier "262-ski" built by the Soviets - it was absolutely
a follow on, albeit short lived. I think the role of the Me 262 in history was
to act as a dividing line between prop fighter supremacy and the rise of the
jet. General Arnold agreed with this and made remarks that "We were really
lucky, weren't we?", when he was given an 'airshow' with a captured example.

v/r

Gordon
<====(A+C====>
USN SAR Aircrew

"Got anything on your radar, SENSO?"
"Nothing but my forehead, sir."

[Gordon]

>These parts were assembled postwar into the
>CS 92 (2-seater equating to the Me 262 B-1a dual control trainer - NOT a
>nightfighter as some think) and the S-92 singleseat nightfighter.

#$%#&

I hate when I do that. The S-92 was a single-seat day fighter. I knew better
LOL Shows what a crappy "aviation expert" I am, eh?

v/r
Gordon

[Bill Shatzer]

On Sun, 31 Aug 2003, Alan Minyard wrote:

> On Tue, 26 Aug 2003 14:08:29 -0700, Bill Shatzer
> > wrote:

> >> Has there been a follow-on project?

> >Soviet Sukhoi Su-9 and Su-11.

> >Japanese Nakajima "Kikka".

> >Arguably, the Czech S.92.

> The Kikka was a copy, not a follow on, and very few were produced.

The Kikka was "patterned after" the Me 262 but it was not a copy.

It was a considerably smaller aircraft for instance ('bout 8 feet
shorter in wingspand) and had several design differences including
a completely different design for the horizontal tail.

Only two Kikkas were completed but that doesn't obviate its
existance as a follow-on "project". The project was aborted
prematurely for obvious reasons but that doesn't make it less
a project.

> The
> Sukhoi SU-9 was a single engine, delta wing design in no way related
> to the 262, while I fail to see any relationship of the SU-11 to the
> Me.

My reference ("Stormbird Rising" by Hugh Morgan) has the Me 262
serving as the "pattern" for the Su-9 and the included picture
resembles nothing so much as a Me 262 with unswept wings and
tail surfaces. The Su-11 was essentially identical to the Su-9
save for the engines and the redesigned engine nacelles. The photos
of the Su-11 similarly resemble a straight-winged Me 262 with
engines nacelles on steroids.

> I am unfamiliar with the S.92, and I cannot find it in any of my
> references or Google. Please let me know where I can research it.

The S.92 (and its trainer version CS.92) were Czech manufactured
Me 262s constructed from spare parts and air frames which the Czechs
found themselves in possession of post-WW2. The S.92 essentially
-was- a Me 262 with few differences from the German aircraft. The
Czechs had under study several upgrades to the S.92 design but with
the post-1948 alignment with the Soviet Union, Soviet aircraft became
available to the Czech AF and further development of the Me 262/S.92
design was abandoned.


Cheers and all,

[TJ]

Alan Minyard wrote:

> The Kikka was a copy, not a follow on, and very few were produced. The
> Sukhoi SU-9 was a single engine, delta wing design in no way related
> to the 262, while I fail to see any relationship of the SU-11 to the
> Me.
>
> I am unfamiliar with the S.92, and I cannot find it in any of my
> references or Google. Please let me know where I can research it.
>
> Al Minyard

Al, you are thinking of the FISHPOT. The designations SU-9 and SU-11 were
1940's designations re-used. Another example was the SU-7. If you do a
Google and input SU-9 or SU-11 with Me-262 then all will become apparent.

http://www.vectorsite.net/avme2628.gif

TJ

[[email protected]]

(Gordon) wrote:


>#$%#&
>
>I hate when I do that. The S-92 was a single-seat day fighter. I knew better
>LOL Shows what a crappy "aviation expert" I am, eh?
>
>v/r
>Gordon

Dammit Gordon, that's TWO MISTAKES this YEAR...if Michael sees
this SECOND one then your goose is cooked!...
--

-Gord.