Australia tries to rewrite history of Vietnam War

[Evan Brennan]

Aerophotos > wrote in message news:
>...
> hey evan

Yes?

> if you think our adf is so pathetic in vietnam care to explain why we
> only lost 500 over 10yrs from a 50,000 total force and you yanks lost
> 56,000 in 10yrs from a force of 585,000?


You must recalculate. The Yank force deployed to SEA totalled almost
three million, not 585,000.


> normal RAR units might of had different kills ratios


I'm afraid their kill ratios sucked harder than Anna Nicole Smith in
a room full of billionaires.

In 1995 the Vietnamese government in Hanoi admitted that over one
million Communist troops had died during the war. Your essentially
do-nothing Australian infantry units claimed less than 1,500 enemy
killed before they pulled out of Vietnam.

Nice of Australia to pitch in, but their contribution in destroying
the enemy was insignificant against that massive total.


> shows we aussies had the most successful tactics.


By the admission of your own General Vincent, Australian infantry
tactics left a lot to be desired. The SAS was too small but more
successful since they copied the airmobility tactics used by US
recon teams and the SAS also liked to use the same kit as our
American LRRPs.

US recon teams learned about jungle reconnaissance and tracking from
the local Nungs and Montagnards, not from the Australian SAS or the
AATTV which was mainly useful in helping us train the natives in using
modern weapons. The most valuable information was learned from the
natives and this was added to Recondo training.

I would gladly trade an entire patrol of SAS men for one experienced
Chinese Nung tracker. He lived in the jungle all his life, and did not
need "stupid white man from Australia" to tell him how to move through
the bush.


> we came from jungle school and malaya and had a force well trained,
> the us army had no idea how to fight a tropical war


Your jungle warfare tactics and pacification programs in Malaya were
ineffectual and irrelevant. The British-led security force outnumbered
the Malayan Communist guerrillas by 100 : 1 or more. At the peak of
US deployment in Vietnam, the Allies outnumbered the North Vietnamese
forces and Communist guerrillas by only 5 : 1.

A 100 : 1 advantage in manpower does not = jungle warfare expertise
or effective pacification techniques. Here's another difference: The
Commie guerrillas in Malaya were trained and supplied by the British
SOE, from 1942-45. The Malayan guerrillas had no government, no air
force and no navy, unlike North Vietnam.

All the British had to do is stop giving supplies to the enemy and
yet the Malayan Communist Party did not sign a peace treaty with
Kuala Lumpur until 1989, long after Australia bugged out of Malaya.
Only the Limeys and Anzacs would declare victory after evacuating
another British colony.


> wait for the next war and see how quick the US preso asks for our
> help again.


We deployed our British and Australian hirelings because no one else
was willing. And because Moe always brings Larry and Curly when he
goes on a road trip.

Another factor is that you speak English. Several countries have
better forces than Australia and Great Britain, but the language
barrier makes it difficult to communicate efficiently. Having a
handful of interpreters does not help much and neither does using
hand puppets and drawing funny pictures.


> we aussies can do and always will **** over you yanks


Sounds like that kid in elementary school who bragged about
being the fastest in his class. Then, during the race, right
after everyone yells "GO!" he trips and cracks his head open
on the asphalt.

Pathetic.

[Fred J. McCall]

(Evan Brennan) wrote:

:Aerophotos > wrote in message news:
>...
:>
:> if you think our adf is so pathetic in vietnam care to explain why we
:> only lost 500 over 10yrs from a 50,000 total force and you yanks lost
:> 56,000 in 10yrs from a force of 585,000?
:
:You must recalculate. The Yank force deployed to SEA totalled almost
:three million, not 585,000.

He's comparing apples and aardvarks. He's using a total count of
fatalities over 10 years, and then only counting peak strength rather
than the total number of people who served over the 10 years.

--
"Some people get lost in thought because it's such unfamiliar
territory."
--G. Behn

[Lyle]

On 8 Jul 2003 21:15:10 -0700, (Evan Brennan)
wrote:

>Aerophotos > wrote in message news:
>...
>> hey evan
>
>Yes?
>
>> if you think our adf is so pathetic in vietnam care to explain why we
>> only lost 500 over 10yrs from a 50,000 total force and you yanks lost
>> 56,000 in 10yrs from a force of 585,000?
>
>
>You must recalculate. The Yank force deployed to SEA totalled almost
>three million, not 585,000.
>
>
>> normal RAR units might of had different kills ratios
>
>
>I'm afraid their kill ratios sucked harder than Anna Nicole Smith in
>a room full of billionaires.
>
>In 1995 the Vietnamese government in Hanoi admitted that over one
>million Communist troops had died during the war. Your essentially
>do-nothing Australian infantry units claimed less than 1,500 enemy
>killed before they pulled out of Vietnam.
>
>Nice of Australia to pitch in, but their contribution in destroying
>the enemy was insignificant against that massive total.
>
>
>> shows we aussies had the most successful tactics.
>
>
>By the admission of your own General Vincent, Australian infantry
>tactics left a lot to be desired. The SAS was too small but more
>successful since they copied the airmobility tactics used by US
>recon teams and the SAS also liked to use the same kit as our
>American LRRPs.
>
>US recon teams learned about jungle reconnaissance and tracking from
>the local Nungs and Montagnards, not from the Australian SAS or the
>AATTV which was mainly useful in helping us train the natives in using
>modern weapons. The most valuable information was learned from the
>natives and this was added to Recondo training.
>
>I would gladly trade an entire patrol of SAS men for one experienced
>Chinese Nung tracker. He lived in the jungle all his life, and did not
>need "stupid white man from Australia" to tell him how to move through
>the bush.

thats sort of like how we used native eskimos during the Alaskan
campaign in WW2 cause they were trained and they could see things that
were out of the ordinary like discoloration of the snow.
>
>
>> we came from jungle school and malaya and had a force well trained,
>> the us army had no idea how to fight a tropical war
>
>
>Your jungle warfare tactics and pacification programs in Malaya were
>ineffectual and irrelevant. The British-led security force outnumbered
>the Malayan Communist guerrillas by 100 : 1 or more. At the peak of
>US deployment in Vietnam, the Allies outnumbered the North Vietnamese
>forces and Communist guerrillas by only 5 : 1.
>
>A 100 : 1 advantage in manpower does not = jungle warfare expertise
>or effective pacification techniques. Here's another difference: The
>Commie guerrillas in Malaya were trained and supplied by the British
>SOE, from 1942-45. The Malayan guerrillas had no government, no air
>force and no navy, unlike North Vietnam.
>
>All the British had to do is stop giving supplies to the enemy and
>yet the Malayan Communist Party did not sign a peace treaty with
>Kuala Lumpur until 1989, long after Australia bugged out of Malaya.
>Only the Limeys and Anzacs would declare victory after evacuating
>another British colony.
>
>
>> wait for the next war and see how quick the US preso asks for our
>> help again.
>
>
>We deployed our British and Australian hirelings because no one else
>was willing. And because Moe always brings Larry and Curly when he
>goes on a road trip.
>
>Another factor is that you speak English. Several countries have
>better forces than Australia and Great Britain, but the language
>barrier makes it difficult to communicate efficiently. Having a
>handful of interpreters does not help much and neither does using
>hand puppets and drawing funny pictures.
>
>
>> we aussies can do and always will **** over you yanks
>
>
>Sounds like that kid in elementary school who bragged about
>being the fastest in his class. Then, during the race, right
>after everyone yells "GO!" he trips and cracks his head open
>on the asphalt.
>
>Pathetic.

[CD]

"Evan Brennan" > wrote in message
m...
> Aerophotos > wrote in message news:
> >...

Evan,

Do yourself a favour and ignore this fool. I suspect he a schizophrenia
suffer or something similar. Only last month he was claiming he was off to
join the RAAF and work in a job description that doesn't exist in our air
force.

CD

[Kevin Brooks]

(Evan Brennan) wrote in message >...
<snip various rants>
>
> We deployed our British and Australian hirelings because no one else
> was willing. And because Moe always brings Larry and Curly when he
> goes on a road trip.

I had thought Evan to be just rabidly anti-British, but now he has not
only extended that irrational thought process to include the Aussies,
but apparently also our own forces (Moe?!). It is probably appropriate
that he engages in this kind of discourse with the likes of
Aerophotos/JGG--kind of "worst meets the worst" from both sides. Too
bad they can't take their respective prejudices into a private
chatroom of some sort and (hopefully) knock both of themselves out...

Brooks

<snip>

[Andrew Chaplin]

Kevin Brooks wrote:
>
> (Evan Brennan) wrote in message >...
> <snip various rants>
> >
> > We deployed our British and Australian hirelings because no one else
> > was willing. And because Moe always brings Larry and Curly when he
> > goes on a road trip.
>
> I had thought Evan to be just rabidly anti-British, but now he has not
> only extended that irrational thought process to include the Aussies,
> but apparently also our own forces (Moe?!). It is probably appropriate
> that he engages in this kind of discourse with the likes of
> Aerophotos/JGG--kind of "worst meets the worst" from both sides. Too
> bad they can't take their respective prejudices into a private
> chatroom of some sort and (hopefully) knock both of themselves out...

The posts he writes are factitious -- a lot of what he writes is true,
but strung together so present his targets in the poorest light. He is
a cynic and ready to impute the least charitable motives to anyone
about whom he writes. It seems unlikely he has ever read a
historiography text, since he always seems to miss the basic bit about
putting yourself in the place of those of whom you write in order to
understand why they acted the way they did.
--
Andrew Chaplin
SIT MIHI GLADIUS SICUT SANCTO MARTINO
(If you're going to e-mail me, you'll have to get "yourfinger." out.)

[Kevin Brooks]

Andrew Chaplin > wrote in message >...
> Kevin Brooks wrote:
> >
> > (Evan Brennan) wrote in message >...
> > <snip various rants>
> > >
> > > We deployed our British and Australian hirelings because no one else
> > > was willing. And because Moe always brings Larry and Curly when he
> > > goes on a road trip.
> >
> > I had thought Evan to be just rabidly anti-British, but now he has not
> > only extended that irrational thought process to include the Aussies,
> > but apparently also our own forces (Moe?!). It is probably appropriate
> > that he engages in this kind of discourse with the likes of
> > Aerophotos/JGG--kind of "worst meets the worst" from both sides. Too
> > bad they can't take their respective prejudices into a private
> > chatroom of some sort and (hopefully) knock both of themselves out...
>
> The posts he writes are factitious -- a lot of what he writes is true,
> but strung together so present his targets in the poorest light. He is
> a cynic and ready to impute the least charitable motives to anyone
> about whom he writes. It seems unlikely he has ever read a
> historiography text, since he always seems to miss the basic bit about
> putting yourself in the place of those of whom you write in order to
> understand why they acted the way they did.

You are probably mostly correct, though he also has demonstrated a
marked ability to ignore reality when it suits him (i.e., his past
violently argued contention that SFOD-Delta was *not* based upon the
SAS when it was formed--which claim he made just before the
publication of the newest Delta-founding member's book (Haney, IIRC),
who like every other Delta guy who has written on the subject quite
openly admitted to the SAS influence). As to putting himself in their
place-- I find it a bit odd that he continually berates British,
Aussie, etc., military personnel, and has never apparently even worn a
uniform himself.

Brooks

[gblack]

"Kevin Brooks" > wrote in message
om...
: Andrew Chaplin > wrote in message
>...
: > Kevin Brooks wrote:
: > >
: > > (Evan Brennan) wrote in message
>...
: > > <snip various rants>
: > > >
: > > > We deployed our British and Australian hirelings because no
one else
: > > > was willing. And because Moe always brings Larry and Curly
when he
: > > > goes on a road trip.
: > >
: > > I had thought Evan to be just rabidly anti-British, but now he
has not
: > > only extended that irrational thought process to include the
Aussies,
: > > but apparently also our own forces (Moe?!). It is probably
appropriate
: > > that he engages in this kind of discourse with the likes of
: > > Aerophotos/JGG--kind of "worst meets the worst" from both sides.
Too
: > > bad they can't take their respective prejudices into a private
: > > chatroom of some sort and (hopefully) knock both of themselves
out...
: >
: > The posts he writes are factitious -- a lot of what he writes is
true,
: > but strung together so present his targets in the poorest light.
He is
: > a cynic and ready to impute the least charitable motives to anyone
: > about whom he writes. It seems unlikely he has ever read a
: > historiography text, since he always seems to miss the basic bit
about
: > putting yourself in the place of those of whom you write in order
to
: > understand why they acted the way they did.
:
: You are probably mostly correct, though he also has demonstrated a
: marked ability to ignore reality when it suits him (i.e., his past
: violently argued contention that SFOD-Delta was *not* based upon the
: SAS when it was formed--which claim he made just before the
: publication of the newest Delta-founding member's book (Haney,
IIRC),
: who like every other Delta guy who has written on the subject quite
: openly admitted to the SAS influence). As to putting himself in
their
: place-- I find it a bit odd that he continually berates British,
: Aussie, etc., military personnel, and has never apparently even worn
a
: uniform himself.

He is one turkey who has his own selective view of history and
somewhat of a strained agenda..
And, as you state, some-one who has little firsthand knowledge of the
military..

[L'acrobat]

"Andrew Chaplin" > wrote in message
>
> The posts he writes are factitious -- a lot of what he writes is true,
> but strung together so present his targets in the poorest light. He is
> a cynic

etc, snipped.

He is a liar who uses selective quotes, misquotes and lies to promote a
strange agenda.

As far as I can tell he lives for humiliation and visits newsgroups to get
his quota therof.

[Evan Brennan]

(Kevin Brooks) wrote in message >...
> > The posts he writes are factitious -- a lot of what he writes is true,
> > but strung together so present his targets in the poorest light.

> You are probably mostly correct, though he also has demonstrated a
> marked ability to ignore reality when it suits him (i.e., his past
> violently argued contention that SFOD-Delta was *not* based upon the
> SAS when it was formed


I never wrote anything like that. Don't put your words in my mouth.

We had a disagreement about the origins of -ALL- aspects of Delta Force
training and their responsibilities, back then and more recently. Not
just the parts associated with the SAS.

[Evan Brennan]

"gblack" > wrote in message >...
> The history of Vietnam is well and truly written from all sides
> involved..


But Australian accounts are more one-sided than ours. Let us fill
in what is usually missing. Like a giant, Olive Green tooth fairy,
the US and South Vietnamese forces had to bail out Australia on
several occasions....


1. December 1965-September 1966. Since the Australian 1 RAR was
hardly up to the task, the US 173d Airborne Brigade committed two
battalions to operate against the VC and infrastructure in Phuoc
Tuy province, and to clear areas for an Australian base at Nui Dat.
The US Army provided helicopter lift for the Australian Army which
spent much of its time in Vietnam begging the United States to spare
more rotary wings. The joint force carried out four major operations
in the Phuoc Tuy province, SMASH, HARDIHOOD, HOLLANDIA and TOLEDO.
After that, the MACV hoped that Australia might be able to finish
the job without US assistance. They didn't.

2. August 1966. The Australians fought their best known battle
in at Long Tan. Though the Diggers preened and blustered about their
expertise at "unconventional warfare", they were in fact, rescued by
"conventional artillery" during the action. Some of the fire
support came from the self-propelled guns of US artillery units
based at Nui Dat.

3. February - June 1968. After thumbing their noses at Australia
for two years, the 5th VC Division and parts of D445 VC Battalion
were shattered by US troops around Bien Hoa and Long Binh during Tet
and Mini-Tet. American troops should not have encountered these 2nd-
rate Viet Cong units at all, but unfortunately the Australians could
not handle them and let the buggers get away -- as they often did by
the admission of the Australian General Tim Vincent. The consequences
were that, thanks to US troops, it was quiet in the Phuoc Tuy province
while the enemy licked his wounds and slowly rebuilt 5th VC Division
and D445 VC Battalion.

4. February 1968. Town of Baria (the Phuoc Tuy province capital)
was captured by part of D445 VC Battalion during the Tet Offensive.
The Australians from A/3 RAR and their armored units from 3 Cavalry
could not dislodge them with their own resources and had to rely on
South Vietnamese units to jettison the VC from Baria.

5. May 1968. Part of the Australian TF found themselves besieged
at FSBs CORAL and BALMORAL and American air power was called for help.
US aircraft carried out airstrikes on advancing and retreating NVA
and their supply lines.

6. July 1970 to April 1971. In addition to responsibilities in Long
Khanh and Bien Hoa provinces, 2d Brigade, US 25th Infantry Division
was forced to operate in the Phuoc Tuy province because the Australian
Army could not handle the enemy or pacification program without us.
This is in addition to the fact that US troops guarded the seaport and
other installations at Vung Tau, and provided road convoy security to
and from.

7. April 1971-June 1972. The 2d Brigade, US 25th Infantry Division
was replaced by the 3d Brigade, US 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile).
Despite the recent and massive withdrawl of Allied forces, the Air Cav
"fire brigade" was responsible for ranging three provinces, Binh Tuy,
Long Khanh and Phuoc Tuy. Their air assault training and larger fleet
of helicopter lift and gunships made this possible. Such widespread
coverage was well beyond the capability of any Australian brigade.

8. 1965-1972. Supply flow to Viet Cong units in Phuoc Tuy province
came via the Ho Chi Minh Trail, Mekong Delta and ports in Cambodia.
This meant the goods had to pass through areas that were patrolled by
Americans and other Allied units, who often intercepted the supplies.
Captured documents revealed that, thanks to US forces, VC units in the
Phuoc Tuy province complained of shortages in food and other stocks.


Allied participation in the Phuoc Tuy province and against the 5th VC
Division and D445 VC Battalion has been carefully downplayed or lashed
up by Australia. Oz could not fail when their American guardian angels
were running around tweaking circumstance.

[Evan Brennan]

(Kevin Brooks) wrote in message >...
> (Evan Brennan) wrote in message >...
> <snip various rants>
> >
> > We deployed our British and Australian hirelings because no one else
> > was willing. And because Moe always brings Larry and Curly when he
> > goes on a road trip.
>
> I had thought Evan to be just rabidly anti-British, but now he has not
> only extended that irrational thought process to include the Aussies,
> but apparently also our own forces (Moe?!).


Less moral cheerleading, more content please.

And stop waving your MOS at us Brooks. You're turning into a younger
version of Art Kramer.

[Kevin Brooks]

(Evan Brennan) wrote in message >...
> (Kevin Brooks) wrote in message >...
> > > The posts he writes are factitious -- a lot of what he writes is true,
> > > but strung together so present his targets in the poorest light.
>
> > You are probably mostly correct, though he also has demonstrated a
> > marked ability to ignore reality when it suits him (i.e., his past
> > violently argued contention that SFOD-Delta was *not* based upon the
> > SAS when it was formed
>
>
> I never wrote anything like that. Don't put your words in my mouth.
>
> We had a disagreement about the origins of -ALL- aspects of Delta Force
> training and their responsibilities, back then and more recently. Not
> just the parts associated with the SAS.

No need to put any words in your mouth...Your words:

"Your claim that Delta Force was solely modeled after the SAS is
easy to discredit..." (April 23, 2002).

Unfortunately, you never were able to actually *do* that discrediting,
instead trotting out examples of folks involved in Delta's founding
who were supposedly *not* influenced by Delta (like Dick Meadows)...

(24 April) "If Beckwith's only goal was to copy the SAS verbatim,
then he certainly would not need the services of Shumate and
Meadows..."

But oops, Meadows was indeed actually another of Beckwith's
SAS-exchange vets. Or the fact that you never could quite get it
through your head that the primary reason SFOD-Delta was founded by
Beckwith, with support from folks like Wilson, Kingston, Meyer, etc.,
was originally as a CT/HRT force, and that its later mission creep
into other areas...

(Your words, 1 May) "Smells like BS to me. You're saying that "back
in the 1970s" Delta Force was formed "for CT operations only" but
later "developed into something else"."

Yep, that was what I was saying, and a read of Beckwith, Haney,
Burrus, etc., will demonstrate that was indeed the original
reason/mission envisioned when Delta was formed, and it had to
complete with the 7th SFG's (COL Bob Mountel) "Blue Light" for that
role as it was first forming. Did you happen to read Haney's book yet?
But hey, like the other guys who were founding members and later wrote
books about Delta and its genesis as a US-form of the SAS, I am sure
you will discount him...

So...you can't get your facts straight about Delta due, apparently, to
myopic vision caused by an irrational hatred for all things
British...and now you continue to demonstrate the same lack of a grasp
of reality by dissing the various Aussie forces, compounded by a
slight directed at US forces to boot. Not a very impressive record you
have going for you there, Evan. If all of these folks, including our
own, are so screwed up, why have you chosen to not join them and
square them away?

Brooks

[Sunny]

"Evan Brennan" > wrote in message

I don't know where you are getting these "facts" from, so.......

> 1. December 1965-September 1966. Since the Australian 1 RAR was
> hardly up to the task, the US 173d Airborne Brigade committed two
> battalions to operate against the VC and infrastructure in Phuoc
> Tuy province, and to clear areas for an Australian base at Nui Dat.
> The US Army provided helicopter lift for the Australian Army which
> spent much of its time in Vietnam begging the United States to spare
> more rotary wings. The joint force carried out four major operations
> in the Phuoc Tuy province, SMASH, HARDIHOOD, HOLLANDIA and TOLEDO.
> After that, the MACV hoped that Australia might be able to finish
> the job without US assistance. They didn't.

Fact.... 1RAR was attached to 173rd Air borne during that period

> 2. August 1966. The Australians fought their best known battle
> in at Long Tan. Though the Diggers preened and blustered about their
> expertise at "unconventional warfare", they were in fact, rescued by
> "conventional artillery" during the action. Some of the fire
> support came from the self-propelled guns of US artillery units
> based at Nui Dat.

Fact.....The Husky Battery (155mm) could not fire close to D Coy and the
main fire support was provided by Aust 105mm. (plus Aust 9 Sqn and another
Coy with APC support)

> 3. February - June 1968. After thumbing their noses at Australia
> for two years, the 5th VC Division and parts of D445 VC Battalion
> were shattered by US troops around Bien Hoa and Long Binh during Tet
> and Mini-Tet. American troops should not have encountered these 2nd-
> rate Viet Cong units at all, but unfortunately the Australians could
> not handle them and let the buggers get away -- as they often did by
> the admission of the Australian General Tim Vincent. The consequences
> were that, thanks to US troops, it was quiet in the Phuoc Tuy province
> while the enemy licked his wounds and slowly rebuilt 5th VC Division
> and D445 VC Battalion.

Fact......... The VC units that the US forces encountered did not come from
the Aust AO.
By that period US forces had taken resposibility for the northern and
western approaches to Bien Hoa and Long Binh.

> 4. February 1968. Town of Baria (the Phuoc Tuy province capital)
> was captured by part of D445 VC Battalion during the Tet Offensive.
> The Australians from A/3 RAR and their armored units from 3 Cavalry
> could not dislodge them with their own resources and had to rely on
> South Vietnamese units to jettison the VC from Baria.

Utter frog ****... Fact..... the SVN forces were overwhelmed in the first
attacks.

> 5. May 1968. Part of the Australian TF found themselves besieged
> at FSBs CORAL and BALMORAL and American air power was called for help.
> US aircraft carried out airstrikes on advancing and retreating NVA
> and their supply lines.

Bull****,...Fact.... The Aust forces called in and directed air and arty
support.
May come as a shock to you but calling in US air support was actually
allowed.
(and you don't repulse ground attacks by "bombing supply lines")

> 6. July 1970 to April 1971. In addition to responsibilities in Long
> Khanh and Bien Hoa provinces, 2d Brigade, US 25th Infantry Division
> was forced to operate in the Phuoc Tuy province because the Australian
> Army could not handle the enemy or pacification program without us.
> This is in addition to the fact that US troops guarded the seaport and
> other installations at Vung Tau, and provided road convoy security to
> and from.

More Bull****... Fact......Ops during the period 1969/70 so decimated the
VC in Phouc Tuy that D445 ceased to operate as a unit. US troops only
"guarded" their own establishments in Vung Tau and never provided "road
convoy security" for anyone but their own movements, (as we did)

> 7. April 1971-June 1972. The 2d Brigade, US 25th Infantry Division
> was replaced by the 3d Brigade, US 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile).
> Despite the recent and massive withdrawl of Allied forces, the Air Cav
> "fire brigade" was responsible for ranging three provinces, Binh Tuy,
> Long Khanh and Phuoc Tuy. Their air assault training and larger fleet
> of helicopter lift and gunships made this possible. Such widespread
> coverage was well beyond the capability of any Australian brigade.

What bloody Brigade? Nov 70 saw the withdrawal, and non replacement of 8RAR
plus the gradual planned withdrawal of all Aust troops commence.

> 8. 1965-1972. Supply flow to Viet Cong units in Phuoc Tuy province
> came via the Ho Chi Minh Trail, Mekong Delta and ports in Cambodia.
> This meant the goods had to pass through areas that were patrolled by
> Americans and other Allied units, who often intercepted the supplies.
> Captured documents revealed that, thanks to US forces, VC units in the
> Phuoc Tuy province complained of shortages in food and other stocks.

More bull****... Fact.... The VC obtained all their food from within Phuoc
Tuy and Aust ops that denied them access to villages caused most of their
food shortages.

> Allied participation in the Phuoc Tuy province and against the 5th VC
> Division and D445 VC Battalion has been carefully downplayed or lashed
> up by Australia. Oz could not fail when their American guardian angels
> were running around tweaking circumstance.

Fact... All operations, together with the parts played by *everyone* are
readily available in the various Bn books from the RAR and other Aust Units.
Suggest you read them, and get a less jaundiced view of things in general.

[L'acrobat]

"Evan Brennan" > wrote in message
...
> "gblack" > wrote in message
>...
> > The history of Vietnam is well and truly written from all sides
> > involved..
>
>
> But Australian accounts are more one-sided than ours. Let us fill
> in what is usually missing. Like a giant, Olive Green tooth fairy,
> the US and South Vietnamese forces had to bail out Australia on
> several occasions....
>

Yawn.

>
> 1. December 1965-September 1966. Since the Australian 1 RAR was
> hardly up to the task, the US 173d Airborne Brigade committed two
> battalions to operate against the VC and infrastructure in Phuoc
> Tuy province, and to clear areas for an Australian base at Nui Dat.
> The US Army provided helicopter lift for the Australian Army which
> spent much of its time in Vietnam begging the United States to spare
> more rotary wings. The joint force carried out four major operations
> in the Phuoc Tuy province, SMASH, HARDIHOOD, HOLLANDIA and TOLEDO.
> After that, the MACV hoped that Australia might be able to finish
> the job without US assistance. They didn't.


Poor Evan, determined to look stupid again.

Given that the Aust commitment to Vietnam at the time was only 1 Bn is it
any surprise they were attached to a US Bde rather than told to handle a Bde
sized AO alone?

Once the Aust commitment was upped to a TF (Bde) they handled the AO
superbly.

"The Aussies taught us a lot about small unit ops"

Brig General Ellis 'Butch' Williamson (Commander of the US 173d Airborne
Brigade) to David Horner 29 Apr 1986

"When we (the US Paras) found something we shot at it. We did not wait and
establish the patterns, look for opportunities after out thinking the VC
commander. We were just not patient enough - too much too do in too little
time. We did not use reconnaissance enough. Our ambushes were for security
not to kill. Australians were quiet hunters - patient, thorough, trying to
out-think the VC. I would not have liked to operate at night and know there
was a chance of ending up in an Aussie ambush."

Lt Col George Dexter CO of 2/503rd Bn to David Horner 10 May 1986

>
> 2. August 1966. The Australians fought their best known battle
> in at Long Tan. Though the Diggers preened and blustered about their
> expertise at "unconventional warfare", they were in fact, rescued by
> "conventional artillery" during the action. Some of the fire
> support came from the self-propelled guns of US artillery units
> based at Nui Dat.

Long Tan was a conventional encounter battle, where 100 patrolling troops
encountered and defeated an advancing force of 1000 to 2000 enemy.

It's hardly surprising that artillery played a major part in a conventional
battle, you cretin.

"Some of the fire support came from US guns", you are rather grabbing at
straws here, yes some was fired from US 155s - according to 1Fd Regt RAA log
it seems they fired 8 missions out of aprox 63 FMs.


>
> 3. February - June 1968. After thumbing their noses at Australia
> for two years, the 5th VC Division and parts of D445 VC Battalion
> were shattered by US troops around Bien Hoa and Long Binh during Tet
> and Mini-Tet.

Thumbing their noses at the Australians from in a US AO were they?

Both Long Binh and Bien Hoa were well outside the Australian AO.

****ing idiot.



> American troops should not have encountered these 2nd-
> rate Viet Cong units at all,

They were bound to since they were in the US AO, having found the Aust one
too hot.

>but unfortunately the Australians could
> not handle them and let the buggers get away

Sent them packing is the technical term.

>-- as they often did by
> the admission of the Australian General Tim Vincent. The consequences
> were that, thanks to US troops, it was quiet in the Phuoc Tuy province
> while the enemy licked his wounds and slowly rebuilt 5th VC Division
> and D445 VC Battalion.

Yawn, you were shown to be a liar and a fool on this one before Evan.


> 4. February 1968. Town of Baria (the Phuoc Tuy province capital)
> was captured by part of D445 VC Battalion during the Tet Offensive.
> The Australians from A/3 RAR and their armored units from 3 Cavalry
> could not dislodge them with their own resources and had to rely on
> South Vietnamese units to jettison the VC from Baria.

Ah yes, D445, heavily reinforced took Baria, A/3RAR with APCs and 24 Hrs
later B/3RAR engaged in street fighting and quickly ejected them and
returned to Nui Dat.

(Abbreviated from D.Horners "Duty First" P.231)

Try again Evan.


>
> 5. May 1968. Part of the Australian TF found themselves besieged
> at FSBs CORAL and BALMORAL and American air power was called for help.
> US aircraft carried out airstrikes on advancing and retreating NVA
> and their supply lines.

You do know that that is the point of establishing FSBs don't you? (of
course you don't), give the enemy a target they must engage, then use max
force against them.

That is why the Americans asked 1 ATF to move into the previously US held AO
Surfers, to clear it out, they did and then went back to their own AO.

All the airstrikes and arty in the world is of no use if the Infantry can't
hold the position.


>
> 6. July 1970 to April 1971. In addition to responsibilities in Long
> Khanh and Bien Hoa provinces, 2d Brigade, US 25th Infantry Division
> was forced to operate in the Phuoc Tuy province because the Australian
> Army could not handle the enemy or pacification program without us.
> This is in addition to the fact that US troops guarded the seaport and
> other installations at Vung Tau, and provided road convoy security to
> and from.

Yawn, 1 ATF pacified the area quite nicely, in the dates you indicate the
Australian deployment was winding down (like the US one) however -

"the sustained effort against D445 and D440 in the period Sept 1969 - Apr
1970 resulted in those units becoming essentially inactive, and subsequently
they were removed from the province for rest, reinforcement and retraining"
D. Horner "Duty First" P.271

>
> 7. April 1971-June 1972. The 2d Brigade, US 25th Infantry Division
> was replaced by the 3d Brigade, US 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile).
> Despite the recent and massive withdrawl of Allied forces, the Air Cav
> "fire brigade" was responsible for ranging three provinces, Binh Tuy,
> Long Khanh and Phuoc Tuy. Their air assault training and larger fleet
> of helicopter lift and gunships made this possible. Such widespread
> coverage was well beyond the capability of any Australian brigade.

So?

>
> 8. 1965-1972. Supply flow to Viet Cong units in Phuoc Tuy province
> came via the Ho Chi Minh Trail, Mekong Delta and ports in Cambodia.
> This meant the goods had to pass through areas that were patrolled by
> Americans and other Allied units, who often intercepted the supplies.
> Captured documents revealed that, thanks to US forces, VC units in the
> Phuoc Tuy province complained of shortages in food and other stocks.

and do you have a point?

> Allied participation in the Phuoc Tuy province and against the 5th VC
> Division and D445 VC Battalion has been carefully downplayed or lashed
> up by Australia. Oz could not fail when their American guardian angels
> were running around tweaking circumstance.

Of course it has, poor sad little Evan, why don't you tell us all about your
military experience and how well you can judge these matters?

[L'acrobat]

"Kevin Brooks" > wrote in message
om...
> (Evan Brennan) wrote in message
>...
> > (Kevin Brooks) wrote in message
>...
> > > > The posts he writes are factitious -- a lot of what he writes is
true,
> > > > but strung together so present his targets in the poorest light.
> >
> > > You are probably mostly correct, though he also has demonstrated a
> > > marked ability to ignore reality when it suits him (i.e., his past
> > > violently argued contention that SFOD-Delta was *not* based upon the
> > > SAS when it was formed
> >
> >
> > I never wrote anything like that. Don't put your words in my mouth.
> >
> > We had a disagreement about the origins of -ALL- aspects of Delta Force
> > training and their responsibilities, back then and more recently. Not
> > just the parts associated with the SAS.
>
> No need to put any words in your mouth...Your words:
>
> "Your claim that Delta Force was solely modeled after the SAS is
> easy to discredit..." (April 23, 2002).

Good lord, Evan gets caught lying again!

Who'd a thunk it!

and he seemed so credible....

[Evan Brennan]

"L'acrobat" > wrote in message
> > 8. 1965-1972. Supply flow to Viet Cong units in Phuoc Tuy province
> > came via the Ho Chi Minh Trail, Mekong Delta and ports in Cambodia.
> > This meant the goods had to pass through areas that were patrolled by
> > Americans and other Allied units, who often intercepted the supplies.
> > Captured documents revealed that, thanks to US forces, VC units in the
> > Phuoc Tuy province complained of shortages in food and other stocks.
>

> and do you have a point?



Yes, the United States bailed out Austrlalia in more ways than one.


> Of course it has, poor sad little Evan, why don't you tell us all about your
> military experience and how well you can judge these matters?


Then tell us your real name, your military experience if any, the units
you served with, and when.

[gblack]

"Evan Brennan" > wrote in message
m...
: "L'acrobat" > wrote in message
: > > 8. 1965-1972. Supply flow to Viet Cong units in Phuoc Tuy
province
: > > came via the Ho Chi Minh Trail, Mekong Delta and ports in
Cambodia.
: > > This meant the goods had to pass through areas that were
patrolled by
: > > Americans and other Allied units, who often intercepted the
supplies.
: > > Captured documents revealed that, thanks to US forces, VC units
in the
: > > Phuoc Tuy province complained of shortages in food and other
stocks.
: >
:
: > and do you have a point?
:
:
:
: Yes, the United States bailed out Austrlalia in more ways than one.
:
Cute misspelling there but what about Australia???????


: > Of course it has, poor sad little Evan, why don't you tell us all
about your
: > military experience and how well you can judge these matters?
:
:
: Then tell us your real name, your military experience if any, the
units
: you served with, and when.

You go first.....

--
_________________________________________
George Black
ICQ#: 6963409
More ways to contact me: http://wwp.icq.com/6963409
_________________________________________
Home page: http://www.koekejunction.hnpl.net/

[L'acrobat]

"Evan Brennan" > wrote in message
m...
> "L'acrobat" > wrote in message
> > > 8. 1965-1972. Supply flow to Viet Cong units in Phuoc Tuy province
> > > came via the Ho Chi Minh Trail, Mekong Delta and ports in Cambodia.
> > > This meant the goods had to pass through areas that were patrolled by
> > > Americans and other Allied units, who often intercepted the supplies.
> > > Captured documents revealed that, thanks to US forces, VC units in the
> > > Phuoc Tuy province complained of shortages in food and other stocks.
> >
>
> > and do you have a point?
>
>
>
> Yes, the United States bailed out Austrlalia in more ways than one.

But the problem is that it was Australian patrolling that denied the VC food
and supplies in Phouc Tuy.

Why is it you think that the US managed to do it in Phuc Tuy yet managed it
in no other province?

Again do you have a point?

>
>
> > Of course it has, poor sad little Evan, why don't you tell us all about
your
> > military experience and how well you can judge these matters?
>
>
> Then tell us your real name, your military experience if any, the units
> you served with, and when.

11.5 years in the Aust army, most of it in 3 RAR (Para) and you don't think
I am going to give stridently barking loons like yourself the info you need
to send your nonsense to my current employer do you?

Now its your turn Evan, tell us about your experience.

I'm sure that there are plenty here who could ask pertinent questions to
verify it...

[Evan Brennan]

"L'acrobat" > wrote in message news:<belnd6>

> 1. December 1965-September 1966. Since the Australian 1 RAR was
> > hardly up to the task, the US 173d Airborne Brigade committed two
> > battalions to operate against the VC and infrastructure in Phuoc
> > Tuy province, and to clear areas for an Australian base at Nui Dat.
> > The US Army provided helicopter lift for the Australian Army which
> > spent much of its time in Vietnam begging the United States to spare
> > more rotary wings. The joint force carried out four major operations
> > in the Phuoc Tuy province, SMASH, HARDIHOOD, HOLLANDIA and TOLEDO.
> > After that, the MACV hoped that Australia might be able to finish
> > the job without US assistance. They didn't.
>
> "The Aussies taught us a lot about small unit ops"


For once I agree with you. But then again the 173d Airborne was green
in 1965 with no experience in combat, let alone in jungle warfare.
There was no Vietnam recondo schools in 1965. They did too much
shooting since they were not familiar with the sounds of the jungle
and often shot at various animals by mistake. They also made too much
noise, built too many fires, and left garbage laying around outside
of the firebases.

But they learned and improved whereas Australia did not improve much
at all, save for the SAS since they embraced US style airmobility.

The very low number of kills claimed by Oz infantry speaks louder
than your lame attempts at cooking up a cover story.


> > 3. February - June 1968. After thumbing their noses at Australia
> > for two years, the 5th VC Division and parts of D445 VC Battalion
> > were shattered by US troops around Bien Hoa and Long Binh during Tet
> > and Mini-Tet. American troops should not have encountered these 2nd-
> > rate Viet Cong units at all, but unfortunately the Australians could
> > not handle them and let the buggers get away -- as they often did by
> > the admission of the Australian General Tim Vincent. The consequences
> > were that, thanks to US troops, it was quiet in the Phuoc Tuy province
> > while the enemy licked his wounds and slowly rebuilt 5th VC Division
> > and D445 VC Battalion.

> > 6. July 1970 to April 1971. In addition to responsibilities in Long
> > Khanh and Bien Hoa provinces, 2d Brigade, US 25th Infantry Division
> > was forced to operate in the Phuoc Tuy province because the Australian
> > Army could not handle the enemy or pacification program without us.
> > This is in addition to the fact that US troops guarded the seaport and
> > other installations at Vung Tau, and provided road convoy security to
> > and from.
>
> Yawn, 1 ATF pacified the area quite nicely, in the dates you indicate the
> Australian deployment was winding down (like the US one) however -


Westmoreland never thanked Australia for "pacifying the Phuoc Tuy
Province" or "destroying the 5th VC Division and D445" because
they never did.

The VC had bunkers and tunnels EVERYWHERE and the Kangaroos-in-denial
could not find all of them. Everytime the Australian weenies thought
they "hunted out the province" the Communists paid them a nice visit.
From David Horner's history of Australian SAS:

April 1969: Lt. General Julian Ewell of the US Army II Field Force
issued a directive to 1st Australian Task Force they should change
their concept of operations to concentrate on pacification;
interdiction of local VC as they entered villages in the east of
the province". Nevertheless, there was no major VC main force activity
in 1969 other than the summer offensive.

May 1969: Elements of 33 NVA Regiment, 274 VC Regiment and local
VC began a month long operation around the villages and hamlets along
Route 15 and provincial Route 2. Their intentions were unknown, but
it was believed they may have wanted to disrupt normal government
administration. The build-up for a VC-NVA assault of this size
should have been obvious to Australian troops but they were taken
by surprise. The SAS failed to detect the staging areas and
Australian officers ignored the warning signs from previous contacts.
In May and June there were several enemy rocket attacks on the
Australian Task Force base at Nui Dat.

June 1969: 3 Squadron of the SAS Regiment conducted eleven patrols
with a total of 157 enemy troops sighted and five contacts resulting
in eight VC killed. Results for July 308 enemy sighted, five killed.

September 1969: As his Vietnam tour ended, Brigadier Pearson halted
operations around Dak Do and since the VC often moved to high ground
between raids, the SAS began patrolling around the May Taos, a VC
mountain stronghold on the border of the Long Khanh province.

April 1970: Task Force began Operation CONCRETE in the Xuyen
Moc district, Phuoc Tuy province, with the aim of destroying
D445 VC Main Force Battalion and its base areas.

September 1970: The SAS began operations in support of Operation
CUNG and CHUNG II in which 7 RAR had the mission of denying
access to Xuyen Moc, Dat Do and Lang Phuoc Hai. Unfortunately,
the successful results achieved were short-lived.

November 1970: Part of D445 VC Battalion supported by elements
of the disbanded D440 VC Battalion successfully attacked district
capital of Xuyen Moc. Nine days later a 7 RAR night defensive
position was mortared, followed by an attack by elements of the
D445 VC Battalion. On the night of 30/31 December elements of
7 RAR ambushed a large part of D445 VC Battalion south of Xuyen
Moc. In these incidents the enemy displayed classic VC tactics
and fought with a tenacity thought long dead in Phuoc Tuy.

March 1971: A 6-man patrol led by Sgt. Terry O' Farrell was inserted
twelve kilometers northeast of Xuyen Moc. While establishing a night
LUP, they heard a large force of enemy moving north east along a
track, to the west of their LUP. Four days later 3 RAR, which had
relieved 7 RAR, contacted a company of D445 VC Battalion about
4 kilometers northwest of Xuyen Moc. In an operation that lasted
well into April, 3 RAR and elements of the 2 RAR/NZ located and
attacked a bunker system recently occupied by the D445 VC Battalion.

April 1971: The month had been frustrating for the Australian SAS
and the overall situation had not changed appreciably. In 23 patrols
they had sighted three enemy and claimed two killed. Lt. B.R.A. Jones
was killed by Friendly Fire -- shot and fatally wounded by a member
of his own patrol. Contacts were still required but the enemy remained
elusive, once he realized ATF troops are looking for him he became
very careful in his daily routine and movement. He continued to move
freely about the province from bunker system to bunker system.

August 1971: Sgt. Frank Cashmore's SAS patrol observed some VC
troops hit by an airstrike and in the debris they found the dead
body of the assistant chief of staff, 274 VC Regiment. He was
carrying a satchel containing money, maps and documents that
provided an accurate and up-to-date picture of the 274 Regiment's
condition and intentions. The VC were moving into position to
attack populated areas in northern Phuoc Tuy to disrupt the
local elections.

September 1971: Because of a snafu, the Australian SAS was unable
to provide adequate coverage and screening for the Task Force and
they failed to detect that 33 NVA Regiment re-entered Phuoc Tuy
province. The SAS was not involved in Operation IVANHOE, the
Australian Task Force's last operation in which 4 RAR was engaged
in "heavy contacts with the North Vietnamese north of Binh Gia".

October 1971: The Australian SAS pulled out of Vietnam for good
and returned home to an openly hostile reception from their own
Army. Although the mission record of the SAS Regiment suggested
impressive statistics for a small unit, not everyone felt that
the SAS performed well in Vietnam.

January 1972: Ian McFarlane took over the regiment from Lawrie
Clark, at a time when "SAS" was considered "a dirty word" in the
Army. Officers were warned that a posting to the SAS could curtail
their careers and the regiment tried to find new roles to avoid the
possibility of being disbanded. It would be some time before the
SAS Regiment was widely accepted as a permanent part of the
Australian Army. One thing that saved them was working with US
Navy SEALs and the US Army Special Forces in Vietnam. The
members who served with the AATTV had a front row seat to a
wide variety of missions and concluded the potential special
ops extended far beyond the reconnaissance patrols that were
the focus of SAS operations in Vietnam.


> > 5. May 1968. Part of the Australian TF found themselves besieged
> > at FSBs CORAL and BALMORAL and American air power was called
>> for help. US aircraft carried out airstrikes on advancing and
retreating NVA
>> and their supply lines.
>
> You do know that that is the point of establishing FSBs don't you? (of
> course you don't), give the enemy a target they must engage, then use max
> force against them. That is why the Americans asked 1 ATF to move into the
> previously US held AO Surfers, to clear it out, they did and then went back
> to their own AO.



They never cleared it out, and were sent packing back to the Phuoc Tuy
province where they obviously failed to clear out the enemy there
as well.


> All the airstrikes and arty in the world is of no use if the
> Infantry can't hold the position.


Your infantry would have been dead meat without the airstrikes
and artillery. Being dead always makes it difficult to hold
a position.

Of course the enemy understood the real threats better than
you ever will. A Viet Cong officer spelled that out for us
with his thoughts on US Airmobility:


" The South Vietnamese government troops
did not pose too much of a problem to the
Viet Cong, but the Americans with their
helicopters and artillery changed the
face of the war overnight "
~ Hai Chua, PLAF

[L'acrobat]

"Evan Brennan" > wrote in message
m...
modeled after the SAS is
> > > easy to discredit..." (April 23, 2002).
> >
> > Good lord, Evan gets caught lying again!
> >
> > Who'd a thunk it!
> >
> > and he seemed so credible....
>
>
>
> .....As L'acrobat loses his daily battle with logic (and written
> English apparently) he simply repeats himself like a Xerox machine
> after a lightning strike. ; )

Oh Evan, given your constant record of untruths how can we believe that you
even think the above is true?

All you are is an amusement, slapping you down is fun rather like whack a
mole with cretins.

[L'acrobat]

"Evan Brennan" > wrote in message

> >
> > "The Aussies taught us a lot about small unit ops"
>
>
> For once I agree with you. But then again the 173d Airborne was green
> in 1965 with no experience in combat, let alone in jungle warfare.
> There was no Vietnam recondo schools in 1965. They did too much
> shooting since they were not familiar with the sounds of the jungle
> and often shot at various animals by mistake. They also made too much
> noise, built too many fires, and left garbage laying around outside
> of the firebases.
>
> But they learned and improved whereas Australia did not improve much
> at all, save for the SAS since they embraced US style airmobility.
>
> The very low number of kills claimed by Oz infantry speaks louder
> than your lame attempts at cooking up a cover story.


Oh poor Evan, a moment ago you were claiming -

"December 1965-September 1966. Since the Australian 1 RAR was
hardly up to the task, the US 173d Airborne Brigade committed two
battalions to operate against the VC and infrastructure in Phuoc
Tuy province, and to clear areas for an Australian base at Nui Dat."

Now it turns out that you are forced to admit that they didn't teach the
Aussies how to do it, your back flip with half pike is amusing to say the
least, the follow on 'but they learned and the Aussies didn't' is laughable
as an attempt to retreat from your earlier gaffe.


>
> > > 6. July 1970 to April 1971. In addition to responsibilities in Long
> > > Khanh and Bien Hoa provinces, 2d Brigade, US 25th Infantry Division
> > > was forced to operate in the Phuoc Tuy province because the Australian
> > > Army could not handle the enemy or pacification program without us.
> > > This is in addition to the fact that US troops guarded the seaport and
> > > other installations at Vung Tau, and provided road convoy security to
> > > and from.
> >
> > Yawn, 1 ATF pacified the area quite nicely, in the dates you indicate
the
> > Australian deployment was winding down (like the US one) however -
>
>
> Westmoreland never thanked Australia for "pacifying the Phuoc Tuy
> Province" or "destroying the 5th VC Division and D445" because
> they never did.

General Westmoreland commented on the Australian troops that: "I have never
seen a finer group of men. I have never fought with a finer group of
soldiers".

You can't permanently destroy a formation like a Div as new troops are
inducted into it.

If you had served in the military you would know that.

Yet David Horner himself (who wrote the only reference you own) notes that
D445 were reduced to impotence by the Australians.

But then if you had served, you wouldn't keep making such an arse of
yourself would you?

>
> The VC had bunkers and tunnels EVERYWHERE and the Kangaroos-in-denial
> could not find all of them. Everytime the Australian weenies thought
> they "hunted out the province" the Communists paid them a nice visit.
> From David Horner's history of Australian SAS:

http://www.abc.net.au/austory/transcripts/s329667.htm

The Americans went there, found the tunnel entrances, sealed the tunnel
entrances after blowing smoke down to find other entrances, and didn't go
down the tunnels. General Westmoreland was against going down tunnels. We
didn't know that. As soon as we came across a tunnel in Ben Cat area, I knew
that I was going to be the first down as far as I was concerned and I was
going to do it. So I went down head first with a torch in one hand and a
pistol in the other and my feet tied - one foot was tied - and my sergeant
was lowering me down the tunnel as I went down. And was I scared?
Absolutely, I was.

The information that we brought out of the tunnels was enormous. There were
guns, there were typewriters. We were right on the headquarters of the Gia
Dinh area. There was over 100,000 sheets of paper. We had the list of
Vietcong agents in Saigon. It was like a feast of intelligence, and I KNEW
that we were making a difference to the war effort. There's no doubt about
that.


DENNIS AYOUB, ex "Tunnel Rat": Sandy had to make us a cohesive bunch, and he
did, though he got the very best out of us by pushing us and by pushing us
as hard as possible, and, in fact, after a while there was a begrudging
respect for this guy because we used to achieve.


SANDY: Straight after that, General Westmoreland changed his mind and said
we were going to have now a strategy of searching down, searching out
tunnels and pulling out the intelligence. It's too valuable. That was the
difference that we made.


> April 1969: Lt. General Julian Ewell of the US Army II Field Force
> issued a directive to 1st Australian Task Force they should change
> their concept of operations to concentrate on pacification;
> interdiction of local VC as they entered villages in the east of
> the province". Nevertheless, there was no major VC main force activity
> in 1969 other than the summer offensive.
>
> May 1969: Elements of 33 NVA Regiment, 274 VC Regiment and local
> VC began a month long operation around the villages and hamlets along
> Route 15 and provincial Route 2. Their intentions were unknown, but
> it was believed they may have wanted to disrupt normal government
> administration. The build-up for a VC-NVA assault of this size
> should have been obvious to Australian troops but they were taken
> by surprise. The SAS failed to detect the staging areas and
> Australian officers ignored the warning signs from previous contacts.
> In May and June there were several enemy rocket attacks on the
> Australian Task Force base at Nui Dat.


and these were the only rocket attacks on bases in the whole of Vietnam were
they?

>
> June 1969: 3 Squadron of the SAS Regiment conducted eleven patrols
> with a total of 157 enemy troops sighted and five contacts resulting
> in eight VC killed. Results for July 308 enemy sighted, five killed.


the difference being that these are credible numbers rather than the
fantasies submitted by US units.

>
> September 1969: As his Vietnam tour ended, Brigadier Pearson halted
> operations around Dak Do and since the VC often moved to high ground
> between raids, the SAS began patrolling around the May Taos, a VC
> mountain stronghold on the border of the Long Khanh province.


Which means that troops were deployed into areas that the VC were likely to
be found, what do you think it means?

>
> April 1970: Task Force began Operation CONCRETE in the Xuyen
> Moc district, Phuoc Tuy province, with the aim of destroying
> D445 VC Main Force Battalion and its base areas.

"the sustained effort against D445 and D440 in the period Sept 1969 - Apr
1970 resulted in those units becoming essentially inactive, and subsequently
they were removed from the province for rest, reinforcement and retraining"
D. Horner "Duty First" P.271

I couldn't be bothered doing a piece by piece refutation of the rubbish you
post, it's all based on what is at best your total misunderstanding of the
military or, what is far more likely, the fact that you are a lying piece of
****.

You are routinely caught lying and misquoting sources, your credibility is
nil.

Now tell us about your military experience, why should we give any credence
to whay you post?

[gblack]

"L'acrobat" > wrote in message
...
cut
: 11.5 years in the Aust army, most of it in 3 RAR (Para) and you
don't think
: I am going to give stridently barking loons like yourself the info
you need
: to send your nonsense to my current employer do you?
:
: Now its your turn Evan, tell us about your experience.
:
: I'm sure that there are plenty here who could ask pertinent
questions to
: verify it...

Ex Royal New Zealand Navy myself....
Now's time to let us in on -your- history Evan
_________________________________________
George Black
ICQ#: 6963409
More ways to contact me: http://wwp.icq.com/6963409
_________________________________________
Home page: http://www.koekejunction.hnpl.net/

[Evan Brennan]

"Sunny" > wrote in message news:<3AsPa.32$wU5.0@news->
> > 3. February - June 1968. After thumbing their noses at Australia
> > for two years, the 5th VC Division and parts of D445 VC Battalion
> > were shattered by US troops around Bien Hoa and Long Binh during Tet
> > and Mini-Tet. American troops should not have encountered these 2nd-
> > rate Viet Cong units at all, but unfortunately the Australians could
> > not handle them and let the buggers get away -- as they often did by
> > the admission of the Australian General Tim Vincent. The consequences
> > were that, thanks to US troops, it was quiet in the Phuoc Tuy province
> > while the enemy licked his wounds and slowly rebuilt 5th VC Division
> > and D445 VC Battalion.
>

> Fact....The VC units that the US forces encountered did not come
> from the Aust AO. By that period US forces had taken resposibility
> for the northern and western approaches to Bien Hoa and Long Binh.


You're grasping at straws, not facts. The 274 Regiment hit the eastern
bunker lines of Bien Hoa. The 275 Regiment also slipped past the
Australians to attack the northern perimeter of Long Binh. Parts of
the D445 VC Battalion were mixed in.

And besides, Australian troops -- had they been as effective as
your propaganda claims -- would have destroyed these units during
1966-67 and that way US troops would not have to see them, and
destroy them, in 1968.

After the D440 was disbanded and its personnel used to replenish
the D445, they were once again a thorn in the side of Australia. : )


> > 4. February 1968. Town of Baria (the Phuoc Tuy province capital)
> > was captured by part of D445 VC Battalion during the Tet Offensive.
> > The Australians from A/3 RAR and their armored units from 3 Cavalry
> > could not dislodge them with their own resources and had to rely on
> > South Vietnamese units to jettison the VC from Baria.
>
> Utter frog ****... Fact..... the SVN forces were overwhelmed in the
> first attacks.


Fact: The civilian population and police were overwhelmed. Fact: South
Vietnamese troops bailed out the Australians at Baria.


> > 5. May 1968. Part of the Australian TF found themselves besieged
> > at FSBs CORAL and BALMORAL and American air power was called for help.
> > US aircraft carried out airstrikes on advancing and retreating NVA
> > and their supply lines.
>
> Bull****,...Fact.... The Aust forces called in and directed air and arty
> support. May come as a shock to you but calling in US air support was
> actually allowed.(and you don't repulse ground attacks by "bombing supply lines")


Maybe on your planet, but not here on Earth.



> > 6. July 1970 to April 1971. In addition to responsibilities in Long
> > Khanh and Bien Hoa provinces, 2d Brigade, US 25th Infantry Division
> > was forced to operate in the Phuoc Tuy province because the Australian
> > Army could not handle the enemy or pacification program without us.
> > This is in addition to the fact that US troops guarded the seaport and
> > other installations at Vung Tau, and provided road convoy security to
> > and from.
>
> More Bull****... Fact......Ops during the period 1969/70 so decimated the
> VC in Phouc Tuy that D445 ceased to operate as a unit.


Australian propaganda is not fact. Many documents have been found and
cited. Even if Australian body counts were accurate, there is no
evidence that Australia ever seriously damaged the D445 VC Battalion,
D440 VC Battalion, the undersized 5th VC Division, or local VC companies.

And there is no proof that your body counts were typically accurate
and the amount of enemy activity by these units suggests otherwise.


> "guarded" their own establishments in Vung Tau and never provided "road
> convoy security" for anyone but their own movements, (as we did)
>
> > 7. April 1971-June 1972. The 2d Brigade, US 25th Infantry Division
> > was replaced by the 3d Brigade, US 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile).
> > Despite the recent and massive withdrawl of Allied forces, the Air Cav
> > "fire brigade" was responsible for ranging three provinces, Binh Tuy,
> > Long Khanh and Phuoc Tuy. Their air assault training and larger fleet
> > of helicopter lift and gunships made this possible. Such widespread
> > coverage was well beyond the capability of any Australian brigade.
>
> What bloody Brigade?



At peak, there was about 8,000 Australian troops in Vietnam. An Air
Cavalry brigade had roughly the same number of men but they were a
far more effective and free ranging killing machine during their time
in Vietnam from 1965-72.

Unlike the more gravitationally-challenged Australian infantry, the
Air Cav could set up ambushes where and when they pleased in their
TOAR, or they could land right on top of the VC/NVA when it suited
them...when Charlie was taking a nap, when Charlie was taking a crap,
when Charlie was reading another Dear Gian letter...


> > 8. 1965-1972. Supply flow to Viet Cong units in Phuoc Tuy province
> > came via the Ho Chi Minh Trail, Mekong Delta and ports in Cambodia.
> > This meant the goods had to pass through areas that were patrolled by
> > Americans and other Allied units, who often intercepted the supplies.
> > Captured documents revealed that, thanks to US forces, VC units in the
> > Phuoc Tuy province complained of shortages in food and other stocks.
>
> More bull****... Fact.... The VC obtained all their food from within Phuoc
> Tuy and Aust ops that denied them access to villages caused most of their
> food shortages.


Now you're getting really desperate. Dream on!

[Evan Brennan]

"L'acrobat" > wrote in message >...
> "Evan Brennan" > wrote in message
> m...
> modeled after the SAS is
> > > > easy to discredit..." (April 23, 2002).
> > >
> > > Good lord, Evan gets caught lying again!
> > >
> > > Who'd a thunk it!
> > >
> > > and he seemed so credible....
> >
> >
> >
> > .....As L'acrobat loses his daily battle with logic (and written
> > English apparently) he simply repeats himself like a Xerox machine
> > after a lightning strike. ; )
>
> Oh Evan, given your constant record of untruths how can we believe that you
> even think the above is true?


Let me guess. You were born in a trailer, live in a trailer or have existed
in a trailer for some period of time.

[Sunny]

"Evan Brennan" > wrote in message
m...
<snip>
> Australian propaganda is not fact. Many documents have been found and
> cited. Even if Australian body counts were accurate, there is no
> evidence that Australia ever seriously damaged the D445 VC Battalion,
> D440 VC Battalion, the undersized 5th VC Division, or local VC companies.

I am not quoting from "propaganda" I served in SVN (infantry)
You would do better in your supposed "quest for the truth", if you read a
larger selection of material.

> And there is no proof that your body counts were typically accurate
> and the amount of enemy activity by these units suggests otherwise.

Your joking right? according to US "body counts" charlie was wiped out
three times over.

> > "guarded" their own establishments in Vung Tau and never provided "road
> > convoy security" for anyone but their own movements, (as we did)
> >
> > > 7. April 1971-June 1972. The 2d Brigade, US 25th Infantry Division
> > > was replaced by the 3d Brigade, US 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile).
> > > Despite the recent and massive withdrawl of Allied forces, the Air Cav
> > > "fire brigade" was responsible for ranging three provinces, Binh Tuy,
> > > Long Khanh and Phuoc Tuy. Their air assault training and larger fleet
> > > of helicopter lift and gunships made this possible. Such widespread
> > > coverage was well beyond the capability of any Australian brigade.
> >
> > What bloody Brigade?
>
> At peak, there was about 8,000 Australian troops in Vietnam. An Air
> Cavalry brigade had roughly the same number of men but they were a
> far more effective and free ranging killing machine during their time
> in Vietnam from 1965-72.

Read your original statement a bit closer. you were discussing 1971-72
(The Aust commitment had been more than halved by then and two Bns do not
even go close to a "Brigade"

> Unlike the more gravitationally-challenged Australian infantry, the
> Air Cav could set up ambushes where and when they pleased in their
> TOAR, or they could land right on top of the VC/NVA when it suited
> them...when Charlie was taking a nap, when Charlie was taking a crap,
> when Charlie was reading another Dear Gian letter...

Yep, saw a few of their "automatic ambushes" during my "gravitationally
challenged" strolls through the country side. (they did not even have the
common dog f**k to pass on grid references to their "allies")
Auto Ambush = a large qty of Clamore mines, setup with trip wire initiation,
then back in the choppers and home for a beer.

BTW, Part of a statement by Lieutenant General Julian J Ewell (Commanding
General 11 Field Force Vietnam)
"Only by grinding away at the enemy, capturing his supplies and denying him
his sanctuaries as you are doing, will we be able to force him out of Phuoc
Tuy Province, and out of the Republic of Vietnam"
(Just after the conclusion of Operation Hammersley, in which 8 RAR, with
elements of A Sqn 1 Armd Regt and 3 Troop B Sqn 3 Cav Regt, attacked the VC
controlled Long Hai Hills and delivered a severe blow to D445 which had
concentrated there.)

[L'acrobat]

"Evan Brennan" > wrote in message

> > > .....As L'acrobat loses his daily battle with logic (and written
> > > English apparently) he simply repeats himself like a Xerox machine
> > > after a lightning strike. ; )
> >
> > Oh Evan, given your constant record of untruths how can we believe that
you
> > even think the above is true?
>
>
> Let me guess. You were born in a trailer, live in a trailer or have
existed
> in a trailer for some period of time.

If it were the case, it would still put me well above you, since you can
only aspire to inhabiting a trailer.

[Drewe Manton]

"L'acrobat" > waxed lyrical
:

> I couldn't be bothered doing a piece by piece refutation of the
> rubbish you post, it's all based on what is at best your total
> misunderstanding of the military or, what is far more likely, the fact
> that you are a lying piece of ****.
>
> You are routinely caught lying and misquoting sources, your
> credibility is nil.
>

Errr. . . this much we know. What amazes me is that you continue to
play wack-a-mole with his imperial cluelessness. Surely the fun must've
gone by now? Just killfile and move on. I sometimes look through google
at his posts if I have a half hour to kill and fancy a laugh, but to take
him seriously or engage him in argument seems like a waste of
intellectual capacity. He's a brain donor, an oxygen thief, an idiot
without a village, move on!

--
--------
Regards
Drewe
Artificial intelligence is no match for natural stupidity

[L'acrobat]

"Drewe Manton" > wrote in message
. 4...
> "L'acrobat" > waxed lyrical
> :
>
> > I couldn't be bothered doing a piece by piece refutation of the
> > rubbish you post, it's all based on what is at best your total
> > misunderstanding of the military or, what is far more likely, the fact
> > that you are a lying piece of ****.
> >
> > You are routinely caught lying and misquoting sources, your
> > credibility is nil.
> >
>
> Errr. . . this much we know. What amazes me is that you continue to
> play wack-a-mole with his imperial cluelessness. Surely the fun must've
> gone by now? Just killfile and move on. I sometimes look through google
> at his posts if I have a half hour to kill and fancy a laugh, but to take
> him seriously or engage him in argument seems like a waste of
> intellectual capacity. He's a brain donor, an oxygen thief, an idiot
> without a village, move on!
>

I admit tormenting him has been fun, but you are right, conducting a battle
of wits with an unarmed man does start to pale after a while.

[Evan Brennan]

"L'acrobat" > wrote in message >...
>> But they learned and improved whereas Australia did not improve much
>> at all, save for the SAS since they embraced US style airmobility. The very
>> low number of kills claimed by Oz infantry speaks louderthan your lame
>> attempts at cooking up a cover story.

> Now it turns out that you are forced to admit that they didn't teach the
> Aussies how to do it, your back flip with half pike is amusing to say the
> least, the follow on 'but they learned and the Aussies didn't' is laughable
> as an attempt to retreat from your earlier gaffe.


Looks like you got all excited and wet yourself over a few initial
encounters of one Australian battalion and two US battalions from
the 173d Airborne. I hate to ruin a surprise for you, but at peak,
there was 81 US Army/USMC infantry battalions and most of them never
had contact with Australian troops in the field.

This will be a blow to your overinflated ego, but the US Air Cavalry
accomplished more in *one summer* than the Australian Task Force did
during their entire stay in Vietnam. From 1 May 1970 to 30 June 1970,
elements of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) amassed a kill ratio
of 2,574 : 157 against the NVA/VC during the invasion of Cambodia.

US units also uncovered massive supply bases used by the 7th NVA
Division, 5th VC Division, 9th VC Division and other units with their
main headquarters located in the Fishhook. Enough rice was seized to
feed 38,000 troops for a year and enough small arms to equip 55 full-
strength VC battalions. The 1st Cavalry took a big chunk of this loot.


> > Westmoreland never thanked Australia for "pacifying the Phuoc Tuy
> > Province" or "destroying the 5th VC Division and D445" because
> > they never did.
>
> General Westmoreland commented on the Australian troops that:
> "I have never seen a finer group of men. I have never fought with
> a finer group of soldiers".


I have no objections to his few kind words -- but he did not thank
them for pacifying Phuoc Tuy province or destroying 5th VC Division
and D445 -- because they never did.

Remember that the Australian SAS kissed Westmoreland where he sits
when they copied his Recondo School, which L.G. Clark formed at
Ingleburn in November 1960 based on his experience in the USA. Reg
Beeseley conducted nine Australian Recondo courses based on the US
system and thought it was the most realistic part of SAS training.
Australia scored points for brown-nosing Westmoreland.


> the difference being that these are credible numbers rather than the
> fantasies submitted by US units.


Nope. Hanoi has admitted that over a million Communist troops died
and that exceeds the MACV and CIA body count estimates that Walter
Cronkite once got all lathered up about.

Australian infantry units chipped in only about 1,200 enemy killed
during the entire war. Totally pathetic. The inability of Digger
infantry to close with the more crafty and resourceful VC on a
consistent basis left many an Australian Commander looking like
a cub scout having a temper tantrum. Since Australian infantry
could not find or catch the enemy, their only hope was to let the
enemy come to them, as they did at Long Tan, Coral, Balmoral,
Nui Dat, Xuyen Moc, Binh Gia, etc.

US troops did not have these unfortunate deficiencies. Their swarms
of Huey slicks, gunships and LOH helicopters allowed them to set
up ambushes anywhere, land near the enemy, or land on top of the
enemy at will.


> > April 1970: Task Force began Operation CONCRETE in the Xuyen
> > Moc district, Phuoc Tuy province, with the aim of destroying
> > D445 VC Main Force Battalion and its base areas.
>
> "the sustained effort against D445 and D440 in the period Sept 1969 - Apr
> 1970 resulted in those units becoming essentially inactive, and subsequently
> they were removed from the province for rest, reinforcement and retraining"
D. Horner "Duty First" P.271



I don't disagree with this. But your interpretation is a brand of
faux-confusion parading as intellect. The "sustained effort" by
Australia was really easy since the D445 was reduced to a shell
after Tet-68 and Mini-Tet 68, thanks to US and SVN troops doing the
job on them. The D445 was rebuilt with personnel from the disbanded
D440 VC Battalion.

To get a fix on all the damage done by the ATF, all we have to do is
add up the original and replacement manpower strength of every enemy
division, regiment, battalion, company engaged by the ATF in Vietnam
and then subtract the kills claimed by the ATF. None of those units
were destroyed by Australian forces.


> Now tell us about your military experience


Yo, Trailer Park...this act is wearing thin.

Tell us about your military experience -- after you tell us your real
name. We cannot tell if you are male or female. Based on the hissy fits
you always burst into, I would guess the latter.


> I couldn't be bothered doing a piece by piece refutation of the rubbish you
> post, it's all based on what is at best your total misunderstanding of the
> military


Everyone knows that you cannot be bothered with facts.

Why don't you just go to the library and read PHANTOMS of WAR instead
of continuously and baselessly denying the contents of same.

[L'acrobat]

"Evan Brennan" > wrote in message
m...
> "L'acrobat" > wrote in message
>...
> >> But they learned and improved whereas Australia did not improve much
> >> at all, save for the SAS since they embraced US style airmobility. The
very
> >> low number of kills claimed by Oz infantry speaks louderthan your lame
> >> attempts at cooking up a cover story.
>
> > Now it turns out that you are forced to admit that they didn't teach the
> > Aussies how to do it, your back flip with half pike is amusing to say
the
> > least, the follow on 'but they learned and the Aussies didn't' is
laughable
> > as an attempt to retreat from your earlier gaffe.
>
>
> Looks like you got all excited and wet yourself over a few initial
> encounters of one Australian battalion and two US battalions from
> the 173d Airborne. I hate to ruin a surprise for you, but at peak,
> there was 81 US Army/USMC infantry battalions and most of them never
> had contact with Australian troops in the field.
>
> This will be a blow to your overinflated ego, but the US Air Cavalry
> accomplished more in *one summer* than the Australian Task Force did
> during their entire stay in Vietnam. From 1 May 1970 to 30 June 1970,
> elements of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) amassed a kill ratio
> of 2,574 : 157 against the NVA/VC during the invasion of Cambodia.
>

Claimed a ratio, not amassed a ratio.

The US military kill claims have long been acknowledged as farce. even by
the US Military.

Drivel snipped.

> > Now tell us about your military experience
>
>
> Yo, Trailer Park...this act is wearing thin.

Then stop acting.

>
> Tell us about your military experience -- after you tell us your real
> name. We cannot tell if you are male or female. Based on the hissy fits
> you always burst into, I would guess the latter.

Yawn, I note you have supplied no claims of any military experience just
more of your drivel (and quite a few people on sci.military.naval know my
real name).

I told you about my military service, now it's your turn. put up or shut up.

Tell us why your opinion on military subjects is worth anything, what have
you done that gives your opinion credibility loserboy?

Have you even tried to sign up?

What stopped you?

a. lack of guts,
b. lack of brains,
c. lack of education, or
d. all of the above.


> > I couldn't be bothered doing a piece by piece refutation of the rubbish
you
> > post, it's all based on what is at best your total misunderstanding of
the
> > military
>
>
> Everyone knows that you cannot be bothered with facts.

Oh Evan, you poor sad little loser, you are the one who keeps getting caught
out lying.


> Why don't you just go to the library and read PHANTOMS of WAR instead
> of continuously and baselessly denying the contents of same.

I own a copy, you misquote it routinely and ignore the fact that Horners
other works do not agree with your drivel, you are clearly an idiot who has
fixed on some poorly selected and frequently misquoted sections of one book.

Now Evan, tell us what military experience you have that makes your opinions
valid, given the interesting interpretations you place on military accounts
(or more accurately, deceptively selected extracts of one account) one would
assume you are simply an idiot in search of a village.

[Evan Brennan]

"Sunny" > wrote in message >...
> "Evan Brennan" > wrote in message
> m...
> <snip>
> > Australian propaganda is not fact. Many documents have been found and
> > cited. Even if Australian body counts were accurate, there is no
> > evidence that Australia ever seriously damaged the D445 VC Battalion,
> > D440 VC Battalion, the undersized 5th VC Division, or local VC companies.
>
> I am not quoting from "propaganda" I served in SVN (infantry)You would do
> better in your supposed "quest for the truth", if you read a larger
> selection of material.


I'm always willing to read a "larger selection of material" so
recommend all the titles you want. Just remember that it won't
change "the bottom line" though.


> > And there is no proof that your body counts were typically accurate
> > and the amount of enemy activity by these units suggests otherwise.
>
> Your joking right? according to US "body counts" charlie was wiped out
> three times over.


Not according to the numbers published by both sides.

Both the MACV and CIA body count estimates are lower than what Hanoi
admitted during the 1990s (over a million dead Communist troops).


> > Unlike the more gravitationally-challenged Australian infantry, the
> > Air Cav could set up ambushes where and when they pleased in their
> > TOAR, or they could land right on top of the VC/NVA when it suited
> > them...when Charlie was taking a nap, when Charlie was taking a crap,
> > when Charlie was reading another Dear Gian letter...
>
> Yep, saw a few of their "automatic ambushes" during my "gravitationally
> challenged" strolls through the country side. (they did not even have the
> common dog f**k to pass on grid references to their "allies")
> Auto Ambush = a large qty of Clamore mines, setup with trip wire initiation,
> then back in the choppers and home for a beer.


Playmore with Claymore? You're saying US troops corned the market
on minelaying, eh?

Remember Australia's half-assed scheme to "secure" part of the
Phuoc Tuy province by sowing over 20,000 anti-personnel mines?
The Diggers and the local SVN militia did not fully address the
security problems since they failed to keep out VC sappers who
removed roughly half the mines and used them against us. The VC
appreciated the "gifts" from Australia and it wasn't long before
unsuspecting Allied troops were dropping like flies.

To his credit, General Westmoreland had the patience of a saint
and could only grit his teeth and try to forget it.

Your remark that all the VC units working inside the Phuoc Tuy
province got all their food from there is hilarious. The main HQ
and logistics group of 5th VC Division was located in Cambodia.
There was huge stockpiles of rice and weapons stored there.

[L'acrobat]

"Evan Brennan" > wrote in message

> > I am not quoting from "propaganda" I served in SVN (infantry)You would
do
> > better in your supposed "quest for the truth", if you read a larger
> > selection of material.
>
>
> I'm always willing to read a "larger selection of material" so
> recommend all the titles you want. Just remember that it won't
> change "the bottom line" though.
>

Or to put it another way, facts will not sway your ludicrous opinions.

BTW you still haven't told us about your vast military experience Evan.

Why is it we should listen to your nonsense again?

>
> To his credit, General Westmoreland had the patience of a saint
> and could only grit his teeth and try to forget it.

Oh yes and now the village idiot can read Westmorelands mind.

"I have never seen a finer group of men. I have never fought with a finer
group of
soldiers".

Westmoreland on Australian troops in Vietnam.

You sad pathetic joke.

[gblack]

"Evan Brennan" > wrote in message
m...
:
snip
: Why don't you just go to the library and read PHANTOMS of WAR
instead
: of continuously and baselessly denying the contents of same.

They've let him out again.


--
_________________________________________
George Black
ICQ#: 6963409
More ways to contact me: http://wwp.icq.com/6963409
_________________________________________
Home page: http://www.koekejunction.hnpl.net/

[Sunny]

"Evan Brennan" > wrote in message
<snip>
> I'm always willing to read a "larger selection of material" so
> recommend all the titles you want. Just remember that it won't
> change "the bottom line" though.

Don't get lazy, go to a library and look through their "selection".
btw, nice to see that your "mind" is locked in to "your" bottom line.

> Remember Australia's half-assed scheme to "secure" part of the
> Phuoc Tuy province by sowing over 20,000 anti-personnel mines?
> The Diggers and the local SVN militia did not fully address the
> security problems since they failed to keep out VC sappers who
> removed roughly half the mines and used them against us. The VC
> appreciated the "gifts" from Australia and it wasn't long before
> unsuspecting Allied troops were dropping like flies.

The SVN military failed to keep the minefield under surveilance.
(read some more books on the US idea of "Vietnamisation")

> Your remark that all the VC units working inside the Phuoc Tuy
> province got all their food from there is hilarious. The main HQ
> and logistics group of 5th VC Division was located in Cambodia.
> There was huge stockpiles of rice and weapons stored there.

Tell that to the villagers who "donated" half their wages and food to the VC
units.
(open your other eye)