Why publish a plate for an OTS approach? [Archive]

Mark Hansen

May 28th 07, 12:57 AM

On 05/27/07 15:37, Roy Smith wrote:
> In article >,
> (Paul Tomblin) wrote:
>
>> I'm just reading IFR Refresher, and it has a report on an accident that
>> happened after a King Air was cleared for an SDF approach at KSME.
>> According to the article, at the time the A/FD and NTAP listed the SDF as
>> "Out of Service (OTS) - Indefinitely", and had been for four years, but
>> the plate was still being published with no mention that the SDF was OTS.
>> Why the hell would they continue to publish an approach plate in a
>> situation like that?
>
> There's probably less paperwork and red tape involved to just notam
> something OTS than to get it revoked. "We don't have to make sense, we're
> the FAA".

Hmmm, I wonder. When they pulled the NDB approach at KSAC (Sacramento
Executive), it just went away -no more plate.

Maybe they think the SDF approach mentioned by the OP may come back at
some point, so they don't want to completely remove it from the system?

--
Mark Hansen, PP-ASEL, Instrument Airplane, USUA Ultralight Pilot
Cal Aggie Flying Farmers
Sacramento, CA

Bob Gardner

May 28th 07, 02:54 AM

An instrument approach is, in effect, an act of Congress. Although they do
it through obscure references to Part 97, each approach must be published in
the Code of Federal Regulations and, as you might imagine, it literally
takes an act of Congress to revoke one. Jepp and NACO probably have some
kind of contractual obligation to publish all existing approaches.

Bob Gardner

"Paul Tomblin" > wrote in message
...
> I'm just reading IFR Refresher, and it has a report on an accident that
> happened after a King Air was cleared for an SDF approach at KSME.
> According to the article, at the time the A/FD and NTAP listed the SDF as
> "Out of Service (OTS) - Indefinitely", and had been for four years, but
> the plate was still being published with no mention that the SDF was OTS.
> Why the hell would they continue to publish an approach plate in a
> situation like that?
>
> --
> Paul Tomblin > http://blog.xcski.com/
> Experience is that marvelous thing that enables you recognize a
> mistake when you make it again. -- F. P. Jones

Paul Tomblin

May 28th 07, 03:10 PM

In a previous article, "Bob Gardner" > said:
>An instrument approach is, in effect, an act of Congress. Although they do
>it through obscure references to Part 97, each approach must be published in
>the Code of Federal Regulations and, as you might imagine, it literally
>takes an act of Congress to revoke one. Jepp and NACO probably have some
>kind of contractual obligation to publish all existing approaches.

You'd think that it would be a small change of procedure and a huge
improvement in safety if they would at least overprint the procedure with
"NAVAID OTS" or something.

--
Paul Tomblin > http://blog.xcski.com/
To iterate is human; to recurse, is divine.

[email protected]

May 28th 07, 03:16 PM

A good example of why one should always check the FDC NOTAMS for this
kind of information.

Having an approach chart does not mean the approach is authorized.

Why the controlling facility (who should have been aware) issued the
approach clearance is a reasonable question.

On Sun, 27 May 2007 22:20:13 +0000 (UTC),
(Paul Tomblin) wrote:

>I'm just reading IFR Refresher, and it has a report on an accident that
>happened after a King Air was cleared for an SDF approach at KSME.
>According to the article, at the time the A/FD and NTAP listed the SDF as
>"Out of Service (OTS) - Indefinitely", and had been for four years, but
>the plate was still being published with no mention that the SDF was OTS.
>Why the hell would they continue to publish an approach plate in a
>situation like that?

[email protected]

May 28th 07, 03:22 PM

FDC NOTAMS are the vehicle to communicate changes to approach
procedures. If a pilot is unaware of an FDC NOTAM which applies to
his destination chart, he has not done adequate preflight.

On Sun, 27 May 2007 18:37:40 -0400, Roy Smith > wrote:

>In article >,
> (Paul Tomblin) wrote:
>
>> I'm just reading IFR Refresher, and it has a report on an accident that
>> happened after a King Air was cleared for an SDF approach at KSME.
>> According to the article, at the time the A/FD and NTAP listed the SDF as
>> "Out of Service (OTS) - Indefinitely", and had been for four years, but
>> the plate was still being published with no mention that the SDF was OTS.
>> Why the hell would they continue to publish an approach plate in a
>> situation like that?
>
>There's probably less paperwork and red tape involved to just notam
>something OTS than to get it revoked. "We don't have to make sense, we're
>the FAA".

Paul Tomblin

May 28th 07, 03:27 PM

In a previous article, said:
>A good example of why one should always check the FDC NOTAMS for this
>kind of information.

And the whole process of moving 56 day old NOTAMs off the normal NOTAM
list onto that $115 publication that nobody subscribes to is just
incredibly stupid.

Keep in mind that this navaid had been OTS for 4 years at the time of the
accident.

--
Paul Tomblin > http://blog.xcski.com/
I mean, if went 'round saying I was a perl hacker, just because some
moistened bint lobbed a "Perl for Dummies" at me, they'd put me away!
-- Randy the Random

Bob Gardner

May 28th 07, 05:17 PM

I don't think that either Jepp or NACO has the authority to do modify an
approach plate.

Bob

"Paul Tomblin" > wrote in message
...
> In a previous article, "Bob Gardner" > said:
>>An instrument approach is, in effect, an act of Congress. Although they do
>>it through obscure references to Part 97, each approach must be published
>>in
>>the Code of Federal Regulations and, as you might imagine, it literally
>>takes an act of Congress to revoke one. Jepp and NACO probably have some
>>kind of contractual obligation to publish all existing approaches.
>
> You'd think that it would be a small change of procedure and a huge
> improvement in safety if they would at least overprint the procedure with
> "NAVAID OTS" or something.
>
>
> --
> Paul Tomblin > http://blog.xcski.com/
> To iterate is human; to recurse, is divine.

Jose

May 28th 07, 05:20 PM

> I don't think that either Jepp or NACO has the authority to do modify an approach plate.

They don't have the authority to modify an approach =procedure=.
However, they can chart the procedure any way they want. Overprinting
the words "Probably OTS, check notams", while raising questions that
probably should be raised, would be within their authority.

Jose
--
There are two kinds of people in the world. Those that just want to
know what button to push, and those that want to know what happens when
they push the button.
for Email, make the obvious change in the address.

[email protected]

May 29th 07, 11:55 AM

On Mon, 28 May 2007 14:27:22 +0000 (UTC),
(Paul Tomblin) wrote:

>In a previous article, said:
>>A good example of why one should always check the FDC NOTAMS for this
>>kind of information.
>
>And the whole process of moving 56 day old NOTAMs off the normal NOTAM
>list onto that $115 publication that nobody subscribes to is just
>incredibly stupid.
>
>Keep in mind that this navaid had been OTS for 4 years at the time of the
>accident.

Here are all the kentucky NOTAMS.

Looked them up in two minutes. Free.

I'll say it again. Anyone who is not aware of a NOTAM deauthorizing
an approach has not performed adequate preflight.

ASHLAND

Ashland Rgnl

FDC 6/9264 DWU FI/T ASHLAND REGIONAL, ASHLAND, KY. VOR OR GPS RWY 10,
AMDT 10A...TERMINAL ROUTE: ECB VORTAC TO YRK VORTAC MINIMUM ALTITUDE
3300. HOLD IN LIEU OF PT MINIMUM ALTITUDE 3300. MISSED APPROACH:
CLIMBING LEFT TURN TO 3300 DIRECT YRK VORTAC AND HOLD. MINIMUM SECTOR
ALTITUDE WITHIN 25NM OF YRK VORTAC 3300.

FDC 6/9263 DWU FI/T ASHLAND REGIONAL, ASHLAND, KY. SDF RWY 10, AMDT
6A...MINIMUM SECTOR ALTITUDE WITHIN 25NM OF YRK VORTAC 3300.

CAMPBELLSVILLE

Taylor County

FDC 6/2912 AAS FI/T TAYLOR COUNTY, CAMPBELLSVILLE, KY. VOR/DME OR
GPS-A, AMDT 5A...CIRCLING CAT A/B/C MDA 1480/HAA 559.

COVINGTON

Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky Intl

FDC 7/5621 CVG FI/T CINCINNATI/NORTHERN KENTUCKY INTL, COVINGTON, KY.
ILS OR LOC RWY 36L, ORIG-A...JIMUR FIX MINIMUMS: DME REQUIRED.

FDC 7/1437 CVG FI/P CINCINNATI/NORTHERN KENTUCKY INTL, COVINGTON, KY.
ILS OR LOC RWY 27 AMDT 16...DELETE ALL REFERENCE TO MM. THIS IS ILS OR
LOC RWY 27, AMDT 16A.

FDC 6/9638 CVG FI/T CINCINNATI/NORTHERN KENTUCKY INTL, COVINGTON, KY.
RNAV (GPS) RWY 36C, ORIG-A...LNAV/VNAV DA 1345/HAT 494 ALL CATS, VIS 1
1/4. CIRCLING VIS CAT ABC 1 3/4.

FDC 5/1862 CVG FI/T CINCINNATI/NORTHERN KENTUCKY INTERNATIONAL,
COVINGTON, KY. RNAV (GPS) RWY 9, ORIG....PROCEDURE NA.

FDC 5/0055 CVG FI/T CINCINNATI/NORTHERN KENTUCKY INTL, COVINGTON, KY.
RNAV (GPS) RWY 18L, ORIG. RNAV (GPS) RWY 18C, ORIG. TERMINAL ROUTE
CHARZ TO CEDOM NA.

FORT CAMPBELL/HOPKINSVILLE

Campbell AAF (Fort Campbell)

FDC 4/3865 HOP FI/T CAMPBELL AAF, FORT CAMPBELL, KY. RADAR-2,
ORIG...PAR-36 DA 808/HAT 250 ALL CATS ASR-5 VIS CATS D, E 1 1/4.
CEIL-VIS (400-1 1/4) ASR-23 CEIL-VIS CAT C/D/E (500-1 1/4) FIELD ELEV
571.

FRANKFORT

Capital City

FDC 6/2301 FFT FI/T CAPITAL CITY, FRANKFORT, KY. LOC RWY 24 AMDT
1...CIRCLING MINIMUMS: MDA 1260/HAA 454 CAT A.

HOPKINSVILLE

Hopkinsville-Christian County

FDC 6/2535 HVC FI/T HOPKINSVILLE-CHRISTIAN COUNTY, HOPKINSVILLE, KY.
LOC RWY 26 AMDT 3...NDB OR GPS RWY 26 AMDT 6...RADAR REQUIRED.

LEXINGTON

Blue Grass

FDC 6/8332 LEX FI/T LEXINGTON/BLUEGRASS, LEXINGTON, KY. RNAV (GPS) RWY
8, ORIG...RNAV (GPS) RWY 26, ORIG...LNAV MDA NA. CIRCLING TO RWY 8/26
NA.

FDC 6/1735 LEX FI/T BLUE GRASS, LEXINGTON, KY. ILS OR LOC RWY 4, AMDT
17...RNAV (GPS) RWY 4, AMDT 1...RNAV (GPS) RWY 22, AMDT 1...ILS RWY
22, AMDT 19...VOR A, AMDT 9...CIRCLING TO RWY 8/26 NA.

LOUISVILLE

Louisville Intl-Standiford Field

FDC 6/0291 SDF FI/T LOUISVILLE INTL-STANDIFORD FLD, LOUISVILLE, KY.
ILS RWY 17L, AMDT 2...DME MINIMUMS: S-LOC-17L MDA 960/HAT460 ALL CATS.
VIS CAT C RVR 4000. VIS CAT D RVR 5000. TEMPORARY CRANE 656 MSL 5365
FEET NNW OF RWY 17L THLD AND 1302 LEFT OF CENTERLINE.

FDC 6/0290 SDF FI/T LOUISVILLE INTL-STANDIFORD FLD, LOUISVILLE, KY.
TAKE-OFF MINIMUMS AND (OBSTACLE) DEPARTURE PROCEDURES...TAKE-OFF RWY
35R: 300-2 1/2 OR STANDARD WITH A MINIMUM CLIMB OF 390 FPM TO 900.
TEMPORARY CRANE 656 MSL 5365 FEET NNW OF RWY 17L THLD AND 1302 FEET
LEFT OF CENTERLINE. NOTE: RWY 35R, TEMPROARY CRANE 5365 FEET FROM
DEPARTURE END OF RUNWAY. 1302 FEET LEFT OF CENTERLINE 170 FEET AGL/656
FEET MSL.

MOUNT STERLING

Mount Sterling-Montgomery County

FDC 6/6719 IOB FI/T MOUNT STERLING-MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MOUNT STERLING,
KY. NDB OR GPS RWY 3, AMDT 1C...MINIMUM SAFE ALTITUDE WITHIN 25 NM
3600.

PIKEVILLE

Pike County-Hatcher Field

FDC 5/9844 PBX FI/T PIKE-COUNTY-HATHCER FILED, PIKEVILLE, KY. ILS RWY
27, ORIG. RNAV (GPS) RWY 9, ORIG. RNAV (GPS) RWY 27, ORIG. STRAIGHT-IN
MINIMA NA, ONLY CIRCLING MINIMA AUTHORIZED.

Dave Butler

May 29th 07, 06:51 PM

wrote:

> Here are all the kentucky NOTAMS.
>
> Looked them up in two minutes. Free.
>
> I'll say it again. Anyone who is not aware of a NOTAM deauthorizing
> an approach has not performed adequate preflight.

Does your list include the NOTAMS that are more than 56(?) days old but
are still in force, or is this just a DUAT dump?

DB

[email protected]

May 30th 07, 10:39 AM

They are out of the online version of the Notices to Airmaen
Publication (faa.gov/ntap)

On Tue, 29 May 2007 13:51:59 -0400, Dave Butler > wrote:

wrote:
>
>> Here are all the kentucky NOTAMS.
>>
>> Looked them up in two minutes. Free.
>>
>> I'll say it again. Anyone who is not aware of a NOTAM deauthorizing
>> an approach has not performed adequate preflight.
>
>Does your list include the NOTAMS that are more than 56(?) days old but
>are still in force, or is this just a DUAT dump?
>
>DB

Dave Butler

May 30th 07, 01:59 PM

wrote:
> They are out of the online version of the Notices to Airmaen
> Publication (faa.gov/ntap)

Are you saying that your two minute lookup is adequate, then? Do the
NOTAMs you found include the NOTAM deauthorizing the SDF approach at
KSME that the original poster referred to? What's your point?

> On Tue, 29 May 2007 13:51:59 -0400, Dave Butler > wrote:
>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Here are all the kentucky NOTAMS.
>>>
>>> Looked them up in two minutes. Free.
>>>
>>> I'll say it again. Anyone who is not aware of a NOTAM deauthorizing
>>> an approach has not performed adequate preflight.
>> Does your list include the NOTAMS that are more than 56(?) days old but
>> are still in force, or is this just a DUAT dump?
>>
>> DB

Paul Tomblin

May 30th 07, 02:34 PM

In a previous article, Dave Butler > said:
wrote:
>> They are out of the online version of the Notices to Airmaen
>> Publication (faa.gov/ntap)
>
>Are you saying that your two minute lookup is adequate, then? Do the
>NOTAMs you found include the NOTAM deauthorizing the SDF approach at
>KSME that the original poster referred to? What's your point?

The SDF was listed as OTS for four years before the accident (in 2000),
then for another year or so after the accident, and then it was
decomissioned and replaced by another approach.

The problem is that it's very hard to look up NOTAMs while in the air,
like when conditions force you to divert to an airport you hadn't planned
on. Or you might not remember which approaches are OTS while you're
bumping along in the dark. In my view, it would be a really great
improvement in safety if they either stopped publishing the plates while
the navaids were OTS, or overprinted them with "OTS DO NOT USE" or
something. (It would also be an improvement in safety if controllers
didn't clear you for OTS approaches, but they're human too and might miss
once in a while - the whole point of IFR flying is checks and cross
checks.)

--
Paul Tomblin > http://blog.xcski.com/
Alright. Talk. Don't make me reach over there and pull your still-pumping
heart out from the gaping hole you used to call a chest whilst breaking
your sternum and playing air guitar with your ribcage. -- Tai

Dave Butler

May 30th 07, 03:13 PM

Paul Tomblin wrote:
> In a previous article, Dave Butler > said:
>> wrote:
>>> They are out of the online version of the Notices to Airmaen
>>> Publication (faa.gov/ntap)
>> Are you saying that your two minute lookup is adequate, then? Do the
>> NOTAMs you found include the NOTAM deauthorizing the SDF approach at
>> KSME that the original poster referred to? What's your point?
>
> The SDF was listed as OTS for four years before the accident (in 2000),
> then for another year or so after the accident, and then it was
> decomissioned and replaced by another approach.

OK, so there's probably no place to find that NOTAM today, and the NOTAM
is no longer in effect.

> The problem is that it's very hard to look up NOTAMs while in the air,

It' even hard to look up NOTAMs while on the ground. Disregarding the
problem of sorting out the important ones from the unlighted tower
chaff, NOTAMs older than the current edition of the A/FD are transferred
to the A/FD and no longer published as NOTAMs.

> like when conditions force you to divert to an airport you hadn't planned
> on. Or you might not remember which approaches are OTS while you're
> bumping along in the dark. In my view, it would be a really great
> improvement in safety if they either stopped publishing the plates while
> the navaids were OTS, or overprinted them with "OTS DO NOT USE" or
> something. (It would also be an improvement in safety if controllers
> didn't clear you for OTS approaches, but they're human too and might miss
> once in a while - the whole point of IFR flying is checks and cross
> checks.)

Agreed.

[email protected]

May 30th 07, 05:14 PM

I have no idea of the current status of the SDF approach in question.
It may be in service, or it may be decommissioned.

If I wanted current status, however, I would check a) the current
approach chart, along with b) DUATS FDC NOTAMS, and c) the NOTAM
piublication.

All this information is available on the internet at no cost, easily
looked up.

My point is the same point I made twice now. With all available
information available on the internet at no cost, anyone who is not
aware of a deauthorized approach at his destination has not done
adequate preflight.

On Wed, 30 May 2007 08:59:38 -0400, Dave Butler > wrote:

wrote:
>> They are out of the online version of the Notices to Airmaen
>> Publication (faa.gov/ntap)
>
>Are you saying that your two minute lookup is adequate, then? Do the
>NOTAMs you found include the NOTAM deauthorizing the SDF approach at
>KSME that the original poster referred to? What's your point?
>
>> On Tue, 29 May 2007 13:51:59 -0400, Dave Butler > wrote:
>>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Here are all the kentucky NOTAMS.
>>>>
>>>> Looked them up in two minutes. Free.
>>>>
>>>> I'll say it again. Anyone who is not aware of a NOTAM deauthorizing
>>>> an approach has not performed adequate preflight.
>>> Does your list include the NOTAMS that are more than 56(?) days old but
>>> are still in force, or is this just a DUAT dump?
>>>
>>> DB

[email protected]

May 30th 07, 05:31 PM

When you think about it a bit, there is no real difference between an
approach deauthorized last week and one deauthorized last year or two
years ago.. The PIC still has to confirm the availability of the
approach by examining all current and published FDC NOTAMS. When a
NOTAM says "Approach NA", who cares how old the information is? The
fact that it is NA now is current information.

I think if there is anything that is subject to criticism here it is
that the pilot was apparently cleared for a deauthorized approach by
ATC. It seems to me that they should have known of its status.

On Wed, 30 May 2007 13:34:45 +0000 (UTC),
(Paul Tomblin) wrote:

>In a previous article, Dave Butler > said:
wrote:
>>> They are out of the online version of the Notices to Airmaen
>>> Publication (faa.gov/ntap)
>>
>>Are you saying that your two minute lookup is adequate, then? Do the
>>NOTAMs you found include the NOTAM deauthorizing the SDF approach at
>>KSME that the original poster referred to? What's your point?
>
>The SDF was listed as OTS for four years before the accident (in 2000),
>then for another year or so after the accident, and then it was
>decomissioned and replaced by another approach.
>
>The problem is that it's very hard to look up NOTAMs while in the air,
>like when conditions force you to divert to an airport you hadn't planned
>on. Or you might not remember which approaches are OTS while you're
>bumping along in the dark. In my view, it would be a really great
>improvement in safety if they either stopped publishing the plates while
>the navaids were OTS, or overprinted them with "OTS DO NOT USE" or
>something. (It would also be an improvement in safety if controllers
>didn't clear you for OTS approaches, but they're human too and might miss
>once in a while - the whole point of IFR flying is checks and cross
>checks.)

KP[_1_]

May 30th 07, 11:46 PM

> wrote in message
...
>> I think if there is anything that is subject to criticism here it is
> that the pilot was apparently cleared for a deauthorized approach by
> ATC. It seems to me that they should have known of its status.

It's not "apparent" the aircraft was "cleared for a deauthorized approach by
ATC" at all.

If the controller used the phraseology "CLEARED APPROACH" it was up to the
pilot to select the instrument approach.

That doesn't include an approach that was known (or should have been known
through a proper pre-flight) to be OTS.

[email protected]

May 31st 07, 10:55 AM

A good point.

On Wed, 30 May 2007 15:46:21 -0700, "KP" <nospam@please> wrote:

> wrote in message
...
>>> I think if there is anything that is subject to criticism here it is
>> that the pilot was apparently cleared for a deauthorized approach by
>> ATC. It seems to me that they should have known of its status.
>
>It's not "apparent" the aircraft was "cleared for a deauthorized approach by
>ATC" at all.
>
>If the controller used the phraseology "CLEARED APPROACH" it was up to the
>pilot to select the instrument approach.
>
>That doesn't include an approach that was known (or should have been known
>through a proper pre-flight) to be OTS.
>

Steven P. McNicoll

May 31st 07, 06:49 PM

"KP" <nospam@please> wrote in message
. ..
>
> It's not "apparent" the aircraft was "cleared for a deauthorized approach
> by ATC" at all.
>
> If the controller used the phraseology "CLEARED APPROACH" it was up to the
> pilot to select the instrument approach.
>
> That doesn't include an approach that was known (or should have been known
> through a proper pre-flight) to be OTS.

It's apparent the controller did not use the phraseology "CLEARED APPROACH".
From the NTSB report:

"At 1145:15, the controller stated, "november seven four charlie charlie,
cleared for the s d f approach to uh somerset, maintain four thousand until
your established on the approach." The pilot replied, "ok maintain four till
established (unintelligible), thank you four charlie charlie." The
controller then repeated the approach clearance and this time specified the
SDF RWY 4 approach, and the pilot again repeated that he was to maintain
4,000 feet until established and was cleared for the SDF RWY 4 approach at
Somerset."

http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?id=NYC00FA067&rpt=fa

Everett M. Greene[_2_]

May 31st 07, 07:16 PM

"KP" <nospam@please> writes:
> > wrote
> > I think if there is anything that is subject to criticism here it is
> > that the pilot was apparently cleared for a deauthorized approach by
> > ATC. It seems to me that they should have known of its status.
>
> It's not "apparent" the aircraft was "cleared for a deauthorized approach by
> ATC" at all.
>
> If the controller used the phraseology "CLEARED APPROACH" it was up to the
> pilot to select the instrument approach.
>
> That doesn't include an approach that was known (or should have been known
> through a proper pre-flight) to be OTS.

Doesn't the standard clearance phraseology include the approach
for which one is cleared?

Steven P. McNicoll

May 31st 07, 08:06 PM

"Everett M. Greene" > wrote in message
...
>
> Doesn't the standard clearance phraseology include the approach
> for which one is cleared?
>

CLEARED APPROACH- ATC authorization for an aircraft to execute any standard
or special instrument approach procedure for that airport. Normally, an
aircraft will be cleared for a specific instrument approach procedure.

[email protected]

May 31st 07, 10:17 PM

you can no doubt answer a question I have long wondered about.

What information does the controller have at his immediate disposal
that an approach is not authorized?

Are they just supposed to have an awareness, or is there some listing
at their radar stations that show NA approaches?

(I was once nipped by poor preflight planning when I was informed by
the approach controller that an approach I wanted was FDC NOTAM'd
"not authorized at night". Much scrambling. Never forgot to check
FDC NOTAMS again after that)

On Thu, 31 May 2007 17:49:03 GMT, "Steven P. McNicoll"
> wrote:

>
>"KP" <nospam@please> wrote in message
. ..
>>
>> It's not "apparent" the aircraft was "cleared for a deauthorized approach
>> by ATC" at all.
>>
>> If the controller used the phraseology "CLEARED APPROACH" it was up to the
>> pilot to select the instrument approach.
>>
>> That doesn't include an approach that was known (or should have been known
>> through a proper pre-flight) to be OTS.
>
>It's apparent the controller did not use the phraseology "CLEARED APPROACH".
>From the NTSB report:
>
>"At 1145:15, the controller stated, "november seven four charlie charlie,
>cleared for the s d f approach to uh somerset, maintain four thousand until
>your established on the approach." The pilot replied, "ok maintain four till
>established (unintelligible), thank you four charlie charlie." The
>controller then repeated the approach clearance and this time specified the
>SDF RWY 4 approach, and the pilot again repeated that he was to maintain
>4,000 feet until established and was cleared for the SDF RWY 4 approach at
>Somerset."
>
>
>http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?id=NYC00FA067&rpt=fa
>

Steven P. McNicoll

June 1st 07, 09:07 PM

> wrote in message
...
>
> you can no doubt answer a question I have long wondered about.
>
> What information does the controller have at his immediate disposal
> that an approach is not authorized?
>
> Are they just supposed to have an awareness, or is there some listing
> at their radar stations that show NA approaches?
>

I don't believe there is no one-size-fits-all procedure. ARTCC air traffic
managers are charged with coordinating with other air traffic facilities in
their area to ensure that adequate procedures are established for NOTAM
distribution. That gets the NOTAM to the terminal facility, it's up to that
facility's management to ensure the controllers are aware of pertinent
NOTAMs.

Michael[_1_]

June 1st 07, 11:05 PM

On May 30, 11:31 am, wrote:
> When you think about it a bit, there is no real difference between an
> approach deauthorized last week and one deauthorized last year or two
> years ago..

Of course if you think about it some more, you will realize you are
wrong.

First difference - an approach deauthorized last week will be under a
current NOTAM, and you will get it as part of a standard briefing.
Not so for an approach deauthorized last year.

Second difference - approaches are deauthorized fairly infrequently,
but can stay deauthorized a long time (sometimes years).

Therefore, a pilot who does a normal preflight (including a preflight
FSS briefing) will most likely know about an approach deauthorized
last week, but not one that was deauthorized last year.

If a pilot performs a PERFECT preflight preparation, including a
review of all published NOTAM's for every possible place he may need
to land, there is no problem. This is not going to happen every
flight. Even with the best of intentions, things get missed.
Controllers have procedures to prevent them from issuing OTS
approaches, but that happens too - the way it did here.

Proper safety systems are layered, like swiss cheese - every layer has
holes in it (eliminating every possible hole is impractical) but when
you overlay them the likelihood of holes lining up is very small.
Intelligent analysis of accidents includes a review of the factors
leading up to it, and a consideration of what sorts of simple, cheap,
non-intrusive changes could have made a big difference. In this case,
the simple, cheap, and non-intrusive change is to print a notice on
the plate - approach OTS as of print date. It costs next to nothing,
does not affect usability of the plate should the approach be returned
to service prior to the next publication, and could easily prevent an
accident (most probably would have in this case). I know of some
close calls that resulted because this is not done - but in those
situations, fortunately other layers in the safety system worked and
nothing bad happened. I always knew something like this would happen
eventually (we have discussed this topic on this newsgroup before) and
now it has.

Unintelligent analysis consists of blaming the PIC for not meeting
some arbitrary standard of perfect preflight preparation, and
insisting no system changes are needed because if the PIC acted
perfectly, there would have been no accident. People are not perfect,
and any safety system that relies primarily on people executing boring
tasks perfectly every time is not very intelligently designed.

We have all sorts of rules and processes in place to prevent accidents
- and most are expensive and restrict the pilot's options. This
proposed process (marking the plate) is extremely cheap and simple,
and restricts nothing. Not adopting it is just dumb. Will it be
executed perfectly every time? No. Eventually a plate for a
decomissioned approach will get published without the notice. It's a
given. But it makes this sort of accident dramatically less likely.
Given that it's a rare event anyway, that's probably all that is
necessary.

Further, this peculiarity of the approach plate publishing system is
not known to the majorty of IFR rated pilots (at least in my
experience - but hey, I'm just and ATP and CFII, what do I know), is
quite counter-intuitive, and is not covered in the standard IFR prep
materials. It would probably cost more to cover it in the IFR prep
materials than to fix it outright.

Michael

[email protected]

June 2nd 07, 11:04 AM

On Fri, 01 Jun 2007 15:05:10 -0700, Michael
> wrote:

>On May 30, 11:31 am, wrote:
>> When you think about it a bit, there is no real difference between an
>> approach deauthorized last week and one deauthorized last year or two
>> years ago..
>
>Of course if you think about it some more, you will realize you are
>wrong.
>
Actually, thge more I think about it the more I am convinced I am
right.

A proper preflight will consist of a review of (a) current charts, (b)
DUATS (or briefing) recent NOTAMS and (c) a review of the NOTAM
publication for published NOTAMS.

This will reveal ALL NOTAMS, regardless of their age, and therefore
makes no difference whether the NOTAM is 6 days or 6 years old. If
it's in effect, it is current, regardless of its age. If you want a
chart annotated for a NOTAM, why just go ahead and annotate it. Why
depend on the FAA to perform this simple task?

It's a simple three step system thayt anyone (excluding CFII's
perhaps) can understand and follow.

>First difference - an approach deauthorized last week will be under a
>current NOTAM, and you will get it as part of a standard briefing.
>Not so for an approach deauthorized last year.
>
>Second difference - approaches are deauthorized fairly infrequently,
>but can stay deauthorized a long time (sometimes years).
>
>Therefore, a pilot who does a normal preflight (including a preflight
>FSS briefing) will most likely know about an approach deauthorized
>last week, but not one that was deauthorized last year.
>
>If a pilot performs a PERFECT preflight preparation, including a
>review of all published NOTAM's for every possible place he may need
>to land, there is no problem. This is not going to happen every
>flight. Even with the best of intentions, things get missed.
>Controllers have procedures to prevent them from issuing OTS
>approaches, but that happens too - the way it did here.
>
>Proper safety systems are layered, like swiss cheese - every layer has
>holes in it (eliminating every possible hole is impractical) but when
>you overlay them the likelihood of holes lining up is very small.
>Intelligent analysis of accidents includes a review of the factors
>leading up to it, and a consideration of what sorts of simple, cheap,
>non-intrusive changes could have made a big difference. In this case,
>the simple, cheap, and non-intrusive change is to print a notice on
>the plate - approach OTS as of print date. It costs next to nothing,
>does not affect usability of the plate should the approach be returned
>to service prior to the next publication, and could easily prevent an
>accident (most probably would have in this case). I know of some
>close calls that resulted because this is not done - but in those
>situations, fortunately other layers in the safety system worked and
>nothing bad happened. I always knew something like this would happen
>eventually (we have discussed this topic on this newsgroup before) and
>now it has.
>
>Unintelligent analysis consists of blaming the PIC for not meeting
>some arbitrary standard of perfect preflight preparation, and
>insisting no system changes are needed because if the PIC acted
>perfectly, there would have been no accident. People are not perfect,
>and any safety system that relies primarily on people executing boring
>tasks perfectly every time is not very intelligently designed.
>
>We have all sorts of rules and processes in place to prevent accidents
>- and most are expensive and restrict the pilot's options. This
>proposed process (marking the plate) is extremely cheap and simple,
>and restricts nothing. Not adopting it is just dumb. Will it be
>executed perfectly every time? No. Eventually a plate for a
>decomissioned approach will get published without the notice. It's a
>given. But it makes this sort of accident dramatically less likely.
>Given that it's a rare event anyway, that's probably all that is
>necessary.
>
>Further, this peculiarity of the approach plate publishing system is
>not known to the majorty of IFR rated pilots (at least in my
>experience - but hey, I'm just and ATP and CFII, what do I know)
> is
>quite counter-intuitive, and is not covered in the standard IFR prep
>materials. It would probably cost more to cover it in the IFR prep
>materials than to fix it outright.
>
>Michael

Dave Butler

June 2nd 07, 01:58 PM

wrote:

> Actually, thge more I think about it the more I am convinced I am
> right.
>
> A proper preflight will consist of a review of (a) current charts, (b)
> DUATS (or briefing) recent NOTAMS and (c) a review of the NOTAM
> publication for published NOTAMS.

Good, you're learning. So now you can admit you erred when you implied
all that was required was a two-minute check:

--> Here are all the kentucky NOTAMS.
-->
--> Looked them up in two minutes. Free.
-->
--> I'll say it again. Anyone who is not aware of a NOTAM deauthorizing
--> an approach has not performed adequate preflight.

[email protected]

June 2nd 07, 03:05 PM

Actually, counting the time it took to key in the URL, the published
NOTAM lookup took less than 30 seconds.

Leaves about 1.5 minutes to check DUATs, to get under the 2-minute
mark for all NOTAMS.

On Sat, 02 Jun 2007 08:58:11 -0400, Dave Butler > wrote:

wrote:
>
>> Actually, thge more I think about it the more I am convinced I am
>> right.
>>
>> A proper preflight will consist of a review of (a) current charts, (b)
>> DUATS (or briefing) recent NOTAMS and (c) a review of the NOTAM
>> publication for published NOTAMS.
>
>Good, you're learning. So now you can admit you erred when you implied
>all that was required was a two-minute check:
>
> --> Here are all the kentucky NOTAMS.
> -->
> --> Looked them up in two minutes. Free.
> -->
> --> I'll say it again. Anyone who is not aware of a NOTAM deauthorizing
> --> an approach has not performed adequate preflight.

Michael[_1_]

June 4th 07, 02:30 PM

On Jun 2, 5:04 am, wrote:
> Actually, thge more I think about it the more I am convinced I am
> right.

Of course you're convinced. Now answer me this question - do you
always know where you are going to land (or can you always narrow it
down to a short list, just a few airports) before you ever start the
engines? If you say yes, you're not getting much capability out of
the airplane.

In the real world of flying GA IFR, things don't work that way.
Headwinds and ATC delays force landings short of the intended
destination (or fuel stop). Weather systems that turn out worse than
forecasts or move differentl than forecast (thunderstorms, ice,
widespread below-mins conditions) cause diversions around weather, and
thus landings dozens (or even hundreds) of miles off the intended
course. Landing sites in such cases are chosen by consulting printed
publications in the cockpit to select appropriate facilities and
consultation with FSS (by radio) to confirm weather. Time is at a
premium because FSS frequencies in such weather tend to be tied up -
everyone is doing this. Even if the first diversion landing is fine,
planning for the next leg is done wherever you landed - not
necessarily a place with internet access. So what are you suggesting
now - what everyone who actually uses the airplane for transportation
should have a printed copy of the published NOTAM's in the cockpit to
deal with this issue?

Michael

[email protected]

June 4th 07, 07:17 PM

First of all, no strawmen, please.

The statement I made (more than once) was that anyone who was unaware
of a deauthorized approach at his destination, given the availability
of preflight FDC NOTAM information, was guily of inadequate preflight
preparation. I stand by that statement, notwithstanding any feeble
and logically fallacious attempts to refute it.

Apparently, you favor one single source of all approach information
that is updated in real time in the cockpit.

Undoubtedly this will become a reality some day. In the meantime, I
would like to hear your ideas for implementing and maintaining such a
system with readily available and affordable resources and
capabilitues.

On Mon, 04 Jun 2007 06:30:26 -0700, Michael
> wrote:

>On Jun 2, 5:04 am, wrote:
>> Actually, thge more I think about it the more I am convinced I am
>> right.
>
>Of course you're convinced. Now answer me this question - do you
>always know where you are going to land (or can you always narrow it
>down to a short list, just a few airports) before you ever start the
>engines? If you say yes, you're not getting much capability out of
>the airplane.
>
>In the real world of flying GA IFR, things don't work that way.
>Headwinds and ATC delays force landings short of the intended
>destination (or fuel stop). Weather systems that turn out worse than
>forecasts or move differentl than forecast (thunderstorms, ice,
>widespread below-mins conditions) cause diversions around weather, and
>thus landings dozens (or even hundreds) of miles off the intended
>course. Landing sites in such cases are chosen by consulting printed
>publications in the cockpit to select appropriate facilities and
>consultation with FSS (by radio) to confirm weather. Time is at a
>premium because FSS frequencies in such weather tend to be tied up -
>everyone is doing this. Even if the first diversion landing is fine,
>planning for the next leg is done wherever you landed - not
>necessarily a place with internet access. So what are you suggesting
>now - what everyone who actually uses the airplane for transportation
>should have a printed copy of the published NOTAM's in the cockpit to
>deal with this issue?
>
>Michael

Michael[_1_]

June 4th 07, 11:09 PM

On Jun 4, 1:17 pm, wrote:
> First of all, no strawmen, please.

Not a strawman at all. The situation I describe is real.

> The statement I made (more than once) was that anyone who was unaware
> of a deauthorized approach at his destination, given the availability
> of preflight FDC NOTAM information, was guily of inadequate preflight
> preparation. I stand by that statement, notwithstanding any feeble
> and logically fallacious attempts to refute it.

Nonsense again. Unless you are making your preflight preparation at a
place where internet access is available, published NOTAM's are not
generally accessible. You won't find the publication at the average
FBO - in fact, I think I only ever saw it on sale ONCE. If the
internet can be assumed to be available, then why do we bother to have
telephone briefings available at all? Think of the money we could
save by eliminating those.

Unfortunately, exactly the weather that makes this sort of accident
most likely is the weather that is most likely to put you in that
position on any flight that can't easily be completed within the IFR
range of your airplane. Of course none of this is an issue for
recently deauthorized approaches, because they are covered by current
NOTAM's.

> Apparently, you favor one single source of all approach information
> that is updated in real time in the cockpit.

That would be ideal, but it's not happening at a price most pilots can
afford. What I really favor is approach information that is as
logical and intuitive as practical. Every time you move away from
that, you make an accident more likely. The accident under discussion
is one example of this.

The simple change I advocate costs essentially nothing, and makes an
accident less likely for those of us who routinely fly beyond easy IFR
range of the airplane in instrument conditions.

Michael

[email protected]

June 5th 07, 01:08 AM

On Mon, 04 Jun 2007 15:09:44 -0700, Michael
> wrote:

>On Jun 4, 1:17 pm, wrote:
>> First of all, no strawmen, please.
>
>Not a strawman at all. The situation I describe is real.
>
>> The statement I made (more than once) was that anyone who was unaware
>> of a deauthorized approach at his destination, given the availability
>> of preflight FDC NOTAM information, was guily of inadequate preflight
>> preparation. I stand by that statement, notwithstanding any feeble
>> and logically fallacious attempts to refute it.
>
>Nonsense again. Unless you are making your preflight preparation at a
>place where internet access is available, published NOTAM's are not
>generally accessible.

Published NOTAMS are as accessible as the nearest telephone.

From the book:

"Current NOTAMs are available from Flight Service Stations at
1-800-WX-BRIEF. Notices, restrictions, and advisories may change at
any time and without notice. Do not attempt any operation in the
National Airspace System without first obtaining and understanding a
thorough pre-flight briefing. "

Just ask a briefer to check the published NOTAMS, and your problem is
solved...

>You won't find the publication at the average
>FBO - in fact, I think I only ever saw it on sale ONCE. If the
>internet can be assumed to be available, then why do we bother to have
>telephone briefings available at all? Think of the money we could
>save by eliminating those.

>
>Unfortunately, exactly the weather that makes this sort of accident
>most likely is the weather that is most likely to put you in that
>position on any flight that can't easily be completed within the IFR
>range of your airplane. Of course none of this is an issue for
>recently deauthorized approaches, because they are covered by current
>NOTAM's.
>
>> Apparently, you favor one single source of all approach information
>> that is updated in real time in the cockpit.
>
>That would be ideal, but it's not happening at a price most pilots can
>afford. What I really favor is approach information that is as
>logical and intuitive as practical. Every time you move away from
>that, you make an accident more likely. The accident under discussion
>is one example of this.
>

>The simple change I advocate costs essentially nothing, and makes an
>accident less likely for those of us who routinely fly beyond easy IFR
>range of the airplane in instrument conditions.
>

>Michael

Frank Ch. Eigler

June 5th 07, 07:30 PM

Michael wrote:

> [...] Unless you are making your preflight preparation at a place
> where internet access is available, published NOTAM's are not
> generally accessible. You won't find the publication at the average
> FBO - in fact, I think I only ever saw it on sale ONCE. [...]

OK, but if I read correctly the NTSB writeup of this particular
accident (2000-01-18, NYC00FA067) then the A/FD did mention that the
approach was out of service. (There also wasn't an ident signal on
the SDF frequency, the radar track indicates that the pilot failed to
intercept *any* of the approaches.)

- FChE

[email protected]

June 16th 07, 02:58 PM

What part of your butt did you pull that BS out of?

Congress has nothing to do with the federal register.

Bob Gardner wrote:

> An instrument approach is, in effect, an act of Congress. Although they
> do it through obscure references to Part 97, each approach must be
> published in the Code of Federal Regulations and, as you might imagine,
> it literally takes an act of Congress to revoke one. Jepp and NACO
> probably have some kind of contractual obligation to publish all
> existing approaches.
>
> Bob Gardner
>
> "Paul Tomblin" > wrote in message
> ...
>
>> I'm just reading IFR Refresher, and it has a report on an accident that
>> happened after a King Air was cleared for an SDF approach at KSME.
>> According to the article, at the time the A/FD and NTAP listed the SDF as
>> "Out of Service (OTS) - Indefinitely", and had been for four years, but
>> the plate was still being published with no mention that the SDF was OTS.
>> Why the hell would they continue to publish an approach plate in a
>> situation like that?
>>
>> --
>> Paul Tomblin > http://blog.xcski.com/
>> Experience is that marvelous thing that enables you recognize a
>> mistake when you make it again. -- F. P. Jones
>
>

[email protected]

June 17th 07, 02:38 PM

wrote:

What part of your butt did you pull that BS out of?

Congress has nothing to do with the federal register.

> Bob Gardner wrote:
>
>> An instrument approach is, in effect, an act of Congress. Although
>> they do it through obscure references to Part 97, each approach must
>> be published in the Code of Federal Regulations and, as you might
>> imagine, it literally takes an act of Congress to revoke one. Jepp and
>> NACO probably have some kind of contractual obligation to publish all
>> existing approaches.
>>
>> Bob Gardner
>>
>> "Paul Tomblin" > wrote in message
>> ...
>>
>>> I'm just reading IFR Refresher, and it has a report on an accident that
>>> happened after a King Air was cleared for an SDF approach at KSME.
>>> According to the article, at the time the A/FD and NTAP listed the
>>> SDF as
>>> "Out of Service (OTS) - Indefinitely", and had been for four years, but
>>> the plate was still being published with no mention that the SDF was
>>> OTS.
>>> Why the hell would they continue to publish an approach plate in a
>>> situation like that?
>>>
>>> --
>>> Paul Tomblin > http://blog.xcski.com/
>>> Experience is that marvelous thing that enables you recognize a
>>> mistake when you make it again. -- F. P. Jones
>>
>>
>>

C J Campbell[_1_]

June 17th 07, 04:41 PM

On 2007-05-27 15:20:13 -0700, (Paul Tomblin) said:

> I'm just reading IFR Refresher, and it has a report on an accident that
> happened after a King Air was cleared for an SDF approach at KSME.
> According to the article, at the time the A/FD and NTAP listed the SDF as
> "Out of Service (OTS) - Indefinitely", and had been for four years, but
> the plate was still being published with no mention that the SDF was OTS.
> Why the hell would they continue to publish an approach plate in a
> situation like that?

The FAA did not remove the approach from the database because Pulaski
County, which controls the field, did not ask them to. FAA requires
that the controlling agency ask them to remove an IP. Pulaski County
did not want to remove the procedure because if they ever wanted to
reactivate the approach they would have had to go through the entire
approval and certification process of a new approach if the old one was
removed. Another example of this is the VOR at McChord AFB which was
OTS for several years.

I suppose one could question whether it is a good idea to make
recertification so onerous that it becomes a safety hazard because of
OTS navaids and procedures still being in the database for years, but
that is the current state of affairs.

From the accident report:

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION  The investigation revealed that Somerset
Airport and its instrument approaches were under the control of Pulaski
County, Commonwealth of Kentucky. FAA procedures required that any
request for removal of the instrument approach be initiated by the
controlling agency for the instrument approach. Once the instrument
approach was removed from the system, it could not be reinstated
without going through the same procedure required for the certification
of a new approach. In case the instrument approach did not pass a
flight check, and it was not desired to permanently remove it, a NOTAM
would be issued indicating it was out of service. Once the NOTAM had
been in effect through one complete cycle (56 days), it was removed
from the list of active NOTAMS, and the data transferred to the airport
facility directory, also on a 56-day cycle. Even though the SDF RWY 4
approach was carried as out of service in the airport facility
directory, no warning or advisory was printed on the approach procedure
to indicate that status, nor was it required. If the approach had been
returned to service, a NOTAM would have been issued, and the NOTAM
would have been carried until the airport facility directory had been
changed.   A flight check was conducted of the instrument approaches at
Somerset. The flight check crew reported that no signal was received
when they tuned their navigation radios to the listed frequency for the
SDF RWY 4 approach. However, signals were received for the other
approaches, and they passed the flight check.  According to the
Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM): Section 1-1-12:  "During periods
of routine or emergency maintenance, coded identification (or code and
voice, where applicable) is removed from certain FAA
NAVAID's."  "Removal of identification serves as a warning to pilots
that the facility is officially off the air for tune-up or repair and
may be unreliable even though intermittent or constant signals are
received." 
--
Waddling Eagle
World Famous Flight Instructor

C J Campbell[_1_]

June 17th 07, 08:55 PM

On 2007-05-30 15:46:21 -0700, "KP" <nospam@please> said:

> > wrote in message
> ...
>>> I think if there is anything that is subject to criticism here it is
>> that the pilot was apparently cleared for a deauthorized approach by
>> ATC. It seems to me that they should have known of its status.
>
> It's not "apparent" the aircraft was "cleared for a deauthorized approach by
> ATC" at all.
>
> If the controller used the phraseology "CLEARED APPROACH" it was up to the
> pilot to select the instrument approach.
>
> That doesn't include an approach that was known (or should have been known
> through a proper pre-flight) to be OTS.

It would probably help if you guys read the accident report instead of
speculating.

For example, the report notes that controller should not have cleared
the aircraft for an OTS approach, but faults the pilot as the primary
error for

1) Not following the published approach courses and altitudes.
2) Not identifying the navaid for the approach -- no identifier was
being broadcast, so the pilots should have known that the approach was
OTS, notam or no notam.

Checking notams on the ground is a good idea, but things change while
you are in the air. Actually tuning and identifying a navaid is a
pretty good idea. You never know what might have happened in the last
few minutes.
--
Waddling Eagle
World Famous Flight Instructor

C J Campbell[_1_]

June 17th 07, 08:57 PM

On 2007-05-30 09:14:03 -0700, said:

> I have no idea of the current status of the SDF approach in question.
> It may be in service, or it may be decommissioned.
>
> If I wanted current status, however, I would check a) the current
> approach chart, along with b) DUATS FDC NOTAMS, and c) the NOTAM
> piublication.
>
> All this information is available on the internet at no cost, easily
> looked up.
>
>
> My point is the same point I made twice now. With all available
> information available on the internet at no cost, anyone who is not
> aware of a deauthorized approach at his destination has not done
> adequate preflight.

That may be, but no identifier was being broadcast, either. Suppose the
approach had been only out of service for the last half hour -- no
notam would have told them that. You still need to tune and check
identifiers for navaids. If the pilots had done that they might still
be alive today.

--
Waddling Eagle
World Famous Flight Instructor

Everett M. Greene[_2_]

June 23rd 07, 09:11 PM

C J Campbell > writes:
> On 2007-05-30 09:14:03 -0700, said:
>
> > I have no idea of the current status of the SDF approach in question.
> > It may be in service, or it may be decommissioned.
> >
> > If I wanted current status, however, I would check a) the current
> > approach chart, along with b) DUATS FDC NOTAMS, and c) the NOTAM
> > piublication.
> >
> > All this information is available on the internet at no cost, easily
> > looked up.
> >
> >
> > My point is the same point I made twice now. With all available
> > information available on the internet at no cost, anyone who is not
> > aware of a deauthorized approach at his destination has not done
> > adequate preflight.
>
> That may be, but no identifier was being broadcast, either. Suppose the
> approach had been only out of service for the last half hour -- no
> notam would have told them that. You still need to tune and check
> identifiers for navaids. If the pilots had done that they might still
> be alive today.

Which raises a related question: How quickly do ATC controllers
receive the info that a facility is OTS for maintenance or other
such activity?