Long-range Spitfires and daylight Bomber Command raids (was: Re: #1 Jet of World War II)

[The Revolution Will Not Be Televised]

On Mon, 18 Aug 2003 20:39:22 GMT, Guy Alcala
> wrote:

>Let's just say my reply has been delayed, but here goes.

[snip more gratuitous and unprovoked logical discourse. NB all
gallons referred to in this post are Imperial, not the inferior Yanqui
oppressor's titchy competitive effort.]

[Quill on longitudinal instability on Mk Vs]

>Ah, now we can compare close readings and interpretations of same. Onward.
>We agree on all the above, but I posit that the commitment would result in a shift to
>Mk. VIIIs (or Mk. IXs with similar tankage), accepting the likely temporary decrease
>in production.

Actually I don't see there being a production shortfall, except at
Castle Bromwich which would need some retooling to produce Mk VIII
airframes instead of IXs as it ended Vc production in July - October
1943. The rear fuselage tanks could be post-production fittings at
Maintenance Units, which would only receive as many airframes for
fitting as tanks were available. So there'd be two deployment streams
(short-range and long-range Mk VIIIs) until Boulton Paul or whoever
else could produce sufficient tanks for full production fitting.

>> Much like the behaviour of the actual Mk IX/XVIs with rear-fuselage
>> tanks in 1945.
>
>True, but those Mk.IX/XVIs also had extra fuel in the regular fuselage tanks (ca.
>94-96 gallons, depending on the source) forward of the datum.

66 or 75 gallons according to the Pilot's Notes and Shacklady &
Morgan.

> And correct me if I'm
>wrong, but ISTR that only those a/c with cut-down rear fuselages got the aft tanks;

Nope: the standard fuselage versions actually got larger internal
rear fuselage tankage - 75 vs 66 gallons. At least that's what the
Pilot's Notes say. [BTW, the VII/VIII/PR.X Pilot's Notes have some
range/climb/cruise graphs which I think might be relevant to this
discussion]

>> >and if you want to extend the escort range it's the amount of fuel you
>> >can carry internally to fight and return on that determines escort radius, no
>> >matter how much fuel you hang externally to boost endurance.
>>
>> Agreed. This is why the rear-fuselage tankage issue is critical to
>> this speculation.
>
>Not for combat radius/return, unless you can use rear fuselage tankage for that;
>otherwise you're just extending the endurance and ferry range.

This is how Supermarine and the RAF saw it: instability in the early
stages of a flight was acceptable, providing that the fuel load had
been consumed to the point of stability before the aircraft entered
combat. As this is the attitude historically adopted with
rear-fuselage tanks in the Mk IX/XVI, it's not such a stretch to
invoke it a little earlier.

The Mustang could only
>retain a fraction (ca. 25-50%) of that rear tank fuel to use for combat without being
>dangerously unstable, with the contemporary Spit possibly (probably?) being unable to
>retain any of it;

Actually, the relevant testing in January 1945 revealed that the
acceptable manoevering limit with the 75-gallon rear fuselage tank was
9.9 inches aft of the datum, or after 34 gallons had been used.
Clearly the tank didn't need to be emptied for this to be achieved.

>at best, it could retain the same fraction as the Mustang. The
>Mustang with rear tank didn't have 269 U.S. gallons to fight and return on; it had
>somewhere between 205 and 227, depending on what fraction of the aft tank capacity
>allowed acceptable combat handling.

In this case we have a Mk IX with 85 gallons internal forward tanks
and about 40 gallons in the rear tank within apparently tolerable
limits for combat.

>To be an acceptable long-range escort, the Spit still needed the extra forward
>fuselage fuel of the later Mk. IXs and the Mk. VIIIs, plus the leading edge tanks of
>the latter. The Mk. VIII carried 124 Imperial gallons internally (149 U.S), ALL of
>which was usable in combat, plus whatever extra fuel usable in combat (if any) a rear
>tank provided.

Ah, here we disagree: as far as I know, most IX/XVIs didn't have
enlarged forward tanks (in the traditional position forward of the
cabin bulkhead, behind the engine), and most MK VIIIs seem to have
been similar. So the best reliable figure for the internal capacity
of the Mk VIII would actually be around 110 Imp galls. I suppose Air
Commodore Alcala, Director of Fighter Operations in this scenario,
will be pressing the Air Member for Research and Development to get
them all with the enlarged forward tanks as well....



>In the case of the Spit wing it seems to have been a strength issue, at least
>according to Quill

Yes, but I suggest what Wright Field did was a reliable indicator of
what the USAAF would have done if Spitfire production and procurement
was within their grasp. A&AEE whinges about instability would get
short shrift in this situation.
[i]
>>. So I
>> suggest basic experience of rear-fuselage tankage, and measures to
>> combat the worst CoG issues resulting were at hand in plenty of time
>> to have an impact on the postulated fitting of rear-fuselage tanks in
>> the summer of 1943.
>
>The difference being that the flights to Gibraltar were ferry flights, and no
>formation maneuvering or combat flying with the aft tanks full was required.

Sure, but how different is this from Vcs emptying them on the climb
out of East Anglia and the cruise out to Holland? The short-ranged
Spit Vs and IXs could handle combat in those areas, while the LR Spits
would be briefed to pick up their escorts further out over the Zuider
Zee. Giving them an extra 30-45 minutes of flight on internal fuel,
even with the most restricted utility (e.g. only on the way in, no
combat endurance to remain after entering combat) is still of use, and
reflects the utility of giving them drop-tanks to start with. The
final determinant is the distance over enemy territory a Vc could
return on forward tanks alone after exhausting the rear tank, dropping
the 90-gallon drop-tank and spending 10 minutes at high throttle
settings in combat. This is obviously *not* a profile which makes it
contender for deep-penetration escort, but it still means they should
be able to operate out across Holland beyond Amsterdam and up to the
German border. Even a marginal improvement like this would have had a
real and clearly-observable benefit in supressing bomber losses.

>> In the end, even the RAF cleared the rear-fuselage tanks for
>> production usage in 1945, and they were happy enough to fit half of
>> the tankage in the FR XIV and the full thing in the XVIII.
>
>Again, both a/c with cut-down rear fuselages.

Yes, but the cut-down fuselage doesn't seem to be a factor in deciding
whether a Spit got rear-fuselage tanks or not: the IX and XVI with
conventional fuselage got them, the FR XIV got them and I suspect the
XIV would have got them if it hadn't been succeeded on the production
lines by the XVIII in 1945, which only came in a cut-down fuselage
version. As it was, the example of the FR XIV and the IX/XVI
indicates the cut-down fuselage actually had a lower capacity for
rear-fuselage tankage (66 vs 75 gallons).

>Getting to our respective readings and
>conclusions on Quill, I note that he says in the case of the Mk. 21 that he disagreed
>with A&AEE on whether the Mk. 21's handling was acceptable at a certain point, and
>that he felt that such handling deficiencies could be accepted to get an a/c with
>superior performance into the field (he's also man enough to admit that he may have
>been overconfident by this point that average squadron pilots wouldn't have had
>serious difficulties, based on his own skills).

I suspect A&AEE were right on that point; but it's instructive to see,
yet again, that Quill states a fix for the stability and trimming
issues that plagued the F.21 in 1944 was known about (enlarged tail
surfaces), but production issues ruled it out until 1945. Take the
MAP monkey off Supermarine's back, demanding production at the expense
of development all the time, and this and a lot of other relevant
problems could have been dealt with earlier.

> Now, it may just be a question of him
>not thinking to mention it, or the way he worded it, but he maentions no such
>disagreement between himself and A&AEE regarding the handling of the rear fuselage
>tank-equipped a/c; he just says that the handling wasn't acceptable for a long time,
>and required a lot of development.

The origin of the "acceptability" comments over the rear-tank tests
appears to be Supermarine's development testing. Aircraft would only
go to A&AEE after they had arrived at what they saw as a production
standard (e.g. Quill testing the 75 gall RF tank in July 1944, but
Boscombe Down not getting it for another six months). Also, note that
the A&AEE testing was not a peacetime acceptance test as such - the
aircraft and fittings involved were often ordered into production
anyway to minimise delays to production totals, and A&AEE testing was
often being performed as representative of current or imminent
production. F.21's were actually being produced before and after
A&AEE first critically reported on them.

>I'm certainly not going to claim, based on such flimsy evidence, that this is
>definitive proof that the a/c couldn't have been flown in operations with an aft tank
>with accceptable handling much earlier given sufficient motivation, especially given
>your comments re the prevailing attitude of the A&AEE. But I do think it at least
>suggests that the Cg problems were real and agreed to be so by both the A&AEE _and_
>Quill. And that's as far as I'm prepared to gaze into my crystal ball. Your reading
>may well be different.

And it is, I'm afraid. A&AEE seem to get their first rear-tank Spit
in January 1945, and quantify it as acceptable once 34 gallons out of
the 75 were used. Nobody was going to Boscombe Down and pushing this
idea, the whole issue seems to come from Supermarine. Posit a burning
interest in the Air Ministry in increasing inernal tankage in 1943
(e.g. ACM Kramer getting upset) and I suspect things would have been
remarkably different.

>> I suggest
>> with the equivalent of Eaker, Spaatz and Arnold lighting fires under
>> people's arses to increase range in 1943, this would have happened
>> earlier.
>
>Not Eaker or Spaatz; it was Arnold through Giles. From "To Command the Sky":

I stand corrected.

>As to someone lighting fires for the R.A.F., that was what Pete and I were
>postulating, only for the Spit IX/VIII, with the highest priority to getting increased
>range British fighters in the U.K. soonest, with all other Spit improvements pushed
>back. Grabbing available Mk. VIIIs first (the MTO and CBI/PTO will just have to suck
>it up for a while), at the cost of MK.XII/XIV production,

It wouldn't have been at the expense of Mk XII or XIV production if
you're specifying a start after Schweinfurt II in October 1943. The
XII production run had finished, the XIV was settled month beforehand
and was going to start to appear in a dribble in December 1943 as
production deliveries of Griffon 65s began.

> then either expanding Mk.
>VIII production at the cost of the Mk. IX

That would have been possible, but only at the point of converting
Castle Bromwich over to the VIII in the summer or autumn of 1943.
This needs a demonstration of the effectiveness and need for it
somewhat earlier: hence my LR Vs in 12 Group in July.

>or (if possible) transitioning to Mk. IXs
>with the extra leading edge tanks of the VIII, with aft fuselage tanks and whatever
>airframe mods required to pack usable _combat_ fuel in.

That would have required prducing the VIII wings & airframe, I
believe, rather than stuffing a Merlin 60-series into a Vc airframe as
was done to churn out IXs. So I think there would be production
infrastructure issues. As it was, the Supermarine production group
around Eastleigh delivered about 90 Mk VIIIs to the RAF in July 1943,
which should be enough to prove the concept if you grab them all.

>Sure, and that with an aft tank was next on the agenda after boosting production of
>the standard Mk. VIII/leading-edge tank Mk. IX. Either of the latter should have given
>us an escort radius of 250-300 miles.

See my note on the actual forward-tank capacity of most VIIIs.
Although this may have been changeable.

>Unfortunately, a similar chart for a Mk. V doesn't seem to be available on the site,
>but I have my doubts that the Mk. V was carrying around any such ballast in 1943, or
>if it did, so far aft. Of course, AB197 was a very early Spit IX (the report date
>seems to be June 10th, 1942), so that ballast was probably reduced as more operational
>equipment was added, but it at least suggests (combined with the Mk. V's further aft
>Cg vs.the Mk. IX as reported in various tests on the site) that the Mk. V was pretty
>much at the limit, while the Mk. IX had considerably more Cg range available.

I can't find anything to substantiate this with the V myself, and I
understand the validity of your reservations. Nevertheless, the
critical issue as I see it is whether any rear tankage could become
available given improvements in the CoG by means of the enlarged
elevator horn balance and convex Westland elevator. I fully accept
this would, in all probability, have been insufficient to allow a 75
gallon rear-fuselage tank to be carried and cleared for combat. The
critical issue is whether this would have been enough to permit a
rear-fuselage tank to be used in the early stages of flight to extend
the pre-combat range. Given that this was done with a 29 gallon rear
tank, I think there is a useable margin, albeit a smaller one than a
LR-fitted Mk VIII with better weight distrubution and enlarged tail
surfaces would have.

I'm focusing on using the V not because it had more or even
comparitive utility with the Alacal/Stickney LR Mk VIII (something
I've argued for in the past myself), but because even with the greater
constraints involved, it was a more likely concept-demonstrator in the
historical timescale. If you want an overnight conversion to LR Spit
IXs at any given point without the example of a LR operational trial
in the RAF to start with, you'd have to posit the removal of most of
the higher command and their staff involved to eliminate their
existing preconceptions and prejudices.

So this is why I think LR Vs would be an issue worth consideration
even taking into account their inferiority from all aspects of the job
when compared to the VIII. I think it's more credible to posit
changes in the Vs proving the concept, as this would be more
institutionally tolerable. This is important from my point of view,
as I think any counter-factual speculation has to be made within the
known constraints of the industrial, economic and institutional
context to remain credible.

[production pressures]

>I don't underestimate the pressures, I just think (as you mentioned a few paragraphs
>above) that if the decision had been made to go over to daylight, fighter range
>extension would have increased in priority and changes would have to have been
>accepted, whatever the disruption elsewhere. Because otherwise, it wasn't going to
>work.

Indeed, but when the RAF actually faced this dilemma, at the end of
1939 and then again in spring 1941, they abandoned daylight bombing.
The two concepts had become divorced, for understandable external
reasons, and asserting a sudden and complete reversal of this is
stretching the credibiluity of the institutional appreciation involved
in the speculation.

Now I think the concept is possible, and a valid piece of historical
speculation, but I also think it has to work within the context
involved, and, frankly, anybody demanding a reduction in Spitfire
production in favour of speculative operational development was on a
losing wicket. The British strategical position in this respect can't
be overstressed too much: the USAAF had a doctine and institutional
ambition towards independence which was served by the 8th AF campaign,
secured by other forces doing things like protecting their bases and
dealing with the existing war against Germany. They had room to stop
and rethink tactics and strategy, and change production priorities
accordingly.

The British did not have this space. They had to maintain existing
commitments and fight the war as it existed from a smaller industrial
and economic base closer to the enemy threat. Proving strategic
concepts, even ones which had great war-winning potential, was a
luxury that could not come at the expense of the means for repelling
the enemy in the meantime.

The RAF could not prejudice production of their main fighter when it
was needed for home defence, operations in the MTO and Far East and
supply to the Russians. The difference between these commitments and
facilitating daylight strategic bombing was the difference between
fighting the war and demonstrating an abstract concept. Whatever
happened in the skies over Germany, Fighter Command were conceiveably
in a position to lose a war for national survival. The 8th AF wasn't.
No lack of respect intended. The 8th might prove vital in winning the
war, but high Spitfire production was known to be needed meanwhile to
avoid defeat and stay in the war, which was an essential prerequisite.

>> The Mk XIV was settled long before production started in October 1943,
>> the number of airframe's you'd be losing in that year (six for
>> development work most of which didn't need massive work for Mk XIV
>> testing and ended up testing contra-props instead, maybe 20 for
>> delivery to operational squadrons) is trivial. Simply cutting out the
>> Mk VIII airframe allocation to the Mk XII production might free twice
>> as many as that.
>
>And we'll be happy to take them, and we'll just have to accept the occasional FW-190
>Jabo getting through.

They weren't much of a threat on the larger scale, but if you're
assuming a change of events in autumn 1943, the XII production run is
effectively already over and done with.

> But we'll also take the airframes that became 610 Squadron's
>Mk. XIVs in January 1944.

If you've got CBAF producing VIIIs or LR IXs in January 1944, which is
perfectly possible if you start in July or August 1943, there's no
shortage of airframes. Also, bear in mind production factor I've
pointed out earlier - it's likely you'll have more airframes than rear
tanks available by the end of 1943, so you might as well do something
to enhance the remaining non-rear-tanked airframes. I really don't
see either Griffon Spit (XII and XIV) having a substantive impact on
LR Spit VIII supply in late '43 - early '44. I do think that the F.21
and later Seafires would have been delayed if Supermarine were working
like demons on rear-tank stability problems in autumn 1943, though.
But as I've already said, small loss.

>> If we're talking about an operational need in the summer of 1943,
>
>No, the postulated date of the decision (to go over to days) was sometime in the fall
>of '43, although the exact date was a bit unclear. It seemed to be in the
>September/October timeframe, but we were unable to get ACM Kramer to be more precise.

Well, pending a decision from "Butch" Kramer, let's assume either the
first or second Schweinfurts as the PoD for this speculation. The
faster the better, as far as the Controller of Research and
Development and the MAP production executive are concerned: getting
Castle Bromwich to produce Mk VIII wings and getting Boulton Paul to
do the pressurised, self-sealing tanks are the major bottlenecks in
the short term.

>Good points, and I don't disagree about the utility of the Mk. V as 'certainly better
>than nothing,' and better to lose people one at a time rather 7 or 8 at a time Again,
>my main concern with the V is whether they could in fact have been given the radius
>(not range).

I appreciate the distinction, but I think increasing range was the
first, and most easily achieveable step.

>> I don't think the early XVIs actually had the rear-fuselage tankage
>> when they first came off the production lines (September 1944),
>
>Right, I should have said the rear fuselage tank (and I think they only came in with
>the cut-down rear fuselage) about 16-18 months early, as i forget just when those
>versions came out, but I think it was only in '45.

That's right. But while I'm always sceptical about blanket
counter-factual claims about the relative ease of any one measure
changing things, I have to say I can't see any overpowering practical
reasons why they couldn't have arrived sooner, once the institutional
prejudices and conflicting strategic alignments have been addressed.
And I honestly think they are addressable.

>> Please desist from this moderate rationality or I will complain to
>> your ISP.
>
>Did I mention that I have INCONTROVERTIBLE PROOF that the U.K. government has been
>testing UFOs ( and dissecting ALIEN CORPSES) at their base at Machrihanish,

Nah, you're just confusing Alien corpses with the average westie.
Understandable mistake. We only retain them to give the midges a
round-the-year locally-available food supply until the German tourists
appear in the summer.

cleverly
>disguising test flights of same as those by Aurora and, in times past, SR-71s? Wait,
>I hear the black helicopters coming to get me. I can feel the beams as they try to
>alter my brain. Excuse me while I done my tinfoil hat.

Interesting theory, although it lacks credibility, until we
acknowledge the critical role played by the Templars and the
Illuminatii in the Ministry of Aircraft Production in 1942 [censored]

Gavin Bailey
--

Another user rings. "I need more space" he says.
"Well, why not move to Texas?", I ask. - The ******* Operator From Hell

[The Revolution Will Not Be Televised]

On Wed, 20 Aug 2003 02:04:33 -0400, (Peter
Stickney) wrote:

[arbitrarily moved to this thread by me]

>I've been delayed my own self, but I'll invite myself back in...

By all means, except I also note a depressing lack of nationalistic
abuse in this post.

[rear fuselage tanks in Spit Vcs]

>The Spit, especially the small tailed Mk V, had a very narrow CG
>range. Something on the order of 1.6". The later aircraft, both the
>2-stage Merlin powered VIII, IX, and XVIs, and the various Griffon
>models, also had a narrow range, but had the advantage of a heavier
>engine way up front to even things out. It'a also teh case that
>retracting the gear on a Spit translated the CG aft nearly half of its
>range. That's teh problem with dainty little airplanes - it doesn't
>take much to upset 'em.

OK, but let's be clear about the standard of aircraft modification
involved. Did this include an enlarged elevator horn balance, and if
not how much aftwards CoG movement did bob-weights plus elevator
adaption provide? Quill states that the bob weights gave about 2
inches of rearward travel, and the westland elevator tested at the end
of 1942 gave a "significant amount of C of G travel" with the enlarged
horn balance being "even more effective", although I don't have exact
figures for the CoG movement involved.

>Other U.S. fighters that I could dig up in short order are the P-40,
>with a CG range of 8.9", and the P-63 with a range of 5.4". On first
>analysis, stuffing an aft fuel tank into a Spit V is a much more dicey
>proposition that doing the same with a P-51.

Agreed, but is this insoluable? The question doesn't appear as easily
to definatively answer (either way) as it first appeared to me.

>Actually, if you're looking for a fairly long-ranged Medium/Low
>altitude escort fighter already in RAF hands in 1942, might I suggest
>the Allison-engined Mustang I, IA< and II. They're long legged, adn
>while they don't climb as well as a normally loaded Spit V, they're
>danged fast, accelerate well, and can meet an Fw 190A on fairly equal
>terms. Mustang Is were the first RAF fighters over Germany, after teh
>fall of France, and they spent a lot of time stooging around in the
>same areas that are being proposed as Medium Bomber targets.

Sure: I've no objection to using them as B-25 escorts, as they
actually were historically, except to expand this usage. I still feel
the altitude limitation and the numbers available leave the LR Spit V
a live issue nonetheless. Even Typhoons got used as 2 Group escorts
on occasion, and in this scenario there's a real attritional premium
to be paid for allowing the Luftwaffe undistracted attention on
daylight Lancaster forces, above and beyond what B-17s suffered, and
as a result I think the "everything and the kitchen sink" approach
would be adopted. The commitment of the available fighter force would
need to be much higher than the RAF historically got away with.

>Perhaps. It's also the case that the RAF were never really in the
>Long Range Escort business. Most of their missions didn't require
>flying Combat Air Patrols over German airfields near Prague. The aft
>fuel tank didn't provide a whole lof of gain for the RAF.

Precisely. We need to posit a sufficient instiutional change of
policy and interest to even begin this, but as nothing would happen
without it, we might as well take it as a given.

>Just my opinion, mind, but I think the thing that really would have
>crimped an RAF long range day bombing effort would have been pilot
>availability. The RAF Night Heavies (Except, I think, for the
>Sirling), were 1 pilot airplanes.

They all had facility for 2 pilots, e.g. extra controls could be
fitted to the Halifax and Lanc if neccessary, but basically they had
ceased to be 2-pilot aircraft by 1943.

>That's not enough if you expect to
>be getting shot at by people wh actually can see what they're shooting
>at. You're going to want copilots, and where are you going to get
>them? The Empire Air Training Scheme was a tremendous achievement,
>but it was pretty stretched supplying the pilots that the RAF needed
>in real life. And you'll have to divert even more pilots to be
>instructors.

The loading on the training infrastructure would increase, and the
attritionally-supportable force would shrink, but then again BC took
heavy casualties and expanded, and I'm not aware of a critical aircrew
shortage: aircrew training slots seem to be over-subscribed since
1941, with pools of aircrew forming everywhere except in Bomber
Command. The output of trained pilots is an issue, but then I'm not
aware of it being inadequate historically. If anything, the British
prioritised aircrew training too much in the period 1941-43 with
repercussions elsewhere on the war effort (e.g. infantry replacements
in 1944-45).

>Again, I must disagree. The cold, hard numbers say that the Spit was
>a lot less tolerant of stuffing weight behind the wings. It's
>intersting to note that the Wright Field modified Spits got a big
>chunk of their extra capacity by stuffing fuel into the wing leading
>edges, which not only didn't upset the CG as much, but moved it in the
>forward (good) direction, somewhat counterbalancing the tank behind
>the cockpit.

Yes, but even the Wright Field Spits also had 43 gallon tanks behind
the pilot, against 33 gallons in the wings (according to the A&AEE
report summary on MK210 in S&M). Wing tanks have always been a given
with me, as you & Guy have already specified Mk VIII airframes, which
had 25 gall leading-edge tanks, but as Quill states, the only
available space for major increases in internal fuel was behind the
pilot.

You have also opened the drop-tank issue a little wider here with the
two 62 gallon underwing tanks carried by MK210, which is also useful
for the discussion. The Vc airframe could well have taken drop tanks
in the under-wing bomb positions: a 44 gallon drop tank under each
wing would give us another 88 galllons to go with a 90 or 45 gallon
slipper tank. Granted, this isn't increasing the combat radius, and
even I'm dubious about the weight issues, but every gallon gives
greater possibilities for deeper penetration escort up to the limit of
the internal fuel only return-to-base range.

>Much less, according to the reports. To increase the CG range of a Mk
>V enough to fit a rear tank, you'll need a bigger tail, and ballast in
>the nose. At that point, it stops being a Field Conversion, and
>starts looking like a remanufacturing job.

This all hinges on the CoG travel the remedial measures like
bob-weights and elevator modification provides. I can't really go any
further until I have some kind of figure to associate with the latter.
I appreciate the rational grounds for your doubts, but I don't think
this issue is resolved yet.

>If I get a chance, I'll run some numbers for how much fuel it would
>take to get a Spit V to its rear limit. At a first guess, I'd say
>"Not Much". The rearward shift when the gear comes up is a problem.

Granted. But none of this works without the hierarchy breathing fire
from the CAS on down for long-range escorts a la Arnold. Let me know
what you think could be done with a range of figures, from 4 inches
rearward travel on up, which seems a reasonable conjectural starting
point for me. Don't forget to use the Vc airframe as a reference
rather than a Vb in regard to landing gear.

Alternatively, sit out in the sun with a cold beer instead.....

Gavin Bailey

--

Another user rings. "I need more space" he says.
"Well, why not move to Texas?", I ask. - The ******* Operator From Hell

[Guy Alcala]

The Revolution Will Not Be Televised wrote:

> On Mon, 18 Aug 2003 20:39:22 GMT, Guy Alcala
> > wrote:
>
> >Let's just say my reply has been delayed, but here goes.
>
> [snip more gratuitous and unprovoked logical discourse. NB all
> gallons referred to in this post are Imperial, not the inferior Yanqui
> oppressor's titchy competitive effort.]
>
> [Quill on longitudinal instability on Mk Vs]

<snip>

> >> Much like the behaviour of the actual Mk IX/XVIs with rear-fuselage
> >> tanks in 1945.
> >
> >True, but those Mk.IX/XVIs also had extra fuel in the regular fuselage tanks (ca.
> >94-96 gallons, depending on the source) forward of the datum.
>
> 66 or 75 gallons according to the Pilot's Notes and Shacklady &
> Morgan.

I was referring to the increased tankage forward of the firewall.

> > And correct me if I'm
> >wrong, but ISTR that only those a/c with cut-down rear fuselages got the aft tanks;
>
> Nope: the standard fuselage versions actually got larger internal
> rear fuselage tankage - 75 vs 66 gallons. At least that's what the
> Pilot's Notes say. [BTW, the VII/VIII/PR.X Pilot's Notes have some
> range/climb/cruise graphs which I think might be relevant to this
> discussion]

Yes, you're right about the aft tanks. OTOH, those a/c with cut down rear fuselages also
had increased forward fuselage fuel and in some cases leading edge tanks (according to
several sources which I take to be credible), and I think larger horizontal tails, so
clearly they wanted to move the Cg back forward again (more fuel forward, less aft) and
improve the stability. For instance, here's a post from a couple of years back on this
subject:
------------------------------------------------

The Pilot's notes state the following tankage:

The Spitfire 1/II/V had 85 gallons of internal tankage, in two tanks
behind the engine and in front of the pilot. Additional fuel was
carried in 30, 45 or 90 gallon "slipper" tanks under the fuselage.
These were in common use after 1941.

Early Spitfire IX's had the same internal tankage, while at the end of
1944 a further 75 gallons of internal capacity in rear fuselage tanks
was provided. This caused CoG problems as described, but in reality
they seem little worse than those experienced in USAAF Mustangs using
a similar rear-tabkage arrangement. In late model Spitfires with
tear-drop canopies (late '44 production), the front tankage was
increased to 95 gallons while the rear fuselage tankage was reduced to
66 gallons (for roughly the same total tankage). Also, late
production Spitfires had the leading-edge wing tanks used in the Mk
VII/VIII for an additional 26 gallons of internal capacity. From
mid-1944, the existing slipper tanks were augmented with longer
"torpedo"-shaped drop tanks with a 50 or 90 gallon capacity.
Spitfires operating in 1944 seem to have used the latter tanks very
frequently, judging by the photographic evidence.

The Spitfire VII & VIII formed the airframe basis for the later
production Spitfires, and apart from some early Mk XII Spitfire's
converted from Mark V's, all Mark XII and Mark XIV Spitfires had
similar tankage arrangements of 96 gallon forward internal tanks and
26 gallons in wing tanks. Later Mark XIV and Mk XVIII Spitfires had
rear fuselage tanks, either of 62 gallons capacity.

Early Mark XIV's (examples in the RB-serialled series at least) did
not have rear tanks, and seem to have had Mark VIII-arrangement (with
reduced forward tankage capacity previously mentioned) and I suspect
the rear fuselage tanks only arrived with the later production Mk XIVe
models, again after mid-1944.

>> Some examples of
>> the Spit V had a smaller rear tank, though I believe this was used for ferry
>> only.

That's correct. The CoG issues were regarded as insurmountable until
larger tail surfaces arrived with the Mark VIII and later-production
Mark IX's. This is a bit suprising as the Mark V rear-fuselage ferry
tank carried 29 gallons, while flight testing of a Mark IX with the 75
gallon rear-fuselage tank indicated that the lateral instability
associated with the extra tankage eased considerably after 35 gallons
had been used, taking the remaining capacity close to the earlier 29
gallon tank level. This of course is a comment made in ignorance of
the physical positioning of the tank, which would have the biggest
impact on the CoG and consequent stability of any one factor.
--------------------------------------------------------

You may recognize the poster's style, although he's since undergone a revolutionary
reincarnation ;-)

<snip>

> The Mustang could only
> >retain a fraction (ca. 25-50%) of that rear tank fuel to use for combat without being
> >dangerously unstable, with the contemporary Spit possibly (probably?) being unable to
> >retain any of it;
>
> Actually, the relevant testing in January 1945 revealed that the
> acceptable manoevering limit with the 75-gallon rear fuselage tank was
> 9.9 inches aft of the datum, or after 34 gallons had been used.
> Clearly the tank didn't need to be emptied for this to be achieved.

> >at best, it could retain the same fraction as the Mustang. The
> >Mustang with rear tank didn't have 269 U.S. gallons to fight and return on; it had
> >somewhere between 205 and 227, depending on what fraction of the aft tank capacity
> >allowed acceptable combat handling.
>
> In this case we have a Mk IX with 85 gallons internal forward tanks
> and about 40 gallons in the rear tank within apparently tolerable
> limits for combat.

With which tail, and did the a/c have leading edge tanks?


> >To be an acceptable long-range escort, the Spit still needed the extra forward
> >fuselage fuel of the later Mk. IXs and the Mk. VIIIs, plus the leading edge tanks of
> >the latter. The Mk. VIII carried 124 Imperial gallons internally (149 U.S), ALL of
> >which was usable in combat, plus whatever extra fuel usable in combat (if any) a rear
> >tank provided.
>
> Ah, here we disagree: as far as I know, most IX/XVIs didn't have
> enlarged forward tanks (in the traditional position forward of the
> cabin bulkhead, behind the engine), and most MK VIIIs seem to have
> been similar. So the best reliable figure for the internal capacity
> of the Mk VIII would actually be around 110 Imp galls. I suppose Air
> Commodore Alcala, Director of Fighter Operations in this scenario,
> will be pressing the Air Member for Research and Development to get
> them all with the enlarged forward tanks as well....

Every source I have implies or claims that all Mk. VIIIs had the bigger forward fuselage
tanks, but I'm willing to be convinced otherwise. But the tank size increase, according to
a different poster from a couple of years ago, was something that could be done on any Mk.
VIII or IX -- the space was always there, it just hadn't been used. Oddly enough,

http://www.fourthfightergroup.com/eagles/spit9tactical.html

which contains the tctical trial data for AB 505 from April 1942, (i.e. prior to the
testing of AB 197, which had the usual 85 gal.), states that

"25......... The fuel capacity of the Spitfire IX is 92 gallons, 57 in the top tank and 35
in the bottom tank. This is 10 gallons more
than the Spitfire VC."


>
>
> >In the case of the Spit wing it seems to have been a strength issue, at least
> >according to Quill
>
> Yes, but I suggest what Wright Field did was a reliable indicator of
> what the USAAF would have done if Spitfire production and procurement
> was within their grasp. A&AEE whinges about instability would get
> short shrift in this situation.

Oh, I don't know. They found it impossible to increase the tankage of the P-39/P-63 for Cg
reasons, and those a/c certainly could have used it in our service (it didn't matter to the
Russians, but that was due to local theater conditions).
[i]
> >>. So I
> >> suggest basic experience of rear-fuselage tankage, and measures to
> >> combat the worst CoG issues resulting were at hand in plenty of time
> >> to have an impact on the postulated fitting of rear-fuselage tanks in
> >> the summer of 1943.
> >
> >The difference being that the flights to Gibraltar were ferry flights, and no
> >formation maneuvering or combat flying with the aft tanks full was required.
>
> Sure, but how different is this from Vcs emptying them on the climb
> out of East Anglia and the cruise out to Holland? The short-ranged
> Spit Vs and IXs could handle combat in those areas, while the LR Spits
> would be briefed to pick up their escorts further out over the Zuider
> Zee. Giving them an extra 30-45 minutes of flight on internal fuel,
> even with the most restricted utility (e.g. only on the way in, no
> combat endurance to remain after entering combat) is still of use, and
> reflects the utility of giving them drop-tanks to start with. The
> final determinant is the distance over enemy territory a Vc could
> return on forward tanks alone after exhausting the rear tank, dropping
> the 90-gallon drop-tank and spending 10 minutes at high throttle
> settings in combat. This is obviously *not* a profile which makes it
> contender for deep-penetration escort, but it still means they should
> be able to operate out across Holland beyond Amsterdam and up to the
> German border. Even a marginal improvement like this would have had a
> real and clearly-observable benefit in supressing bomber losses.

If the fuel in the external drop tank(s) is already roughly equal to the internal capacity
needed to return, as it was with the 90 gal. tank, adding extra internal fuel that can't be
used in combat does nothing for the combat radius, which is what we're interested in.
Zemke makes this point with regard to the carriage of 2 x 108 USG tanks on P-47s prior to
the D-25 models. All the earlier versions had 305 USG internal, and the switch from a
single CL 150 (nominal) USG tank to a pair of 108s did little or nothing to extend the
radius, although it did boost the endurance in the same area. zemek says that average fuel
burn on escort missions was around 200 gal./hr., giving them at most about 90 minutes on
internal fuel (this is with some combat allowance). Only when the D-25 and subsequent
models entered service with the 65 gallon rear fuselage tank did the extra external fuel
give an increased radius. Presumably most of this 65 gallons was usuable within Cg
limits. Since it took quite a while for them to replace all the earlier models, even in
the 56th, the extra radius couldn't be used for a long time.

> >> In the end, even the RAF cleared the rear-fuselage tanks for
> >> production usage in 1945, and they were happy enough to fit half of
> >> the tankage in the FR XIV and the full thing in the XVIII.
> >
> >Again, both a/c with cut-down rear fuselages.
>
> Yes, but the cut-down fuselage doesn't seem to be a factor in deciding
> whether a Spit got rear-fuselage tanks or not: the IX and XVI with
> conventional fuselage got them, the FR XIV got them and I suspect the
> XIV would have got them if it hadn't been succeeded on the production
> lines by the XVIII in 1945, which only came in a cut-down fuselage
> version. As it was, the example of the FR XIV and the IX/XVI
> indicates the cut-down fuselage actually had a lower capacity for
> rear-fuselage tankage (66 vs 75 gallons).

See the two-year old post above, which indicates measures to move the fuel and Cg forward
on these a/c.

> >Getting to our respective readings and
> >conclusions on Quill, I note that he says in the case of the Mk. 21 that he disagreed
> >with A&AEE on whether the Mk. 21's handling was acceptable at a certain point, and
> >that he felt that such handling deficiencies could be accepted to get an a/c with
> >superior performance into the field (he's also man enough to admit that he may have
> >been overconfident by this point that average squadron pilots wouldn't have had
> >serious difficulties, based on his own skills).
>
> I suspect A&AEE were right on that point; but it's instructive to see,
> yet again, that Quill states a fix for the stability and trimming
> issues that plagued the F.21 in 1944 was known about (enlarged tail
> surfaces), but production issues ruled it out until 1945. Take the
> MAP monkey off Supermarine's back, demanding production at the expense
> of development all the time, and this and a lot of other relevant
> problems could have been dealt with earlier.

Certainly what we intended to do, with range extension pushed to priority one. Would you
happen to know what the production of Mk. VIIIs was in say October through Dec. '43, or
maybe Jan. '44, inclusive? I'm thinking that a move like Arnold's (he gave the ETO _all_
P-38 and P-51 production for a three month period in late '43), giving Fighter Command all
the Mk. VIII production in that period, would be enough to get us going. The MTO and
everyone else will just have to accept Mk. VC Trops and/or Mk. IXs for a while longer (they
were already using them in any case).

> > Now, it may just be a question of him
> >not thinking to mention it, or the way he worded it, but he maentions no such
> >disagreement between himself and A&AEE regarding the handling of the rear fuselage
> >tank-equipped a/c; he just says that the handling wasn't acceptable for a long time,
> >and required a lot of development.
>
> The origin of the "acceptability" comments over the rear-tank tests
> appears to be Supermarine's development testing. Aircraft would only
> go to A&AEE after they had arrived at what they saw as a production
> standard (e.g. Quill testing the 75 gall RF tank in July 1944, but
> Boscombe Down not getting it for another six months). Also, note that
> the A&AEE testing was not a peacetime acceptance test as such - the
> aircraft and fittings involved were often ordered into production
> anyway to minimise delays to production totals, and A&AEE testing was
> often being performed as representative of current or imminent
> production. F.21's were actually being produced before and after
> A&AEE first critically reported on them.

And Quill mentions that the F.21 a/c which A&AEE finally accepted had its handling much
improved over the original version he was trying to get them to accept.


> >I'm certainly not going to claim, based on such flimsy evidence, that this is
> >definitive proof that the a/c couldn't have been flown in operations with an aft tank
> >with accceptable handling much earlier given sufficient motivation, especially given
> >your comments re the prevailing attitude of the A&AEE. But I do think it at least
> >suggests that the Cg problems were real and agreed to be so by both the A&AEE _and_
> >Quill. And that's as far as I'm prepared to gaze into my crystal ball. Your reading
> >may well be different.
>
> And it is, I'm afraid. A&AEE seem to get their first rear-tank Spit
> in January 1945, and quantify it as acceptable once 34 gallons out of
> the 75 were used. Nobody was going to Boscombe Down and pushing this
> idea, the whole issue seems to come from Supermarine. Posit a burning
> interest in the Air Ministry in increasing inernal tankage in 1943
> (e.g. ACM Kramer getting upset) and I suspect things would have been
> remarkably different.

Pete and I certainly hoped that would be the case, although I don't know that the rear
tankage was critical. As long as we could get standard Mk. VIIIs (or LE-tank Mk. IXs) for
the initial day transition period (France/Low countries/Ruhr/German coastal targets), if
the Spit aft tank was taking too long Mustang production would probably cover our needs (as
well as those of the U.S.) by the time we were ready to go deep. And then we'd be on the
continent, and it would become almost a non-issue.

<snip>

> > then either expanding Mk.
> >VIII production at the cost of the Mk. IX
>
> That would have been possible, but only at the point of converting
> Castle Bromwich over to the VIII in the summer or autumn of 1943.
> This needs a demonstration of the effectiveness and need for it
> somewhat earlier: hence my LR Vs in 12 Group in July.

See Pete's post re: Mk. V Cg range.


> >or (if possible) transitioning to Mk. IXs
> >with the extra leading edge tanks of the VIII, with aft fuselage tanks and whatever
> >airframe mods required to pack usable _combat_ fuel in.
>
> That would have required prducing the VIII wings & airframe, I
> believe, rather than stuffing a Merlin 60-series into a Vc airframe as
> was done to churn out IXs. So I think there would be production
> infrastructure issues.

> As it was, the Supermarine production group
> around Eastleigh delivered about 90 Mk VIIIs to the RAF in July 1943,
> which should be enough to prove the concept if you grab them all.

That's what we want, say 6 squadrons worth of Mk. VIIIs to start with.

> >Sure, and that with an aft tank was next on the agenda after boosting production of
> >the standard Mk. VIII/leading-edge tank Mk. IX. Either of the latter should have given
> >us an escort radius of 250-300 miles.
>
> See my note on the actual forward-tank capacity of most VIIIs.
> Although this may have been changeable.

And see my comments.

> >Unfortunately, a similar chart for a Mk. V doesn't seem to be available on the site,
> >but I have my doubts that the Mk. V was carrying around any such ballast in 1943, or
> >if it did, so far aft. Of course, AB197 was a very early Spit IX (the report date
> >seems to be June 10th, 1942), so that ballast was probably reduced as more operational
> >equipment was added, but it at least suggests (combined with the Mk. V's further aft
> >Cg vs.the Mk. IX as reported in various tests on the site) that the Mk. V was pretty
> >much at the limit, while the Mk. IX had considerably more Cg range available.
>
> I can't find anything to substantiate this with the V myself, and I
> understand the validity of your reservations. Nevertheless, the
> critical issue as I see it is whether any rear tankage could become
> available given improvements in the CoG by means of the enlarged
> elevator horn balance and convex Westland elevator. I fully accept
> this would, in all probability, have been insufficient to allow a 75
> gallon rear-fuselage tank to be carried and cleared for combat. The
> critical issue is whether this would have been enough to permit a
> rear-fuselage tank to be used in the early stages of flight to extend
> the pre-combat range. Given that this was done with a 29 gallon rear
> tank, I think there is a useable margin, albeit a smaller one than a
> LR-fitted Mk VIII with better weight distrubution and enlarged tail
> surfaces would have.

See Pete's post, which seems to confirm my reservations.

> I'm focusing on using the V not because it had more or even
> comparitive utility with the Alacal/Stickney LR Mk VIII (something
> I've argued for in the past myself), but because even with the greater
> constraints involved, it was a more likely concept-demonstrator in the
> historical timescale. If you want an overnight conversion to LR Spit
> IXs at any given point without the example of a LR operational trial
> in the RAF to start with, you'd have to posit the removal of most of
> the higher command and their staff involved to eliminate their
> existing preconceptions and prejudices.

Well, we're already postulating that Winston has tossed most of the CBO out the window and
told Butch to knock off most of the area bombing and switch to days, so existing prejudices
have already been overturned. There'd still likely be a rearguard action, but it would be
difficult to sustain when those 'action this day' prayers start being delivered to Portal
on down.

> So this is why I think LR Vs would be an issue worth consideration
> even taking into account their inferiority from all aspects of the job
> when compared to the VIII. I think it's more credible to posit
> changes in the Vs proving the concept, as this would be more
> institutionally tolerable. This is important from my point of view,
> as I think any counter-factual speculation has to be made within the
> known constraints of the industrial, economic and institutional
> context to remain credible.

I accept the idea, but retain my caveats over Cg, now strengthened by Pete's comments.

> [production pressures]
>
> >I don't underestimate the pressures, I just think (as you mentioned a few paragraphs
> >above) that if the decision had been made to go over to daylight, fighter range
> >extension would have increased in priority and changes would have to have been
> >accepted, whatever the disruption elsewhere. Because otherwise, it wasn't going to
> >work.
>
> Indeed, but when the RAF actually faced this dilemma, at the end of
> 1939 and then again in spring 1941, they abandoned daylight bombing.
> The two concepts had become divorced, for understandable external
> reasons, and asserting a sudden and complete reversal of this is
> stretching the credibiluity of the institutional appreciation involved
> in the speculation.
>
> Now I think the concept is possible, and a valid piece of historical
> speculation, but I also think it has to work within the context
> involved, and, frankly, anybody demanding a reduction in Spitfire
> production in favour of speculative operational development was on a
> losing wicket. The British strategical position in this respect can't
> be overstressed too much: the USAAF had a doctine and institutional
> ambition towards independence which was served by the 8th AF campaign,
> secured by other forces doing things like protecting their bases and
> dealing with the existing war against Germany. They had room to stop
> and rethink tactics and strategy, and change production priorities
> accordingly.
>
> The British did not have this space. They had to maintain existing
> commitments and fight the war as it existed from a smaller industrial
> and economic base closer to the enemy threat. Proving strategic
> concepts, even ones which had great war-winning potential, was a
> luxury that could not come at the expense of the means for repelling
> the enemy in the meantime.
>
> The RAF could not prejudice production of their main fighter when it
> was needed for home defence, operations in the MTO and Far East and
> supply to the Russians. The difference between these commitments and
> facilitating daylight strategic bombing was the difference between
> fighting the war and demonstrating an abstract concept. Whatever
> happened in the skies over Germany, Fighter Command were conceiveably
> in a position to lose a war for national survival. The 8th AF wasn't.
> No lack of respect intended. The 8th might prove vital in winning the
> war, but high Spitfire production was known to be needed meanwhile to
> avoid defeat and stay in the war, which was an essential prerequisite.

I don't agree that was the case by mid '43. Under no conceivable set of circumstances
could Fighter Command lose air superiority over the UK then. As it was, Fighter Command
was over-manned and equipped, and as you have yourself stated, under-utilized. What
happened in Burma and in the Italian campaign weren't going to decide the war, and the
Russians could have survived quite well without Spitfires. If nothing else, we could have
produced more P-39s/P-63s, which in any case were etter suited to conditions on that front.

<snip areas of agreement or mild disagreement>

> >> Please desist from this moderate rationality or I will complain to
> >> your ISP.
> >
> >Did I mention that I have INCONTROVERTIBLE PROOF that the U.K. government has been
> >testing UFOs ( and dissecting ALIEN CORPSES) at their base at Machrihanish,
>
> Nah, you're just confusing Alien corpses with the average westie.
> Understandable mistake. We only retain them to give the midges a
> round-the-year locally-available food supply until the German tourists
> appear in the summer.
>
> cleverly
> >disguising test flights of same as those by Aurora and, in times past, SR-71s? Wait,
> >I hear the black helicopters coming to get me. I can feel the beams as they try to
> >alter my brain. Excuse me while I done my tinfoil hat.
>
> Interesting theory, although it lacks credibility, until we
> acknowledge the critical role played by the Templars and the
> Illuminatii in the Ministry of Aircraft Production in 1942 [censored]

That would explain the Templars' intimate knowledge of Spitfire fuel tankage, as reposted
well above ;-)

Guy

[John Halliwell]

In article >, The Revolution Will Not
Be Televised > writes
>They all had facility for 2 pilots, e.g. extra controls could be
>fitted to the Halifax and Lanc if neccessary, but basically they had
>ceased to be 2-pilot aircraft by 1943.

I'm not sure if they were intended to be operational with two pilots,
I've only ever seen references to an extra set of controls if required,
presumably mostly for training (although all the sources I have suggest
training was done with only one set of controls). Most sources seem to
suggest movement to/from the nose was awkward enough without extra
controls getting in the way.

Even for daylight ops, I'm not sure if a second pilot would have been
carried, maybe the flight engineers would have received additional
training (as some did unofficially from their pilots). I'm not sure when
autopilots became common equipment (1943 perhaps?), they'd take some of
the workload off the pilot.

--
John

[Peter Stickney]

In article >,
(The Revolution Will Not Be Televised) writes:
> On Wed, 20 Aug 2003 02:04:33 -0400, (Peter
> Stickney) wrote:
>
> [arbitrarily moved to this thread by me]
>
>>I've been delayed my own self, but I'll invite myself back in...
>
> By all means, except I also note a depressing lack of nationalistic
> abuse in this post.

Oh, well then, how's this: The last time a Brit tried to hand my
family a line like that we threw his tea in the harbor.


> [rear fuselage tanks in Spit Vcs]
>
>>The Spit, especially the small tailed Mk V, had a very narrow CG
>>range. Something on the order of 1.6". The later aircraft, both the
>>2-stage Merlin powered VIII, IX, and XVIs, and the various Griffon
>>models, also had a narrow range, but had the advantage of a heavier
>>engine way up front to even things out. It'a also teh case that
>>retracting the gear on a Spit translated the CG aft nearly half of its
>>range. That's teh problem with dainty little airplanes - it doesn't
>>take much to upset 'em.
>
> OK, but let's be clear about the standard of aircraft modification
> involved. Did this include an enlarged elevator horn balance, and if
> not how much aftwards CoG movement did bob-weights plus elevator
> adaption provide? Quill states that the bob weights gave about 2
> inches of rearward travel, and the westland elevator tested at the end
> of 1942 gave a "significant amount of C of G travel" with the enlarged
> horn balance being "even more effective", although I don't have exact
> figures for the CoG movement involved.

That's going to take a lot of fiddly meaduring & figuruing to say for
sure, but, looking over the inboard profiles (X-ray views) of both
aircraft, one thing does stand out - a Spitfire's cockpit is aft of
the wing, and well aft of the CG. And the fuselage ahead of the
cockpit is already full of stuff. (Fuel, mostly) The available space
behind the cockpit is a long way aft of the CG, which isn't good.
A Mustang's cocpit is over the wing. The aft tank location is
basically right at the trailing edge. Not only is the airplane more
tolerant of how it's loaded, the tank location is in a better place.

That might be a reason for the Sutton Harness in a Spit- you wouldn't
want the pilot leaning forward causing the airplane to nose down!
(Actually, I have doen this with light airplaes, to demonstrate the
balance of forces to (captive audience) passengers - lean forward,
nose down, lean back, nose up.)

>>Other U.S. fighters that I could dig up in short order are the P-40,
>>with a CG range of 8.9", and the P-63 with a range of 5.4". On first
>>analysis, stuffing an aft fuel tank into a Spit V is a much more dicey
>>proposition that doing the same with a P-51.
>
> Agreed, but is this insoluable? The question doesn't appear as easily
> to definatively answer (either way) as it first appeared to me.

Well, for teh Mk VIII and Mk XIV, it indeed was. FOr a Mk V, I'm not
sure.

>>Actually, if you're looking for a fairly long-ranged Medium/Low
>>altitude escort fighter already in RAF hands in 1942, might I suggest
>>the Allison-engined Mustang I, IA< and II. They're long legged, adn
>>while they don't climb as well as a normally loaded Spit V, they're
>>danged fast, accelerate well, and can meet an Fw 190A on fairly equal
>>terms. Mustang Is were the first RAF fighters over Germany, after teh
>>fall of France, and they spent a lot of time stooging around in the
>>same areas that are being proposed as Medium Bomber targets.
>
> Sure: I've no objection to using them as B-25 escorts, as they
> actually were historically, except to expand this usage. I still feel
> the altitude limitation and the numbers available leave the LR Spit V
> a live issue nonetheless. Even Typhoons got used as 2 Group escorts
> on occasion, and in this scenario there's a real attritional premium
> to be paid for allowing the Luftwaffe undistracted attention on
> daylight Lancaster forces, above and beyond what B-17s suffered, and
> as a result I think the "everything and the kitchen sink" approach
> would be adopted. The commitment of the available fighter force would
> need to be much higher than the RAF historically got away with.

Actually, according to the A&AEE's reports on testing Mustang Is, and
various Mk Vs, I don't see a whole lot of difference in altitude
performance, even without the Mustang II's higher-supercharged engine.
It didn't climb as well as a Spit, adn it didn't quite turn as well,
but it did out-speed, out-turn and out-zoom the Fw 190As that the
Abbeville boys were flying. (Speaking of which, is Holly Hills still
extant? I know he was recovering from his stroke a few years back.)

>
>>Perhaps. It's also the case that the RAF were never really in the
>>Long Range Escort business. Most of their missions didn't require
>>flying Combat Air Patrols over German airfields near Prague. The aft
>>fuel tank didn't provide a whole lof of gain for the RAF.
>
> Precisely. We need to posit a sufficient instiutional change of
> policy and interest to even begin this, but as nothing would happen
> without it, we might as well take it as a given.

Well, I could begin my somewhat-factually based Nationalistic Rant
about how the Brits, and Europeans in general never figured out how to
put long range into fighter airplanes becasue their countries are so
danged small, and that you can't ever be more than an hour from a
National Border or coastline, unlike those of us who need to be able
to fly stuff from San Francisco to Honolulu routinely, but I won't.

>>Just my opinion, mind, but I think the thing that really would have
>>crimped an RAF long range day bombing effort would have been pilot
>>availability. The RAF Night Heavies (Except, I think, for the
>>Stirling), were 1 pilot airplanes.
>
> They all had facility for 2 pilots, e.g. extra controls could be
> fitted to the Halifax and Lanc if neccessary, but basically they had
> ceased to be 2-pilot aircraft by 1943.
>
>>That's not enough if you expect to
>>be getting shot at by people wh actually can see what they're shooting
>>at. You're going to want copilots, and where are you going to get
>>them? The Empire Air Training Scheme was a tremendous achievement,
>>but it was pretty stretched supplying the pilots that the RAF needed
>>in real life. And you'll have to divert even more pilots to be
>>instructors.
>
> The loading on the training infrastructure would increase, and the
> attritionally-supportable force would shrink, but then again BC took
> heavy casualties and expanded, and I'm not aware of a critical aircrew
> shortage: aircrew training slots seem to be over-subscribed since
> 1941, with pools of aircrew forming everywhere except in Bomber
> Command. The output of trained pilots is an issue, but then I'm not
> aware of it being inadequate historically. If anything, the British
> prioritised aircrew training too much in the period 1941-43 with
> repercussions elsewhere on the war effort (e.g. infantry replacements
> in 1944-45).

It's a good question, though. If you suddenly start needing twice as
many bomber pilots, the repercussions will be far & wide.
>
>>Again, I must disagree. The cold, hard numbers say that the Spit was
>>a lot less tolerant of stuffing weight behind the wings. It's
>>intersting to note that the Wright Field modified Spits got a big
>>chunk of their extra capacity by stuffing fuel into the wing leading
>>edges, which not only didn't upset the CG as much, but moved it in the
>>forward (good) direction, somewhat counterbalancing the tank behind
>>the cockpit.
>
> Yes, but even the Wright Field Spits also had 43 gallon tanks behind
> the pilot, against 33 gallons in the wings (according to the A&AEE
> report summary on MK210 in S&M). Wing tanks have always been a given
> with me, as you & Guy have already specified Mk VIII airframes, which
> had 25 gall leading-edge tanks, but as Quill states, the only
> available space for major increases in internal fuel was behind the
> pilot.

43 of _whose_ gallons? It's worth pointing out that the Wright Field
modded aircraft used a somewhat smaller tank behind the cockpit, adn
stucl 150 U.S. Gallons of fuel under the wings, where CG wasn't an
issue. I'll admit to being a bit puzzled about why the RAF never went
for wing rack mounted drops on a Spit, until it occurred to me that
there isn't any significant amount of fuel in the wing, and teh
plumbing and pumping is going to be a royal pain.

> You have also opened the drop-tank issue a little wider here with the
> two 62 gallon underwing tanks carried by MK210, which is also useful
> for the discussion. The Vc airframe could well have taken drop tanks
> in the under-wing bomb positions: a 44 gallon drop tank under each
> wing would give us another 88 galllons to go with a 90 or 45 gallon
> slipper tank. Granted, this isn't increasing the combat radius, and
> even I'm dubious about the weight issues, but every gallon gives
> greater possibilities for deeper penetration escort up to the limit of
> the internal fuel only return-to-base range.

See above.

>>Much less, according to the reports. To increase the CG range of a Mk
>>V enough to fit a rear tank, you'll need a bigger tail, and ballast in
>>the nose. At that point, it stops being a Field Conversion, and
>>starts looking like a remanufacturing job.
>
> This all hinges on the CoG travel the remedial measures like
> bob-weights and elevator modification provides. I can't really go any
> further until I have some kind of figure to associate with the latter.
> I appreciate the rational grounds for your doubts, but I don't think
> this issue is resolved yet.

Well, the elevator balance change will add to the stabilizer/elevator
combination area, and that's good. It also will reduce the control
forces for pitch, possibly to the point whre the controls are
over-balanced, and once you start waving the stick around, it wants to
amplify the action, and that's bad, leading to overcontrolling at
beast, and breaking the airplane at worst, especially with an airplane
that's already pretty light on the controls, like a Spit. The
bobweight tends to resist this overbalancing, at a cost in stick
forces. The thing is, the amount of influence from the bobweight
changes, like the elevator balance, with deflection. It's confusing,
adn there's no intuitive answer other than make the tail bigger.
The same applies to the rudder, as well.

>>If I get a chance, I'll run some numbers for how much fuel it would
>>take to get a Spit V to its rear limit. At a first guess, I'd say
>>"Not Much". The rearward shift when the gear comes up is a problem.
>
> Granted. But none of this works without the hierarchy breathing fire
> from the CAS on down for long-range escorts a la Arnold. Let me know
> what you think could be done with a range of figures, from 4 inches
> rearward travel on up, which seems a reasonable conjectural starting
> point for me. Don't forget to use the Vc airframe as a reference
> rather than a Vb in regard to landing gear.

I'll get round to it, after...
>
> Alternatively, sit out in the sun with a cold beer instead.....

After the Great Blaster Worm and Sobig Hydra chases I've had this
week, that's top priority. (Work real job, than travel up to the
North COuntry to help out some former clients)

--
Pete Stickney
A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many
bad measures. -- Daniel Webster

[Guy Alcala]

The Revolution Will Not Be Televised wrote:

> On Wed, 20 Aug 2003 08:42:55 GMT, Air Commodore Guy Alcala, Director
> of Fighter Operations > wrote:

Isn't rapid promotion in wartime wonderful? And to think, I was just a lowly Wing Commander on
Butch's staff a month or so ago, along with then Group Captain Stickney.

<snip>

> >Yes, you're right about the aft tanks. OTOH, those a/c with cut down rear fuselages also
> >had increased forward fuselage fuel and in some cases leading edge tanks (according to
> >several sources which I take to be credible), and I think larger horizontal tails, so
> >clearly they wanted to move the Cg back forward again (more fuel forward, less aft) and
> >improve the stability.
>
> Ah, but the tankage juggling didn't happen quite as sequentially and
> in such a comprehensive fashion. These things were much more
> piecemeal than an overall summary makes them appear. A comprehensive
> history of the modification states at and after delivery of all
> Spitfire models would be nice, but frankly it seems like a task better
> left to candidates for extensive residence in purgatory.

Reviewing some of the "here they are, now they're gone" tank capacities in the A&AEE test
reports on the 4th FG website, I'm beginning to think you're right.


> >For instance, here's a post from a couple of years back on this
> >subject:
>
> Well, this chap seems to talk some sense for once in this
> thread....[cough]
>
> > In late model Spitfires with
> >tear-drop canopies (late '44 production), the front tankage was
> >increased to 95 gallons while the rear fuselage tankage was reduced to
> >66 gallons (for roughly the same total tankage).
>
> That's not entirely true, although I do enjoy the rueful pleasure of
> hoisting myself with my own petard. I don't think it's possible to
> definatively state that all RF-tanked Spit IXs had increased forward
> tankage. There's no reason this can't be the case in the ATL we're
> considering, though.
>
> >The Spitfire VII & VIII formed the airframe basis for the later
> >production Spitfires, and apart from some early Mk XII Spitfire's
> >converted from Mark V's, all Mark XII and Mark XIV Spitfires had
> >similar tankage arrangements of 96 gallon forward internal tanks and
> >26 gallons in wing tanks.
>
> Again, this seems to be out, based on my understanding as it has
> evolved over the past couple of years.

Indeed.
--------------------------------------------

AFDU Wittering July 1943 Spitfire XIV JF317

SHORT TACTICAL TRIALS OF EXPERIMENTAL SPITFIRE XIV

INTRODUCTION

On instructions from Headquarters, Fighter Command, an experimental Spitfire XIV JF317 (Griffon
61) was made available by
A&AEE for three days for short tactical trials. The trials took the form of a direct comparison
with a Spitfire VIII (Merlin 63)
JF664, and flying took place from 27 to 29 July 1943.

BRIEF DESCPRIPTION

The aircraft used is a conversion of the Spitfire VIII. The larger engine involves a much longer
engine cowling and the extra
weight forward has been balanced by ballast in the tail. The fin has been increased in area to
help directional stability and a
large rudder is fitted. This aircraft had the normal span wings of the Spitfire VIII with small
span ailerons, but the extended wing
tips had been replaced by the standard wing tips as on the MK IX. The engine is not
representative of production as the FS
gear is higher and the MS lower. A five blade propeller is fitted. The engine had a Bendix
injection carberator and boost for
combat is limited to plus 15 lbs. The Spitfire VIII weighed 7,760 lb, the XIV 8,376.

<snip>

Range and Endurance- Both aircraft carry the same amount of fuel (96 gallons in the main tank
and 27 gallons in two wing
tanks.) Refueling checks made to compare consumption showed than when the two aircraft stayed
together throughtout the
trials, the Griffon engine was using approximately 10-15 gallons more fuel per hour than the
Merlin.
-----------------------------------------------------

So it appears that the "standard" Mk. VIII as well as the Mk. VIII(G) conversions did indeed
have an internal capacity of 123 gallons, as early as July 1943. But then the weight and
loading data for the second _production_ Mk. XIV, RB. 141, dated 15 Dec. 1943, state that it has
112 gallons, 85 in the fuselage (i.e. the original fuselage tanks) plus the 27 in the wing L.E.
Just to confuse things, there's the later test below:

-------------------------------------------------------

INTRODUCTION

1. In accordance with instructions from Headquarters, A.D.G.B., tactical trials have been
completed on Spitfire XIV. Aircraft
No. RB.141 was delivered to this Unit on 28.1.44 for comparative trials with the Tempest V. It
was discovered that this
aircraft was not representative of production aircraft for Squadrons, and Spitfire XIV No.
RB.179 was made available and
delivered on 25.2.44. The operational weight with full fuel and ammunition is 8,400 lbs. To give
a clear picture to the greatest
number, the Spitfire IX (maximum engine settings +18 lbs boost, 3,000 revs) has been chosen for
full comparison, and not the
Spitfire XII which is a low altitude aircraft built only in small numbers. Tactical comparisons
have been made with the Tempest
V and Mustang III, and combat trials have been carried out against the FW 190 (BMW 801D) and Me
109G.

<snip>

TACTICAL COMPARISON WITH SPITFIRE IX

13. The tactical differences are caused chiefly by the fact that the Spitfire XIV has an engine
of greater capacity and is the
heavier aircraft (weighing 8,400 lbs. against 7,480 lbs. of Spitfire IX).

Range & Endurance
14. The Spitfire XIV, without a long-range tank, carries 110 gallons of fuel and 9 gallons of
oil. When handled similarily, the
Spitfire XIV uses fuel at about 1 1/4 times the rate of the Spitfire IX. Its endurance is
therefore slightly less. Owing to its higher
speed for corresponding engine settings, its range is about equal. For the same reasons, extra
fuel carried in a long-range tank
keeps its range about equal to that of the Spitfire IX, its endurance being slightly less.
------------------------------------------------------------

Now, was that 110 gallons a misprint, a rough rounding (seems unlikely), representative of the
"standard" production a/c (details of differences not given) as opposed to the "non-standard"
RB. 141, or just Supermarine fitting in whatever tanks they happened to have on the shelf on any
particular day?

> > Later Mark XIV and Mk XVIII Spitfires had
> >rear fuselage tanks, either of 62 gallons capacity.
>
> Note that the FR XIVs, with cameras in place of one of the RF tanks,
> still had the second 33 gallon tank. I think RF-tanked Mk XIVs can't
> be dismissed out of hand. But one maniacal idea at a time.

Brng it up again and it's off to Wandsworth with you, for sabotaging the war effort.

> >You may recognize the poster's style, although he's since undergone a revolutionary
> >reincarnation ;-)
>
> Via a publically-acclaimed stint as a German emperor's hairstyle...
>
> Nonetheless, it's a reasonable summary but I think the forward tank
> size is probably not representative. The Pilot's Notes for the Mk XII
> give a standard 85-gallon forward tankage, the PN's for the F.21 give
> it the same tankage and ditto for the Mk XVIII.

Interestingly enough, the tactical test of the Mk. XII EN. 223 in Dec. 1942 includes the
following comment:
-------------------------------------------
Flying Characteristics

5. In the air the handling of both EN.223, and another production Spitfire XII which was made
available by Supermarine for one day, were felt to be far superior to the normal Spitfire IX or
VB, being exceptionally good in the lateral control which is crisper and lighter due to the
clipped wings. The longitudinal stability is much better than that of the Spitfire V, and in the
dive it was particularly noticed that when trimmed for cruising flight, it stays in easily at
400 m.p.h. I.A.S., and does not recover fiercely. In turns the stick load is always positive and
the control very comfortable.
-----------------------------------------------

Also "It is fitted with facilities for beam approach and about the first seven, including the
aircraft on trial, have the oil tank behind the pilot. This is not acceptable operationally and
subsequent aircraft will have the oil tank mounted immediately aft of the fireproof bulkhead.
The fuel capacity is retained at 85 gallons, and jettison tanks can be used if required."
Moving the oil tank forward would of course shift the Cg in the same direction, boosting the
stability even more.


> Both of the latter
> were definative production versions, with plenty of time to include
> larger forward tankage in the production lines if it had been decided
> upon as a production version requirement.
>
> The PN's for the VII/VIII/X do refer to an increased 96 gallon forward
> tankage, so you're right and it would be valid for the Merlin LR Spit,
> but not for the Griffons, I suspect.

So it seems, from the Mk. VIII/conversion Mk. XIV test quoted above, and the various Mk. XIV
prodution tests..


> >> In this case we have a Mk IX with 85 gallons internal forward tanks
> >> and about 40 gallons in the rear tank within apparently tolerable
> >> limits for combat.
> >
> >With which tail, and did the a/c have leading edge tanks?
>
> Vc tail, no leading edge tanks. I think we can summarise on a LR Spit
> VIII having the following:
>
> 96 gallons internal forward tanks (47 and 49 gallons)
> 25 gallons internal wing tanks (two 12.5 gallon tanks; conservative
> figures used)
>
> The Spit VIII srs ii a.k.a. Spit LR VIII gets this extra -
>
> 75 gallons internal rear fuselage tank.
>
> This gives a potential internal fuel capacity of 196 gallons, with a
> further 90 available from external slipper or drop tanks. How this
> translates to range might be worth exploring. Much of this is pure
> conjecture on my part, I should add, and please correct me if you have
> a better idea of the figures involved.
>
> The PN's for the VIII give an allowance of 9 gallons for run-up and
> take-off. That should be out of the rear tank.

Depends. For safety reasons it's more likely to be from one of the main tanks, so as to avoid
any fumbling during takeoff if there are feed problems. I'm assuming that all the drops, aft
fuselage and L.E. tanks all feed into one of the main tanks, like the Mustang. I don't know the
details of the Spit's fuel plumbing.


> Climbing at 160 IAS (if I'm assuming this correctly from the curves
> given) should take perhaps 15 gallons and maybe 15 minutes to 25,000
> feet on a low revs weak mixture. The performance curve I'm looking at
> only covers a clean aircraft, so an extra 5 gallons or so to cover the
> higher weight might be reasonable. I'm assuming wing rendezvous and
> assembly could be done on the climb phase, if not let's assume another
> 5 gallons. This knocks off 34 gallons from the rear tank, and should
> mean the aircraft is reasonably stable when they depart the English
> coast.
>
> I imagine the rest of the profile would be flown at a low-revs,
> high-boost weak mixture cruise. That could go down to 1,800 rpm, but
> then there's the tactical need to maintain a high airspeed. I suggest
> your wing commanders cruisie at 2,200 rpm and +4 boost, for a
> consumption of 61 gallons per hour. That should give about 6.5 air
> mpg, or maybe 6 when the drag of the external tank is taken into
> consideration.

What kind of air speed does that give you? Zemke says that they normally cruised at maybe
210-220 IAS on Rodeos (doesn't say specifically what the cruise was on Ramrods), giving 320-325
TAS at escort altitudes.

> There obviously needs to be a contingency reserve on the internal
> forward fuel, maybe 10 gallons as a minimum. This gives us 24 gallons
> in the wing tanks, 86 usable in the forward tanks, 41 left in the rear
> tanks and 90 in the drop tank. The priority would be to expend fuel
> in the tanks which cause performance degredation, so the rear and drop
> tanks would have the priority. We'd have to assume a minimum of 10
> minutes at full combat settings for the engine, which at +18 lbs and
> 3,000 rpm (even if it might not attain this in high-altitude combat, I
> want to be conservative). At 150 gallons per hour, this means as much
> as 25 gallons being used in combat, and this must come from the
> internal fuel.
>
> So the internal fuel situation is looking like 34 gallons for climb
> and assembly from the rear tank, a 10 gallon reserve from the front
> tanks (the last to be emptied and the ones you'd be on when stooging
> about East Anglia in the fog desperately seeking somewhere to land)
> and 25 gallon allocation for combat from the same tanks.
>
> This leaves 41 gallons in the rear tanks and 76 gallons in the wing
> and forward tanks, not including 90 in the drop tank.
>
> The remaining 117 gallons of internal fuel should give a still air
> range of about 700 miles, or about 350 miles radius under good
> cruising conditions. The 90 gallon tank should give a further
> still-air range of 500 miles or so, but none of that can be relied
> upon as it will be jettisoned at the first sing of combat. The range
> on internal fuel is more impressive than I thought. The drop tank
> would be useful getting across the North Sea, and as the USAAF
> demonstrated, could be held on until German fighters were spotted long
> past the enemy-held coast, and so the internal fuel would really only
> be needed for combat and returning from combat.
>
> If these figures (admittedly from a "back of fag packet" provenance)
> have any pretence at being representative, it seems the Director of
> Fighter Operations (Air Commodore Alcala) and the Air Member for
> Research and Development (AVM Stickney) might be on to something here.
> The Spit LR VIII might well have been very useful as an
> intermediate-range escort.

I think some of your assumptions are a wee bit optimistic for Wing-size ops, but agree with the
general tenor.

> >Every source I have implies or claims that all Mk. VIIIs had the bigger forward fuselage
> >tanks, but I'm willing to be convinced otherwise.
>
> I'm not going to push that angle: it seems a reasonable enough
> assumption on the basis of the evidence I have.
>
> >But the tank size increase, according to
> >a different poster from a couple of years ago, was something that could be done on any Mk.
> >VIII or IX -- the space was always there, it just hadn't been used. Oddly enough,
>
> Some IXs did get it, but I can't discover the logic or process
> involved at this stage.

I increasingly wonder if it was a matter of "whatever the subcontractors deliver today." Any
idea who made the internal tanks (if not Supermarine), and if there was more than one company
involved?


> >which contains the tctical trial data for AB 505 from April 1942, (i.e. prior to the
> >testing of AB 197, which had the usual 85 gal.), states that
> >
> >"25......... The fuel capacity of the Spitfire IX is 92 gallons, 57 in the top tank and 35
> >in the bottom tank. This is 10 gallons more
> >than the Spitfire VC."
>
> That's interesting, as it's not the actual VII or VII forward tank
> profile (47 gallons top and 49 gallons bottom). This might be an
> unrepresentative example. I think the VIII capacity is plausible
> enough, and they began production in November 1942.

Yeah, I have no idea where the 92 gallons comes from, or how it can be considered "10 more than
the Spit Vc."

> >> Yes, but I suggest what Wright Field did was a reliable indicator of
> >> what the USAAF would have done if Spitfire production and procurement
> >> was within their grasp. A&AEE whinges about instability would get
> >> short shrift in this situation.
> >
> >Oh, I don't know. They found it impossible to increase the tankage of the P-39/P-63 for Cg
> >reasons, and those a/c certainly could have used it in our service (it didn't matter to the
> >Russians, but that was due to local theater conditions).
>
> They did apparently stick a 43 gallon tank behind the pilot, which is
> interestingly enough when we bear in mind the 75 gallon tankage
> becoming tolerable after 34 gallons were used; i.e. taking it down to
> 41 gallons behind the pilot. I really think there is some valid
> mileage there, especially since MK210, the aircraft in question had
> normal Vc/IX tail surfaces, and not the Mk VIII extended tail which
> would have improved stability further.
>
> >If the fuel in the external drop tank(s) is already roughly equal to the internal capacity
> >needed to return, as it was with the 90 gal. tank, adding extra internal fuel that can't be
> >used in combat does nothing for the combat radius, which is what we're interested in.
> >Zemke makes this point with regard to the carriage of 2 x 108 USG tanks on P-47s prior to
> >the D-25 models. All the earlier versions had 305 USG internal, and the switch from a
> >single CL 150 (nominal) USG tank to a pair of 108s did little or nothing to extend the
> >radius, although it did boost the endurance in the same area.
>
> I appreciate the distinction, but pre-combat endurance at the range
> limit is still an important advantage, especially in this scenario.
> I'm not asserting that an LR Spit could replace the longer ranged
> escorts like the P-38 and P-51. It could have moved out to
> Thunderbolt-radius, and that would have been a major benefit. While
> the early P-47 groups were complaining about range and endurance
> difficulties, they still did a lot of good work within their
> attainable radius.

Agreed. It seems that the break point in practice for radius extension is reached when the
external capacity is roughly 2/3rd of the (combat usable) internal. Beyond that you're just
boosting the endurance or ferry range.

<snip>

> >Certainly what we intended to do, with range extension pushed to priority one. Would you
> >happen to know what the production of Mk. VIIIs was in say October through Dec. '43, or
> >maybe Jan. '44, inclusive?
>
> No, but the service acceptances by the RAF seem to be (by a hand and
> eye count of the appendices in Shacklady & Morgan, so I can't claim
> any real authority for these figures) about 90 in July 1943, 98 in
> October, declining to 67 in November, 53 in December and 28 in January
> 1944. This doesn't reflect production figures per se, as the aircraft
> had often been in storage for some time or were shipped to Casablanca
> or India, and had actually been produced earlier. But it does give an
> indicator of deliveries, which is almost what you want.

We're in fat city, then, and I see no need to mess around with Mk. Vs. The October acceptances
will allow us to form 3 squadrons immediately plus 50% reserves (ideally we'd want at least
100%), more than sufficient force for escorting the first 'Combat wing' of heavies we form in 3
Gp.

> Bear in mind there was a minor changeover to Mk XIV production
> (starting with 2 aircraft in October 1943, to about 7 per month in
> December 1943) at this point. Otherwise the Eastleigh production
> group under Supermarine were moving to producing Seafires and fooling
> about with XVIII and F.21 development (which would take aeons to
> culminate in a production version). The main production resource was
> Castle Bromwich, which was churning out Mk IXs at this point.
>
> I don't see why Mk VIII airframe production couldn't be extended and
> maintained at about 90 per month. That should be enough to operate 9
> squadrons (on 20 a/c i.e. strength, 10 per month per sqn to replace
> losses) on a reasonable 50% per month wastage figure without even
> touching CBAF. As tanks become available, the CBAF IXs can mutate
> into VIIIs and then LR VIIIs.

Seems reasonable, although we'd want to boost Mk. VIII production well above 90/month, to allow
us to re-equip Fighter Command faster and supply the overseas squadrons. In the meantime, they
get the Mk. IXs that we're not replacing with Mk. VIIIs.


> > I'm thinking that a move like Arnold's (he gave the ETO _all_
> >P-38 and P-51 production for a three month period in late '43), giving Fighter Command all
> >the Mk. VIII production in that period, would be enough to get us going. The MTO and
> >everyone else will just have to accept Mk. VC Trops and/or Mk. IXs for a while longer (they
> >were already using them in any case).
>
> Well, it looks like the real bottleneck is in fitting enlarged main
> tanks, wing tanks and rear fuselage tanks to the IX. I don't have the
> information to scale this into consideration, but I can't believe that
> tank production couldn't have been expanded.
>
> >And Quill mentions that the F.21 a/c which A&AEE finally accepted had its handling much
> >improved over the original version he was trying to get them to accept.
>
> Yes, they did: by early 1945, after production deliveries began in
> August 1944. In my version of this scenario, after appointing myself
> as Air Member for Production at the MAP and Air Council, I'm telling
> Supermarine to continue Mk VIII production and move the F.21 onto the
> back burner, although fighting for an allocation of Mk VIII airframes
> for conversion to Mk XIV offset from Castle Bromwich beginning
> production of LR Spit IXs with LR Mk VIII tankange to keep ACdr Alcala
> and AVM Strickney quiet. This gives us an interim two-stage Griffon
> version in service in February 1944 without all the dislocation caused
> by the arseing about producing unusable F.21s in the short term.

An excellent plan.

> >Pete and I certainly hoped that would be the case, although I don't know that the rear
> >tankage was critical.
>
> Maybe not as much as I thought, but still, let's go for it as a Spit
> VIII series ii (Long-Range) standard to come in when possible. With
> ACM Kramer in charge that might happen a lot sooner than in OTL.

Not to mention Winston pushing.

> >I don't agree that was the case by mid '43. Under no conceivable set of circumstances
> >could Fighter Command lose air superiority over the UK then.
>
> Well, we know that now, and I'm sure some did at the time, but don't
> underestimate the retentive power of the 1940-41 institutional and
> beurocratic memories, and the impact of the production priorities
> which were shaped then.
>
> > As it was, Fighter Command
> >was over-manned and equipped, and as you have yourself stated, under-utilized. What
> >happened in Burma and in the Italian campaign weren't going to decide the war, and the
> >Russians could have survived quite well without Spitfires.
>
> I'd say so as well, but the political ramifications were not easily
> dismissed. The Aussies, India Command, the DAF, the Americans and
> Russians had all asked for and been promised Spitfire allocations
> which were still required at the time. These all had to come out of
> Mk IX production. I don't think this is as big a problem as I'd
> initially assumed if the main bottleneck is building and fitting the
> internal tanks: there was no need to stop production meanwhile, even
> if there was a shortage of tanks to fit them all.

Ah, but we're doing a direct swap, giving them Mk. IXs instead of Mk. VIIIs, just for a few
months. As it is, 31st FG was flying a mix of Mk. Vs, Mk. IXs and Mk. VIIIs in Italy, so the
U.S. would just have to wait on the Mk. VIIIs for a while.

> > If nothing else, we could have
> >produced more P-39s/P-63s, which in any case were etter suited to conditions on that front.
>
> I wouldn't disagree with that, but again, it's a judgement borne of
> hindsight. Nobody was going to emerge successfully unscathed from a
> Chief of Staffs meeting with Winnie present after voicing the
> suggestion that Russian allocation of British fighters be cut
> entirely.

Hey, they can have all the Mk. IXs they want.

> >That would explain the Templars' intimate knowledge of Spitfire fuel tankage, as reposted
> >well above ;-)
>
> Wait till the German emperor's hairpiece turns up on Google with it's
> own unique contribution to make. Have I mentioned Sabre-powered
> Lancasters yet?

Yes, you have, oh spawn of the devil;-)

Guy

[Dave Eadsforth]

In article >, Peter Stickney
> writes
>In article >,
> (The Revolution Will Not Be Televised) writes:
>> On Wed, 20 Aug 2003 02:04:33 -0400, (Peter
>> Stickney) wrote:

SNIP lots

>That might be a reason for the Sutton Harness in a Spit- you wouldn't
>want the pilot leaning forward causing the airplane to nose down!

The Sutton harness, because of that lousy pin-and-hole arrangement, was
only ever capable of stopping pear-shaped people from moving around.
RAF fighter pilots tended to be slightly slimmer...

>(Actually, I have doen this with light airplaes, to demonstrate the
>balance of forces to (captive audience) passengers - lean forward,
>nose down, lean back, nose up.)
>
The refined version of this was carried out by a rugger team on a flight
in a small airliner some years ago. While the stewardess was busy in
the galley, the team members went to the back of the aircraft one by one
(at a rate calculated by a pilot member of the team to make the pilot of
the aircraft trim back slowly) and then at a given signal they all ran
forwards again...yeeehaaaa!

Cheers,

Dave

--
Dave Eadsforth

[Guy Alcala]

Peter Stickney wrote:

> In article >,
> John Halliwell > writes:
> > In article >, The Revolution Will Not
> > Be Televised > writes
> >>They all had facility for 2 pilots, e.g. extra controls could be
> >>fitted to the Halifax and Lanc if neccessary, but basically they had
> >>ceased to be 2-pilot aircraft by 1943.
> >
> > I'm not sure if they were intended to be operational with two pilots,
> > I've only ever seen references to an extra set of controls if required,
> > presumably mostly for training (although all the sources I have suggest
> > training was done with only one set of controls). Most sources seem to
> > suggest movement to/from the nose was awkward enough without extra
> > controls getting in the way.
> >
> > Even for daylight ops, I'm not sure if a second pilot would have been
> > carried, maybe the flight engineers would have received additional
> > training (as some did unofficially from their pilots). I'm not sure when
> > autopilots became common equipment (1943 perhaps?), they'd take some of
> > the workload off the pilot.
>
> It's not so much a question of workload as is is, uhm, having a backup
> pilot fully capable of flying a probably damaged airplane to a safe
> recovery. Yes, quite a number of Lancaster and Halifax FEs got stick
> time, but how many were practicing engine-out landings? For that
> matter, if you've got a damaged airplane, you want somebody to fly
> while the FE keeps things together.

I'll disagree here. You want two pilots so they can take turns flying tight
formation. For night ops it was no big deal to put the a/c on george and have
the first and second pilots swap out (before they replaced the 2nd pilot with
a FE). That's not an option when flying in a combat box. With only a single
pilot the formations are going to be looser, and that's the last thing the
Brit heavies need, as they're already going to be the ground bait. Once air
superiority is won and the invasion has happened it's not as big a deal,
becaue there's less need to fly tight formation for as long, but we're talking
about the period before that occurs. Both Lanc and Halifax have FE seats next
to (and slightly aft) of the pilot, so the space shouldn't be a too much of a
problem. I wasn't aware that these two a/c had provisions for dual controls
built in, although I knew that some had them; when we were trying to figure
out what mods we'd have to make to run these a/c by day, we had allowed a fair
amount of time to design and develop a production dual control system, so it
seems that we were overcautious in estimating how much time that would take.

Guy

[The Revolution Will Not Be Televised]

On Thu, 21 Aug 2003 06:53:31 GMT, Air Commodore Guy Alcala, Director
of Fighter OperationsGuy Alcala >
wrote:

>Isn't rapid promotion in wartime wonderful? And to think, I was just a lowly Wing Commander on
>Butch's staff a month or so ago, along with then Group Captain Stickney.

I'm still the only one of the three of us to appoint himself to the
Air Council, so start bribing me now if you want me to rubber-stamp
your promotion to Air rank.

[96 gall forward tanks in Mk VIIIs reduced to 85 galls in Mk XIVs
using Mk VIII airframes]

[Snip AFDU report on Spit XIV]

>So it appears that the "standard" Mk. VIII as well as the Mk. VIII(G) conversions did indeed
>have an internal capacity of 123 gallons, as early as July 1943. But then the weight and
>loading data for the second _production_ Mk. XIV, RB. 141, dated 15 Dec. 1943, state that it has
>112 gallons, 85 in the fuselage (i.e. the original fuselage tanks) plus the 27 in the wing L.E.
>Just to confuse things, there's the later test below:

[snip next test report]

>Now, was that 110 gallons a misprint,

Nope, you've now moved onto the next tankage problem: the wing tanks!


Notice how I've been using a figure of 12.5 Imperial gallons for them?
Well, their size seems to fluctuate from 12.5 galls up to 16-or even
18 in some later Spits. 12.5 seems to be the most common as this
report bears out: 85 galls forward fuselage plus two 12.5 galls in
the wing giving 110 gallons.

>a rough rounding (seems unlikely), representative of the
>"standard" production a/c (details of differences not given) as opposed to the "non-standard"
>RB. 141, or just Supermarine fitting in whatever tanks they happened to have on the shelf on any
>particular day?

My impression, and it isn't any more than that, but it is nonetheless
based on some limited research on 125 Wing which fielded the first
Spit XIV sqns in 2 TAF, is that 110 is representative of the
RB-serials delivered in late '43 and early '44.

>> Note that the FR XIVs, with cameras in place of one of the RF tanks,
>> still had the second 33 gallon tank. I think RF-tanked Mk XIVs can't
>> be dismissed out of hand. But one maniacal idea at a time.
>
>Brng it up again and it's off to Wandsworth with you, for sabotaging the war effort.

Listen, I'm all for your LR VIIIs, and I'm even helping by pushing for
rear-fuselage tanks for them, but the quid pro quo is XIV production
beginning on schedule, and the fitting of rear tanks to them whenever
possible.

>Interestingly enough, the tactical test of the Mk. XII EN. 223 in Dec. 1942 includes the
>following comment:

[snip better longitudinal stability characteristics than Mk V]

No argument here. Although it did need a larger rudder. And so do we
for the LR VIIIs, BTW.

>Moving the oil tank forward would of course shift the Cg in the same direction, boosting the
>stability even more.

A couple of blocks of steel ballast might assist....

>> The PN's for the VII/VIII/X do refer to an increased 96 gallon forward
>> tankage, so you're right and it would be valid for the Merlin LR Spit,
>> but not for the Griffons, I suspect.
>
>So it seems, from the Mk. VIII/conversion Mk. XIV test quoted above, and the various Mk. XIV
>prodution tests..

Right, there's only so much of this outrageous agreement I'm prepared
to stand.

>> The PN's for the VIII give an allowance of 9 gallons for run-up and
>> take-off. That should be out of the rear tank.
>
>Depends. For safety reasons it's more likely to be from one of the main tanks, so as to avoid
>any fumbling during takeoff if there are feed problems.

I've just been thinking of this. Why not run the rear tank via a pump
(or two for redundancy) to the main tanks to keep them full while
running down the rear tank, just like the approach with the wing
tanks?

>I'm assuming that all the drops, aft
>fuselage and L.E. tanks all feed into one of the main tanks, like the Mustang.

The drops on the Spit didn't at this point, as far as I know. This
caused problems involving fuel starvation when changing to main tanks.
Notably for Al Deere and Buck McNair. Although this might have been
down to vacuum problems in a common feed-line.

> I don't know the
>details of the Spit's fuel plumbing.

Annoyingly, I can't find anything but main tanks and drop tank feed in
the Pilot's Notes, so I don't know how the rear tank was handled.

>> I imagine the rest of the profile would be flown at a low-revs,
>> high-boost weak mixture cruise. That could go down to 1,800 rpm, but
>> then there's the tactical need to maintain a high airspeed. I suggest
>> your wing commanders cruisie at 2,200 rpm and +4 boost, for a
>> consumption of 61 gallons per hour. That should give about 6.5 air
>> mpg, or maybe 6 when the drag of the external tank is taken into
>> consideration.
>
>What kind of air speed does that give you?

180 IAS according to the (rather small-scale) graph at 15,000 feet.
It claims to be valid from 10,000-25,000 feet, but not fully accurate
for rpm at different heights.

>Zemke says that they normally cruised at maybe
>210-220 IAS on Rodeos (doesn't say specifically what the cruise was on Ramrods), giving 320-325
>TAS at escort altitudes.

By November 1942 the Spit Vs at least seem to be cruising at 300mph
TAS at 20,000 feet when anticipating enemy contact. 2,400 rpm +4 lbs
seems to have been one target setting recorded in some primary
documentation I've seen from that time. 2,400 rpm at +4lbs would
increase consumption to 66 galls per hour, but should permit
(according to the graph) 200 IAS within the acceptable revs range.
The Air mpg drops to 6, and we'd need to increase that consumption for
external tank drag, but it doesn't change things much. The relatively
low consumption of the Merlin seems to stand it in good stead there,
but I've always thought the P-47 cruised faster.

>> If these figures (admittedly from a "back of fag packet" provenance)
>> have any pretence at being representative, it seems the Director of
>> Fighter Operations (Air Commodore Alcala) and the Air Member for
>> Research and Development (AVM Stickney) might be on to something here.
>> The Spit LR VIII might well have been very useful as an
>> intermediate-range escort.
>
>I think some of your assumptions are a wee bit optimistic for Wing-size ops

Sure, but I don't think I'm wildly out, and the figures were good
enough to be significant even with a fudge factor.

>, but agree with the
>general tenor.

>> Some IXs did get it, but I can't discover the logic or process
>> involved at this stage.
>
>I increasingly wonder if it was a matter of "whatever the subcontractors deliver today." Any
>idea who made the internal tanks (if not Supermarine), and if there was more than one company
>involved?

Yes, there were several firms involved, some locally around
Southampton. I think CBAF made their own. I don't want to
investigate that nightmare much further. My own suspicion is that any
aircraft reserved as a test-bed tended to perform several test regimes
simultaneously and sequentially, going back and forth from Eastleigh
to Boscombe or Farnborough and having minor non-standard modifications
made on a constant, unrecorded basis. For example, one Spit being
used by A&AEE for gun heating trials with all the modifcations
involved would also have Supermarine sticking new fuel tanks in and
repositioning the IFF set at the same time, and apparently off their
own bat.

>> No, but the service acceptances by the RAF seem to be (by a hand and
>> eye count of the appendices in Shacklady & Morgan, so I can't claim
>> any real authority for these figures) about 90 in July 1943, 98 in
>> October, declining to 67 in November, 53 in December and 28 in January
>> 1944. This doesn't reflect production figures per se, as the aircraft
>> had often been in storage for some time or were shipped to Casablanca
>> or India, and had actually been produced earlier. But it does give an
>> indicator of deliveries, which is almost what you want.
>
>We're in fat city, then, and I see no need to mess around with Mk. Vs.

This is where my political considerations kick in: the promises to
the DAF, the 12th AF and the Russians and the Far East already exist
and need to be serviced. Almost all the VIIIs being produced are
being shipped out to overseas theatres. If you want the whole of Mk
VIII production, when does this decision get made?

My Mk V speculation was based on what would be likely with existing
resources. 12 Group needed that range, and FC didn't give a stuff
what they did with their Mk Vs (e.g. the LF Vb conversions at this
time). Increasing internal tankage would be a small step to them,
without major political considerations. I can only see this whole
scenario working if FC actually have some resources capable of
supporting a daylight effort; even the CAS can't complelely dictate
operational tactics to an RAF C-in-C.

>The October acceptances
>will allow us to form 3 squadrons immediately plus 50% reserves (ideally we'd want at least
>100%), more than sufficient force for escorting the first 'Combat wing' of heavies we form in 3
>Gp.

The actual political changeover point would be earlier: the British
press, establishment and even some in the RAF were very impressed by
aspects of the USAAF daylight bombing effort in the spring and summer
1943. It would really have to happen about then, before Schweinfurt I
reinforced all their prejudices.

>> I don't see why Mk VIII airframe production couldn't be extended and
>> maintained at about 90 per month. That should be enough to operate 9
>> squadrons (on 20 a/c i.e. strength, 10 per month per sqn to replace
>> losses) on a reasonable 50% per month wastage figure without even
>> touching CBAF. As tanks become available, the CBAF IXs can mutate
>> into VIIIs and then LR VIIIs.
>
>Seems reasonable, although we'd want to boost Mk. VIII production well above 90/month,

I'd agree, but frankly you're hitting the limit of the relevant
production resource, i.e. the Hampshire production group focused on
Supermarine's dispersed work. You might get 120 or so out of them per
month of they packed up everything else, bar a couple of PR Spits and
the beginnings of the Mk XIV. The next focus I suggest would be
getting Westlands, finishing off their Mk V production run with
Seafires to move to Mk VIIIs while tackling Castle Bromwich. I think
you could fully convert to Mk VIII-based production by spring 1944,
with an increasing number of rear-tank versions available within that
output, and with the Mk XIV entering service at the same time.

> to allow
>us to re-equip Fighter Command faster and supply the overseas squadrons. In the meantime, they
>get the Mk. IXs that we're not replacing with Mk. VIIIs.

Seems reasonable. By this point the Burmese offensive has been put
off for shipping reasons, and the 12th AF and DAF will be able to
utilise bases on mainland Italy to support operations.

>> This gives us an interim two-stage Griffon
>> version in service in February 1944 without all the dislocation caused
>> by the arseing about producing unusable F.21s in the short term.
>
>An excellent plan.

It shunts the F.21 off until later in 1945, but if the strategic air
offensive is to peak in 1944, we need the LR VIIIs we can get, and if
we're going back into Europe we need more XIVs in the next 12 months
than we need a slightly improved Mk XIV in 1945 at the expense of Mk
XIVs usable for D-Day. And the Admiralty can make do with modified Mk
LF Vbs for their Seafires, as their main fighter resources are going
to be Hellcats and Corsairs, anyway. The RN only needs good deck
fighters to take on the IJN, so it's in the political interest of the
US government (if not in the interests of King's ego) to keep them
supplied under Lend-Lease.

This all actually sounds quite credible, the more I think about it.

>> Maybe not as much as I thought, but still, let's go for it as a Spit
>> VIII series ii (Long-Range) standard to come in when possible. With
>> ACM Kramer in charge that might happen a lot sooner than in OTL.
>
>Not to mention Winston pushing.

I think the political dynamic, i.e. when and how WSC starts pushing,
needs some exploration.

>Ah, but we're doing a direct swap, giving them Mk. IXs instead of Mk. VIIIs, just for a few
>months. As it is, 31st FG was flying a mix of Mk. Vs, Mk. IXs and Mk. VIIIs in Italy,

Likewise the 52nd FG: by spring 1944 and their conversion to
Mustangs, they seem to be almost totally converted to MK VIIIs.
That's about 140-150 Mk VIIIs, not to mention the couple of DAF wings
that had them.

>so the
>U.S. would just have to wait on the Mk. VIIIs for a while.

They would have been useful in 1943, but the peak for that would have
been the extensive over-water operations associated with Sicily,
Salerno and Anzio. They should be fine with Mk IXs in the short term
after September 1943, with the added bonus of getting longer-ranged Mk
IXs in the future. Same for the Far East. Uncle Joe can just get
some of our extensive stock of Mk Vs, and when he actually asks for Mk
IXs in early 1944, we can fob him off with the short-ranged versions.

>> I wouldn't disagree with that, but again, it's a judgement borne of
>> hindsight. Nobody was going to emerge successfully unscathed from a
>> Chief of Staffs meeting with Winnie present after voicing the
>> suggestion that Russian allocation of British fighters be cut
>> entirely.
>
>Hey, they can have all the Mk. IXs they want.

Provided we're getting enough LR IXs for the strategic campaign, 2 TAF
and the DAF, that's fine. I think we'll be on 300 per month by this
stage (total Spit production).

>> >That would explain the Templars' intimate knowledge of Spitfire fuel tankage, as reposted
>> >well above ;-)
>>
>> Wait till the German emperor's hairpiece turns up on Google with it's
>> own unique contribution to make. Have I mentioned Sabre-powered
>> Lancasters yet?
>
>Yes, you have, oh spawn of the devil;-)

Well, it would just need the conversion of 55% of the total British
industrial base to cover replacing the disintegrating sleeve-valves,
and a further 2 million GRT of tanker tonnage to cover the extra oil
consumption involved, but this is a small strategic price to pay for a
fleet of Lancasters cruising at 275 mph at 18,000 feet*.

Gavin Bailey

[* For 5 minutes until the first engine failed.]
--

Another user rings. "I need more space" he says.
"Well, why not move to Texas?", I ask. - The ******* Operator From Hell

[The Revolution Will Not Be Televised]

On Wed, 20 Aug 2003 22:46:44 -0400, Air-Vice Marshal Stickney, Air
Member for Research and Development, wrote:

>> By all means, except I also note a depressing lack of nationalistic
>> abuse in this post.
>
>Oh, well then, how's this: The last time a Brit tried to hand my
>family a line like that we threw his tea in the harbor.

Now that was the kind of atrocity that should have featured in "the
Patriot"....

Still, an innovative approach to evading custioms duties and personal
taxation which I'm sure is maintained as a family tradition under the
IRS and the enlightened leadership of Lord Dubya of Shrub. Shame
about Shay's rebellion, not to mention Sam Adam's interesting
post-colonial take on sedition and the level of property ownership
required to participate in a representative democracy.

Ah, that feels better, now back to the mud-slinging of rational
discourse.

[rear fuselage tanks in Spit Vcs]

>That's going to take a lot of fiddly meaduring & figuruing to say for
>sure, but, looking over the inboard profiles (X-ray views) of both
>aircraft, one thing does stand out - a Spitfire's cockpit is aft of
>the wing, and well aft of the CG. And the fuselage ahead of the
>cockpit is already full of stuff. (Fuel, mostly) The available space
>behind the cockpit is a long way aft of the CG, which isn't good.
>A Mustang's cocpit is over the wing. The aft tank location is
>basically right at the trailing edge. Not only is the airplane more
>tolerant of how it's loaded, the tank location is in a better place.

There's no denying it's a real problem.

>> Agreed, but is this insoluable? The question doesn't appear as easily
>> to definatively answer (either way) as it first appeared to me.
>
>Well, for teh Mk VIII and Mk XIV, it indeed was. FOr a Mk V, I'm not
>sure.

See what you think over the sums when you get a chance.

>Actually, according to the A&AEE's reports on testing Mustang Is, and
>various Mk Vs, I don't see a whole lot of difference in altitude
>performance, even without the Mustang II's higher-supercharged engine.

At 25,000 feet? There's no doubt the Alison Mustang was very useful
below that height, but we need an escort force which performs well in
the 20-25,000 or even 30,000 feet band. I'm dubious about the Mustang
I in that environment, even more so with the Mustang II which I
thought had a lower-altitude supercharger peak.

>It didn't climb as well as a Spit, adn it didn't quite turn as well,
>but it did out-speed, out-turn and out-zoom the Fw 190As that the
>Abbeville boys were flying. (Speaking of which, is Holly Hills still
>extant? I know he was recovering from his stroke a few years back.)

Sorry, I don't know.

>> Precisely. We need to posit a sufficient instiutional change of
>> policy and interest to even begin this, but as nothing would happen
>> without it, we might as well take it as a given.
>
>Well, I could begin my somewhat-factually based Nationalistic Rant
>about how the Brits, and Europeans in general never figured out how to
>put long range into fighter airplanes becasue their countries are so
>danged small, and that you can't ever be more than an hour from a
>National Border or coastline, unlike those of us who need to be able
>to fly stuff from San Francisco to Honolulu routinely, but I won't.

Actually, I don't think that's sufficiently chauvanistic, in that I
think there is a cultural dynamic relatesd to geography at work.
However, the flip side of that is that the Europeans produced better
interceptors in the early war period partly because of their
willingness to cut weight (and fuel carried) to the minimum required
for an area-defence fighter. Now I actually think the early US
fighters (even the P-40 and P-39) were better than their later press
made them out to be, but in this instance I think that for all it's
shortcomings, the Spitfire in 1942-3 was the best type available in
meaningful quantity for altitude combat, which is one reason the USAAF
got it to replace the P-39.

Getting more fuel into the Spitfire airframe, for all the
difficulties, is a better option than trying to make the P-40 or P-39
a competitive high-altitude fighter.

[2 pilot regime]

>> The loading on the training infrastructure would increase, and the
>> attritionally-supportable force would shrink, but then again BC took
>> heavy casualties and expanded, and I'm not aware of a critical aircrew
>> shortage: aircrew training slots seem to be over-subscribed since
>> 1941, with pools of aircrew forming everywhere except in Bomber
>> Command. The output of trained pilots is an issue, but then I'm not
>> aware of it being inadequate historically. If anything, the British
>> prioritised aircrew training too much in the period 1941-43 with
>> repercussions elsewhere on the war effort (e.g. infantry replacements
>> in 1944-45).
>
>It's a good question, though. If you suddenly start needing twice as
>many bomber pilots, the repercussions will be far & wide.

Agreed, but look how many pilots BC were going through in 1943. 100%
losses over 6 months is not insubstantial. If we can keep daylight
raid losses within bounds, which I think is possible, we'll be no
worse off even if we half the size of 3 Group's initial operational
strength.

>> Yes, but even the Wright Field Spits also had 43 gallon tanks behind
>> the pilot, against 33 gallons in the wings (according to the A&AEE
>> report summary on MK210 in S&M). Wing tanks have always been a given
>> with me, as you & Guy have already specified Mk VIII airframes, which
>> had 25 gall leading-edge tanks, but as Quill states, the only
>> available space for major increases in internal fuel was behind the
>> pilot.
>
>43 of _whose_ gallons?

I thought Imperial - were the 62.5 gallon Mustang underwing tanks used
in that trial US or Imperial? They look bigger than 44/45 gallon RAF
tanks.

> It's worth pointing out that the Wright Field
>modded aircraft used a somewhat smaller tank behind the cockpit, adn
>stucl 150 U.S. Gallons of fuel under the wings, where CG wasn't an
>issue. I'll admit to being a bit puzzled about why the RAF never went
>for wing rack mounted drops on a Spit, until it occurred to me that
>there isn't any significant amount of fuel in the wing, and teh
>plumbing and pumping is going to be a royal pain.

I think some of this was dealt with with the Vc, in terms of structure
and stressing for under-wing stores. I think 44 gallon ferry tanks
should be a possibility.

>Well, the elevator balance change will add to the stabilizer/elevator
>combination area, and that's good. It also will reduce the control
>forces for pitch, possibly to the point whre the controls are
>over-balanced, and once you start waving the stick around, it wants to
>amplify the action, and that's bad, leading to overcontrolling at
>beast, and breaking the airplane at worst, especially with an airplane
>that's already pretty light on the controls, like a Spit. The
>bobweight tends to resist this overbalancing, at a cost in stick
>forces. The thing is, the amount of influence from the bobweight
>changes, like the elevator balance, with deflection.

Absolutely. Over-tightening in turns was an issue, and this could
only be evaded, not resolved, in a regime putting more weight behind
the CoG datum.

> It's confusing,
>adn there's no intuitive answer other than make the tail bigger.
>The same applies to the rudder, as well.

I'm going to give you those in new-production Mk VIIIs and IXs as a
priority. I took that as granted for the LR VIII with a 75 gallon
rear-fuselage tank.

For the LR Vc, we don't need as much in a rear tank, and we only need
it for 3 months or so as a proof of concept demonstrator before doing
it for real with the LR VIII.

>> Granted. But none of this works without the hierarchy breathing fire
>> from the CAS on down for long-range escorts a la Arnold. Let me know
>> what you think could be done with a range of figures, from 4 inches
>> rearward travel on up, which seems a reasonable conjectural starting
>> point for me. Don't forget to use the Vc airframe as a reference
>> rather than a Vb in regard to landing gear.
>
>I'll get round to it, after...

Demotion may follow as a consequence of disobeying my petty whims.
Now, about those performance figures for Sabre-engined Lancasters....

[beer]

>After the Great Blaster Worm and Sobig Hydra chases I've had this
>week, that's top priority. (Work real job, than travel up to the
>North COuntry to help out some former clients)

No beer for bad AMRD's. Just explain the priorities to your clients
would you, there's a good chap?

Gavin Bailey

--

Another user rings. "I need more space" he says.
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[John Halliwell]

In article >, Guy Alcala
> writes
>I'll disagree here. You want two pilots so they can take turns flying tight
>formation. For night ops it was no big deal to put the a/c on george and have
>the first and second pilots swap out (before they replaced the 2nd pilot with
>a FE). That's not an option when flying in a combat box. With only a single
>pilot the formations are going to be looser, and that's the last thing the
>Brit heavies need, as they're already going to be the ground bait.

Hmmm, we're assuming here that tight combat boxes are the only way to
go. Whilst I haven't looked at it in depth, I reckon that with
sufficient long range fighter escort, smaller, loser formations might
have worked out fine. The combat box seems to me to make a large target
for flak.

> Once air
>superiority is won and the invasion has happened it's not as big a deal,
>becaue there's less need to fly tight formation for as long, but we're talking
>about the period before that occurs. Both Lanc and Halifax have FE seats next
>to (and slightly aft) of the pilot, so the space shouldn't be a too much of a
>problem.

Space may not have been a problem, but the FE seats (certainly on the
Lanc, not sure about the Halifax) were fold out types to allow for the
bomb aimer to take up his station. I remember reading reports that some
bomb aimer's were able to crawl under the seat whilst the FE occupied
it, but on the whole it sounds a difficult manoeuvre. The only
recommended escape route (apart from the rear gunners station) was
through the bomb aimer's hatch, getting the crew out with the 2nd pilot
in his seat would be a major problem.

In the Halifax, the pilot sat above the radio operator, I think with a
walkway down the right hand side (level with the radio ops floor), not
sure where/how the FEs seat was arranged (looks to me like he'd be
hanging in mid-air if sat next to the pilot!).

> I wasn't aware that these two a/c had provisions for dual controls
>built in, although I knew that some had them; when we were trying to figure
>out what mods we'd have to make to run these a/c by day, we had allowed a fair
>amount of time to design and develop a production dual control system, so it
>seems that we were overcautious in estimating how much time that would take.

The dual controls available were very crude connections to the existing
controls. For operational use these may require re-working (along with
the addition of a better 2nd seat and harness). Whether a 2nd pilot was
required for daylight ops might be irrelevant, whether the command would
agree to it is another question (all resources were tight).

The BBMF Lanc has proper dual controls and two pilots.

--
John

[Guy Alcala]

The Revolution Will Not Be Televised wrote:

> On Thu, 21 Aug 2003 06:53:31 GMT, Air Commodore Guy Alcala, Director
> of Fighter OperationsGuy Alcala >
> wrote:
>
> >Isn't rapid promotion in wartime wonderful? And to think, I was just a lowly Wing Commander on
> >Butch's staff a month or so ago, along with then Group Captain Stickney.
>
> I'm still the only one of the three of us to appoint himself to the
> Air Council, so start bribing me now if you want me to rubber-stamp
> your promotion to Air rank.

At the rate you're going I'd better begin, before you retire and take over from Freeman at MAP. I
shall miss your sagacity, judiciousness, dare I say genius, that has made my own job immeasurably
easier. The country owes you a debt of gratitude that it can never repay. I remain, Sir, your most
humble and obedient servant.

P.S. Are the rumors correct that AM Hill is going to be promoted from AOC 12 Group to AOCinC ADGB,
about mid-November? 12 Group will have to be the base for our long-range escort force, so we'll need
an AOC there who's fully committed to making long-range escort a reality.

<snip internal tank capacity>

> [snip next test report]
>
> >Now, was that 110 gallons a misprint,
>
> Nope, you've now moved onto the next tankage problem: the wing tanks!
>
> Notice how I've been using a figure of 12.5 Imperial gallons for them?
> Well, their size seems to fluctuate from 12.5 galls up to 16-or even
> 18 in some later Spits. 12.5 seems to be the most common as this
> report bears out: 85 galls forward fuselage plus two 12.5 galls in
> the wing giving 110 gallons.

I've seen a precise figure of 13 point (something) given for the Mk. VII/VIII, which often gets
rounded up to 14 gallons, although rounding to 27 total is closer.

> >a rough rounding (seems unlikely), representative of the
> >"standard" production a/c (details of differences not given) as opposed to the "non-standard"
> >RB. 141, or just Supermarine fitting in whatever tanks they happened to have on the shelf on any
> >particular day?
>
> My impression, and it isn't any more than that, but it is nonetheless
> based on some limited research on 125 Wing which fielded the first
> Spit XIV sqns in 2 TAF, is that 110 is representative of the
> RB-serials delivered in late '43 and early '44.

Fine by me. The Mk. XIVs are for the continent anyway, as that 110 gives them about the same range
as the Mk. IX, but less endurance.

> >> Note that the FR XIVs, with cameras in place of one of the RF tanks,
> >> still had the second 33 gallon tank. I think RF-tanked Mk XIVs can't
> >> be dismissed out of hand. But one maniacal idea at a time.
> >
> >Brng it up again and it's off to Wandsworth with you, for sabotaging the war effort.
>
> Listen, I'm all for your LR VIIIs, and I'm even helping by pushing for
> rear-fuselage tanks for them, but the quid pro quo is XIV production
> beginning on schedule, and the fitting of rear tanks to them whenever
> possible.

Whenever possible is fine, as long as it doesn't delay our increasing standard Mk. VIII production.

<snip unfortunate but seemingly unavoidable areas of agreement>

> >> The PN's for the VIII give an allowance of 9 gallons for run-up and
> >> take-off. That should be out of the rear tank.
> >
> >Depends. For safety reasons it's more likely to be from one of the main tanks, so as to avoid
> >any fumbling during takeoff if there are feed problems.
>
> I've just been thinking of this. Why not run the rear tank via a pump
> (or two for redundancy) to the main tanks to keep them full while
> running down the rear tank, just like the approach with the wing
> tanks?

The one account I have of the L.e. tank usage says that they are transferred to the main(s) once
space is available. Otherwise, the excess gets vented overboard, which is rather counterproductive.

<snip musings on tank plumbing>

> >> I imagine the rest of the profile would be flown at a low-revs,
> >> high-boost weak mixture cruise. That could go down to 1,800 rpm, but
> >> then there's the tactical need to maintain a high airspeed. I suggest
> >> your wing commanders cruisie at 2,200 rpm and +4 boost, for a
> >> consumption of 61 gallons per hour. That should give about 6.5 air
> >> mpg, or maybe 6 when the drag of the external tank is taken into
> >> consideration.
> >
> >What kind of air speed does that give you?
>
> 180 IAS according to the (rather small-scale) graph at 15,000 feet.
> It claims to be valid from 10,000-25,000 feet, but not fully accurate
> for rpm at different heights.
>
> >Zemke says that they normally cruised at maybe
> >210-220 IAS on Rodeos (doesn't say specifically what the cruise was on Ramrods), giving 320-325
> >TAS at escort altitudes.
>
> By November 1942 the Spit Vs at least seem to be cruising at 300mph
> TAS at 20,000 feet when anticipating enemy contact. 2,400 rpm +4 lbs
> seems to have been one target setting recorded in some primary
> documentation I've seen from that time. 2,400 rpm at +4lbs would
> increase consumption to 66 galls per hour, but should permit
> (according to the graph) 200 IAS within the acceptable revs range.
> The Air mpg drops to 6, and we'd need to increase that consumption for
> external tank drag, but it doesn't change things much. The relatively
> low consumption of the Merlin seems to stand it in good stead there,
> but I've always thought the P-47 cruised faster.

I'd think 200 IAS cruise at escort height would be about the minimum we'd want over the continent.
200 IAS @ 25kft gets us 300 TAS, @ 30kft 327 TAS, ignoring P.E. and C.E. in both cases.

<snip even more general agreement>

> >> Some IXs did get it, but I can't discover the logic or process
> >> involved at this stage.
> >
> >I increasingly wonder if it was a matter of "whatever the subcontractors deliver today." Any
> >idea who made the internal tanks (if not Supermarine), and if there was more than one company
> >involved?
>
> Yes, there were several firms involved, some locally around
> Southampton. I think CBAF made their own. I don't want to
> investigate that nightmare much further.

<snip>

Oh, admit it, you enjoy hunting through boxes of stuff at the PRO, peering at miniscule type on
yellowed, 50+ year old mimeographed copies so you can discover that a/c in serial range XX-1XX
through XX-127 were fitted with canopy enmergency release pin 2C-5392-9 rather 2C-5587-6, owing to
the delivery van breaking down.

> >> No, but the service acceptances by the RAF seem to be (by a hand and
> >> eye count of the appendices in Shacklady & Morgan, so I can't claim
> >> any real authority for these figures) about 90 in July 1943, 98 in
> >> October, declining to 67 in November, 53 in December and 28 in January
> >> 1944. This doesn't reflect production figures per se, as the aircraft
> >> had often been in storage for some time or were shipped to Casablanca
> >> or India, and had actually been produced earlier. But it does give an
> >> indicator of deliveries, which is almost what you want.
> >
> >We're in fat city, then, and I see no need to mess around with Mk. Vs.
>
> This is where my political considerations kick in: the promises to
> the DAF, the 12th AF and the Russians and the Far East already exist
> and need to be serviced. Almost all the VIIIs being produced are
> being shipped out to overseas theatres.

Which is why we'll replace them with Mk. IXs temporarily (Mk. VC Trops to the Far East if we don't
have enough Mk. IXs), until we can ramp up production.

> If you want the whole of Mk
> VIII production, when does this decision get made?

End of September '43 seems like a good date, and continuing for the next few months.

> My Mk V speculation was based on what would be likely with existing
> resources. 12 Group needed that range, and FC didn't give a stuff
> what they did with their Mk Vs (e.g. the LF Vb conversions at this
> time). Increasing internal tankage would be a small step to them,
> without major political considerations. I can only see this whole
> scenario working if FC actually have some resources capable of
> supporting a daylight effort; even the CAS can't complelely dictate
> operational tactics to an RAF C-in-C.

We'll have to wait on AVM Stickney's Cg calcs, I think.

<Mk. VIII production rate>

> >Seems reasonable, although we'd want to boost Mk. VIII production well above 90/month,
>
> I'd agree, but frankly you're hitting the limit of the relevant
> production resource, i.e. the Hampshire production group focused on
> Supermarine's dispersed work. You might get 120 or so out of them per
> month of they packed up everything else, bar a couple of PR Spits and
> the beginnings of the Mk XIV. The next focus I suggest would be
> getting Westlands, finishing off their Mk V production run with
> Seafires to move to Mk VIIIs while tackling Castle Bromwich. I think
> you could fully convert to Mk VIII-based production by spring 1944,
> with an increasing number of rear-tank versions available within that
> output, and with the Mk XIV entering service at the same time.

<snip>

Sounds like the way to go. I'm not sure that we even need Castle Bromwich to transition. If we can
get say 150-200 Mk. VIIIs a month, that will probably do the trick until we're on the continent
and/or get our Mustangs. By all means, though, let's make sure we get at least 96 gallons in the Mk.
IXs from now on. It's ridiculous to be building a/c with 85.

Guy

[Guy Alcala]

The Revolution Will Not Be Televised wrote:

> On Thu, 21 Aug 2003 06:53:31 GMT, Air Commodore Guy Alcala, Director
> of Fighter OperationsGuy Alcala >
> wrote:
>
> >Isn't rapid promotion in wartime wonderful? And to think, I was just a lowly Wing Commander on
> >Butch's staff a month or so ago, along with then Group Captain Stickney.
>
> I'm still the only one of the three of us to appoint himself to the
> Air Council, so start bribing me now if you want me to rubber-stamp
> your promotion to Air rank.

At the rate you're going I'd better begin, before you retire and take over from Freeman at MAP. I
shall miss your sagacity, judiciousness, dare I say genius, that has made my own job immeasurably
easier. The country owes you a debt of gratitude that it can never repay. I remain, Sir, your most
humble and obedient servant.

P.S. Are the rumors correct that AM Hill is going to be promoted from AOC 12 Group to AOCinC ADGB,
about mid-November? 12 Group will have to be the base for our long-range escort force, so we'll need
an AOC there who's fully committed to making long-range escort a reality.

<snip internal tank capacity>

> [snip next test report]
>
> >Now, was that 110 gallons a misprint,
>
> Nope, you've now moved onto the next tankage problem: the wing tanks!
>
> Notice how I've been using a figure of 12.5 Imperial gallons for them?
> Well, their size seems to fluctuate from 12.5 galls up to 16-or even
> 18 in some later Spits. 12.5 seems to be the most common as this
> report bears out: 85 galls forward fuselage plus two 12.5 galls in
> the wing giving 110 gallons.

I've seen a precise figure of 13 point (something) given for the Mk. VII/VIII, which often gets
rounded up to 14 gallons, although rounding to 27 total is closer.

> >a rough rounding (seems unlikely), representative of the
> >"standard" production a/c (details of differences not given) as opposed to the "non-standard"
> >RB. 141, or just Supermarine fitting in whatever tanks they happened to have on the shelf on any
> >particular day?
>
> My impression, and it isn't any more than that, but it is nonetheless
> based on some limited research on 125 Wing which fielded the first
> Spit XIV sqns in 2 TAF, is that 110 is representative of the
> RB-serials delivered in late '43 and early '44.

Fine by me. The Mk. XIVs are for the continent anyway, as that 110 gives them about the same range
as the Mk. IX, but less endurance.

> >> Note that the FR XIVs, with cameras in place of one of the RF tanks,
> >> still had the second 33 gallon tank. I think RF-tanked Mk XIVs can't
> >> be dismissed out of hand. But one maniacal idea at a time.
> >
> >Brng it up again and it's off to Wandsworth with you, for sabotaging the war effort.
>
> Listen, I'm all for your LR VIIIs, and I'm even helping by pushing for
> rear-fuselage tanks for them, but the quid pro quo is XIV production
> beginning on schedule, and the fitting of rear tanks to them whenever
> possible.

Whenever possible is fine, as long as it doesn't delay our increasing standard Mk. VIII production.

<snip unfortunate but seemingly unavoidable areas of agreement>

> >> The PN's for the VIII give an allowance of 9 gallons for run-up and
> >> take-off. That should be out of the rear tank.
> >
> >Depends. For safety reasons it's more likely to be from one of the main tanks, so as to avoid
> >any fumbling during takeoff if there are feed problems.
>
> I've just been thinking of this. Why not run the rear tank via a pump
> (or two for redundancy) to the main tanks to keep them full while
> running down the rear tank, just like the approach with the wing
> tanks?

The one account I have of the L.e. tank usage says that they are transferred to the main(s) once
space is available. Otherwise, the excess gets vented overboard, which is rather counterproductive.

<snip musings on tank plumbing>

> >> I imagine the rest of the profile would be flown at a low-revs,
> >> high-boost weak mixture cruise. That could go down to 1,800 rpm, but
> >> then there's the tactical need to maintain a high airspeed. I suggest
> >> your wing commanders cruisie at 2,200 rpm and +4 boost, for a
> >> consumption of 61 gallons per hour. That should give about 6.5 air
> >> mpg, or maybe 6 when the drag of the external tank is taken into
> >> consideration.
> >
> >What kind of air speed does that give you?
>
> 180 IAS according to the (rather small-scale) graph at 15,000 feet.
> It claims to be valid from 10,000-25,000 feet, but not fully accurate
> for rpm at different heights.
>
> >Zemke says that they normally cruised at maybe
> >210-220 IAS on Rodeos (doesn't say specifically what the cruise was on Ramrods), giving 320-325
> >TAS at escort altitudes.
>
> By November 1942 the Spit Vs at least seem to be cruising at 300mph
> TAS at 20,000 feet when anticipating enemy contact. 2,400 rpm +4 lbs
> seems to have been one target setting recorded in some primary
> documentation I've seen from that time. 2,400 rpm at +4lbs would
> increase consumption to 66 galls per hour, but should permit
> (according to the graph) 200 IAS within the acceptable revs range.
> The Air mpg drops to 6, and we'd need to increase that consumption for
> external tank drag, but it doesn't change things much. The relatively
> low consumption of the Merlin seems to stand it in good stead there,
> but I've always thought the P-47 cruised faster.

I'd think 200 IAS cruise at escort height would be about the minimum we'd want over the continent.
200 IAS @ 25kft gets us 300 TAS, @ 30kft 327 TAS, ignoring P.E. and C.E. in both cases.

<snip even more general agreement>

> >> Some IXs did get it, but I can't discover the logic or process
> >> involved at this stage.
> >
> >I increasingly wonder if it was a matter of "whatever the subcontractors deliver today." Any
> >idea who made the internal tanks (if not Supermarine), and if there was more than one company
> >involved?
>
> Yes, there were several firms involved, some locally around
> Southampton. I think CBAF made their own. I don't want to
> investigate that nightmare much further.

<snip>

Oh, admit it, you enjoy hunting through boxes of stuff at the PRO, peering at miniscule type on
yellowed, 50+ year old mimeographed copies so you can discover that a/c in serial range XX-1XX
through XX-127 were fitted with canopy enmergency release pin 2C-5392-9 rather 2C-5587-6, owing to
the delivery van breaking down.

> >> No, but the service acceptances by the RAF seem to be (by a hand and
> >> eye count of the appendices in Shacklady & Morgan, so I can't claim
> >> any real authority for these figures) about 90 in July 1943, 98 in
> >> October, declining to 67 in November, 53 in December and 28 in January
> >> 1944. This doesn't reflect production figures per se, as the aircraft
> >> had often been in storage for some time or were shipped to Casablanca
> >> or India, and had actually been produced earlier. But it does give an
> >> indicator of deliveries, which is almost what you want.
> >
> >We're in fat city, then, and I see no need to mess around with Mk. Vs.
>
> This is where my political considerations kick in: the promises to
> the DAF, the 12th AF and the Russians and the Far East already exist
> and need to be serviced. Almost all the VIIIs being produced are
> being shipped out to overseas theatres.

Which is why we'll replace them with Mk. IXs temporarily (Mk. VC Trops to the Far East if we don't
have enough Mk. IXs), until we can ramp up production.

> If you want the whole of Mk
> VIII production, when does this decision get made?

End of September '43 seems like a good date, and continuing for the next few months.

> My Mk V speculation was based on what would be likely with existing
> resources. 12 Group needed that range, and FC didn't give a stuff
> what they did with their Mk Vs (e.g. the LF Vb conversions at this
> time). Increasing internal tankage would be a small step to them,
> without major political considerations. I can only see this whole
> scenario working if FC actually have some resources capable of
> supporting a daylight effort; even the CAS can't complelely dictate
> operational tactics to an RAF C-in-C.

We'll have to wait on AVM Stickney's Cg calcs, I think.

<Mk. VIII production rate>

> >Seems reasonable, although we'd want to boost Mk. VIII production well above 90/month,
>
> I'd agree, but frankly you're hitting the limit of the relevant
> production resource, i.e. the Hampshire production group focused on
> Supermarine's dispersed work. You might get 120 or so out of them per
> month of they packed up everything else, bar a couple of PR Spits and
> the beginnings of the Mk XIV. The next focus I suggest would be
> getting Westlands, finishing off their Mk V production run with
> Seafires to move to Mk VIIIs while tackling Castle Bromwich. I think
> you could fully convert to Mk VIII-based production by spring 1944,
> with an increasing number of rear-tank versions available within that
> output, and with the Mk XIV entering service at the same time.

<snip>

Sounds like the way to go. I'm not sure that we even need Castle Bromwich to transition. If we can
get say 150-200 Mk. VIIIs a month, that will probably do the trick until we're on the continent
and/or get our Mustangs. By all means, though, let's make sure we get at least 96 gallons in the Mk.
IXs from now on. It's ridiculous to be building a/c with 85.

Guy

[Guy Alcala]

The Revolution Will Not Be Televised wrote:

> On Thu, 21 Aug 2003 06:53:31 GMT, Air Commodore Guy Alcala, Director
> of Fighter OperationsGuy Alcala >
> wrote:
>
> >Isn't rapid promotion in wartime wonderful? And to think, I was just a lowly Wing Commander on
> >Butch's staff a month or so ago, along with then Group Captain Stickney.
>
> I'm still the only one of the three of us to appoint himself to the
> Air Council, so start bribing me now if you want me to rubber-stamp
> your promotion to Air rank.

At the rate you're going I'd better begin, before you retire and take over from Freeman at MAP. I
shall miss your sagacity, judiciousness, dare I say genius, that has made my own job immeasurably
easier. The country owes you a debt of gratitude that it can never repay. I remain, Sir, your most
humble and obedient servant.

P.S. Are the rumors correct that AM Hill is going to be promoted from AOC 12 Group to AOCinC ADGB,
about mid-November? 12 Group will have to be the base for our long-range escort force, so we'll need
an AOC there who's fully committed to making long-range escort a reality.

<snip internal tank capacity>

> [snip next test report]
>
> >Now, was that 110 gallons a misprint,
>
> Nope, you've now moved onto the next tankage problem: the wing tanks!
>
> Notice how I've been using a figure of 12.5 Imperial gallons for them?
> Well, their size seems to fluctuate from 12.5 galls up to 16-or even
> 18 in some later Spits. 12.5 seems to be the most common as this
> report bears out: 85 galls forward fuselage plus two 12.5 galls in
> the wing giving 110 gallons.

I've seen a precise figure of 13 point (something) given for the Mk. VII/VIII, which often gets
rounded up to 14 gallons, although rounding to 27 total is closer.

> >a rough rounding (seems unlikely), representative of the
> >"standard" production a/c (details of differences not given) as opposed to the "non-standard"
> >RB. 141, or just Supermarine fitting in whatever tanks they happened to have on the shelf on any
> >particular day?
>
> My impression, and it isn't any more than that, but it is nonetheless
> based on some limited research on 125 Wing which fielded the first
> Spit XIV sqns in 2 TAF, is that 110 is representative of the
> RB-serials delivered in late '43 and early '44.

Fine by me. The Mk. XIVs are for the continent anyway, as that 110 gives them about the same range
as the Mk. IX, but less endurance.

> >> Note that the FR XIVs, with cameras in place of one of the RF tanks,
> >> still had the second 33 gallon tank. I think RF-tanked Mk XIVs can't
> >> be dismissed out of hand. But one maniacal idea at a time.
> >
> >Brng it up again and it's off to Wandsworth with you, for sabotaging the war effort.
>
> Listen, I'm all for your LR VIIIs, and I'm even helping by pushing for
> rear-fuselage tanks for them, but the quid pro quo is XIV production
> beginning on schedule, and the fitting of rear tanks to them whenever
> possible.

Whenever possible is fine, as long as it doesn't delay our increasing standard Mk. VIII production.

<snip unfortunate but seemingly unavoidable areas of agreement>

> >> The PN's for the VIII give an allowance of 9 gallons for run-up and
> >> take-off. That should be out of the rear tank.
> >
> >Depends. For safety reasons it's more likely to be from one of the main tanks, so as to avoid
> >any fumbling during takeoff if there are feed problems.
>
> I've just been thinking of this. Why not run the rear tank via a pump
> (or two for redundancy) to the main tanks to keep them full while
> running down the rear tank, just like the approach with the wing
> tanks?

The one account I have of the L.e. tank usage says that they are transferred to the main(s) once
space is available. Otherwise, the excess gets vented overboard, which is rather counterproductive.

<snip musings on tank plumbing>

> >> I imagine the rest of the profile would be flown at a low-revs,
> >> high-boost weak mixture cruise. That could go down to 1,800 rpm, but
> >> then there's the tactical need to maintain a high airspeed. I suggest
> >> your wing commanders cruisie at 2,200 rpm and +4 boost, for a
> >> consumption of 61 gallons per hour. That should give about 6.5 air
> >> mpg, or maybe 6 when the drag of the external tank is taken into
> >> consideration.
> >
> >What kind of air speed does that give you?
>
> 180 IAS according to the (rather small-scale) graph at 15,000 feet.
> It claims to be valid from 10,000-25,000 feet, but not fully accurate
> for rpm at different heights.
>
> >Zemke says that they normally cruised at maybe
> >210-220 IAS on Rodeos (doesn't say specifically what the cruise was on Ramrods), giving 320-325
> >TAS at escort altitudes.
>
> By November 1942 the Spit Vs at least seem to be cruising at 300mph
> TAS at 20,000 feet when anticipating enemy contact. 2,400 rpm +4 lbs
> seems to have been one target setting recorded in some primary
> documentation I've seen from that time. 2,400 rpm at +4lbs would
> increase consumption to 66 galls per hour, but should permit
> (according to the graph) 200 IAS within the acceptable revs range.
> The Air mpg drops to 6, and we'd need to increase that consumption for
> external tank drag, but it doesn't change things much. The relatively
> low consumption of the Merlin seems to stand it in good stead there,
> but I've always thought the P-47 cruised faster.

I'd think 200 IAS cruise at escort height would be about the minimum we'd want over the continent.
200 IAS @ 25kft gets us 300 TAS, @ 30kft 327 TAS, ignoring P.E. and C.E. in both cases.

<snip even more general agreement>

> >> Some IXs did get it, but I can't discover the logic or process
> >> involved at this stage.
> >
> >I increasingly wonder if it was a matter of "whatever the subcontractors deliver today." Any
> >idea who made the internal tanks (if not Supermarine), and if there was more than one company
> >involved?
>
> Yes, there were several firms involved, some locally around
> Southampton. I think CBAF made their own. I don't want to
> investigate that nightmare much further.

<snip>

Oh, admit it, you enjoy hunting through boxes of stuff at the PRO, peering at miniscule type on
yellowed, 50+ year old mimeographed copies so you can discover that a/c in serial range XX-1XX
through XX-127 were fitted with canopy enmergency release pin 2C-5392-9 rather 2C-5587-6, owing to
the delivery van breaking down.

> >> No, but the service acceptances by the RAF seem to be (by a hand and
> >> eye count of the appendices in Shacklady & Morgan, so I can't claim
> >> any real authority for these figures) about 90 in July 1943, 98 in
> >> October, declining to 67 in November, 53 in December and 28 in January
> >> 1944. This doesn't reflect production figures per se, as the aircraft
> >> had often been in storage for some time or were shipped to Casablanca
> >> or India, and had actually been produced earlier. But it does give an
> >> indicator of deliveries, which is almost what you want.
> >
> >We're in fat city, then, and I see no need to mess around with Mk. Vs.
>
> This is where my political considerations kick in: the promises to
> the DAF, the 12th AF and the Russians and the Far East already exist
> and need to be serviced. Almost all the VIIIs being produced are
> being shipped out to overseas theatres.

Which is why we'll replace them with Mk. IXs temporarily (Mk. VC Trops to the Far East if we don't
have enough Mk. IXs), until we can ramp up production.

> If you want the whole of Mk
> VIII production, when does this decision get made?

End of September '43 seems like a good date, and continuing for the next few months.

> My Mk V speculation was based on what would be likely with existing
> resources. 12 Group needed that range, and FC didn't give a stuff
> what they did with their Mk Vs (e.g. the LF Vb conversions at this
> time). Increasing internal tankage would be a small step to them,
> without major political considerations. I can only see this whole
> scenario working if FC actually have some resources capable of
> supporting a daylight effort; even the CAS can't complelely dictate
> operational tactics to an RAF C-in-C.

We'll have to wait on AVM Stickney's Cg calcs, I think.

<Mk. VIII production rate>

> >Seems reasonable, although we'd want to boost Mk. VIII production well above 90/month,
>
> I'd agree, but frankly you're hitting the limit of the relevant
> production resource, i.e. the Hampshire production group focused on
> Supermarine's dispersed work. You might get 120 or so out of them per
> month of they packed up everything else, bar a couple of PR Spits and
> the beginnings of the Mk XIV. The next focus I suggest would be
> getting Westlands, finishing off their Mk V production run with
> Seafires to move to Mk VIIIs while tackling Castle Bromwich. I think
> you could fully convert to Mk VIII-based production by spring 1944,
> with an increasing number of rear-tank versions available within that
> output, and with the Mk XIV entering service at the same time.

<snip>

Sounds like the way to go. I'm not sure that we even need Castle Bromwich to transition. If we can
get say 150-200 Mk. VIIIs a month, that will probably do the trick until we're on the continent
and/or get our Mustangs. By all means, though, let's make sure we get at least 96 gallons in the Mk.
IXs from now on. It's ridiculous to be building a/c with 85.

Guy

[Guy Alcala]

Guy Alcala wrote:
<snip>

Sorry for the multiple posts. My browser kept telling me that my ID was incorrect, and that the message
hadn't been posted. Obviously, neither was correct.

Guy

[Peter Stickney]

In article >,
(The Revolution Will Not Be Televised) writes:
> On Wed, 20 Aug 2003 22:46:44 -0400, Air-Vice Marshal Stickney, Air
> Member for Research and Development, wrote:
>
>>> By all means, except I also note a depressing lack of nationalistic
>>> abuse in this post.
>>
>>Oh, well then, how's this: The last time a Brit tried to hand my
>>family a line like that we threw his tea in the harbor.
>
> Now that was the kind of atrocity that should have featured in "the
> Patriot"....

It did, in the 1773 original version. (Well, what really happened was
that Charlie, the guy unloading the tea, sorta miscalculated with the
block & tackle. So he and the Shop Steward cooked up this story about
how some of the patriot guys were down at the tavern, getting all
riled up about the tea tax, and after they had a snootful, dressed up
like Indians and chucked the tea in the harbor...)

In truth, though, the Revolutionary period, and the years leading up
to it were a turbulent time. Neither side was above a bit on
intimidation or downright terrorism. For example, Kingston, NH, right
near me, has a memorial plaque for one Dr. Josiah Bartlett, who was
delegate to the Continental Congress, and the second signature on the
Declaration of Independance. What they don't tell you is that while
he was down in Philadelphia, his peace-loving, Rule of Law Loyalist
neighbors burned his house, looted his farm, and, I believe, killed at
least one of his sons.

> Still, an innovative approach to evading custioms duties and personal
> taxation which I'm sure is maintained as a family tradition under the
> IRS and the enlightened leadership of Lord Dubya of Shrub. Shame
> about Shay's rebellion, not to mention Sam Adam's interesting
> post-colonial take on sedition and the level of property ownership
> required to participate in a representative democracy.

It takes all sorts. And we have all sorts.
>
Ah, that feels better, now back to the mud-slinging of rational
> discourse.
>
> [rear fuselage tanks in Spit Vcs]
>
>>That's going to take a lot of fiddly meaduring & figuruing to say for
>>sure, but, looking over the inboard profiles (X-ray views) of both
>>aircraft, one thing does stand out - a Spitfire's cockpit is aft of
>>the wing, and well aft of the CG. And the fuselage ahead of the
>>cockpit is already full of stuff. (Fuel, mostly) The available space
>>behind the cockpit is a long way aft of the CG, which isn't good.
>>A Mustang's cocpit is over the wing. The aft tank location is
>>basically right at the trailing edge. Not only is the airplane more
>>tolerant of how it's loaded, the tank location is in a better place.
>
> There's no denying it's a real problem.

That's the difficulty with small airplanes. The slightest change has
big effects. R.J. Mitchell's successors at Vickers-Supermarine did an
absolutely incredible job keeping the Spitfire not only viable, but at
the top end of things during the war. Of course, Rolls helped, too,
by buiding three world-beating engines that were not only private
ventures, but, at least originally, not favored officially.
(For the record, those are the original Merlin, the two-stage Merlin
60 series, and the Griffon. The Air Ministry had been planning on
curtailing Merlin production in the '42-'43 timeframe, and, after teh
failure of the Vulture, using the Napier Sabre for high power
applications. Luckily, Lord Hives was a manager who not only could
perceive the real need, but was persuasive enough to sway the
government.

>>> Agreed, but is this insoluable? The question doesn't appear as easily
>>> to definatively answer (either way) as it first appeared to me.
>>
>>Well, for teh Mk VIII and Mk XIV, it indeed was. FOr a Mk V, I'm not
>>sure.
>
> See what you think over the sums when you get a chance.
>
>>Actually, according to the A&AEE's reports on testing Mustang Is, and
>>various Mk Vs, I don't see a whole lot of difference in altitude
>>performance, even without the Mustang II's higher-supercharged engine.
>
> At 25,000 feet? There's no doubt the Alison Mustang was very useful
> below that height, but we need an escort force which performs well in
> the 20-25,000 or even 30,000 feet band. I'm dubious about the Mustang
> I in that environment, even more so with the Mustang II which I
> thought had a lower-altitude supercharger peak.

At 25,000, there's not a whole lot of difference between a Mk V Spit
and a Mustang I. Both were gettig pretty ahsmatic at that point.
in static conditions, (no ram) a Merlin 45's Full Throttle Height for
Max Power was 9250' (3000RPM/+16) Climb Power FTH was 16,000', (2850
RPM/+9). A Merlin 46's FTM was 14,000' for max power, and 19,000' for
climb power. There wasn't a whole lot of difference there than the
Mustan'gs Allisons, and the Mustang had a bit better ram recovery.
Note also that as the Merlin 40 series was progressively re-rated for
higher boosts, the FTH dropped quite a bit. The supercharger could
only compress the air so much, after all, and so, in order to get a
higher boost, it has to start with thicker air.
>
>>It didn't climb as well as a Spit, and it didn't quite turn as well,
>>but it did out-speed, out-turn and out-zoom the Fw 190As that the
>>Abbeville boys were flying. (Speaking of which, is Holly Hills still
>>extant? I know he was recovering from his stroke a few years back.)
>
> Sorry, I don't know.

I hope he is. He used to show up here, and had corresponded with some
of us, back about the turn of the century. Among his other
accomplishments, he was the first pilot to score a kill while flying a
Mustang. He bagged an Fw 190 over Dieppe during the attempted raid,
while flying with an RCAF squadron. He later joined the U.S. Navy,
and partidcipated in the Marianas Turkey Shoot.

>>> Precisely. We need to posit a sufficient instiutional change of
>>> policy and interest to even begin this, but as nothing would happen
>>> without it, we might as well take it as a given.
>>
>>Well, I could begin my somewhat-factually based Nationalistic Rant
>>about how the Brits, and Europeans in general never figured out how to
>>put long range into fighter airplanes becasue their countries are so
>>danged small, and that you can't ever be more than an hour from a
>>National Border or coastline, unlike those of us who need to be able
>>to fly stuff from San Francisco to Honolulu routinely, but I won't.
>
> Actually, I don't think that's sufficiently chauvanistic, in that I
> think there is a cultural dynamic relatesd to geography at work.
> However, the flip side of that is that the Europeans produced better
> interceptors in the early war period partly because of their
> willingness to cut weight (and fuel carried) to the minimum required
> for an area-defence fighter. Now I actually think the early US
> fighters (even the P-40 and P-39) were better than their later press
> made them out to be, but in this instance I think that for all it's
> shortcomings, the Spitfire in 1942-3 was the best type available in
> meaningful quantity for altitude combat, which is one reason the USAAF
> got it to replace the P-39.

Well, we could, if we wanted to, produce small, short-ranged fast
climbing interceptors. Take a look at teh Curtiss CW-22 Demon. One
way to look at it was that it was the American Zero. Basically, it
was a Wright R1820 with a pistol grip. Consider, if you will, a 1940
airplane with a climb rate of 5,000'/ minute, adn a lower wing loading
than a Mitsubishi A6M. The Flying Tigers got 3, which crashed on a
delivery flight due to poor fuel and bad weather (Erik Shilling flew
it and liked it), and the Dutch East Indies had a couple of squadrons
of them. They didn't fare at all well when the Japanese came - they
didn't have hte endurance to fly standing patrols, and Java had no
early warning system or GCI. All thich climb and maneuverability
meant nothing when the Zeros dropped on them like a box of rocks when
they were trying to take off.

> Getting more fuel into the Spitfire airframe, for all the
> difficulties, is a better option than trying to make the P-40 or P-39
> a competitive high-altitude fighter.

Oh, I certainly agree. I've got the NACA Tech Report on full-size
drag tests done on single-engin service airplanes in the Langley Full
Size Tunnel. (Not models, mind you, but the real airplanes) One of
the airplanes tested was the Turbosupercharged XP-39. With the turbo
& intercooler, it was a very draggy airplane that would have never met
its performance guarantees. The small wing limited ceiling as much as
the lack of engine power, and there wasn't any room for growth.
>
> [2 pilot regime]
>
>>> The loading on the training infrastructure would increase, and the
>>> attritionally-supportable force would shrink, but then again BC took
>>> heavy casualties and expanded, and I'm not aware of a critical aircrew
>>> shortage: aircrew training slots seem to be over-subscribed since
>>> 1941, with pools of aircrew forming everywhere except in Bomber
>>> Command. The output of trained pilots is an issue, but then I'm not
>>> aware of it being inadequate historically. If anything, the British
>>> prioritised aircrew training too much in the period 1941-43 with
>>> repercussions elsewhere on the war effort (e.g. infantry replacements
>>> in 1944-45).
>>
>>It's a good question, though. If you suddenly start needing twice as
>>many bomber pilots, the repercussions will be far & wide.
>
> Agreed, but look how many pilots BC were going through in 1943. 100%
> losses over 6 months is not insubstantial. If we can keep daylight
> raid losses within bounds, which I think is possible, we'll be no
> worse off even if we half the size of 3 Group's initial operational
> strength.

Perhaps.

>>> Yes, but even the Wright Field Spits also had 43 gallon tanks behind
>>> the pilot, against 33 gallons in the wings (according to the A&AEE
>>> report summary on MK210 in S&M). Wing tanks have always been a given
>>> with me, as you & Guy have already specified Mk VIII airframes, which
>>> had 25 gall leading-edge tanks, but as Quill states, the only
>>> available space for major increases in internal fuel was behind the
>>> pilot.
>>
>>43 of _whose_ gallons?
>
> I thought Imperial - were the 62.5 gallon Mustang underwing tanks used
> in that trial US or Imperial? They look bigger than 44/45 gallon RAF
> tanks.

They were the U.S. streamlined tanks. that would give each one 450#
of fuel. 62.5 Imperial, or 75 US.

>> It's worth pointing out that the Wright Field
>>modded aircraft used a somewhat smaller tank behind the cockpit, adn
>>stuck 150 U.S. Gallons of fuel under the wings, where CG wasn't an
>>issue. I'll admit to being a bit puzzled about why the RAF never went
>>for wing rack mounted drops on a Spit, until it occurred to me that
>>there isn't any significant amount of fuel in the wing, and teh
>>plumbing and pumping is going to be a royal pain.
>
> I think some of this was dealt with with the Vc, in terms of structure
> and stressing for under-wing stores. I think 44 gallon ferry tanks
> should be a possibility.

The stressing was there, the plumbing wasn't. It's not 100% sinple to
rig up a drop tank. You need the fuel line, of course, but also a
pressure source to force the fuel out of the tanks when you want them
to feed, and some sort of overflow vant to deal with a tank being
pressurized, but not feeding - It adds up to a lot of plumbing,
really, sort of like taking an old carbureted car and rigging it up
for Bosch fuel injection.
>
>>Well, the elevator balance change will add to the stabilizer/elevator
>>combination area, and that's good. It also will reduce the control
>>forces for pitch, possibly to the point whre the controls are
>>over-balanced, and once you start waving the stick around, it wants to
>>amplify the action, and that's bad, leading to overcontrolling at
>>beast, and breaking the airplane at worst, especially with an airplane
>>that's already pretty light on the controls, like a Spit. The
>>bobweight tends to resist this overbalancing, at a cost in stick
>>forces. The thing is, the amount of influence from the bobweight
>>changes, like the elevator balance, with deflection.
>
> Absolutely. Over-tightening in turns was an issue, and this could
> only be evaded, not resolved, in a regime putting more weight behind
> the CoG datum.
>
>> It's confusing,
>>and there's no intuitive answer other than make the tail bigger.
>>The same applies to the rudder, as well.
>
> I'm going to give you those in new-production Mk VIIIs and IXs as a
> priority. I took that as granted for the LR VIII with a 75 gallon
> rear-fuselage tank.

Yes. They did, indeed solve the problems there.

> For the LR Vc, we don't need as much in a rear tank, and we only need
> it for 3 months or so as a proof of concept demonstrator before doing
> it for real with the LR VIII.

I'd leave the Mk V< and put the effort into the Mk VIII. In the 3
months that it would take to get the Mk VIIIs going, you can use the
heavies on targets in Western France that can be covered by the Mk Vs,
giving them some valuable experience. That's how we did it, anyway.

>>> Granted. But none of this works without the hierarchy breathing fire
>>> from the CAS on down for long-range escorts a la Arnold. Let me know
>>> what you think could be done with a range of figures, from 4 inches
>>> rearward travel on up, which seems a reasonable conjectural starting
>>> point for me. Don't forget to use the Vc airframe as a reference
>>> rather than a Vb in regard to landing gear.
>>
>>I'll get round to it, after...
>
> Demotion may follow as a consequence of disobeying my petty whims.
> Now, about those performance figures for Sabre-engined Lancasters....

The Sabre engined Lanc is easy. Given a glide ratio of about 9:1, it
should be able to achieve a ferry range of about 10 miles. After
Bomber Command's experience with the Napier-[un]powered Hereford, the
only Motor-glider Medium Bomber, I don't think you could push that one
through. What might work, though, is after you retring the Lanc with
a bigger wing and 2-stage Merlins, you stick a set of Griffons on it.
Change the shape a bit, call it after some explorer, and sell it to
Coastal Command, if need be.

>
> [beer]
>
>>After the Great Blaster Worm and Sobig Hydra chases I've had this
>>week, that's top priority. (Work real job, than travel up to the
>>North COuntry to help out some former clients)
>
> No beer for bad AMRD's. Just explain the priorities to your clients
> would you, there's a good chap?

Thus sayeth the Air Ministry - Sole Agents for Air.
Applications to be sent to Hercules Grytpype-Tynne, the Bladders Hot
Air Pipe.

--
Pete Stickney
A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many
bad measures. -- Daniel Webster

[The Revolution Will Not Be Televised]

On Thu, 21 Aug 2003 20:52:34 GMT, Air Commodore Guy Alcala, Director
of Fighter Operations > wrote:

>At the rate you're going I'd better begin, before you retire and take over from Freeman at MAP. I
>shall miss your sagacity, judiciousness, dare I say genius, that has made my own job immeasurably
>easier. The country owes you a debt of gratitude that it can never repay. I remain, Sir, your most
>humble and obedient servant.

I'm only holding this Production job down until I can replace
Coningham in 2 TAF, which will let me play with all those new toys I'm
producing for his command meanwhile. That's one of the reasons I want
the XIV and I'm also breathing fire down people's necks to get the
long-nacelled Meteor III available ASAP.

>P.S. Are the rumors correct that AM Hill is going to be promoted from AOC 12 Group to AOCinC ADGB,
>about mid-November? 12 Group will have to be the base for our long-range escort force, so we'll need
>an AOC there who's fully committed to making long-range escort a reality.

Hill followed by Robb sounds good. You've already got some good Wing
leanders, like Lloyd Chadburn at Digby and Laddie Lucas at Coltishall.
Once the experiment is demonstrated to be successful, and the numbers
of LR Spits expand , 11 Group bases like Martlesham, Bradwell Bay,
Hornchurch and North Weald can be included. They'll be seeing more
combat than the 11 Group Spit squadrons, so you can count on the more
enthusiastic and aggresive squadron and wing commanders trying to get
in on the act.

>> My impression, and it isn't any more than that, but it is nonetheless
>> based on some limited research on 125 Wing which fielded the first
>> Spit XIV sqns in 2 TAF, is that 110 is representative of the
>> RB-serials delivered in late '43 and early '44.
>
>Fine by me. The Mk. XIVs are for the continent anyway, as that 110 gives them about the same range
>as the Mk. IX, but less endurance.

Initially my aim is to replace the Spit Vs in the 2 TAF squadrons with
short-ranged XIVs and IXs for the invasion period. I also want to
replace the LR Spit VIIIs and IXs in ADGB with Mustang III (LRs), with
the deleted rear fuselage tank in 1944. Hopefully this can begin in
the second half of 1944, and allow 2 TAF to re-equip with LR Spit
VIII/IXs and LR XIVs to allow strategic escort operations to take
place from 2 TAF bases in France and Belgium. By the second half of
1944, all Merlin-engined Spit production will be to an LR standard
(enlarged 96 gallon front tanks, 27 gallon wing tanks and 75 gallon
rear tank) so supply shouldn't be a problem.

The leanest time will be in spring 1944, as LR wastage will only be
replaceable from the Mk VIII production from the Eastleigh group as
Castle Bromwich converts, and operational wastage will be high. There
should be an easing during D-Day and Normandy, as the Germans move
back to France to face the tactical fighters, and Castle Bromwich
comes on stream. This should allow extensive re-equipment at the same
time as Mustangs become available. There should be enough Mustangs to
re-equip two wings (as in OTL; in this TL less Mustangs are being lost
in spring 1944 as the LR Spits are taking some of the strain) which
should go to 12 Group, and allow 11 Group to re-equip.

>> Listen, I'm all for your LR VIIIs, and I'm even helping by pushing for
>> rear-fuselage tanks for them, but the quid pro quo is XIV production
>> beginning on schedule, and the fitting of rear tanks to them whenever
>> possible.
>
>Whenever possible is fine, as long as it doesn't delay our increasing standard Mk. VIII production.

The maximum loss to Mk VIII production will be 10 airframes per month
in December 1943 - January 1944, any further increase being covered by
new production of Mk VIIIs, or more likely from increasing LR IX
production at Castle Bromwhich thereafter. I think you should be able
to rely on a minimum allocation of 90 Spit VIIIs in October, November
and December 1943, moving up to 100 to 120 per month for the first
three months of 1944, and some of these appearing with rear-fuselage
tanks. In return, I should be getting deliveries of 10 Mk XIVs per
month from December to March 1944, going up to 20 and thirty per month
thereafer as Griffon 65 production increases. Remember that the XIVs
will be taking the short-ranged airframes first, and we won't start
producing LR XIVs until you're getting about 200 LR series ii Spit
VIII/IXs per month in April or May 1944.

On the other hand, this will give us an excellent tactical fighter to
counter the Fw190D, and one that can have rear-fuselage tankage
installed at the end of 1944 to give us more intermediate-range
escorts with Mustang-equivalent performance.

>> I've just been thinking of this. Why not run the rear tank via a pump
>> (or two for redundancy) to the main tanks to keep them full while
>> running down the rear tank, just like the approach with the wing
>> tanks?
>
>The one account I have of the L.e. tank usage says that they are transferred to the main(s) once
>space is available. Otherwise, the excess gets vented overboard, which is rather counterproductive.

Yes, I think a direct feed from the rear tank and drop tank might be
less of a handling problem, providing it was used after take-off and
the initial climb, and the switch to the other tanks was done at the
right time..

>I'd think 200 IAS cruise at escort height would be about the minimum we'd want over the continent.
>200 IAS @ 25kft gets us 300 TAS, @ 30kft 327 TAS, ignoring P.E. and C.E. in both cases.

2,400 rpm + 4lbs and 66 gallons per hour it is then.

>> Yes, there were several firms involved, some locally around
>> Southampton. I think CBAF made their own. I don't want to
>> investigate that nightmare much further.
>
><snip>
>
>Oh, admit it, you enjoy hunting through boxes of stuff at the PRO, peering at miniscule type on
>yellowed, 50+ year old mimeographed copies so you can discover that a/c in serial range XX-1XX
>through XX-127 were fitted with canopy enmergency release pin 2C-5392-9 rather 2C-5587-6, owing to
>the delivery van breaking down.

Thankfully, this sort of detail generally isn't recorded at the PRO,
although the odd bureucratic struggle between the MAP and Air Ministry
and suppliers does emerge over troublesome embodiment loan equipment.
This gives you some acerbic comments about Lucas electrics not
delivering the generators required under contract x/xxxx-xx for
Manchesters, but this not being a problem as Avro hadn't got the right
mountings for the generators made yet anyway.

The level of detail you want will be stored at the supplier and
contractor's end, if it is recorded at all. Good luck!

>> This is where my political considerations kick in: the promises to
>> the DAF, the 12th AF and the Russians and the Far East already exist
>> and need to be serviced. Almost all the VIIIs being produced are
>> being shipped out to overseas theatres.
>
>Which is why we'll replace them with Mk. IXs temporarily (Mk. VC Trops to the Far East if we don't
>have enough Mk. IXs), until we can ramp up production.

This is easier the earlier it is done: by September 1943 a lot of Mk
VIIIs are on merchant ships, and you've only got a pool of a couple of
dozen available to you in MU storage waiting to be shipped out.

>> If you want the whole of Mk
>> VIII production, when does this decision get made?
>
>End of September '43 seems like a good date, and continuing for the next few months.

What provokes this at the strategic and political level? I'd suggest
an earlier date, maybe June 1943 before Hamburg and before Schweinfurt
collectively hyped BC and depressed the fortunes of daylight bombing.
It would take a couple of months for the procurement decisions to be
made and things shaken out to the point of doing something at the
squadron end.

[snip LR Vc on hold pending AMR&D AVM Stickney's report from RAE and
A&AEE]

>Sounds like the way to go. I'm not sure that we even need Castle Bromwich to transition. If we can
>get say 150-200 Mk. VIIIs a month,

That will need CBAF: it's beyond the capacity of Supermarine's at
Eastleigh even with the marginals like Westland thrown in.

>that will probably do the trick until we're on the continent
>and/or get our Mustangs. By all means, though, let's make sure we get at least 96 gallons in the Mk.
>IXs from now on. It's ridiculous to be building a/c with 85.

Yes, I think it should break down something like this. [Fantasy time,
but this should have some rational basis after the thrashing we've
given the subject]

R&D

1. Development on Seafires at Eastleigh (Mk XV, etc) to stop
immediately. FAA will survive Vc's being converted to Seafire IIIs
and L.IIIIs from storage; i.e. no new output of Seafires once Westland
have converted to the Spitfire Mk VIII. FAA to get by on US supply
otherwise.

2. Development on F.21 at Eastleigh to cease and all R&D priority to
switch to fitting LR tankage as detailed below to Mk VIII and IX
airframe. Final production work on Mk XIV to continue, any further
airframe allocation for R&D purposes to be cleared by AMR&D. Top
priority on increasing Mk IX internal tanage to Mk VIII standard, then
installing and clearing 75 gallon rear tank for operations in Mk VIII
and IX no later than December 1943. Subsequently development work to
be completed on installing same tank in MK XIV when supplies are
available.

Production

1. Eastleigh to continue maximum production of Mk Spitfire Mk VIIIs,
to a minimum MAP quota of 100 per month, increasing to 120 per month
by December 1943 as the highest priority. Entire output to go to
ADGB.

2. All Spitfire production from all sources to standardise on
enlarged Mk VIII tail on all production as soon as possible.

3. Eastleigh to begin production of maximum 10 Mk XIVs per month in
December (plus quota of 10 in October for existing airframes),
providing Mk VIII delivery minimum is fully completed.

4. Eastleigh to install 75 gallon rear-fuselage tanks in production
(Mk VIII LR), beginning December 1943, with priority for equipping
entire production output by March 1944.

5. Eastleigh to install 75 gallon RF tanks in production Mk XIVs (Mk
XIV LR) when tankage becomes available (i.e. when assigned minimum of
200 LR Spit VIII/IXs are being produced with rear-tanks). Target
date, July 1944.

6. Castle Bromwich to plan switch to Mk VIII airframe production,
with report on required machine tools and assesment of impact on
production output of Mk IXs. No action to be taken pending approval
from AMP with consultation from DFO and AMR&D on acceptability of any
production shortfall. [Marginal note scrawled by AMP: "No point
accepting any shortfall of deliveries just for retractable tailwheels
in all our Spitfire production when we're already getting the internal
tankage which is the main point at issue."]

7. Castle Bromwich to maintain full production of Mk IXs, adding Mk
VIII internal tankage (enlarged forward tanks and wing tanks) as a
priority as soon as supplies of tanks become available after meeting
Eastleigh's needs. Production to be spliced with Mk IX (LR series i)
to be Mk VIII-equivalent. Supplies to be directed to ADGB as
priority.

8. Castle Bromwich to install 75-gallon rear tank to begin June 1944
as Mk IX [LR series ii). Supplies to be directed to ADGB as priority.

Taking a wild stab in the dark, I'll make some
hopefully-not-totally-ridiculous minimum estimations of production.

[figures for Mk VIII/IX [LR]/Mk XIV]

Oct '43 - 90/10/10
Nov '43 - 100/10/10
Dec '43 - 120/10/10
Jan '44 - 110/20/10
Feb '44 - 110/30/10
Mar '44 - 110/50/10
Apr '44 - 100/80/20
May '44 - 100/100/20
Jun '44 - 100/100/20
Jul '44 - 90/120/20
Aug '44 - 90/120/30
Sep '44 - 90/120/30
Oct '44 - 80/150/30
Nov '44 - 80/150/30
Dec '44 - 80/150/30

I think there were about 300 Spitfires being produced per month in
this period as a an approximate rule of thumb. These figures leave a
remaining balance of shorter-ranged Spitfires for supply to other
theatres and reverse-lend lease. All Spitfires built by October 1943
were Mk IX or better, as the Mk V production run ended at CBAF that
month with the last half-dozen to be produced, so Merlin 60 supply
shouldn't be an issue.

By March 1944, I think it might be possible to have the entire
production of Mk VIIIs with RF tanks, and the same for the LR IXs by
the summer. The tank production is of course the biggest unknown and
consequently the largest bit of fantasy, but the scaling up here
shouldn't be too far from what Supermarine actually did with the Mk
VII/VIII production earlier in 1943 and what CBAF did with the
rear-tanked IXs and XVIs in late 1944.

Gavin Bailey



--

Another user rings. "I need more space" he says.
"Well, why not move to Texas?", I ask. - The ******* Operator From Hell

[The Revolution Will Not Be Televised]

On Sat, 23 Aug 2003 04:01:24 GMT, Guy Alcala
> wrote:

[tank plumbing]

>I'm not sure that accords with RAF standards. I finally got my hands on Price, and reading the specs for
>F.7/30, Part 2(B) "Fuel and Oil Systems," I'm not sure that would be allowable. OTOH, the spec may have
>changed.

The re-armament sepcs were definately modified as a result of combat
experience. The external slipper tanks which appeared in 1941 were
unforseen in the original contracts, just like the need for bomb
shackles and so on. I should just scan the Pilots Note's and send
them to you.

>> What provokes this at the strategic and political level?
>
>Nothing. As explained in my other post, this was originally a 'what if' thought experiment from ACM
>Kramer.

Fair enough. But from my perspective it's more fun to ground this in
a believeable context for a departure from the historical policy.

[Spit range]

> at least 250-300 mile radius would seem doable when carrying a 90 gal. tank.
>What gives? The 85 gallon Mk. IX will be somewhat worse, but not all that much.

The RAF were very conservative when planning fuel usage on operations.
They gave a Spit LF IX a range of 365 miles on internal fuel, or 785
with a 90 gallon external tank. Yet the figures the planners for
Cirucs ops used were 100 miles radius for big formations of Spit V/IXs
and only 150 miles for "long-range" [external tank] profiles*.

[* PRO AIR 14/407 "Co-ordinated Operations, Bombers & Fighters
(Circus ops) Vol.2, 78B: Fighter Command Operational instruction
13/1943 - "Operational Endurance of Fighters", Appendix A. This gives
the following breakdown:

Type long sea-crossing/short-sea crossing/large formation

Spit V/IX short-range 300m/240m/100m
Spit V/IX long-range 420m/300m/150m]

Using these figures, actual deployment in regard to operational ranges
used on operations seems to be conservative: after D-Day, Spit V
units based on 11 Group bases and ALGs were sweeping from Manston to
Verdun on 90-gallon tanks, and Spit IX wings based on similar ALGs
were escorting and sweeping to Paris and back. This was on a tankage
profile that was identical to that available in 1942.

The high-altitude Circus ops of 1941-42 did involve large and
complicated wing assemblies over the southern coast of England at high
altitude, which consumed time and fuel, and involved formating on
slower bomber formations with zig-zag courses which all suppressed
available range. Things did change in 1942-43, with low-altitude
assemblies and mid-Channel climbs, as well as increasing external
tankage. Nobody seems to have put two and two together and actually
acknowledged the fact that they could actually escort a bomber force
all the way to the German border and back with sequential waves of
Spitfire escorts covering different sections of the route.

In this respect, the USAAF benefitted from a strategic bombing policy
which pulled the fighters out in support. British escorted bomber
operations didn't dicate fighter operational deployment in the same
manner.

The conservative figures used for Group planners (i.e. understating
the available fuel to avoid disaters like 133 Sqn's escort to Morlaix
in September 1942) leave a big difference between the known individual
range figures they used. BTW, those figures for the Mustang III from
the same source (individual a/c stats) give it a range of 690 miles on
internal fuel, or 1180 with a 90 gallon tank, while the planning
figure for short sea-crossing, small number of a/c range (the best
range figure) gives it just 600 miles. Speculatively using the same
divisor for large formations on a big-sea crossing would indicate a
contemplated range for operational planning purposes of only 200
miles.

Gavin Bailey

--

Another user rings. "I need more space" he says.
"Well, why not move to Texas?", I ask. - The ******* Operator From Hell

[Peter Stickney]

In article >,
(The Revolution Will Not Be Televised) writes:
> On Fri, 22 Aug 2003 00:40:42 -0400, (Air
> Vice-Marshal Stickney, Air Member for Research & Developent) wrote:
>
>>In truth, though, the Revolutionary period, and the years leading up
>>to it were a turbulent time. Neither side was above a bit on
>>intimidation or downright terrorism. For example, Kingston, NH, right
>>near me, has a memorial plaque for one Dr. Josiah Bartlett, who was
>>delegate to the Continental Congress, and the second signature on the
>>Declaration of Independance. What they don't tell you is that while
>>he was down in Philadelphia, his peace-loving, Rule of Law Loyalist
>>neighbors burned his house, looted his farm, and, I believe, killed at
>>least one of his sons.
>
> As I see it, a civil war between to elites clashing for power. The
> ordinary people were a little closer to the power in the revolutionary
> colonial administrations than they were under Gubernatorial rule, but
> not as much as the propaganda would have it. I reckon North could
> have avoided it all by ramming through an "America Act" after the
> Quebec one, giving the colonies a couple of MPs apiece, recognising
> the colonial assemblies rights to levy inland taxation and reserving
> trade, navigation and mercantile taxes for Parliament. There was
> still going to be a collision between the British national debt and
> American taxation yields at some point, but maybe it would't have come
> to blows in the way that it did. I'm convinved American independence
> would follow, although not in quite the same manner, but that's a
> different piece of speculation altogether. Now where were we... oh
> yes.

I was going to post ans incisive and fact-filled rebuttal, mentioning
the cultural drift that had taken place in the 150 years previous to
the American Revolution, and the sea change that occurred during the
French and Indian Wars, when the Colonists realized that they could,
indeed form organized troops of European quality, and the inconsistant
and, in general foolish policies of His Majesty King George III's
Governments, But it gre to about 500 lines. FOr brevity's sake,
might I refer you to James Stokesbury's "Navy and Empire". which
covers the era in a rather fair and factual manner - even if he is a
Brit.

> Smash the gringos! American colonialist oppressors

Hey, I really don't mind being Overpaid, Oversexed, and Over Here.
Beats formating on the South end of a Northbound mule.

> Ah, the Sabre... the great white hope of British planners in 1940, and
> the single biggest indictment of British production engineering and
> management. Can I mention MAP reports of the level of swarf in Sabre
> IIs in 1943 at this point? Hives and Freeman did the right thing by
> insisting on continued Merlin development in 1941, no question about
> it. Having said that, the Air Ministry investment in Merlin
> production was massive, but only for the Merlin 20 series. The Merlin
> 60 and Griffon were definately outside chances and not part of the
> great MAP "plan" of 1940 (lots of Merlin 20s from Rolls, Ford, and
> Packard, but the new types to get, yes, as you said, Sabres or better
> still, Vultures. Vulture-engined Typhoons, yes that would have had
> the Jagdwaffe quaking in their shoes.....) .

Oh, yes. the Vulture. inline engines, if they aren't horizontally
opposed pancakes, like to be upright or inverted. Both upright and
inverted is not a good idea. It's danged fortunate that the 12"
supercharger impeller from the Vulture matched the requirements to
build a 1st (Aux) stage for the 2-stage Merlin. That almost made it
worth the trouble.
[i]
>>> At 25,000 feet? There's no doubt the Alison Mustang was very useful
>>> below that height, but we need an escort force which performs well in
>>> the 20-25,000 or even 30,000 feet band. I'm dubious about the Mustang
>>> I in that environment, even more so with the Mustang II which I
>>> thought had a lower-altitude supercharger peak.
>>
>>At 25,000, there's not a whole lot of difference between a Mk V Spit
>>and a Mustang I. Both were gettig pretty ahsmatic at that point.
>
> Yes, but relatively the Mustang was worse. The RAF gave it a service
> ceiling of 25,000 feet, so I think it's out of the running for
> operations at or above that height. Where it could really stand out,
> though, was on operations from ground level up to 15,000 feet, where
> it really did have superb performance, un-matched by any other type at
> the time. I'm confident they could have been used very successfully
> and more agressively in that environment than they were.

The AAF's numbers for the P-51 gove a Combat Ceiling (500'/min) for
Military Power at 'bout 27,500', at 8600#, and roughly 30,000' for the
-81 engined P-51A. Normal power is, of course, rather a bit lower.
>
> The only real problem as I see it is supply: by the summer of 1943
> production has ceased, and the existing Mustang Is are being expended
> from a stock imported a year or so earlier. Given that production
> ended in favour of the Merlin Mustang, which we want in this ATL just
> as much as historically, and the Mustang II was produced in too little
> quantity to be relevant, we're stuck with a dwindling supply of ageing
> aircraft.

Well, there were a lot of Mustang IIs (P-51A), you just weren't
getting them. Most were going to the MTO, and some to the CBI
Theaters. Perhaps some horse-trading could have been done.

>
> Good aircraft nonetheless, with plenty of scope for more effective
> employment, but as far as I can see not available in the numbers
> required to maintain substantive attritional losses. What I would say
> is that there's no reason Army Co-Operation Command can't lose them
> and the potential LR Spit Vc wings in 12 Group swap their LF Spit Vbs
> for them. I think a 4-6 squadron force should be operable in 1943,
> swtiching to Merlin Mustangs as they become available.

Makes sense. Merlin Mustangs is really the way to go, once you get
them.

>>Note also that as the Merlin 40 series was progressively re-rated for
>>higher boosts, the FTH dropped quite a bit. The supercharger could
>>only compress the air so much, after all, and so, in order to get a
>>higher boost, it has to start with thicker air.
>
> In this instance we're on stock Merlin 46 engines on 1941 Circus and
> Rodeo heights.


> [European vs American geographical influence on fighter design]
>
>>Well, we could, if we wanted to, produce small, short-ranged fast
>>climbing interceptors. Take a look at the Curtiss CW-22 Demon.
>
> Well, yes, and the British could produce equally practical and
> effective aircraft. Like the Brabazon. And let's not forget US
> efforts like the Goblin here. Not much excess structural weight on
> display there....

Well, pratical if you're building something to take the Royal Mail and
a few King's Messengers out to Inja, with stops along the way. The
payload/structure weight ratio's still pretty unfavorable. Even BOAC
bought Constallations and Strats, postwar.

>>> Getting more fuel into the Spitfire airframe, for all the
>>> difficulties, is a better option than trying to make the P-40 or P-39
>>> a competitive high-altitude fighter.
>>
>>Oh, I certainly agree. I've got the NACA Tech Report on full-size
>>drag tests done on single-engine service airplanes in the Langley Full
>>Size Tunnel. (Not models, mind you, but the real airplanes) One of
>>the airplanes tested was the Turbosupercharged XP-39. With the turbo
>>& intercooler, it was a very draggy airplane that would have never met
>>its performance guarantees. The small wing limited ceiling as much as
>>the lack of engine power, and there wasn't any room for growth.
>
> Didn't they do that with a Spit Vb? I've got a NACA report on that
> filed away somewhere. I was suprised they used such an example (early
> production Vb, IIRC) in 1943 when they did it. I presume it had been
> sitting around at Wright Field as I know some British pilots sent to
> tour the US in late 1941 flew one there, although I don't know the
> serial.

The Cranfield Tech Reports Server, which is an echo of the NACA tech
reports server, has a lot of Air Ministry and MoS tech reports on all
manner of subjects. One of which is model tests of the Spit, the
Mustang, adn the Spiteful, Most interesting stuff.
>
>>>>> Yes, but even the Wright Field Spits also had 43 gallon tanks behind
>>>>> the pilot, against 33 gallons in the wings (according to the A&AEE
>>>>> report summary on MK210 in S&M). Wing tanks have always been a given
>>>>> with me, as you & Guy have already specified Mk VIII airframes, which
>>>>> had 25 gall leading-edge tanks, but as Quill states, the only
>>>>> available space for major increases in internal fuel was behind the
>>>>> pilot.
>>>>
>>>>43 of _whose_ gallons?
>>>
>>> I thought Imperial - were the 62.5 gallon Mustang underwing tanks used
>>> in that trial US or Imperial? They look bigger than 44/45 gallon RAF
>>> tanks.
>>
>>They were the U.S. streamlined tanks. that would give each one 450#
>>of fuel. 62.5 Imperial, or 75 US.
>
> That would indicate the rear tank was measured in imperial gallons as
> well, which brings us back to the pleasant synchronicity of
> Supermarine, A&AEE and Wright Field preferring 40-43 gallons as a
> stable rear tank load in a Spit IX (I forget the weight of petrol in
> pounds 7 or 8 lbs per gallon? This would make a Mk IX tolerably
> stable with 240lbs behind the pilot with the CoG movement somewhere
> about 10 inches behind the datum). I have to admit, that sounds well
> beyond a balanced, bob-weighted, enlarged-horn-balanced Mk Vc.

1 Imperial Gallon is 7.2# of petrol, for most purposes. But I agree,
I'd say that the Mk V is pretty much out, as far as more fuselage fuel
goes. Wing tanks, on the other hand...

>
>>> I think some of this was dealt with with the Vc, in terms of structure
>>> and stressing for under-wing stores. I think 44 gallon ferry tanks
>>> should be a possibility.
>>
>>The stressing was there, the plumbing wasn't.
>
> Agreed, but Wright Field did it. I have to admit I've never seen a
> Spit with under-wing tanks, however. Even post-war. However, I don't
> see the plumbing as a show-stopper.

It's a matter of will and resources. As the Wright Field experiment
showed, it could be done. But, then, that's not what Spits were used
for, what?
>
>> It's not 100% sinple to
>>rig up a drop tank. You need the fuel line, of course, but also a
>>pressure source to force the fuel out of the tanks when you want them
>>to feed, and some sort of overflow vant to deal with a tank being
>>pressurized, but not feeding - It adds up to a lot of plumbing,
>>really, sort of like taking an old carbureted car and rigging it up
>>for Bosch fuel injection.
>
> Sure but this was done for various under-fuselage drop tanks, and was
> done for under-wing drop tanks on the Hurricane II and Typhoon Ib.
> Clearly the engineering capacity was there; my question is was there
> a strucutural reason (as Supermarine claimed with MK210) to prevent
> it?

The only thing that I can thing of is torsional strength of the wing -
It micht be prone to flutter. Failing that, it's easier to plumb drop
tanks into already exixting wing tanks. The fuel line runs are
shorter, and there aren't so many joints.

>>> For the LR Vc, we don't need as much in a rear tank, and we only need
>>> it for 3 months or so as a proof of concept demonstrator before doing
>>> it for real with the LR VIII.
>>
>>I'd leave the Mk V< and put the effort into the Mk VIII.
>
> As I said to the Director of Fighter Operations, this hinges upon the
> timing and approach. If this comes from the top down, then Mk VIII
> allocations and production are changeable. This demands major changes
> in RAF strategic and operational leadership.
>
> If it evolves from the ground up, it demands less of a sea-change on
> behalf of the RAF brass but consequently makes the allocation of the
> optimal type of Spitfire for the operations in question more subject
> to the existing political and strategic dynamics.

Yeah - the Ground-up scenario will be pretty much Come as You Are.
Then again, there micht be a call for a slightly enlarged
Merlin-powered Westland Whirlwind. (With a properly sorted out fuel
system)


> Pick and chose the scenario you prefer out of the two; I've made it
> clear that the I feel the second is more credible on a historical
> basis, not on any engineering grounds (as you have demonstrated). The
> LR Vs make sense in the second, but obviously not in the first.
>
>>>>I'll get round to it, after...
>>>
>>> Demotion may follow as a consequence of disobeying my petty whims.
>>> Now, about those performance figures for Sabre-engined Lancasters....
>>
>>The Sabre engined Lanc is easy. Given a glide ratio of about 9:1, it
>>should be able to achieve a ferry range of about 10 miles.
>
> I find your cavalier disregard for the entertainment value of multiple
> engine failure on maximum all-up-weight take-off to be most
> disappointing.
>
>>After
>>Bomber Command's experience with the Napier-[un]powered Hereford, the
>>only Motor-glider Medium Bomber, I don't think you could push that one
>>through.
>
> Not even when I point out that any fighter attempting to engage in a
> classical curve of pursuit attack from behind would have to deal with
> the dense defensive smoke-screen produced by four Sabres burning oil
> like an Iraqi making self-destructive gestures against the Coalition
> occupation?

Sounds like the USAF's MiG Evasion tactics for the COllege Eye
EC-121s, Turn away, and METO power on all operating engines. The
flood of oil would cover the MiG's canopy and force him to break off
the attack. If that didn't work, the Radar would render him sterile.
>
>>What might work, though, is after you retring the Lanc with
>>a bigger wing and 2-stage Merlins, you stick a set of Griffons on it.
>>Change the shape a bit, call it after some explorer, and sell it to
>>Coastal Command, if need be.
>
> And end up using it as a keystone AEW platform in national defence
> against the Warsaw pact for fifty years? No, your counterfactual
> speculation has really departed from the path of rationality at this
> point. Let's get back to something more credible, like a
> sky-blackening horde of Lanc B.V's (Sabre) deafening the population of
> the Ruhr.

Oh, I don't know - if you've got some hand-me-down Air Search radars
that have managed to outlive 2 previous airframes, it might just
work...


>>> No beer for bad AMRD's. Just explain the priorities to your clients
>>> would you, there's a good chap?
>>
>>Thus sayeth the Air Ministry - Sole Agents for Air.
>>Applications to be sent to Hercules Grytpype-Tynne, the Bladders Hot
>> Air Pipe.
>
> Like the Mexican bandit accomplices around el Jefe in a spaghetti
> western, nobody can risk laughing until the CAS signals his approval
> of the AMR&D's jokes by laughing himself. Anybody ill-advised enough
> to continue displaying signs of amusement after the CAS stops smiling
> will of course find themselves on an interesting posting to Burma.

If you take such action sir, you will hear from my Soliciters, the
firm of Lamb, Curry, and Rice are on retainer.

Oddly enough, this post is rather delayed because I was laid low by
the recurrence of some dratted Intestinal thing that I picked up in
the Tropics. That's what I get for not drinking Gin.

--
Pete Stickney
A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many
bad measures. -- Daniel Webster

[Peter Stickney]

In article >,
(The Revolution Will Not Be Televised) writes:
> On Sat, 23 Aug 2003 04:01:24 GMT, Guy Alcala
> > wrote:
>
> [tank plumbing]
>
>>I'm not sure that accords with RAF standards. I finally got my hands on Price, and reading the specs for
>>F.7/30, Part 2(B) "Fuel and Oil Systems," I'm not sure that would be allowable. OTOH, the spec may have
>>changed.
>
> The re-armament sepcs were definately modified as a result of combat
> experience. The external slipper tanks which appeared in 1941 were
> unforseen in the original contracts, just like the need for bomb
> shackles and so on. I should just scan the Pilots Note's and send
> them to you.

If you do, I respectfully request a copy as well. I'm more than
willing to trade.

> Using these figures, actual deployment in regard to operational ranges
> used on operations seems to be conservative: after D-Day, Spit V
> units based on 11 Group bases and ALGs were sweeping from Manston to
> Verdun on 90-gallon tanks, and Spit IX wings based on similar ALGs
> were escorting and sweeping to Paris and back. This was on a tankage
> profile that was identical to that available in 1942.
>
> The high-altitude Circus ops of 1941-42 did involve large and
> complicated wing assemblies over the southern coast of England at high
> altitude, which consumed time and fuel, and involved formating on
> slower bomber formations with zig-zag courses which all suppressed
> available range. Things did change in 1942-43, with low-altitude
> assemblies and mid-Channel climbs, as well as increasing external
> tankage. Nobody seems to have put two and two together and actually
> acknowledged the fact that they could actually escort a bomber force
> all the way to the German border and back with sequential waves of
> Spitfire escorts covering different sections of the route.

Y'know, I get the feeling that the RAF didn't really trust the
navigation skills of its fighter pilots. I don't know what
justification they had, but they did seem to think that having relays
of escorts would be too complicated. Mark you, it _was_ complicated,
and there were some serious Eighth Air FOrce errors, on this score,
where the relief relay didn't make it, and the bombers were exposed,
but it did work often enough.

>
> In this respect, the USAAF benefitted from a strategic bombing policy
> which pulled the fighters out in support. British escorted bomber
> operations didn't dicate fighter operational deployment in the same
> manner.

> The conservative figures used for Group planners (i.e. understating
> the available fuel to avoid disaters like 133 Sqn's escort to Morlaix
> in September 1942) leave a big difference between the known individual
> range figures they used. BTW, those figures for the Mustang III from
> the same source (individual a/c stats) give it a range of 690 miles on
> internal fuel, or 1180 with a 90 gallon tank, while the planning
> figure for short sea-crossing, small number of a/c range (the best
> range figure) gives it just 600 miles. Speculatively using the same
> divisor for large formations on a big-sea crossing would indicate a
> contemplated range for operational planning purposes of only 200
> miles.

The AAF figures for a Merlin Mustang give ita Radius in internal fuel
of about 400 miles, includeng takeoff, form-up and climbout, 20
minutes of combat, and 30 minutes of reserve.

--
Pete Stickney
A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many
bad measures. -- Daniel Webster

[The Revolution Will Not Be Televised]

On Wed, 27 Aug 2003 01:07:03 -0400, AVM Stickney, Air Member for
Research & Development reported:

[American Rev]
>> As I see it, a civil war between to elites clashing for power.

>I was going to post ans incisive and fact-filled rebuttal, mentioning
>the cultural drift that had taken place in the 150 years previous to
>the American Revolution, and the sea change that occurred during the
>French and Indian Wars, when the Colonists realized that they could,
>indeed form organized troops of European quality, and the inconsistant
>and, in general foolish policies of His Majesty King George III's
>Governments,

It depends what you mean by foolish. There was an internal logic to
them, even if it produced counter-productive results when actually
applied. The real problem was the new-found determination on the part
of a British government to face up to the problems of reconciling
colonial and wartime expenditure with colonial tax receipts:
appointed governors and local colonial assemblies had been clashing
for generations prior to post-1762 episodes.

>But it gre to about 500 lines. FOr brevity's sake,
>might I refer you to James Stokesbury's "Navy and Empire". which
>covers the era in a rather fair and factual manner - even if he is a
>Brit.

I have plenty of references on that period, believe me. My own
personal interpretation probably comes closest to Draper's in most of
the essentials.

[Vulture-engined Typhoons, aka The Tornado]

>Oh, yes. the Vulture. inline engines, if they aren't horizontally
>opposed pancakes, like to be upright or inverted. Both upright and
>inverted is not a good idea. It's danged fortunate that the 12"
>supercharger impeller from the Vulture matched the requirements to
>build a 1st (Aux) stage for the 2-stage Merlin. That almost made it
>worth the trouble.

Hives did claim that the latest Vulture
>> Yes, but relatively the Mustang was worse. The RAF gave it a service
>> ceiling of 25,000 feet, so I think it's out of the running for
>> operations at or above that height. Where it could really stand out,
>> though, was on operations from ground level up to 15,000 feet, where
>> it really did have superb performance, un-matched by any other type at
>> the time. I'm confident they could have been used very successfully
>> and more agressively in that environment than they were.
>
>The AAF's numbers for the P-51 gove a Combat Ceiling (500'/min) for
>Military Power at 'bout 27,500', at 8600#, and roughly 30,000' for the
>-81 engined P-51A. Normal power is, of course, rather a bit lower.[/color]

I should correct myself, the RAF gave the Mustang I a service ceiling
of 30,000ft, but the RoC at those heights was clearly inferior to the
Spitfire V. The only USAAF report on the Mustang I/P-51 I've seen
quotes a "fighting ceiling" of 20,000ft and goes on to criticise the
loss of power over 18,000ft, before recommending increased altitude
performance. The same can be said about the USAAF on the P-51A,
limiting it's useful service ceiling to about 25,000ft.
[i]
>> The only real problem as I see it is supply: by the summer of 1943
>> production has ceased, and the existing Mustang Is are being expended
>> from a stock imported a year or so earlier. Given that production
>> ended in favour of the Merlin Mustang, which we want in this ATL just
>> as much as historically, and the Mustang II was produced in too little
>> quantity to be relevant, we're stuck with a dwindling supply of ageing
>> aircraft.
>
>Well, there were a lot of Mustang IIs (P-51A), you just weren't
>getting them. Most were going to the MTO, and some to the CBI
>Theaters. Perhaps some horse-trading could have been done.

There don't seem to be a lot of them even then: a couple of groups of
A-36's, a few squadrons of F-6's and a couple of squadron's worth of
Mustang IIs in the RAF.

>> Well, yes, and the British could produce equally practical and
>> effective aircraft. Like the Brabazon. And let's not forget US
>> efforts like the Goblin here. Not much excess structural weight on
>> display there....
>
>Well, pratical if you're building something to take the Royal Mail and
>a few King's Messengers out to Inja, with stops along the way.

But even then the Brabazon was a complete turkey.

> The
>payload/structure weight ratio's still pretty unfavorable.

Diabolic, more like.

> Even BOAC
>bought Constallations and Strats, postwar.

Holding patterns around the Tudor and Comet, basically. Less haste,
more speed might have been a better governmental approach in the
immediate post-war period.

>> That would indicate the rear tank was measured in imperial gallons as
>> well, which brings us back to the pleasant synchronicity of
>> Supermarine, A&AEE and Wright Field preferring 40-43 gallons as a
>> stable rear tank load in a Spit IX (I forget the weight of petrol in
>> pounds 7 or 8 lbs per gallon? This would make a Mk IX tolerably
>> stable with 240lbs behind the pilot with the CoG movement somewhere
>> about 10 inches behind the datum). I have to admit, that sounds well
>> beyond a balanced, bob-weighted, enlarged-horn-balanced Mk Vc.
>
>1 Imperial Gallon is 7.2# of petrol, for most purposes. But I agree,
>I'd say that the Mk V is pretty much out, as far as more fuselage fuel
>goes.

Depends on the size of the tank, to my mind. I think a 75-gallon Spit
IX.XVI tank is too much for the probable stability limits, fair
enough.

[drop tanks]

>> Sure but this was done for various under-fuselage drop tanks, and was
>> done for under-wing drop tanks on the Hurricane II and Typhoon Ib.
>> Clearly the engineering capacity was there; my question is was there
>> a strucutural reason (as Supermarine claimed with MK210) to prevent
>> it?
>
>The only thing that I can thing of is torsional strength of the wing -
>It micht be prone to flutter.

It was a problem on all Spits to a degree, but the Vc should have been
usable, and should have been able to take wing tanks if the IXc could.

[likely scenarios for LR fighters in FC in 1943]

>Yeah - the Ground-up scenario will be pretty much Come as You Are.
>Then again, there micht be a call for a slightly enlarged
>Merlin-powered Westland Whirlwind. (With a properly sorted out fuel
>system)

I can't see the Whirlwind surviving the Beaverbrookisation of the MAP
in 1940, at a time when the BoB demanded defensive fighters and well
before any need for long-range escorts was going to be discovered.
The use of Peregrines and Westlands small design department would rule
out any realistic prospect of them developing the Whirlwind afterwards
whatever happened.

[Sabre-engined Lancasters]

>> Not even when I point out that any fighter attempting to engage in a
>> classical curve of pursuit attack from behind would have to deal with
>> the dense defensive smoke-screen produced by four Sabres burning oil
>> like an Iraqi making self-destructive gestures against the Coalition
>> occupation?
>
>Sounds like the USAF's MiG Evasion tactics for the COllege Eye
>EC-121s, Turn away, and METO power on all operating engines. The
>flood of oil would cover the MiG's canopy and force him to break off
>the attack. If that didn't work, the Radar would render him sterile.

And with the Sabre-Lanc, don't forget the difficulty any attacker
would have following the violent evasions made possible by involuntary
asymmetric flight patterns after individual engine failure on full
power settings. And if you flying behiond a Lanc with Sabres made at
the Acton plant, the additional defensive capacity of the occasional
piece of fracture sleeve-valve or engine swarf being hurled out of the
exhaust manifold at you.

>> Like the Mexican bandit accomplices around el Jefe in a spaghetti
>> western, nobody can risk laughing until the CAS signals his approval
>> of the AMR&D's jokes by laughing himself. Anybody ill-advised enough
>> to continue displaying signs of amusement after the CAS stops smiling
>> will of course find themselves on an interesting posting to Burma.
>
>If you take such action sir, you will hear from my Soliciters, the
>firm of Lamb, Curry, and Rice are on retainer.
>
>Oddly enough, this post is rather delayed because I was laid low by
>the recurrence of some dratted Intestinal thing that I picked up in
>the Tropics. That's what I get for not drinking Gin.

Well, if you get A&AEE to pass the LR Spit Vc, we might relocate your
HQ from such foetid jungles in the back of beyond and move you away
from the plague-ridden swamps of Washington.

Gavin Bailey

--

Another user rings. "I need more space" he says.
"Well, why not move to Texas?", I ask. - The ******* Operator From Hell