What F-102 units were called up for Viet Nam

[Tarver Engineering]

I want this for a political newsgroup.

thanks

[Harley W. Daugehrty]

"Scott Peterson" > wrote in message
...
> "Tarver Engineering" > wrote:
>
> >I want this for a political newsgroup.
> >
> >thanks
>
> I don't think any were. This plane was strictly an interceptor for
> shooting down bombers. No guns, no ground attack capability.
> Absolutely no use in Viet Nam.
>
> Adding a political comment, when George W. joined the Texas ANG, he
> was assigned to an F-102 unit. Some of the comments about that were
> that it was a very safe unit to join as there was no possibility of
> overseas assignment.
>
> Scott Peterson
>
>
> The things that come to those that
> wait may be the things left by those
> who got there first.

If I remember correctly the F-102 was not exactly a "safe" aircraft, it was
a rather of a challenge to fly and its mission profile in a nuclear exchange
was not desirable at all.


Harley W. Daugherty

[Aerophotos]

The F102 operated out of Tan Son Nhut and also on detachment from Osan,
South Korea i understand.... they were used as point interceptors and
f102 chase planes for B52 raids in out of country sorties and sometimes
used their IR ball as a 2.75 FFAR aim point for ground attack missions.

1 x F102 was shot down by a Mig in 67 i think.



Tarver Engineering wrote:
>
> I want this for a political newsgroup.
>
> thanks

--

[Tex Houston]

"Scott Peterson" > wrote in message
...
> "Tarver Engineering" > wrote:
>
> >I want this for a political newsgroup.
> >
> >thanks
>
> I don't think any were. This plane was strictly an interceptor for
> shooting down bombers. No guns, no ground attack capability.
> Absolutely no use in Viet Nam.
>
> Adding a political comment, when George W. joined the Texas ANG, he
> was assigned to an F-102 unit. Some of the comments about that were
> that it was a very safe unit to join as there was no possibility of
> overseas assignment.
>
> Scott Peterson

F-102s did indeed serve in SEA and early on too. The 509FIS sent F-102s to
Tan Son Nhut on 21 March 1962 under Project "Water Glass" and they remained
under Project "Candy Machine". In addition to Tan Son Nhut tey were
stationed at Bien Hoa. Some of these deployments were from the unit at
Clark. The F-102s also served at Don Muang from 1961-1964. I think they
were also at Udorn at one time (but maybe not...it was a long time ago).
Since so many F-102 were ANG service in SEA was opened to them on an
individual basis under Project "Palace Alert".

I did not see the original message (I don't see Tarver messages unless
quoted) so I don't know whose ox I'm goring.

Tex Houston

[Steve Hix]

In article >,
Scott Peterson > wrote:

> "Tarver Engineering" > wrote:
>
> >I want this for a political newsgroup.
> >
> >thanks
>
> I don't think any were. This plane was strictly an interceptor for
> shooting down bombers. No guns, no ground attack capability.
> Absolutely no use in Viet Nam.

One F-102 was lost over North Vietnam.

82nd FIS flew F-102s out of Bien Hoa in 1968.

509th FIS flew out of Tan Son Nhut and Danang and
from Don Muang (Thailand) in 1968.

> Adding a political comment, when George W. joined the Texas ANG, he
> was assigned to an F-102 unit. Some of the comments about that were
> that it was a very safe unit to join as there was no possibility of
> overseas assignment.

[MikeT]

I did some searching, at:
http://www.arthurhu.com/index/militry.htm
I found this
"Greatest Clunkers of Vietnam
-----------
F102 - Nothing to shoot down, trials were made of using Falcons
against ground targets"

http://www.war-stories.com/t_jensen.htm
Numerous references to NVA attacks where F-102 alert aircraft were parked.

http://www.dposs.com/t_jensen-dab-bush-account-1965.htm
also talks about NVA attacks and F102s. There are also some pics available.

I do remember that the F102s were deployed to VietName but do not remember
what the unit was involved or how long they stayed, not long for sure since
there was nothing for them to do.


MikeT

[av8r]

Hi John

Good timing. I'm presently working on a journal article about F-102 ops
in Viet Nam and Thailand code named 'Water Glass' and 'Candy Time'.

The following active duty units operated the Convair the F-102A and
TF-102's in Viet Nam and Thailand:

64th FIS/405th FW
82nd FIS/51st FW
509th FIS/405th FW

Cheers...Chris

[Kevin Brooks]

Scott Peterson > wrote in message >...
> "Tarver Engineering" > wrote:
>
> >I want this for a political newsgroup.
> >
> >thanks
>
> I don't think any were. This plane was strictly an interceptor for
> shooting down bombers. No guns, no ground attack capability.
> Absolutely no use in Viet Nam.

Wrong. F-102's did serve in both Vietnam and Thailand (which is why
every once in a while you see a photo of a Delta Dagger in SEA camo).
If you can get a hold of an old National Geographic from that period
that covered the war (sorry, can't recall which issue...), you'll note
that a photo of Tan Son Nhut (or whatever the spelling was) showed
F-102's sitting in sandbagged revetments. I believe three were listed
as combat losses, one to a Mig, the remaining two to ground fire, and
a few others were lost during VC sapper/rocket attacks on the ground.
Served as interceptors, some escort duty, and even ground
attack--there was even an experamental program where they went after
NVA cooking fires at night with their IR Falcons. They also used their
12 unguided rockets against ground targets.

>
> Adding a political comment, when George W. joined the Texas ANG, he
> was assigned to an F-102 unit. Some of the comments about that were
> that it was a very safe unit to join as there was no possibility of
> overseas assignment.

Very strange, since the ANG was sending F-102 folks over to SEA during
the war on rotations. ISTR that Bush's then-commanding officer once
commented that ol' GWB volunteered for that duty, but was not
submitted because he lacked suffcient stick time in comparison to the
more experienced pilots who did participate.

Brooks

>
> Scott Peterson
>
>
> The things that come to those that
> wait may be the things left by those
> who got there first.

[David Hartung]

"av8r" > wrote in message
...
> Hi John
>
> Good timing. I'm presently working on a journal article about F-102 ops
> in Viet Nam and Thailand code named 'Water Glass' and 'Candy Time'.
>
> The following active duty units operated the Convair the F-102A and
> TF-102's in Viet Nam and Thailand:
>
> 64th FIS/405th FW
> 82nd FIS/51st FW
> 509th FIS/405th FW

Just out of curiosity, does your research make any reference to 102 pilots
from the 176th FIS?Wis.ANG, serving in Viet Nam. This was my Dad's old
outfit.

[Scott Peterson]

"Harley W. Daugehrty" > wrote:

>If I remember correctly the F-102 was not exactly a "safe" aircraft, it was
>a rather of a challenge to fly and its mission profile in a nuclear exchange
>was not desirable at all.

May be, but by the 1970's that was all in the past. Patrolling over
the Gulf of Mexico for waves of bombers from Cuba was hardly the stuff
of legend.

To everyone else who did correct me about the use of the F-102 in SEA,
thank for the information.



Scott Peterson


Seen it all, done it all,
can't remember most of it.

[Jim Thomas]

F-102s were stationed in Thailand, in 1967, primarily as weather recon
aircraft.

At one point in 1967, (I think around September) there was a Search and
Rescue (SAR) effort near Route 9 (in N. Vietnam, just east of the border
with Laos). I was Sandy lead for this mission. Several SAMs were fired;
turns out, all or most were fired at the F-102s, our MIG cap, not at us.

None hit (and the downed pilot was rescued). Later on, I talked to some
of the F-102 pilots. This was the high point of their tour: they were
shot at.

Seems to me that the worst thing that can happen to a warrior is not to
be allowed to take part. There were lots of warriors in the F-102 bunch.

Jim Thomas

[Cub Driver]

>a very safe unit to join as there was no possibility of
>overseas assignment.

I don't think flying supersonic jets in a military environment can
reasonably be called a safe activity.


all the best -- Dan Ford
email: www.danford.net/letters.htm#9

see the Warbird's Forum at www.warbirdforum.com
and the Piper Cub Forum at www.pipercubforum.com

[av8r]

Juvat wrote:
> av8r posted
>
>
>
>>Good timing. I'm presently working on a journal article about F-102 ops
>>in Viet Nam and Thailand code named 'Water Glass' and 'Candy Time'.
>
>
> "Candy Machine"

OOps!!!!

You are absolutely right. I was half awake when I posted last night.

Cheers...Chris

>

[Paul J. Adam]

In message >, Frank Vaughan
> writes
>Could you go into greater detail on this? The 2.75" FFAR was an
>unguided rocket munition. How would the F-102 IR ball come into
>play?

At a guess... Find an IR source (running engine, camp fire, etc.) with
the IR sensor, then fire unguided FFARs at IR source.

--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBox<at>jrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

[av8r]

>>sometimes used their IR ball as a 2.75 FFAR aim point for ground attack missions.

* The IR ball was part of the Hughes MG 10 fire control system
integrated with the AIM 4 Falcon


>>1 x F102 was shot down by a Mig in 67 i think.

* An F-102 of the 509th FIS/ 405thFW was shot down by an Atoll
air-to-air missile fired from a North Vietnamese Air Force MiG-21
'Fishbed'. This took place on the 3rd of February, 1968 while flying
MiG CAP over Route Pack 4

Cheers...Chris

[Thomas Schoene]

"Juvat" > wrote in message

> Jim Thomas posted:
>
> >
> > F-102s were stationed in Thailand, in 1967, primarily as weather
> > recon aircraft.
>
> Didn't they have a rather short radius of action? (Can't recall seeing
> a picture of one on "the boom" thinking they're like B-57s...no air
> refueling capability...but I could be VERY wrong on that score)

http://home.att.net/~jbaugher1/f102_1.html

"The F-102A was not equipped at the factory for midair refuelling. However,
there were some examples of the F-102A that were fitted in the field with
probe and drogue inflight-refuelling probes mounted immediately aft of the
cockpit on the right-hand side of the fuselage. These were fitted for the
purpose of ferrying aircraft from the US to Southeast Asia. The probes were
removed upon arrival. Some ANG F-102As were also fitted with these midair
refuelling probes. "



--�
Tom Schoene Replace "invalid" with "net" to e-mail
"If brave men and women never died, there would be nothing
special about bravery." -- Andy Rooney (attributed)

[RCold36]

>Subject: Re: What F-102 units were called up for Viet Nam
>From: Scott Peterson

Not sure what or where they came from, but there were 2 F-102's at Don Muang
RTAF when I arrived there in early November 1961. I was in the AF on project
Able Mable with 4 RF-101C's for recce work over Laos.

Roy Colding USAF Ret.
email:

[Tarver Engineering]

"Peter Stickney" > wrote in message
...
> In article >,
> "Tarver Engineering" > writes:
> > I want this for a political newsgroup.
>
> Ask a civil question, get a civil answer.

Dude, you attacked me out of ignorance and I expect you to apologise.

[Jim Thomas]

Juvat wrote:


>
> Didn't they have a rather short radius of action? (Can't recall seeing
> a picture of one on "the boom" thinking they're like B-57s...no air
> refueling capability...but I could be VERY wrong on that score)
>
> Where were they doing this? (I know starting in Aug 66 the 6461st TRS
> at Udorn in RF-4s was flying wx recce into RP-6 covering high and low
> altitude then using their HF radios to relay the wx back to Udorn and
> 7th AF Hq)
>
> From what I've read their Dets were rather small?
>
The F-102s I knew were out of Udorn, and were only a few aircraft.
>
>
> Were you involved with the SAR on 3 Feb 68 when an F-102 was shotdown
> by a MiG? Supposedly they were part of a SAR along the NVN-Laos
> border.
>
> Juvat
>
No, I left Udorn in November 1967. I hadn't heard about this SAR.

Jim Thomas
>

[Tex Houston]

"Peter Stickney" > wrote in message
...
> F-102s showed up in Thailand and Viet Nam from before the beginning,
> as it were.
>
> In August, 1961, 4 F-102As from the 509th FIS, Clark AB, Pi deployed
> to Don Muang Airport, outside of Bankok for air defence duties,
> apparently as part of Project Bell Tone.


My source shows this took place in April 1961.

Tex Houston

[Peter Stickney]

In article >,
"Tex Houston" > writes:
>
> "Peter Stickney" > wrote in message
> ...
>> F-102s showed up in Thailand and Viet Nam from before the beginning,
>> as it were.
>>
>> In August, 1961, 4 F-102As from the 509th FIS, Clark AB, Pi deployed
>> to Don Muang Airport, outside of Bankok for air defence duties,
>> apparently as part of Project Bell Tone.
>
>
> My source shows this took place in April 1961.

The early '60s period of our involmement in this area was, shall we
say, a bit turbid, but here's what I have on Bell Tone, which isn't
much.
The initial BellTone deployment was 6 F-100s from the 510th TFS/405th
FW from Clark AB, from April -> August '61. They were relieved by the
4 F-102s from the 509th FIS/405th FW in August, closing shop sometime
in early '62.

Or so says my somewhat tattered photocopy of "Combat Wings of the Air
Force"

--
Pete Stickney
A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many
bad measures. -- Daniel Webster

[Mike Marron]

>Jim Thomas > wrote:

>No, I left Udorn in November 1967.

You didn't by chance, know a Capt. Bob "Best of the Bad Guys"
Marron (my Dad) while stationed at Udorn?

-Mike Marron

[Kevin Brooks]

Scott Peterson > wrote in message >...
> "Harley W. Daugehrty" > wrote:
>
> >If I remember correctly the F-102 was not exactly a "safe" aircraft, it was
> >a rather of a challenge to fly and its mission profile in a nuclear exchange
> >was not desirable at all.
>
> May be, but by the 1970's that was all in the past. Patrolling over
> the Gulf of Mexico for waves of bombers from Cuba was hardly the stuff
> of legend.

Huh? You are aware that the Cold War was still alive and well through
the *eighties*? And that despite the fact that the TXANG units were
based in Texas, they could have been assigned air defense duties
*anywhere*? The situation today is not all that different (except that
today's threat is unlikely to shoot back), with ANG fighters flying AD
missions from detached locations on a routine basis. You may not like
GWB, but attacking the service of the F-102 pilots who did their duty
*wherever* it occured is not gaining you very much.

Brooks

>
> To everyone else who did correct me about the use of the F-102 in SEA,
> thank for the information.
>
>
>
> Scott Peterson
>
>
> Seen it all, done it all,
> can't remember most of it.

[Tex Houston]

"Peter Stickney" > wrote in message
...
> In article >,
> "Tex Houston" > writes:
> >
> > "Peter Stickney" > wrote in message
> > ...
> >> F-102s showed up in Thailand and Viet Nam from before the beginning,
> >> as it were.
> >>
> >> In August, 1961, 4 F-102As from the 509th FIS, Clark AB, Pi deployed
> >> to Don Muang Airport, outside of Bankok for air defence duties,
> >> apparently as part of Project Bell Tone.
> >
> >
> > My source shows this took place in April 1961.
>
> The early '60s period of our involmement in this area was, shall we
> say, a bit turbid, but here's what I have on Bell Tone, which isn't
> much.
> The initial BellTone deployment was 6 F-100s from the 510th TFS/405th
> FW from Clark AB, from April -> August '61. They were relieved by the
> 4 F-102s from the 509th FIS/405th FW in August, closing shop sometime
> in early '62.
>
> Or so says my somewhat tattered photocopy of "Combat Wings of the Air
> Force"
>
> --
> Pete Stickney

Probably never know which is correct but I'm using Appendix I "Growth of
Major United States Air Force and Vietnamese Air Force Units to February
1965" from the book The United States Air Force iIn Southeast Asia...The
Advisory Years To 1965" published by Office of Air Force History, United
States Air Force, 1981.

This particular movement is not in the Table of Units: Vietnam, 1954-1964
contained in Vic Flintham's "Air Wars and Aircraft...A detailed Record of
Air Combat, 1945 to the Present" 1990.

Tex Houston

[av8r]

Hi Peter

The first operational deployment to Viet by F-102's was actually on the
21st of March 1962. Deuces of the 509th FIS deployed to Tan Son Nhut.
They returned 8 days later on the 29th. For the next year during Water
Glass ops, they rotated every six weeks with U.S. Navy AD5Q's.

Project Bell Tone 1 commenced in December 1960 with six F-100D's of the
510th TFS were deployed to Don Muang Airport. They were replaced by six
F-102A's of the 509th FIS nine months later.


Peter, let's keep this thread going if possible. It's extremely
interesting. Are you interested in F-102 losses in country?

I used to love watching the F-102's of the 59th FIS roaring around while
I was at Goose Bay, Labrador (June 64-June 67). The odd time a Deuce of
the 57th FIS would come down from Kef for a visit. Lots of good Bear
hunting back in those days too.


Cheers...Chris

[Kevin Brooks]

"Paul J. Adam" > wrote in message >...
> In message >, Frank Vaughan
> > writes
> >Could you go into greater detail on this? The 2.75" FFAR was an
> >unguided rocket munition. How would the F-102 IR ball come into
> >play?
>
> At a guess... Find an IR source (running engine, camp fire, etc.) with
> the IR sensor, then fire unguided FFARs at IR source.

I believe the gent may be mixing up his situations a bit. There was an
experament conducted in the theater of operations where F-102's used
their IR sensor, paired with their IR Falcons, to strike heat sources
along the Ho Chi Minh Trail--more of a nuisance program than anything
else. And I have read that they did use their 12 FFARs against ground
targets--but I have not read that the two situations were related. One
of the aviation history magazines did an article on the F-102 a few
years back and covered this episode in reasonable detail.

Brooks

[Peter Stickney]

In article >,
av8r > writes:
> Hi Peter
>
> The first operational deployment to Viet by F-102's was actually on the
> 21st of March 1962. Deuces of the 509th FIS deployed to Tan Son Nhut.
> They returned 8 days later on the 29th. For the next year during Water
> Glass ops, they rotated every six weeks with U.S. Navy AD5Q's.

Thanks. Not to pick nits, but an AD-5Q and an EA-1F were teh same
airplane, redesignated after the 1962 MacNa-fit which unified the US
Service's designation systems. (Pity, 'casue there were some that
really got around. The Lockheed L-100 was, simultaneously, the C-130,
the R8V for the Coast Guard, the GV-1 for the Marines, and the GV-1U
for the Navy. ) I've always wondered what the EA-1s would have done if
something had actually been flying around at that time. Maybe they
were going to microwave it to death. Or, perhaps, pull up alongside
and have the EMs in back fire a bradside with the .38 revolvers in the
survival gear.
>
> Project Bell Tone 1 commenced in December 1960 with six F-100D's of the
> 510th TFS were deployed to Don Muang Airport. They were replaced by six
> F-102A's of the 509th FIS nine months later.

Again, thanks. I didn't realize that Bell Tone started that early. I
do know that later on, part of the USAF Air Defence Detachment at Don
Muang ended up as dedicated support for the King. Was that also the
case during Bell Tone?
>
> Peter, let's keep this thread going if possible. It's extremely
> interesting. Are you interested in F-102 losses in country?

By all means. It was an interesting period in our history. The
Kennnedy Administration and Kruschev's government (Was it an
Administration? Or, perhaps a Regime? I don't know) were constantly
playing Challenge and Response, with a bit of James Bond and Matt Helm
thrown in. Kruschev always seemed to underestimate Kennedy's, and the
U.S.'s resolve. You'd think that in a logical world, the response to
the Berlin Wall Crisis in '61, with the National Guard and Reserve
callups, and the deployment of significant forces to Europe, would
have been enough of a warning sign that sticking the MRBMs in Cuba was
a Bad Idea.

>
> I used to love watching the F-102's of the 59th FIS roaring around while
> I was at Goose Bay, Labrador (June 64-June 67). The odd time a Deuce of
> the 57th FIS would come down from Kef for a visit. Lots of good Bear
> hunting back in those days too.

We used to see them a lot when I was a kid, a bit before. New England
was teh birthplace of SAGE, and in the early '60s, Lincoln Labs and
Mitre were supervising SAGE tests against fast high-flyers. local ADC
Deuces, F-101s, F-106s, and the occasional F-104A from Westover would
practice intercepting single B-58s coming down the East Coast.
Needless to say, we got boomed a lot.

--
Pete Stickney
A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many
bad measures. -- Daniel Webster

[Mike Marron]

> (Peter Stickney) wrote:

>We used to see them a lot when I was a kid, a bit before. New England
>was teh birthplace of SAGE, and in the early '60s, Lincoln Labs and
>Mitre were supervising SAGE tests against fast high-flyers. local ADC
>Deuces, F-101s, F-106s, and the occasional F-104A from Westover would
>practice intercepting single B-58s coming down the East Coast.
>Needless to say, we got boomed a lot.

Viewing the SAC museum's B-58 (aptly named "Greased Lightning")
with my Dad, he recalled going after a Hustler back in the '60's in
the F-101. The Hustler was way up there (like FL490 or something)
going like, well, "greased lightning" and his mach 1.7 Voodoo couldn't
touch it.

-Mike Marron

[Scott Peterson]

(Kevin Brooks) wrote:

>You are aware that the Cold War was still alive and well through
>the *eighties*?

Yes. But I'm also aware that throughout the Viet Nam era National
Guard units were regarded as draft dodgers refuges. Specifically, the
TxANG 147th fighter group was considered a "champagne" unit that was a
refuge for the area's privileged. Its ranks included John Conally's
son, Lloyd Benston's son, John Tower's son, George Bush's son and
seven Dallas Cowboys


>And that despite the fact that the TXANG units were
>based in Texas, they could have been assigned air defense duties
>*anywhere*?

Could of, maybe shudda, but weren't and considering that in that time
frame the F-102 was no longer a first-line aircraft, were probably
close to the bottom of the list for doing that.

>The situation today is not all that different (except that
>today's threat is unlikely to shoot back), with ANG fighters flying AD
>missions from detached locations on a routine basis.

You've lost me here. I'm not aware of any 'threats' that shot back at
air defence missions around the Continental US. In the seventies or
now.

I believe that in the sixties and seventies, the units were much more
tightly tied to the state than they are now. Also since they were
flying aircraft that were not in first-line service, and fairly
high-maintenance, moving them to other bases not equipped to handle
them would have been a major logistical move that would be difficult
to justify.

>You may not like
>GWB, but attacking the service of the F-102 pilots who did their duty
>*wherever* it occured is not gaining you very much.

I said it wasn't the stuff of legend. i.e. not particularly
memorable. That's a long way from attacking them. Anyone who did
their duty honorably can be justifiably proud, regardless of how
memorable it was.


Scott Peterson


"Placebos raise a problem in these days of the pharmacist
labeling pill bottles with their contents. One cannot admit
that the pill is nothing but sugar if it is to work, so a fancy
brand name is needed. Among the proposals made for what
to name a brandname placebo are Confabulase, Gratifycin,
Deludium, Hoaxacillin, Dammitol, Placebic Acid and Panacease."

[Cub Driver]

>I said it wasn't the stuff of legend. i.e. not particularly
>memorable. That's a long way from attacking them.

That's not the way I read it. I saw mockery for the Cowboy pilots and
sons of the elite, riding herd on Cuban invaders. I think that a) you
are back-pedaling, b) you seize any opportunity to run down the
incumbent prezdint, and c) you really don't care squat about F-102s or
the men who flew them.

Often in the cocktail parties I attend, I hear the Good People being
shocked--shocked!--that Bush failed to attend the last year's meetings
of the Guard. These are of course the same people who would rise up
with dignity and leave any room which a military officer had the ill
manners to enter.

all the best -- Dan Ford
email: www.danford.net/letters.htm#9

see the Warbird's Forum at www.warbirdforum.com
and the Piper Cub Forum at www.pipercubforum.com

[Kevin Brooks]

Scott Peterson > wrote in message >...
> (Kevin Brooks) wrote:
>
> >You are aware that the Cold War was still alive and well through
> >the *eighties*?
>
> Yes. But I'm also aware that throughout the Viet Nam era National
> Guard units were regarded as draft dodgers refuges. Specifically, the
> TxANG 147th fighter group was considered a "champagne" unit that was a
> refuge for the area's privileged. Its ranks included John Conally's
> son, Lloyd Benston's son, John Tower's son, George Bush's son and
> seven Dallas Cowboys

I wonder if you'd have the temerity to utter such a thing to, say, the
personnel from the ANG units like those in CO and NM that were
activated and flew in Vietnam, or to those "champagne unit" (your
description) members who pulled their voluntary rotations in Vietnam?
Methinks not...

>
>
> >And that despite the fact that the TXANG units were
> >based in Texas, they could have been assigned air defense duties
> >*anywhere*?
>
> Could of, maybe shudda, but weren't and considering that in that time
> frame the F-102 was no longer a first-line aircraft, were probably
> close to the bottom of the list for doing that.

Was no longer a "first line aircraft"? Uhmmm...care to guess when the
last F-102's left active duty? Since you did not even have a ghostly
idea that they had served in Vietnam, how the heck are we supposed to
believe your assessment of their operational status? As to even the
definition of 'first line", have you ever looked at what the breakdown
in the old ADC force was during that period? Take a gander at how many
of those forces you call "second echelon", I presume, were standing
alert on a routine basis.

>
> >The situation today is not all that different (except that
> >today's threat is unlikely to shoot back), with ANG fighters flying AD
> >missions from detached locations on a routine basis.
>
> You've lost me here. I'm not aware of any 'threats' that shot back at
> air defence missions around the Continental US. In the seventies or
> now.

You had no idea that the TU-95 was armed?! Or that Bears routinely
trolled down the eastern seaboard, and into the Gulf? That the USSR
used Cuba as a refueling point for those Bears (even into the 90's
IIRC)?

>
> I believe that in the sixties and seventies, the units were much more
> tightly tied to the state than they are now.

Not really. The degree of state control has always been exaggerated by
those who have never served in a Guard unit, which number I am
guessing from your sneering tone you would be a part of.

Also since they were
> flying aircraft that were not in first-line service, and fairly
> high-maintenance, moving them to other bases not equipped to handle
> them would have been a major logistical move that would be difficult
> to justify.

Uhmmm...take a gander at when the F-102 retired from active service,
and recall that two NATO allies continued to fly them even after they
left ANG service--and you can't see where they might have been used?

>
> >You may not like
> >GWB, but attacking the service of the F-102 pilots who did their duty
> >*wherever* it occured is not gaining you very much.
>
> I said it wasn't the stuff of legend. i.e. not particularly
> memorable. That's a long way from attacking them. Anyone who did
> their duty honorably can be justifiably proud, regardless of how
> memorable it was.

Too little, too late (in terms of backpeddling, that is). Go up and
read your first paragraph in *this* post and then come back and tell
me you were not "attacking".

Brooks

>
>
> Scott Peterson
>
>

[Juvat]

Kevin Brooks blurted out:


>I wonder if you'd have the temerity to utter such a thing to, say, the
>personnel from the ANG units like those in CO and NM that were
>activated and flew in Vietnam,

Jeez...you're reading waaaay too much into Scott's posts IMO. The
original question you will recall had to do with ANG F-102 units
called up. He posited none due to the mission. He was correct on that
score. Yes? No?

> or to those "champagne unit" (your
>description) members who pulled their voluntary rotations in Vietnam?
>Methinks not...

Okay, but that's an entirely different issue from the "entitled"
gentlemen that used their position to get an officer slot in the TX
ANG...in an airplane that had next to ZERO chance of getting activated
and sent into harm's way. So I'd be willing to bet Scott would have no
problem acknowledging the excellent service of the SEA volunteers.

>Was no longer a "first line aircraft"? Uhmmm...care to guess when the
>last F-102's left active duty?

When?

>Since you did not even have a ghostly
>idea that they had served in Vietnam, how the heck are we supposed to
>believe your assessment of their operational status?

Again...simply from a comprehension stand point the question was ANG
F-102 sqdns recalled for SEA...NOT, I repeat NOT if any AD squadrons
served. Scott was correct on this score even if he simply guessed.

>As to even the
>definition of 'first line", have you ever looked at what the breakdown
>in the old ADC force was during that period? Take a gander at how many
>of those forces you call "second echelon", I presume, were standing
>alert on a routine basis.

Fair point...then read Charles J Gross book published by the Office of
Air Force History "Prelude to Total Force" The Air National Guard
1943-1969." Apparently the USAF AD Corona (generals) held the notion
the ANG was second echelon for quite awhile, highlighted by the
deployment of ANG forces to Korea for the Pueblo Crisis. The highly
successful F-100 deployment to SEA was quite the eye-opener for AD
commanders.

>Not really. The degree of state control has always been exaggerated by
>those who have never served in a Guard unit, which number I am
>guessing from your sneering tone you would be a part of.

OK your AD and ANG service and my AD and ANG service differed greatly.
I agree with Scott's POV on state control in the past (only from
asking the question of career ANG guys). YMMV

>Too little, too late (in terms of backpeddling, that is). Go up and
>read your first paragraph in *this* post and then come back and tell
>me you were not "attacking".

OK...I don't think he was attacking. And I think it is fairly accurate
to postulate that the USAF didn't think the F-102 was essential in
SEA, short legs and an adversary with a token number of IL-28s.

Juvat

[Ed Rasimus]

Juvat > wrote:

>Jeez...you're reading waaaay too much into Scott's posts IMO. The
>original question you will recall had to do with ANG F-102 units
>called up. He posited none due to the mission. He was correct on that
>score. Yes? No?

Well, I think you're word-smithing a bit here. If we are searching for
full unit deployments of F-102, specifically from ANG units, for SEA,
then I'm not sure that there were any. But, I do know that there were
Deuces in SEA in '66 when I was there, and there were Deuces in SEA in
'72-'73 when I was there. The convolutions of ADC (Air-then-Aerospace
Defense Command) and it's relationships between ANG and USAF are
sometimes difficult to decipher.
>
>> or to those "champagne unit" (your
>>description) members who pulled their voluntary rotations in Vietnam?
>>Methinks not...
>
>Okay, but that's an entirely different issue from the "entitled"
>gentlemen that used their position to get an officer slot in the TX
>ANG...in an airplane that had next to ZERO chance of getting activated
>and sent into harm's way. So I'd be willing to bet Scott would have no
>problem acknowledging the excellent service of the SEA volunteers.

Well, again. Here the question revolves around the somewhat belabored
point of the two political parties in America. The fact is, that the
President probably could have avoide military service entirely. We
have a lot of documentation that his predecessor was successful and
arguably when he was avoiding, a lot less "privileged" than Bush.

Given the choice between being a tactical aviator and an infantryman,
he made the same choice I did (although my choice was made a few years
earlier.) Now, we had the comparisons with Bush's opponent, who,
despite being a college graduate and being able to arguably make a
greater contribution to his nation as an officer, chose to be an
enlisted Army admin clerk.

Now, as you well understand, Bush went through a full year of UPT,
then the various required USAF survival schools, then full operational
qualification and a couple of years of ANG service flying a Century
Series jet. That seems to me (based on what I know of
single-engine/single-seat aviation) a somewhat hazardous occupation.

This was in a period in which the aircraft which he was qualified in
was continously deployed to SEA. I'd say there was a little bit more
than "ZERO chance" of winding up in harm's way. Again, arguably a bit
more chance than being a body-guarded PIO clerk who spent 151 days of
a year tour in SEA.
>

>
>Again...simply from a comprehension stand point the question was ANG
>F-102 sqdns recalled for SEA...NOT, I repeat NOT if any AD squadrons
>served. Scott was correct on this score even if he simply guessed.
>
>>As to even the
>>definition of 'first line", have you ever looked at what the breakdown
>>in the old ADC force was during that period? Take a gander at how many
>>of those forces you call "second echelon", I presume, were standing
>>alert on a routine basis.

Well, throughout most of SEA, there were units in combat flying the
F-100, F-101, F-102, F-104, and F-105. There were units flying C-47,
C-119, C-123, AT-37, A-1, B-57, B-66, O-1, O-2, etc. etc. It seems as
though the "second echelon" question isn't a very good one.
>
>OK your AD and ANG service and my AD and ANG service differed greatly.
>I agree with Scott's POV on state control in the past (only from
>asking the question of career ANG guys). YMMV
>
>>Too little, too late (in terms of backpeddling, that is). Go up and
>>read your first paragraph in *this* post and then come back and tell
>>me you were not "attacking".
>
>OK...I don't think he was attacking. And I think it is fairly accurate
>to postulate that the USAF didn't think the F-102 was essential in
>SEA, short legs and an adversary with a token number of IL-28s.

The continual deployment (despite the fairly dismal combat
effectiveness) of the F-102 during SEA seems to disagree with your
last statement here.

No one thought the Beagles were coming, but there was a lot of
apprehension about a singleton MiG-17 or 21 making a penetration over
Laos into the Thai bases or across the DMZ to Danang. An alert
interceptor force was always deployed.



Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (ret)
***"When Thunder Rolled:
*** An F-105 Pilot Over N. Vietnam"
*** from Smithsonian Books
ISBN: 1588341038

[Paul J. Adam]

In message >, Kevin
Brooks > writes
>"Paul J. Adam" > wrote in message
>...
>> At a guess... Find an IR source (running engine, camp fire, etc.) with
>> the IR sensor, then fire unguided FFARs at IR source.
>
>I believe the gent may be mixing up his situations a bit. There was an
>experament conducted in the theater of operations where F-102's used
>their IR sensor, paired with their IR Falcons, to strike heat sources
>along the Ho Chi Minh Trail--more of a nuisance program than anything
>else.

A modified Sidewinder got similar use (AGM-87A Focus I, apparently) -
said to be intended for use on truck headlights (visible or IR)
according to Friedman.

Wouldn't have thought the Falcon would be much use for the role, with
its reliability problems and small warhead, but if it's what you've got
I guess you use it and hope...


--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBox<at>jrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

[Juvat]

Ed Rasimus posted:

>Juvat wrote:
>
>>Jeez...you're reading waaaay too much into Scott's posts IMO. The
>>original question you will recall had to do with ANG F-102 units
>>called up. He posited none due to the mission. He was correct on that
>>score. Yes? No?
>
>Well, I think you're word-smithing a bit here.

No sir...simply reading the question as posted (looking up at the
thread topic). If the topic were "F-102s units deployed to SEA" you
might have a leg to stand on. Honest, I've got the whole thread saved
because the topic is interesting and was going to post some details
that others beat me to the punch.

> If we are searching for full unit deployments of F-102,
> specifically from ANG units, for SEA, then I'm not sure that there were any.

Respectfully, you do know the answer. None. I will direct you to the
book by Gross...published by the USAF Office of History.

>Well, again. Here the question revolves around the somewhat belabored
>point of the two political parties in America. The fact is, that the
>President probably could have avoide military service entirely. We
>have a lot of documentation that his predecessor was successful and
>arguably when he was avoiding, a lot less "privileged" than Bush.

No argument...but we're getting off on a tangent I suspect.

>Now, as you well understand, Bush went through a full year of UPT,
>then the various required USAF survival schools, then full operational
>qualification and a couple of years of ANG service flying a Century
>Series jet. That seems to me (based on what I know of
>single-engine/single-seat aviation) a somewhat hazardous occupation.

You and I have differing POV on what constitutes GWB becoming MR and
maintaining that status. I'll agree he did achieve MR status, but that
as far as I will go...

However, I'm somewhat surprised that you consider he met all his
obligations. Or have I inferred something you are not implying?

Belay that last...it is not my desire to let this thread turn into a
groveling, low speed, knife fight at the bottom of the TRA on ths
subject of GWB...but I can.

>This was in a period in which the aircraft which he was qualified in
>was continously deployed to SEA. I'd say there was a little bit more
>than "ZERO chance" of winding up in harm's way. Again, arguably a bit
>more chance than being a body-guarded PIO clerk who spent 151 days of
>a year tour in SEA.

And I suspect if the names were reversed you would find it EQUALLY
plausible that the swinging dick that served in SEA had a better
chance of going into harm's way than a guy that was suspended from
flying status in Aug 1972 for failing to take a physical.

>The continual deployment (despite the fairly dismal combat
>effectiveness) of the F-102 during SEA seems to disagree with your
>last statement here.

Fair enough, and fairly close in the details, I believe that F-102s
were gone from SEA by Jul 1970. Yes? No?

I should have posited that had the NVAF threat been deem
greater...there would have been a greater force than four Dets of
roughly 6 jets each. Mea Culpa.

>No one thought the Beagles were coming, but there was a lot of
>apprehension about a singleton MiG-17 or 21 making a penetration over
>Laos into the Thai bases or across the DMZ to Danang. An alert
>interceptor force was always deployed.

I'd be willing to speculate that "somebody" in 13th/7th AF thought
IL-28s were a threat. The reason for my statement is simply that I've
read about the Beagle threat perception in CHECO reports, inferred on
my part becasue the reports mention the Beagle being able to reach
Saigon.

Juvat

[Alan Minyard]

On Sun, 07 Sep 2003 17:43:17 -0400, av8r >
wrote:

>Hi Peter
>
>The first operational deployment to Viet by F-102's was actually on the
>21st of March 1962. Deuces of the 509th FIS deployed to Tan Son Nhut.
>They returned 8 days later on the 29th. For the next year during Water
>Glass ops, they rotated every six weeks with U.S. Navy AD5Q's.
>
>Project Bell Tone 1 commenced in December 1960 with six F-100D's of the
>510th TFS were deployed to Don Muang Airport. They were replaced by six
>F-102A's of the 509th FIS nine months later.
>
>
>Peter, let's keep this thread going if possible. It's extremely
>interesting. Are you interested in F-102 losses in country?
>
>I used to love watching the F-102's of the 59th FIS roaring around while
>I was at Goose Bay, Labrador (June 64-June 67). The odd time a Deuce of
>the 57th FIS would come down from Kef for a visit. Lots of good Bear
>hunting back in those days too.
>
>
>Cheers...Chris

Does anyone know what the accidental lose rate for the -102 was? I
have heard that it was pretty high, which for an early single engine
delta is easy to believe.

Al Minyard

[Alan Minyard]

On Mon, 08 Sep 2003 05:49:38 -0400, Cub Driver >
wrote:

>
>>I said it wasn't the stuff of legend. i.e. not particularly
>>memorable. That's a long way from attacking them.
>
>That's not the way I read it. I saw mockery for the Cowboy pilots and
>sons of the elite, riding herd on Cuban invaders. I think that a) you
>are back-pedaling, b) you seize any opportunity to run down the
>incumbent prezdint, and c) you really don't care squat about F-102s or
>the men who flew them.
>
>Often in the cocktail parties I attend, I hear the Good People being
>shocked--shocked!--that Bush failed to attend the last year's meetings
>of the Guard. These are of course the same people who would rise up
>with dignity and leave any room which a military officer had the ill
>manners to enter.
>
>all the best -- Dan Ford
>email: www.danford.net/letters.htm#9
>
>see the Warbird's Forum at www.warbirdforum.com
>and the Piper Cub Forum at www.pipercubforum.com

You need to find some higher quality cocktail parties to attend.

Al Minyard

[av8r]

Hi Peter

Any and all constructive nitpicking is welcome.

I do not have the exact date, but sometime in August of 1962, the U.S.
Navy sent a five AD-5Q (EA-IF) Skyraider detachment from VAW-13 to Tan
Son Nhut. While there, the five-aircraft interceptor team, alternated
with detachments from the 509th FIS. It was a learning process for
theme as they practiced the best methods od identifying airborne
intruders. The deployments which were under operational control of
COMUSMACV ranged from August to September, 1962; January to February,
1964 and finally during November of 1963.

Speaking of the F-102, it got down to 40 and 50 below up in Goose Bay
quite often. The sound of the A/B kicking in on a cold day or even
colder night was deafening. It used to rattle all the dishes in the
china cabinet of our married quarters. It could really get off the
ground in a short distance on cold days as well.

Cheers...Chris

[Zajcevi]

Hello

Nice discussion. :-)

I would like to ask about A-A load used on F-102s during Vietnam war.

In J. Baughers article about F-102 was writem that it usually carries
6 AIM-4s, both in SARH or IR version. Or 3 AIM-4s and 1 AIM-26.

The second load seems strange to me, AIM-26 should be carried in
central missile bay, but 3 AIM-4s, 2 in starboard and 1 in port
missile bay?

Combo 4x AIM-4 (per 2 in side bays) and 1xAIM-26 seems to me rather
realistic.

In other forum one guy have told me that combination of 3xAIM-4Ds,
2xAIM-4As, single AIM-26B and some FFARS was used in SEA.

So where is the true?

Ivan

[Ed Rasimus]

Juvat > wrote:

>Ed Rasimus posted:
>
>Fair enough, and fairly close in the details, I believe that F-102s
>were gone from SEA by Jul 1970. Yes? No?


>
>I should have posited that had the NVAF threat been deem
>greater...there would have been a greater force than four Dets of
>roughly 6 jets each. Mea Culpa.
>
>>No one thought the Beagles were coming, but there was a lot of
>>apprehension about a singleton MiG-17 or 21 making a penetration over
>>Laos into the Thai bases or across the DMZ to Danang. An alert
>>interceptor force was always deployed.
>
>I'd be willing to speculate that "somebody" in 13th/7th AF thought
>IL-28s were a threat. The reason for my statement is simply that I've
>read about the Beagle threat perception in CHECO reports, inferred on
>my part becasue the reports mention the Beagle being able to reach
>Saigon.
>
>Juvat

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (ret)
***"When Thunder Rolled:
*** An F-105 Pilot Over N. Vietnam"
*** from Smithsonian Books
ISBN: 1588341038

[Ed Rasimus]

Juvat > wrote:

>Ed Rasimus posted:

>>The continual deployment (despite the fairly dismal combat
>>effectiveness) of the F-102 during SEA seems to disagree with your
>>last statement here.
>
>Fair enough, and fairly close in the details, I believe that F-102s
>were gone from SEA by Jul 1970. Yes? No?

No. At least as I recall, and posted. There were still F-102s deployed
in '72 when I was back at Korat in the F-4. Danang and Udorn I
believe. But, I've been wrong in the past....there was, after all, the
fateful decision to marry my first wife.
>
>I should have posited that had the NVAF threat been deem
>greater...there would have been a greater force than four Dets of
>roughly 6 jets each. Mea Culpa.

Realistically, the NVAF threat was small, yet, the need for an air
defense response existed and it made more sense to deploy those
specialized aircraft and retain the mission flexibility of other
tactical jets that could also carry iron up N.

>
>>No one thought the Beagles were coming, but there was a lot of
>>apprehension about a singleton MiG-17 or 21 making a penetration over
>>Laos into the Thai bases or across the DMZ to Danang. An alert
>>interceptor force was always deployed.
>
>I'd be willing to speculate that "somebody" in 13th/7th AF thought
>IL-28s were a threat. The reason for my statement is simply that I've
>read about the Beagle threat perception in CHECO reports, inferred on
>my part becasue the reports mention the Beagle being able to reach
>Saigon.

I'm always bothered by the "historians" and "statisticians" who quote
from CHECO and Red Baron reports. In a few years this crap will go
unrefuted, but while a few crusty *******s are still alive, we'll
throw a bull-**** flag occasionally.

If the IL-28s, parked at Gia Lam were a threat, we should have taken
them off the ramp. We could have done it on any given day. We all knew
where they were and had the wherewithal to do it. The ROE prevented it
until '72 when we were finally allowed to jettison on the airfields.

The air attack threat was more realistically from a MiG 17 or 21 with
a pair of bombs making a quick dash in-country. During several years
of the bombing pause, the MiGs operated further south than the main
bases in Pack VI, including Vinh and Dong Hoi. It would have been well
within the capabiltiy of the little jets to make a run at NKP, Udorn,
Ubon or Danang.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (ret)
***"When Thunder Rolled:
*** An F-105 Pilot Over N. Vietnam"
*** from Smithsonian Books
ISBN: 1588341038

[Juvat]

Ed Rasimus posted:


>No. At least as I recall, and posted. There were still F-102s deployed
>in '72 when I was back at Korat in the F-4. Danang and Udorn I
>believe. But, I've been wrong in the past....

I think you are mistaken, from reading Michel referencing the F-4s
sitting alert at Udorn and flying CAPs on Laos/NVN border. Perhaps he
missed this detail.

According to Pete Stickney's post...
>>The 64th FIS was inactivated in November '69,
>>with the 509th FIS once again picking up the Don Muang det. Operations
>>at Da Nang ended in ealy '70, and the Don Muang det was closed in late
>>May. On 24 July, 1970, the 509th FIS was inactivated. The 82nd FIS,
>>which had been at Naha AB, and had been supplying alert dets in Korea,
>>inactivated in May, 71.

So my question would be...what unit in 1972 since all the PACAF F-102s
were history (so to speak). I suspect that you honestly don't know,
but that may not alter your recollection (right or wrong).

>Realistically, the NVAF threat was small, yet, the need for an air
>defense response existed and it made more sense to deploy those
>specialized aircraft and retain the mission flexibility of other
>tactical jets that could also carry iron up N.

Apparently only until Jul 70 for the 509th, and May of 71 for the 82d.

Regarding my reference to CHECO reports...

>I'm always bothered by the "historians" and "statisticians" who quote
>from CHECO and Red Baron reports.

Hmmm, imagine folks like myself actually believing the contemporaneous
reporting of tactics, trends, and analysis by the likes of Robert
Futrell and Warren Thompson.

I am certainly a skeptical asshole, looking for mutiple sources.

>In a few years this crap will go
>unrefuted, but while a few crusty *******s are still alive, we'll
>throw a bull-**** flag occasionally.

Fair enough...you tossed out the F-102s still in SEA in 1972. That may
well proved to be a bull-**** flag *or* simply bull-****. Does that
mean we ignore you if you prove to be incorrect on this matter of
fact? Not at all. The problem I found with oral history is the lack of
contemporaneous documentation.

>If the IL-28s, parked at Gia Lam were a threat,...

Which would support the reason for having F-102s at TSN and Don
Muang..

>The air attack threat was more realistically from a MiG 17 or 21 with
>a pair of bombs making a quick dash in-country...

Which explains the Det at Da Nang however long that lasted (1970
according to Stickney's research), and certainly not past Jul 72 when
the 366th TFW moved to Thailand...and Udorn Det whenever it closed.

Juvat

[William Wright]

National Geographic Vol.128, No. 3, September 1965 "United States Air Force
Of Planes and Men" pages 302-3 has the picture you are looking for. It shows
2 Voodoos, 6 Delta Daggers, 1 Navy Sky Warrior and 1 Super Sabre. One of
the Delta Daggers pictured is 56-1161 which was lost in a Viet Cong attack
on Da Nang, Jul 1, 1965 so it had already been destroyed by the time this
picture made it to press. This was one of my favorite issues as kid growing
up as a SAC brat.


<snip>
> Wrong. F-102's did serve in both Vietnam and Thailand (which is why
> every once in a while you see a photo of a Delta Dagger in SEA camo).
> If you can get a hold of an old National Geographic from that period
> that covered the war (sorry, can't recall which issue...), you'll note
> that a photo of Tan Son Nhut (or whatever the spelling was) showed
> F-102's sitting in sandbagged revetments. I believe three were listed
> as combat losses, one to a Mig, the remaining two to ground fire, and
> a few others were lost during VC sapper/rocket attacks on the ground.
> Served as interceptors, some escort duty, and even ground
> attack--there was even an experamental program where they went after
> NVA cooking fires at night with their IR Falcons. They also used their
> 12 unguided rockets against ground targets.

[Kevin Brooks]

"Paul J. Adam" > wrote in message >...
> In message >, Kevin
> Brooks > writes
> >"Paul J. Adam" > wrote in message
> >...
> >> At a guess... Find an IR source (running engine, camp fire, etc.) with
> >> the IR sensor, then fire unguided FFARs at IR source.
> >
> >I believe the gent may be mixing up his situations a bit. There was an
> >experament conducted in the theater of operations where F-102's used
> >their IR sensor, paired with their IR Falcons, to strike heat sources
> >along the Ho Chi Minh Trail--more of a nuisance program than anything
> >else.
>
> A modified Sidewinder got similar use (AGM-87A Focus I, apparently) -
> said to be intended for use on truck headlights (visible or IR)
> according to Friedman.
>
> Wouldn't have thought the Falcon would be much use for the role, with
> its reliability problems and small warhead, but if it's what you've got
> I guess you use it and hope...

I gather the objective was really little more than keeping the bad
guys on-edge. Apparently the folks in charge were looking for ways to
(a) use the F-102's they already had in hand, and (b) make life for
the gomers on the HCM trail as troublesome as possible. The account I
read indicated that the usual target was *cooking fires*, in hopes of
killing a few relaxing bad guys and making them sweat over trying to
get a hot bowl of rice to go with their fermented fish heads.
Believeable when you consider some of the other even more exotic and
off-the-wall things that were considered and even tried in an effort
to interdict the NVA/VC supply routes (i.e., people sniffers, for
one), or when you consider the amount of arty that was fired for H&I
purposes (that term no longer even appears in our arty doctrine, from
what my old Redleg buddies told me).

Brooks

[Ed Rasimus]

Juvat > wrote:

>Ed Rasimus posted:
>
>
>>No. At least as I recall, and posted. There were still F-102s deployed
>>in '72 when I was back at Korat in the F-4. Danang and Udorn I
>>believe. But, I've been wrong in the past....
>
>I think you are mistaken, from reading Michel referencing the F-4s
>sitting alert at Udorn and flying CAPs on Laos/NVN border. Perhaps he
>missed this detail.

In "Clashes" Michel is dealing with MiG engagements, not with air
defense alerts. Clashes has a lot of good research behind it and
Marshall has the experience to back up that of which he writes. But,
even he makes mistakes, such as calling all the ECM pods for the war,
QRC-160.

Certainly there were F-4s on alert at Udorn and absolutely they were
flying CAP, but CAP is a different mission than air defense and alert
can be for a number of mission options--I sat alert at Korat in 105's,
but that was SAR and ground attack alert. And, I sat alert at Korat in
F-4Es, but that also was for ground attack.

>
>According to Pete Stickney's post...
>>>The 64th FIS was inactivated in November '69,
>>>with the 509th FIS once again picking up the Don Muang det. Operations
>>>at Da Nang ended in ealy '70, and the Don Muang det was closed in late
>>>May. On 24 July, 1970, the 509th FIS was inactivated. The 82nd FIS,
>>>which had been at Naha AB, and had been supplying alert dets in Korea,
>>>inactivated in May, 71.
>
>So my question would be...what unit in 1972 since all the PACAF F-102s
>were history (so to speak). I suspect that you honestly don't know,
>but that may not alter your recollection (right or wrong).

I honestly don't know what unit was deployed, but I'm fairly confident
in the recollection that 102s were still in SEA in '72.
>
>>Realistically, the NVAF threat was small, yet, the need for an air
>>defense response existed and it made more sense to deploy those
>>specialized aircraft and retain the mission flexibility of other
>>tactical jets that could also carry iron up N.
>
>Apparently only until Jul 70 for the 509th, and May of 71 for the 82d.
>
>Regarding my reference to CHECO reports...
>
>>I'm always bothered by the "historians" and "statisticians" who quote
>>from CHECO and Red Baron reports.
>
>Hmmm, imagine folks like myself actually believing the contemporaneous
>reporting of tactics, trends, and analysis by the likes of Robert
>Futrell and Warren Thompson.

I certainly like Thompson. His compilation of history in "To Hanoi and
Back" is excellent. Still, I like to deal with people who actually
flew the missions more than folks who are familiar with the bowels of
the AU library and how to run a micro-fiche machine.
>
>I am certainly a skeptical asshole, looking for mutiple sources.
>
>>In a few years this crap will go
>>unrefuted, but while a few crusty *******s are still alive, we'll
>>throw a bull-**** flag occasionally.
>
>Fair enough...you tossed out the F-102s still in SEA in 1972. That may
>well proved to be a bull-**** flag *or* simply bull-****. Does that
>mean we ignore you if you prove to be incorrect on this matter of
>fact? Not at all. The problem I found with oral history is the lack of
>contemporaneous documentation.
>
>>If the IL-28s, parked at Gia Lam were a threat,...
>
>Which would support the reason for having F-102s at TSN and Don
>Muang..
>
>>The air attack threat was more realistically from a MiG 17 or 21 with
>>a pair of bombs making a quick dash in-country...
>
>Which explains the Det at Da Nang however long that lasted (1970
>according to Stickney's research), and certainly not past Jul 72 when
>the 366th TFW moved to Thailand...and Udorn Det whenever it closed.

If the 366th moved out of Danang in July of '72 at the peak of
Linebacker, it's a surprise to me. Of course, I was a member of a
squadron that was deactivated at Korat in September of '72, so it's
possible. There were movements all over the theater at that time,
including the 35th and 67the TFSs coming from Kadena and the entire
354th TFW from CONUS as well as the F-4s from the 4th at S-J. And
don't forget the F-111s and even the 561st WW from George.

What was at Danang then and where did the 366th go in Thailand? Only
the Marine F-4 det?

Udorn still had a full house of F-4s and RFs until I left theater in
July of '73.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (ret)
***"When Thunder Rolled:
*** An F-105 Pilot Over N. Vietnam"
*** from Smithsonian Books
ISBN: 1588341038

[Pete]

"Juvat" > wrote in message
...
> Kevin Brooks blurted out:
>
>
> >I wonder if you'd have the temerity to utter such a thing to, say, the
> >personnel from the ANG units like those in CO and NM that were
> >activated and flew in Vietnam,
>
> Jeez...you're reading waaaay too much into Scott's posts IMO. The
> original question you will recall had to do with ANG F-102 units
> called up. He posited none due to the mission. He was correct on that
> score. Yes? No?
>
> > or to those "champagne unit" (your
> >description) members who pulled their voluntary rotations in Vietnam?
> >Methinks not...
>
> Okay, but that's an entirely different issue from the "entitled"
> gentlemen that used their position to get an officer slot in the TX
> ANG...in an airplane that had next to ZERO chance of getting activated
> and sent into harm's way. So I'd be willing to bet Scott would have no
> problem acknowledging the excellent service of the SEA volunteers.

Is the military dedication, professionalism, or 'influence' of any other
officer who served in the Texas ANG at that time in question?
Or indeed any other non-draftee, who incidentially did not see combat during
the Vietnam years?

Or is it only some guy, who 30 years later, would become president?

Hindsight is a wonderful thing.

15 years ago, a B-52 crew performing close air support over a battlefield
was a laughable concept. They had basically a ZERO chance of 'being
activated'. Times change. Tactics and A/C roles change.

They could just as easily have changed for the -102 crews.

Pete

[Kevin Brooks]

Juvat > wrote in message >...
> Kevin Brooks blurted out:
>
>
> >I wonder if you'd have the temerity to utter such a thing to, say, the
> >personnel from the ANG units like those in CO and NM that were
> >activated and flew in Vietnam,
>
> Jeez...you're reading waaaay too much into Scott's posts IMO.

No, I am not reading anything "into it". His words are quite clear in
their meaning and intent.

The
> original question you will recall had to do with ANG F-102 units
> called up. He posited none due to the mission. He was correct on that
> score. Yes? No?

No, he was incorrect. He said none were deployed (which was wrong)
because there was no need for interceptors (wrong again, as in fact an
interceptor force was maintained in Vietnam, and in Thailand
(including some RAAF folks with F-86's at one point, IIRC) throughout
the period of major US involvement).

>
> > or to those "champagne unit" (your
> >description) members who pulled their voluntary rotations in Vietnam?
> >Methinks not...
>
> Okay, but that's an entirely different issue from the "entitled"
> gentlemen that used their position to get an officer slot in the TX
> ANG...in an airplane that had next to ZERO chance of getting activated
> and sent into harm's way.

Zero chance? That's probably what the F-100 jockeys from CO thought,
too, right up until they deployed to the RVN. An airplane that had
ZERO percent chanc??? Odd, since that very same aircraft served in SEA
throughout most of the war, with ANG pilots forming part of the
manning that supported them.


So I'd be willing to bet Scott would have no
> problem acknowledging the excellent service of the SEA volunteers.

Well, since he is so willing to brush the entire 111th FIS, a unit
that did contribute pilots to fly F-102's in Vietnam, with his "I hate
GWB" brush, I would disagree that he demonstrates such willingness.

>
> >Was no longer a "first line aircraft"? Uhmmm...care to guess when the
> >last F-102's left active duty?
>
> When?

The last F-102's left active duty service (as interceptors, that
is--they would later return in the guise of the QF-102) in 73, after
the US had concluded the treaty with Hanoi (source:
www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/SP-468/ch11-4.htm). They continued
in ANG service for only a few more years (77 IIRC). So, throughout
this period of the Vietnam conflict, the Dagger remained in "front
line" service. It was the *first* US combat aircraft deployed to the
RVN after the Tonking Gulf incident, and remained in theater throught
the time of US major involvement. Not bad for Scott's "second echelon"
fighter, as he would call it, no?

>
> >Since you did not even have a ghostly
> >idea that they had served in Vietnam, how the heck are we supposed to
> >believe your assessment of their operational status?
>
> Again...simply from a comprehension stand point the question was ANG
> F-102 sqdns recalled for SEA...NOT, I repeat NOT if any AD squadrons
> served.

No, that was NOT the question. The question was about F-102 service in
Vietnam, period. Which Scott managed to fumble--but hey, that's
excusable, we all make mistakes, and he admitted as much (which is
better than a lot of folks hereabouts...). But he left the ballpark
when he tried to go political and engaged in wholesale libel with his
"the Guard was a haven for draftdodgers" crap. My brother served in
the Guard at the very end of the Vietnam conflict--AFTER serving on
active duty and pulling a year flying DUSTOFF missions out of Danang
and Phu Bai...but hey, that tarbrush Scott was wielding casts a broad
stroke, does it not? ANG and ARNG units were serving in Vietnam as
well, along with a few thousand former ARNG "individual replacements"
(see what happened to the HIARNG infantry brigade that was
activated....). Then we get the attempt to tar the entire 111th FIS
because Scott does not like GWB; again, uncalled for.

>Scott was correct on this score even if he simply guessed.

Not really. The F-102's went in when the curtain went up, and returned
only when it went down. ANG F-102 folks played in the same sandbox as
their AC counterparts.

>
> >As to even the
> >definition of 'first line", have you ever looked at what the breakdown
> >in the old ADC force was during that period? Take a gander at how many
> >of those forces you call "second echelon", I presume, were standing
> >alert on a routine basis.
>
> Fair point...then read Charles J Gross book published by the Office of
> Air Force History "Prelude to Total Force" The Air National Guard
> 1943-1969." Apparently the USAF AD Corona (generals) held the notion
> the ANG was second echelon for quite awhile, highlighted by the
> deployment of ANG forces to Korea for the Pueblo Crisis. The highly
> successful F-100 deployment to SEA was quite the eye-opener for AD
> commanders.

I believe you, or the author maybe, forgot another earlier
example--the activation and deployment to Europe of various ANG
fighter units as a result of the Berlin crisis earlier that same
decade.

>
> >Not really. The degree of state control has always been exaggerated by
> >those who have never served in a Guard unit, which number I am
> >guessing from your sneering tone you would be a part of.
>
> OK your AD and ANG service and my AD and ANG service differed greatly.

My AD and ARNG service, you mean.

> I agree with Scott's POV on state control in the past (only from
> asking the question of career ANG guys). YMMV

OK. Just how did the states leverage this control? Appointing
officers? Not really--they had to be vetted by a federal rec board
before the appointments were effective. Training plans? Nope--that was
controlled by the federal side. IET? Nope, because this was after it
was decided that all NG personnel would attend AC IET. Money,
organization, and/or equipment? Heck no--that was firmly the purview
of the feds. So, where was all of this state control really
manifested?

>
> >Too little, too late (in terms of backpeddling, that is). Go up and
> >read your first paragraph in *this* post and then come back and tell
> >me you were not "attacking".
>
> OK...I don't think he was attacking.

Then you apparently share his view of the Guard as a whole during that
period. Too bad.

And I think it is fairly accurate
> to postulate that the USAF didn't think the F-102 was essential in
> SEA, short legs and an adversary with a token number of IL-28s.

Gee, then why did they keep them in service over there throughout the
war? Do you think if your opponent has a weak, but existant, air
strike capability, then it is OK to ignore air defense? Good way to
get a bloody nose (see what happened when we had B-29's caught on
Saipan during WWII by that "remote" threat).

Brooks

>
> Juvat

[Juvat]

Ed Rasimus posted:

>In "Clashes" Michel is dealing with MiG engagements, not with air
>defense alerts. Clashes has a lot of good research behind it and
>Marshall has the experience to back up that of which he writes.

True...but wouldyou acknowledge that F-102s did fly CAPs and not
simply sitting cocked at the end of a runway? And can you agree that
the F-102 shot down by the MiG-21 in Feb 1968 was flying CAP?

>Certainly there were F-4s on alert at Udorn and absolutely they were
>flying CAP, but CAP is a different mission than air defense and alert
>can be for a number of mission options--I sat alert at Korat in 105's,
>but that was SAR and ground attack alert. And, I sat alert at Korat in
>F-4Es, but that also was for ground attack.

So taking this just a little bit farther...if they were still in place
at Udorn in 1972 they just might have flown CAPs, they might have even
practiced some ACM vs the local air-to-air sqdns (13th, 555th, and TDY
523d, etc). Yet when the F-8s came to town to play, no mention of
giving the F-102s a taste. No mention of using F-102s for DACM for the
benefit of the air-to-air guys. [FWIW, Ritchie does say that the 432d
selected crews for the air-to-air mission into RP-6.]

>I honestly don't know what unit was deployed, but I'm fairly confident
>in the recollection that 102s were still in SEA in '72.

>I certainly like Thompson. His compilation of history in "To Hanoi and
>Back" is excellent.

Fair enough...since I got you to acknowledge that Thompson just might
have his **** in one sock, look at page 309 of his book. Fourth entry
down...Udorn...number of F-102s there in 1967 = 6, number there in
July 1972 = ZERO. Number of F-102s in SEA in July 1972 = ZERO.

He could be mistaken, his data is from a HQ document and not an eye
witness account.

>Still, I like to deal with people who actually
>flew the missions more than folks who are familiar with the bowels of
>the AU library and how to run a micro-fiche machine.

I resemble that remark...Fair enough...Idle --*Chaff* --*Flare* -- I'm
just having a problem wondering whose "there i was story" to believe.

>If the 366th moved out of Danang in July of '72 at the peak of
>Linebacker, it's a surprise to me.

Ummm, respectfully are you being sarcastic with the last part? See
Thompson page 223...talks about the movement of the 366th from Da Nang
to Takhli in June of 1972.

So I ask the question again, sincerely, who do we believe? And why am
I doing all the citations/research?

Juvat

[Juvat]

I posted:
>> Jeez...you're reading waaaay too much into Scott's posts IMO.

Kevin Brooks posted:
>No, I am not reading anything "into it". His words are quite clear in
>their meaning and intent.

Kevin cool your jets pardner...the title of this thread is what?

"What F-102 units were called up for Viet Nam"

What does "called up" mean to you? To me it means what non-active duty
units, Guard or Reserve were activated for duty. How do you "call up"
an active duty unit?

It does NOT mean which Acitve Duty squadrons deployed. But I'd bet
that's how you're reading this thread.

>No, he was incorrect. He said none were deployed (which was wrong)

Actually he said "I don't think any were. This plane was strictly an
interceptor for shooting down bombers. No guns, no ground attack
capability."

I'm pretty sure history will confirm that F-102s were indeed
interceptors lacking a surface attack mission. I acknowledge the
kludged attempts to use it's IRST in a surface attack role, but that
was NOT it's mission (Air Defense as you acknowledge). And history
will confirm that no ANG unit was called up for active duty in SEA.

>because there was no need for interceptors (wrong again, as in fact an
>interceptor force was maintained in Vietnam, and in Thailand
>throughout the period of major US involvement).

Okay...you're absolutely right. He was incorrect WRT to the presence
of ANY F-102s.

>Zero chance? That's probably what the F-100 jockeys from CO thought,
>too, right up until they deployed to the RVN. An airplane that had
>ZERO percent chanc??? Odd, since that very same aircraft served in SEA
>throughout most of the war, with ANG pilots forming part of the
>manning that supported them.

Come on Kevin...I'm sincerely trying to keep this on topic about ANG
F-102 sqdns and Scott's post.

ZERO chance of an ANG F-102 pilot flying combat unless he volunteered.
The issue regarding the four ANG F-100 units that deployed, it's a
great display of what the citizen airman has been willing to do for
our country from the gitgo. The USAF was very pleased with that
deployment. (Not back pedaling...before you suggest that I am)

>The last F-102's left active duty service (as interceptors, that
>is--they would later return in the guise of the QF-102) in 73, ... They continued
>in ANG service for only a few more years (77 IIRC).

I guess you won't be surprised when I was hoping for a little more
detail, like last AD sqdn date and last ANG date. Guess I'll do the
reasearch [sigh].

>It was the *first* US combat aircraft deployed to the
>RVN after the Tonking Gulf incident,

You'd be hard pressed to make a case of "first" deployed after the
Gulf of Tonkin. Afterall, the 1st Air Commando (Farm Gate) guys were
already flying combat sorties from Bien Hoa before GoT, as were RF-101
guys (Able Mable) from Misawa (45th TRS) and Kadena (15th TRS). You
get the picture.

>No, that was NOT the question. The question was about F-102 service in
>Vietnam, period.

Kevin, re-read the title of this thread. "What F-102 units were called
up for Viet Nam," not what F-102 units served in SEA. Sir you are in
error...but I bet you disagree with me.

>>Scott was correct on this score even if he simply guessed.
>
>Not really.

OK...I say tomato...you say cantalope.

>I believe you, or the author maybe, forgot another earlier
>example--the activation and deployment to Europe of various ANG
>fighter units as a result of the Berlin crisis earlier that same
>decade.

Phew...uhhh my bad, I was trying to keep the discussion close to
topic, sorta, hoping to keep it on SEA deployments of ANG F-102s. I
mentioned the only activations during SEA.

If you wish I can cite every ANG squadron activated for Berlin and the
deployment location, but I don't think it is germaine to F-102s in
SEA.

>Gee, then why did they keep them in service over there throughout the
>war? Do you think if your opponent has a weak, but existant, air
>strike capability, then it is OK to ignore air defense?

Fair question, one I cannot answer. If the threat were that great,
then why not bring the superior interceptor (the F-106) in to replace
the F-102, I cannot answer that one either. I guess the F-102 was so
good at it's mission the AF only needed 24 or so in SEA (four 6 plane
Dets) and that might be proof of its effectiveness as an Interceptor.

Truly sorry for the bad blood. You have misconstrued my intent. That
being Scott was correct that no ANG F-102 unit was called up for Viet
Nam, and he was mistaken that no F-102 units served in SEA.

Juvat

[David Hartung]

"Kevin Brooks" > wrote in message
om...
> Juvat > wrote in message
>...
> > Kevin Brooks blurted out:
> >
> >
> > >I wonder if you'd have the temerity to utter such a thing to, say, the
> > >personnel from the ANG units like those in CO and NM that were
> > >activated and flew in Vietnam,
> >
> > Jeez...you're reading waaaay too much into Scott's posts IMO.
>
> No, I am not reading anything "into it". His words are quite clear in
> their meaning and intent.
>
> The
> > original question you will recall had to do with ANG F-102 units
> > called up. He posited none due to the mission. He was correct on that
> > score. Yes? No?
>
> No, he was incorrect. He said none were deployed (which was wrong)
> because there was no need for interceptors (wrong again, as in fact an
> interceptor force was maintained in Vietnam, and in Thailand
> (including some RAAF folks with F-86's at one point, IIRC) throughout
> the period of major US involvement).
>
> >
> > > or to those "champagne unit" (your
> > >description) members who pulled their voluntary rotations in Vietnam?
> > >Methinks not...
> >
> > Okay, but that's an entirely different issue from the "entitled"
> > gentlemen that used their position to get an officer slot in the TX
> > ANG...in an airplane that had next to ZERO chance of getting activated
> > and sent into harm's way.
>
> Zero chance? That's probably what the F-100 jockeys from CO thought,
> too, right up until they deployed to the RVN. An airplane that had
> ZERO percent chanc??? Odd, since that very same aircraft served in SEA
> throughout most of the war, with ANG pilots forming part of the
> manning that supported them.

If I recall my reading correctly(an article I read about 34 years ago), the
ANG F100 units were flying "C" models, while the Regular Air Force was
flying "D " models. A difference which may seem minor, but apparently was
significant.

[Scott Peterson]

(Kevin Brooks) wrote:

>I wonder if you'd have the temerity to utter such a thing to, say, the
>personnel from the ANG units like those in CO and NM that were
>activated and flew in Vietnam, or to those "champagne unit" (your
>description) members who pulled their voluntary rotations in Vietnam?
>Methinks not...

You're absolutely correct. I would not. I have the utmost respect
for those people.

>Was no longer a "first line aircraft"? Uhmmm...care to guess when the
>last F-102's left active duty?

From what I have, the last ADC units in the Air Force were converted
in 1973. It was a unit in Iceland. In the Pacific, it was 1971. In
Alaska, it was 1970, Europe, 1970. Almost all ANG units were
converted to other aircraft by 1975. The last units, the 195th in the
Calif. ANG in 1975 and the 199th ANG in Hawaii, stopped flying them
in Jan, 1977.

FWIW, someone just posted a series of nice pictures of the 195th
planes just before they converted on alt.binaries.pictures.military.


>Since you did not even have a ghostly
>idea that they had served in Vietnam, how the heck are we supposed to
>believe your assessment of their operational status? As to even the
>definition of 'first line", have you ever looked at what the breakdown
>in the old ADC force was during that period? Take a gander at how many
>of those forces you call "second echelon", I presume, were standing
>alert on a routine basis.
>
You got me on the Viet Nam part. I'd completely forgotten about that.
And yes, I have an idea of what the forces were like and what second
echelon means. They were second-line units with older, less capable
or even obsolete equipment.

>
>You had no idea that the TU-95 was armed?! Or that Bears routinely
>trolled down the eastern seaboard, and into the Gulf? That the USSR
>used Cuba as a refueling point for those Bears (even into the 90's
>IIRC)?
>
Yes, I am aware of that. The problem is that you're so anxious to find
fault that you are misquoting me. I said " I'm not aware of any
'threats' that shot back". Operative word being shot, not armed.

>> I believe that in the sixties and seventies, the units were much more
>> tightly tied to the state than they are now.
>
>Not really. The degree of state control has always been exaggerated by
>those who have never served in a Guard unit, which number I am
>guessing from your sneering tone you would be a part of.
>
It's sneering to say they were tied to a state? The rest of what you
say doesn't really make sense. which number what?

Also, that's not how I understood it, but if you can expand on how the
NG units were not tied to a state, I'd appreciate your explaining how
it did work.

>Also since they were
>> flying aircraft that were not in first-line service, and fairly
>> high-maintenance, moving them to other bases not equipped to handle
>> them would have been a major logistical move that would be difficult
>> to justify.
>
>Uhmmm...take a gander at when the F-102 retired from active service,
>and recall that two NATO allies continued to fly them even after they
>left ANG service--and you can't see where they might have been used?

What is your point? The real question seems to be when the Air Force
no longer considered the 102 to be a first line aircraft.I can't give
you a date for that. Although, it might be when they started giving
them to ANG units. But it's a fact that within 3 years of the time
we're talking about (1970) you could count the number of units still
flying F-102's on one hand and in 3 more, they were all gone except
for targets...and, of course, the Greeks and Turks.

>Too little, too late (in terms of backpeddling, that is). Go up and
>read your first paragraph in *this* post and then come back and tell
>me you were not "attacking".

I remember those years very well, and I knew a lot of people who were
able to get into the National Guard as an alternative to the draft. It
was a very popular option and every National Guard unit had waiting
lists with hundreds or even thousands of names. Joining those units
was not a crime or a black mark. The ones I have no respect for are
the ones who used their influence or their family's influence to get
into these units ahead of other people who were in line. I guess my
question is why you would want to defend people who would do that?


Scott Peterson


If it looks like a duck, sounds like a duck
and walks like a duck, then it probably
needs a few more minutes in the Microwave

[Peter Stickney]

In article >,
Alan Minyard > writes:
> On Mon, 08 Sep 2003 05:49:38 -0400, Cub Driver >
> wrote:
>
>>
>>>I said it wasn't the stuff of legend. i.e. not particularly
>>>memorable. That's a long way from attacking them.
>>
>>That's not the way I read it. I saw mockery for the Cowboy pilots and
>>sons of the elite, riding herd on Cuban invaders. I think that a) you
>>are back-pedaling, b) you seize any opportunity to run down the
>>incumbent prezdint, and c) you really don't care squat about F-102s or
>>the men who flew them.
>>
>>Often in the cocktail parties I attend, I hear the Good People being
>>shocked--shocked!--that Bush failed to attend the last year's meetings
>>of the Guard. These are of course the same people who would rise up
>>with dignity and leave any room which a military officer had the ill
>>manners to enter.

> You need to find some higher quality cocktail parties to attend.

Dan lives in a College Town. It might not be the People's Republic of
Berkeley, but some of the attitudes are still there.
(I was born on Gasoline Alley, so I can say that)

Dan, are the Good People still Up in Arms and Pointing With Alarm that
the resurgent Bear population (Ursine, not Soviet) are finding their
bir feeders and garbage cans a convenient supermarket? You'd think
that those Greeney Folks would like getting close to Cuddly Nature.
(Well, as long as it's the squirrels. If it's big enough to invite
_you_ to dinner, it seems to be different)


--
Pete Stickney
A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many
bad measures. -- Daniel Webster

[Peter Stickney]

In article >,
av8r > writes:
> Hi Peter
>
> Any and all constructive nitpicking is welcome.
>
> I do not have the exact date, but sometime in August of 1962, the U.S.
> Navy sent a five AD-5Q (EA-IF) Skyraider detachment from VAW-13 to Tan
> Son Nhut. While there, the five-aircraft interceptor team, alternated
> with detachments from the 509th FIS. It was a learning process for
> theme as they practiced the best methods od identifying airborne
> intruders. The deployments which were under operational control of
> COMUSMACV ranged from August to September, 1962; January to February,
> 1964 and finally during November of 1963.

Hmm, As I understand it, the Australians were also present as well,
flying Avon Sabres. Do you have anything on their activities?
>
> Speaking of the F-102, it got down to 40 and 50 below up in Goose Bay
> quite often. The sound of the A/B kicking in on a cold day or even
> colder night was deafening. It used to rattle all the dishes in the
> china cabinet of our married quarters. It could really get off the
> ground in a short distance on cold days as well.

Yepper. I've heard some amazing tales about the performance boost
that cold weather gives a jet from some of the Canadian CF-101
drivers. At 50 below, the Voodoo really gets up & goes.

--
Pete Stickney
A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many
bad measures. -- Daniel Webster

[Paul Hirose]

The February '91 issue of Wings has a cover photo of two camouflaged
F-102s in a revetment, and an article called "Unsheathing the Dagger,"
about the F-102 in Vietnam.

Author Warren Thompson says the 509th FIS at Clark AB got orders to
deploy on the morning of 5 August 1964. Within 2 1/2 hours they had
four planes at Danang, "making the 509th the first fighter squadron to
deploy aircraft to Vietnam following the Gulf of Tonkin incident."

There are some interesting war stories in the article. One describes
hunting VC at night with the IRST. It was "an excellent piece of
equipment," according to a former pilot, able to track a guy smoking a
cigarette from 30,000 feet. They would detect campfires and fire IR
missiles at them, then follow up with radar missiles visually aimed at
the explosions.

Another pilot thought the F-102's dozen 2.75 inch rockets were better
(but not much better) than its AIM-4s, which he called "of little
value against ground targets." However, on one of his missions they
fired AIM-4s unguided and saved a downed aircrew from capture.

Somebody asked about the F-102 accident rate. Statistics for current
and retired USAF aircraft are here:
http://afsafety.af.mil/AFSC/RDBMS/Flight/stats/aircraft_stats.html

(Javascript must be enabled for the page to work.)

--

Paul Hirose >

[Peter Stickney]

In article >,
Alan Minyard > writes:
> On Sun, 07 Sep 2003 17:43:17 -0400, av8r >
> wrote:
>
>>Hi Peter
>>
>>The first operational deployment to Viet by F-102's was actually on the
>>21st of March 1962. Deuces of the 509th FIS deployed to Tan Son Nhut.
>>They returned 8 days later on the 29th. For the next year during Water
>>Glass ops, they rotated every six weeks with U.S. Navy AD5Q's.
>>
>>Project Bell Tone 1 commenced in December 1960 with six F-100D's of the
>>510th TFS were deployed to Don Muang Airport. They were replaced by six
>>F-102A's of the 509th FIS nine months later.
>>
>>
>>Peter, let's keep this thread going if possible. It's extremely
>>interesting. Are you interested in F-102 losses in country?
>>
>>I used to love watching the F-102's of the 59th FIS roaring around while
>>I was at Goose Bay, Labrador (June 64-June 67). The odd time a Deuce of
>>the 57th FIS would come down from Kef for a visit. Lots of good Bear
>>hunting back in those days too.
>>
>>
>>Cheers...Chris
>
> Does anyone know what the accidental lose rate for the -102 was? I
> have heard that it was pretty high, which for an early single engine
> delta is easy to believe.

Check out the USAF Safety Office at:

http://afsafety.af.mil/AFSC/RDBMS/Flight/stats/aircraft_stats.html

They've got stats on all manner of stuff, from 1950 on, ranging, with
some holes, from F-47s to the F-22, and all manner of types in
between.

According to them, the F-102 had a lifetime Class A accident rate of
13.69/100K flight hours, with 357 Class A accidents between 1953
(first loss), to 1981 (last loss)

For a bit of context, here are some of the other fighter's lifelim
numbers for the Class A rate:

F-84 52.86
F-86 44.18
F-89 24.54
F-100 21.22
F-101 14.65
F-102 13.69
F-104 30.63
F-105 17.83
F-106 9.47
F-4 4.64
F-5 8.82
F-15 2.47
F-16 4.19

The Century Series and later numbers don't include combat losses.
I can't tell if that's the case for the F-84 adn F-86.

It ought to be noted that in 2 years of service, about half of all teh
F-84s built had been written off.


--
Pete Stickney
A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many
bad measures. -- Daniel Webster

[Scott Peterson]

(Kevin Brooks) wrote:


>
>So I'd be willing to bet Scott would have no
>> problem acknowledging the excellent service of the SEA volunteers.
>
>Well, since he is so willing to brush the entire 111th FIS, a unit
>that did contribute pilots to fly F-102's in Vietnam, with his "I hate
>GWB" brush, I would disagree that he demonstrates such willingness.
>
Please don't put words in my mouth. I said nothing about this unit or
their activities.

>> >Was no longer a "first line aircraft"? Uhmmm...care to guess when the
>> >last F-102's left active duty?
>>
>> When?
>
>The last F-102's left active duty service (as interceptors, that
>is--they would later return in the guise of the QF-102) in 73, after
>the US had concluded the treaty with Hanoi

What the heck does that treaty have to do with the service of the
102's? This is like saying that the F-102 was taken out of service
after the 1973 Fords were announced. It's an absolutely true
statement but also absolutely meaningless.

If you look at my other post, I give better dates of when it went out
of service.

(source:
>www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/SP-468/ch11-4.htm). They continued
>in ANG service for only a few more years (77 IIRC). So, throughout
>this period of the Vietnam conflict, the Dagger remained in "front
>line" service.

I guess it all depends on what you mean by front line service. I
think that suggesting that it was a front line aircraft past the mid
sixties is more accurate.

>It was the *first* US combat aircraft deployed to the
>RVN after the Tonking Gulf incident, and remained in theater throught
>the time of US major involvement. Not bad for Scott's "second echelon"
>fighter, as he would call it, no?

Well, in Korea when the war broke out, some of the first aircraft
deployed were P-51's, not jets. Not because they were the best, but
because they were close. As far as remaining in theatre, it was
pointed out that the total deployment was a total of 24 aircraft. Do
you know the numbers for similar aircraft? For all we know, it may
simply have been more trouble to return them than it was worth.....I
don't know.

>
>
>No, that was NOT the question. The question was about F-102 service in
>Vietnam, period. Which Scott managed to fumble--but hey, that's
>excusable, we all make mistakes, and he admitted as much (which is
>better than a lot of folks hereabouts...). But he left the ballpark
>when he tried to go political and engaged in wholesale libel with his
>"the Guard was a haven for draftdodgers" crap.

Wasn't it? That's certainly the way I remember it....and I knew a
quite a few people who were in it for exactly that reason.

>My brother served in
>the Guard at the very end of the Vietnam conflict--AFTER serving on
>active duty and pulling a year flying DUSTOFF missions out of Danang
>and Phu Bai...but hey, that tarbrush Scott was wielding casts a broad
>stroke, does it not?

More power to him. There were a lot of personnel that came into the
guard that way. In fact, to bring it back on subject, that was one of
the few career paths for many of the F-102 pilots that were considered
excess as the number of F-102 squadrons was reduced. Many of them
were not going to be retrained on a newer aircraft. If they could
find a NG unit that would take them, they could keep flying.


>ANG and ARNG units were serving in Vietnam as
>well, along with a few thousand former ARNG "individual replacements"
>(see what happened to the HIARNG infantry brigade that was
>activated....). Then we get the attempt to tar the entire 111th FIS
>because Scott does not like GWB; again, uncalled for.
>
Again, not what I said.

>Not really. The F-102's went in when the curtain went up, and returned
>only when it went down. ANG F-102 folks played in the same sandbox as
>their AC counterparts.

OK. ....and a list of their major accomplishments while there would
be?????? # missions, troops killed, planes shot down, missiles
fired.

>
>I believe you, or the author maybe, forgot another earlier
>example--the activation and deployment to Europe of various ANG
>fighter units as a result of the Berlin crisis earlier that same
>decade.
>
I don't know if that's really a fair comparison. After all, that was
less than 2 1/2 years after WWII ended.


>OK. Just how did the states leverage this control? Appointing
>officers? Not really--they had to be vetted by a federal rec board
>before the appointments were effective. Training plans? Nope--that was
>controlled by the federal side. IET? Nope, because this was after it
>was decided that all NG personnel would attend AC IET. Money,
>organization, and/or equipment? Heck no--that was firmly the purview
>of the feds. So, where was all of this state control really
>manifested?
>
Good question. I thought that through the 1980's the chain of command
for the NG went to the Governor unless the unless the units had been
federalized.

The example that comes to mind was Eisenhower doing this to keep NG
troops from being used by segratationist governors in the school
integration efforts in the mid-1950's.

>Gee, then why did they keep them in service over there throughout the
>war? Do you think if your opponent has a weak, but existant, air
>strike capability, then it is OK to ignore air defense? Good way to
>get a bloody nose (see what happened when we had B-29's caught on
>Saipan during WWII by that "remote" threat).

It's a good question. In all seriousness, maybe it was simply easier
to keep them there than return them. I've seen pictures of
Davis-Monahan in this time frame, it was covered with little delta
dots. There was no shortage of low-hour 102 airframes.

Anyway, I did a quick search and apparently at least some of them were
on alert sitting armed with the cockpits open. So someone expected
some trouble and wanted them there. Apparently they also escorted some
B-52 missions according to the SAC Museum.

http://www.dposs.com/t_jensen-dab-bush-account-1965.htm


Scott Peterson


Don't accept your dog's admiration
as conclusive evidence that you're
wonderful.

[Cub Driver]

>Dan, are the Good People still Up in Arms and Pointing With Alarm that
>the resurgent Bear population

I haven't heard anything about bears lately, but most every year we
have a moose sighting.

Is there a plaque on Gasoline Alley to mark your birthplace?

all the best -- Dan Ford
email: www.danford.net/letters.htm#9

see the Warbird's Forum at www.warbirdforum.com
and the Piper Cub Forum at www.pipercubforum.com

[Cub Driver]

>>Was no longer a "first line aircraft"? Uhmmm...care to guess when the
>>last F-102's left active duty?
>
>When?

1976 in U.S. service.

Greece and Turkey also had a few, and perhaps ran them longer.

all the best -- Dan Ford
email: www.danford.net/letters.htm#9

see the Warbird's Forum at www.warbirdforum.com
and the Piper Cub Forum at www.pipercubforum.com

[Cub Driver]

>Jeez...you're reading waaaay too much into Scott's posts IMO.

I read the post pretty much the same way. Nor has he softened his
implications any in his followup, only saluted a few times toward the
active-service veterans.

Does anyone seriously believe that Scott or anyone else would care a
fig about the F-102 and the Texas Air Guard except as a way to
denigrate the rather remarkable accomplishment of the incumbent
prezdint--who is, after all, the first pilot of a supersonic fighter
(or interceptor, if that helps you choke back the tears) to hold the
office?

I recently changed my party affiliation to Unaffiliated. I was asked:
"Does this mean you have developed reservations about Mr. Bush?"
Actually, I've always had reservations about Mr. Bush, father and son.
But to scoff at the latter's academic (Andover, Yale, Harvard Business
School) or military (two years on active duty as a jet jockey--a fact
that seems to go unmentioned when his ANG service is under
discussion--followed by however many years in the Guard) is just plain
comical.

all the best -- Dan Ford
email: www.danford.net/letters.htm#9

see the Warbird's Forum at www.warbirdforum.com
and the Piper Cub Forum at www.pipercubforum.com

[Cub Driver]

>Kevin cool your jets pardner...the title of this thread is what?

Now you're being ridiculous. The title of the thread has nothing to do
with the discussion, and it was Scott's post that moved it into its
present territory. If he didn't mean to do that, he can always
apologize and set the record straight.

all the best -- Dan Ford
email: www.danford.net/letters.htm#9

see the Warbird's Forum at www.warbirdforum.com
and the Piper Cub Forum at www.pipercubforum.com

[Kevin Brooks]

Scott Peterson > wrote in message >...
> (Kevin Brooks) wrote:
>
> >I wonder if you'd have the temerity to utter such a thing to, say, the
> >personnel from the ANG units like those in CO and NM that were
> >activated and flew in Vietnam, or to those "champagne unit" (your
> >description) members who pulled their voluntary rotations in Vietnam?
> >Methinks not...
>
> You're absolutely correct. I would not. I have the utmost respect
> for those people.

Then why make the comment in this forum? It has to be either safety
through remoteness, or a case of a really bad
slip-of-the-tongue(typing finger)--I'd hope it was the latter.

>
> >Was no longer a "first line aircraft"? Uhmmm...care to guess when the
> >last F-102's left active duty?
>
> From what I have, the last ADC units in the Air Force were converted
> in 1973. It was a unit in Iceland. In the Pacific, it was 1971. In
> Alaska, it was 1970, Europe, 1970. Almost all ANG units were
> converted to other aircraft by 1975. The last units, the 195th in the
> Calif. ANG in 1975 and the 199th ANG in Hawaii, stopped flying them
> in Jan, 1977.

Dates vary. The 57th FIS did indeed not give their last Deuces up
until July 73--meaning that by *any* definition they were in "first
line" service until then. The actual last use by the ANG is a bit more
murky from what I have read--the 77 date is floated, but at least one
source I ran into indicated that the HIANG actually conducted its last
operational Deuce flight in October 76.

>
> FWIW, someone just posted a series of nice pictures of the 195th
> planes just before they converted on alt.binaries.pictures.military.
>
>
> >Since you did not even have a ghostly
> >idea that they had served in Vietnam, how the heck are we supposed to
> >believe your assessment of their operational status? As to even the
> >definition of 'first line", have you ever looked at what the breakdown
> >in the old ADC force was during that period? Take a gander at how many
> >of those forces you call "second echelon", I presume, were standing
> >alert on a routine basis.
> >
> You got me on the Viet Nam part. I'd completely forgotten about that.
> And yes, I have an idea of what the forces were like and what second
> echelon means. They were second-line units with older, less capable
> or even obsolete equipment.

And the 57th FIS would presumably not meet that criteria.

>
> >
> >You had no idea that the TU-95 was armed?! Or that Bears routinely
> >trolled down the eastern seaboard, and into the Gulf? That the USSR
> >used Cuba as a refueling point for those Bears (even into the 90's
> >IIRC)?
> >
> Yes, I am aware of that. The problem is that you're so anxious to find
> fault that you are misquoting me. I said " I'm not aware of any
> 'threats' that shot back". Operative word being shot, not armed.

Oh....so combat is not a realistic possibility unless it has already
occurred? I believe you were insinuating that US interceptors of that
period faced no real danger, right? I am having a bit of a problem
here, since the previous statements have been snipped.

>
> >> I believe that in the sixties and seventies, the units were much more
> >> tightly tied to the state than they are now.
> >
> >Not really. The degree of state control has always been exaggerated by
> >those who have never served in a Guard unit, which number I am
> >guessing from your sneering tone you would be a part of.
> >
> It's sneering to say they were tied to a state?

No, the sneering bit was your snide little "Guard as a haven for
draftdodgers" crap in the earlier paragraph.

The rest of what you
> say doesn't really make sense. which number what?

That you are one of the number who have never served in a Guard
unit--the meaning is rather clear if you actually read the wording.

>
> Also, that's not how I understood it, but if you can expand on how the
> NG units were not tied to a state, I'd appreciate your explaining how
> it did work.

Nice try, but nope, that is not what I said. I seem to recall that you
were mumbling about the Guard being much more firmly state controlled
during the Vietnam era (hard to get your wording right, as it has been
snipped and I lack the resolve to dig back into the old posts). I
believe that is a much exaggerated claim--please show me what area(s)
the state exerted real control over? In fact, the states really have
their "control" limited to administrative matters (and then only IAW
federal guidelines and significant federal supervision). I am sure you
are harkening back to the sinister "GWB got appointed unfairly..."
stance, and envision this as being another example of Guard good ol'
boy operations (like we never saw good ol' boy action in the regular
services, right?). But the fact is that the federal side controlled
the appointment of officers--no officer could be appointed, or
promoted, without approval of a federal board.

>
> >Also since they were
> >> flying aircraft that were not in first-line service, and fairly
> >> high-maintenance, moving them to other bases not equipped to handle
> >> them would have been a major logistical move that would be difficult
> >> to justify.
> >
> >Uhmmm...take a gander at when the F-102 retired from active service,
> >and recall that two NATO allies continued to fly them even after they
> >left ANG service--and you can't see where they might have been used?
>
> What is your point? The real question seems to be when the Air Force
> no longer considered the 102 to be a first line aircraft.I can't give
> you a date for that. Although, it might be when they started giving
> them to ANG units. But it's a fact that within 3 years of the time
> we're talking about (1970) you could count the number of units still
> flying F-102's on one hand and in 3 more, they were all gone except
> for targets...and, of course, the Greeks and Turks.

That the demise was quick after it began is immaterial. That the AC
was replacing the F-102 with F-106's as quickly as possible is true,
and understandable. But from an operational standpoint, there is no
way you can claim that the F-102 was out-to-pasture while it was still
being flown by active duty squadrons (especially the 57th in Iceland,
where they ran a pretty regular Bear greeting service IIRC). The fact
is that while GWB was training and beginning his squadron service the
Deuce was not some has-been/never-going-nowhere player as you would
have us believe, but was still serving with both frontline units on
the AC side and was standing alert at various CONUS stations as well.

>
> >Too little, too late (in terms of backpeddling, that is). Go up and
> >read your first paragraph in *this* post and then come back and tell
> >me you were not "attacking".
>
> I remember those years very well, and I knew a lot of people who were
> able to get into the National Guard as an alternative to the draft. It
> was a very popular option and every National Guard unit had waiting
> lists with hundreds or even thousands of names. Joining those units
> was not a crime or a black mark. The ones I have no respect for are
> the ones who used their influence or their family's influence to get
> into these units ahead of other people who were in line. I guess my
> question is why you would want to defend people who would do that?

Because while I am sure it may have happened (just as I am equally
sure that Senator Shmedlap could have influenced the Army's decision
to have his son serve as a clerk on a rather short tour--or maybe
Senator Gore?), I am reluctant to smear folks without darned good
evidence (which apparently in the case of GWB has never been given,
even after journalists from such anti-GWB forums as the Boston Herald
and the Washington Post (or Washington Pravda as we used to refer to
it) spent considerable effort trying to do just that), for one.
Second, when you take that tack, you run the risk of smearing a lot of
other good folks, especially when you use wording such as that that
you chose in your earlier post--there were a lot of folks serving in
the Guard before the war ever began, for example, and more than a few
vets joined Guard units upon their return. Not to mention the fact
that, despite LBJ/McNamara's stupid mistake of not using Guard and
Reserve forces earlier, there were a significant number of both ANG
and ARNG folks mobilized during the conflict, and a number of other
ANG crews and personnel performed support missions as well (to include
transport runs into the RVN, IIRC). And BTW, are you sure that ALL of
the Guard units had those waiting lists? Rather definitive and
inclusive statement you are making there...

Brooks
>
>
> Scott Peterson

[Peter Stickney]

In article >,
Cub Driver > writes:
>
>>Dan, are the Good People still Up in Arms and Pointing With Alarm that
>>the resurgent Bear population
>
> I haven't heard anything about bears lately, but most every year we
> have a moose sighting.
>
> Is there a plaque on Gasoline Alley to mark your birthplace?

Not yet. But someday, perhaps... My student days much later did have
a few distinguishing moments - Struggling back to Stoke Hole from the
McConnell Hall computer cluster during the Blizzard of '78, and having
to put into Smith Hall (a Women's Dorm at the time) to wait out the
storm. It was Hell I say! We were trapped for 3 days. (The tough part
was sheaking out * piling more snow in front of the door)

It was the brick place on the
corner - 2nd floor. Of course, I was rather young at the time, so my
memory could be a bit off, but I recall wanting to be near my mother.


--
Pete Stickney
A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many
bad measures. -- Daniel Webster

[Ed Rasimus]

Juvat > wrote:

>Ed Rasimus posted:
>
>>In "Clashes" Michel is dealing with MiG engagements, not with air
>>defense alerts. Clashes has a lot of good research behind it and
>>Marshall has the experience to back up that of which he writes.
>
>True...but wouldyou acknowledge that F-102s did fly CAPs and not
>simply sitting cocked at the end of a runway? And can you agree that
>the F-102 shot down by the MiG-21 in Feb 1968 was flying CAP?

I would acknowledge that F-102s flew. I would acknowledge that F-102s
even did some ersatz ground attack. I would assert that in 150 North
Vietnam missions in Rolling Thunder, Linebacker I & II, I never once
was supported by an F-102 CAP. Not once. I never was supported by and
F-102 escort, nor in a package with an F-102 sweep either. Never had
an F-102 participate in any NVN mission that I was on.
>
>>Certainly there were F-4s on alert at Udorn and absolutely they were
>>flying CAP, but CAP is a different mission than air defense and alert
>>can be for a number of mission options--I sat alert at Korat in 105's,
>>but that was SAR and ground attack alert. And, I sat alert at Korat in
>>F-4Es, but that also was for ground attack.
>
>So taking this just a little bit farther...if they were still in place
>at Udorn in 1972 they just might have flown CAPs, they might have even
>practiced some ACM vs the local air-to-air sqdns (13th, 555th, and TDY
>523d, etc). Yet when the F-8s came to town to play, no mention of
>giving the F-102s a taste. No mention of using F-102s for DACM for the
>benefit of the air-to-air guys. [FWIW, Ritchie does say that the 432d
>selected crews for the air-to-air mission into RP-6.]

I doubt that they would have flown and briefed, scheduled ACM. It was
simply against AF policy to fly dissimilar in those days. And, it must
be considered that the mission was to fly combat, not to train locally
in theater. There was the occasional hassle during RTB, but no
scheduled, briefed, training objectives established DACM.

Certainly Ritchie is correct. In July of '72, the 7th AF DO toured the
Thai bases. He directed that since the Linebacker mission was
critical, each base would establish "primary Linebacker crews"--folks
who specialized in a particular mission, who would be first scheduled
for Pack VI every day and who would carry the load. That meant Udorn
established specialized A/A crews. It's the same policy that had me
assigned as a primary F-4 Hunter/Killer SEAD guy.
>
>>I honestly don't know what unit was deployed, but I'm fairly confident
>>in the recollection that 102s were still in SEA in '72.
>
>>I certainly like Thompson. His compilation of history in "To Hanoi and
>>Back" is excellent.
>
>Fair enough...since I got you to acknowledge that Thompson just might
>have his **** in one sock, look at page 309 of his book. Fourth entry
>down...Udorn...number of F-102s there in 1967 = 6, number there in
>July 1972 = ZERO. Number of F-102s in SEA in July 1972 = ZERO.

I'll concede. Could be. I'm working strictly from memory. A good
memory generally, but capable of error.
>
>He could be mistaken, his data is from a HQ document and not an eye
>witness account.
>
>>Still, I like to deal with people who actually
>>flew the missions more than folks who are familiar with the bowels of
>>the AU library and how to run a micro-fiche machine.
>
>I resemble that remark...Fair enough...Idle --*Chaff* --*Flare* -- I'm
>just having a problem wondering whose "there i was story" to believe.

T'was Ronaldus Maximus that said, "trust, but verify." Can't argue
with that.
>
>>If the 366th moved out of Danang in July of '72 at the peak of
>>Linebacker, it's a surprise to me.
>
>Ummm, respectfully are you being sarcastic with the last part? See
>Thompson page 223...talks about the movement of the 366th from Da Nang
>to Takhli in June of 1972.
>
>So I ask the question again, sincerely, who do we believe? And why am
>I doing all the citations/research?

OK, I knew that Tahkli got the 4th deployment for S-J when the base
was re-activated. Didn't realize that the Gunfighters moved there as
well.

And, you're doing the research because you love it!

>
>Juvat

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (ret)
***"When Thunder Rolled:
*** An F-105 Pilot Over N. Vietnam"
*** from Smithsonian Books
ISBN: 1588341038

[Ed Rasimus]

Juvat > wrote:


>Fair question, one I cannot answer. If the threat were that great,
>then why not bring the superior interceptor (the F-106) in to replace
>the F-102, I cannot answer that one either. I guess the F-102 was so
>good at it's mission the AF only needed 24 or so in SEA (four 6 plane
>Dets) and that might be proof of its effectiveness as an Interceptor.

>Juvat

Simple answer to your question regarding why 106's weren't deployed
instead of 102's. During '66 to '69, there was a chronic shortage of
J-75s. Since the Deuce used the much more common J-57, it was more
readily deployable.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (ret)
***"When Thunder Rolled:
*** An F-105 Pilot Over N. Vietnam"
*** from Smithsonian Books
ISBN: 1588341038

[Kevin Brooks]

Juvat > wrote in message >...
> I posted:
> >> Jeez...you're reading waaaay too much into Scott's posts IMO.
>
> Kevin Brooks posted:
> >No, I am not reading anything "into it". His words are quite clear in
> >their meaning and intent.
>
> Kevin cool your jets pardner...the title of this thread is what?
>
> "What F-102 units were called up for Viet Nam"
>
> What does "called up" mean to you? To me it means what non-active duty
> units, Guard or Reserve were activated for duty. How do you "call up"
> an active duty unit?

By deploying them into the theater of operations from their current
station would be one manner of "calling up" an AC unit. I note that
the other posters who anwered the initial question also did not take
the "this solely deals with the RC" approach--are all of us wrong?

>
> It does NOT mean which Acitve Duty squadrons deployed. But I'd bet
> that's how you're reading this thread.

I took it as a total force question.

>
> >No, he was incorrect. He said none were deployed (which was wrong)
>
> Actually he said "I don't think any were. This plane was strictly an
> interceptor for shooting down bombers. No guns, no ground attack
> capability."
>
> I'm pretty sure history will confirm that F-102s were indeed
> interceptors lacking a surface attack mission. I acknowledge the
> kludged attempts to use it's IRST in a surface attack role, but that
> was NOT it's mission (Air Defense as you acknowledge).

Take away the "strictly"; as it was indeed used in ground attack
missions, albeit not very effectively (I do believe a couple of their
three total losses occurred when performing this mission that they
supposedly could not even undertake). The Fairey Battle was by all
accounts a rather lousy ground attack aircraft, but it was indeed used
in that role; the F-104 was never originally intended to serve in the
CAS/BAI role, but that is the role it later found itself serving with
many NATO nations. Why put blinders on only in regards to the F-102's
history?


> And history will confirm that no ANG unit was called up for active duty in SEA.

No ANG unit was called up for active duty in SEA?! I thought you
already acknowledged the fact that ANG units were indeed called up?

>
> >because there was no need for interceptors (wrong again, as in fact an
> >interceptor force was maintained in Vietnam, and in Thailand
> >throughout the period of major US involvement).
>
> Okay...you're absolutely right. He was incorrect WRT to the presence
> of ANY F-102s.
>
> >Zero chance? That's probably what the F-100 jockeys from CO thought,
> >too, right up until they deployed to the RVN. An airplane that had
> >ZERO percent chanc??? Odd, since that very same aircraft served in SEA
> >throughout most of the war, with ANG pilots forming part of the
> >manning that supported them.
>
> Come on Kevin...I'm sincerely trying to keep this on topic about ANG
> F-102 sqdns and Scott's post.

Sorry to inform you of this, but this thread began to meander
(something that is rather common in Usenet) after Scott made his post
and tried to link it to an anti-GWB thrust. As others have commented,
the only folks who seem restricted to the ANG-only approach appear to
be you and Scott.

>
> ZERO chance of an ANG F-102 pilot flying combat unless he volunteered.

Uhmmm...like when Bush reportedly volunteered for Palace Alert (but
did not meet the experience requirement, which according to one
responsible individual was a minimum of one thousand hours)?

> The issue regarding the four ANG F-100 units that deployed, it's a
> great display of what the citizen airman has been willing to do for
> our country from the gitgo. The USAF was very pleased with that
> deployment. (Not back pedaling...before you suggest that I am)

OK. So your earlier statement that no ANG units were deployed was
apparently misworded--I would assume that you mean no F-102 units were
activated? Which would be true enough--but that leaves one wondering
whether F-102 units would indeed have been activated if sufficient
*volunteers* had not stepped forward?

>
> >The last F-102's left active duty service (as interceptors, that
> >is--they would later return in the guise of the QF-102) in 73, ... They continued
> >in ANG service for only a few more years (77 IIRC).
>
> I guess you won't be surprised when I was hoping for a little more
> detail, like last AD sqdn date and last ANG date. Guess I'll do the
> reasearch [sigh].

Gee, I was unaware you were so picky, when the issue had meandered to
whether the F-102 was a viable go-to-war/get-activated asset while GWB
was boring holes in the sky during his training and with the 111th FIS
(which question has already been answered, as they were still serving
with AC units while he was flying). But...the 57th FIS ceased Deuce
operations out of Iceland in July 73, and the HIARNG unit reportedly
flew its last Deuce operational sortie in October 76. Good enough?

>
> >It was the *first* US combat aircraft deployed to the
> >RVN after the Tonking Gulf incident,
>
> You'd be hard pressed to make a case of "first" deployed after the
> Gulf of Tonkin. Afterall, the 1st Air Commando (Farm Gate) guys were
> already flying combat sorties from Bien Hoa before GoT, as were RF-101
> guys (Able Mable) from Misawa (45th TRS) and Kadena (15th TRS). You
> get the picture.

Well, the folks in Bien Hoa did not have to deploy into the theater of
operations after the Gulf resolution, now did they (see, this playing
with finite word definitions can work both ways)? Actually, I believe
I read where the first F-102's to enter the area preceeded this by a
few years (1962, when they apparently started running a det out of the
RVN). I did read where the 509th FIS claims to have been the first
unit to deploy into the RVN after the GT incident--is that wrong?

>
> >No, that was NOT the question. The question was about F-102 service in
> >Vietnam, period.
>
> Kevin, re-read the title of this thread. "What F-102 units were called
> up for Viet Nam," not what F-102 units served in SEA. Sir you are in
> error...but I bet you disagree with me.

As apparently do the other folks who took exception with Scott's post,
not to mention those who answered the original post with the data on
the AC F-102 units that did indeed find themselves flying combat
missions.

>
> >>Scott was correct on this score even if he simply guessed.
> >
> >Not really.
>
> OK...I say tomato...you say cantalope.
>
> >I believe you, or the author maybe, forgot another earlier
> >example--the activation and deployment to Europe of various ANG
> >fighter units as a result of the Berlin crisis earlier that same
> >decade.
>
> Phew...uhhh my bad, I was trying to keep the discussion close to
> topic, sorta, hoping to keep it on SEA deployments of ANG F-102s. I
> mentioned the only activations during SEA.
>
> If you wish I can cite every ANG squadron activated for Berlin and the
> deployment location, but I don't think it is germaine to F-102s in
> SEA.

But it is germane to the fact that the USAF already regarded the ANG
as a real, honest to goodness go-to-war asset well before the entry of
GWB into ANG service.

>
> >Gee, then why did they keep them in service over there throughout the
> >war? Do you think if your opponent has a weak, but existant, air
> >strike capability, then it is OK to ignore air defense?
>
> Fair question, one I cannot answer. If the threat were that great,
> then why not bring the superior interceptor (the F-106) in to replace
> the F-102, I cannot answer that one either. I guess the F-102 was so
> good at it's mission the AF only needed 24 or so in SEA (four 6 plane
> Dets) and that might be proof of its effectiveness as an Interceptor.

I would suspect that, like happened during the Korean conflict, the
USAF was examining the degree of threat (admittedly not great in SEA,
but then again it could not be completely discounted, either) and
decided that the F-106's were better deployed against the more serious
threat and the F-102's could handle the threat posed by the North
Vietnamese.

>
> Truly sorry for the bad blood. You have misconstrued my intent. That
> being Scott was correct that no ANG F-102 unit was called up for Viet
> Nam, and he was mistaken that no F-102 units served in SEA.

No bad blood. But I get a bit tired when folks like Scott traipse out
the old "the Guard was a bunch of draftdodgers" mantra, not to mention
why he had to even enter into the "bash GWB" mode in the first place.
The first is a gross exaggeration born of enough folks making the
claim in the past, so it must be true, right? The second was just
another attempt at a backhanded swipe at a guy who performed military
service and flew combat aircraft in the defense of this nation-- a
much better alternative to refusing to serve at all, and then
attacking those who did, as many of his then-compatriots did, and none
of which he should be ashamed of, IMO.

Brooks

>
> Juvat

[Ed Rasimus]

Scott Peterson > wrote:

>> But he left the ballpark
>>when he tried to go political and engaged in wholesale libel with his
>>"the Guard was a haven for draftdodgers" crap.
>
>Wasn't it? That's certainly the way I remember it....and I knew a
>quite a few people who were in it for exactly that reason.

Well, I've got the distinct impression that the period in question is
prior to your birth, but let me point out that there is a considerable
difference between ANG and Army NG. During the SEA period, a lot of
folks sought Guard duty specifically to avoid active Army draft
service. But, to stretch the Guard responsibility to fit the mission
and extensive training requirements of an ANG pilot is a significant
move.
>

>Good question. I thought that through the 1980's the chain of command
>for the NG went to the Governor unless the unless the units had been
>federalized.
>
>The example that comes to mind was Eisenhower doing this to keep NG
>troops from being used by segratationist governors in the school
>integration efforts in the mid-1950's.

While you are technically correct, in that NG units are under the
control of the Governor of the state, there is a parallel chain of
command to the NGB and then reporting to the appropriate service CinC
and then JCS. While Army Guard units were activated to enforce federal
policy and also for disaster relief and riot duty (in '68) the ANG
units are much more often activated for federal military service
deployed.
>

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (ret)
***"When Thunder Rolled:
*** An F-105 Pilot Over N. Vietnam"
*** from Smithsonian Books
ISBN: 1588341038

[Juvat]

Cub Driver posted:

>Now you're being ridiculous.

Geez Dan, thanks for the breath of fresh air. I'm honestly not trying
to escalate the signal to noise ratio here...honestly trying to post
details

>The title of the thread has nothing to do
>with the discussion,

And here I was trying to keep it within near earth orbit of the title
of the thread. Mea Culpa, mea culpa.

>and it was Scott's post that moved it into its
>present territory. If he didn't mean to do that, he can always
>apologize and set the record straight.

Your concerns are noted.

Juvat

[Juvat]

Kevin Brooks posted:


>By deploying them into the theater of operations from their current
>station would be one manner of "calling up" an AC unit.

OK but that's not how I would interpret it when I was active duty.
Different strokes...

>I took it as a total force question.

Again, fair enough...not how I read it.

>Take away the "strictly"; as it was indeed used in ground attack
>missions, albeit not very effectively...why put blinders on only in regards to the F-102's
>history?

Not trying to put blinders on it, I did post that Scott was incorrect
on this score. He made an easy mistake.

>Sorry to inform you of this, but this thread began to meander
>(something that is rather common in Usenet) after Scott made his post
>and tried to link it to an anti-GWB thrust. As others have commented,
>the only folks who seem restricted to the ANG-only approach appear to
>be you and Scott.

OK, guilty as charged I was honestly trying to keep it on topic.
Respectfully, I'm happy NOT to discuss GWB service record. Nuff said.

>OK. So your earlier statement that no ANG units were deployed was
>apparently misworded--I would assume that you mean no F-102 units were
>activated?

You are correct on that score, I fumble fingered the text when I left
out F-102.

>Which would be true enough--but that leaves one wondering
>whether F-102 units would indeed have been activated if sufficient
>*volunteers* had not stepped forward?

A very small detail regarding F-102 pilots on active duty from Colonel
(PhD) Gross' "Prelude to the Total Force..." page 150

"Pilot shortages due to Southeast Asia operations increasingly
affected the Air Guard. Small numbers of Air Guard F-102 were
encouraged to volunteer for temporary active duty overseas. In July
1968, twenty-four of these pilots were on active duty at bases in
Holland, Germany, Alaska, the Philippines, and Okinawa."


>Gee, I was unaware you were so picky... Good enough?

The devil is in the details...

>Well, the folks in Bien Hoa did not have to deploy into the theater of
>operations after the Gulf resolution, now did they (see, this playing
>with finite word definitions can work both ways)?

You win...my sincere apologies for not staying on topic.

> I did read where the 509th FIS claims to have been the first
>unit to deploy into the RVN after the GT incident--is that wrong?

My humble apologies again, since there were so many deployments to SEA
from back in 1961 up until the GT incident, I honestly don't think a
great deal about which outfit gets the "honor" of being first.

>But it is germane to the fact that the USAF already regarded the ANG
>as a real, honest to goodness go-to-war asset well before the entry of
>GWB into ANG service.

I encourage you to read Gross' book, it might get you to reconsider
that remark.

Regarding the Berlin call-up (there's that expression again) there
were bright spots (no aircraft lost in the deployment) and some less
than stellar deals like three of the four provisional Fighter Wings
BUSTING their ORIs, one actually busted twice. All deployed ANG
tactical fighter (versus interceptor) squadrons were not currently
qualified in conventional surface attack, but had mistaken qualified
in nukes....

Anyway lots of great stuff in the book. Good and bad.

>No bad blood. But I get a bit tired when folks like Scott traipse out
>the old "the Guard was a bunch of draftdodgers" mantra, ...
>The first is a gross exaggeration born of enough folks making the
>claim in the past, so it must be true, right?

Again read Gross, he writes..."President Johnson's decision to rely on
draftees rather than reservists raised questions about the expense and
military utility or reserve programs. Many Americans were incensed
that their sons and husbands were being drafted to risk death in
Southeast Asia while men who received drill pay stayed home. The
draft-exempt status of the National Guard, as well as other reserve
programs, became a major incentive to volunteer for those programs."

You can disagree with Gross, but I think he nailed it.

Finally...my apologies, reasonable men can disagree (still scratching
my head over Dan's post) and with that you are welcome to the last
word.

Juvat

[av8r]

Hi Peter

No more world of lie, I saw a CF-101 get off the ground in roughly 2,000
feet at Goose on a 45 degree below zero sunny morning.

On the 1st of June, 1962, eight R.A.A.F. CA-27 Sabres were deployed to
Ubon R.T.A.F.B. from Butterworth, Malaya. They acted as a
counter-measure to communist operations in the region. This detachment
formed the basis for a re-formed No. 79 (F) Squadron. The squadron was
assigned to the S.E.A.T.O. force during the Thailand Crisis. No. 79 (F)
Squadron flew some of the earliest C.A.P.'s over Thailand before things
started to really heat up in Viet Nam. The squadron remained in
Thailand until August, 1968 when at that time it was officially disbanded.

Cheers...Chris

[Mike Marron]

>Ed Rasimus > wrote:

>I would acknowledge that F-102s flew. I would acknowledge that F-102s
>even did some ersatz ground attack. I would assert that in 150 North
>Vietnam missions in Rolling Thunder, Linebacker I & II, I never once
>was supported by an F-102 CAP. Not once. I never was supported by and
>F-102 escort, nor in a package with an F-102 sweep either. Never had
>an F-102 participate in any NVN mission that I was on.

I realize that second-hand accounts shared by "non-participants" is
viewed with contempt by many on this NG so if you happen to fall
into that category go ahead and stop reading now...

Having said that and for those who are interested, my Dad was one
of the first group of fighter pilots to operate supersonic fighters
(e.g: Dueces) with operational FIS squadrons back in the mid to
late '50's. A while back I shared with the NG a local newspaper
story about him ejecting from an F-102 over Wisconsin (predictably,
the nitpicker contingent here even picked apart THAT!) Anyway,
he especially loved the Duece's maneuverability and often spoke
fondly of the ol' bird. Seems Walt BJ who also flew the Duece felt
exactly the same way about it.

However, when the topic of F-102's being sent to Vietnam came
up (they were based out of Udorn which is where Dad was based
out of while flying the A-1E) he didn't have much to say about
it other than it was a waste of resources and -102's didn't belong
in SEA, period.

Just my 0.02

-Mike Marron

[Juvat]

Cub Driver posted:

>I read the post pretty much the same way.

Understood...I focused on the first paragraph not the political note.

I can appreciate your feelings WRT GWB, and I'm happy not to engage
you on this topic. You have great day...I'm gonna go put some miles on
my road bike.

Juvat

[Scott Peterson]

(Kevin Brooks) wrote:

>No bad blood. But I get a bit tired when folks like Scott traipse out
>the old "the Guard was a bunch of draftdodgers" mantra, not to mention
>why he had to even enter into the "bash GWB" mode in the first place.
>The first is a gross exaggeration born of enough folks making the
>claim in the past, so it must be true, right? The second was just
>another attempt at a backhanded swipe at a guy who performed military
>service and flew combat aircraft in the defense of this nation-- a
>much better alternative to refusing to serve at all, and then
>attacking those who did, as many of his then-compatriots did, and none
>of which he should be ashamed of, IMO.

Interesting. I mentioned George W. in one post. You have in seven
that I've counted so far, using me as the excuse. Of course, it does
make a good excuse to avoid other questions.

Seems like you have the problem here.

As far as what the NG is/was, I guess it was just coincidence that as
draft rates went up in the sixties, so did guard enlistments and
waiting lists. ....and when they went down, so did......

Pure coincidence, I suppose.





Scott Peterson


If genetic scientists crossed a chicken
with a zebra would they get a four-legged
chicken with its own barcode?

[Scott Peterson]

Ed Rasimus > wrote:

>Well, I've got the distinct impression that the period in question is
>prior to your birth, but let me point out that there is a considerable
>difference between ANG and Army NG. During the SEA period, a lot of
>folks sought Guard duty specifically to avoid active Army draft
>service. But, to stretch the Guard responsibility to fit the mission
>and extensive training requirements of an ANG pilot is a significant
>move.


I don't know why you'd think that. But no, I'm one of the baby
boomers.

Scott Peterson


If one synchronized swimmer drowns,
do the rest have to drown too?

[Buzzer]

On Mon, 8 Sep 2003 23:30:27 -0400, (Peter Stickney)
wrote:

>Hmm, As I understand it, the Australians were also present as well,
>flying Avon Sabres. Do you have anything on their activities?

"Ubon air force base in Thailand during the period 31 May 1962 to 31
August 1968" Air Defense of Thailand
google search will turn up more info..

[Scott Peterson]

(Kevin Brooks) wrote:

>Then why make the comment in this forum? It has to be either safety
>through remoteness, or a case of a really bad
>slip-of-the-tongue(typing finger)--I'd hope it was the latter.
>

Becaue it's not what I said. It's your incorrect intrepretation that
I'm responding to.

>>
>> >Was no longer a "first line aircraft"? Uhmmm...care to guess when the
>> >last F-102's left active duty?
>>
>> From what I have, the last ADC units in the Air Force were converted
>> in 1973. It was a unit in Iceland. In the Pacific, it was 1971. In
>> Alaska, it was 1970, Europe, 1970. Almost all ANG units were
>> converted to other aircraft by 1975. The last units, the 195th in the
>> Calif. ANG in 1975 and the 199th ANG in Hawaii, stopped flying them
>> in Jan, 1977.
>
>Dates vary. The 57th FIS did indeed not give their last Deuces up
>until July 73--meaning that by *any* definition they were in "first
>line" service until then.

Fine, then what is "any" definition. To me, the fact that they were
still in use by an Air Force unit does not mean it was a first-line
unit. Cynically, I'd think that there was a good reason that unit was
chosen to be last, but I don't know what it was in this case.

>The actual last use by the ANG is a bit more
>murky from what I have read--the 77 date is floated, but at least one
>source I ran into indicated that the HIANG actually conducted its last
>operational Deuce flight in October 76.
>
They claim 1/77, but who knows.

>
>Oh....so combat is not a realistic possibility unless it has already
>occurred? I believe you were insinuating that US interceptors of that
>period faced no real danger, right? I am having a bit of a problem
>here, since the previous statements have been snipped.

Again, you are misquoting me me for your own benefit. This was a very
touchy situation. There's always the possibility of accidents on both
sides. But neither side ever did shoot at each other.

I've always wondered what the orders given to the intercepting
aircraft were in these cases. Given the very serous consequences of
an incident, did they have permission to fire if fired on or would
they have had to wait for a decision by their superiors.

>> It's sneering to say they were tied to a state?
>
>No, the sneering bit was your snide little "Guard as a haven for
>draftdodgers" crap in the earlier paragraph.

Well, as stated elsewhere, that's the way I remember it, but I really
don't have time to look up why people joined back then.

>That you are one of the number who have never served in a Guard
>unit--the meaning is rather clear if you actually read the wording.
>

I did read it several times. ....and no, I never served in a Guard
unit.

>>
>> Also, that's not how I understood it, but if you can expand on how the
>> NG units were not tied to a state, I'd appreciate your explaining how
>> it did work.
>
>Nice try, but nope, that is not what I said. I seem to recall that you
>were mumbling about the Guard being much more firmly state controlled
>during the Vietnam era (hard to get your wording right, as it has been
>snipped and I lack the resolve to dig back into the old posts). I
>believe that is a much exaggerated claim--please show me what area(s)
>the state exerted real control over? In fact, the states really have
>their "control" limited to administrative matters (and then only IAW
>federal guidelines and significant federal supervision).

Discussed in another post. And yes, the guard did report to and take
orders from the governor of the state, unless the unit was
federalized.

> I am sure you
>are harkening back to the sinister "GWB got appointed unfairly..."
>stance,

Among others.....

>That the demise was quick after it began is immaterial. That the AC
>was replacing the F-102 with F-106's as quickly as possible is true,
>and understandable. But from an operational standpoint, there is no
>way you can claim that the F-102 was out-to-pasture while it was still
>being flown by active duty squadrons (especially the 57th in Iceland,
>where they ran a pretty regular Bear greeting service IIRC). The fact
>is that while GWB was training and beginning his squadron service the
>Deuce was not some has-been/never-going-nowhere player as you would
>have us believe, but was still serving with both frontline units on
>the AC side and was standing alert at various CONUS stations as well.
>

I disagree. The fact that it was still being flown by Air Force
squadrons does not mean that it's regarded as a first-line aircraft.
The Air Force bought 1,000 of the things and they were still a usable
aircraft, just not the best.

As far as the 57th continuing to fly them. I would speculate that that
the 102 was a adequate aircraft for that location and that role even
into the Seventies. The only hostile aircraft they would be expecting
there would be the subsonic Bears....which are exactly what they were
designed to intercept.

>Because while I am sure it may have happened (just as I am equally
>sure that Senator Shmedlap could have influenced the Army's decision
>to have his son serve as a clerk on a rather short tour--or maybe
>Senator Gore?), I am reluctant to smear folks without darned good
>evidence (which apparently in the case of GWB has never been given,
>even after journalists from such anti-GWB forums as the Boston Herald
>and the Washington Post (or Washington Pravda as we used to refer to
>it) spent considerable effort trying to do just that), for one.

I would suggest that you do a web search on GWB and National Guard. A
number of sites have his entire military history on line. Give this
an honest look to sites reporting all POV's and see if you still want
to discuss it.

>Second, when you take that tack, you run the risk of smearing a lot of
>other good folks, especially when you use wording such as that that
>you chose in your earlier post--there were a lot of folks serving in
>the Guard before the war ever began, for example, and more than a few
>vets joined Guard units upon their return.

I never said all. But I think that suggesting that the NG's
popularity during the Viet Nam years was not due to the draft borders
on ridiculous.

>Not to mention the fact
>that, despite LBJ/McNamara's stupid mistake of not using Guard and
>Reserve forces earlier, there were a significant number of both ANG
>and ARNG folks mobilized during the conflict, and a number of other
>ANG crews and personnel performed support missions as well (to include
>transport runs into the RVN, IIRC). And BTW, are you sure that ALL of
>the Guard units had those waiting lists? Rather definitive and
>inclusive statement you are making there...

Individuals, not units.

You're right, though. ALL is very inclusive. What guard units did
not have long waiting lists at this time? It would be intersting to
try to figure out why.....


Scott Peterson

[[email protected]]

Mike Marron > wrote:

>I realize that second-hand accounts shared by "non-participants" is
>viewed with contempt by many on this NG so if you happen to fall
>into that category go ahead and stop reading now...
>

Really having fun with this aren't you Marron?...you're showing a
very ugly aspect of your mental makeup IMO, one where you're most
comfortable when you have lot's of people that you can hate.

I can see no other reason for taking such unreasonable offense at
Gordon's very polite request awhile ago.

You're actually a rather scary guy you know...
--

-Gord.

[Mike Marron]

>"Gord Beaman" ) wrote:

>Really having fun with this aren't you Marron?...you're showing a
>very ugly aspect of your mental makeup IMO, one where you're most
>comfortable when you have lot's of people that you can hate.

>I can see no other reason for taking such unreasonable offense at
>Gordon's very polite request awhile ago.

>You're actually a rather scary guy you know...

Huh? You just love to argue about off-topic crap doncha' Gord?
What does this have to do with what I posted about the Duece?


-Mike (scary guy) Marron

[Kevin Brooks]

Scott Peterson > wrote in message >...
> (Kevin Brooks) wrote:
>
>
> >
> >So I'd be willing to bet Scott would have no
> >> problem acknowledging the excellent service of the SEA volunteers.
> >
> >Well, since he is so willing to brush the entire 111th FIS, a unit
> >that did contribute pilots to fly F-102's in Vietnam, with his "I hate
> >GWB" brush, I would disagree that he demonstrates such willingness.
> >
> Please don't put words in my mouth. I said nothing about this unit or
> their activities.

Bullpoopie. "...throughout the Viet Nam era National Guard units were
regarded as draft dodgers refuges. Specifically, the TxANG 147th
fighter group was considered a "champagne" unit that was a refuge for
the area's privileged." Your words, right? And the 111th was a
component of the 147th FG, right?

>
> >> >Was no longer a "first line aircraft"? Uhmmm...care to guess when the
> >> >last F-102's left active duty?
> >>
> >> When?
> >
> >The last F-102's left active duty service (as interceptors, that
> >is--they would later return in the guise of the QF-102) in 73, after
> >the US had concluded the treaty with Hanoi
>
> What the heck does that treaty have to do with the service of the
> 102's? This is like saying that the F-102 was taken out of service
> after the 1973 Fords were announced. It's an absolutely true
> statement but also absolutely meaningless.

It bears upon your assertion that there was no likelihood of the
F-102's seeing combat during this period, as they were in your
estimation truly second-line equipment. Be that as it may, what matter
is that they were serving in a first line role through mid-73 with the
AC, and still standing full alert even later with the ANG.

>
> If you look at my other post, I give better dates of when it went out
> of service.

July 73 for the AC (57th FIS), and October 76 with the ANG (a HIANG
unit).

>
> (source:
> >www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/SP-468/ch11-4.htm). They continued
> >in ANG service for only a few more years (77 IIRC). So, throughout
> >this period of the Vietnam conflict, the Dagger remained in "front
> >line" service.
>
> I guess it all depends on what you mean by front line service. I
> think that suggesting that it was a front line aircraft past the mid
> sixties is more accurate.

Huh? Not sure I follow the meaning of that last sentence. But suffice
it to say that one of the more regular Bear hunting outfits was the
*last* AC unit to lose its Deuces in July 73, which would seem to
indicate that contrary to your theory that Bush was safely serving in
an aircraft that was unlikely to see combat service, it was indeed
seeing "front line" use during that period.

>
> >It was the *first* US combat aircraft deployed to the
> >RVN after the Tonking Gulf incident, and remained in theater throught
> >the time of US major involvement. Not bad for Scott's "second echelon"
> >fighter, as he would call it, no?
>
> Well, in Korea when the war broke out, some of the first aircraft
> deployed were P-51's, not jets. Not because they were the best, but
> because they were close. As far as remaining in theatre, it was
> pointed out that the total deployment was a total of 24 aircraft. Do
> you know the numbers for similar aircraft? For all we know, it may
> simply have been more trouble to return them than it was worth.....I
> don't know.

So what? The NV threat did not require a greater force (that would
generally have been considered a good thing, right?).

>
> >
> >
> >No, that was NOT the question. The question was about F-102 service in
> >Vietnam, period. Which Scott managed to fumble--but hey, that's
> >excusable, we all make mistakes, and he admitted as much (which is
> >better than a lot of folks hereabouts...). But he left the ballpark
> >when he tried to go political and engaged in wholesale libel with his
> >"the Guard was a haven for draftdodgers" crap.
>
> Wasn't it?

Not in my opinion. Sure, there were those who joined the Guard in
order to perform their service in a manner which was less likely to
see them having to deploy; but there were a lot more folks who were
already in the Guard when the war heated up and stayed the course.
There were others, like my brother, who did their AC tours, to include
many Vietnam veterans, and then joined the Guard after their return
home. Do you classify either of these latter two categories as
"draftdodgers"? What about the thousands of Guardsmen who just a few
short years earlier were called up for the Berlin Crisis--were they
draft dodgers as well? Or the thousands of Guardsmen who were
activated to serve in Korea and Vietnam in 68? Let me give you a
hint--a draftdodger took off for Canada, or strung educational
deferrments together in search of a degree he really did not want, or
made a half-assed gesture at joining ROTC and then canned it when he
was safe and joined the protesters in Merry Ol' England--he did not
don a uniform in the Guard or Reserves.

That's certainly the way I remember it....and I knew a
> quite a few people who were in it for exactly that reason.

They were not "draftdodgers" IMO.

>
> >My brother served in
> >the Guard at the very end of the Vietnam conflict--AFTER serving on
> >active duty and pulling a year flying DUSTOFF missions out of Danang
> >and Phu Bai...but hey, that tarbrush Scott was wielding casts a broad
> >stroke, does it not?
>
> More power to him. There were a lot of personnel that came into the
> guard that way. In fact, to bring it back on subject, that was one of
> the few career paths for many of the F-102 pilots that were considered
> excess as the number of F-102 squadrons was reduced. Many of them
> were not going to be retrained on a newer aircraft. If they could
> find a NG unit that would take them, they could keep flying.

But hey, gosh forbid they could have ended up in the "champagne
group", upon which you heap scorn? And if you are willing to admit
that "a lot of personnel" came into the Guard from the AC's, how do
you then turn around and label it merely a haven for draftdodgers?

>
>
> >ANG and ARNG units were serving in Vietnam as
> >well, along with a few thousand former ARNG "individual replacements"
> >(see what happened to the HIARNG infantry brigade that was
> >activated....). Then we get the attempt to tar the entire 111th FIS
> >because Scott does not like GWB; again, uncalled for.
> >
> Again, not what I said.

Then I guess "champagne unit" was a term of endearment?

>
> >Not really. The F-102's went in when the curtain went up, and returned
> >only when it went down. ANG F-102 folks played in the same sandbox as
> >their AC counterparts.
>
> OK. ....and a list of their major accomplishments while there would
> be?????? # missions, troops killed, planes shot down, missiles
> fired.

How about, "No enemy aircraft attempted to attack US installations
while they were on duty"? Not a bad record.

>
> >
> >I believe you, or the author maybe, forgot another earlier
> >example--the activation and deployment to Europe of various ANG
> >fighter units as a result of the Berlin crisis earlier that same
> >decade.
> >
> I don't know if that's really a fair comparison. After all, that was
> less than 2 1/2 years after WWII ended.

WWII ended in 1960?! I was referring to the activation of troops and
airmen by Kennedy; a few ANG units made the trip across the big pond
at that time. Richard bach, author of "Jonathan Livingston Seagull",
was one of those F-84F pilots so involved; he wrote a short book about
one of his flights in Europe.

>
>
> >OK. Just how did the states leverage this control? Appointing
> >officers? Not really--they had to be vetted by a federal rec board
> >before the appointments were effective. Training plans? Nope--that was
> >controlled by the federal side. IET? Nope, because this was after it
> >was decided that all NG personnel would attend AC IET. Money,
> >organization, and/or equipment? Heck no--that was firmly the purview
> >of the feds. So, where was all of this state control really
> >manifested?
> >
> Good question. I thought that through the 1980's the chain of command
> for the NG went to the Governor unless the unless the units had been
> federalized.

And that chain has little meaning outside of the use of the Guard in a
state active duty role for disaster response or riot control.

>
> The example that comes to mind was Eisenhower doing this to keep NG
> troops from being used by segratationist governors in the school
> integration efforts in the mid-1950's.

By which both Eisenhower and later Kennedy established beyond a doubt
that the Guard's first duty was to the nation. This does not exactly
buttress your argument that the states' had some major control over
the Guard, now does it?

>
> >Gee, then why did they keep them in service over there throughout the
> >war? Do you think if your opponent has a weak, but existant, air
> >strike capability, then it is OK to ignore air defense? Good way to
> >get a bloody nose (see what happened when we had B-29's caught on
> >Saipan during WWII by that "remote" threat).
>
> It's a good question. In all seriousness, maybe it was simply easier
> to keep them there than return them. I've seen pictures of
> Davis-Monahan in this time frame, it was covered with little delta
> dots. There was no shortage of low-hour 102 airframes.

Then one wonders why we brought them back after their duty was
complete?

>
> Anyway, I did a quick search and apparently at least some of them were
> on alert sitting armed with the cockpits open. So someone expected
> some trouble and wanted them there. Apparently they also escorted some
> B-52 missions according to the SAC Museum.

Yep. And undoubtedly examined a few bogies which were experiencing
difficulties or were not sqawking proper IFF. The fact is that at
least three were lost to enemy fire (in the air-- a few more were
destroyed on the ground), so they had to be doing something.

Brooks

>
> http://www.dposs.com/t_jensen-dab-bush-account-1965.htm
>
>
> Scott Peterson

[Juvat]

Kevin Brooks posted:

>Be that as it may, what matter
>is that they were serving in a first line role through mid-73 with the
>AC, and still standing full alert even later with the ANG.

And again...

>July 73 for the AC (57th FIS), and October 76 with the ANG (a HIANG
>unit).

Please allow me to apologize in advance if you are offended by the
question...but what the heck is AC?

You posted that several times and I'm sure it means Active
C-something. I used AD for Active Duty or are slipping in some army
jargon on us AF types?

Juvat (curious minds want to know)

[Paul J. Adam]

In message >, Juvat
> writes
>Please allow me to apologize in advance if you are offended by the
>question...but what the heck is AC?

Air Component? (may be too modern, I'm getting regular purple
transfusions at the moment).

Active Component?

--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBox<at>jrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

[Ed Rasimus]

Juvat > wrote:

>Regarding the Berlin call-up (there's that expression again) there
>were bright spots (no aircraft lost in the deployment) and some less
>than stellar deals like three of the four provisional Fighter Wings
>BUSTING their ORIs, one actually busted twice. All deployed ANG
>tactical fighter (versus interceptor) squadrons were not currently
>qualified in conventional surface attack, but had mistaken qualified
>in nukes....

Sometimes stuff just jumps out at me and I've got to comment.

The "omigod, they busted an ORI" business, for example. In January of
'73, the 388th wing at Korat had an ORI. This, commencing just days
after the end of Linebacker II, when the Korat wing exclusively flew
all of the SAM-suppression, both day and night for all the effort.
When we flew all of the EB-66 counter-measures and where we had
successfully absorbed and integrated the three squadron wing of the
354th with A-7s.

The LG, Chief of Maintenance, Chief of supply and Munitions Squadron
CC were all off the base within 24 hours. I became exec to Jack Chain
*(later CINCSAC), as he moved from Wing DO to become LG and "fix"
things as well as respond to the IG report.

Was Korat not "operationally ready"? By whose warped interpretation?

Or, there was the "operationally ready" issue when after a bit of time
in the F-4, I asked if I qualified for the Operational Readiness
Medal, which took three or four years of OR status. I learned that my
time in the F-105 didn't count. I was never "operationally ready"!!!
Despite 110 combat missions, I was never OR, because I never had the
requisite checkride.

Something is occasionally rotten in Denmark and in the Inspector's
offices. It ain't always what the reports say that indicates the fact.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (ret)
***"When Thunder Rolled:
*** An F-105 Pilot Over N. Vietnam"
*** from Smithsonian Books
ISBN: 1588341038

[Kevin Brooks]

Juvat > wrote in message >...
> Kevin Brooks posted:
>
>
> >By deploying them into the theater of operations from their current
> >station would be one manner of "calling up" an AC unit.
>
> OK but that's not how I would interpret it when I was active duty.
> Different strokes...
>
> >I took it as a total force question.
>
> Again, fair enough...not how I read it.
>
> >Take away the "strictly"; as it was indeed used in ground attack
> >missions, albeit not very effectively...why put blinders on only in regards to the F-102's
> >history?
>
> Not trying to put blinders on it, I did post that Scott was incorrect
> on this score. He made an easy mistake.
>
> >Sorry to inform you of this, but this thread began to meander
> >(something that is rather common in Usenet) after Scott made his post
> >and tried to link it to an anti-GWB thrust. As others have commented,
> >the only folks who seem restricted to the ANG-only approach appear to
> >be you and Scott.
>
> OK, guilty as charged I was honestly trying to keep it on topic.
> Respectfully, I'm happy NOT to discuss GWB service record. Nuff said.
>
> >OK. So your earlier statement that no ANG units were deployed was
> >apparently misworded--I would assume that you mean no F-102 units were
> >activated?
>
> You are correct on that score, I fumble fingered the text when I left
> out F-102.
>
> >Which would be true enough--but that leaves one wondering
> >whether F-102 units would indeed have been activated if sufficient
> >*volunteers* had not stepped forward?
>
> A very small detail regarding F-102 pilots on active duty from Colonel
> (PhD) Gross' "Prelude to the Total Force..." page 150
>
> "Pilot shortages due to Southeast Asia operations increasingly
> affected the Air Guard. Small numbers of Air Guard F-102 were
> encouraged to volunteer for temporary active duty overseas. In July
> 1968, twenty-four of these pilots were on active duty at bases in
> Holland, Germany, Alaska, the Philippines, and Okinawa."

I believe what he is describing here was the Palace Alert program; I
had thought that was a SEA-only operation, but in reading some info
found on the web during this discussion I noted that the program sent
ANG pilots to various locales. Since it was/is impossible for the USAF
to activate individuals (other than IRR, which likely had few F-102
pilots at the time), the use of volunteers was required. Had those
volunteers not materialized, the only real solution (given that they
were apparently *required*, not just "nice to have along" assets)
would have been to activate an F-102 squadron (and this could easily
have been the case in 68, as you are well aware of the other
activations of both ANG and ARNG units that happened at this time).

>
>
> >Gee, I was unaware you were so picky... Good enough?
>
> The devil is in the details...
>
> >Well, the folks in Bien Hoa did not have to deploy into the theater of
> >operations after the Gulf resolution, now did they (see, this playing
> >with finite word definitions can work both ways)?
>
> You win...my sincere apologies for not staying on topic.
>
> > I did read where the 509th FIS claims to have been the first
> >unit to deploy into the RVN after the GT incident--is that wrong?
>
> My humble apologies again, since there were so many deployments to SEA
> from back in 1961 up until the GT incident, I honestly don't think a
> great deal about which outfit gets the "honor" of being first.
>
> >But it is germane to the fact that the USAF already regarded the ANG
> >as a real, honest to goodness go-to-war asset well before the entry of
> >GWB into ANG service.
>
> I encourage you to read Gross' book, it might get you to reconsider
> that remark.
>
> Regarding the Berlin call-up (there's that expression again) there
> were bright spots (no aircraft lost in the deployment) and some less
> than stellar deals like three of the four provisional Fighter Wings
> BUSTING their ORIs, one actually busted twice. All deployed ANG
> tactical fighter (versus interceptor) squadrons were not currently
> qualified in conventional surface attack, but had mistaken qualified
> in nukes....
>
> Anyway lots of great stuff in the book. Good and bad.

Not unusual. That the units had problems with the ORI is not a
surprise; it leaves wanting the more important question of how good
the pilots and their ground crews were (and yes, a unit, be it ground
or air, with superlative crews could still bust a major inspection,
for as you note "the devil is in the details"). As to the question of
nuclear versus conventional delivery training, the fault would have to
lie with the AC on that one--those units training plans had to be
approved ultimately by the AC side of the house, and if they were that
far off-track, then they had to have either (a) been given bad
training guidance, or (b) were given guidance without requisite
resourcing to allow accomplishment of the additional tasks.

I can recall one of my (Regular Army) tac officers in college, who had
entered active duty back in the mid-70's, commenting about the quality
of Guard units--he was amazed at the teamwork they displayed, if not
their (universal) military bearing. He laughed about his active duty
mortar platoon having been rather humiliated in a competition with an
ARNG mortar platoon that was training with them, said they may have
looked like old geezers who called each other by their first names,
but by golly could they hustle in setting up their tubes and putting
rounds downrange and on-target. And this was during one of the Guard's
worst periods (but then again, it was not such a swell time to be in
the "Volar" army, either).

>
> >No bad blood. But I get a bit tired when folks like Scott traipse out
> >the old "the Guard was a bunch of draftdodgers" mantra, ...
> >The first is a gross exaggeration born of enough folks making the
> >claim in the past, so it must be true, right?
>
> Again read Gross, he writes..."President Johnson's decision to rely on
> draftees rather than reservists raised questions about the expense and
> military utility or reserve programs. Many Americans were incensed
> that their sons and husbands were being drafted to risk death in
> Southeast Asia while men who received drill pay stayed home. The
> draft-exempt status of the National Guard, as well as other reserve
> programs, became a major incentive to volunteer for those programs."
>
> You can disagree with Gross, but I think he nailed it.

"Many Americans" also served in the Guard, or had friends or relatives
who did. More than a few thousand of them served in Vietnam (and yes,
there were even cases of Guardsmen volunteering for active duty during
the war), and ISTR something like seven to eight thousand ARNG troops
found themselves deploying to Vietnam during the 68-69 timeframe (a
few arty units, a lot of CS/CSS units, and that infantry brigade that
was broken down to provide replacements to the AC divisions already in
country; even, IIRC, Co D/51st Inf Rgt (Ranger), which was an Indiana
ARNG LRRP unit). I believe Mr. Gross is making a generalization that
does not serve the purposes of accuracy, either in the fact that
Guardsmen did indeed serve in Vietnam (and LBJ's mistake was not their
doing), or that there was some kind of universal groundswell of
identifying the Guard as a "draftdodgers haven".

>
> Finally...my apologies, reasonable men can disagree (still scratching
> my head over Dan's post) and with that you are welcome to the last
> word.

Hey, I have not seen you step beyond the bounds of amicable discussion
here, nor have I seen you really endorse all of Scott's comments, so
no problem.

Brooks

>
> Juvat

[Kevin Brooks]

Scott Peterson > wrote in message >...
> (Kevin Brooks) wrote:
>
> >No bad blood. But I get a bit tired when folks like Scott traipse out
> >the old "the Guard was a bunch of draftdodgers" mantra, not to mention
> >why he had to even enter into the "bash GWB" mode in the first place.
> >The first is a gross exaggeration born of enough folks making the
> >claim in the past, so it must be true, right? The second was just
> >another attempt at a backhanded swipe at a guy who performed military
> >service and flew combat aircraft in the defense of this nation-- a
> >much better alternative to refusing to serve at all, and then
> >attacking those who did, as many of his then-compatriots did, and none
> >of which he should be ashamed of, IMO.
>
> Interesting. I mentioned George W. in one post. You have in seven
> that I've counted so far, using me as the excuse. Of course, it does
> make a good excuse to avoid other questions.

I have not avoided squat.

>
> Seems like you have the problem here.

Nope, seems like you made the mistake of trying to insert an
irrelevant, and essentially incorrect, political point into a military
discussion. That more than a couple of folks have called you on it may
tell you something, if you have the common sense to consider it.

>
> As far as what the NG is/was, I guess it was just coincidence that as
> draft rates went up in the sixties, so did guard enlistments and
> waiting lists. ....and when they went down, so did......

What service did they dodge? Those ANG and ARNG folks who were sent to
Vietnam in 68-69; what kind of "dodging" was that? Or those AC vets
who went into the Guard--what were they "dodging"? How about the
members of that "champagne unit" you ridiculed who volunteered for
Palace Alert, were they "shirkers"? Are you beginning to see the
problem with making overly generalized characterizations of groups
like the Guard?

>
> Pure coincidence, I suppose.

FYI, *none* of the military services were *real* popular in the
aftermath of Vietnam (do you even know what a "VOLAR blanket" was?).
That the cessation of the draft hurt Guard recruiting efforts was
undeniable (as it also hampered AC efforts), but you are forgetting
that those who had joined the Guard because they thought it may (a big
*may* in the case of those who found themselves activated anyway) have
kept them from being drafted were not "dodging" the draft, but instead
were performing military service that exempted them from it. Not
unlike the folks who volunteered for the USN or USAF instead of
waiting for their draft notices--does that make those services "havens
for draft dodgers"?

Brooks
>
>
>
>
>
> Scott Peterson
>
>

[David Hartung]

"Mike Marron" > wrote in message
...

> Having said that and for those who are interested, my Dad was one
> of the first group of fighter pilots to operate supersonic fighters
> (e.g: Dueces) with operational FIS squadrons back in the mid to
> late '50's. A while back I shared with the NG a local newspaper
> story about him ejecting from an F-102 over Wisconsin (predictably,
> the nitpicker contingent here even picked apart THAT!) Anyway,
> he especially loved the Duece's maneuverability and often spoke
> fondly of the ol' bird. Seems Walt BJ who also flew the Duece felt
> exactly the same way about it.

Perchance was your dad flying out of Truax at Madison? My Dad was a Pilot
for the ANG squadron at Madison. When he joined the unit in about 1956 they
were flying F89s, in late 1964 Dad was TDY to Perrin in Texas to learn to
fly the 102, he flew the Deuce from then until his retirement from the unit
in 1972. This doesn't have much to do with the 102 in SEA discussion, please
accept my apologies.

[Mike Marron]

>"David Hartung" > wrote:
>>"Mike Marron" > wrote:

>>Having said that and for those who are interested, my Dad was one
>>of the first group of fighter pilots to operate supersonic fighters
>>(e.g: Dueces) with operational FIS squadrons back in the mid to
>>late '50's. A while back I shared with the NG a local newspaper
>>story about him ejecting from an F-102 over Wisconsin (predictably,
>>the nitpicker contingent here even picked apart THAT!) Anyway,
>>he especially loved the Duece's maneuverability and often spoke
>>fondly of the ol' bird. Seems Walt BJ who also flew the Duece felt
>>exactly the same way about it.

>Perchance was your dad flying out of Truax at Madison? My Dad was a Pilot
>for the ANG squadron at Madison. When he joined the unit in about 1956 they
>were flying F89s, in late 1964 Dad was TDY to Perrin in Texas to learn to
>fly the 102, he flew the Deuce from then until his retirement from the unit
>in 1972. This doesn't have much to do with the 102 in SEA discussion, please
>accept my apologies.

No apologies necessary. Yes, he was out of Truax when he bailed out
and he also checked out in the Duece at Parrin in the mid/late '50's.
Here's the post I sent to RAM last year:

***

My Dad punched out of an F-102A over Wisconsin in the late '50's.
Here's a few excerpts from local newspaper clippings:

Truax Jet Crashes; Pilot Safe

PORTAGE -- A Dagger F-102 jet from Truax Field crashed and exploded in
a wooded swamp north of here today, minutes after the pilot, 1st Lt.
Robert Marron, 29, jumped to safety.

The plane crashed about 10 miles from the spot where Marron's
parachute landed. The Air Force put up a security guard around
the wreckage this afternoon. The plane crashed in a sparsely populated
area on the Marquette-Columbia County line.

An Air Force spokesman at Truax Field said the plan suffered
"mechanical difficulties" during a two-plane flight. The spokesman
said Marron stayed with the plane until he had guided it away from
populous areas then bailed out.

The Air Force spokesman indicated that the plane was armed and
probably caused a tremendous explosion when it crashed into the swamp.


An eyewitness, Gary Stevens, was plowing about a quarter mile away,
ran across the swamp and arrived at the plane, "just as the pieces
stopped smouldering." He said that the plane exploded "like a small
atomic bomb" when it hit the ground and that when he reached the scene
"there wasn't a piece of the plane so big you couldn't hold it in your
hand." Stevens watched the pilot come down and said later that he
"just got there when the pilot walked over to me."

Truax Field immediately sent a team to the scene to disarm and
retrieve the armaments and to take wreckage back to Madison where
investigators will attempt to determine the cause of the fire.

Marron, a pilot, with the 325th fighter interceptor squadron, has been
stationed at Truax since he graduated from pilot school in 1957.

#30#

Of course, over a few beers, Dad explained his ejection story in much
more vivid detail.

One particular aspect of his story that stands out in my memory is
when the flabbergasted farmer ran over to him and asked, "Are
you OK!??!??"

His typical fighter-pilot manner of irreverence reply to the farmer
was, "Yeah...are *you* OK?!!?" ;-))

-Mike Marron
Clearwater, FL

***

-Mike Marron

[Kevin Brooks]

Juvat > wrote in message >...
> Kevin Brooks posted:
>
> >Be that as it may, what matter
> >is that they were serving in a first line role through mid-73 with the
> >AC, and still standing full alert even later with the ANG.
>
> And again...
>
> >July 73 for the AC (57th FIS), and October 76 with the ANG (a HIANG
> >unit).
>
> Please allow me to apologize in advance if you are offended by the
> question...but what the heck is AC?
>
> You posted that several times and I'm sure it means Active
> C-something. I used AD for Active Duty or are slipping in some army
> jargon on us AF types?
>
> Juvat (curious minds want to know)

Active Component, versus RC (Reserve Component). I believe the term is
commonly used in both the Army and Air Force these days. I believe it
can prevent some degree of confusion, because RC units frequently are
on "AD" of one type or another, as are their individual unit members.
A lot of ANG and ARNG units are on "active duty" right now in
Iraq--but they remain "reserve component" units.

Brooks

[Kevin Brooks]

Scott Peterson > wrote in message >...
> (Kevin Brooks) wrote:
>
> >Then why make the comment in this forum? It has to be either safety
> >through remoteness, or a case of a really bad
> >slip-of-the-tongue(typing finger)--I'd hope it was the latter.
> >
>
> Becaue it's not what I said.

Are you saying you did NOT say, "Guard units were regarded as draft
dodgers refuges. Specifically, the TxANG 147th fighter group was
considered a "champagne" unit"?

> It's your incorrect intrepretation that
> I'm responding to.

It is not that hard to interpret that quote.

>
> >>
> >> >Was no longer a "first line aircraft"? Uhmmm...care to guess when the
> >> >last F-102's left active duty?
> >>
> >> From what I have, the last ADC units in the Air Force were converted
> >> in 1973. It was a unit in Iceland. In the Pacific, it was 1971. In
> >> Alaska, it was 1970, Europe, 1970. Almost all ANG units were
> >> converted to other aircraft by 1975. The last units, the 195th in the
> >> Calif. ANG in 1975 and the 199th ANG in Hawaii, stopped flying them
> >> in Jan, 1977.
> >
> >Dates vary. The 57th FIS did indeed not give their last Deuces up
> >until July 73--meaning that by *any* definition they were in "first
> >line" service until then.
>
> Fine, then what is "any" definition. To me, the fact that they were
> still in use by an Air Force unit does not mean it was a first-line
> unit. Cynically, I'd think that there was a good reason that unit was
> chosen to be last, but I don't know what it was in this case.

Well gee, I guess the USAF routinely placed incapable aircraft at a
location that saw a significant chunk of the active intercepts of that
period? ISTR that the 57th FIS was frequently out and about
intercepting Soviet Bears, Bisons, etc.?

>
> >The actual last use by the ANG is a bit more
> >murky from what I have read--the 77 date is floated, but at least one
> >source I ran into indicated that the HIANG actually conducted its last
> >operational Deuce flight in October 76.
> >
> They claim 1/77, but who knows.

I believe that was the official date that they began operating the
F-4C (IIRC), but they had ceased being an operational F-102 element
back in October of 76 according to what I read at one of the various
websites; sounds reasonable to me.

>
> >
> >Oh....so combat is not a realistic possibility unless it has already
> >occurred? I believe you were insinuating that US interceptors of that
> >period faced no real danger, right? I am having a bit of a problem
> >here, since the previous statements have been snipped.
>
> Again, you are misquoting me me for your own benefit.

No, because there is no "quote" there; I ammerely trying to define
your position based upon your statements. It appeared to me (again,
the snippage makes it a bit difficult...) that you were saying that
because they saw no combat action in their CONUS ADC role, the
likelihood of their seeing combat in that role was not a realistic
possibility. A bit of a logic fault in that approach if you ask me.

This was a very
> touchy situation. There's always the possibility of accidents on both
> sides. But neither side ever did shoot at each other.

Along the CONUS border, you are correct. But that does not mean that
we should have, or could have, dismantled our air defenses at that
point in time. The F-102 was a significant player in that air defense
network up through the early 70's.

>
> I've always wondered what the orders given to the intercepting
> aircraft were in these cases. Given the very serous consequences of
> an incident, did they have permission to fire if fired on or would
> they have had to wait for a decision by their superiors.

I believe a former F-102 pilot (Walt?) lurks hereabouts and could
answer that question.

>
> >> It's sneering to say they were tied to a state?
> >
> >No, the sneering bit was your snide little "Guard as a haven for
> >draftdodgers" crap in the earlier paragraph.
>
> Well, as stated elsewhere, that's the way I remember it, but I really
> don't have time to look up why people joined back then.

You don't have to. Answer one question--do you think that all of the
Guardsmen who were already serving before the war heated up just
pulled pitch and left the Guard in 1965-68? How does your "draft
dodger" moniker fit them?

>
> >That you are one of the number who have never served in a Guard
> >unit--the meaning is rather clear if you actually read the wording.
> >
>
> I did read it several times. ....and no, I never served in a Guard
> unit.

I have, and in the company of a fair number of Vietnam veterans who
did not dodge diddly.

>
> >>
> >> Also, that's not how I understood it, but if you can expand on how the
> >> NG units were not tied to a state, I'd appreciate your explaining how
> >> it did work.
> >
> >Nice try, but nope, that is not what I said. I seem to recall that you
> >were mumbling about the Guard being much more firmly state controlled
> >during the Vietnam era (hard to get your wording right, as it has been
> >snipped and I lack the resolve to dig back into the old posts). I
> >believe that is a much exaggerated claim--please show me what area(s)
> >the state exerted real control over? In fact, the states really have
> >their "control" limited to administrative matters (and then only IAW
> >federal guidelines and significant federal supervision).
>
> Discussed in another post. And yes, the guard did report to and take
> orders from the governor of the state, unless the unit was
> federalized.

OFCS, then please tell us what that Governor actually controlled?
Training plans and inspections? Nope. Officer appointments? Not
without federal approval of each and every one. Equipment? Nope.
Organization? Nope again. Logistical support? No. Funding? Heck no. So
what was this tremendous control they exerted over their state Guard
units?

>
> > I am sure you
> >are harkening back to the sinister "GWB got appointed unfairly..."
> >stance,
>
> Among others.....

Gee, you cover your political sentiments so well...

>
> >That the demise was quick after it began is immaterial. That the AC
> >was replacing the F-102 with F-106's as quickly as possible is true,
> >and understandable. But from an operational standpoint, there is no
> >way you can claim that the F-102 was out-to-pasture while it was still
> >being flown by active duty squadrons (especially the 57th in Iceland,
> >where they ran a pretty regular Bear greeting service IIRC). The fact
> >is that while GWB was training and beginning his squadron service the
> >Deuce was not some has-been/never-going-nowhere player as you would
> >have us believe, but was still serving with both frontline units on
> >the AC side and was standing alert at various CONUS stations as well.
> >
>
> I disagree. The fact that it was still being flown by Air Force
> squadrons does not mean that it's regarded as a first-line aircraft.
> The Air Force bought 1,000 of the things and they were still a usable
> aircraft, just not the best.
>
> As far as the 57th continuing to fly them. I would speculate that that
> the 102 was a adequate aircraft for that location and that role even
> into the Seventies. The only hostile aircraft they would be expecting
> there would be the subsonic Bears....which are exactly what they were
> designed to intercept.

And just what the heck do you think your "first line" F-106's and
F-4C's would have been facing in CONUS? Reallly looong range high
performance Migs? le tme get this straight--since the Bear was the
primary threat, it was OK to have the F-102 serve in Iceland, but
those same F-102's were somehow outclassed when facing the *same*
threat here in CONUS??

>
> >Because while I am sure it may have happened (just as I am equally
> >sure that Senator Shmedlap could have influenced the Army's decision
> >to have his son serve as a clerk on a rather short tour--or maybe
> >Senator Gore?), I am reluctant to smear folks without darned good
> >evidence (which apparently in the case of GWB has never been given,
> >even after journalists from such anti-GWB forums as the Boston Herald
> >and the Washington Post (or Washington Pravda as we used to refer to
> >it) spent considerable effort trying to do just that), for one.
>
> I would suggest that you do a web search on GWB and National Guard. A
> number of sites have his entire military history on line. Give this
> an honest look to sites reporting all POV's and see if you still want
> to discuss it.

You are trolling without bait. GWB joined, he trained, and he flew.
Condemn that if you waqnt, but it ain't gonna carry much water with
most of us. Ever notice how the military, down at the
rubber-hits-the-road-level, responds to GWB when he appears with them?
Compare that to how they conducted themselves when his predecessor was
in office (you do recall the incident where that predecessor flew out
to a CVN (without the media whining that accompanied GWB's similar
trip) and was actually booed by his audience?). Case closed.

>
> >Second, when you take that tack, you run the risk of smearing a lot of
> >other good folks, especially when you use wording such as that that
> >you chose in your earlier post--there were a lot of folks serving in
> >the Guard before the war ever began, for example, and more than a few
> >vets joined Guard units upon their return.
>
> I never said all. But I think that suggesting that the NG's
> popularity during the Viet Nam years was not due to the draft borders
> on ridiculous.

And volunteering for service in another military branch or component
does not equate to "draft dodger". Or are you gonna fling that
accusation at all of those folks who joined the Navy, Coast Guard, or
Air Force because they preferred that to serving in the Army? My, what
a long list of "draft dodgers" you have created there...

Brooks

>
> >Not to mention the fact
> >that, despite LBJ/McNamara's stupid mistake of not using Guard and
> >Reserve forces earlier, there were a significant number of both ANG
> >and ARNG folks mobilized during the conflict, and a number of other
> >ANG crews and personnel performed support missions as well (to include
> >transport runs into the RVN, IIRC). And BTW, are you sure that ALL of
> >the Guard units had those waiting lists? Rather definitive and
> >inclusive statement you are making there...
>
> Individuals, not units.


>
> You're right, though. ALL is very inclusive. What guard units did
> not have long waiting lists at this time? It would be intersting to
> try to figure out why.....
>
>
> Scott Peterson

[Cub Driver]

>the ANG
>units are much more often activated for federal military service
>deployed.

The New Hampshire Air Guard was, as I recall, called up for a couple
weeks every December to fly packages to Vietnam. While this tour of
duty would no doubt be sneered at by the Good People who never in
their lives put on a uniform, it did serve a purpose.

In Vietnam in 1964, I fell into conversation with a C-123 pilot who'd
been stationed next door to me at (then) Pease AFB. He'd been flying
B-52s (I think) and was really really annoyed when he found himself
assigned to an aerial pickup truck in Vietnam. Some of his SAC mates,
he said, had gotten out of the service rather than suffer the
indignity. But he had concluded that flying for the air force was
better than not flying for the air force, so he took the assignment
and found himself enjoying it.

It ain't how you got there that matters, it's how the do the job once
you're there.


all the best -- Dan Ford
email: www.danford.net/letters.htm#9

see the Warbird's Forum at www.warbirdforum.com
and the Piper Cub Forum at www.pipercubforum.com

[David Hartung]

"Frank Vaughan" > wrote in message
...
> In message >, Ed
> Rasimus > wrote:
>
>
> >
> > Something is occasionally rotten in Denmark and in the Inspector's
> > offices. It ain't always what the reports say that indicates the fact.
> >
> >
> > Ed Rasimus
> > Fighter Pilot (ret)
> > ***"When Thunder Rolled:
> > *** An F-105 Pilot Over N. Vietnam"
> > *** from Smithsonian Books
> > ISBN: 1588341038
>
>
> When I was loading nukes on B-52's for SAC, we used to joke that
> we could predict with great accuracy when the next ORI would
> "happen".
>
> The following conditions had to be met:
>
> Payday was on a Friday.
> It was a 3-day weekend.
> There was a Saturday somewere in the middle of that weekend.
>
> Never failed!

My only SAC ORI experience was at Anderson, we had an advantage over other
Bases. The IG Team came through Hickam, we had at least eight hours notice
that they were on the way, and yes, the managed to show up on Friday! I had
been at Anderson about two weeks, and was not yet on a load crew, thus I
played gopher, and discovered that B52 generations can be an interesting
spectator sport.

[David Hartung]

"Mike Marron" > wrote in message
...
> >"David Hartung" > wrote:
> >>"Mike Marron" > wrote:
>
> >>Having said that and for those who are interested, my Dad was one
> >>of the first group of fighter pilots to operate supersonic fighters
> >>(e.g: Dueces) with operational FIS squadrons back in the mid to
> >>late '50's. A while back I shared with the NG a local newspaper
> >>story about him ejecting from an F-102 over Wisconsin (predictably,
> >>the nitpicker contingent here even picked apart THAT!) Anyway,
> >>he especially loved the Duece's maneuverability and often spoke
> >>fondly of the ol' bird. Seems Walt BJ who also flew the Duece felt
> >>exactly the same way about it.
>
> >Perchance was your dad flying out of Truax at Madison? My Dad was a Pilot
> >for the ANG squadron at Madison. When he joined the unit in about 1956
they
> >were flying F89s, in late 1964 Dad was TDY to Perrin in Texas to learn to
> >fly the 102, he flew the Deuce from then until his retirement from the
unit
> >in 1972. This doesn't have much to do with the 102 in SEA discussion,
please
> >accept my apologies.
>
> No apologies necessary. Yes, he was out of Truax when he bailed out
> and he also checked out in the Duece at Parrin in the mid/late '50's.
> Here's the post I sent to RAM last year:
>
> ***
>
> My Dad punched out of an F-102A over Wisconsin in the late '50's.
> Here's a few excerpts from local newspaper clippings:
>
> Truax Jet Crashes; Pilot Safe
>
> PORTAGE -- A Dagger F-102 jet from Truax Field crashed and exploded in
> a wooded swamp north of here today, minutes after the pilot, 1st Lt.
> Robert Marron, 29, jumped to safety.
>
> The plane crashed about 10 miles from the spot where Marron's
> parachute landed. The Air Force put up a security guard around
> the wreckage this afternoon. The plane crashed in a sparsely populated
> area on the Marquette-Columbia County line.
>
> An Air Force spokesman at Truax Field said the plan suffered
> "mechanical difficulties" during a two-plane flight. The spokesman
> said Marron stayed with the plane until he had guided it away from
> populous areas then bailed out.
>
> The Air Force spokesman indicated that the plane was armed and
> probably caused a tremendous explosion when it crashed into the swamp.
>
>
> An eyewitness, Gary Stevens, was plowing about a quarter mile away,
> ran across the swamp and arrived at the plane, "just as the pieces
> stopped smouldering." He said that the plane exploded "like a small
> atomic bomb" when it hit the ground and that when he reached the scene
> "there wasn't a piece of the plane so big you couldn't hold it in your
> hand." Stevens watched the pilot come down and said later that he
> "just got there when the pilot walked over to me."
>
> Truax Field immediately sent a team to the scene to disarm and
> retrieve the armaments and to take wreckage back to Madison where
> investigators will attempt to determine the cause of the fire.
>
> Marron, a pilot, with the 325th fighter interceptor squadron, has been
> stationed at Truax since he graduated from pilot school in 1957.
>
> #30#
>
> Of course, over a few beers, Dad explained his ejection story in much
> more vivid detail.
>
> One particular aspect of his story that stands out in my memory is
> when the flabbergasted farmer ran over to him and asked, "Are
> you OK!??!??"
>
> His typical fighter-pilot manner of irreverence reply to the farmer
> was, "Yeah...are *you* OK?!!?" ;-))
>
> -Mike Marron
> Clearwater, FL

Thanks for the info, since I was born in 1954, my memories of the late
fifties to not include much ANG stuff, I do remember that the Regular AF
flew out of Truax, and that when they moved out, the ANG took over their
facilities. I also seem to recall that after the Deuce unit left Madoson,
there was a detachment of 101s there for a while.

[Peter Stickney]

In article >,
Cub Driver > writes:
>
>>the ANG
>>units are much more often activated for federal military service
>>deployed.
>
> The New Hampshire Air Guard was, as I recall, called up for a couple
> weeks every December to fly packages to Vietnam. While this tour of
> duty would no doubt be sneered at by the Good People who never in
> their lives put on a uniform, it did serve a purpose.

I was going to bring this one up, and you beat me to it.
Actually, the 157th ATG/MAG (Air Transport Group/Military Airlift
Group _was_ flying missions into Vietnam, Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia
from about 1963 on. They were flying C-97s, and later, C-124s, out
of Grenier Field (MHT), and, later, Pease AFB. They weren't called
up, though. They voluntarily placed the unit into the MATS/MAC
schedule to fly "for real" airlift missions. Other ANG and Air Force
Reserve airlifters did the same thing. ANG crews also ended up doing
"Detached Duty" in all manner of, shall we say, "Interesting Places".
Fer example, most of the aircraft and crews used by Balair, the
Inernational Red Cross, and Joint Church Aid for relief flights into
Biafra came from various Air National Guard units, the NH ANG among
them. This was ugly, intense duty, and as dangerous as an airlifter
could get. (the Kenyan MiGs, which were active and shot down several
relief aircraft, were the least of their problems.)


--
Pete Stickney
A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many
bad measures. -- Daniel Webster

[Walt BJ]

Sheesh! What a bunch of wasted electrons over a hasty ill-considered
remark.
'Nuf said on that.
ROE - to make it sweet and simple we were cleared to fire without
seeking permission on 'a hostile aircraft committing a hostile act'.
Both were defined but it boiled down to any 'not clearly marked or
recognized friendly aircraft'
doing a bad thing - firing on the interceptor, releasing weapons,
paratroops, attacking a vessel not marked as an enemy (I am
paraphrasing here as I forgot the exact wording), that sort of thing.
So we had some latitude - more than in SEA!
FWIW anybody who straps on a single seat jet and takes off has guts. I
well remember my first solo in the T33 after learning how to fly in
props up to the T28 (270 knots in a dive was red line - 505 level in
the T-bird) I ran it up, looked down the runway, asked myself 'do I
really want to do this?' The answer was 'hell, yes!' and off I went.
That was (gulp) 49 years ago.
FWIW here goes on the Deuce. Even now - at night, mind you - the Deuce
would be a serious opponent. It had excellent radar, excellent IR,
missiles that worked if you fired all 6 at once ( I actually killed a
Firebee with a single obsolete radar Falcon despite its warhead being
dearmed) and was a very accurate - as accurate as strafing!) rocket
launcher in air to ground. Of course 24 later 12 2.75s won't do much
but we blew an old Navy destroyer (Patricia target) to pieces with
live (!) 2.75s. 40 sorties with 12 RX apiece left the poor thing very
much the worse for wear - bridge and deck houses flattened.
As for range a Deuce with two tanks is equal to an F4 with 3 and a lot
better handling and faster cruise for 1300 nautical with IFR reserves
(approach plus 20 minutes). You start at 35,000 and .87. Clean, you go
to 42-45+ and .92, and you can go 900 miles and still have IFR reserve
fuel. When the Deuce was new it was good for 1.3M at 35-38000
(tropopause). Then the engines got tired and 1.2 was about it. But it
could fly level at 59000 in AB - subsonic. It could snap-up and launch
on a U2 above 60. (Never did let us do it for real).
But in daylight - that 60 degree blind cone behind one made dayight
air to air dicey and something like a Thach weave mandatory - which of
course ADC never trained in. No RHAW gear. No armor at all. Wet wings,
a candidate for battle damage. No (sob!) gun. It did have an air to
air rocket sight supposed to be good up to 3G - I never got to try it
on a rag, though. That was incorporated for a radar-inop curve of
pursuit shot at a bomber. I guess you could say that beats ramming him
which was the last option we had.
Very sweet handling, very difficult to depart (coarse rudder at 95
KIAS will get you in a spin - recovery is standard, simple, quick),
fully controllable down to 110-115 KIAS, capable of one great bat turn
and then no more energy.
Flown delicately it would out maneuver a navy F4D Skyray at altitude
quite nicely. But, like I said, at night . . . it could lurk and
listen to GCI "bogey dope" (range and bearing to target, target
heading altitude and actions) and never say a word, never turn the
radar on, intercept a bogey using IRSTS and close to missile range and
then 3 seconds before fire 'radar on, lock on, shoot' 6 fully guided
missiles from a low six. How did we range in IR? get level, drop 3000
feet, close to a 30 angle-up on the bogie, you're a mile behind and in
range, get set and shoot. But it was a bomber-killer and with a
GAR11/AIM26 a good bomb-killer. (The bomber was collateral damage.)
Nice airplane. A couple serious design goofs: vision, no fuselage fuel
tank to feed the engine from a central point, no Sidewinder mounts,
wrong engine (it was supposed to get a 30K engine, Gyron or Olympus,
but design problems with them resulted in the J57 at 16K). One other
point - it was made of 7075ST which was NOT alclad hence they had to
be painted - more weight and drag, and airframe problems from
intergranular corrosion late in life. Case in point - I have heard the
Okinawa 102s were scrapped there rather than brought back to the
States because of the results of the vicious sea-salt environment
there...any body know about this?
Cheers - Walt BJ

[Alan Minyard]

On Tue, 09 Sep 2003 19:35:11 GMT, Juvat >
wrote:

>Kevin Brooks posted:
>
>>Be that as it may, what matter
>>is that they were serving in a first line role through mid-73 with the
>>AC, and still standing full alert even later with the ANG.
>
>And again...
>
>>July 73 for the AC (57th FIS), and October 76 with the ANG (a HIANG
>>unit).
>
>Please allow me to apologize in advance if you are offended by the
>question...but what the heck is AC?
>
>You posted that several times and I'm sure it means Active
>C-something. I used AD for Active Duty or are slipping in some army
>jargon on us AF types?
>
>Juvat (curious minds want to know)

Aircraft

Al Minyard

[Alan Minyard]

On 9 Sep 2003 19:50:02 -0700, (Kevin Brooks)
wrote:

>Juvat > wrote in message >...
>> Kevin Brooks posted:
>>
>> >Be that as it may, what matter
>> >is that they were serving in a first line role through mid-73 with the
>> >AC, and still standing full alert even later with the ANG.
>>
>> And again...
>>
>> >July 73 for the AC (57th FIS), and October 76 with the ANG (a HIANG
>> >unit).
>>
>> Please allow me to apologize in advance if you are offended by the
>> question...but what the heck is AC?
>>
>> You posted that several times and I'm sure it means Active
>> C-something. I used AD for Active Duty or are slipping in some army
>> jargon on us AF types?
>>
>> Juvat (curious minds want to know)
>
>Active Component, versus RC (Reserve Component). I believe the term is
>commonly used in both the Army and Air Force these days. I believe it
>can prevent some degree of confusion, because RC units frequently are
>on "AD" of one type or another, as are their individual unit members.
>A lot of ANG and ARNG units are on "active duty" right now in
>Iraq--but they remain "reserve component" units.
>
>Brooks

Ahh, that is what I get for being a old Navy type, thought you meant
aircraft (that was what "ac" meant in my day). Thanks for setting me
straight. ;-)

Al Minyard

[Harry Andreas]

In article >, Jim
Thomas > wrote:

> F-102s were stationed in Thailand, in 1967, primarily as weather recon
> aircraft.
>
> At one point in 1967, (I think around September) there was a Search and
> Rescue (SAR) effort near Route 9 (in N. Vietnam, just east of the border
> with Laos). I was Sandy lead for this mission. Several SAMs were fired;
> turns out, all or most were fired at the F-102s, our MIG cap, not at us.
>
> None hit (and the downed pilot was rescued). Later on, I talked to some
> of the F-102 pilots. This was the high point of their tour: they were
> shot at.
>
> Seems to me that the worst thing that can happen to a warrior is not to
> be allowed to take part. There were lots of warriors in the F-102 bunch.

Jim,
wondering about your thoughts on RCS of the F-102 vs the A-1's?
(Assuming you were in A-1's)

Did they get shot at because of that big wing/big RCS, or because of
operating altitude?

regards

--
Harry Andreas
Engineering raconteur

[Juvat]

Kevin Brooks posted:

>Active Component, versus RC (Reserve Component). I believe the term is
>commonly used in both the Army and Air Force these days.

As opposed to Guard pukes, and Reserve pukes...the circle of AF types
I routinely communicate with didn't get the memo.

>I believe it can prevent some degree of confusion,

And yet...

>A lot of ANG and ARNG units are on "active duty" right now in
>Iraq--but they remain "reserve component" units.

My fault for not applying current nomenclature for historical
purposes.

[Guy Alcala]

Ed Rasimus wrote:

> Juvat > wrote:
>
> >Ed Rasimus posted:

<snip>

> >>If the 366th moved out of Danang in July of '72 at the peak of
> >>Linebacker, it's a surprise to me.
> >
> >Ummm, respectfully are you being sarcastic with the last part? See
> >Thompson page 223...talks about the movement of the 366th from Da Nang
> >to Takhli in June of 1972.
> >
> >So I ask the question again, sincerely, who do we believe? And why am
> >I doing all the citations/research?
>
> OK, I knew that Tahkli got the 4th deployment for S-J when the base
> was re-activated. Didn't realize that the Gunfighters moved there as
> well.

Squadrons of the 366th moved from DaNang, as stated. Offhand I don't
remember if they remained part of the 366th at first, or were put under some
other wing's control. Walt BJ can say, as he commanded one of the 366th's
squadrons (390th IIRR) at the time, and has mentioned the move in the past.

> And, you're doing the research because you love it!

Speaking for myself, it's more often because I hate having to depend on
filktered, inaccurate accounts and urban legends, when the truth can be so
much more interesting (if less hyperbolic). But sometimes you come across a
nugget or vein of real gold in research, and you say "Ah Ha!, why they did
what they did now makes sense," and that is very satisfying.

Guy

[David Hartung]

"Walt BJ" > wrote in message
om...

> intergranular corrosion late in life. Case in point - I have heard the
> Okinawa 102s were scrapped there rather than brought back to the
> States because of the results of the vicious sea-salt environment
> there...any body know about this?

Anecdotal only, a guy I worked with on Guam was on Okinawa when the Deuce
came off alert, if I remember the story correctly, they had put all the jets
on alert for some big international emergency(USS Pueblo?), when the order
came to download, the planes were downloaded and cut up.

[Jim Thomas]

In this case, I think the F-102s were targets because they were high. We
A1s and Jollys were at a couple thousand feet, as I recall.

Jim Thomas

Harry Andreas wrote:
> In article >, Jim
> Thomas > wrote:
>
>
>>F-102s were stationed in Thailand, in 1967, primarily as weather recon
>>aircraft.
>>
>>At one point in 1967, (I think around September) there was a Search and
>>Rescue (SAR) effort near Route 9 (in N. Vietnam, just east of the border
>>with Laos). I was Sandy lead for this mission. Several SAMs were fired;
>>turns out, all or most were fired at the F-102s, our MIG cap, not at us.
>>
>>None hit (and the downed pilot was rescued). Later on, I talked to some
>>of the F-102 pilots. This was the high point of their tour: they were
>>shot at.
>>
>>Seems to me that the worst thing that can happen to a warrior is not to
>>be allowed to take part. There were lots of warriors in the F-102 bunch.
>
>
> Jim,
> wondering about your thoughts on RCS of the F-102 vs the A-1's?
> (Assuming you were in A-1's)
>
> Did they get shot at because of that big wing/big RCS, or because of
> operating altitude?
>
> regards
>

[edctx]

"Scott Peterson" wrote in message
...
"Tarver Engineering" wrote:

I want this for a political newsgroup.

thanks

I don't think any were. This plane was strictly an interceptor for
shooting down bombers. No guns, no ground attack capability.
Absolutely no use in Viet Nam.

Adding a political comment, when George W. joined the Texas ANG, he
was assigned to an F-102 unit. Some of the comments about that were
that it was a very safe unit to join as there was no possibility of
overseas assignment.

Scott Peterson

F-102s did indeed serve in SEA and early on too. The 509FIS sent F-102s to
Tan Son Nhut on 21 March 1962 under Project "Water Glass" and they remained
under Project "Candy Machine". In addition to Tan Son Nhut tey were
stationed at Bien Hoa. Some of these deployments were from the unit at
Clark. The F-102s also served at Don Muang from 1961-1964. I think they
were also at Udorn at one time (but maybe not...it was a long time ago).
Since so many F-102 were ANG service in SEA was opened to them on an
individual basis under Project "Palace Alert".

I did not see the original message (I don't see Tarver messages unless
quoted) so I don't know whose ox I'm goring.

Tex Houston

The reason the 509th was sent to Ton Son Nhut was that low level tracks were observed flying over laos and Cambodia to reach the delta areas. These tracks were only on moonlit nights and were believed to be dropping supplies to rebel forces. Initially only two seat aircraft were deployed because the targets were slow and low and it was thought that it would be too hazardous for one man to fly the aircraft and operate the radar system flying at low altitudes at night.

Single seat fighters were also used in Waterglass in an attempt to keep viet cong awake during the day. From very high altitude the F1-2 would enter a steep supersonic dive at a specific location. By pulling out about 25,000' a loud sonic boom woould be heard on the ground and the aircraft would not be seen or heard. It was hoped that this would be interpreted as artillery fire and disrupt the sleeping habits of the enemy.

As for being a safe airplane I can tell you from personal experience that it is no fun to eject from one, especially when over water.

Ed Clark

[bjholt]

I want this for a political newsgroup.

thanks

I was a member of the initial Operation Waterglass team in 1962. It was a highly classified mission and used F102's from several places. I don't know if all the Waterglass details have been declassified, so will not be specific regarding the home bases of the aircraft and personnel.

[bjholt]

Hi John

Good timing. I'm presently working on a journal article about F-102 ops
in Viet Nam and Thailand code named 'Water Glass' and 'Candy Time'.

The following active duty units operated the Convair the F-102A and
TF-102's in Viet Nam and Thailand:

64th FIS/405th FW
82nd FIS/51st FW
509th FIS/405th FW

Cheers...Chris

I am very interested in reading your article. I participated in Operation Waterglass in 1962 and know quite a bit about it and the F102 in general.