Aircrew casualities

[ArtKramr]

The common wisdom in WW II was that tail gunners and bombardiers suffered the
highest casualties among bomber aircrews. Anyone have any actual statistics on
aircrew casualties by position in USAAC bombers?



Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[Erik Plagen]

"ArtKramr" <wrote in message
> The common wisdom in WW II was that tail gunners and bombardiers suffered
the
> highest casualties among bomber aircrews. Anyone have any actual
statistics on
> aircrew casualties by position in USAAC bombers?


'COMMON WISDOM" OF WHOM?

Luftwaffe statistics-

Pilots 85%
Waist Gunners-8%
Dorsal und Ventral Gunners- 3%
Upper turret Gunners-2%
Navigators- 1 1/2%
Nose Gunners/Bomb Togglers.05%

Schematische Kriegsgliederung, RH 2. Has also been published in Kurt
Mehner's Geheime Tagesberichte der OKW, 12 vols.

Erik

[Guy Alcala]

ArtKramr wrote:

> The common wisdom in WW II was that tail gunners and bombardiers suffered the
> highest casualties among bomber aircrews. Anyone have any actual statistics on
> aircrew casualties by position in USAAC bombers?

I wish you had asked that a few weeks ago, as I had a source here which gave the
stats for B-17s. AFAIR, pilots were top of the list (because they had to stay
while everyone else got out), with ball turret gunners about equal in loss rate.
Bombardiers were actually among the best in survival rate if not the best (I think
the navs were the best), because many of the attacks were from the rear, and
because they had an escape hatch in their compartment that was easy to get to.

Guy

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: Aircrew casualities
>From: Guy Alcala
>Date: 9/16/03 3:21 PM Pacific Daylight Time
>Message-id: >
>
>ArtKramr wrote:
>
>> The common wisdom in WW II was that tail gunners and bombardiers suffered
>the
>> highest casualties among bomber aircrews. Anyone have any actual statistics
>on
>> aircrew casualties by position in USAAC bombers?
>
>I wish you had asked that a few weeks ago, as I had a source here which gave
>the
>stats for B-17s. AFAIR, pilots were top of the list (because they had to
>stay
>while everyone else got out), with ball turret gunners about equal in loss
>rate.
>Bombardiers were actually among the best in survival rate if not the best (I
>think
>the navs were the best), because many of the attacks were from the rear, and
>because they had an escape hatch in their compartment that was easy to get
>to.
>
>Guy
>

In the B-26 we had no escape hatch at all. The bombardier had along path to
creawl in front of the copilot then out the bombay. A long trip indeed. Maybe
we should break down the losses by aircraft type rather than lumping all
bombers together

Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: Aircrew casualities
>From: "Erik Plagen"
>Date: 9/16/03 11:36 AM Pacific Daylight Time
>Message-id: >

>ArtKramr" <wrote in message
>> The common wisdom in WW II was that tail gunners and bombardiers suffered
>the
>> highest casualties among bomber aircrews. Anyone have any actual
>statistics on
>> aircrew casualties by position in USAAC bombers?

> 'COMMON WISDOM" OF WHOM?

Those of us who were there.


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[Michael Williamson]

Erik Plagen wrote:
> "ArtKramr" <wrote in message
>
>>The common wisdom in WW II was that tail gunners and bombardiers suffered
>
> the
>
>>highest casualties among bomber aircrews. Anyone have any actual
>
> statistics on
>
>>aircrew casualties by position in USAAC bombers?
>
>
>
> 'COMMON WISDOM" OF WHOM?
>
> Luftwaffe statistics-
>
> Pilots 85%
> Waist Gunners-8%
> Dorsal und Ventral Gunners- 3%
> Upper turret Gunners-2%
> Navigators- 1 1/2%
> Nose Gunners/Bomb Togglers.05%
>
> Schematische Kriegsgliederung, RH 2. Has also been published in Kurt
> Mehner's Geheime Tagesberichte der OKW, 12 vols.
>
> Erik
>
>
Overall statistics may or may not be all that helpful- what were
the numbers of (for instance) waist gunners flying with the Luftwaffe,
and what were their casualty rates compared to the other crew positions
in the same aircraft? Different casualty rates for different aircraft,
along with the total numbers of each type involved in the overall
statistics, make it difficult to come up with a single, overall answer.

Mike

[[email protected]]

(ArtKramr) wrote:

>>Bombardiers were actually among the best in survival rate if not the best (I
>>think
>>the navs were the best), because many of the attacks were from the rear, and
>>because they had an escape hatch in their compartment that was easy to get
>>to.
>>
>>Guy
>>
>
>In the B-26 we had no escape hatch at all. The bombardier had along path to
>creawl in front of the copilot then out the bombay. A long trip indeed. Maybe
>we should break down the losses by aircraft type rather than lumping all
>bombers together
>
>Arthur Kramer

Lancasters were good to Bombardiers (and nose gunners), they had
their own good sized hatch in the bottom of the nose compartment,
matter of fact the Pilot and Engineer used that hatch too.
--

-Gord.

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: Aircrew casualities
>From: Michael Williamson
>Date: 9/16/03 8:11 PM Pacific Daylight Time
>Message-id: >
>
>Erik Plagen wrote:
>> "ArtKramr" <wrote in message
>>
>>>The common wisdom in WW II was that tail gunners and bombardiers suffered
>>
>> the
>>
>>>highest casualties among bomber aircrews. Anyone have any actual
>>
>> statistics on
>>
>>>aircrew casualties by position in USAAC bombers?
>>
>>
>>
>> 'COMMON WISDOM" OF WHOM?
>>
>> Luftwaffe statistics-
>>
>> Pilots 85%
>> Waist Gunners-8%
>> Dorsal und Ventral Gunners- 3%
>> Upper turret Gunners-2%
>> Navigators- 1 1/2%
>> Nose Gunners/Bomb Togglers.05%
>>
>> Schematische Kriegsgliederung, RH 2. Has also been published in Kurt
>> Mehner's Geheime Tagesberichte der OKW, 12 vols.
>>
>> Erik
>>
>>
> Overall statistics may or may not be all that helpful- what were
>the numbers of (for instance) waist gunners flying with the Luftwaffe,
>and what were their casualty rates compared to the other crew positions
>in the same aircraft? Different casualty rates for different aircraft,
>along with the total numbers of each type involved in the overall
>statistics, make it difficult to come up with a single, overall answer.
>
>Mike
>

I don't think there is a single answer. Some postions in some planes are very
diffciult to get out of. The nose of a B-26 for example. But the A-26 Invader
had a trap door under the nose. One twist and you were falling through space.

Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[Guy Alcala]

" wrote:

> (ArtKramr) wrote:
>
> >>Bombardiers were actually among the best in survival rate if not the best (I
> >>think
> >>the navs were the best), because many of the attacks were from the rear, and
> >>because they had an escape hatch in their compartment that was easy to get
> >>to.
> >>
> >>Guy
> >>
> >
> >In the B-26 we had no escape hatch at all. The bombardier had along path to
> >creawl in front of the copilot then out the bombay. A long trip indeed. Maybe
> >we should break down the losses by aircraft type rather than lumping all
> >bombers together
> >
> >Arthur Kramer
>
> Lancasters were good to Bombardiers (and nose gunners), they had
> their own good sized hatch in the bottom of the nose compartment,
> matter of fact the Pilot and Engineer used that hatch too.

OTOH, the survival rate was considerably worse than for Halifax crews, who had
better placed escape hatches. The survival rate of either was pretty dismal at
night -- IIRR, Middlebrook stated an 86% fatality rate for Lanc crews when shot
down, with the Halifax being slightly better. Crew fatality rates by U.S. heavies
operating by day were much better, about the inverse of the RAF night bombers,
roughly 15%. You could probably chalk that up to more armor, being able to see the
enemy approach so more defensive fire (and thus less effective fire from the
fighters, due to evasive action and longer firing ranges), and in the last resort,
it being much easier to find and put on parachutes and then locate the exits by
day. It would be interesting to see if B-17s and B-24s that operated with RAF 100
Group by night, had similar crew survival rates as the RAF heavies doing the same
missions.

Guy

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: Aircrew casualities
>From: "Gord Beaman" )
>Date: 9/16/03 8:12 PM Pacific Daylight Time
>Message-id: >
>
(ArtKramr) wrote:
>
>>>Bombardiers were actually among the best in survival rate if not the best
>(I
>>>think
>>>the navs were the best), because many of the attacks were from the rear,
>and
>>>because they had an escape hatch in their compartment that was easy to get
>>>to.
>>>
>>>Guy
>>>
>>
>>In the B-26 we had no escape hatch at all. The bombardier had along path to
>>creawl in front of the copilot then out the bombay. A long trip indeed.
>Maybe
>>we should break down the losses by aircraft type rather than lumping all
>>bombers together
>>
>>Arthur Kramer
>
>Lancasters were good to Bombardiers (and nose gunners), they had
>their own good sized hatch in the bottom of the nose compartment,
>matter of fact the Pilot and Engineer used that hatch too.
>--
>
>-Gord.


They fixed the B-26 problem for bombardiers when they built the A-26 Invader. I
sat a on a trap door. One twist of the handle and you were out. It was nice to
leave the B's for the A's just for that escape hatch..



Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[Guy Alcala]

ArtKramr wrote:

> >Subject: Re: Aircrew casualities

<snip>

> In the B-26 we had no escape hatch at all. The bombardier had along path to
> creawl in front of the copilot then out the bombay. A long trip indeed. Maybe
> we should break down the losses by aircraft type rather than lumping all
> bombers together

You have to do that at a minimum, and also you may have to modify things by
mission type, theater etc. A B-25 strafer in the PTO is likely to have very a
different crew casualty breakdown than the same a/c doing medium altitude bombing
in the MTO.

Guy

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: Aircrew casualities
>From: Guy Alcala
>Date: 9/16/03 9:09 PM Pacific Daylight Time
>Message-id: >

>e (and thus less effective fire from the
>fighters, due to evasive action and longer firing ranges), and in the last
>resort,
>it being much easier to find and put on parachutes and then locate the

Interesting.We never took evasive action against fighters.we jus tightened our
formation, stayed on course and returned their fire. We did take evasive action
against flak. Find their parachutes??? We wore them from the ground up.Y'mean
the Brits didn't??? If you got hit and didn't have your chute on it was often
too late to put it on.


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[Mike Marron]

(ArtKramr) wrote:

>Interesting.We never took evasive action against fighters.we jus tightened our
>formation, stayed on course and returned their fire. We did take evasive action
>against flak. Find their parachutes??? We wore them from the ground up.Y'mean
>the Brits didn't??? If you got hit and didn't have your chute on it was often
>too late to put it on.

Would you shoot the Jerry *******s in their chutes?

-Mike (I damn sure would've) Marron

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: Aircrew casualities
>From: Mike Marron
>Date: 9/17/03 5:34 AM Pacific Daylight Time
>Message-id: >
>
(ArtKramr) wrote:
>
>>Interesting.We never took evasive action against fighters.we jus tightened
>our
>>formation, stayed on course and returned their fire. We did take evasive
>action
>>against flak. Find their parachutes??? We wore them from the ground
>up.Y'mean
>>the Brits didn't??? If you got hit and didn't have your chute on it was
>often
>>too late to put it on.
>
>Would you shoot the Jerry *******s in their chutes?
>
>-Mike (I damn sure would've) Marron
>
>
>
>
No Mike, I don't think; I would. I have strafed and when I saw woman or
children I lifted my thumbs off the triggers. See "Strafing as if in a dream".
on my website. But I don't think you can make that decision as to whether you
would kill a man in a chute until he is right in front of you.. When you are
actually there and see the man, then we'll see. It isn't easy to kill a man in
cold blood.

Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[[email protected]]

Mike Marron > wrote:

>
>Would you shoot the Jerry *******s in their chutes?
>
>-Mike (I damn sure would've) Marron
>
>
I'm sure that the Allies thought that that idea was very
counterproductive because of the 'tit for tat' syndrome.

There'd be many more Allied 'chutists' than German chutists so
it's not a great habit to promote.

-Gord (I damned sure wouldn't) Beaman

[Mike Marron]

> (ArtKramr) wrote:
>>Mike Marron wrote:

>>Would you shoot the Jerry *******s in their chutes?

>>-Mike (I damn sure would've) Marron

>No Mike, I don't think; I would. I have strafed and when I saw woman or
>children I lifted my thumbs off the triggers. See "Strafing as if in a dream".
>on my website. But I don't think you can make that decision as to whether you
>would kill a man in a chute until he is right in front of you.. When you are
>actually there and see the man, then we'll see. It isn't easy to kill a man in
>cold blood.

Just reflecting on the many talks over a cold brew I've had with my
Dad (who, as you know, was a warrior). It wasn't the airplane he was
after, it was the SOB_flying_the_plane.

-Mike Marron

[Mike Marron]

>"Gord Beaman" ) wrote:
>>Mike Marron > wrote:

>>Would you shoot the Jerry *******s in their chutes?

>>-Mike (I damn sure would've) Marron

>I'm sure that the Allies thought that that idea was very
>counterproductive because of the 'tit for tat' syndrome.

>There'd be many more Allied 'chutists' than German chutists so
>it's not a great habit to promote.

>-Gord (I damned sure wouldn't) Beaman

Haven't you heard all the stories of the Luftwaffe strafing downed
allied pilots coming down their chutes or seen those old, grainy
B&W clips of allied forces being slaughtered in their chutes by the
Germans?

-Mike Marron

[[email protected]]

Mike Marron > wrote:

>
>Haven't you heard all the stories of the Luftwaffe strafing downed
>allied pilots coming down their chutes or seen those old, grainy
>B&W clips of allied forces being slaughtered in their chutes by the
>Germans?
>
>-Mike Marron
>
>
Of course but ISTR that it was looked upon as a bad thing to do
(of course) and was discouraged heavily for the reason that I
mentioned. I could of course be wrong, not having BT&DT.

Perhaps Art could give us his impressions?. What did they tell
you Art?.
--

-Gord.

[[email protected]]

Mike Marron > wrote:

>> (ArtKramr) wrote:
>>>Mike Marron wrote:
>
>>>Would you shoot the Jerry *******s in their chutes?
>
>>>-Mike (I damn sure would've) Marron
>
>>No Mike, I don't think; I would. I have strafed and when I saw woman or
>>children I lifted my thumbs off the triggers. See "Strafing as if in a dream".
>>on my website. But I don't think you can make that decision as to whether you
>>would kill a man in a chute until he is right in front of you.. When you are
>>actually there and see the man, then we'll see. It isn't easy to kill a man in
>>cold blood.
>
>Just reflecting on the many talks over a cold brew I've had with my
>Dad (who, as you know, was a warrior). It wasn't the airplane he was
>after, it was the SOB_flying_the_plane.
>
>-Mike Marron

You've apparently never heard the admonition "Get him on the rise
sir, get him on the rise", right?
--

-Gord.

[Erik Plagen]

"Mike Marron" <> wrote in message
> >"Gord Beaman" (wrote:
> >>Mike Marron <wrote:
>
> >>Would you shoot the Jerry *******s in their chutes?
>
> >>-Mike (I damn sure would've) Marron
>
> >I'm sure that the Allies thought that that idea was very
> >counterproductive because of the 'tit for tat' syndrome.
> Haven't you heard all the stories of the Luftwaffe strafing downed
> allied pilots coming down their chutes >
> -Mike Marron
>
That;s all they were- "stories" or fairy tales!

We never tried to shoot down Crew Members in their chutes!

You are thinking of the Japanese.

Erik

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: Aircrew casualities
>From: "Gord Beaman" )
>Date: 9/17/03 11:50 AM Pacific Daylight Time
>Message-id: >
>
>Mike Marron > wrote:
>
>>
>>Haven't you heard all the stories of the Luftwaffe strafing downed
>>allied pilots coming down their chutes or seen those old, grainy
>>B&W clips of allied forces being slaughtered in their chutes by the
>>Germans?
>>
>>-Mike Marron
>>
>>
>Of course but ISTR that it was looked upon as a bad thing to do
>(of course) and was discouraged heavily for the reason that I
>mentioned. I could of course be wrong, not having BT&DT.
>
>Perhaps Art could give us his impressions?. What did they tell
>you Art?.
>--
>
>-Gord.

It was never discussed in training or anywhere else. It was taken for granted
that it was not to be done. I guess. If I were ordered to do it, that would be
an order never forgotten even after 60 years.


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: Aircrew casualities
>From: "Erik Plagen"
>Date: 9/17/03 12:16 PM Pacific Daylight Time
>Message-id: >
>
>
>"Mike Marron" <> wrote in message
>> >"Gord Beaman" (wrote:
>> >>Mike Marron <wrote:
>>
>> >>Would you shoot the Jerry *******s in their chutes?
>>
>> >>-Mike (I damn sure would've) Marron
>>
>> >I'm sure that the Allies thought that that idea was very
>> >counterproductive because of the 'tit for tat' syndrome.
>> Haven't you heard all the stories of the Luftwaffe strafing downed
>> allied pilots coming down their chutes >
>> -Mike Marron
>>
>That;s all they were- "stories" or fairy tales!
>
>We never tried to shoot down Crew Members in their chutes!
>
>You are thinking of the Japanese.
>
>Erik
>
>


War sie im kreig?




Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[Erik Plagen]

"ArtKramr" <wrote in message > >Subject: Re: Aircrew casualities
> >We never tried to shoot down Crew Members in their chutes!
> >
> >You are thinking of the Japanese.
> >
> >Erik
> >
> >
>
>
> War sie im kreig?
>
>
>
>
> Arthur Kramer

Ich war der Fliegeroffizer.

Was soll die ganze Fragerei?

Erik

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: Aircrew (Casualties)
>From: "Erik Plagen"
>Date: 9/17/03 1:24 PM Pacific Daylight Time
>Message-id: >
>
>
>"ArtKramr" <wrote in message > >Subject: Re: Aircrew casualities
>> >We never tried to shoot down Crew Members in their chutes!
>> >
>> >You are thinking of the Japanese.
>> >
>> >Erik
>> >
>> >
>>
>>
>> War sie im kreig?
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Arthur Kramer
>
>Ich war der Fliegeroffizer.

Ich auch. Ich war ein bombenschutzer mit der 344 bombengeschwader von 1943 bis
1945.(sp)
>
>Was soll die ganze Fragerei?

War sie ein flieger?


>

Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[Mike Marron]

(ArtKramr) wrote:

>War sie im kreig?

Reawj akjlj asjlk;fjk nnbaa afjapo!

-Mike (akjalk) Marron

[Tarver Engineering]

"Mike Marron" > wrote in message
...
> (ArtKramr) wrote:
>
> >War sie im kreig?
>
> Reawj akjlj asjlk;fjk nnbaa afjapo!
>
> -Mike (akjalk) Marron

What sock were you, before you became Maron?

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: Aircrew casualities
>From: Mike Marron
>Date: 9/17/03 4:07 PM Pacific Daylight Time
>Message-id: >
>
(ArtKramr) wrote:
>
>>War sie im kreig?
>
>Reawj akjlj asjlk;fjk nnbaa afjapo!
>
>-Mike (akjalk) Marron


OH YEAH ! (grin)
Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[Mike Marron]

>"Erik Plagen" > wrote:
>>Mike Marron wrote:

>>Haven't you heard all the stories of the Luftwaffe strafing downed
>>allied pilots coming down their chutes >

>That;s all they were- "stories" or fairy tales!

>We never tried to shoot down Crew Members in their chutes!

>You are thinking of the Japanese.

Nope, I'm thinking of the Germans. In fact, I've heard Chuck Yeager
himself during an interview describe how the Germans were known
to strafe downed allied airmen descending in their chutes.

Note the part in the story below that says, "Careful to delay pulling
his ripcord."

From the "FIGHTER PILOT" email list:

***

Chuck Yeager, as an eighteen-year old West Virginia country boy,
joined the U.S. Army Air Corps in 1941. He later shot down eleven
[and one-half ] German aircraft including two Me-262 jet fighters.

Yeager was also shot down over France, successfully evaded,
joined the Maquis, and made his way back to England via
Spain. Contrary to war policy, he somehow persuaded the brass
to let him continue flying fighter missions in Europe all of this by
the age of twenty-two.

Born in 1923, Yeager's dirt-poor youth was filled with hillbilly
themes that might sound quaint and romantic today. But probably
weren't much fun at the time .. going barefoot all summer ..
butchering hogs .. swiping neighbor's water melons. But at an early
age Chuck was able to do well at anything requiring manual
dexterity or working with numbers.

After graduating form high school, Yeager enlisted in the
Air Corps and became an airplane mechanic. He hated flying ..
after vomiting his first time in the air. But when he was given the
chance came to become a ' flying sergeant ' and avoid further
K.P.duties, he won acceptance for flight training.

Yeager's manual dexterity, keen eyesight, and excellent memory
would continue to impress his flight training instructors.

He moved up to P-39 fighters and joined a fighter training squadron
in Tonopah, Nevada. At Tonopah, he first developed a fighter pilot's
detached attitude toward death .. even getting irritated at the other
flying students he thought had been killed needlessly .. or through
lack of skill.

During the ruthless weeding-out process in Nevada, the student pilots
managed to work as hard at playing as they did flying. And he and his
lifelong friend, Bud Anderson, made it through the process together.

When his squadron moved to the West Coast to train for bomber
escort missions, Yeager was temporarily sent to Wright Field, to
test out newly designed P-39 propellors. While there, he also sniveled
opportunities to fly the new P-47 fighter aircraft. He rejoined his
squadron, in California, where he met his future wife Glennis. "
Pretty as a movie star and making more money than I was", Yeager
recalls.

His squadron moved on to Wyoming for additional training. But
Wyoming was also a location for great hunting. Chuck recalls carefully
herding antelopes, with his P-39, to a predetermined location, where
his armed buddies had a field day; he and his squadronmates feasted
on antelope filet steaks for a month.

But on another day, his engine blew up and his P-39 burst into flames.
He bailed out - hit the ground hard -and was hospitalized, for a time,
with a fractured spine.

Yeager was able to be shipped out for Europe with his squadron. And
they began operations in England in early 1944, as the first P-51
Mustang equipped unit in the Eighth Air Force. On his seventh mission,
Yeager shot down his first Messerschmitt and the next day .. three
FW-190s shot him down. Yeager bailed out over occupied France.
Careful to delay pulling his ripcord, he fell close to the ground to
avoid the possibility of his descending parachute getting
strafed by tempted German fighters.

He had landed about 50 miles east of Bordeaux. Injured and
bleeding, but armed with a forty-five caliber pistol, Yeager was
determined to evade over the Pyrenees mountains into Spain. He
hid in the woods the first night, ate stale chocolate from his
survival kit and huddled under this parachute. The next
morning, he encountered a woodcutter who was in contact with
the Resistance.

They couldn't communicate very well, but the woodcutter gestured for
Yeager to stay put. Uncertain as to the Frenchman's loyalties, but
having no better choices, he stayed, but trained his gun on the
woodcutter's path; the woodcutter returned with members of the
Resistance.

His new friends hid him in a barn, while the Germans searched. An
English-speaking woman questioned him. Then satisfied that he
was not a German ' plant', the local resistance people assisted him,
starting with a local doctor who removed shrapnel from his leg. Then
he was taken to the nearest Maquis group, to hide out until the snow
had melted enough to permit passage over the Pyrenees. Yeager
was an outsider and relations were sometimes strained, but they
accepted him when he assisted them in fusing plastic explosives.

He made it into Spain and found his way to the American consul's
office. After he languished in a Spanish hotel for six weeks, the U.S.
government negotiated a deal with the Franco government and
swapped some quantity of Texaco gasoline for him. The other
357th pilots were shocked when Yeager walked in the door; he
was the first downed fighter pilot to have evaded successfully.

Well-considered combat rules forbade the return of evaded pilots to
the fighting because they would be able to reveal information about
the Resistance if they were shot down a second time. But Chuck Yeager
would have none of it; he was determined to return to combat.
The ' evader rule' was strict, but Yeager appealed all the way
to ' Ike', who promised to "do what he could." While the decision was
pending, Yeager's Group let him fly training missions.

But when he was called to cover a downed pilot in the English Channel
a Ju-88 appeared. Yeager couldn't restrain himself .. he shot it down
just off the German occupied coast. Now in big trouble, he gifted his
gun camera footage and the victory to a buddy .. but he was found out
and caught hell for it.

Ike allowed Yeager to return to air combat in the summer of 1944. And
he returned with a vengeance. He flew in a four plane division with
double aces Bud Anderson and Don Bochkay At first, the pickings were
slim, as the German fliers seemed to be laying low. And on September
18, he flew in support of glider drops over Arnhem, but couldn't do
much to stop the appalling slaughter of the C-47s. On the plus side,
he received a commission as a Lieutenant.

While leading a bomber escort over Bremen Germany, Yeager became
an 'ace-in-a-day'. As he closed in on one 109 and his wingman, its
pilot broke left and ran into his wingman. Both German pilots bailed
out .. giving Yeager credit for two victories .. without his having to
fire a shot. In the sharp dogfighting that followed, Yeager's superb
eye sight .. flying skills .. and marksmanship .. gave him three more
quick kills.

The German Me-262 jets appeared in combat in late 1944, but went right
after the Allied bombers, avoiding dogfights with the Mustangs.
Whenever the jet fighters wanted to, they could just accelerate away
from the Mustangs with a 150 MPH speed advantage. One day he caught
one of the jets as it approached its airfield for a landing. Attacking
through dense flak, Yeager attacked and shot down the German jet,
earning a DFC for the feat.

He flew his final mission in January, 1945 when he and friend Bud
Anderson carried out their scheme to sign on as "spares" creating an
opportunity to do some uninhibited flying. Anderson describes this in
his autobiography, To Fly And To Fight: "

***

We hit the Dutch coast, took a right .. and flew south, at 500 feet
across France into Switzerland. Chuck was the guide. And I was the
tourist. We dropped our fuel tanks on Mount Blanc and strafed them,
trying to set them afire [ it seemed like a good idea at the time ],
then found Lake Annecy, and its lakeshore hotel. We buzzed the hotel,
fast enough and low enough to ' tug at the shingles' and then we
zoomed out over the water, right on the deck, our props throwing up
mist. "

" We'd just shot up a mountain in a neutral country, buzzed half of
Europe, and probably could have been court-martialed on any one of a
half-dozen charges. But it didn't matter. We were aglow. It was over,
we had survived, we were finished, and now we would go home together.

When we landed at Leiston, my crew chief jumped on my wing, " Group
got more than 50 [victories] today. Must've been something. How many
did you get? "

" None, " I confessed in a small, strangled voice. I felt sick.

[abridged]

[Mike Marron]

(ArtKramr) wrote:
>>Mike Marron wrote:

>>Reawj akjlj asjlk;fjk nnbaa afjapo!

>>-Mike (akjalk) Marron

>OH YEAH ! (grin)

Aoccdrnig to rscheearch at Cmabrigde Uinervtisy,
it deosn't mttaer in waht oredr the ltteers in a
wrod are, the olny iprmoetnt tihng is taht the frist
and lsat ltteer be at the rghit pclae.

The rset can be a total mses and you can sitll
raed it wouthit a porbelm. Tihs is bcuseae the
huamn mnid deos not raed ervey lteter by istlef,
but the wrod as a wlohe.

-Mike (Fcuknig amzanig, huh?) Marron

[Guy Alcala]

ArtKramr wrote:

> >Subject: Re: Aircrew casualities
> >From: Guy Alcala
> >Date: 9/16/03 9:09 PM Pacific Daylight Time
> >Message-id: >
>
> >e (and thus less effective fire from the
> >fighters, due to evasive action and longer firing ranges), and in the last
> >resort,
> >it being much easier to find and put on parachutes and then locate the
>
> Interesting.We never took evasive action against fighters.we jus tightened our
> formation, stayed on course and returned their fire.

No, I meant the fighters taking evasive action on the run-in, and preparing to do
so after the firing pass. At night, they could usually just cruise leisurely into
position behind/under (with Schrage Musik) the bomber at very short range, aim for
the fuel/oil tanks in the wings, and fire. 50-100 yd firing ranges weren't
uncommon for the better pilots.

> We did take evasive action
> against flak. Find their parachutes??? We wore them from the ground up.Y'mean
> the Brits didn't??? If you got hit and didn't have your chute on it was often
> too late to put it on.

The USAAF bomber crew didn't have backpack parachutes either for quite a while (it
seems to have been late in 1943 that they started to come in). Normally it was a
clip-on chest chute, and they were normally left off until needed as they made it
difficult to move around in the a/c. Pilots got seat pack or backpack chutes (in
some cases, from the Brits) first. That's another reason why ball turret gunners
had such a high casualty rate; there was no room in the turret for them to have
their chutes, so they had to first make it back up into the fuselage, get their
chute and put it on before they could jump. The waist gunners had it far easier.

Guy

[Guy Alcala]

Mike Marron wrote:

> >"Erik Plagen" > wrote:
> >>Mike Marron wrote:
>
> >>Haven't you heard all the stories of the Luftwaffe strafing downed
> >>allied pilots coming down their chutes >
>
> >That;s all they were- "stories" or fairy tales!
>
> >We never tried to shoot down Crew Members in their chutes!
>
> >You are thinking of the Japanese.
>
> Nope, I'm thinking of the Germans. In fact, I've heard Chuck Yeager
> himself during an interview describe how the Germans were known
> to strafe downed allied airmen descending in their chutes.

<snip>

There were certainly instances (on both sides) of this happening, and it
was widely believed (again, by both sides) that the other side was just
looking for opportunities to do so, but it was an individual thing, not an
order. It tended to be crews with better reasons to hate, i.e. a pilot
whose family had been killed by bombing, or pilots of some of the occupied
countries (the Poles come to mind). And there were the occasional
bloodthirsty or just plain ruthless types on both sides. There was little
reason for the Germans to strafe parachutes when they were on the
defensive, because the crews were almost certain to be captured. There
was more reason for the allies to do so when they were on the offensive,
because any German pilot who survived was likely to be back in the air;
most of the top German aces were shot down numerous times. The situation
was the reverse in the BoB, where it would have made sense for the Germans
to shoot British pilots as they descended, but was pointless for the
British. There seems to have been one exception: in the case of the
Me-262, US fighter pilots were ordered to kill the pilots, in their chutes
or on the ground, according to Yeager and/or Clarence 'Bud' Anderson in
their biographies.

Guy

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: Aircrew casualities
>From: Guy Alcala
>Date: 9/18/03 11:53 AM Pacific Daylight Time
>Message-id: >

>No, I meant the fighters taking evasive action on the run-in, and preparing
>to do

Never saw that once. Thyey would drop tgheior inside wing and their nose would
swing in toward us and we hten knew they had started their classic fighter
approach. And once they set up constant bearing, they never swerved, changed
course or took evasive action at all. They just bore in on their heading of
constant bearing firing as they came.

>The USAAF bomber crew didn't have backpack parachutes either for quite a
>while (it
>seems to have been late in 1943 that they started to come in). Normally it
>was a

>The USAAF bomber crew didn't have backpack parachutes either for quite a
>while (it
>seems to have been late in 1943 that they started to come in). Normally it
>was a

I wore a chestpack. The tail gunner and the top turrest gunners also had
chestpacks and we wore them in our positions with no problem. We never ever
flew missions with chutes off. And in 1943 both our pilot and copilot flew with
backpacks, the rest of us wore chestpacks and once in the air never took them
of except when I had to enter the bomb bays. I couldn't fit through the bombay
access door with a chestpack on.


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[Dale]

In article >,
wrote:

> chutes (in
> That's another reason why ball turret
> gunners
> had such a high casualty rate; there was no room in the turret for them to
> have
> their chutes, so they had to first make it back up into the fuselage, get
> their
> chute and put it on before they could jump. The waist gunners had it far
> easier.


Hmmm. From what I've been told statistically the ball was one of the more
survivable positions..regarless of what the silly History Channel "Suicide
Mission" show stated.

And if you think about it, it makes sense. The ball gunner has more steel
around him than say the waist gunner and he's in the fetal position making for a
smaller target, not standing upright like a waist gunner or top turret gunner
(some of which were on seats as in the B-26).

--
Dale L. Falk

There is nothing - absolutely nothing - half so much worth doing
as simply messing around with airplanes.

http://home.gci.net/~sncdfalk/flying.html

[[email protected]]

Mike Marron > wrote:

>
>Aoccdrnig to rscheearch at Cmabrigde Uinervtisy,
>it deosn't mttaer in waht oredr the ltteers in a
>wrod are, the olny iprmoetnt tihng is taht the frist
>and lsat ltteer be at the rghit pclae.
>
>The rset can be a total mses and you can sitll
>raed it wouthit a porbelm. Tihs is bcuseae the
>huamn mnid deos not raed ervey lteter by istlef,
>but the wrod as a wlohe.
>
>-Mike (Fcuknig amzanig, huh?) Marron
>

It is!...I never came across that before!...quite amazing.
--

-Gord.

[[email protected]]

(ArtKramr) wrote:

>
>I wore a chestpack. The tail gunner and the top turrest gunners also had
>chestpacks and we wore them in our positions with no problem. We never ever
>flew missions with chutes off. And in 1943 both our pilot and copilot flew with
>backpacks, the rest of us wore chestpacks and once in the air never took them
>of except when I had to enter the bomb bays. I couldn't fit through the bombay
>access door with a chestpack on.
>
>
>Arthur Kramer

Art, I remember three or four days ago you mentioned that your
escape route was through the bomb bay, here's what you said:

>> In the B-26 we had no escape hatch at all. The bombardier
>> had along path to creawl in front of the copilot then
>> out the bombay.

How did you work that?...or did I misunderstand something?.
--

-Gord.

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: Aircrew casualities
>From: "Gord Beaman" )
>Date: 9/18/03 1:31 PM Pacific Daylight Time
>Message-id: >
>
(ArtKramr) wrote:
>
>>
>>I wore a chestpack. The tail gunner and the top turrest gunners also had
>>chestpacks and we wore them in our positions with no problem. We never ever
>>flew missions with chutes off. And in 1943 both our pilot and copilot flew
>with
>>backpacks, the rest of us wore chestpacks and once in the air never took
>them
>>of except when I had to enter the bomb bays. I couldn't fit through the
>bombay
>>access door with a chestpack on.
>>
>>
>>Arthur Kramer
>
>Art, I remember three or four days ago you mentioned that your
>escape route was through the bomb bay, here's what you said:
>
>>> In the B-26 we had no escape hatch at all. The bombardier
>>> had along path to creawl in front of the copilot then
>>> out the bombay.
>
>How did you work that?...or did I misunderstand something?.
>--
>
>-Gord.
Entering the bomb bay for two different purposes. When entering the bombay to
do repaireslike kicking out a hung up bomb, I wore no chute at all, Nervious
work with the bombay doors open. For bailout, unhook one side of the chest
pack, step out, rehook it and bail out.But where possible go out the nosewheel
well. It is a lot faster and a shorter trip. Luckily I never had to do either.


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[[email protected]]

(ArtKramr) wrote:

>Entering the bomb bay for two different purposes. When entering the bombay to
>do repaireslike kicking out a hung up bomb, I wore no chute at all, Nervious
>work with the bombay doors open. For bailout, unhook one side of the chest
>pack, step out, rehook it and bail out.But where possible go out the nosewheel
>well. It is a lot faster and a shorter trip. Luckily I never had to do either.
>
>
>Arthur Kramer

I see...thank you.
--

-Gord.

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: Aircrew casualities
>From: "Gord Beaman" )
>Date: 9/18/03 6:10 PM Pacific Daylight Time
>Message-id: >
>
(ArtKramr) wrote:
>
>>Entering the bomb bay for two different purposes. When entering the bombay
>to
>>do repaireslike kicking out a hung up bomb, I wore no chute at all, Nervious
>>work with the bombay doors open. For bailout, unhook one side of the chest
>>pack, step out, rehook it and bail out.But where possible go out the
>nosewheel
>>well. It is a lot faster and a shorter trip. Luckily I never had to do
>either.
>>
>>
>>Arthur Kramer
>
>I see...thank you.
>--
>
>-Gord.

One more point. With certain types of battle damage you may not be able to
lower the wheels so that last option may not be available.

Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[[email protected]]

(ArtKramr) wrote:

>>Subject: Re: Aircrew casualities
>>From: "Gord Beaman" )
>>Date: 9/18/03 6:10 PM Pacific Daylight Time
>>Message-id: >
>>
(ArtKramr) wrote:
>>
>>>Entering the bomb bay for two different purposes. When entering the bombay
>>to
>>>do repaireslike kicking out a hung up bomb, I wore no chute at all, Nervious
>>>work with the bombay doors open. For bailout, unhook one side of the chest
>>>pack, step out, rehook it and bail out.But where possible go out the
>>nosewheel
>>>well. It is a lot faster and a shorter trip. Luckily I never had to do
>>either.
>>>
>>>
>>>Arthur Kramer
>>
>>I see...thank you.
>>--
>>
>>-Gord.
>
>One more point. With certain types of battle damage you may not be able to
>lower the wheels so that last option may not be available.
>
>Arthur Kramer

Of course and it likely goes without saying that if you cannot
open the BB then you can't use that route either.
--

-Gord.

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: Aircrew casualities
>From: "Gord Beaman" )
>Date: 9/18/03 6:46 PM Pacific Daylight Time
>Message-id: >
>
(ArtKramr) wrote:
>
>>>Subject: Re: Aircrew casualities
>>>From: "Gord Beaman" )
>>>Date: 9/18/03 6:10 PM Pacific Daylight Time
>>>Message-id: >
>>>
(ArtKramr) wrote:
>>>
>>>>Entering the bomb bay for two different purposes. When entering the bombay
>>>to
>>>>do repaireslike kicking out a hung up bomb, I wore no chute at all,
>Nervious
>>>>work with the bombay doors open. For bailout, unhook one side of the chest
>>>>pack, step out, rehook it and bail out.But where possible go out the
>>>nosewheel
>>>>well. It is a lot faster and a shorter trip. Luckily I never had to do
>>>either.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>Arthur Kramer
>>>
>>>I see...thank you.
>>>--
>>>
>>>-Gord.
>>
>>One more point. With certain types of battle damage you may not be able to
>>lower the wheels so that last option may not be available.
>>
>>Arthur Kramer
>
>Of course and it likely goes without saying that if you cannot
>open the BB then you can't use that route either.
>--
>
>-Gord.

There's always the waist windows or the cockp[it overheads..



Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[Mike Marron]

>DAN > wrote:
>>Guy Alcala wrote:

>>There seems to have been one exception: in the case of the
>>Me-262, US fighter pilots were ordered to kill the pilots, in their chutes
>>or on the ground, according to Yeager and/or Clarence 'Bud' Anderson in
>>their biographies.

>Why? difficult to train?

Nah. To kill the enemy.

-Mike (novel idea, eh?) Marron

[Jeff Crowell]

Mike Marron wrote:
> >Aoccdrnig to rscheearch at Cmabrigde Uinervtisy,
> >it deosn't mttaer in waht oredr the ltteers in a
> >wrod are, the olny iprmoetnt tihng is taht the frist
> >and lsat ltteer be at the rghit pclae.
> >
> >The rset can be a total mses and you can sitll
> >raed it wouthit a porbelm. Tihs is bcuseae the
> >huamn mnid deos not raed ervey lteter by istlef,
> >but the wrod as a wlohe.

Gord Beaman wrote
> It is!...I never came across that before!...quite amazing.

Just a lesson in how gifted the human mind is in
finding familiar patterns in a stream of input or data.
Some "progressive" people (mis)used this ability as
the springboard to the concept of "sight reading,"
where kids who are learning to read are taught to
try to guess the word based on how it looks. Funny
thing is, if you don't already know how to read (i.e.
your mind has not yet learned what patterns to try to
fit the jumbles into), it doesn't work worth a damn.


Jeff

[Keith Willshaw]

"Guy Alcala" > wrote in message
. ..
> Mike Marron wrote:
>
> > >"Erik Plagen" > wrote:
> > >>Mike Marron wrote:
> >
> > >>Haven't you heard all the stories of the Luftwaffe strafing downed
> > >>allied pilots coming down their chutes >
> >
> > >That;s all they were- "stories" or fairy tales!
> >
> > >We never tried to shoot down Crew Members in their chutes!
> >
> > >You are thinking of the Japanese.
> >
> > Nope, I'm thinking of the Germans. In fact, I've heard Chuck Yeager
> > himself during an interview describe how the Germans were known
> > to strafe downed allied airmen descending in their chutes.
>
> <snip>
>
> There were certainly instances (on both sides) of this happening, and it
> was widely believed (again, by both sides) that the other side was just
> looking for opportunities to do so, but it was an individual thing, not an
> order. It tended to be crews with better reasons to hate, i.e. a pilot
> whose family had been killed by bombing, or pilots of some of the occupied
> countries (the Poles come to mind). And there were the occasional
> bloodthirsty or just plain ruthless types on both sides. There was little
> reason for the Germans to strafe parachutes when they were on the
> defensive, because the crews were almost certain to be captured. There
> was more reason for the allies to do so when they were on the offensive,
> because any German pilot who survived was likely to be back in the air;
> most of the top German aces were shot down numerous times. The situation
> was the reverse in the BoB, where it would have made sense for the Germans
> to shoot British pilots as they descended, but was pointless for the
> British. There seems to have been one exception: in the case of the
> Me-262, US fighter pilots were ordered to kill the pilots, in their chutes
> or on the ground, according to Yeager and/or Clarence 'Bud' Anderson in
> their biographies.
>
> Guy
>

During the BOB Dowding specifically ordered the RAF not
to strafe German pilots who had bailed out over UK territory

He made the point that under international law once the
pilot had bailed out over enemy territory he was no longer
an enemy combatant but a surrndering prisoner. German
pilots over occupied territory or British pilots over the
UK were fair game.

Keith

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: Aircrew casualities
>From: Mike Marron
>Date: 9/19/03 6:26 AM Pacific Daylight Time
>Message-id: >
>
>>DAN > wrote:
>>>Guy Alcala wrote:
>
>>>There seems to have been one exception: in the case of the
>>>Me-262, US fighter pilots were ordered to kill the pilots, in their chutes
>>>or on the ground, according to Yeager and/or Clarence 'Bud' Anderson in
>>>their biographies.
>
>>Why? difficult to train?
>
>Nah. To kill the enemy.
>
>-Mike (novel idea, eh?) Marron


The Germans supposedly put their best into the ME 262's

Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[Mike Marron]

> (ArtKramr) wrote:
>>Mike Marron wrote:
>>>DAN > wrote:
>>>>Guy Alcala wrote:

>>>>There seems to have been one exception: in the case of the
>>>>Me-262, US fighter pilots were ordered to kill the pilots, in their chutes
>>>>or on the ground, according to Yeager and/or Clarence 'Bud' Anderson in
>>>>their biographies.

>>>Why? difficult to train?

>>Nah. To kill the enemy.

>>-Mike (novel idea, eh?) Marron

>The Germans supposedly put their best into the ME 262's

That, in addition to the fact that the 262 was 130 kts. faster than
anything the U.S. could put in the air explains why the Americans
were ordered to kill 262 pilots in their chutes or on the ground
rather than pay homage to the Nazi *******s.

-Mike Marron

[Tarver Engineering]

"Mike Marron" > wrote in message
...
> > (ArtKramr) wrote:
> >>Mike Marron wrote:
> >>>DAN > wrote:
> >>>>Guy Alcala wrote:
>
> >>>>There seems to have been one exception: in the case of the
> >>>>Me-262, US fighter pilots were ordered to kill the pilots, in their
chutes
> >>>>or on the ground, according to Yeager and/or Clarence 'Bud' Anderson
in
> >>>>their biographies.
>
> >>>Why? difficult to train?
>
> >>Nah. To kill the enemy.
>
> >>-Mike (novel idea, eh?) Marron
>
> >The Germans supposedly put their best into the ME 262's
>
> That, in addition to the fact that the 262 was 130 kts. faster than
> anything the U.S. could put in the air explains why the Americans
> were ordered to kill 262 pilots in their chutes or on the ground
> rather than pay homage to the Nazi *******s.

You served when Marron? You say your pussy hurt?

[Mike Marron]

>Gernot Hassenpflug > wrote:

>Although Mike is in my kill-score file, I can't resist some play
>here.

What a joke. You don't have me (or anyone else) in your
mythical "killfile." Even if you did, who cares? Certainly not
me, but perhaps I shall killfile YOU.

>If the sole reason for ordering the killing of someone is
>because he happens to fly something better than you have, that
>makes a pretty good reason for the Germans to order the killing
>of almost all allied fighter pilots by that stage of the war. Frankly,
>war is barbarous enough without going completely off one's
>rocker. Keeping one's marbles after the events is also am
>important issue.

Are you a Nazi apologist? I wasn't even born when the orders to
shoot Me-262 pilots in their chutes were given. If you don't agree
with the U.S. WW2 policy, tough!

-Mike Marron

[Gernot Hassenpflug]

Mike Marron > writes:

>>Gernot Hassenpflug > wrote:
>
>>Although Mike is in my kill-score file, I can't resist some play
>>here.
>
> What a joke. You don't have me (or anyone else) in your
> mythical "killfile." Even if you did, who cares? Certainly not
> me, but perhaps I shall killfile YOU.

I just enjoy baiting you. If you knew how gnus worked, you would
understand (I hope).

>>If the sole reason for ordering the killing of someone is
>>because he happens to fly something better than you have, that
>>makes a pretty good reason for the Germans to order the killing
>>of almost all allied fighter pilots by that stage of the war. Frankly,
>>war is barbarous enough without going completely off one's
>>rocker. Keeping one's marbles after the events is also am
>>important issue.
>
> Are you a Nazi apologist? I wasn't even born when the orders to
> shoot Me-262 pilots in their chutes were given. If you don't agree
> with the U.S. WW2 policy, tough!

What is the relevance of Nazi aplogoy here, or when you were born? I
have no issue with you personally, just the orders. Yes, you are
right, I don't agree, and yes, that is `tough'. Stupid orders or worse
are the same whichever `side' enacted them.

--
G Hassenpflug * IJN & JMSDF equipment/history fan

[Guy Alcala]

Dale wrote:

> In article >,
> wrote:
>
> > chutes (in
> > That's another reason why ball turret
> > gunners
> > had such a high casualty rate; there was no room in the turret for them to
> > have
> > their chutes, so they had to first make it back up into the fuselage, get
> > their
> > chute and put it on before they could jump. The waist gunners had it far
> > easier.
>
> Hmmm. From what I've been told statistically the ball was one of the more
> survivable positions..regarless of what the silly History Channel "Suicide
> Mission" show stated.

I've seen claims of that, but the stats don't seem to back it up, at least for the
B-17.

> And if you think about it, it makes sense. The ball gunner has more steel
> around him than say the waist gunner and he's in the fetal position making for a
> smaller target, not standing upright like a waist gunner or top turret gunner
> (some of which were on seats as in the B-26).

As I understood Art, his question wasn't so much about casualty rates, as it was
survival rates. The ball turret gunner had the hardest time getting out of the a/c,
because he first had to get back IN to the a/c, then put on his chute, then bail
out. If the turret was damaged it was often difficult or impossible to rotate it so
that the hatch faced the proper direction, even with help from the crewmembers
inside the a/c. Ideally, the ball turret gunner could have worn his chute in the
turret, and just open the hatch and fall out backwards; I've read one case of a
really small man (even among ball turret gunners) who was able to wear his chute in
the turret, but he seems to be the exception.

Guy

[Guy Alcala]

ArtKramr wrote:

> >Subject: Re: Aircrew casualities
> >From: Guy Alcala
> >Date: 9/18/03 11:53 AM Pacific Daylight Time
> >Message-id: >
>
> >No, I meant the fighters taking evasive action on the run-in, and preparing
> >to do
>
> Never saw that once. Thyey would drop tgheior inside wing and their nose would
> swing in toward us and we hten knew they had started their classic fighter
> approach. And once they set up constant bearing, they never swerved, changed
> course or took evasive action at all. They just bore in on their heading of
> constant bearing firing as they came.

"Evasive action' was a poor choice of words on my part; involuntary flinching
before the breakaway, and doing the breakaway early for fear of collision/gunfire,
was more what I meant.

>
> >The USAAF bomber crew didn't have backpack parachutes either for quite a
> >while (it
> >seems to have been late in 1943 that they started to come in). Normally it
> >was a
>
> >The USAAF bomber crew didn't have backpack parachutes either for quite a
> >while (it
> >seems to have been late in 1943 that they started to come in). Normally it
> >was a
>
> I wore a chestpack. The tail gunner and the top turrest gunners also had
> chestpacks and we wore them in our positions with no problem. We never ever
> flew missions with chutes off. And in 1943 both our pilot and copilot flew with
> backpacks, the rest of us wore chestpacks and once in the air never took them
> of except when I had to enter the bomb bays. I couldn't fit through the bombay
> access door with a chestpack on.

Then it must have been 8th AF practice not to wear them, as numerous accounts exist
of crews trying to buckle theirs on in a hurry. The RAF bomber crews didn't
normally wear theirs either, aside from the pilots and the tail gunner.

Guy

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: Aircrew casualities
>From: Guy Alcala
>Date: 9/22/03 2:51 PM Pacific Daylight Time
>Message-id: <3F6F6FE0.3067CB20@junkpo

>Then it must have been 8th AF practice not to wear them, as numerous accounts
>exist
>of crews trying to buckle theirs on in a hurry. The RAF bomber crews didn't
>normally wear theirs either, aside from the pilots and the tail gunner.
>
>Guy

The mind boggles (sheesh)

Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: Aircrew casualities
>From: Guy Alcala
>Date: 9/22/03 2:51 PM Pacific Daylight Time
>Message-id:

>"Evasive action' was a poor choice of words on my part; involuntary flinching
>before the breakaway, and doing the breakaway early for fear of
>collision/gunfire,
>was more what I meant.

I never once saw that. It would be a foolish thing for the pilot to do. If he
bore in and came out the other side it was a clean getaway, But if he flinched
and turned away before he got to us he would expose his belly and vastly
increase his chance of being shot down by the bomber's gunners. I guess young
inexperienced pilots scared to death might do that. But not the old hands.
Anyway. if you are a gunner in a bomber and a fighter comes at you don't count
on his tuning way before his run is done.


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[Matt Wiser]

"Keith Willshaw" > wrote:
>
>"Guy Alcala" >
>wrote in message
. ..
>> Mike Marron wrote:
>>
>> > >"Erik Plagen" > wrote:
>> > >>Mike Marron wrote:
>> >
>> > >>Haven't you heard all the stories of the
>Luftwaffe strafing downed
>> > >>allied pilots coming down their chutes
>>
>> >
>> > >That;s all they were- "stories" or fairy
>tales!
>> >
>> > >We never tried to shoot down Crew Members
>in their chutes!
>> >
>> > >You are thinking of the Japanese.
>> >
>> > Nope, I'm thinking of the Germans. In fact,
>I've heard Chuck Yeager
>> > himself during an interview describe how
>the Germans were known
>> > to strafe downed allied airmen descending
>in their chutes.
>>
>> <snip>
>>
>> There were certainly instances (on both sides)
>of this happening, and it
>> was widely believed (again, by both sides)
>that the other side was just
>> looking for opportunities to do so, but it
>was an individual thing, not an
>> order. It tended to be crews with better
>reasons to hate, i.e. a pilot
>> whose family had been killed by bombing, or
>pilots of some of the occupied
>> countries (the Poles come to mind). And there
>were the occasional
>> bloodthirsty or just plain ruthless types
>on both sides. There was little
>> reason for the Germans to strafe parachutes
>when they were on the
>> defensive, because the crews were almost certain
>to be captured. There
>> was more reason for the allies to do so when
>they were on the offensive,
>> because any German pilot who survived was
>likely to be back in the air;
>> most of the top German aces were shot down
>numerous times. The situation
>> was the reverse in the BoB, where it would
>have made sense for the Germans
>> to shoot British pilots as they descended,
>but was pointless for the
>> British. There seems to have been one exception:
>in the case of the
>> Me-262, US fighter pilots were ordered to
>kill the pilots, in their chutes
>> or on the ground, according to Yeager and/or
>Clarence 'Bud' Anderson in
>> their biographies.
>>
>> Guy
>>
>
>During the BOB Dowding specifically ordered
>the RAF not
>to strafe German pilots who had bailed out over
>UK territory
>
>He made the point that under international law
>once the
>pilot had bailed out over enemy territory he
>was no longer
>an enemy combatant but a surrndering prisoner.
>German
>pilots over occupied territory or British pilots
>over the
>UK were fair game.
>
>Keith
>
>
How about the Pacific casualties? With USN/MC aircraft like the SBD, SB2C,
TBF/M off of carriers, plus the Navy/Marine and AAF aircraft, wouldn't the
casualties be somewhat different than Europe? I'm thinking the TBF/M might
have a higher casualty rate with the turret gunners-wouldn't those guys have
a hard time bailing out than the pilot or radio operator/tunnel gunner?

Posted via www.My-Newsgroups.com - web to news gateway for usenet access!

[Guy Alcala]

ArtKramr wrote:

> >Subject: Re: Aircrew casualities
> >From: Guy Alcala
> >Date: 9/22/03 2:51 PM Pacific Daylight Time
> >Message-id:
>
> >"Evasive action' was a poor choice of words on my part; involuntary flinching
> >before the breakaway, and doing the breakaway early for fear of
> >collision/gunfire,
> >was more what I meant.
>
> I never once saw that. It would be a foolish thing for the pilot to do. If he
> bore in and came out the other side it was a clean getaway, But if he flinched
> and turned away before he got to us he would expose his belly and vastly
> increase his chance of being shot down by the bomber's gunners. I guess young
> inexperienced pilots scared to death might do that. But not the old hands.

<snip>

While the inexperienced pilots were more likely to open fire out of range or break
off too soon, experienced hands could also do so. It was often a question of
morale; the old heads had been in combat for a long time, and everyone only has so
much courage to spend. Many were very tired, combat fatigued if you will, and
there are many accounts by German pilots stating that this or that leader wasn't
going in with their former aggression (often not going in at all, but finding
something wrong with the a/c or themselves, breaking off and returning to base, or
at best hunting for stragglers). I'd really recommend you read Caldwell's "JG 26:
Top Guns of the Luftwaffe" for the German perspective of that unit's (and
individuals) changing behavior throughout the war. Leadership and morale varied
considerably, and both tended to deteriorate later in the war.

Guy

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: Aircrew casualities
>From: Guy Alcala
>Date: 9/24/03 12:26 AM Pacific Daylight Time
>Message-id: <3F71484E.B147DA0A@junk

> courage to spend. Many were very tired, combat fatigued if you will, and
>there are many accounts by German pilots stating that this or that leader
>wasn't
>going in with their former aggression

You coulda fooled me.


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[Guy Alcala]

Guy Alcala wrote:

> Dale wrote:
>
> > In article >,
> > wrote:
> >
> > > chutes (in
> > > That's another reason why ball turret
> > > gunners
> > > had such a high casualty rate; there was no room in the turret for them to
> > > have
> > > their chutes, so they had to first make it back up into the fuselage, get
> > > their
> > > chute and put it on before they could jump. The waist gunners had it far
> > > easier.
> >
> > Hmmm. From what I've been told statistically the ball was one of the more
> > survivable positions..regarless of what the silly History Channel "Suicide
> > Mission" show stated.
>
> I've seen claims of that, but the stats don't seem to back it up, at least for the
> B-17.

Okay, I've been able to retrieve a copy of Martin Middlebrook's "The
Schweinfurt-Regensburg Mission," August 17th, 1943, which includes a breakdown of B-17
crewmen killed by crew position on that day. Middlebrook gives the following info (info
is casualties in 4th Bomb Wing - Regensburg/1st Bomb Wing - Schweinfurt/Total number of
casualties)

Killed 34/68/102

POW 133/248/381

Evaders* 13/25/38

Interned 20/-/20

Rescued from sea 40/20/60

Total 240/361/601

*only includes those who actually made it back to England.
Broken down another way, this is officers/enlisted:

Killed 40/62

PoW 154/227

Evaders 13/25

Interned 8/12

Rescued from Sea 24/36

Total 239/362

He then goes on to write:

"Concentrating now on the mortality rate, one is immediately impressed with the high
proportion of men who survived from B-17s shot down during these daylight operations.
On average less than two men in each standard crew of ten died in the B-17s lost that
day; the actual figure was 1.7 men per crew. Even if the eleven a/c which either
ditched or crash-landed without any loss of life are excluded, the mortality rate only
creeps up to a little over two in the crew of ten. But these overall figures could hide
large variations. The 91st bomb Group lost thirty-six men killed in its ten missing
crews; the 381st had only five deaths in their eleven. This relatively high survival
rate was not unusual for 8th AF operations; the outcome on other B-17 missions was
roughly similar. A comparison with the survival chances in shot-down RAf night bombers
shows almost the reverse position. The mortality rate in 213 RAF bombers shot down in
RAF raids to Hamburg (four raids), Peenemunde and Nuremberg was 83 per cent!
Unfortunately it would require a lengthy essay to explain the different factors
involved."

The relative danger of the crew positions in a shot-down B-17 can also be presented.
The following crew members were killed in B-17s on the Regensburg and Schweinfurt
mission:

Pilot 15

Co-pilot 12

Navigator 6

Bombardier 6

Engineer/Gunner 11

Radio/Gunner 8

Ball Gunner 14

Right Waist Gunner 11

Left Waist Gunner 8

Tail Gunner 10

[Guy Note: this only totals 101. A pilot died in unusual circumstances on the ground,
probably shot and killed while trying to evade capture. He was armed and seen running
by other members of his crew before he was shot, and according to them he was the type
who didn't plan to be taken alive.]

". . . There is not so much difference here from night operations. The RAF bomb aimer
was the safest man in his crew, and pilots -- who have to remain at the controls until
other crew members have parachuted -- always ran the greatest risk. The higher figures
above for the ball-turret gunner reflect the known danger of that cramped and isolated
position from which escape was so difficult. RAF bombers did not have ball turrets."
----------------------------------------------------

[Me again]

Naturally, this can hardly be considered applicable to the entire war, but it is a
fairly good sample size (from 60 a/c shot down) and probably gives a fair representation
of the relative odds for each crewmember given the situation in August 1943. Most of
the tactics, techniques and weapons also used by the Germans in 1944 and 1945 were in
use by that time, although the balance between fighter and flak losses obviously shifted
in 1944 and 1945, which might change the survival odds for some of the positions.

Guy

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: Aircrew casualities
>From: Guy Alcala
>Date: 9/25/03 8:26 PM Pacific Daylight Time
>Message-id: <3F73B305.D9AA9E02@junkpostof

>Okay, I've been able to retrieve a copy of Martin Middlebrook's "The
>Schweinfurt-Regensburg Mission," August 17th, 1943, which includes a
>breakdown of B-17
>crewmen killed by crew position on that day. Middlebrook gives the following
>info (info

One mission does not a war make. Especially Schweinfort Regensburg which may
be be one he most atypical targets/missions of all. If I think back to the
missions I flew with the 344th and had to name a "typical" mission, I couldn't
do it. We had no typical mssions.. Each one was unique, except of course for
the milk runs, which in themselves were not typical.






Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[Guy Alcala]

ArtKramr wrote:

> >Subject: Re: Aircrew casualities
> >From: Guy Alcala
> >Date: 9/25/03 8:26 PM Pacific Daylight Time
> >Message-id: <3F73B305.D9AA9E02@junkpostof
>
> >Okay, I've been able to retrieve a copy of Martin Middlebrook's "The
> >Schweinfurt-Regensburg Mission," August 17th, 1943, which includes a
> >breakdown of B-17
> >crewmen killed by crew position on that day. Middlebrook gives the following
> >info (info
>
> One mission does not a war make.

Obviously, which is why I included the following caveat at the end of that post:

"Naturally, this can hardly be considered applicable to the entire war, but it is
a fairly good sample size (from 60 a/c shot down) and probably gives a fair
representation of the relative odds for each crewmember given the situation in
August 1943. Most of
the tactics, techniques and weapons also used by the Germans in 1944 and 1945 were
in use by that time, although the balance between fighter and flak losses
obviously shifted in 1944 and 1945, which might change the survival odds for some
of the
positions."

> Especially Schweinfort Regensburg which may
> be be one he most atypical targets/missions of all.

As far as tactics, techniques, and weapons used, Regensburg/Schweinfurt was quite
typical of deep penetration missions to Germany in the summer and fall of 1943,
well beyond fighter cover. Indeed, it was the first to go that deep, but was
followed up by several more in September and October, with similar results. The
only difference between this mission and others was that the 4th bW went on to
Africa, but that is unlikely to affect the distribution of KIA in shot down B-17s.

> If I think back to the
> missions I flew with the 344th and had to name a "typical" mission, I couldn't
> do it. We had no typical mssions.. Each one was unique, except of course for
> the milk runs, which in themselves were not typical.

Sure, but we're looking for statistical data on survival rates, and so far the
only such data presented in the course of this thread is that which I provided in
that post. Everything else has been perceptual or anecdotal. We now have some
actual data (limited to a single mission though it is, and only 60 B-17 combat
losses out of the 4,688 B-17s combat losses in the European war as a whole), which
is more than we've had otherwise.

Guy

P.S. I'll be out of town for a couple of days, so will be out of touch for a
while.

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: Aircrew casualities
>From: Guy Alcala
>Date: 9/26/03 3:15 PM Pacific Daylight Time
>Message-id: >
>
>ArtKramr wrote:
>
>> >Subject: Re: Aircrew casualities
>> >From: Guy Alcala
>> >Date: 9/25/03 8:26 PM Pacific Daylight Time
>> >Message-id: <3F73B305.D9AA9E02@junkpostof
>>
>> >Okay, I've been able to retrieve a copy of Martin Middlebrook's "The
>> >Schweinfurt-Regensburg Mission," August 17th, 1943, which includes a
>> >breakdown of B-17
>> >crewmen killed by crew position on that day. Middlebrook gives the
>following
>> >info (info
>>
>> One mission does not a war make.
>
>Obviously, which is why I included the following caveat at the end of that
>post:
>
>"Naturally, this can hardly be considered applicable to the entire war, but
>it is
>a fairly good sample size (from 60 a/c shot down) and probably gives a fair
>representation of the relative odds for each crewmember given the situation
>in
>August 1943. Most of
>the tactics, techniques and weapons also used by the Germans in 1944 and 1945
>were
>in use by that time, although the balance between fighter and flak losses
>obviously shifted in 1944 and 1945, which might change the survival odds for
>some
>of the
>positions."
>
>> Especially Schweinfort Regensburg which may
>> be be one he most atypical targets/missions of all.
>
>As far as tactics, techniques, and weapons used, Regensburg/Schweinfurt was
>quite
>typical of deep penetration missions to Germany in the summer and fall of
>1943,
>well beyond fighter cover. Indeed, it was the first to go that deep, but was
>followed up by several more in September and October, with similar results.
>The
>only difference between this mission and others was that the 4th bW went on
>to
>Africa, but that is unlikely to affect the distribution of KIA in shot down
>B-17s.
>
>> If I think back to the
>> missions I flew with the 344th and had to name a "typical" mission, I
>couldn't
>> do it. We had no typical mssions.. Each one was unique, except of course
>for
>> the milk runs, which in themselves were not typical.
>
>Sure, but we're looking for statistical data on survival rates, and so far
>the
>only such data presented in the course of this thread is that which I
>provided in
>that post. Everything else has been perceptual or anecdotal. We now have
>some
>actual data (limited to a single mission though it is, and only 60 B-17
>combat
>losses out of the 4,688 B-17s combat losses in the European war as a whole),
>which
>is more than we've had otherwise.
>
>Guy
>
>P.S. I'll be out of town for a couple of days, so will be out of touch for a
>while.
>


You are only saying that because you never had to fly the Schweinfort mission.
If you had there would be no way in hell you would call it typical. Find me
one guy who went to Schweinfort and said it was just another mission like all
others. No big deal. Nothing special. Find me just one such guy. Guy you post a
lot of good stuff here, but sometimes you just slip away from reality.


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[Steve Hix]

In article >,
(ArtKramr) wrote:

> You are only saying that because you never had to fly the Schweinfort
> mission.
> If you had there would be no way in hell you would call it typical. Find me
> one guy who went to Schweinfort and said it was just another mission like all
> others. No big deal. Nothing special. Find me just one such guy.

Wouldn't be my high school algebra/woodshop teacher. He was a
B-17 navigator shot down over Rengensberg. Spent the rest of
the war as a guest of the German government, including time
working on tunnel support for the "Great Escape". (He spent
time mostly at Sagan and Mooseburg, IIRC.)

He did make a point in mentioning that there were some very
good surgeons who worked on him after the shootdown, else he
would not have been there to teach us.

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: Aircrew casualities
>From: Steve Hix
>Date: 9/26/03 7:43 PM Pacific Daylight Time
>Message-id: >
>
>In article >,
> (ArtKramr) wrote:
>
>> You are only saying that because you never had to fly the Schweinfort
>> mission.
>> If you had there would be no way in hell you would call it typical. Find
>me
>> one guy who went to Schweinfort and said it was just another mission like
>all
>> others. No big deal. Nothing special. Find me just one such guy.
>
>Wouldn't be my high school algebra/woodshop teacher. He was a
>B-17 navigator shot down over Rengensberg. Spent the rest of
>the war as a guest of the German government, including time
>working on tunnel support for the "Great Escape". (He spent
>time mostly at Sagan and Mooseburg, IIRC.)
>
>He did make a point in mentioning that there were some very
>good surgeons who worked on him after the shootdown, else he
>would not have been there to teach us.


Only guys who never flew anything but an armchair would call Schweinfurt
"typical".

..

Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[Juvat]

After an exhausting session with Victoria's Secret Police, Art Kramer
blurted out:

>You are only saying that because you never had to fly the Schweinfort mission.
>If you had there would be no way in hell you would call it typical.

Begging your pardon Art, this is what Guy posted:

>>As far as tactics, techniques, and weapons used, Regensburg/Schweinfurt was
>>quite typical of deep penetration missions to Germany in the summer and fall of
>>1943, well beyond fighter cover.

So how Regensburg/Schweinfurt was atypical...besides the losses
incurred. What was done differently (tactics/techniques) or what new
weapons were used? 8th AF Bomber Command had hit targets beyond the
range of fighter escort before (and would again). The mission was in
daylight, a max effort, doesn't that seem typical? The mission prep
and execution were typical...the results (big losses) not so typical.

Art states further:
> Find me one guy who went to Schweinfort and said it was just
> another mission like all others. No big deal. Nothing special.

Art you're framing that remark based upon already knowing the results,
i.e. "Black Thursday." Just suppose you asked any B-17 crewman that
morning what was "special" about that day. Nobody can accurately
predict casualties, or random events.

> Guy you post a lot of good stuff here, but sometimes you
> just slip away from reality.

Art your singular distinction (WWII aviator) is a welcomed addition,
but you find nit-noys to take offense with. Continued good health to
you sir.

Juvat

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: Aircrew casualities
>From: Juvat
>Date: 9/26/03 10:15 PM Pacific Daylight Time
>Message-id: >
>
>After an exhausting session with Victoria's Secret Police, Art Kramer
>blurted out:
>
>>You are only saying that because you never had to fly the Schweinfort
>mission.
>>If you had there would be no way in hell you would call it typical.
>
>Begging your pardon Art, this is what Guy posted:
>
>>>As far as tactics, techniques, and weapons used, Regensburg/Schweinfurt was
>>>quite typical of deep penetration missions to Germany in the summer and
>fall of
>>>1943, well beyond fighter cover.
>
>So how Regensburg/Schweinfurt was atypical...besides the losses
>incurred. What was done differently (tactics/techniques) or what new
>weapons were used? 8th AF Bomber Command had hit targets beyond the
>range of fighter escort before (and would again). The mission was in
>daylight, a max effort, doesn't that seem typical? The mission prep
>and execution were typical...the results (big losses) not so typical.
>
>Art states further:
>> Find me one guy who went to Schweinfort and said it was just
>> another mission like all others. No big deal. Nothing special.
>
>Art you're framing that remark based upon already knowing the results,
>i.e. "Black Thursday." Just suppose you asked any B-17 crewman that
>morning what was "special" about that day. Nobody can accurately
>predict casualties, or random events.
>
>> Guy you post a lot of good stuff here, but sometimes you
>> just slip away from reality.
>
>Art your singular distinction (WWII aviator) is a welcomed addition,
>but you find nit-noys to take offense with. Continued good health to
>you sir.
>
>Juvat
>

Black Thursday typical??? The term BlackThursday in itself reveals just how
atypical it was. It was called black Thursday to separate it from all other
missions so it would never be confused with any oridinary mission. They used
the term black to indicate it was a worst of missions with losses that far
exceeded the norm. Understand now? And to say Schweinfort was not typical is
hardly a nit. And may you enjoy a long and prosperous life enjoying the details
of the air war over Europe. And may I thank you for your recognising my
"singular distinction" as a WWII aviator. All kind words are always
appreciated. May you never experience a Schweinfort in your life.


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[Juvat]

After an exhausting session with Victoria's Secret Police, Art Kramer
blurted out:

>Black Thursday typical??? The term BlackThursday in itself reveals just how
>atypical it was. It was called black Thursday to separate it from all other
>missions so it would never be confused with any oridinary mission. They used
>the term black to indicate it was a worst of missions with losses that far
>exceeded the norm. Understand now?

Art...the cost in terms of airframes and lives was indeed at that
point atypical. But...please consider this carefully...the expression
Black Thursday was used after the mission ended.

However...whether the planets aligned perfectly, or the Luftwaffe
really got their **** in one sock that day, the 8th AF Bomber Command
was conducting a "typical" daylight, max effort, beyond fighter escort
raid over Germany. Understand?

None of those men (casualties or survivors) were briefed to the
effect,"Gentlemen today is Black Thursday...oh yeah the target is
Schweinfurt."

> And to say Schweinfort was not typical is hardly a nit.

We'll agree to disagree. The mission was IMO a typical 8th AF, the
degree of coordinated Luftwaffe defense and the result, i.e.
staggering losses were atypical.

Juvat

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: Aircrew casualities
>From: Juvat
>Date: 9/27/03 5:45 AM Pacific Daylight Time
>Message-id: >

>the
>degree of coordinated Luftwaffe defense and the result, i.e.
>staggering losses were atypical.
>
>Juvat

I think you are getting the point.

Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[Guy Alcala]

Juvat wrote:

> After an exhausting session with Victoria's Secret Police, Art Kramer
> blurted out:
>
> >You are only saying that because you never had to fly the Schweinfort mission.
> >If you had there would be no way in hell you would call it typical.
>
> Begging your pardon Art, this is what Guy posted:
>
> >>As far as tactics, techniques, and weapons used, Regensburg/Schweinfurt was
> >>quite typical of deep penetration missions to Germany in the summer and fall of
> >>1943, well beyond fighter cover.
>
> So how Regensburg/Schweinfurt was atypical...besides the losses
> incurred. What was done differently (tactics/techniques) or what new
> weapons were used? 8th AF Bomber Command had hit targets beyond the
> range of fighter escort before (and would again). The mission was in
> daylight, a max effort, doesn't that seem typical?

Normal procedure was to only fly 3 out of a group's 4 squadrons on a mission; indeed,
that seems to have been the reason that American bomber groups were given a four
squadron organization (late war, the B-29 groups only had three squadrons,
individually larger than the earlier squadrons). On the Regensburg/Schweinfurt
mission, the 9 Groups in the 1st BW (the Schweinfurt force), who would normally make
up 3 combat wings each consisting of three 18 a/c "groups", used their fourth
squadrons and extra crews and a/c to form an additional 3 composite groups, i.e. the
equivalent of one more combat wing. At that time, the combat wings were still
provisional; they didn't become official organizations until September, when the 1st,
2nd and 4th Bomb Wings were redesignated the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Bomb Divisions,
respectively.

Middlebrook, referring to Regensburg/Schweinfurt, writes:

"The true 'maximum effort' was a very rare event [Guy note: at least at that time]
and this was probably the first time it had been used. The result was that
individual planes were added to formations wherever possible [Guy note: This was in
addition to the composite groups mentioned above]. The availability status of the
1st Bombardment Wing for the evening of 16th August shows that 238 B-17s were
operational and capable of being prepared for the raid next morning. The groups
planned to dispatch 231 of these, while several more were to be sent up as 'air
spares' to replace a/c which had to turn back because of operational difficulty."

So, instead of the standard three combat wings each of 54 a/c, the Schweinfurt force
(as dispatched) consisted of the following (in order, lead/high/low group)

101st CW: 91st BG, 18 aircraft / 101st Comp. Group, 19 acft. of 91st, 351st and 381st
BGs / 381st BG, 20 acft.

Composite CW: 351st BG, 21 acft. / 306th Comp. Gp., 20 acft. of 92nd, 305th and 306th
BGs / 384th BG, 19 acft.

102nd CW: 306th BG, 21 acft. / 305th BG, 20 acft. / 92nd BG, 20 acft.

103rd CW: 379th BG, 18 acft. / 103rd Comp. Gp., 17 acft. of 303rd and 379th BGs /
303rd BG, 18 acft.

The 4th Bomb Wing (Regensburg force) only had 7 Groups in it at the time, making it
difficult to form three full combat wings, each of three groups. LeMay, the 4th BW
commander, arranged the force a bit differently. LeMay didn't like ad hoc composite
wings, so organized his 7 groups into one wing of three groups and two wings of 2
groups. However, he had each group attach an extra three a/c element to the high
squadron, more as combat attrition spares than to boost the total bomb tonnage. So,
each group dispatched 21 a/c vice the normal 18, plus air spares for aborts prior to
crossing the occupied coast. The 4th BW had 189 a/c operational the evening before,
but only planned to dispatch 147 of them plus spares, well short of a 'maximum
effort.'

> The mission prep
> and execution were typical...the results (big losses) not so typical.

<snip>

The scale of losses was a record at that time, but percentage-wise (16% total, 16.4%
for Regensburg, 15.7% for Schweinfurt) it wasn't all that much greater than the
losses for un-escorted deep penetration missions in the next two months.
Regensburg/Schweinfurt was the deepest penetration mission into Germany at that time,
but succeeding missions in September and the week of October 8-14th 1943, culminating
in Second Schweinfurt ("Black Thursday"), showed that losses equal or greater than
10% could be _expected_ on un-escorted deep-penetration missions into Germany. For
example, the mission to Stuttgart on 6th September suffered 45 losses out of 338
dispatched (I need to check this; one source says 407 dispatched, but only 262
arrived in the target area owing to lousy weather), i.e at least 13.3% losses.
October 8th - Bremen (relatively shallow penetration) 30 out of 378 dispatched (357
effective), or 7.9%. October 9th, 378 a/c dispatched to targets in Poland and East
Prussia, fortunately most of the trip was over the North Sea and Baltic to points
well beyond the main fighter and flak defenses; even so the defenses were able to
shoot down 28 out of 378 (352 effective sorties), or somewhere between 7.5 and 8%.
October 10th, Munster (relatively shallow), 30 out of 274 dispatched, 10.9%. And
then Second Schweinfurt on October 14th, 60 out of 291 that actually crossed the
defended coast, 20.6% (less if you count the aborts, but I don't have that figure
handy.

Guy

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: Aircrew casualities
>From: Guy Alcala
>Date: 9/29/03 8:36 PM Pacific Daylight Time
>Message-id: <3F78FB42.14031EFC@junkpo

>The scale of losses was a record at that time,

>Guy
>

Yeah.. No way in hell a typicle mission. Those of us who flew missions in the
ETO the word Schweinfort sent shivers down our spines. Does your historical
research allow for shivers down the spine on that never to be forgotten "black"
mission which along with Ploesti defined missions that were pure hell.?


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[Guy Alcala]

ArtKramr wrote:

> >Subject: Re: Aircrew casualities
> >From: Guy Alcala
> >Date: 9/26/03 3:15 PM Pacific Daylight Time
> >Message-id: >
> >
> >ArtKramr wrote:

<snip>

> >> If I think back to the
> >> missions I flew with the 344th and had to name a "typical" mission, I
> >couldn't
> >> do it. We had no typical mssions.. Each one was unique, except of course
> >for
> >> the milk runs, which in themselves were not typical.
> >
> >Sure, but we're looking for statistical data on survival rates, and so far
> >the
> >only such data presented in the course of this thread is that which I
> >provided in
> >that post. Everything else has been perceptual or anecdotal. We now have
> >some
> >actual data (limited to a single mission though it is, and only 60 B-17
> >combat
> >losses out of the 4,688 B-17s combat losses in the European war as a whole),
> >which
> >is more than we've had otherwise.
> >
> >Guy

> You are only saying that because you never had to fly the Schweinfort mission.
> If you had there would be no way in hell you would call it typical.

Juvat has already pointed out that I specifically stated that my comments referred
to the mission tactics, techniques, and weapons employment. As he says, the losses
were unheard of _to that time_, but as I pointed out in my reply to one of his
posts, not all that un-representative of subsequent similar missions.
Regensburg/Schweinfurt was the deepest penetration of Germany to date, but the
results were similar on other missions, if not quite so extreme. In the case of
first Schweinfurt, the German fighter controllers guessed right for the wrong
reasons; they'd re-positioned much of their fighter force to hit the Regensburg
force when it returned to England. That force continued on to Africa, but the
Schweinfurt force came in and returned on virtually the same track (neither force
had the range to take anything other than the most direct route to the target), so
the fighters hit them instead, both coming and going. The only reason they were
able to do so in that case was owing to English weather, and the decision by BG
Anderson to delay the takeoff of the Schweinfurt force for several hours as a
consequence. Sometimes things don't break your way.

> Find me
> one guy who went to Schweinfort and said it was just another mission like all
> others. No big deal. Nothing special. Find me just one such guy. Guy you post a
> lot of good stuff here, but sometimes you just slip away from reality.

How about several guys who went to Regensburg, who Middlebrook interviewed (and he
interviewed crew from every single U.S. bomb and fighter group that took part in
the mission, as well as German crew from every single fighter gruppe, and RAF
pilots from all the RAF fighter squadrons)? It really all depends on where you
were in the formation, and your perspective.
Middlebrook wrote:

"Two of the groups in the leading combat wing - the 96th and 388th - had never been
under serious attack and had so far suffered no casualties [Guy note: on the way in
to Regensburg; the 388th subsequently lost one a/c that ditched short of Africa
after being damaged by flak over the target). Several men in these groups refer to
the Regensburg mission as 'almost like a milk run'. But the officer observing from
the tail turret of the leading plane had been sending a steady stream of reports
about the action which had been taking place further back in the force and
reporting those losses which he could see. LeMay was well aware that his force had
taken heavy casualties."

So, several of the crews who Middlebrook interviewed considered Regensburg "almost
like a milk run," despite the fact that the percentage losses were actually higher
(16.4% vs. 15.7%) than the Schweinfurt force suffered. There were also units on
the First Schweinfurt mission who suffered no or low casualties, and may not have
even seen a German fighter. For those units and crews it was a milk run _for them
personally_. The 303rd and 306th BGs didn't suffer a single loss on First
Schweinfurt, just because the fighters didn't hit them. Other groups got hammered
- the 91st lost 9 of 24 dispatched, the 381st 11 of 26. Both of these groups were
in the lead wing, which took heavy damage. Wings further back in the stream
received much less attention.

Just the opposite was the case with Regensburg, where the lead wing encountered
little opposition, but the trailing wings got hit. Luck of the draw. The main
reason that crews on first Schweinfurt were aware of the heavy losses as a whole
was because they returned over virtually the same route as the way in, so they
could see all the ground fires from crashed a/c. Second Schweinfurt was another
matter; they expected to get hammered, with the experience of the preceding two
months and especially the preceding week as an indication of just what they were
facing. Even so, some units came through Second Schweinfurt without losing an a/c,
including the "Bloody 100th". Of course, the 100th was only able to put up 8 a/c
for that mission, owing to the heavy losses suffered on the Bremen (7) and Munster
(12 of 13!) raids on the 8th and 10th.

Guy

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: Aircrew casualities
>From: Guy Alcala
>Date: 9/29/03 9:27 PM Pacific Daylight Time
>Message-id: >
>
>ArtKramr wrote:
>
>> >Subject: Re: Aircrew casualities
>> >From: Guy Alcala
>> >Date: 9/26/03 3:15 PM Pacific Daylight Time
>> >Message-id: >
>> >
>> >ArtKramr wrote:
>
><snip>
>
>> >> If I think back to the
>> >> missions I flew with the 344th and had to name a "typical" mission, I
>> >couldn't
>> >> do it. We had no typical mssions.. Each one was unique, except of
>course
>> >for
>> >> the milk runs, which in themselves were not typical.
>> >
>> >Sure, but we're looking for statistical data on survival rates, and so far
>> >the
>> >only such data presented in the course of this thread is that which I
>> >provided in
>> >that post. Everything else has been perceptual or anecdotal. We now have
>> >some
>> >actual data (limited to a single mission though it is, and only 60 B-17
>> >combat
>> >losses out of the 4,688 B-17s combat losses in the European war as a
>whole),
>> >which
>> >is more than we've had otherwise.
>> >
>> >Guy
>
>> You are only saying that because you never had to fly the Schweinfort
>mission.
>> If you had there would be no way in hell you would call it typical.
>
>Juvat has already pointed out that I specifically stated that my comments
>referred
>to the mission tactics, techniques, and weapons employment. As he says, the
>losses
>were unheard of _to that time_

That alone makes it atypical.


, but as I pointed out in my reply to one of
>his
>posts, not all that un-representative of subsequent similar missions.
>Regensburg/Schweinfurt was the deepest penetration of Germany to date

Again. atypical.

but
>the
>results were similar on other missions, if not quite so extreme.

Not so extreme?. Hardly typical.

In the case
>of
>first Schweinfurt, the German fighter controllers guessed right for the wrong
>reasons;

Irrelevant to the guys who got hammered and those who were lost.

they'd re-positioned much of their fighter force to hit the
>Regensburg
>force when it returned to England. That force continued on to Africa, but
>the
>Schweinfurt force came in and returned on virtually the same track (neither
>force
>had the range to take anything other than the most direct route to the
>target), so
>the fighters hit them instead, both coming and going. The only reason they
>were
>able to do so in that case was owing to English weather, and the decision by
>BG
>Anderson to delay the takeoff of the Schweinfurt force for several hours as a
>consequence. Sometimes things don't break your way.

Tell me about it.
>
>> Find me
>> one guy who went to Schweinfort and said it was just another mission like
>all
>> others. No big deal. Nothing special. Find me just one such guy. Guy you
>post a
>> lot of good stuff here, but sometimes you just slip away from reality.
>
>How about several guys who went to Regensburg, who Middlebrook interviewed
>(and he
>interviewed crew from every single U.S. bomb and fighter group that took
>part in
>the mission, as well as German crew from every single fighter gruppe, and RAF
>pilots from all the RAF fighter squadrons)? It really all depends on where
>you
>were in the formation, and your perspective.

Y'mean if we put up 56 aircraft and 55 were lost but one got back unscathed we
could write the mission off as a milk run due toi that one plane?


>Middlebrook wrote:
>
>"Two of the groups in the leading combat wing - the 96th and 388th - had
>never been
>under serious attack and had so far suffered no casualties [Guy note: on the
>way in
>to Regensburg; the 388th subsequently lost one a/c that ditched short of
>Africa
>after being damaged by flak over the target). Several men in these groups
>refer to
>the Regensburg mission as 'almost like a milk run'. But the officer
>observing from
>the tail turret of the leading plane had been sending a steady stream of
>reports
>about the action which had been taking place further back in the force and
>reporting those losses which he could see. LeMay was well aware that his
>force had
>taken heavy casualties."

Hardlly typical or a milk run in spite of what one flight had experienced


>So, several of the crews who Middlebrook interviewed considered Regensburg
>"almost
>like a milk run," despite the fact that the percentage losses were actually
>higher
>(16.4% vs. 15.7%) than the Schweinfurt force suffered.


Looks like those "several crews " got it wrong.

There were also units
>on
>the First Schweinfurt mission who suffered no or low casualties, and may not
>have
>even seen a German fighter. For those units and crews it was a milk run _for
>them
>personally_.

Why do you keep evaluating based on "several crews" We evaluate by overall
losses, not by "several crews" To those who never flew a mission. all missions
are milk runs. It all depends on who's ox is gored.






Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[Guy Alcala]

ArtKramr wrote:

> >Subject: Re: Aircrew casualities
> >From: Guy Alcala
> >Date: 9/29/03 9:27 PM Pacific Daylight Time
> >Message-id: >
> >
> >ArtKramr wrote:
> >
> >> >Subject: Re: Aircrew casualities
> >> >From: Guy Alcala
> >> >Date: 9/26/03 3:15 PM Pacific Daylight Time
> >> >Message-id: >
> >> >
> >> >ArtKramr wrote:
> >
> ><snip>
> >
> >> >> If I think back to the
> >> >> missions I flew with the 344th and had to name a "typical" mission, I
> >> >couldn't
> >> >> do it. We had no typical mssions.. Each one was unique, except of
> >course
> >> >for
> >> >> the milk runs, which in themselves were not typical.
> >> >
> >> >Sure, but we're looking for statistical data on survival rates, and so far
> >> >the
> >> >only such data presented in the course of this thread is that which I
> >> >provided in
> >> >that post. Everything else has been perceptual or anecdotal. We now have
> >> >some
> >> >actual data (limited to a single mission though it is, and only 60 B-17
> >> >combat
> >> >losses out of the 4,688 B-17s combat losses in the European war as a
> >whole),
> >> >which
> >> >is more than we've had otherwise.
> >> >
> >> >Guy
> >
> >> You are only saying that because you never had to fly the Schweinfort
> >mission.
> >> If you had there would be no way in hell you would call it typical.
> >
> >Juvat has already pointed out that I specifically stated that my comments
> >referred
> >to the mission tactics, techniques, and weapons employment. As he says, the
> >losses
> >were unheard of _to that time_
>
> That alone makes it atypical.

High percentage losses had been suffered prior to that mission, albeit with
smaller forces dispatched (which is why I left them out). For instance, the
mission to Bremen on 17th April 1943 lost 16 out of 115 dispatched (107
effective), or 13.9%. The mission to Kiel (among several targets; a total of 228
bombers were dispatched) on 13th June lost 22 of 60, which is to say, 36%, far
exceeding the loss rate at Regensburg/Schweinfurt or Second Schweinfurt.


> , but as I pointed out in my reply to one of
> >his
> >posts, not all that un-representative of subsequent similar missions.
> >Regensburg/Schweinfurt was the deepest penetration of Germany to date
>
> Again. atypical.

And again, to that date. Stuttgart on September 6th was about as deep as
Schweinfurt, with similar results (45 losses, 13.3%). As I said, this level of
losses could be expected on such deep penetrations.

> but
> >the
> >results were similar on other missions, if not quite so extreme.
>
> Not so extreme?. Hardly typical.

See above.

>
>
> In the case
> >of
> >first Schweinfurt, the German fighter controllers guessed right for the wrong
> >reasons;
>
> Irrelevant to the guys who got hammered and those who were lost.

Sure. As it happens, the German controllers gambled that we wouldn't dispatch a
second force to targets in northern Germany, as they'd moved all those Gruppes
south, leaving the north unprotected. They were aware that the Regensburg force
was less than half of the available bombers, so were taking a big chance.

> they'd re-positioned much of their fighter force to hit the
> >Regensburg
> >force when it returned to England. That force continued on to Africa, but
> >the
> >Schweinfurt force came in and returned on virtually the same track (neither
> >force
> >had the range to take anything other than the most direct route to the
> >target), so
> >the fighters hit them instead, both coming and going. The only reason they
> >were
> >able to do so in that case was owing to English weather, and the decision by
> >BG
> >Anderson to delay the takeoff of the Schweinfurt force for several hours as a
> >consequence. Sometimes things don't break your way.
>
> Tell me about it.
> >
> >> Find me
> >> one guy who went to Schweinfort and said it was just another mission like
> >all
> >> others. No big deal. Nothing special. Find me just one such guy. Guy you
> >post a
> >> lot of good stuff here, but sometimes you just slip away from reality.
> >
> >How about several guys who went to Regensburg, who Middlebrook interviewed
> >(and he
> >interviewed crew from every single U.S. bomb and fighter group that took
> >part in
> >the mission, as well as German crew from every single fighter gruppe, and RAF
> >pilots from all the RAF fighter squadrons)? It really all depends on where
> >you
> >were in the formation, and your perspective.
>
> Y'mean if we put up 56 aircraft and 55 were lost but one got back unscathed we
> could write the mission off as a milk run due toi that one plane?

Nope, but if your group and wing suffered no or minimal casualties, and you never
saw other groups/wings taking major losses, you'd certainly think it was an easy
mission, now wouldn't you? The higher commanders would think otherwise, but
that's due to the difference in their and your perspective.

> >Middlebrook wrote:
> >
> >"Two of the groups in the leading combat wing - the 96th and 388th - had
> >never been
> >under serious attack and had so far suffered no casualties [Guy note: on the
> >way in
> >to Regensburg; the 388th subsequently lost one a/c that ditched short of
> >Africa
> >after being damaged by flak over the target). Several men in these groups
> >refer to
> >the Regensburg mission as 'almost like a milk run'. But the officer
> >observing from
> >the tail turret of the leading plane had been sending a steady stream of
> >reports
> >about the action which had been taking place further back in the force and
> >reporting those losses which he could see. LeMay was well aware that his
> >force had
> >taken heavy casualties."
>
> Hardlly typical or a milk run in spite of what one flight had experienced

Again, depends on your perspective. It was a milk run for those groups, and not
for others further back. To LeMay, it certainly wasn't a milk run for the 4th
Bomb Wing, although it was a milk run for him personally (he flew in the lead
plane of the 96th BG, leading the first combat wing to Regensburg. As mentioned,
the 96th suffered no casualties, a/c or personnel, at all, one other group in the
combat wing lost one a/c and the high group lost 6 of 21, although one of those
made it to Switzerland and two others ditched out of gas (there'd been a snafu in
the field order, which caused that group, the 390th, to take off well before the
rest of the force).

> >So, several of the crews who Middlebrook interviewed considered Regensburg
> >"almost
> >like a milk run," despite the fact that the percentage losses were actually
> >higher
> >(16.4% vs. 15.7%) than the Schweinfurt force suffered.
>
> Looks like those "several crews " got it wrong.

Not for them, they didn't. For an individual crew, which is harder, a mission
where the force as a whole takes heavy casualties but they themselves are
untouched and unaware of any attacks in their area, or one where the rest of their
unit is undamaged, but they themselves take casualties/are shot down? The latter
would be a milk run from the command perspective, a disaster for them personally.

> There were also units
> >on
> >the First Schweinfurt mission who suffered no or low casualties, and may not
> >have
> >even seen a German fighter. For those units and crews it was a milk run _for
> >them
> >personally_.
>
> Why do you keep evaluating based on "several crews"

I'm doing no such thing. You were the one who asked me to find, "one, just one
guy who went to Schweinfurt and said it was just a mission like all the others.
No big deal. Nothing special." I then provided you with evidence that several
crews going to Regensburg (on the same mission, and suffering higher percentage
losses than the Schweinfurt task force) thought the mission was indeed fairly
quiet, albeit obviously unusual in that it was going so deep and then on to
Africa.

> We evaluate by overall
> losses, not by "several crews" To those who never flew a mission. all missions
> are milk runs. It all depends on who's ox is gored.

And that's the point, it all depends on the perspective of the observer. If
you're commanding an army, you may report your front "quiet, little enemy activity
except patrols," and from your perspective you'd be right; if you happen to be a
private in a squad that ran into an enemy patrol, had a vicious little firefight
lasting several hours and lost two dead and six wounded (including yourself), from
your perspective the war is anything but "quiet, little enemy activity" as your
unit has just suffered somewhere between 66 to 100% casualties, and you'd also be
right.

Guy

[Guy Alcala]

ArtKramr wrote:

> >Subject: Re: Aircrew casualities
> >From: Guy Alcala
> >Date: 9/29/03 8:36 PM Pacific Daylight Time
> >Message-id: <3F78FB42.14031EFC@junkpo
>
> >The scale of losses was a record at that time,
>
> >Guy
> >
>
> Yeah.. No way in hell a typicle mission.

Again, typical referred to the tactics, techniques, and weapons. The losses were
very high, but only a bit outside the normal percentage to be expected for such
missions.

> Those of us who flew missions in the
> ETO the word Schweinfort sent shivers down our spines. Does your historical
> research allow for shivers down the spine on that never to be forgotten "black"
> mission which along with Ploesti defined missions that were pure hell.?

Sure. it also allows for the first big mission to Berlin on March 6th, 1944, where
we lost 69 bombers and 11 fighters, a greater total loss than any other single
mission (but a much smaller pecentage loss than Second Schweinfurt or Kiel, because
far more a/c were involved). It also allows for missions like the one where the
445th BG (Jimmy Stewart's old outfit) was in the wrong place at the wrong time and
suffered the highest losses by any single group on any mission in the war, on a
mission to Kassel on September 27th, 1944. IIRR, they lost 24 or 25 B-24s out of
30 or so. But the force as a whole took average casualties, because the 445th took
almost all the casualties sustained. So, from the force commander's perspective,
it was a typical mission, but from the 445th's perspective it was a unique
disaster. Both are correct.

Guy

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: Aircrew casualities
>From: Guy Alcala
>Date: 9/30/03 12:01 PM Pacific Daylight Time
>Message-id: >

>And that's the point, it all depends on the perspective of the observer. If
>you're commanding an army, you may report your front "quiet, little enemy
>activity
>except patrols," and from your perspective you'd be right; if you happen to
>be a
>private in a squad that ran into an enemy patrol, had a vicious little
>firefight
>lasting several hours and lost two dead and six wounded (including yourself),
>from
>your perspective the war is anything but "quiet, little enemy activity" as
>your
>unit has just suffered somewhere between 66 to 100% casualties, and you'd
>also be
>right.
>
>Guy
>
>


Well, let me tell you about the perspective of the observer. The best way to
"observe" mission results is to get back to your base, have a few drinks at the
OC then go count the empty bunks. Everything else is just crap.


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[Guy Alcala]

We'd been discussing the types of parachutes used by VIIIth
AF crews, and whether they were worn or not in the heavies.
I've just retrieved a copy of Roger Freeman's "Mighty Eighth
War Manual," which goes into great detail on all manner of
operational procedures, equipment, weapons, bases, etc.
Here's most of his section on parachutes (I've left out the
section on fighters):

"VIII BC groups were equipped with five different types of
parachute during the early days of operations. These were
seat-pack types, S-1 and S-2, back pack types B-7 and
P3-E-24 and a few US chest packs AN 6513-1, a new design. A
study carried out in January 1943 showed that most B-17 and
B-24 pilots and co-pilots wore seat type parachutes;
bombardiers, navigators, waist and radio gunners used seat
and back types. Very few turret gunners found they could
wear a parachute while at their stations. B-17 tail gunners
used back types. Because of the fatigue caused by the
additional weight and interference with movement, half the
men who could wear parachutes did not. The parachutes were
therefore placed at the nearest handy spot, crew members
trusting that they would have enough time to retrieve them
and get into the harness, although pilots and ball turret
gunners took a very fatalistic view of their chances if
forced to bail out. With the exception of the chest type,
all these parachutes had attached harness requiring three or
four separate actions to attach and detach, without any
provision for attaching individual life-saving dinghies."

"Pilots wearing seat packs found that they could not get out
of their seats without first unbuckling leg straps. Even
the quick attachment AN 6513-1 chest pack parachute was
found far from satisfactory, chiefly because its fixings
were not sufficiently strong. To improve the situation, in
June 1943 the 8th Air Force Central Medical Establishment
recommended that all bomber crews wear the RAF quick-release
harness and observer chest-pack parachute until better types
were forthcoming from the USA. The advantages were that the
harness could be worn at all times and in one operation
could be quickly and completely removed; both parachute and
dinghy packs were quickly attached to it by simple snap
hooks. Some back-pack parachutes were retained for special
purposes and the US chest pack, AN 6513-1, continued to be
used until sufficient Observer packs were available. Also
the harness for the aN 6513-1 was modified for quick
attachment and many canopies from back and seat packs were
repacked in the British chest packs."

"RAF Observer chest packs were supplied to all 8th Air Force
bomber groups until a new US chest pack with nylon canopies
was received in 1944. Despite successful projects to modify
ball turrets to enable gunners to wear a back-pack, no
similar move was made in production and escape from this
crew station remained the most precarious."

Guy

[Juvat]

After an exhausting session with Victoria's Secret Police, Guy Alcala
blurted out:

>I've just retrieved a copy of Roger Freeman's "Mighty Eighth
>War Manual," which...

....is a great resource. Couple years ago down at the Archives at
Maxwell, I heard a resident PhD War College staffer discuss Freeman's
work with one of Art's contemporaries. I chimed in how I thought the
"War Manual" was his best (at least my favorite)...the good doctor
scrunched up his forehead, "but it's just tactics and formations..."

I just smiled...different strokes I guess.

Juvat

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: Aircrew casualities
>From: Juvat
>Date: 10/1/03 9:36 PM Pacific Daylight Time
>Message-id: >
>
>After an exhausting session with Victoria's Secret Police, Guy Alcala
>blurted out:
>
>>I've just retrieved a copy of Roger Freeman's "Mighty Eighth
>>War Manual," which...
>
>...is a great resource. Couple years ago down at the Archives at
>Maxwell, I heard a resident PhD War College staffer discuss Freeman's
>work with one of Art's contemporaries. I chimed in how I thought the
>"War Manual" was his best (at least my favorite)...the good doctor
>scrunched up his forehead, "but it's just tactics and formations..."
>
>I just smiled...different strokes I guess.
>
>Juvat
>


Just curious. Did Freeman actually fly missions with the 8th?


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[Guy Alcala]

ArtKramr wrote:

> >Subject: Re: Aircrew casualities
> >From: Juvat
> >Date: 10/1/03 9:36 PM Pacific Daylight Time
> >Message-id: >
> >
> >After an exhausting session with Victoria's Secret Police, Guy Alcala
> >blurted out:
> >
> >>I've just retrieved a copy of Roger Freeman's "Mighty Eighth
> >>War Manual," which...
> >
> >...is a great resource. Couple years ago down at the Archives at
> >Maxwell, I heard a resident PhD War College staffer discuss Freeman's
> >work with one of Art's contemporaries. I chimed in how I thought the
> >"War Manual" was his best (at least my favorite)...the good doctor
> >scrunched up his forehead, "but it's just tactics and formations..."
> >
> >I just smiled...different strokes I guess.
> >
> >Juvat
> >
>
> Just curious. Did Freeman actually fly missions with the 8th?

Nope, he was an English kid who lived near one of the bomber bases during
the war, and spent a lot of time hanging out there (the ground crews let
him). Since then he's become unquestionably the foremost historian of the
8th AF, although his aviation interest extend somewhat beyond that -- do a
google or amazon.com search on Roger A. Freeman. ISTR that he's also
involved in the 2nd Air Division Memorial Library in Norwich, England -

http://www.2ndair.org.uk/new%20pages/library.htm

Guy

[lisieux]

(ArtKramr) wrote in message >...
> >Subject: Re: Aircrew casualities
> >From: "Erik Plagen"
> >Date: 9/16/03 11:36 AM Pacific Daylight Time
> >Message-id: >
>
> >ArtKramr" <wrote in message
> >> The common wisdom in WW II was that tail gunners and bombardiers suffered
> the
> >> highest casualties among bomber aircrews. Anyone have any actual
> statistics on
> >> aircrew casualties by position in USAAC bombers?
>
> > 'COMMON WISDOM" OF WHOM?
>
> Those of us who were there.
>
>
> Arthur Kramer
> 344th BG 494th BS
> England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
> Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
> http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer


:o))

[lisieux]

Mike Marron > wrote in message >...
> >"Erik Plagen" > wrote:
> >>Mike Marron wrote:
>
> >>Haven't you heard all the stories of the Luftwaffe strafing downed
> >>allied pilots coming down their chutes >
>
> >That;s all they were- "stories" or fairy tales!
>
> >We never tried to shoot down Crew Members in their chutes!
>
> >You are thinking of the Japanese.
>
> Nope, I'm thinking of the Germans. In fact, I've heard Chuck Yeager
> himself during an interview describe how the Germans were known
> to strafe downed allied airmen descending in their chutes.
>
> Note the part in the story below that says, "Careful to delay pulling
> his ripcord."


It is very unlikely that any Luftwaffe pilot would shoot an American
pilot in his chute if he was descending on their territory. The
description you posted would suggest that the experienced German
pilots were to be destroyed as they landed or took off and the
amateurs might be relied upon to kill themselves.

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: Aircrew casualities
>From: Guy Alcala
>Date: 10/3/03 11:45 PM Pacific Daylight Time
>Message-id: >
>
>ArtKramr wrote:
>
>> >Subject: Re: Aircrew casualities
>> >From: Juvat
>> >Date: 10/1/03 9:36 PM Pacific Daylight Time
>> >Message-id: >
>> >
>> >After an exhausting session with Victoria's Secret Police, Guy Alcala
>> >blurted out:
>> >
>> >>I've just retrieved a copy of Roger Freeman's "Mighty Eighth
>> >>War Manual," which...
>> >
>> >...is a great resource. Couple years ago down at the Archives at
>> >Maxwell, I heard a resident PhD War College staffer discuss Freeman's
>> >work with one of Art's contemporaries. I chimed in how I thought the
>> >"War Manual" was his best (at least my favorite)...the good doctor
>> >scrunched up his forehead, "but it's just tactics and formations..."
>> >
>> >I just smiled...different strokes I guess.
>> >
>> >Juvat
>> >
>>
>> Just curious. Did Freeman actually fly missions with the 8th?
>
>Nope, he was an English kid who lived near one of the bomber bases during
>the war, and spent a lot of time hanging out there (the ground crews let
>him). Since then he's become unquestionably the foremost historian of the
>8th AF, although his aviation interest extend somewhat beyond that -- do a
>google or amazon.com search on Roger A. Freeman. ISTR that he's also
>involved in the 2nd Air Division Memorial Library in Norwich, England -
>
>http://www.2ndair.org.uk/new%20pages/library.htm
>
>Guy
>


In a previous post you quoted Freeman on how parachutes were handled in the
eigth. The descriptions you gave were in direct contradiction to my experiences
in the 9th. I never flew with the 8th, so I won't comment, but the idea that
aircrews flew with their harnesse and chutes off and, "had to go look for them
before bailing out" defies logic as well as my expereinces. We flew with our
chutes on for the full length of the missions. Would never think of flying
otherwise. That is why I asked if he actually flew missions with the 8th. It is
interesting to find out he never did.

Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[Guy Alcala]

ArtKramr wrote:

> >Subject: Re: Aircrew casualities
> >From: Guy Alcala
> >Date: 10/3/03 11:45 PM Pacific Daylight Time
> >Message-id: >
> >
> >ArtKramr wrote:

<snip>

> >> Just curious. Did Freeman actually fly missions with the 8th?
> >
> >Nope, he was an English kid who lived near one of the bomber bases during
> >the war, and spent a lot of time hanging out there (the ground crews let
> >him). Since then he's become unquestionably the foremost historian of the
> >8th AF, although his aviation interest extend somewhat beyond that -- do a
> >google or amazon.com search on Roger A. Freeman. ISTR that he's also
> >involved in the 2nd Air Division Memorial Library in Norwich, England -
> >
> >http://www.2ndair.org.uk/new%20pages/library.htm
> >
> >Guy
> >
>
> In a previous post you quoted Freeman on how parachutes were handled in the
> eigth. The descriptions you gave were in direct contradiction to my experiences
> in the 9th. I never flew with the 8th, so I won't comment, but the idea that
> aircrews flew with their harnesse and chutes off and, "had to go look for them
> before bailing out" defies logic as well as my expereinces. We flew with our
> chutes on for the full length of the missions. Would never think of flying
> otherwise. That is why I asked if he actually flew missions with the 8th. It is
> interesting to find out he never did.

You'll note that he describes the use of chutes from 1942 on, while equipment was
constantly changing. By 1944, much practical experience had been gained, equipment
and techniques modified, etc., all of which he noted. I've read numerous accounts
by 8th AF bomber crews dexcribing having to attach chutes before they can bail
out. As has Freeman, as well as him having interviewed hundreds if not thousands
of aircrew over the years. And the quote you reference was taken from an 8th AF
study and questionnaire done in January 1943; what reason would the crews have to
lie about what they did?

I'd also point out that 8th AF missions were considerably longer than 9th AF ones,
and were also flown at high altitude on oxygen while wearing heavy clothing to
protect them from the sub-zero temperatures (the electric suits were very
unreliable prior to a redesign that only became available in 1944). Crews (even
those wearing the electric suits) also wore full sheepskin clothes over them in
case the suits failed, so bulk was more of an issue; moving around was very
fatiguing, especially when wearing flak suits as well. I don't know if the later
flak suits could be worn over parachutes, chest pack or otherwise, but it doesn't
appear that the earlier ones could be. Still doubt that they didn't normally wear
chutes? Here's some crew accounts, from the Regensburg/Schweinfurt mission, given
in interviews to Martin Middlebrook. I've edited them for length, with ellipsis
used to mark those sections:

[Tony Arcaro, pilot, 91st BG] "I decided that I had to order the crew to abandon
ship -- it was all that fuel I was worried about. . . . I put it on automatic and
managed to get my chest pack on. Then I dove right from the flight deck out
through the front hatch -- right through the fire. I cleared it just like a
champion diver; I never even bumped the side."

[An anonymous bombardier, presumably to spare the feelings of any family members of
the pilot and co-pilot who might read it]:

"Then I poked my head up into the cockpit. The top turret gunner was all right; he
was getting out of his turret. I could only see the backs of the two pilot's seats
and all I could see was that they were both immobile. The instruments were all
shot away, hit from the front and blown inwards. . . . "

"The top turret gunner said, 'Let's get out of here.' I crawled back to the nose
and got my chest parachute and told the navigator we had got to go. For some
reason I had always had a fear of parachuting and often said that I would never do
it but, when the time came, I never gave it a second thought." [Middlebrook notes
that both pilots had been decapitated by the cannon rounds that had hit the
cockpit]

[An anonymous navigator, for similar reasons as that above] "I turned away from my
gun, picked up my parachute from the bench and put it on. . . ."

[2nd Lt. Walter Brown, Bombardier, 91st BG] ". . . The whole wing just flopped off
outside Number 2 engine and that was it. No one really had much chance to get a
parachute on. I had seen two planes collide over England and a good buddy of mine
was the only one to get out. He'd been wearing a back-pack so I always wore one
after that -- the only one in the crew to do so. The navigator was at his table
and was able to reach out and grab his chest-pack quickly. He only got one of the
clips fastened when the centrifugal force pinned us both to the floor. He was
being throttled by his oxygen tube but I was able to reach up and unplug it from
the wall for him. I never heard a word from or had a chance to see the others from
beginning to end."

"I didn't realize we were spinning -- you lose the horizon and you have no idea
what position you are in -- but my pal in another a/c told me that that we made
three or three and a half turns and then the plane disintegrated. I don't know
whether there was an explosion or not; centrifugal force can be enough to tear a
plane apart. All I know is that I went flying out the plexiglass window. The
glass wasn't there but the nose gun was and I hit it with my back. I'm sure that
would have killed me if I hadn't had the back parachute pack on. I reckon that
backpack saved my life twice." [The only other survivor of this crew was the
navigator he mentioned, 2nd Lt. Edgar Yelle]

Convinced? Now let's jump forward from August 17th, 1943, to April 7th, 1945.
This is from an account of his 34th mission by 2nd Lt. Walter F. Hughes, in his
self-published book "A Bomber Pilot in World War II." Hughes flew B-24s in the
93rd BG:

"543 F, the ship we were assigned had a standard soft pilot's seat. The pilots
were protected by a flak curtain which hung from the ceiling about a foot behind
the seats. When I checked the plane I found that some flak-happy pilot had lined
the seat and back with several layers of flak vests. I hadn't seen that done
before so I shrugged my shoulders and replaced the cushions. Old pilots liked this
seat because they could wear a backpack parachute while flying, whereas with the
other seat, a box made of armor plate, the pilots could not get out with a
parachute on. In planes with that seat, the parchute was hung on a hook on the
flight deck out of the pilot's reach. If a plane was spinning, or there was fire
on the flight deck, there was no way a pilot could get to his parachute. He could
squeeze out the pilot's window, but to no purpose without a chute. . . ."

The rest of his account doesn't describe a bailout; rather, a fighter attack that
caused a cannon shell to penetrate the armor next to him and explode against the
flak curtain behind him, wounding the co-pilot and radio operator, and "The flak
vests lining the seat were absolutely chewed to pieces. Had they not been there, my
backside would have been full of holes, big ones." So it's a tradeoff. The
armored seat undoubtedly provided better protection than the flak suits, but made
it harder to bail out in certain conditions.

Guy

[[email protected]]

Guy Alcala > wrote:

> In planes with that seat, the parchute was hung on a hook on the
>flight deck out of the pilot's reach. If a plane was spinning, or there was fire
>on the flight deck, there was no way a pilot could get to his parachute. He could
>squeeze out the pilot's window, but to no purpose without a chute. . . ."
>

This sounds reasonable of course...I've seen where Art says that
they always wore the harness and the chestpack chute but It seems
to me that it would be pretty inconvenient to get any work done
that way.

I've never flown during wartime but we used the harness and
chestpack on the Lancaster during ASW ops in peacetime. We always
wore the harness but never the chestpack, that sucker is big,
about 1.5 feet wide, 8 - 10 inches 'deep' and about 8 - 10 inches
'fore and aft'. It's heavy too, likely 25 pounds or so. I just
can't imagine moving around much with that thing dangling from
your chest for 6 - 8 hours...BUT...I wasn't there and war can do
funny things to one I'm sure.

I mean nothing derogatory by that either...it was just a
different time, one that I'm not familiar with. Thank God.
--

-Gord.

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: Aircrew casualities
>From: Guy Alcala
>Date: 10/4/03 1:31 PM Pacific Daylight Time
>Message-id: >
>
>ArtKramr wrote:
>
>> >Subject: Re: Aircrew casualities
>> >From: Guy Alcala
>> >Date: 10/3/03 11:45 PM Pacific Daylight Time
>> >Message-id: >
>> >
>> >ArtKramr wrote:
>
><snip>
>
>> >> Just curious. Did Freeman actually fly missions with the 8th?
>> >
>> >Nope, he was an English kid who lived near one of the bomber bases during
>> >the war, and spent a lot of time hanging out there (the ground crews let
>> >him). Since then he's become unquestionably the foremost historian of the
>> >8th AF, although his aviation interest extend somewhat beyond that -- do a
>> >google or amazon.com search on Roger A. Freeman. ISTR that he's also
>> >involved in the 2nd Air Division Memorial Library in Norwich, England -
>> >
>> >http://www.2ndair.org.uk/new%20pages/library.htm
>> >
>> >Guy
>> >
>>
>> In a previous post you quoted Freeman on how parachutes were handled in the
>> eigth. The descriptions you gave were in direct contradiction to my
>experiences
>> in the 9th. I never flew with the 8th, so I won't comment, but the idea
>that
>> aircrews flew with their harnesse and chutes off and, "had to go look for
>them
>> before bailing out" defies logic as well as my expereinces. We flew with
>our
>> chutes on for the full length of the missions. Would never think of flying
>> otherwise. That is why I asked if he actually flew missions with the

Wait a minute Guy. This last post gives a different impession than the first
post. n this last post everyone seems to have worn their harnesses and it was
just a question of snapping on the chest pack OK that makes more sense. I can
buy that. In this post you never mention no harnesses, they all had hanresses
on and snapping on a chest pack takes all of two seconds. It takes a long time
to get onto a harness unaided and some guys can't do it alone. My waist gunner
always needed help. Your first post is rather different than this post. BTW, I
almost always wore my harness and chest pack under my flak suit.If not I had
it right next to me and could snap it on in a secnod after I took off my flak
jacket off. I never had to go look for it. Safety first every time. It was
dangerous up there. You might be interested in reading, "Sgt Greigos Flak
Jacket" on my website.

Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: Aircrew casualities
>From: "Gord Beaman" )
>Date: 10/4/03 3:07 PM Pacific Daylight Time
>Message-id: >

>This sounds reasonable of course...I've seen where Art says that
>they always wore the harness and the chestpack chute but It seems
>to me that it would be pretty inconvenient to get any work done
>that way.

Got work done fine. Never gave it a thought. But I would think long and hard
before snapping that chest pack off.

>I've never flown during wartime but we used the harness and
>chestpack on the Lancaster during ASW ops in peacetime. We always
>wore the harness but never the chestpack, that sucker is big,
>about 1.5 feet wide, 8 - 10 inches 'deep' and about 8 - 10 inches
>'fore and aft'. It's heavy too, likely 25 pounds or so. I just
>can't imagine moving around much with that thing dangling from
>your chest for 6 - 8 hours...BUT...I wasn't there and war can do
>funny things to one I'm sure.
>
>I mean nothing derogatory by that either...it was just a
>different time, one that I'm not familiar with. Thank God.
>--
>
>-Gord.


We could take a direct hit from flak any second and our escape time could be
counted in nanoseconds. We all flew with out chutes on. And harnesses strapped
tight. Very tight. Go to my website and see the photo, "One went down". That
says it all when it comes to chutes.



Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[Guy Alcala]

ArtKramr wrote:

> >Subject: Re: Aircrew casualities
> >From: Guy Alcala
> >Date: 10/4/03 1:31 PM Pacific Daylight Time
> >Message-id: >
> >
> >ArtKramr wrote:
> >
> >> >Subject: Re: Aircrew casualities
> >> >From: Guy Alcala
> >> >Date: 10/3/03 11:45 PM Pacific Daylight Time
> >> >Message-id: >
> >> >
> >> >ArtKramr wrote:
> >
> ><snip>
> >
> >> >> Just curious. Did Freeman actually fly missions with the 8th?
> >> >
> >> >Nope, he was an English kid who lived near one of the bomber bases during
> >> >the war, and spent a lot of time hanging out there (the ground crews let
> >> >him). Since then he's become unquestionably the foremost historian of the
> >> >8th AF, although his aviation interest extend somewhat beyond that -- do a
> >> >google or amazon.com search on Roger A. Freeman. ISTR that he's also
> >> >involved in the 2nd Air Division Memorial Library in Norwich, England -
> >> >
> >> >http://www.2ndair.org.uk/new%20pages/library.htm
> >> >
> >> >Guy
> >> >
> >>
> >> In a previous post you quoted Freeman on how parachutes were handled in the
> >> eigth. The descriptions you gave were in direct contradiction to my
> >experiences
> >> in the 9th. I never flew with the 8th, so I won't comment, but the idea
> >that
> >> aircrews flew with their harnesse and chutes off and, "had to go look for
> >them
> >> before bailing out" defies logic as well as my expereinces. We flew with
> >our
> >> chutes on for the full length of the missions. Would never think of flying
> >> otherwise. That is why I asked if he actually flew missions with the
>
> Wait a minute Guy. This last post gives a different impession than the first
> post. n this last post everyone seems to have worn their harnesses and it was
> just a question of snapping on the chest pack OK that makes more sense. I can
> buy that. In this post you never mention no harnesses, they all had hanresses
> on and snapping on a chest pack takes all of two seconds. It takes a long time
> to get onto a harness unaided and some guys can't do it alone. My waist gunner
> always needed help. Your first post is rather different than this post.

Yes, the first post did mention the difference. I'll repeat the relevant section
from Freeman:

"VIII BC groups were equipped with five different types of
parachute during the early days of operations. These were
seat-pack types, S-1 and S-2, back pack types B-7 and
P3-E-24 and a few US chest packs AN 6513-1, a new design. A
study carried out in January 1943 showed that most B-17 and
B-24 pilots and co-pilots wore seat type parachutes;
bombardiers, navigators, waist and radio gunners used seat
and back types. Very few turret gunners found they could
wear a parachute while at their stations. B-17 tail gunners
used back types. Because of the fatigue caused by the
additional weight and interference with movement, half the
men who could wear parachutes did not. The parachutes were
therefore placed at the nearest handy spot, crew members
trusting that they would have enough time to retrieve them
and get into the harness, although pilots and ball turret
gunners took a very fatalistic view of their chances if
forced to bail out. With the exception of the chest type,
all these parachutes had attached harness requiring three or
four separate actions to attach and detach, without any
provision for attaching individual life-saving dinghies."
------------------------------------------------------

<Guy Again> So, as of January 1943, the main types in use were seat and backpacks,
which all lacked quick attach fittings. Crews found them uncomfortable, and half
of them didn't wear them until needed. Only the new chest pack had (relatively)
quick attach fittings, but it had deficiencies as well, as noted below:

<Freeman again>

"Pilots wearing seat packs found that they could not get out
of their seats without first unbuckling leg straps. Even
the quick attachment AN 6513-1 chest pack parachute was
found far from satisfactory, chiefly because its fixings
were not sufficiently strong. To improve the situation, in
June 1943 the 8th Air Force Central Medical Establishment
recommended that all bomber crews wear the RAF quick-release
harness and observer chest-pack parachute until better types
were forthcoming from the USA. The advantages were that the
harness could be worn at all times and in one operation
could be quickly and completely removed; both parachute and
dinghy packs were quickly attached to it by simple snap
hooks. Some back-pack parachutes were retained for special
purposes and the US chest pack, AN 6513-1, continued to be
used until sufficient Observer packs were available. Also
the harness for the AN 6513-1 was modified for quick
attachment and many canopies from back and seat packs were
repacked in the British chest packs."

<Guy again> From June 1943, the chest pack harness is modified, but 8th AF crews
are beginning to be issued with RAF harnesses and Observer chest chute packs, as
the best available type.

<Freeman>

"RAF Observer chest packs were supplied to all 8th Air Force
bomber groups until a new US chest pack with nylon canopies
was received in 1944. Despite successful projects to modify
ball turrets to enable gunners to wear a back-pack, no
similar move was made in production and escape from this
crew station remained the most precarious."


> BTW, I
> almost always wore my harness and chest pack under my flak suit.If not I had
> it right next to me and could snap it on in a secnod after I took off my flak
> jacket off. I never had to go look for it. Safety first every time. It was
> dangerous up there. You might be interested in reading, "Sgt Greigos Flak
> Jacket" on my website.

I've read it. It was fairly common for 8th crews to try and snag extra suits to
use under/around them. At least one tail gunner was notorious for building himself
a cocoon of flak suits, which the pilot would tell him to get rid of as it screwed
up the Cg. Other gunners preferred to stand on extras, and according to one such
gunner they eventually got flak mats designed for the purpose. I've been unable to
confirm manufacture of such, but on that subject, flak suits underwent considerable
development. Freeman:

"Battle armor. Aware that a large proportion of wounds sustained by bomber crewmen
were made by low-velocity missiles, in the autumn of 1942 Brig. Gen. Malcolm Grow,
8th AF chief surgeon, became interested in the provision of lightweight body
armour. Using information from British experiments, which showed that magnesium
steel plates of 20 gauge would stop a .303 bullet when the muzzle velocity was
reduced to 1300 feet (396m) per second, the Wilkinson Sword Company were asked to
make one bulletproof vest. The plates were 1 3/4 inches (44mm) wide, of varying
length and arranged with a 3/8 inch overlap. This body armor, which came to be
known as a 'flak vest' or 'flak suit', weighed 20 lb. (9 kg). The plates were held
in heavy canvas and the whole, designed to be worn over the parachute harness, was
quickly removed by a pull cord. Production of an experimental batch was authorized
on 15 October 1942 and the first operational use was on 12 December when worn by
two crews of 322nd Bomb Squadron, 91st Group. No tagnible evidence of their value
was acquired on this mission but on 20 December at least one crewmember would have
been seriously wounded if he had not been wearing a flak suit. Thereafter combat
crews showed much more interest. An investigation carried out early in 1943
established that of combat wound causes 40% were flak shrapnel, 40% 20mm shrapnel,
10% machine gun bullets and 10% fragments of a/c structure blasted by shell hits.
Later the value of body armor was established by the fact that two-thirds of men
hit by missiles or fragments while wearing flak jackets escaped injury, and only
8.2% of the remainder were killed."

"Wilkinson's production was supplemented by US made flak suits late in 1943. Four
models were available: M-1, a vest with armored front and back panels, similar to
the original Wilkinson vest, weighing 18 lb. 2 oz. (8.7 kg); the M-2 vest weighing
9 lb. (4 kg), armored in the front only and intended for use by men in armored
seats; M-3 weighing 4 3/4 lb. (2.1 kg), a tapered apron for men in a sitting
position where the lower part of the body required protection and the M-4 weighing
7 1/2 lb. (3.4 kg), protecting the full frontal body area, usually worn by standing
gunners. The M-5 covered legs and groin and was produced for pilots."

He then goes on to describes the use of and modifications to helmets.

Guy

[funkraum]

> Guy Alcala > wrote:
>> Mike Marron wrote:
>>> "Erik Plagen" > wrote:
>>>> Mike Marron wrote:

>> >"Erik Plagen" > wrote:
>> >>Mike Marron wrote:
>>
>> >>Haven't you heard all the stories of the Luftwaffe strafing downed
>> >>allied pilots coming down their chutes >
>>
>> >That;s all they were- "stories" or fairy tales!
>>
>> >We never tried to shoot down Crew Members in their chutes!
>>
>> >You are thinking of the Japanese.
>>
>> Nope, I'm thinking of the Germans. In fact, I've heard Chuck Yeager
>> himself during an interview describe how the Germans were known
>> to strafe downed allied airmen descending in their chutes.
>
><snip>
>
>There were certainly instances (on both sides) of this happening, and it
>was widely believed (again, by both sides) that the other side was just
>looking for opportunities to do so, but it was an individual thing, not an
>order. It tended to be crews with better reasons to hate, i.e. a pilot
>whose family had been killed by bombing, or pilots of some of the occupied
>countries (the Poles come to mind). And there were the occasional
>bloodthirsty or just plain ruthless types on both sides.
>

"bloodthirsty or just plain ruthless types" - or the just plain
stupid, who do not realise that in fact it will be his own fellow
aviators who will be killed in the spiral which he has initiated, and
for something they never had anything to do with.


Overall an excellent appraisal Mr Alacala. And applicable not just to
bailed-out aircrew. Similar with "machine-gunned in the water" after
abandoning ship, "took no prisoners", "are killing our PoWs" ,etc. The
rumour is the dangerous since it can get the whole thing started
without anyone ever committing such an act.

Unfortunately, it cannot be undone by reversing the spiral, i.e.
circling back over the recently landed aviator as he gathers his
'chute and dropping a picnic hamper and a bottle of Beaujolais Premier
or similar.