Re: Can F-15s making 9G turns with payload?

[Paul J. Adam]

In message >, Hobo
> writes
>
>At http://www.israeli-weapons.com/weapons/aircraft/f-15i/F-
>15I.html I found this quote:
>
>"Among other elements tested were the plane's performance at speeds
>greater than Mach 2, and at maximum maneuver load at 9g."
>
>I thought that F-15s can only make 7G turns and that they can only make
>3G turns with a bomb load or the bombs tear off the mounts. What is the
>correct information on these subjects?

Classified, so I don't know.

Open-source suggest a ~7.5G limit on clean Eagles armed air/air (that's
a _lot_ of turn for a big-winged big-engined fighter like the F-15).
Strike loads will be a lot lower and 3G is low but not incredible (if
you have to yank-and-bank you jettison your bombs: it's a relatively
recent idea that you fight through and press on)

--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBox<at>jrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

[Scott Ferrin]

On Wed, 17 Sep 2003 23:45:35 +0100, "Paul J. Adam"
> wrote:

>In message >, Hobo
> writes
>>
>>At http://www.israeli-weapons.com/weapons/aircraft/f-15i/F-
>>15I.html I found this quote:
>>
>>"Among other elements tested were the plane's performance at speeds
>>greater than Mach 2, and at maximum maneuver load at 9g."
>>
>>I thought that F-15s can only make 7G turns and that they can only make
>>3G turns with a bomb load or the bombs tear off the mounts. What is the
>>correct information on these subjects?
>
>Classified, so I don't know.
>
>Open-source suggest a ~7.5G limit on clean Eagles armed air/air (that's
>a _lot_ of turn for a big-winged big-engined fighter like the F-15).
>Strike loads will be a lot lower and 3G is low but not incredible (if
>you have to yank-and-bank you jettison your bombs: it's a relatively
>recent idea that you fight through and press on)


I've read in several places that the Es are stressed for 9gs, not the
previous 7.5.

[AL]

IIRC that is for a clean E.

Scott Ferrin wrote:

>On Wed, 17 Sep 2003 23:45:35 +0100, "Paul J. Adam"
> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>I've read in several places that the Es are stressed for 9gs, not the
>previous 7.5.
>
>

--
AL
New anti-terrorism tool, "Fly naked"
http://www.alfredivy.per.sg

[Walt BJ]

Info sounds odd to me. 7.5 G is a standard operating limit for USAF
fighters. The F16's 9G in non-standard. Both limits offer a 1.5 safety
factor. Again, standard. 3G limit for carrying bombs is awfully low.
We used 4G as a standard pull-out in the F4, 5g if we were pressing
for greater accuracy. I managed to pull 8 once in an extremity (we
were getting hosed) and nothing fell off. Continued with the mission
and the rest of the bombs came off as designed. As for the 15
sustaining 9G, I shouldn't wonder, considering the excess power the
aircraft has and also that no altitude was mentioned. I do know from
personal experience that at sea level the F104A and the F4 would
sustain 7G at 500KIAS as long as the fuel lasted (or the crew). The
F15 has a lot more excess power than either of those aircraft.
Walt BJ

[Guy Alcala]

Walt BJ wrote:

> Info sounds odd to me. 7.5 G is a standard operating limit for USAF
> fighters. The F16's 9G in non-standard. Both limits offer a 1.5 safety
> factor.

The F-15A/B had a +7.33G limit. The F-15C/D was given an overload warning
system that allows it to "maneuver safely to the 9G limit of the airframe
at all design gross weights", or so Dennis Jenkins writes in the Warbirds
Tech Manual for the F-15. At least some F-15As were modified to allow
them to do the same; ISTR this may have involved some minor airframe
strengthening.

> Again, standard. 3G limit for carrying bombs is awfully low.
> We used 4G as a standard pull-out in the F4, 5g if we were pressing
> for greater accuracy.

ISTR that the F-15's MER-200s were designed for +7.33G max., while the
previous generation's (i.e. your F-4) were designed for 5G. I couldn't
say what the CFTs were rated at.

Guy

[Buzzer]

On 17 Sep 2003 19:49:33 -0700, (Walt BJ) wrote:

>Info sounds odd to me. 7.5 G is a standard operating limit for USAF
>fighters. The F16's 9G in non-standard. Both limits offer a 1.5 safety
>factor. Again, standard. 3G limit for carrying bombs is awfully low.
>We used 4G as a standard pull-out in the F4, 5g if we were pressing
>for greater accuracy. I managed to pull 8 once in an extremity (we
>were getting hosed) and nothing fell off.

8gs? No wonder the F-4C wing tips developed cracks.<G>

[Ed Rasimus]

(Walt BJ) wrote:


>We used 4G as a standard pull-out in the F4, 5g if we were pressing
>for greater accuracy. I managed to pull 8 once in an extremity (we
>were getting hosed) and nothing fell off.

Got this among a list of quotes from a reasonably erudite fighter
pilot:

"The aircraft G-limits are only there in case there is another flight
by that particular airplane. If subsequent flights do not appear
likely, there are no G-limits."

Makes a lot of sense to me.



Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (ret)
***"When Thunder Rolled:
*** An F-105 Pilot Over N. Vietnam"
*** from Smithsonian Books
ISBN: 1588341038

[Scott Ferrin]

On Thu, 18 Sep 2003 13:47:22 GMT, Ed Rasimus >
wrote:

(Walt BJ) wrote:
>
>
>>We used 4G as a standard pull-out in the F4, 5g if we were pressing
>>for greater accuracy. I managed to pull 8 once in an extremity (we
>>were getting hosed) and nothing fell off.
>
>Got this among a list of quotes from a reasonably erudite fighter
>pilot:
>
>"The aircraft G-limits are only there in case there is another flight
>by that particular airplane. If subsequent flights do not appear
>likely, there are no G-limits."
>
>Makes a lot of sense to me.



REad of a Skyray pulling 12 Gs and wrinked the wing. Don't know if it
ever flew again. And also of a Tomcat that did a NEGATIVE 8+ (they
didn't have a choice). I think the Tomcat flew again.

[Chad Irby]

In article >,
"José Herculano" > wrote:

> Maximum I read regarding the Phantom was a guy in Vietnam pulling 14 G to
> get an ass-SAM divergence. The bird held and landed.

I know there were a couple of cases in Vietnam where F-4s made hard
enough turns to rip the ECM pods off...

--


Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

[Peter Kemp]

On Thu, 18 Sep 2003 19:03:03 +0100, "José Herculano"
> wrote:

>> "The aircraft G-limits are only there in case there is another flight
>> by that particular airplane. If subsequent flights do not appear
>> likely, there are no G-limits."
>
>Maximum I read regarding the Phantom was a guy in Vietnam pulling 14 G to
>get an ass-SAM divergence. The bird held and landed. An Argentinian 707
>shadowing the British fleet pulled 7 G to avoid a couple of Sea Dart
>missiles. She too landed.

The second claim is incorrect. No Sea Dart missiles were ever launched
at the shadowing aircraft. by a British vessel, although at one point
they nearly did, before identifying the aircraft as (IIRC) a Brazilian
charter flight.

Peter Kemp

[Ed Rasimus]

Chad Irby > wrote:

>In article >,
> "José Herculano" > wrote:
>
>> Maximum I read regarding the Phantom was a guy in Vietnam pulling 14 G to
>> get an ass-SAM divergence. The bird held and landed.
>
>I know there were a couple of cases in Vietnam where F-4s made hard
>enough turns to rip the ECM pods off...

Gotta wonder about that, since ECM pods were routinely carried in the
Sparrow missile wells. Can't imagine a situation in which the pods
suspension gear would fail. Don't say it couldn't, simply that I doubt
it.

In 250 combat missions, 150 over NVN where high threat evasions were
most likely, I never, not even once, heard of a structural failure nor
of an inadvertent separation of any piece of equipment off an
aircraft. I'm not saying it couldn't have, simply that I doubt it.

YMMV.

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (ret)
***"When Thunder Rolled:
*** An F-105 Pilot Over N. Vietnam"
*** from Smithsonian Books
ISBN: 1588341038

[Gene Storey]

"Ed Rasimus" > wrote
>
> "The aircraft G-limits are only there in case there is another flight
> by that particular airplane. If subsequent flights do not appear
> likely, there are no G-limits."

They even include a chair where you can give it back to the taxpayers
anytime you like...

[Gene Storey]

"Scott Ferrin" > wrote
>
> REad of a Skyray pulling 12 Gs and wrinked the wing. Don't know if it
> ever flew again. And also of a Tomcat that did a NEGATIVE 8+ (they
> didn't have a choice). I think the Tomcat flew again.

Humans aren't rated for -8 G's for over 1 second :-)

[Chad Irby]

In article >,
Ed Rasimus > wrote:

> Chad Irby > wrote:
>
> >I know there were a couple of cases in Vietnam where F-4s made hard
> >enough turns to rip the ECM pods off...
>
> Gotta wonder about that, since ECM pods were routinely carried in the
> Sparrow missile wells. Can't imagine a situation in which the pods
> suspension gear would fail. Don't say it couldn't, simply that I doubt
> it.

The missile well adapter was only held on by four moderate-sized bolts,
and I could see quite a few situations where the whole assembly would
pull right out. I had to swap the MWAs out on a regular basis when I
was at George AFB. They kept launchers in that left-front spot until
the regs forced to exercise with the pods.

I also seem to remember at least one case where one of the hooks on an
MWA cracked, and the pod came back in being held by the rear lug only...

> In 250 combat missions, 150 over NVN where high threat evasions were
> most likely, I never, not even once, heard of a structural failure nor
> of an inadvertent separation of any piece of equipment off an
> aircraft. I'm not saying it couldn't have, simply that I doubt it.

Even when the thing was in good shape, I could see one or more bolts
giving way under a hard maneuver, taking the rest of them out too.

--


Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

[Thomas Schoene]

"Peter Kemp" <peter_n_kempathotmaildotcom> wrote in message

> On Thu, 18 Sep 2003 19:03:03 +0100, "José Herculano"
> > wrote:
>

> > An Argentinian 707 shadowing the British fleet pulled 7 G to
> > avoid a couple of Sea Dart missiles. She too landed.
>
> The second claim is incorrect. No Sea Dart missiles were ever launched
> at the shadowing aircraft. by a British vessel, although at one point
> they nearly did, before identifying the aircraft as (IIRC) a Brazilian
> charter flight.

No, it's correct. It is true that the British never fired on the 707s that
shadowed the main Task Force on its trip south, and those flights ended for
several weeks after a pointed warning.

However, the Argentines did eventually resume the flights, conducting
reconnaissance against British reinforcements headed south from Ascension.
On 22 May, HMS Bristol and HMS Cardiff each fired a pair of Sea Darts at a
707 belonging to Grupo 1, which took evasive action as desribed above.

Source: _Falklands: The Air War_

--�
Tom Schoene Replace "invalid" with "net" to e-mail
"If brave men and women never died, there would be nothing
special about bravery." -- Andy Rooney (attributed)

[Mike Marron]

> Ed Rasimus > wrote:
>>Chad Irby > wrote:

>>I know there were a couple of cases in Vietnam where F-4s made hard
>>enough turns to rip the ECM pods off...

>Gotta wonder about that, since ECM pods were routinely carried in the
>Sparrow missile wells. Can't imagine a situation in which the pods
>suspension gear would fail. Don't say it couldn't, simply that I doubt
>it.

>In 250 combat missions, 150 over NVN where high threat evasions were
>most likely, I never, not even once, heard of a structural failure nor
>of an inadvertent separation of any piece of equipment off an
>aircraft. I'm not saying it couldn't have, simply that I doubt it.

I doubt it too!

I don't know how much an F-4 ECM pod weighs, but I do know that it
would require a hellacious amount of G's to cause the bolts that
fasten the pod to the airframe to fail. Much more force than the
surrounding airframe structure itself could withstand.

For example, a standard AN6 bolt (3/8-inch diameter shank) has
a shear strength of approx. 8700 lbs. IIRC. And there is probably
more than just one of these or similiar types of bolts securing the
ECM gear to the belly of an F-4.

-Mike (A&P mech) Marron

[Tarver Engineering]

"Mike Marron" > wrote in message
...
> > Ed Rasimus > wrote:
> >>Chad Irby > wrote:
>
> >>I know there were a couple of cases in Vietnam where F-4s made hard
> >>enough turns to rip the ECM pods off...
>
> >Gotta wonder about that, since ECM pods were routinely carried in the
> >Sparrow missile wells. Can't imagine a situation in which the pods
> >suspension gear would fail. Don't say it couldn't, simply that I doubt
> >it.
>
> >In 250 combat missions, 150 over NVN where high threat evasions were
> >most likely, I never, not even once, heard of a structural failure nor
> >of an inadvertent separation of any piece of equipment off an
> >aircraft. I'm not saying it couldn't have, simply that I doubt it.
>
> I doubt it too!
>
> I don't know how much an F-4 ECM pod weighs, but I do know that it
> would require a hellacious amount of G's to cause the bolts that
> fasten the pod to the airframe to fail.

How could you possibly know that?

[Chad Irby]

Mike Marron > wrote:

> >>Chad Irby > wrote:
>
> >>I know there were a couple of cases in Vietnam where F-4s made hard
> >>enough turns to rip the ECM pods off...
>
> I don't know how much an F-4 ECM pod weighs, but I do know that it
> would require a hellacious amount of G's to cause the bolts that
> fasten the pod to the airframe to fail. Much more force than the
> surrounding airframe structure itself could withstand.
>
> For example, a standard AN6 bolt (3/8-inch diameter shank) has
> a shear strength of approx. 8700 lbs. IIRC. And there is probably
> more than just one of these or similiar types of bolts securing the
> ECM gear to the belly of an F-4.

The only problem is that the missile well adapter isn't held in by the
full strength of 4 brand-new bolts... it's held in by the bolt
*threads*. You're not working with the shear strength of a 3/8"
diameter piece of metal - you're dealing with the actual (not
theoretical) tensile strength of the *threads* of that bolt *and* the
nut plate.

Yep - the four bolts run straight up into the fuselage, making all of
the stress rest on the four bolts, through their four nut plates. That
shouldn't be a problem, since correct installation would give you full
strength. Except...

That's the problem with thoretical and design limits. After a few
months of actual (mis)use, those numbers change. A *lot*. The spec
says that someone should replace those nut plates and bolts each time
you swap out the launcher for the MWA. Nobody did that, of course.
Took too long, cost too much.

Sure, the four bolts, when new, should have been able to hold a total of
almost 35,000 pounds. But then you add in the preload from torquing it
in (at least 600 pounds per bolt, maybe more) plus the 6000 pounds it
would have been carrying with a 600 pound pod at ten times the force of
gravity (maybe higher), and you have a load of at least 8400 pounds, on
a system that is not evenly loaded, in six kinds of vibration modes,
loading and unloading like mad.

I figure one semi-catastrophic failure over a quarter century is pretty
good, considering.

--


Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

[Scott Ferrin]

On Thu, 18 Sep 2003 16:45:14 -0700, "Tarver Engineering"
> wrote:

>
>"Mike Marron" > wrote in message
...
>> > Ed Rasimus > wrote:
>> >>Chad Irby > wrote:
>>
>> >>I know there were a couple of cases in Vietnam where F-4s made hard
>> >>enough turns to rip the ECM pods off...
>>
>> >Gotta wonder about that, since ECM pods were routinely carried in the
>> >Sparrow missile wells. Can't imagine a situation in which the pods
>> >suspension gear would fail. Don't say it couldn't, simply that I doubt
>> >it.
>>
>> >In 250 combat missions, 150 over NVN where high threat evasions were
>> >most likely, I never, not even once, heard of a structural failure nor
>> >of an inadvertent separation of any piece of equipment off an
>> >aircraft. I'm not saying it couldn't have, simply that I doubt it.
>>
>> I doubt it too!
>>
>> I don't know how much an F-4 ECM pod weighs, but I do know that it
>> would require a hellacious amount of G's to cause the bolts that
>> fasten the pod to the airframe to fail.
>
>How could you possibly know that?
>


Math.

[Chad Irby]

In article >,
Scott Ferrin > wrote:

> On Thu, 18 Sep 2003 16:45:14 -0700, "Tarver Engineering"
> > wrote:
>
> >
> >"Mike Marron" > wrote in message
> ...
>
> >> I don't know how much an F-4 ECM pod weighs, but I do know that it
> >> would require a hellacious amount of G's to cause the bolts that
> >> fasten the pod to the airframe to fail.
> >
> >How could you possibly know that?
>
> Math.

....and a near-religious faith that new bolts are just as strong as old
bolts, while corrosion never happens and flightline troops never make
mistakes.

Film at 11.

--


Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

[Peter Kemp]

On Thu, 18 Sep 2003 22:28:05 GMT, "Thomas Schoene"
> wrote:

>"Peter Kemp" <peter_n_kempathotmaildotcom> wrote in message

>> On Thu, 18 Sep 2003 19:03:03 +0100, "José Herculano"
>> > wrote:
>>
>
>> > An Argentinian 707 shadowing the British fleet pulled 7 G to
>> > avoid a couple of Sea Dart missiles. She too landed.
>>
>> The second claim is incorrect. No Sea Dart missiles were ever launched
>> at the shadowing aircraft. by a British vessel, although at one point
>> they nearly did, before identifying the aircraft as (IIRC) a Brazilian
>> charter flight.
>
>No, it's correct. It is true that the British never fired on the 707s that
>shadowed the main Task Force on its trip south, and those flights ended for
>several weeks after a pointed warning.
>
>However, the Argentines did eventually resume the flights, conducting
>reconnaissance against British reinforcements headed south from Ascension.
>On 22 May, HMS Bristol and HMS Cardiff each fired a pair of Sea Darts at a
>707 belonging to Grupo 1, which took evasive action as desribed above.

Odd, I thought that incident was against a Lear Jet. Bloody
memory......

Peter Kemp

[Mike Marron]

>Chad Irby > wrote:
>>Scott Ferrin > wrote:
>>> "Tarver Engineering" > wrote:
>>>>"Mike Marron" > wrote:

>>>>I don't know how much an F-4 ECM pod weighs, but I do know that it
>>>>would require a hellacious amount of G's to cause the bolts that
>>>>fasten the pod to the airframe to fail.

>>>How could you possibly know that?

>>Math.

>...and a near-religious faith that new bolts are just as strong as old
>bolts, while corrosion never happens and flightline troops never make
>mistakes.

Why y'all respond to the dreaded "tarv troll" is beyond me!
In any event, Chad, you're absolutely correct that flightline troops
make mistakes. But the good folks in St. Louis at the McDonnell
Douglas plant have a few scruples to speak of and you can rest
assurred that they designed the F-4's ECM pod with hamfisted
pilots and/or hairy-assed line mechanics in mind.

With regards to your comments about threaded areas and/or
corrosion possibly weakening the ECM attachment points, as
you know AN hardware comes in a wide variety of different flavors
and anything prone to corrosion is generally cadmium plated.
And AN bolts have "rolled" threads (as opposed to "cut" threads)
which results in a strengthening of the bolt in the thread area.

But once again, doubtful the "brainy" types in St. Louis designed the
ECM pod fasteners to take shear loads in the threaded area
anyway (it is a bad practice to do this with any bolt, AN or
otherwise). From a practical standpoint even if you took took an
AN bolt and clamped it in a vice then punished it with a sledgehammer,
you'd find that you could exceed the yield strength without actually
breaking the bolt as it would stretch or bend quite a bit before
snapping.

The bottom line is that, yeah, I actually DO have a "near-religious
faith" in AN hardware since it's my own butt hanging from one single
solitary AN6-44 bolt when flying my own personal homebuilt aircraft
that's rated to +6, -3 G's. I don't simply wrench on A/C and sign 'em
over to some guinea pig to test fly, I actually fly A/C that I worked
on, modified, or constructed myself. I'm not claiming to have flown
an F-4, but that's how I know that it would require a hellacious
amount of G's to cause the bolts that fasten the ECM pod to the
F-4's airframe to fail.

>Film at 11.

Cool. I assume it's a film showing an F-4 ECM pod departing the
airframe in Vietnam as you said?


-Mike Marron
A&P, CFII, UFI (fixed-wing, weightshift, land & sea)

[Buzzer]

On Fri, 19 Sep 2003 14:49:34 GMT, Mike Marron
> wrote:

>Why y'all respond to the dreaded "tarv troll" is beyond me!
>In any event, Chad, you're absolutely correct that flightline troops
>make mistakes. But the good folks in St. Louis at the McDonnell
>Douglas plant have a few scruples to speak of and you can rest
>assurred that they designed the F-4's ECM pod with hamfisted
>pilots and/or hairy-assed line mechanics in mind.

"Hamfisted" crew from Ubon in early 1967 blew a pod off a pylon over
North Vietnam.

And a pod fell off a pylon on a plane taking off at Ubon shortly after
that. No cause was found. The "hairy-assed" line mechanics that loaded
the pod that day were never talked to or questioned about it.

Pods were carried for years hanging from pylons and even the bottom
rack on MERs.
Ever see the two "little" hooks in the pylon that hold bombs and pods
to the pylons?
Take into consideration that bombs and center tanks were dropped to
clean an aircraft up so it could maneuver better. But that pod hung in
there way out from the centerline.

[Tarver Engineering]

"Scott Ferrin" > wrote in message
...
> On Thu, 18 Sep 2003 16:45:14 -0700, "Tarver Engineering"
> > wrote:
>
> >
> >"Mike Marron" > wrote in message
> ...
> >> > Ed Rasimus > wrote:
> >> >>Chad Irby > wrote:
> >>
> >> >>I know there were a couple of cases in Vietnam where F-4s made hard
> >> >>enough turns to rip the ECM pods off...
> >>
> >> >Gotta wonder about that, since ECM pods were routinely carried in the
> >> >Sparrow missile wells. Can't imagine a situation in which the pods
> >> >suspension gear would fail. Don't say it couldn't, simply that I doubt
> >> >it.
> >>
> >> >In 250 combat missions, 150 over NVN where high threat evasions were
> >> >most likely, I never, not even once, heard of a structural failure nor
> >> >of an inadvertent separation of any piece of equipment off an
> >> >aircraft. I'm not saying it couldn't have, simply that I doubt it.
> >>
> >> I doubt it too!
> >>
> >> I don't know how much an F-4 ECM pod weighs, but I do know that it
> >> would require a hellacious amount of G's to cause the bolts that
> >> fasten the pod to the airframe to fail.
> >
> >How could you possibly know that?

> Math.

Marron has no such math skills.

[Tarver Engineering]

"Mike Marron" > wrote in message
...
> >Chad Irby > wrote:
> >>Scott Ferrin > wrote:
> >>> "Tarver Engineering" > wrote:
> >>>>"Mike Marron" > wrote:
>
> >>>>I don't know how much an F-4 ECM pod weighs, but I do know that it
> >>>>would require a hellacious amount of G's to cause the bolts that
> >>>>fasten the pod to the airframe to fail.
>
> >>>How could you possibly know that?
>
> >>Math.
>
> >...and a near-religious faith that new bolts are just as strong as old
> >bolts, while corrosion never happens and flightline troops never make
> >mistakes.
>
> Why y'all respond to the dreaded "tarv troll" is beyond me!

It is because you are writting crap, Marron.

[Mike Marron]

>Buzzer > wrote:

>"Hamfisted" crew from Ubon in early 1967 blew a pod off a pylon over
>North Vietnam.

>And a pod fell off a pylon on a plane taking off at Ubon shortly after
>that. No cause was found.

Interesting. I'm somewhat surprised that Ed Rasimus never heard of
these incidents during his 250 combat missions in SEA in Thuds and
Phantoms. In any event, I simply "doubted" that it could happen, not
that it unequivocally did not happen.

-Mike Marron

[Thomas Schoene]

"Peter Kemp" <peter_n_kempathotmaildotcom> wrote in message

> On Thu, 18 Sep 2003 22:28:05 GMT, "Thomas Schoene"
> > wrote:
> > On 22 May, HMS Bristol and HMS Cardiff each
> > fired a pair of Sea Darts at a 707 belonging to Grupo 1, which took
> > evasive action as desribed above.
>
> Odd, I thought that incident was against a Lear Jet. Bloody
> memory......

Oh, your memory isn't that bad. On 7 June, HMS Exeter actually destroyed a
Learjet 35 on a photo-recce mission -- shot it out of a clear sky at 40,000
ft with Sea Dart (near the outside edge of the Sea Dart envelope it seems,
as a first missile fell short).

--�
Tom Schoene Replace "invalid" with "net" to e-mail
"If brave men and women never died, there would be nothing
special about bravery." -- Andy Rooney (attributed)

[Walt BJ]

The F4 wingtips cracked from vibration, not G. However, G set up the
vibration. Flying close when when lead was doing acro one could see
the wing tip vibrating as the tip vortices did their 'Karmann trail"
thing. The 110v 'thin filament' tip lights used to fail in a jiffy
until they rewired then for 28vDC 'heavy filament' bulbs.
We had an F4 at low altitude peg the G meter both ways when the tip of
the 600gal centerline came off as the pilot (Stormy FAC) dodged a SAM
coming right in from 12:00. Later a second F4 had the tip shot off his
centerline tank and the Gs piled on the same way. Turns out the blunt
nosed tank sets up severely disturbed airflow over the horizontal
stabilizers.
Both aircraft checked out okay except lots of 'bubble gum' was needed
to reseal the bottom of the internal wing tanks.
Walt BJ

[Tarver Engineering]

"Walt BJ" > wrote in message
m...
> The F4 wingtips cracked from vibration, not G. However, G set up the
> vibration. Flying close when when lead was doing acro one could see
> the wing tip vibrating as the tip vortices did their 'Karmann trail"
> thing.

More apropriatly called gain in s-plane analysis, but true.

[Chad Irby]

In article >,
Buzzer > wrote:

> "Hamfisted" crew from Ubon in early 1967 blew a pod off a pylon over
> North Vietnam.
>
> And a pod fell off a pylon on a plane taking off at Ubon shortly after
> that. No cause was found. The "hairy-assed" line mechanics that loaded
> the pod that day were never talked to or questioned about it.

If you didn't do it just right, the missile well adapter for ECM pods
wouldn't lock. Once it was pinned in, the thing wasn't going to come
out without some sort of serious failure.

> Pods were carried for years hanging from pylons and even the bottom
> rack on MERs.
> Ever see the two "little" hooks in the pylon that hold bombs and pods
> to the pylons?
> Take into consideration that bombs and center tanks were dropped to
> clean an aircraft up so it could maneuver better. But that pod hung in
> there way out from the centerline.

After a couple of problems in Vietnam, they made it impossible for
pilots to jettison ECM pods.

An apocryphal story they used to tell us was that some fighter jock was
trying to kill a boat on a river. He dropped bombs. Missed. He used
up all of his 20mm. Missed. So he went in on a run and jettisoned the
pod. Hit. one $5,000 boat for a million dollar pod...

--


Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

[Buzzer]

On Fri, 19 Sep 2003 18:05:09 GMT, Chad Irby > wrote:

>In article >,
> Buzzer > wrote:
>
>> "Hamfisted" crew from Ubon in early 1967 blew a pod off a pylon over
>> North Vietnam.
>>
>> And a pod fell off a pylon on a plane taking off at Ubon shortly after
>> that. No cause was found. The "hairy-assed" line mechanics that loaded
>> the pod that day were never talked to or questioned about it.
>
>If you didn't do it just right, the missile well adapter for ECM pods
>wouldn't lock. Once it was pinned in, the thing wasn't going to come
>out without some sort of serious failure.
>
>> Pods were carried for years hanging from pylons and even the bottom
>> rack on MERs.
>> Ever see the two "little" hooks in the pylon that hold bombs and pods
>> to the pylons?
>> Take into consideration that bombs and center tanks were dropped to
>> clean an aircraft up so it could maneuver better. But that pod hung in
>> there way out from the centerline.
>
>After a couple of problems in Vietnam, they made it impossible for
>pilots to jettison ECM pods.

One of the pods that was dumped over the north was one of the
problems. They took the catridges out of the pylons and the latches
were safty wired shortly after that happened.

>An apocryphal story they used to tell us was that some fighter jock was
>trying to kill a boat on a river. He dropped bombs. Missed. He used
>up all of his 20mm. Missed. So he went in on a run and jettisoned the
>pod. Hit. one $5,000 boat for a million dollar pod...

I suspect if that happened the pilot bought himself a pod.
Our loss was during Bolo or one of the followups. Crew just got a
little excited and cleaned everything off. Of course if anyone talks
to then Col. Olds they might ask what really happened. I'm sure he
remembers. Just don't ask about the time ECM didn't check to see if
there was a control box in a plane when they loaded the pod.<G>

[[email protected]]

Mike Marron > wrote:

>
>For example, a standard AN6 bolt (3/8-inch diameter shank) has
>a shear strength of approx. 8700 lbs. IIRC. And there is probably
>more than just one of these or similiar types of bolts securing the
>ECM gear to the belly of an F-4.
>
>-Mike (A&P mech) Marron
>
>
But that's 'shear strength' isn't it?...sounds to me as if these
pods are held on so as not to use the shear strength, right?
--

-Gord.

[Tarver Engineering]

"Gord Beaman" > wrote in message
...
> Mike Marron > wrote:
>
> >
> >For example, a standard AN6 bolt (3/8-inch diameter shank) has
> >a shear strength of approx. 8700 lbs. IIRC. And there is probably
> >more than just one of these or similiar types of bolts securing the
> >ECM gear to the belly of an F-4.

> But that's 'shear strength' isn't it?...sounds to me as if these
> pods are held on so as not to use the shear strength, right?

Marron is just making **** up, ignore him.

[Gene Storey]

Do you have to **** on every thread? Stick to the pitot tube crap.




"Tarver Engineering" > wrote in message ...
>
> "Mike Marron" > wrote in message
> ...
> > >Chad Irby > wrote:
> > >>Scott Ferrin > wrote:
> > >>> "Tarver Engineering" > wrote:
> > >>>>"Mike Marron" > wrote:
> >
> > >>>>I don't know how much an F-4 ECM pod weighs, but I do know that it
> > >>>>would require a hellacious amount of G's to cause the bolts that
> > >>>>fasten the pod to the airframe to fail.
> >
> > >>>How could you possibly know that?
> >
> > >>Math.
> >
> > >...and a near-religious faith that new bolts are just as strong as old
> > >bolts, while corrosion never happens and flightline troops never make
> > >mistakes.
> >
> > Why y'all respond to the dreaded "tarv troll" is beyond me!
>
> It is because you are writting crap, Marron.
>
>

[Tarver Engineering]

"Gene Storey" > wrote in message
...
> Do you have to **** on every thread? Stick to the pitot tube crap.

Marron is posting crap, those $million pods were attached just fine. What
planet are you from, where mechanics select bolts?

[Gene Storey]

who cares about the bolts. It's not a federal case yet.





"Tarver Engineering" > wrote in message ...
>
> "Gene Storey" > wrote in message
> ...
> > Do you have to **** on every thread? Stick to the pitot tube crap.
>
> Marron is posting crap, those $million pods were attached just fine. What
> planet are you from, where mechanics select bolts?
>
>

[Ed Rasimus]

On Fri, 19 Sep 2003 16:39:45 GMT, Buzzer > wrote:

>
>"Hamfisted" crew from Ubon in early 1967 blew a pod off a pylon over
>North Vietnam.

What you just wrote makes no sense. If the crew was "ham-fisted" then
they over-G'd or "pulled" the pod off. If they "blew" the pod, that
would mean jettisoned by cart-firing. Were they "ham-index-fingered"
in actuating the toggle switch?

Initial installation of the pods at Korat in late Oct. of '66 when
they were highly classified was uncarted, so "blowing" a pod wasn't an
option. And, considering the relatively minimal size and weight,
wouldn't have been worth the time necessary to find the toggle, break
the safety wire, flip the safety cover, establish the necessary
jettison parameters and then "blow."
>
>And a pod fell off a pylon on a plane taking off at Ubon shortly after
>that. No cause was found. The "hairy-assed" line mechanics that loaded
>the pod that day were never talked to or questioned about it.

If the pod "fell off" then an investigation occurred. The maintenance
supervisor that signed the AFTO-781 on the install was undoubtedly
questioned. Are you speaking of facts or stories you heard?

>
>Pods were carried for years hanging from pylons and even the bottom
>rack on MERs.

Pods were carried on the F-4 on inboard pylons and on the F-105 on
outboard pylons. I never saw one carried on a TER or MER. Interposing
a secondary rack, particularly one without aircraft power available
(except for the RAT-driven QRC-160) would be useless.

In '72 and for all the years I carried ALQ-119s in Europe, we carried
ECM pods in a Sparrow well on the F-4.

>Ever see the two "little" hooks in the pylon that hold bombs and pods
>to the pylons?

Yep, seen a lot of those little hooks. If they could hold an M-118
(3000 pound GP bomb) at 4 G, I've gotta think they could retain an ECM
pod at a lot more G.

>Take into consideration that bombs and center tanks were dropped to
>clean an aircraft up so it could maneuver better. But that pod hung in
>there way out from the centerline.

The C/L tank, particularly on AF F-4s was a poorly engineered piece of
dreck. Bombs were lots of weight and lots of drag. ECM pods, on the
other hand were light, small, low drag and generally uncarted. And, if
you were being attacked by a MiG with radar, AKA MiG-21 or -19, you
might like to be throwing some electrons his way.

You've not made the case.

[Tarver Engineering]

"Gene Storey" > wrote in message
...
> who cares about the bolts. It's not a federal case yet.

Bolts are certainly a Federal case. (ie Fasteners Act)

> "Tarver Engineering" > wrote in message
...
> >
> > "Gene Storey" > wrote in message
> > ...
> > > Do you have to **** on every thread? Stick to the pitot tube crap.
> >
> > Marron is posting crap, those $million pods were attached just fine.
What
> > planet are you from, where mechanics select bolts?

[Chad Irby]

In article >,
Ed Rasimus > wrote:

> ECM pods, on the other hand were light, small, low drag and generally
> uncarted. And, if you were being attacked by a MiG with radar, AKA
> MiG-21 or -19, you might like to be throwing some electrons his way.

You have to rmember that for at least some of the Vietnam War, some
pilots didn't like ECM pods at *all*. Weren't manly enough, or
something. After they started noticing a somewhat higher survival rate
among pilots with pods, they got the message.

But by the early 1980s, a lot of jet jockeys were back to the "pods are
for wimps" sort of attitude. I saw it every time we loaded the 119s
onto F-4s for exercises. And then we had a squadron go to Red Flag, and
suddenly all of the pilots were wanting one every damned day... getting
"shot down" a few times with no recourse tends to do that.

--


Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

[Ed Rasimus]

On Fri, 19 Sep 2003 23:38:43 GMT, Chad Irby > wrote:

>In article >,
> Ed Rasimus > wrote:
>
>> ECM pods, on the other hand were light, small, low drag and generally
>> uncarted. And, if you were being attacked by a MiG with radar, AKA
>> MiG-21 or -19, you might like to be throwing some electrons his way.
>
>You have to rmember that for at least some of the Vietnam War, some
>pilots didn't like ECM pods at *all*. Weren't manly enough, or
>something. After they started noticing a somewhat higher survival rate
>among pilots with pods, they got the message.

I don't think I ever heard that. When the QRC-160 arrived at Tahkli &
Korat in October '66, the first guys to carry it were sceptical
(naturally) when told that they would fly "rock steady" at mid to high
altitude and that the pod would make stuff miss. When they tried it
and it worked, they became instantaneous believers.

When I returned in '72, we had much better pods and didn't need the
"pod formation" stuff any more. Unfortunately, the noise from the pods
wouldn't let the Hunter/Killer SEAD flights do our job, so we didn't
use them most of the time, although we did try to remember to get them
active in a last ditch situation evading a missile.
>
>But by the early 1980s, a lot of jet jockeys were back to the "pods are
>for wimps" sort of attitude. I saw it every time we loaded the 119s
>onto F-4s for exercises. And then we had a squadron go to Red Flag, and
>suddenly all of the pilots were wanting one every damned day... getting
>"shot down" a few times with no recourse tends to do that.

I would say by the '80s, the only crews with that kind of attitude
would be those with no combat experience or those who didn't pay
attention to intel briefings. Certainly by the '80s no one was still
carrying ALQ-119s. I'd bet that by that time it was ALQ-131.

[Chad Irby]

In article >,
Ed Rasimus > wrote:

> On Fri, 19 Sep 2003 23:38:43 GMT, Chad Irby > wrote:
>
> >But by the early 1980s, a lot of jet jockeys were back to the "pods
> >are for wimps" sort of attitude. I saw it every time we loaded the
> >119s onto F-4s for exercises. And then we had a squadron go to Red
> >Flag, and suddenly all of the pilots were wanting one every damned
> >day... getting "shot down" a few times with no recourse tends to do
> >that.
>
> I would say by the '80s, the only crews with that kind of attitude
> would be those with no combat experience or those who didn't pay
> attention to intel briefings.

Pretty much half of all fighter pilots by that point, then. <cough>

I got to work with the Wing's EW officer, and every time I talked to
him, he complained about the "who needs it" attitude of most of the
other pilots.

> Certainly by the '80s no one was still carrying ALQ-119s. I'd bet
> that by that time it was ALQ-131.

You'd lose that bet. Out of four years from 1981 to 1985, I think I
loaded *one* ALQ-131 on a plane, to be ferried somewhere else. Whenever
we loaded pods, it was 119s. They used a few on the F-4Gs, but even
there, they were predominantly 119 users. Not sure why (reliability?
availability?), but that's the way it was. We sure didn't have many in
the 35th TFW or the 37th TFW.

I remember this vividly, since I was one of three guys in our CRS who
were pegged as "jammer drivers" for pod loading. We had an MJ-4 rodeo,
and the winners got the job more often (which entailed sitting down a
lot).

There were still ALQ-119s in use as of Desert Storm, by the way...
upgraded insanely from the Vietnam years, but still ALQ-119s.

Speaking of Vietnam: one afternoon, we were working on a plane, and one
of the sheet-metal guys came over to us. He'd just replaced a patch on
the tail of one plane, and he had the old patch in his hands. It was a
flattened can of Vietnamese beer from ten years back...

--


Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

[Juvat]

Chad Irby posted:

>You have to rmember that for at least some of the Vietnam War, some
>pilots didn't like ECM pods at *all*. Weren't manly enough, or
>something. After they started noticing a somewhat higher survival rate
>among pilots with pods, they got the message.

Respectfully that contradicts the utility of the "Pod Formation"
doctrine...the lack of knowledge regarding EW aside, I never heard any
SEA guy pooh-pooh Pods because he had a huge ego. I've heard guys say
early pods were unreliable or acted as strobes.

>But by the early 1980s, a lot of jet jockeys were back to the "pods are
>for wimps" sort of attitude.

Pure BS...I never heard a single swinging dick utter anything close
too that. Hell even in RTU we were being taught Xmit 2 with
such-an-such pressed for crossing the FLOT/FEBA...some guys briefed
aborting certain mission for INOP pods (based upon the WSO's call).

Juvat

[Buzzer]

On Fri, 19 Sep 2003 21:59:36 GMT, Ed Rasimus >
wrote:

>On Fri, 19 Sep 2003 16:39:45 GMT, Buzzer > wrote:
>
>>
>>"Hamfisted" crew from Ubon in early 1967 blew a pod off a pylon over
>>North Vietnam.
>
>What you just wrote makes no sense. If the crew was "ham-fisted" then
>they over-G'd or "pulled" the pod off. If they "blew" the pod, that
>would mean jettisoned by cart-firing. Were they "ham-index-fingered"
>in actuating the toggle switch?

Makes sense to me if you hadn't clipped what Mike wrote and I replied
to..

"On Fri, 19 Sep 2003 14:49:34 GMT, Mike Marron
> wrote:

>Why y'all respond to the dreaded "tarv troll" is beyond me!
>In any event, Chad, you're absolutely correct that flightline troops
>make mistakes. But the good folks in St. Louis at the McDonnell
>Douglas plant have a few scruples to speak of and you can rest
>assurred that they designed the F-4's ECM pod with hamfisted
>pilots and/or hairy-assed line mechanics in mind.

"Hamfisted" crew from Ubon in early 1967 blew a pod off a pylon over
North Vietnam."

>Initial installation of the pods at Korat in late Oct. of '66 when
>they were highly classified was uncarted, so "blowing" a pod wasn't an
>option. And, considering the relatively minimal size and weight,
>wouldn't have been worth the time necessary to find the toggle, break
>the safety wire, flip the safety cover, establish the necessary
>jettison parameters and then "blow."

THEY WERE CARTED AT UBON FOR BOLO and a short time afterwards..
I have no idea what went on in the cockpit. The crews were briefed to
not dump that station. Off it went.. You want to know what happened
ask Olds. I am sure he will remember exactly.

>>And a pod fell off a pylon on a plane taking off at Ubon shortly after
>>that. No cause was found. The "hairy-assed" line mechanics that loaded
>>the pod that day were never talked to or questioned about it.
>
>If the pod "fell off" then an investigation occurred. The maintenance
>supervisor that signed the AFTO-781 on the install was undoubtedly
>questioned. Are you speaking of facts or stories you heard?

Maintenance supervisor? You're kidding right? How about a three
striper and a couple two stripers. Guess who had three stripes in 1967
Ed? Guess who loaded the pod Ed?

>>Pods were carried for years hanging from pylons and even the bottom
>>rack on MERs.
>
>Pods were carried on the F-4 on inboard pylons and on the F-105 on
>outboard pylons.

Pretty clear cut blanket statement covering the Vietnam war period.
Was that right or left inboard? Never on the right outer pylon in
place of the tank?

>I never saw one carried on a TER or MER. Interposing
>a secondary rack, particularly one without aircraft power available
>(except for the RAT-driven QRC-160) would be useless.

You left SEA in Nov 1966 right? You returned in 1973?
You missed out on a lot of things.

F-4C Ubon early 1967
You probably never saw a QRC-160/ALQ-71 pod with external power
running out of the pylon, down around the pod, and connected to the
bottom access cover of the pod just behind the rat. We drilled the
covers, added a 3 phase plug, which ran to another plug that the
normal rat power connected to. One of those short term fixes for
frozen rats before we got in enough dummy nose cones. The cable was
held onto the pod with a couple cable clamps that were put on during
pod upload. Yep. Sure enough. Three phase power wires hanging out in
the wind held on with a couple clamps. Scary isn't it..

Did the same thing with the TER/MER. They were just another rack to me
and I have no idea which one it was. When the pod, ALQ-160/ALQ-71 was
loaded the antenna were just a few inches off the concrete. It was a
real pain to load since it was down so low. Most of the time we just
lifted them in place with two people. We finally made up another
adapter to hold the pod on the jammer forks so we could get it under
the rack. Same method for three phase power. Clamped the cables in a
couple places on the rack and pod.

>In '72 and for all the years I carried ALQ-119s in Europe, we carried
>ECM pods in a Sparrow well on the F-4.

I left SEA in Sep 70 from Korat and the F-4E. I don't remember the
pods being in the Sparrow wells at that time. Biggest pod I remember
at that time was the ALQ-101 and I have no idea what happened to them.
I remember seeing them in the storage room grounded because the
destruct packages were going off during maintenace, but they just are
gone from memory after that. Most of the in shop pod work was ALQ-87
and the ALQ-71 bench was basically gathering dust..

>>Ever see the two "little" hooks in the pylon that hold bombs and pods
>>to the pylons?
>
>Yep, seen a lot of those little hooks. If they could hold an M-118
>(3000 pound GP bomb) at 4 G, I've gotta think they could retain an ECM
>pod at a lot more G.

When we changed over the hardbacks (the mounts that held the lugs that
the pylon hooks go around) on the pods from the F-105 to the F-4 for
BOLO I was amazed at how small the F-105 mounts and lugs were. It was
a stretch to think they were flying pods with those dinky little
lugs..

>>Take into consideration that bombs and center tanks were dropped to
>>clean an aircraft up so it could maneuver better. But that pod hung in
>>there way out from the centerline.
>
>The C/L tank, particularly on AF F-4s was a poorly engineered piece of
>dreck.

The APR-25 analyzer was up inside above the center tank on the F-4C.
They basically refused to lower a tank for us to get to the thing. Too
many problems trying to get it to seal and all that. At least that was
their story. Think it was door 22 that was lowered onto the tank and
then we had to reach way the heck up in there to get the cables and
bolts loose. Couldn't reach and see at the same time so it was all
done by feel.

>Bombs were lots of weight and lots of drag. ECM pods, on the
>other hand were light, small, low drag and generally uncarted. And, if
>you were being attacked by a MiG with radar, AKA MiG-21 or -19, you
>might like to be throwing some electrons his way.

Korat and Ubon up to 1970 when I was there had no I band pods. All set
up for SAM and AAA..

[Mike Marron]

>"Gord Beaman" ) wrote:
>>Mike Marron > wrote:

>>For example, a standard AN6 bolt (3/8-inch diameter shank) has
>>a shear strength of approx. 8700 lbs. IIRC. And there is probably
>>more than just one of these or similiar types of bolts securing the
>>ECM gear to the belly of an F-4.

>But that's 'shear strength' isn't it?...sounds to me as if these
>pods are held on so as not to use the shear strength, right?

As opposed to what, tensile strength? Could be (I've never hung an
ECM pod on an F-4) but the bottom line is that it's highly unlikely
an ECM pod could be "ripped" from the belly of an F-4 while maneuvering.

If you're interested, this is a highly recommended book: Carroll Smith's
Nuts, Bolts and Fasteners and Plumbing Handbook.

MJM

[Buzzer]

On Fri, 19 Sep 2003 23:38:43 GMT, Chad Irby > wrote:

>In article >,
> Ed Rasimus > wrote:
>
>> ECM pods, on the other hand were light, small, low drag and generally
>> uncarted. And, if you were being attacked by a MiG with radar, AKA
>> MiG-21 or -19, you might like to be throwing some electrons his way.
>
>You have to rmember that for at least some of the Vietnam War, some
>pilots didn't like ECM pods at *all*.

That would be an understatement at Ubon in early 1967. It was usually
a major or above pilot that would start in about pods or rhaw in
maintenance debriefing.

>Weren't manly enough, or
>something.

As a matter of fact..

>After they started noticing a somewhat higher survival rate
>among pilots with pods, they got the message.

You might appreciate the little story from Ubon 1967 when the jammer
driver came into the storage building laughing. He had been
transporting a pod and heard someone yelling behind him. He looked
around and here was a crew member running down the ramp after him
yelling I want that pod!

>But by the early 1980s, a lot of jet jockeys were back to the "pods are
>for wimps" sort of attitude. I saw it every time we loaded the 119s
>onto F-4s for exercises. And then we had a squadron go to Red Flag, and
>suddenly all of the pilots were wanting one every damned day... getting
>"shot down" a few times with no recourse tends to do that.

[Buzzer]

On 19 Sep 2003 10:29:42 -0700, (Walt BJ) wrote:

>The F4 wingtips cracked from vibration, not G. However, G set up the
>vibration. Flying close when when lead was doing acro one could see
>the wing tip vibrating as the tip vortices did their 'Karmann trail"
>thing. The 110v 'thin filament' tip lights used to fail in a jiffy
>until they rewired then for 28vDC 'heavy filament' bulbs.
>We had an F4 at low altitude peg the G meter both ways when the tip of
>the 600gal centerline came off as the pilot (Stormy FAC) dodged a SAM
>coming right in from 12:00. Later a second F4 had the tip shot off his
>centerline tank and the Gs piled on the same way. Turns out the blunt
>nosed tank sets up severely disturbed airflow over the horizontal
>stabilizers.
>Both aircraft checked out okay except lots of 'bubble gum' was needed
>to reseal the bottom of the internal wing tanks.
>Walt BJ

Thanks Walt for explaining that. I knew they were cracked, but not the
exact why. I never got over seeing those massive plates on the outer
wing panels. Just seemed like more madness of the Vietnam war...

[Ed Rasimus]

On Sat, 20 Sep 2003 03:13:14 GMT, Buzzer > wrote:

>On Fri, 19 Sep 2003 21:59:36 GMT, Ed Rasimus >
>wrote:
>
>>>"Hamfisted" crew from Ubon in early 1967 blew a pod off a pylon over
>>>North Vietnam.
>>
>>What you just wrote makes no sense. If the crew was "ham-fisted" then
>>they over-G'd or "pulled" the pod off. If they "blew" the pod, that
>>would mean jettisoned by cart-firing. Were they "ham-index-fingered"
>>in actuating the toggle switch?
>
>Makes sense to me if you hadn't clipped what Mike wrote and I replied
>to..
>
>"On Fri, 19 Sep 2003 14:49:34 GMT, Mike Marron
> wrote:
>
>>Why y'all respond to the dreaded "tarv troll" is beyond me!
>>In any event, Chad, you're absolutely correct that flightline troops
>>make mistakes. But the good folks in St. Louis at the McDonnell
>>Douglas plant have a few scruples to speak of and you can rest
>>assurred that they designed the F-4's ECM pod with hamfisted
>>pilots and/or hairy-assed line mechanics in mind.
>
>"Hamfisted" crew from Ubon in early 1967 blew a pod off a pylon over
>North Vietnam."

What Mike wrote is fine, but doesn't relate to the comment. The design
of the mount, bolts, links, suspension gear, whatever, is a good point
of discussion, but doesn't have a thing to do with the comment you
repeat. How does the crew (ham-fisted or not) blowing a pod, i.e.
intentionally jettisoning, relate to the discussion of someone
"pulling" the pod off by over-G? Certainly racks, tanks, panels and
more have been bent, mangled, strained, and disconnected from the
aircraft by over-G, but we are talking about a pod coming off by
over-G, a "ham-fisted" crew being the cause, and the difference
between "blowing" the pod--an intentional act and ripping it off
through exceeding the design limits. Kapish?
>
>>Initial installation of the pods at Korat in late Oct. of '66 when
>>they were highly classified was uncarted, so "blowing" a pod wasn't an
>>option. And, considering the relatively minimal size and weight,
>>wouldn't have been worth the time necessary to find the toggle, break
>>the safety wire, flip the safety cover, establish the necessary
>>jettison parameters and then "blow."
>
>THEY WERE CARTED AT UBON FOR BOLO and a short time afterwards..
>I have no idea what went on in the cockpit. The crews were briefed to
>not dump that station. Off it went.. You want to know what happened
>ask Olds. I am sure he will remember exactly.

I will make it a point to ask General Olds. I see him regularly and
we're on a first name basis---he calls me Raz and I call him Sir!
>
>>>And a pod fell off a pylon on a plane taking off at Ubon shortly after
>>>that. No cause was found. The "hairy-assed" line mechanics that loaded
>>>the pod that day were never talked to or questioned about it.
>>
>>If the pod "fell off" then an investigation occurred. The maintenance
>>supervisor that signed the AFTO-781 on the install was undoubtedly
>>questioned. Are you speaking of facts or stories you heard?
>
>Maintenance supervisor? You're kidding right? How about a three
>striper and a couple two stripers. Guess who had three stripes in 1967
>Ed? Guess who loaded the pod Ed?

Depending upon the level of maintenance being signed off, it took
either a five or seven level to release a red-diagonal, and a seven
level to release a red-X. A new attachment to the airframe that
required carting, but was not yet carted, put the airplane on a red-X.
If you were signing off with three-stripers in '67 you were looking
for trouble.
>
>>>Pods were carried for years hanging from pylons and even the bottom
>>>rack on MERs.
>>
>>Pods were carried on the F-4 on inboard pylons and on the F-105 on
>>outboard pylons.
>
>Pretty clear cut blanket statement covering the Vietnam war period.
>Was that right or left inboard? Never on the right outer pylon in
>place of the tank?

No, it's not a statement covering the entire war. It's a statement
that says, in conjunction with the other statements regarding
carriage, that while I never carried a pod on a wing station in an F-4
(C, D or E model), that there were periods in which the pods were
carried by Phantoms on inboard stations. They also were carried by
105s on outboard (single weapon) pylons. The 105G mod involved
scabbing an ALQ-119 into blisters on each side of the fuselage and
free'd up a wing station.
>
>>I never saw one carried on a TER or MER. Interposing
>>a secondary rack, particularly one without aircraft power available
>>(except for the RAT-driven QRC-160) would be useless.
>
>You left SEA in Nov 1966 right? You returned in 1973?
>You missed out on a lot of things.

Of course. I never carried a pod in an F-105. Not once. I returned in
July of '72. I didn't miss out, I just wasn't there.
>
>F-4C Ubon early 1967
---snip---
>
>Did the same thing with the TER/MER. They were just another rack to me
>and I have no idea which one it was.

You can spot the difference between a TER and MER from a long way
off--the MER is the great big rack that carries six weapons, the TER
is the short stubby one that has three stations. Hard to believe you
could have missed such a basic distinction.


> When the pod, ALQ-160/ALQ-71 was
>loaded the antenna were just a few inches off the concrete. It was a
>real pain to load since it was down so low. Most of the time we just
>lifted them in place with two people. We finally made up another
>adapter to hold the pod on the jammer forks so we could get it under
>the rack. Same method for three phase power. Clamped the cables in a
>couple places on the rack and pod.

You might have noticed that C/L MERs (that's the big long one with six
weapons), have the bottom stations "just a few inches off the
concrete" regardless of what is hung there.
>
>>In '72 and for all the years I carried ALQ-119s in Europe, we carried
>>ECM pods in a Sparrow well on the F-4.
>
>I left SEA in Sep 70 from Korat and the F-4E. I don't remember the
>pods being in the Sparrow wells at that time. Biggest pod I remember
>at that time was the ALQ-101 and I have no idea what happened to them.
>I remember seeing them in the storage room grounded because the
>destruct packages were going off during maintenace, but they just are
>gone from memory after that. Most of the in shop pod work was ALQ-87
>and the ALQ-71 bench was basically gathering dust..

You might have noticed a considerable reduction in missions flown to
areas needing a lot of ECM from October of '68 until May of '72. It
relates.
>
>>>Ever see the two "little" hooks in the pylon that hold bombs and pods
>>>to the pylons?
>>
>>Yep, seen a lot of those little hooks. If they could hold an M-118
>>(3000 pound GP bomb) at 4 G, I've gotta think they could retain an ECM
>>pod at a lot more G.
>
>When we changed over the hardbacks (the mounts that held the lugs that
>the pylon hooks go around) on the pods from the F-105 to the F-4 for
>BOLO I was amazed at how small the F-105 mounts and lugs were. It was
>a stretch to think they were flying pods with those dinky little
>lugs..

Suspension gear is "standard"--doesn't matter to the metal whether it
goes on an F-4 or a 105. The wiring changes, but the suspension is
either 16" or 30" lugs and it's all the same on 781 gear.
>
>>>Take into consideration that bombs and center tanks were dropped to
>>>clean an aircraft up so it could maneuver better. But that pod hung in
>>>there way out from the centerline.

---snip---

>>Bombs were lots of weight and lots of drag. ECM pods, on the
>>other hand were light, small, low drag and generally uncarted. And, if
>>you were being attacked by a MiG with radar, AKA MiG-21 or -19, you
>>might like to be throwing some electrons his way.
>
>Korat and Ubon up to 1970 when I was there had no I band pods. All set
>up for SAM and AAA..

I reiterate, that in 1970, there wasn't a high probabiliy of MiG
encounters.

[Ed Rasimus]

On Sat, 20 Sep 2003 05:08:08 GMT, Buzzer > wrote:

>On 19 Sep 2003 10:29:42 -0700, (Walt BJ) wrote:
>
>>The F4 wingtips cracked from vibration, not G. However, G set up the
>>vibration. Flying close when when lead was doing acro one could see
>>the wing tip vibrating as the tip vortices did their 'Karmann trail"
>>thing.
>>Walt BJ
>
>Thanks Walt for explaining that. I knew they were cracked, but not the
>exact why. I never got over seeing those massive plates on the outer
>wing panels. Just seemed like more madness of the Vietnam war...


The corrective reinforcing plates, while a bit ugly weren't all that
massive--probably about 4x8 inches and maybe 1/4 inch thick. The went
in place abutting the hinges at the wing fold on both sides; main wing
and tip section. The real "ugliness" was that the paint had to be
scrapped away from the hinge and reinforcement to allow visual
inspection for cracks during preflight.

Not at all related to the "madness"--simply a fact of life that metal
can only be flexed so many times before it fatigues. We had the
reinforced wings at Torrejon while I was flogging F-4Cs from '73 to
'77. Hardly noticed them after a while.

[Mike Marron]

>Ed Rasimus > wrote:
>>Buzzer > wrote:

>>"Hamfisted" crew from Ubon in early 1967 blew a pod off a pylon over
>>North Vietnam."

>What Mike wrote is fine, but doesn't relate to the comment. The design
>of the mount, bolts, links, suspension gear, whatever, is a good point
>of discussion, but doesn't have a thing to do with the comment you
>repeat.

True. I was responding to Chad's comments that the entire ECM pod
assembly could be ripped off the belly of an F-4 because they were
held on by only "four moderate-sized bolts." I was also questioning
his assertion that a critical component of the ECM pod a$$embly was
attached to the airplane by the bolt *threads* alone. I don't think
so!


-Mike Marron

[Tarver Engineering]

"Ed Rasimus" > wrote in message
...
> On Sat, 20 Sep 2003 03:13:14 GMT, Buzzer > wrote:
>
> >On Fri, 19 Sep 2003 21:59:36 GMT, Ed Rasimus >
> >wrote:
> >
> >>>"Hamfisted" crew from Ubon in early 1967 blew a pod off a pylon over
> >>>North Vietnam.
> >>
> >>What you just wrote makes no sense. If the crew was "ham-fisted" then
> >>they over-G'd or "pulled" the pod off. If they "blew" the pod, that
> >>would mean jettisoned by cart-firing. Were they "ham-index-fingered"
> >>in actuating the toggle switch?
> >
> >Makes sense to me if you hadn't clipped what Mike wrote and I replied
> >to..
> >
> >"On Fri, 19 Sep 2003 14:49:34 GMT, Mike Marron
> > wrote:
> >
> >>Why y'all respond to the dreaded "tarv troll" is beyond me!
> >>In any event, Chad, you're absolutely correct that flightline troops
> >>make mistakes. But the good folks in St. Louis at the McDonnell
> >>Douglas plant have a few scruples to speak of and you can rest
> >>assurred that they designed the F-4's ECM pod with hamfisted
> >>pilots and/or hairy-assed line mechanics in mind.
> >
> >"Hamfisted" crew from Ubon in early 1967 blew a pod off a pylon over
> >North Vietnam."
>
> What Mike wrote is fine, but doesn't relate to the comment. The design
> of the mount, bolts, links, suspension gear, whatever, is a good point
> of discussion, but doesn't have a thing to do with the comment you
> repeat. How does the crew (ham-fisted or not) blowing a pod, i.e.
> intentionally jettisoning, relate to the discussion of someone
> "pulling" the pod off by over-G?

What Mike wrote was a personal insult, perhaps as a means for covering for
his own ignorance.

>Certainly racks, tanks, panels and
> more have been bent, mangled, strained, and disconnected from the
> aircraft by over-G, but we are talking about a pod coming off by
> over-G, a "ham-fisted" crew being the cause, and the difference
> between "blowing" the pod--an intentional act and ripping it off
> through exceeding the design limits. Kapish?

That would seem to be a rather childish attempt by a pilot to cover for his
own negligence.

[Chad Irby]

In article >,
Mike Marron > wrote:

> I was also questioning his assertion that a critical component of the
> ECM pod a$$embly was attached to the airplane by the bolt *threads*
> alone. I don't think so!

Really?

How else would you characterize four bolts, pointed straight down?

Aside from one cable to the missile well adapter, that's all that holds
the pod missile well adapter to the plane.

The way we mounted it was to put the adapter on the shoulders of one guy
("man under," we called it), and he'd hold it a few inches below the
plane until someone hooked up the cable. Then he'd push it straight up
into the missile well, and the other techs would insert the four bolts.
After we got them medium-tight, the guy holding the MWA would move out
of the way and we'd torque the bolts.

Which were, again, pointed straight up into the bottom of the plane.

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

[Mike Marron]

>Chad Irby > wrote:
>>Mike Marron > wrote:

>> I was also questioning his assertion that a critical component of the
>> ECM pod a$$embly was attached to the airplane by the bolt *threads*
>> alone. I don't think so!

>Really?

>How else would you characterize four bolts, pointed straight down?

>Aside from one cable to the missile well adapter, that's all that holds
>the pod missile well adapter to the plane.

>The way we mounted it was to put the adapter on the shoulders of one guy
>("man under," we called it), and he'd hold it a few inches below the
>plane until someone hooked up the cable. Then he'd push it straight up
>into the missile well, and the other techs would insert the four bolts.
>After we got them medium-tight, the guy holding the MWA would move out
>of the way and we'd torque the bolts.

>Which were, again, pointed straight up into the bottom of the plane.

My point is simply that as any competent mechanic knows, it is a bad
practice to put shear loads in the threaded area of a bolt. Were these
all-thread bolts and what type of loads were they designed for? It's
still difficult to believe that a pilot could put enough G on the
airplane to cause the ECM pod to depart the airframe.

-Mike Marron

[Buzzer]

On Sat, 20 Sep 2003 15:09:37 GMT, Ed Rasimus >
wrote:

If I cut out something a little too much I apologize..

Snip..

>between "blowing" the pod--an intentional act and ripping it off
>through exceeding the design limits. Kapish?

Does that mean I don't get an A on my final term paper? Darn.<G>
Point taken..

>I will make it a point to ask General Olds. I see him regularly and
>we're on a first name basis---he calls me Raz and I call him Sir!

While your're at if you would please ask him if he was in the front
seat when an ECM troop came out to the arming area and tried to
install the pod control box. The airman that had never been near a
running engine and all he could think about was having to climb up on
the intake of that giant vacuum cleaner sucking lots of air..

>Depending upon the level of maintenance being signed off, it took
>either a five or seven level to release a red-diagonal, and a seven
>level to release a red-X. A new attachment to the airframe that
>required carting, but was not yet carted, put the airplane on a red-X.
>If you were signing off with three-stripers in '67 you were looking
>for trouble.

Three stripers were five levels. They were carted or uncarted ahead of
time by MMS. The extra racks if there were usually loaded with bombs
by the time we got to them.

Snip...

>You can spot the difference between a TER and MER from a long way
>off--the MER is the great big rack that carries six weapons, the TER
>is the short stubby one that has three stations. Hard to believe you
>could have missed such a basic distinction.

Not hard to believe after all these years for me. I probably loaded
pods a thousand times in a short period. Just one of many things I
did. Pod goes on a clean pylon or goes between a couple bombs. Just
another load. I don't remember if there were bombs behind the pod or
not. My guess because of the length of the pod it was a TER.

>You might have noticed that C/L MERs (that's the big long one with six
>weapons), have the bottom stations "just a few inches off the
>concrete" regardless of what is hung there.

I don't remember centerline loads at all. There could have been at
Ubon in 1967, but I don't remember any. Just not in the old memory
banks. First time I saw a picture of a load like that I thought wow
that is amazing. I didn't know they could do that.

>You might have noticed a considerable reduction in missions flown to
>areas needing a lot of ECM from October of '68 until May of '72. It
>relates.

I stuck to the shop as much as I could at Korat from Nov 68-Sep 70. I
stayed away from debriefing and any crew involvement. I had no idea
where they were flying or what they were doing and that was fine by
me..

>Suspension gear is "standard"--doesn't matter to the metal whether it
>goes on an F-4 or a 105. The wiring changes, but the suspension is
>either 16" or 30" lugs and it's all the same on 781 gear.

http://www.afa.org/magazine/Nov1998/1198mig.asp
"It had required a massive Air Force*wide effort to bring Bolo into
being. The entire 8th TFW's energy was thrown into overcoming last
minute problems, with the support troops working all night long. (A
typical glitch involved the sway braces on the F-4C. They were located
differently than on the F-105, and the shell of the QRC-160 pod had to
be reinforced in order to fit well.)"

"support troops working all night long." I don't remember the number
of people with me that night in the nose dock, but maybe 2 or 3 and I
think a civilian tech rep. You know that "only a select few" for a
secret mission stuff.<G> And no air driven tools in those days for
some reason. Speed handles and torque wrenches..

>I reiterate, that in 1970, there wasn't a high probabiliy of MiG
>encounters.

Basically bring the F-4E over in Nov 1968 and shut the area down
where they would have been usefull? In 1968 the F-4E squadron from
Eglin was originally scheduled to go into Vietnam and for some reason
changed to Korat. That is the way my orders changed anyway from
Vietnam to Korat.

[Chad Irby]

In article >,
Buzzer > wrote:

> Just don't ask about the time ECM didn't check to see if
> there was a control box in a plane when they loaded the pod.<G>

Oh, you can get all sorts of fun stories about loading pods on planes.

We got around a lot of it by running a "full service" pod loading crew.
The same guys put the MWA on, loaded the pod on it, put the control box
in the plane, and ran the tests.

We also had a big advantage for a few years because we were running ECM
from the Component Repair Squadron, so the same guys who fixed the boxes
installed them on the planes.

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

[Buzzer]

On Sat, 20 Sep 2003 15:14:04 GMT, Ed Rasimus >
wrote:

>>Thanks Walt for explaining that. I knew they were cracked, but not the
>>exact why. I never got over seeing those massive plates on the outer
>>wing panels. Just seemed like more madness of the Vietnam war...
>
>
>The corrective reinforcing plates, while a bit ugly weren't all that
>massive--probably about 4x8 inches and maybe 1/4 inch thick.

I go for 12x8 and 3/8ths, but anyway they were massive to me. I never
saw anything that big on a B-52, and it seemed completely out of place
on a little F-4. (I was out of B-52s from 1966 to 1976 so the D model
and such might have grown patches like that while I was away.)

>The went
>in place abutting the hinges at the wing fold on both sides; main wing
>and tip section. The real "ugliness" was that the paint had to be
>scrapped away from the hinge and reinforcement to allow visual
>inspection for cracks during preflight.
>
>Not at all related to the "madness"--simply a fact of life that metal
>can only be flexed so many times before it fatigues. We had the
>reinforced wings at Torrejon while I was flogging F-4Cs from '73 to
>'77. Hardly noticed them after a while.

A fact of life that the U.S. government can't supply the people that
defend it with something more than a patched up worn out airframe?

[Chad Irby]

In article >,
Mike Marron > wrote:

> But once again, doubtful the "brainy" types in St. Louis designed the
> ECM pod fasteners to take shear loads in the threaded area
> anyway (it is a bad practice to do this with any bolt, AN or
> otherwise).

You can "doubt" all you want, but that's not how the damned things were
put together.

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

[Mike Marron]

>Chad Irby > wrote:
>>Mike Marron > wrote:

>>But once again, doubtful the "brainy" types in St. Louis designed the
>>ECM pod fasteners to take shear loads in the threaded area
>>anyway (it is a bad practice to do this with any bolt, AN or
>>otherwise).

>You can "doubt" all you want, but that's not how the damned things were
>put together.

But according to you, that's how the damned things came apart. Yea or
nay?

-Mike Marron

[[email protected]]

Mike Marron > wrote:

>>Chad Irby > wrote:
>>Which were, again, pointed straight up into the bottom of the plane.
>
>My point is simply that as any competent mechanic knows, it is a bad
>practice to put shear loads in the threaded area of a bolt. Were these
>all-thread bolts and what type of loads were they designed for? It's
>still difficult to believe that a pilot could put enough G on the
>airplane to cause the ECM pod to depart the airframe.
>
>-Mike Marron

Marron, for Christ's sake, what are you talking about??...'shear'
loads are "ACROSS THE BOLT". These bolts are installed so that
they will fail (when they do) by stripping the threads or
breaking the bolt "by STRETCHING it till the shank or the threads
fail".

A 'shear failure' will happen when a bolt is SHEARED off at ~90
degrees to the shank.

Why do you suppose it's called shear strength? and why do you
suppose shear strength is so much higher than tensile
strength?...god...
--

-Gord.

[Tarver Engineering]

"Gord Beaman" > wrote in message
...
> Mike Marron > wrote:
>
> >>Chad Irby > wrote:
> >>Which were, again, pointed straight up into the bottom of the plane.
> >
> >My point is simply that as any competent mechanic knows, it is a bad
> >practice to put shear loads in the threaded area of a bolt. Were these
> >all-thread bolts and what type of loads were they designed for? It's
> >still difficult to believe that a pilot could put enough G on the
> >airplane to cause the ECM pod to depart the airframe.
> >
> >-Mike Marron
>
> Marron, for Christ's sake, what are you talking about??...'shear'
> loads are "ACROSS THE BOLT". These bolts are installed so that
> they will fail (when they do) by stripping the threads or
> breaking the bolt "by STRETCHING it till the shank or the threads
> fail".
>
> A 'shear failure' will happen when a bolt is SHEARED off at ~90
> degrees to the shank.
>
> Why do you suppose it's called shear strength? and why do you
> suppose shear strength is so much higher than tensile
> strength?...god...

It is difficult to understand how FAA could continue to allow Marron to hold
and A&P certificate, in light of his obvious incompetence; in his delegated
area of expertise.

[Chad Irby]

Mike Marron > wrote:

> >Chad Irby > wrote:
>
> >You can "doubt" all you want, but that's not how the damned things were
> >put together.
>
> But according to you, that's how the damned things came apart. Yea or
> nay?

What I'm saying is that the Missile Well Adapter for electronic warfare
pods for the F-4 Phantom was held onto the plane by four bolts running
straight up into the airframe.

You claimed that was "doubtful."

You were (and are still) 100% wrong.

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

[Mike Marron]

>"Gord Beaman" ) wrote:
>>Mike Marron > wrote:

>>My point is simply that as any competent mechanic knows, it is a bad
>>practice to put shear loads in the threaded area of a bolt. Were these
>>all-thread bolts and what type of loads were they designed for? It's
>>still difficult to believe that a pilot could put enough G on the
>>airplane to cause the ECM pod to depart the airframe.

>Marron, for Christ's sake, what are you talking about??...'shear'
>loads are "ACROSS THE BOLT". These bolts are installed so that
>they will fail (when they do) by stripping the threads or
>breaking the bolt "by STRETCHING it till the shank or the threads
>fail".

>A 'shear failure' will happen when a bolt is SHEARED off at ~90
>degrees to the shank.

>Why do you suppose it's called shear strength? and why do you
>suppose shear strength is so much higher than tensile
>strength?...god...

You really are a hysterical old priss aren't you Gord? Jumping up
and down and pounding your white-knuckled fists in frustration
about sheer loads, of all things. Christ, why don't you just go find
a cute little dimpled, hexhead bolt to fellate. It would be less
pathetic, at least philosophically.

Let me clue you in to the obvious Gord, nobody gives half of a
dead rat's scrotum if the bolts failed in tension or in shear. The
point is that, according to at least one former U.S. Air Force
mechanic, they indeed failed. Catastrophically. In combat. Now
Gord, you've put a nice little rant together, but then again, so has
the tarv troll whom I am happily ignoring while he too follows me
around the NG like a puppy dog.

But at your age Gord, you really shouldn't get so worked up about
these things. I realize that you have nothing better to do than to
sit at your beloved 'puter up there in the great frozen north with
your anal duct puckered up in anticipation of another one of your
nit-noid, boring arguments-for-the-sake-of-arguing. However,
I suggest you loosen it a bit, because the freight train of
irrelevance is about to take the express track up your ass.

In any event, I'm so glad you have become such an overnight,
"instant expert" on how bolts are designed to fail. My A&P school
and professional wrenching days was many moons ago and one
of the reasons I stop in here so frequently is to learn about these
things from contrary, sackless douchebags like you. Don't get me
wrong, I still don't quite understand how F-4 ECM pods have been
known to tear apart from the airframe in combat, but then, I also
don't understand why you think I'd be interested in your useless
critiques of my replies.

[Buzzer]

On Sat, 20 Sep 2003 20:10:07 GMT, Chad Irby >
wrote:

>In article >,
> Mike Marron > wrote:
>
>> But once again, doubtful the "brainy" types in St. Louis designed the
>> ECM pod fasteners to take shear loads in the threaded area
>> anyway (it is a bad practice to do this with any bolt, AN or
>> otherwise).
>
>You can "doubt" all you want, but that's not how the damned things were
>put together.

Thinking about bolts shearing I wonder if it could have been like
pylon sway brace bolts that would get worn. No visible damage to the
threads, but when you went to torque them down they wouldn't be tight
against the pod. With a pod because of the length you could shake them
and get a feel for a loose sway brace bolt. Maybe 3 bolts torqued up
tight to the plate and one a hair away from the plate would decrease
the load carrying ability enough to have a pod come off?

Wasn't something said about mechanics carrying bolts around?
I remember now we use to carry spare sway brace bolts and nuts in our
truck.

[Chad Irby]

Buzzer > wrote:

> Thinking about bolts shearing I wonder if it could have been like
> pylon sway brace bolts that would get worn. No visible damage to the
> threads, but when you went to torque them down they wouldn't be tight
> against the pod. With a pod because of the length you could shake them
> and get a feel for a loose sway brace bolt. Maybe 3 bolts torqued up
> tight to the plate and one a hair away from the plate would decrease
> the load carrying ability enough to have a pod come off?

That could be something of a factor, but the sway brace bolts were a lot
bigger than the bolts holding the MWA to the airframe, and we were very
careful about getting them tight. Multiple inspections, et cetera.

> Wasn't something said about mechanics carrying bolts around?
> I remember now we use to carry spare sway brace bolts and nuts in our
> truck.

We usually inspected the MWAs off of the plane, and replaced the bolts
back at the shop when necessary. Considering the size and external
placement of the sway braces, it was very easy to do a good visual
inspection before we put the pod on.

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

[Gene Storey]

Nothing to contribute, except for glorification of self?



"Tarver Engineering" > wrote
>
> It is difficult to understand how FAA could continue to allow Marron to hold
> and A&P certificate, in light of his obvious incompetence; in his delegated
> area of expertise.

[Mike Marron]

>Chad Irby > wrote:
>>Mike Marron > wrote:

>>But according to you, that's how the damned things came apart. Yea or
>>nay?

>What I'm saying is that the Missile Well Adapter for electronic warfare
>pods for the F-4 Phantom was held onto the plane by four bolts running
>straight up into the airframe.

>You claimed that was "doubtful."

>You were (and are still) 100% wrong.

Oops! Instead of answering the question now you're dodging the
question and putting words in my mouth.

I doubted that A) the ECM pod ripped apart from the airframe as you
said, and B) the pod fasteners were designed to take shear loads in
the threaded area.

I did not "doubt" what you said about them "four bolts running
straight up into the airframe."

Now, pardon me if I missed something but I respectfully ask you
once again (for my own edification) in your opinion -- was it the
bolts, the design itself or what was the culprit with regards to what
you said about the ECM gear "ripping apart" from the airframe?

Sincerely,
-Mike Marron

[Mike Marron]

>Buzzer > wrote:

>Thinking about bolts shearing I wonder if it could have been like
>pylon sway brace bolts that would get worn. No visible damage to the
>threads, but when you went to torque them down they wouldn't be tight
>against the pod. With a pod because of the length you could shake them
>and get a feel for a loose sway brace bolt. Maybe 3 bolts torqued up
>tight to the plate and one a hair away from the plate would decrease
>the load carrying ability enough to have a pod come off?

I remain unconvinced that the ECM pod ripped off as the result
of over-G's like Chad said because any G force powerful enough
to cause AN hardware to fail catastrophically like that would most
likely result in some of the surrounding airframe structure to fail
along with it. But as the old adage goes, **** happens. Perhaps the
bolts were over-torqued and were stretched beyond limits, elongation
of the plate(s), or WTF?

>Wasn't something said about mechanics carrying bolts around?
>I remember now we use to carry spare sway brace bolts and nuts in our
>truck.

In addition to a small assortment of tools, I sometimes carry around
a few spare pip pins, tie-down rings, tie-wraps, rubber O-rings, and
of course, bungee cords in my A/C. On the first plane I built, I found
that 032" safety wire comes in handy from time to time not just to
help secure things, but also to unplug the carb main jets in the
field.

-Mike Marron

[Chad Irby]

In article >,
Mike Marron > wrote:

> Oops! Instead of answering the question now you're dodging the
> question and putting words in my mouth.

Nope. The questions have been answered about three differenet ways, you
just don't seem to understand the answers.

As far as putting words in your mouth...

> I doubted that A) the ECM pod ripped apart from the airframe as you
> said,

....and *all* of the reasons you gave for that doubt were based on some
very bad assumptions... which I covered. Multiple times.

> and B) the pod fasteners were designed to take shear loads in
> the threaded area.

....which is completely wrong. You haven't seen the part of the plane in
question, and you're well, just flat-out wrong. There's no other way to
put it. It's four bolts, run straight into the bottom of the plane.

Period.

> I did not "doubt" what you said about them "four bolts running
> straight up into the airframe."

See your comment B) above, which contradicts this.

> Now, pardon me if I missed something but I respectfully ask you
> once again (for my own edification) in your opinion -- was it the
> bolts, the design itself or what was the culprit with regards to what
> you said about the ECM gear "ripping apart" from the airframe?

As I've said a couple of times, it could have been a number of things,
including the design, wear, corrosion, and G-force.

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

[Chad Irby]

In article >,
Mike Marron > wrote:

> I remain unconvinced that the ECM pod ripped off as the result
> of over-G's like Chad said

....except I never claimed just that.

> because any G force powerful enough to cause AN hardware to fail
> catastrophically like that would most likely result in some of the
> surrounding airframe structure to fail along with it.

Bad assumption, in that you think all airframes are always new, always
perfectly maintained, and perfectly designed.

> But as the old adage goes, **** happens. Perhaps the bolts were
> over-torqued and were stretched beyond limits, elongation of the
> plate(s), or WTF?

Oh, *now* you start to get it. Took you long enough.

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

[Mike Marron]

Chad Irby > wrote:
>>Mike Marron > wrote:

>>Oops! Instead of answering the question now you're dodging the
>>question and putting words in my mouth.

>Nope. The questions have been answered about three differenet ways, you
>just don't seem to understand the answers.

There ya' go again dodging questions. Look, we're both adults and
mechanics here but I'm rapidly giving up hope trying to have any
semblance of a meaningful dialogue with you. But I'll give it one more
shot and see what happens. Once again, were these "four bolts" that
you keep referring to all-thread bolts and what type of loads were
they designed for?

>As far as putting words in your mouth...

>>I doubted that A) the ECM pod ripped apart from the airframe as you
>>said,

>...and *all* of the reasons you gave for that doubt were based on some
>very bad assumptions... which I covered. Multiple times.

Excuse me? Assuming that it would require a hellacious amount of G's
to cause the bolts that fasten the ECM pod to the airframe to fail is
a "bad" assumption? Assuming that the surrounding airframe structure
might be also be effected in the event of such a catastrophic failure
occurring is a "bad" assumption? And assuming that the McDonnell
Douglas engineers aren't stupid and would not design the ECM pod
fasteners to take shear loads in the threaded area of a fastener is a
"bad" assumption?

>> and B) the pod fasteners were designed to take shear loads in
>> the threaded area.

>...which is completely wrong. You haven't seen the part of the plane in
>question, and you're well, just flat-out wrong. There's no other way to
>put it. It's four bolts, run straight into the bottom of the plane.

There ya go again fixating on them "four bolts." Allow me to explain
one more time that I doubt that the fasteners were designed to take
shear loads in the threaded area NOT that there were "four bolts
running straight into the bottom of the plane." I don't care if there
were Forty fuggen bolts running straight through the TOP of the plane,
my doubt comes from your implication that the pod fasterners were
designed to take shear and/or tension loads in the THREADED AREA
of the bolts. Comprende, amigo?

>>Now, pardon me if I missed something but I respectfully ask you
>>once again (for my own edification) in your opinion -- was it the
>>bolts, the design itself or what was the culprit with regards to what
>>you said about the ECM gear "ripping apart" from the airframe?

>As I've said a couple of times, it could have been a number of things,
>including the design, wear, corrosion, and G-force.

Anytime something falls off ANY airplane, be it an ECM pod falling
from an F-4 or an engine falling from a DC-10, this is bound to raise
a few eyebrows. In the interest of safety not only for the aircrew
and/or passengers, but the public at large down on the ground, it
would be kinda' nice to know EXACTLY what caused such things
to occur.

In addition to your original comment stating that you KNOW there were
a couple cases in Vietnam where F-4's made hard enough turns to rip
the ECM pods off, you also said that F-4 pilots who were risking their
butts in the deadly skies over 'Nam didn't like ECM pods at all
because they considered them not "manly enough or something."

GMAFB!

It shouldn't surprise you one iota that particular insulting comment
of yours raised a few more eyebrows -- this time from several former
distinguished F-4 jocks right here in this happy NG assembled.

Now, after you wrote all these somewhat inflammatory things, Chad,
whose credibility do you s'pose is at stake here? Yours, or those of
us who are doubting the incredible, somewhat inflammatory things you
write?

Think about it.

-Mike Marron
CFII, A&P, UFI (fixed-wing, weightshift, land & sea)

[Mike Marron]

>Chad Irby > wrote:
>>Mike Marron > wrote:

>>But as the old adage goes, **** happens. Perhaps the bolts were
>>over-torqued and were stretched beyond limits, elongation of the
>>plate(s), or WTF?

>Oh, *now* you start to get it. Took you long enough.

I got it from the beginning. That doesn't mean I bought it then, nor
do I buy it now.

-Mike Marron

[Chad Irby]

Mike Marron > wrote:

This sums up Mike's entire fixation:

> Allow me to explain one more time that I doubt that the fasteners
> were designed to take shear loads in the threaded area NOT that there
> were "four bolts running straight into the bottom of the plane."

That's because, again, the bolts were NOT installed in such a way as to
take a SHEAR load.

It was a TENSION load, running vertically through the plane. The
threads of the bolts and the nutplates were the ONLY things holding the
entire assembly to the aircraft.

Since you can't after several reiterations, manage to keep that in mind,
it's pretty damned obvious that you're never *going* to get it.

Everything else you wrote is just noise.

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

[Mike Marron]

>Chad Irby > wrote:
>>Mike Marron > wrote:

>>Allow me to explain one more time that I doubt that the fasteners
>>were designed to take shear loads in the threaded area NOT that there
>>were "four bolts running straight into the bottom of the plane."

>That's because, again, the bolts were NOT installed in such a way as to
>take a SHEAR load.

I've asked you several times if those "four bolts" that you kept
referring to all-thread bolts and what type of loads were
they designed for. Now that we've finally established that little
bit of info...

>Everything else you wrote is just noise.

Not nearly as noisy as the smoke blowing out your ass such as:

"I know there were a couple of cases in Vietnam where F-4s made hard
enough turns to rip the ECM pods off..."

"An apocryphal story they used to tell us was that some fighter jock
was trying to kill a boat on a river. He dropped bombs. Missed. He
used up all of his 20mm. Missed. So he went in on a run and
jettisoned the pod. Hit. one $5,000 boat for a million dollar pod..."

"You have to rmember that for at least some of the Vietnam War, some
pilots didn't like ECM pods at *all*. Weren't manly enough, or
something. After they started noticing a somewhat higher survival
rate among pilots with pods, they got the message."

"But by the early 1980s, a lot of jet jockeys were back to the "pods
are for wimps" sort of attitude."

"Speaking of Vietnam: one afternoon, we were working on a plane, and
one of the sheet-metal guys came over to us. He'd just replaced a
patch on the tail of one plane, and he had the old patch in his hands.
It was a flattened can of Vietnamese beer from ten years back..."

-Mike ( Riiiiiiiight ) Marron

[Nele_VII]

Gentlemen,

To paraphrase on of Sir Murphy's Laws,
"If it should break, it will break. If it shouldn't break, it will break".

I am just an armchair aviator, but I've seen a car (same manufacturer, but
from 1993) with broken bottom ball bearing on right wheel. (my car is 1974'
vintage, BTW 8-). The driver said 'it's that bl**dy hole in the middle of
the road, and I was doing 50Kmph". Since he was already aside, I turned my
wreck, pardon, my car, :)))) and performed run over the hole... at 60KmPh.
Just a "bump", nothing happened. He just told me with a sore smile "don't
tell this to my insurance".

BTW, cars had the identical suspension/wheel mounting (Russian Lada, my
model 2101, his 2107). Both had original parts, bar mine that had steereng
rods (not bearings) changed in 1982...

S*it happens, that's it.

So, what happened with over g's, since it all went to nuts and bolts? Mr
Cooper, I have read from the interview that one pilot of MiG-25 went to
arond 11g... he skewed a plane a bit, but landed OK. Any info on Russian
planes over g' ing (especially MiG-23MLD, that can pull 8.5g versus ML that
can go to 8g)?

Nele

NULLA ROSA SINE SPINA

Mike Marron wrote in message ...
>>"Gord Beaman" ) wrote:
>>>Mike Marron > wrote:
>
>>>For example, a standard AN6 bolt (3/8-inch diameter shank) has
>>>a shear strength of approx. 8700 lbs. IIRC. And there is probably
>>>more than just one of these or similiar types of bolts securing the
>>>ECM gear to the belly of an F-4.
>
>>But that's 'shear strength' isn't it?...sounds to me as if these
>>pods are held on so as not to use the shear strength, right?
>
>As opposed to what, tensile strength? Could be (I've never hung an
>ECM pod on an F-4) but the bottom line is that it's highly unlikely
>an ECM pod could be "ripped" from the belly of an F-4 while maneuvering.
>
>If you're interested, this is a highly recommended book: Carroll Smith's
>Nuts, Bolts and Fasteners and Plumbing Handbook.
>
>MJM

[Chad Irby]

Mike Marron > wrote:

> I've asked you several times if those "four bolts" that you kept
> referring to all-thread bolts and what type of loads were
> they designed for. Now that we've finally established that little
> bit of info...

"Finally?"

You mean, after the first four or five times?

Sheesh.

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

[Mike Marron]

>Chad Irby > wrote:
>>Mike Marron > wrote:

>>I've asked you several times if those "four bolts" that you kept
>>referring to all-thread bolts and what type of loads were
>>they designed for. Now that we've finally established that little
>>bit of info...

>"Finally?"

>You mean, after the first four or five times?

Scroll back through all the B.S. you've posted in this thread
and show me just one time (prior to your last post you sent
late last night) that you specifically said the bolts in question
were NOT installed in such a way as to take a shear load.

Just *one* time, please and thank you.

[Ed Rasimus]

On Sat, 20 Sep 2003 20:06:35 GMT, Buzzer > wrote:

>On Sat, 20 Sep 2003 15:14:04 GMT, Ed Rasimus >
>wrote:
>
>>>Thanks Walt for explaining that. I knew they were cracked, but not the
>>>exact why. I never got over seeing those massive plates on the outer
>>>wing panels. Just seemed like more madness of the Vietnam war...
>>
--snip--
>>
>>Not at all related to the "madness"--simply a fact of life that metal
>>can only be flexed so many times before it fatigues. We had the
>>reinforced wings at Torrejon while I was flogging F-4Cs from '73 to
>>'77. Hardly noticed them after a while.
>
>A fact of life that the U.S. government can't supply the people that
>defend it with something more than a patched up worn out airframe?
>

I checked out in the F-4C at Luke in April/May of '72, then went to
E-models at Korat. The C at Luke was more than adequate to do the job
although I would have liked consistent switchology with the airplane I
was going to fly combat in. Still, I managed to cope without too much
trouble.

After leaving Korat, I flew C's at Torrejon for four years, from '73
through '77. The C was certainly not "worn out" by a long shot and
because of the relative simplicity of the weapons system (no WRCS,
TISEO, TREE, LES, etc.) it had a higher in-commission rate than D's in
England or E's in Germany at that time. We had responsibility in USAFE
for the NATO Southern Region, and were more than 1/3rd deployed
continually.

We did nuke alert in Aviano and Incirlik, air defense in Spain and on
other deployments, ground attack wherever necessary and led the force
in development of anti-ship tactics.

The C with it's wing fold hinge patches was a long way from "worn out"
and the patches weren't atypical regarding fixes for a lot of various
types and models of aircraft.

When tactical aircraft cost multiple millions apiece and when the
taxpayers deserve to get the maximum bang for their bucks and when the
Congress is reluctant to approve lots of new spending, it isn't really
a bad decision.

[Mike Marron]

>"Nele_VII" > wrote:

>Gentlemen,

>To paraphrase on of Sir Murphy's Laws,
>"If it should break, it will break. If it shouldn't break, it will break".

>I am just an armchair aviator, but I've seen a car (same manufacturer, but
>from 1993) with broken bottom ball bearing on right wheel. (my car is 1974'
>vintage, BTW 8-). The driver said 'it's that bl**dy hole in the middle of
>the road, and I was doing 50Kmph". Since he was already aside, I turned my
>wreck, pardon, my car, :)))) and performed run over the hole... at 60KmPh.
>Just a "bump", nothing happened. He just told me with a sore smile "don't
>tell this to my insurance".

>BTW, cars had the identical suspension/wheel mounting (Russian Lada, my
>model 2101, his 2107). Both had original parts, bar mine that had steereng
>rods (not bearings) changed in 1982...

>S*it happens, that's it.

With such a lackadaisical attitude towards safety as that, little
wonder "**** happens" so much more frequently in Russia than it
does elsewhere in the industrialized world. The goal is to try and
reduce the amount of "**** happening."

Based on what you just wrote, it appears that your homeland is
Russia -- where manufactured products are produced under
less stringent QC (quality control) programs compared to the
QC programs found in the US, UK, France, etc. which ensure that
EVERY unit conforms with the approved design. The keyword
here is "consistency."

Aircraft especially must *consistently* conform to a higher standard
because obviously you can't merely just pull off to the side of the
road and call for help should something break in the air.

To use if your "pothole" analogy, if you happen to hit a pothole in
the sky (e.g: severe turbulence) and your wing fails catastrophically
in midair, you better have jam in your pockets because your ass is
toast.

The following recent tragedy indicates just how poor and INconsistent
the Russians are with regards to quality control. Aeros, a Russian
company that manufactures flexwings primarily for recreational use,
were buying anodized tubing from Antonov Design Bureau stock.

One year ago an experienced American flexwing pilot named Bert
Breitung was flying an Aeros wing when the left leading edge tube
failed during an approach to landing and rolled the craft inverted
causing Bert to auger straight in killing him instantly.

An American metallurgist subsequently inspected the damaged
tube from the fatal crash and found a crack in the wing leading edge
tube. The wing had been manufactured in September 1999
and had only 30 hrs. on it.

Even worse, after word of this fatal accident got out it was later
determined that he tubing that they were getting from Antonov had too
many scratches and flaws for it to look good anodized only so the
Ruskies were simply covering up the defects by also painting the
tubes!

Sleazy, unethical and potentially deadly practices such as the example
above are virtually unheard of here in the U.S. and rarely, if ever,
does a critical component such as a wing leading edge tube fail.

Which brings me back to the topic of the ALLEGED catastrophic failure
of F-4 ECM pods in combat over Vietnam. Had such incidents actually
occurred, rest assurred that the facts as to precisely WHY the pods
ripped away from the airplane would be widely known by the thousands
of dedicated professionals in the F-4 community whom were intimately
involved with flying and fixing the multi-million dollar jet.

-Mike Marron
CFII, A&P, UFI (fixed wing, weightshift, land & sea)

[Alan Minyard]

On Thu, 18 Sep 2003 21:33:40 GMT, Ed Rasimus >
wrote:

>Chad Irby > wrote:
>
>>In article >,
>> "José Herculano" > wrote:
>>
>>> Maximum I read regarding the Phantom was a guy in Vietnam pulling 14 G to
>>> get an ass-SAM divergence. The bird held and landed.
>>
>>I know there were a couple of cases in Vietnam where F-4s made hard
>>enough turns to rip the ECM pods off...
>
>Gotta wonder about that, since ECM pods were routinely carried in the
>Sparrow missile wells. Can't imagine a situation in which the pods
>suspension gear would fail. Don't say it couldn't, simply that I doubt
>it.
>
>In 250 combat missions, 150 over NVN where high threat evasions were
>most likely, I never, not even once, heard of a structural failure nor
>of an inadvertent separation of any piece of equipment off an
>aircraft. I'm not saying it couldn't have, simply that I doubt it.
>
>YMMV.
>
> Ed Rasimus
> Fighter Pilot (ret)
> ***"When Thunder Rolled:
> *** An F-105 Pilot Over N. Vietnam"
> *** from Smithsonian Books
> ISBN: 1588341038


Does "inadvertent separation" cover those "dang, wrong button"
moments?

Al Minyard

[Ed Rasimus]

On Sun, 21 Sep 2003 10:47:10 -0500, Alan Minyard
> wrote:

>On Thu, 18 Sep 2003 21:33:40 GMT, Ed Rasimus >
>wrote:
>>
>>In 250 combat missions, 150 over NVN where high threat evasions were
>>most likely, I never, not even once, heard of a structural failure nor
>>of an inadvertent separation of any piece of equipment off an
>>aircraft. I'm not saying it couldn't have, simply that I doubt it.
>>
>>YMMV.
>>
>> Ed Rasimus

>Does "inadvertent separation" cover those "dang, wrong button"
>moments?
>
>Al Minyard

No. Inadvertent means coming off without action (intended or
accidental) on the part of the aircrew. I've done some of those "dang
(or more scatological, crude or blasphemous words), wrong button"
moves. I mention one in When Thunder Rolled, where I conducted a well
choreographed sequence of finger manipulations to clean the airplane
of tanks, suspension gear and weapons--not necessarily in that order.
I fessed up.

I also dumped a C/L MER full of 750's one stress-filled afternoon by
choosing the wrong toggle switch when I intended to blow the inboard
450 tanks. I fessed up there as well and took an unbelievable amount
of harrassment from my squadron buds.

(To this day I contend it was a result of poor design ergonomics. The
three selective jettison toggle switches were on the right lower
console panel. Republic had them reading from left to right:
inboard, centerline, outboard. I contend the logical sequence should
have been starting from the inside of the row on the right side of the
airplane: centerline, inboard, outboard. Using my logic, when I wanted
to toggle the inboard stations, I incorrectly chose the centerline
jettison switch. Worst of all, I had to continue to the target area,
support my flight, not hurt the enemy cause I didn't have any bombs to
drop and, the final indignity was I got hit by 37mm while doing it.)

[Chad Irby]

In article >,
Mike Marron > wrote:

> Which brings me back to the topic of the ALLEGED catastrophic failure
> of F-4 ECM pods in combat over Vietnam. Had such incidents actually
> occurred, rest assurred that the facts as to precisely WHY the pods
> ripped away from the airplane would be widely known by the thousands
> of dedicated professionals in the F-4 community whom were intimately
> involved with flying and fixing the multi-million dollar jet.

Actually, in the field, the pilots wouldn't have any reason to know
this. The people who would be expected to deal with it are the
flightline troops.

We couldn't even get most of them to learn how to use the stuff that was
installed in the planes every single day. Expecting them to know all
about the problems that can happen with nut plates inside the plane with
a system they didn't fly with all of the time is just, well, silly.

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

[Tarver Engineering]

"Gene Storey" > wrote in message
...
> Nothing to contribute, except for glorification of self?

I have a right to resond to the flamer troll.

> "Tarver Engineering" > wrote
> >
> > It is difficult to understand how FAA could continue to allow Marron to
hold
> > and A&P certificate, in light of his obvious incompetence; in his
delegated
> > area of expertise.
>
>

[Mike Marron]

>Chad Irby > wrote:
>>Mike Marron > wrote:

>>Which brings me back to the topic of the ALLEGED catastrophic failure
>>of F-4 ECM pods in combat over Vietnam. Had such incidents actually
>>occurred, rest assurred that the facts as to precisely WHY the pods
>>ripped away from the airplane would be widely known by the thousands
>>of dedicated professionals in the F-4 community whom were intimately
>>involved with flying and fixing the multi-million dollar jet.

>Actually, in the field, the pilots wouldn't have any reason to know
>this. The people who would be expected to deal with it are the
>flightline troops.

Just wondering, since you were such a rip snortin' air force mechanic
and seem to have such great interest and knowledge in aviation, do
you have an A&P or any other FAA certificates?

>We couldn't even get most of them to learn how to use the stuff that was
>installed in the planes every single day.

Laughable!

Got any more school boy fibs?

[Mike Marron]

>Chad Irby > wrote:
>>Mike Marron > wrote:

>>I've asked you several times if those "four bolts" that you kept
>>referring to all-thread bolts and what type of loads were
>>they designed for. Now that we've finally established that little
>>bit of info...

>"Finally?"

>You mean, after the first four or five times?

Scroll back through all the B.S. you've posted in this thread
and show me just one time (prior to your last post you sent
late last night) that you specifically said the bolts in question
were NOT installed in such a way as to take a shear load.

Just *one* time, please and thank you.

[Ed Rasimus]

On Sun, 21 Sep 2003 16:15:00 GMT, Mike Marron >
wrote:

>>Chad Irby > wrote:
>>>Mike Marron > wrote:
>
>>>Which brings me back to the topic of the ALLEGED catastrophic failure
>>>of F-4 ECM pods in combat over Vietnam. Had such incidents actually
>>>occurred, rest assurred that the facts as to precisely WHY the pods
>>>ripped away from the airplane would be widely known by the thousands
>>>of dedicated professionals in the F-4 community whom were intimately
>>>involved with flying and fixing the multi-million dollar jet.
>
>>Actually, in the field, the pilots wouldn't have any reason to know
>>this. The people who would be expected to deal with it are the
>>flightline troops.

Whoa! Time to throw a flag. If stuff were ripping off of airplanes,
whether through fatigue, corrosion, maintenance oversight or exceeding
design G limits, you can bet your butt, the pilots would know it. They
would NEED to know it, since separations for whatever reason can
endanger the whole airplane.
>
>>We couldn't even get most of them to learn how to use the stuff that was
>>installed in the planes every single day.

Don't know where you were in the food chain of aircrew training, but
if it was installed in the planes every single day, you can bet we
knew how to use it. If it were mission essential or mission critical
we got trained in it, refreshed in it, tested in it, and briefed on
every single mission with regard to employment of it.
>

[Tarver Engineering]

"Chad Irby" > wrote in message
...
> In article >,
> Mike Marron > wrote:
>
> > I remain unconvinced that the ECM pod ripped off as the result
> > of over-G's like Chad said
>
> ...except I never claimed just that.

It is problematic that the Marron lune just makes things up.

[Tarver Engineering]

"Chad Irby" > wrote in message
. ..
> Mike Marron > wrote:
>
> This sums up Mike's entire fixation:
>
> > Allow me to explain one more time that I doubt that the fasteners
> > were designed to take shear loads in the threaded area NOT that there
> > were "four bolts running straight into the bottom of the plane."
>
> That's because, again, the bolts were NOT installed in such a way as to
> take a SHEAR load.
>
> It was a TENSION load, running vertically through the plane. The
> threads of the bolts and the nutplates were the ONLY things holding the
> entire assembly to the aircraft.
>
> Since you can't after several reiterations, manage to keep that in mind,
> it's pretty damned obvious that you're never *going* to get it.
>
> Everything else you wrote is just noise.

Is Mike Marron the pupeteer for John Mazor?

[Gene Storey]

"Ed Rasimus" > wrote
>
> Don't know where you were in the food chain of aircrew training, but
> if it was installed in the planes every single day, you can bet we
> knew how to use it. If it were mission essential or mission critical
> we got trained in it, refreshed in it, tested in it, and briefed on
> every single mission with regard to employment of it.

Well... OK...

One thing that fighter/bomber crews never seemed to understand was
Mode-4 IFF, and wide-band secure voice. In Iceland the mission was
to intercept and escort any unidentified aircraft through the defense zone.
What that meant in real life was that if the IFF gave you problems, you
shut it off. If you couldn't talk to AWACS, or the Shack on secure, then
you switched to clear. Billions in hardware in the off position.

Finally in 1986 the Air Force started getting serious, and they made the
bean count on those two items as painful as possible.

What we found, was that the crews just didn't understand the poorly
designed fault indicators, and since there was no incentive to operate the
equipment, they just shut it off. 1) The Soviets know we're there, 2) The
Soviets understand how NATO intercepts are conducted, and 3) By
doing the intercepts in the clear, the Soviets weren't surprised when
fighters and tankers, and P-3's, etc, all pounced on them for escort.

All of which HQ decided was too damned non-mil to continue.

The Army finally came along in the early 90's after the highly trained
USAF pilots and AWACS controllers splashed their non-participants
in Iraq.

Today, I think the radio is a completely different tool than it was before
1986. The use of wide and narrow secure when it's even necessary, is
the favored position (especially satcom). I listened to some of the
Air/Air recordings from a strike near Hanoi by a flight of 105's when I
went to a technical seminar, and it pretty much defined the word Clint
Eastwood had about Clusters...

I can see where crews might have training/operational problems with
gadgets even more complex than the IFF and Wide-Band panels.

[Nele_VII]

A bit of a pingpong

Mike Marron wrote in message >...
>>"Nele_VII" > wrote:
>
>>Gentlemen,
>
>>To paraphrase on of Sir Murphy's Laws,
>>"If it should break, it will break. If it shouldn't break, it will break".
>
>>I am just an armchair aviator, but I've seen a car (same manufacturer, but
>>from 1993) with broken bottom ball bearing on right wheel. (my car is
1974'
>>vintage, BTW 8-). The driver said 'it's that bl**dy hole in the middle of
>>the road, and I was doing 50Kmph". Since he was already aside, I turned my
>>wreck, pardon, my car, :)))) and performed run over the hole... at 60KmPh.
>>Just a "bump", nothing happened. He just told me with a sore smile "don't
>>tell this to my insurance".
>
>>BTW, cars had the identical suspension/wheel mounting (Russian Lada, my
>>model 2101, his 2107). Both had original parts, bar mine that had steereng
>>rods (not bearings) changed in 1982...
>
>>S*it happens, that's it.
>
>With such a lackadaisical attitude towards safety as that, little
>wonder "**** happens" so much more frequently in Russia than it
>does elsewhere in the industrialized world. The goal is to try and
>reduce the amount of "**** happening."

It didn't happen in the Russia, but in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
>
>Based on what you just wrote, it appears that your homeland is
>Russia -- where manufactured products are produced under
>less stringent QC (quality control) programs compared to the
>QC programs found in the US, UK, France, etc. which ensure that
>EVERY unit conforms with the approved design. The keyword
>here is "consistency."

Firstly, I am not from Russia, nor from B&H. I was born and live in Croatia.

"Consistency" was with my car. I had original ball-bearings and bought
RUSSIAN steering-rods. The guy had bought ITALIAN-MADE ball-bearings when he
replaced his suspension (i.e. steering rods). Also, I have seen other Lada
with a broken steering rod. It was also MADE IN ITALY, guy bougt it since it
was cheap. My cousin almost died in his old Fiat (actually, "Zastava" from
Jragujevac, Yugoslavia)when he bought CROATIAN-made steering-end suspensor
rod. I had to get one-via many channels- from YUGOSLAVIA, Kragujevac from
the assembly line for police-cars (they are strenghened, jut a coincidence
:)

You are mixing simple fact that PARTS FIT, but are not MADE for the car
(case of Lada's) or simply had a flaw (Fiat). I have 250,000Km without
overhaul on my "2101". My cousin has 300,000+ on Yu-Fiat. Only secret is use
of ORIGINAL PARTS, but it does not guarantee that original rod os bearing
will not crack in one of 100,000 Russian cars.

So drop Your thesis abot poor quality of Russian vehicles/parts, better
check Italy.

>
>Aircraft especially must *consistently* conform to a higher standard
>because obviously you can't merely just pull off to the side of the
>road and call for help should something break in the air.

Of course.

>
>To use if your "pothole" analogy, if you happen to hit a pothole in
>the sky (e.g: severe turbulence) and your wing fails catastrophically
>in midair, you better have jam in your pockets because your ass is
>toast.
>
>The following recent tragedy indicates just how poor and INconsistent
>the Russians are with regards to quality control. Aeros, a Russian
>company that manufactures flexwings primarily for recreational use,
>were buying anodized tubing from Antonov Design Bureau stock.
>
>One year ago an experienced American flexwing pilot named Bert
>Breitung was flying an Aeros wing when the left leading edge tube
>failed during an approach to landing and rolled the craft inverted
>causing Bert to auger straight in killing him instantly.
>
>An American metallurgist subsequently inspected the damaged
>tube from the fatal crash and found a crack in the wing leading edge
>tube. The wing had been manufactured in September 1999
>and had only 30 hrs. on it.
>
>Even worse, after word of this fatal accident got out it was later
>determined that he tubing that they were getting from Antonov had too
>many scratches and flaws for it to look good anodized only so the
>Ruskies were simply covering up the defects by also painting the
>tubes!

If it was made un USSR, somebody would go to gulag for that.
>
>Sleazy, unethical and potentially deadly practices such as the example
>above are virtually unheard of here in the U.S. and rarely, if ever,
>does a critical component such as a wing leading edge tube fail.

Really? I come back to the cars, what happened with that SUV vehicle (Ford?)
in which they discovered deadly built-in flaw after 6 YEARS? Our famous
actress, Ena Begovich is suspected that she died 'cause of it! My friend in
Canada says that he has a, qute from mechanic, "minor seepage from steering
servo, engine and transmission". Unbeleivable! It is the Ford Service
Garage, U know!

What about deadly stall/spin characteristic of the F-104 and F-4 (flat
spin)? Ever heard any MiG going into a flat spin? What about wing cracks in
early F/A-18A/B? What about Osprey? What about false spare-parts detected in
the wreckages of AMERICAN helicopters destroyed in unsucessful attempt to
save hostages from Iran during Carter?

You wrote a sad story about the lame sub-contractor from Russia that costed
a man's life and assume that:

a) it can only happen in Russia

b) applies to all aspects of russian industry.

You are -SO- wrong. It happens all around the globe, and, with respect,
United States of America are still on this planet.
>
>Which brings me back to the topic of the ALLEGED catastrophic failure
>of F-4 ECM pods in combat over Vietnam. Had such incidents actually
>occurred, rest assurred that the facts as to precisely WHY the pods
>ripped away from the airplane would be widely known by the thousands
>of dedicated professionals in the F-4 community whom were intimately
>involved with flying and fixing the multi-million dollar jet.

Is it -widely- known that one F-4 "jockey" ripped off one stabilator fin due
to harsh maneuvering? It happened only once!

>
>-Mike Marron
>CFII, A&P, UFI (fixed wing, weightshift, land & sea)

Nenad Karanovic-Nele

NULLA ROSA SINE SPINA

[Nele_VII]

To avoid being told I am making things up...

>>>BTW, cars had the identical suspension/wheel mounting (Russian Lada, my
>>>model 2101, his 2107). Both had original parts, bar mine that had
steereng
>>>rods (not bearings) changed in 1982...

>"Consistency" was with my car. I had original ball-bearings and bought
>RUSSIAN steering-rods. The guy had bought ITALIAN-MADE ball-bearings when
he
>replaced his suspension (i.e. steering rods). Also, I have seen other Lada
>with a broken steering rod. It was also MADE IN ITALY, guy bougt it since
it
>was cheap. My cousin almost died in his old Fiat (actually, "Zastava" from
>Jragujevac, Yugoslavia)when he bought CROATIAN-made steering-end suspensor
>rod. I had to get one-via many channels- from YUGOSLAVIA, Kragujevac from
>the assembly line for police-cars (they are strenghened, jut a coincidence
>:)

Suspicious, right? ;)))))

It should say:

>"Consistency" was with my car. I had original ball-bearings and bought
>RUSSIAN steering-rods. The >>OTHER<< guy had bought ITALIAN-MADE
ball-bearings...

I've seen three cases: one with original/Russian, two with Italian parts...

Sorry, fast typing on a small laptop!

Nele

NULLA ROSSA SINE SPINA

[Ed Rasimus]

On Sun, 21 Sep 2003 17:38:44 GMT, "Gene Storey" >
wrote:

>"Ed Rasimus" > wrote
>>
>> Don't know where you were in the food chain of aircrew training, but
>> if it was installed in the planes every single day, you can bet we
>> knew how to use it. If it were mission essential or mission critical
>> we got trained in it, refreshed in it, tested in it, and briefed on
>> every single mission with regard to employment of it.
>
>Well... OK...
>
>One thing that fighter/bomber crews never seemed to understand was
>Mode-4 IFF, and wide-band secure voice. In Iceland the mission was
>to intercept and escort any unidentified aircraft through the defense zone.
>What that meant in real life was that if the IFF gave you problems, you
>shut it off. If you couldn't talk to AWACS, or the Shack on secure, then
>you switched to clear. Billions in hardware in the off position.

Foggy memory trying to recall things. Best I recollect (although I
might be wrong) was that the IFF/SIF had cockpit control of modes 1,
2, 3 and C. Don't recall that Mode-4 was cockpit controllable. In the
F-4 the coding was done in the nosegear well on the ground with a
plunger-like device. If you're talking peace-time air defense
intercept, and you've got 1,2,3 and C so that AWACS/GCI can control
you, then I'd have to agree with the decision to go. In combat,
interdiction, across the fence, then I'd say the prudent choice would
be no-go.

As for secure, again, if you are an interceptor and (as you stated the
situation), you can't talk to AWACS, etc. secure, you still go and
acknowledge that you're degraded. The option is to not go and be
penetrated.

As for your final statement, "billions in hardware in the off
position"--I'd say maybe millions if all the force wasn't using those
two sub-systems, and I'd say that you didn't indicate that all the
force wasn't using the systems--you simply provided a couple of
examples of "if the IFF gave you problems" and "if you couldn't talk
secure". Seems like you're describing a choice of mission
accomplishment or not, in limited situations.
>
>
>Today, I think the radio is a completely different tool than it was before
>1986. The use of wide and narrow secure when it's even necessary, is
>the favored position (especially satcom). I listened to some of the
>Air/Air recordings from a strike near Hanoi by a flight of 105's when I
>went to a technical seminar, and it pretty much defined the word Clint
>Eastwood had about Clusters...

Well, it depends on when during the conflict the radio recording you
heard was made. There was no Have Quick or later version of secure
voice. Depending upon the training of the crews (see my comments in
this forum in the past or in WTR for re-qual of various types in
fighters), the mission de jour, the weather, the defenses, etc. etc.
it could indeed be an example of remarkable incompetence.

But, that certainly can't be an example to support your argument
regarding what the crews "understand". Understanding the purpose,
operation, etc of equipment is a whole lot different depending upon
the mission circumstances, and quite obviously, the equipment
availability or existence.

[Gene Storey]

"Ed Rasimus" > wrote
>
> Foggy memory trying to recall things. Best I recollect (although I
> might be wrong) was that the IFF/SIF had cockpit control of modes 1,
> 2, 3 and C. Don't recall that Mode-4 was cockpit controllable. In the
> F-4 the coding was done in the nosegear well on the ground with a
> plunger-like device.

Trivia alert

Probably had a "zero, a/b, hold switch", and a caution lite. there was two
codes a-today b-tomorrow, and the hold kept your plunger data on a hot turn, while the
caution lite blinked when someone interrogated you, but your box
couldn't decode it, and it stayed on solid if you lost your crypto (plunger data) or
the computer went TU.

Usually the blinking lite is the worst, because it means the Patriot battery is now
trying to figure out a second way to ID you

[Chad Irby]

In article >,
Mike Marron > wrote:

> >We couldn't even get most of them to learn how to use the stuff that was
> >installed in the planes every single day.
>
> Laughable!

Funny you should post this, at the same time one of our local fighter
pilots posted about having problems with switchology.

> Got any more school boy fibs?

Got any more schoolboy insults?

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

[Chad Irby]

In article >,
Ed Rasimus > wrote:

> Whoa! Time to throw a flag. If stuff were ripping off of airplanes,
> whether through fatigue, corrosion, maintenance oversight or exceeding
> design G limits, you can bet your butt, the pilots would know it. They
> would NEED to know it, since separations for whatever reason can
> endanger the whole airplane.

I agree, they *should* know something about this.

But if there was a rare case of something happening, you'd probably get
a debrief about "be sure to have your crewchiefs inspect all fasteners
to reduce the chance of ECM pod separation." You wouldn't get a
detailed pile of info on it, and you'd probably file it in the "rare"
incident pile. It sure wouldn't be something you could inspect on a
preflight.

> >>We couldn't even get most of them to learn how to use the stuff that was
> >>installed in the planes every single day.
>
> Don't know where you were in the food chain of aircrew training, but
> if it was installed in the planes every single day, you can bet we
> knew how to use it.

Maybe back in Vietnam, but I can guarantee you that a good number of
pilots had a severe lack of interest in ECM matters in the early 1980s.
I was one of the enlisted men who got to go in and "assist" the training
from time to time.

> If it were mission essential or mission critical
> we got trained in it, refreshed in it, tested in it, and briefed on
> every single mission with regard to employment of it.

....and yet, on a weekly basis, we had a problem with pilots who couldn't
even do a correct built-in test on an ALR-46 system. And they'd write
it up as bad because they did it wrong (the description in the writeup
would be completely correct except for pressing one button). And we'd
test, it, it would work fine, and we wouldn't get another writeup on it
until that same guy went back on the plane.

And you wouldn't *believe* how confused they got over the use of the
ALQ-119 pods.

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

[Buzzer]

On Mon, 22 Sep 2003 02:51:39 GMT, Chad Irby > wrote:

>...and yet, on a weekly basis, we had a problem with pilots who couldn't
>even do a correct built-in test on an ALR-46 system. And they'd write
>it up as bad because they did it wrong (the description in the writeup
>would be completely correct except for pressing one button). And we'd
>test, it, it would work fine, and we wouldn't get another writeup on it
>until that same guy went back on the plane.

Eglin AFB second half 1968. Some of the F-4E had a newer model of the
APS-107 installed. The cycle through the APR-36/37 mod line somewhere
was not exactly speedy so we had a mix of rhaw.
Write up - Can not turn on APR-36/37.
Fix - Turned on APR-107. Ops chk OK..
Good for a laugh, but I knew what the crews were going through.
Besides some of the APS-107 wouldn't even work. No spares so we robbed
boards from some of them to keep others running..

>And you wouldn't *believe* how confused they got over the use of the
>ALQ-119 pods.

They? Getting close to end of tour at Ubon in 1967 and we got in
either the QRC-160-8/ALQ-87. The 87 anyway. On failure it had some
weird light sequence on the pod control box. I don't remember any of
it at all, but it was something like this light on means something,
and this one blinking was some other failure. The first time I went in
debriefing for an ALQ-87 flight I saw the cheat sheet on the failure
light sequence and thought you have got to be kidding me. The guy in
back has to remember if lights are blinking and which one is on or
off!

[Juvat]

Chad Irby posted:

>Maybe back in Vietnam, but I can guarantee you that a good number of
>pilots had a severe lack of interest in ECM matters in the early 1980s.

I'm guessing you're talking about Phantom pilots. As one of them, I'd
say you're wrong. We got tested on it in RTU '80-'81 all the time in
USAFE '81-'84, as an RTU IP '84-'86...

>I was one of the enlisted men who got to go in and "assist" the training
>from time to time.

I'm guessing you were an EMS guy that dropped in to talk about 781
write-ups or unique problems you saw in the shop or on the line. You
didn't actually train aircrew how to operate the equipment in a
tactical sense, or did you?

>...and yet, on a weekly basis, we had a problem with pilots who couldn't
>even do a correct built-in test on an ALR-46 system.

Please correct me if I'm wrong, the only time I turned the ALR-46 on
as a "pilot" was as an IP in the backseat. Pilots generally speaking
let the WSO operate the RWR. Hell I was even a squadron ECP
(Electronic Combat Pilot) in Phantoms. In the Viper we used the
ALR-69.

>And they'd write it up as bad because they did it wrong ... And we'd
>test, it, it would work fine, and we wouldn't get another writeup on it
>until that same guy went back on the plane.

Any chance that the guy making the write-up was a RTU student WSO?

>And you wouldn't *believe* how confused they got over the use of the
>ALQ-119 pods.

How 'bout this for another perspective? Rarely carry them because
it's too much trouble for maintenance (that's what we were told), and
and don't think of turning them on because they were programmed with
"war files," we don't want those pesky Warsaw Pact ESM assets
detecting our EC plan. So go to STBY...that's it unless you're at
Red/Green Flag.

Going to Spade Adam in the UK? Take a training pod, yeah it turns on
the same way, but the button pushing for countering the threat
symbology (on the ALR-46) was not what you would do in combat. Hmmm,
train in a way you won't fight...okay, color me confused.

I'll agree that the 119 could be a most confusing piece of equipment
to operate when you personally fly with one maybe 6 times a year.

Juvat

[Chad Irby]

In article >,
Juvat > wrote:

> Chad Irby posted:
>
> >Maybe back in Vietnam, but I can guarantee you that a good number of
> >pilots had a severe lack of interest in ECM matters in the early 1980s.
>
> I'm guessing you're talking about Phantom pilots. As one of them, I'd
> say you're wrong. We got tested on it in RTU '80-'81 all the time in
> USAFE '81-'84, as an RTU IP '84-'86...

"Getting tested on it" and "caring" are, as any high school kid can tell
you, two very different things. When you get a writeup that says,
basically, "RWR makes beeping sounds when in self-test," someone was
asleep in class...

> >I was one of the enlisted men who got to go in and "assist" the training
> >from time to time.
>
> I'm guessing you were an EMS guy that dropped in to talk about 781
> write-ups or unique problems you saw in the shop or on the line. You
> didn't actually train aircrew how to operate the equipment in a
> tactical sense, or did you?

No, we had a wing EWO for formal tactical training (and you should have
heard *him* complain!). But I did get to go in and do quick training
sessions with a lot of the pilots before they launched. Basic stuff,
short sessions about self-test and the like.

> >...and yet, on a weekly basis, we had a problem with pilots who couldn't
> >even do a correct built-in test on an ALR-46 system.
>
> Please correct me if I'm wrong, the only time I turned the ALR-46 on
> as a "pilot" was as an IP in the backseat. Pilots generally speaking
> let the WSO operate the RWR. Hell I was even a squadron ECP
> (Electronic Combat Pilot) in Phantoms. In the Viper we used the
> ALR-69.

I'm using pilots and backseaters interchangeably here.

> >And they'd write it up as bad because they did it wrong ... And we'd
> >test, it, it would work fine, and we wouldn't get another writeup on it
> >until that same guy went back on the plane.
>
> Any chance that the guy making the write-up was a RTU student WSO?

Maybe sometimes, but we didn't have a high rate of exchange in our wing.

> >And you wouldn't *believe* how confused they got over the use of the
> >ALQ-119 pods.
>
> How 'bout this for another perspective? Rarely carry them because
> it's too much trouble for maintenance (that's what we were told), and
> and don't think of turning them on because they were programmed with
> "war files," we don't want those pesky Warsaw Pact ESM assets
> detecting our EC plan. So go to STBY...that's it unless you're at
> Red/Green Flag.

Exactly. If you don't use it, you don't care.

> Going to Spade Adam in the UK? Take a training pod, yeah it turns on
> the same way, but the button pushing for countering the threat
> symbology (on the ALR-46) was not what you would do in combat. Hmmm,
> train in a way you won't fight...okay, color me confused.

And the way many officers dealt with it was... blow it off. If it's not
important, why care?

> I'll agree that the 119 could be a most confusing piece of equipment
> to operate when you personally fly with one maybe 6 times a year.

Try being the guy who has to load it on the plane and then figure out
what was "wrong" with it when it comes back with a writeup that
describes, basically, normal operation.

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

[Juvat]

Chad Irby posted:

>> >Maybe back in Vietnam, but I can guarantee you that a good number of
>> >pilots had a severe lack of interest in ECM matters in the early 1980s.

Regarding the "severe lack of interest," I pointed out:

>> I'm guessing you're talking about Phantom pilots. As one of them, I'd
>> say you're wrong. We got tested on it in RTU '80-'81 all the time in
>> USAFE '81-'84, as an RTU IP '84-'86...

So now Chad says:

>"Getting tested on it" and "caring" are, as any high school kid can tell
>you, two very different things.

Come on chad, we've gone from "severe lack of interest" to "caring?"
If I'm NOT getting tested, asked questions during
certification/verification briefings, mission qualification training,
and plain ol' ordinary day-to-day simulated "Fence" checks on a
flight...I guess you're right. But I'd feel kinda silly as a pilot
saying I "cared." Alan Alda might say he "cared" but I wouldn't. I had
to know about certain aspects of EC...as a guy in the FRONT seat I
couldn't operate the ALR-46 or the ALQ-119/131. As an IP, I could when
in the pit...at that point you would say I "cared."

>Exactly. If you don't use it, you don't care.

Clearly that is the only conclusion you are able to draw. Others would
disagree.

>And the way many officers dealt with it was... blow it off. If it's not
>important, why care?

Again...negative training, that runs counter to "train like you
fight." C'est vrai?

>Try being the guy who has to load it on the plane and then figure out
>what was "wrong" with it when it comes back with a writeup that
>describes, basically, normal operation.

Life isn't fair. But it would be fair to say that the guys making
those write-ups were not PILOTs...correct?

Juvat

[Buzzer]

On Mon, 22 Sep 2003 04:50:20 GMT, Juvat >
wrote:

>How 'bout this for another perspective? Rarely carry them because
>it's too much trouble for maintenance (that's what we were told), and
>and don't think of turning them on because they were programmed with
>"war files," we don't want those pesky Warsaw Pact ESM assets
>detecting our EC plan. So go to STBY...that's it unless you're at
>Red/Green Flag.
>
>Going to Spade Adam in the UK? Take a training pod, yeah it turns on
>the same way, but the button pushing for countering the threat
>symbology (on the ALR-46) was not what you would do in combat. Hmmm,
>train in a way you won't fight...okay, color me confused.

Basically it would seem to be a command - higher up the ladder than
the flying crew problem. Expect crews to know the equipment, but don't
let them use it.

Wonder what B-52 EWOs had to go against in Europe? Fly around and run
everything in Standby?

Read somewhere that was a problem in SEA with B-52 EWOs along for the
ride basically when bombing the trails. I believe the fix was to bring
in an RBS site so the EWO's could keep up their proficiency..

>I'll agree that the 119 could be a most confusing piece of equipment
>to operate when you personally fly with one maybe 6 times a year.

I'm starting to catch on to why a couple of ECM troops out of fighters
in Europe came into our shop at K.I. and couldn't wait to get back to
Europe ASAP. K.I. Sawyer B-52H we were working 12 hr days 7 days a
week supporting training missions where they actually used the
equipment. B-52 crews in the states trained as they would fight, but
fighter crews that were much closer to the "enemy" trained with one
hand tied behind their back?

[Juvat]

Buzzer posted:

>B-52 crews in the states trained as they would fight, but
>fighter crews that were much closer to the "enemy" trained with one
>hand tied behind their back?

WRT to turning the ALQ-119/131 on when you carried a war pod? Sure.
But in USAFE we routinely practiced/exercised all aspects of EC.

We got our Mode IV checked at EOR, getting a thumbs up or down from
the checking us. Did this in TAC and PACAF too.

We routinely did fence checks, ALR-46 in "Training" file rather than
"Open" or "Priority." Everybody...everybody knew what a ZSU-23/4
symbology looked like on the RWR. I remember what the F-16 radar
warning sounds like versus an F-4 radar. I knew that the "batwing" was
a high band threat and the "airplane" was medium band, and which
etched ring the four dots should be on...

Continuing with our everyday fence check...simulate the Pod in "Xmit 2
with xx buttons depressed." During NATO/USAFE or local exercises we
used certain local routes to simulate the Mike Plan (min risk ATC
procedures), and we used actual min risk recovery procedures. We got a
"mickey" from the Command Post after engine start to program the Have
Quick radios and checked them in secure mode but didn't use that
feature inflight since ATC and GCI weren't on the net.

And finally, Wings included pages to their aircrew weapon's guide (AKA
Ladies' Aid) that specifically covered unclassified ALR-46 and ALQ-119
operations, testing, and fault remedies. And this was for normal
day-to-day ops.

The only thing missing was carrying ECM pods routinely, and the lack
of EW ranges to practice. Once in a great while we could practice with
training pods on the Ramstein RBS or the Spade Adam range in the UK.

Juvat

[Alan Minyard]

On Sun, 21 Sep 2003 15:59:17 GMT, Ed Rasimus >
wrote:


>>Does "inadvertent separation" cover those "dang, wrong button"
>>moments?
>>
>>Al Minyard
>
>No. Inadvertent means coming off without action (intended or
>accidental) on the part of the aircrew. I've done some of those "dang
>(or more scatological, crude or blasphemous words), wrong button"
>moves. I mention one in When Thunder Rolled, where I conducted a well
>choreographed sequence of finger manipulations to clean the airplane
>of tanks, suspension gear and weapons--not necessarily in that order.
>I fessed up.
>
>I also dumped a C/L MER full of 750's one stress-filled afternoon by
>choosing the wrong toggle switch when I intended to blow the inboard
>450 tanks. I fessed up there as well and took an unbelievable amount
>of harrassment from my squadron buds.
>
>(To this day I contend it was a result of poor design ergonomics. The
>three selective jettison toggle switches were on the right lower
>console panel. Republic had them reading from left to right:
>inboard, centerline, outboard. I contend the logical sequence should
>have been starting from the inside of the row on the right side of the
>airplane: centerline, inboard, outboard. Using my logic, when I wanted
>to toggle the inboard stations, I incorrectly chose the centerline
>jettison switch. Worst of all, I had to continue to the target area,
>support my flight, not hurt the enemy cause I didn't have any bombs to
>drop and, the final indignity was I got hit by 37mm while doing it.)
>
It is amazing to find someone who does not say/believe "I am perfect
and have never made a mistake" Thanks :-)))

Al Minyard

[Chad Irby]

Juvat > wrote:

> Chad Irby posted:
>
> >"Getting tested on it" and "caring" are, as any high school kid can tell
> >you, two very different things.
>
> Come on chad, we've gone from "severe lack of interest" to "caring?"

"Severe lack of interest" and "not caring" are pretty much the same
thing.

> If I'm NOT getting tested, asked questions during
> certification/verification briefings, mission qualification training,
> and plain ol' ordinary day-to-day simulated "Fence" checks on a
> flight...I guess you're right.

That's my point.

> But I'd feel kinda silly as a pilot
> saying I "cared." Alan Alda might say he "cared" but I wouldn't. I had
> to know about certain aspects of EC...as a guy in the FRONT seat I
> couldn't operate the ALR-46 or the ALQ-119/131.

Well, you *could* operate the ALR-46 and the ALE-40, at least partially.

> As an IP, I could when
> in the pit...at that point you would say I "cared."

But that's *you*. An *instructor pilot* who was expected to make sure
of that sort of thing. A lot of guys in the seat were on the verge of
hostile...

As an example, I was one of those guys who had to do end of runway
checks on the ALR-46, by talking to the back seater on the headset while
two other troops walked up the sides of the plane carrying test
transmitters. About half of the time, I'd hear the BIT tones running as
I plugged in the headset (oops - caught 'em), and it was often like
pulling teeth to get answers out of the back seat.

> >Exactly. If you don't use it, you don't care.
>
> Clearly that is the only conclusion you are able to draw. Others would
> disagree.

Yep. And one of them is an IP. Fancy that. I wonder if an aviator
might be a bit less forthcoming about his attitudes with an IP than with
an airman who can't do much about it?

> >And the way many officers dealt with it was... blow it off. If it's not
> >important, why care?
>
> Again...negative training, that runs counter to "train like you
> fight." C'est vrai?

Exactly. Again.

> >Try being the guy who has to load it on the plane and then figure out
> >what was "wrong" with it when it comes back with a writeup that
> >describes, basically, normal operation.
>
> Life isn't fair. But it would be fair to say that the guys making
> those write-ups were not PILOTs...correct?

Oddly enough, we got a lot of front-seater writeups for ECM. Those
usually came down to switchology.

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

[Peter Stickney]

In article >,
Scott Ferrin > writes:
> On Thu, 18 Sep 2003 13:47:22 GMT, Ed Rasimus >
> wrote:
>
(Walt BJ) wrote:
>>
>>
>>>We used 4G as a standard pull-out in the F4, 5g if we were pressing
>>>for greater accuracy. I managed to pull 8 once in an extremity (we
>>>were getting hosed) and nothing fell off.
>>
>>Got this among a list of quotes from a reasonably erudite fighter
>>pilot:
>>
>>"The aircraft G-limits are only there in case there is another flight
>>by that particular airplane. If subsequent flights do not appear
>>likely, there are no G-limits."
>>
>>Makes a lot of sense to me.
>
>
>
> REad of a Skyray pulling 12 Gs and wrinked the wing. Don't know if it
> ever flew again. And also of a Tomcat that did a NEGATIVE 8+ (they
> didn't have a choice). I think the Tomcat flew again.

That would have been Bob Rahn, in one of hte prototype XF4Ds,
discovering thr Ford's pitchup tendency when pulling G while
decelerating through the transonic range. (An F4D wasn't on most days,
supersonic in level flight. Clean, with a good airplane, maybe, but
otherwise, not. It could be dived to Mach 1.2-1.3 fairly routinely,
though). Since one of teh Skyray's innovations was a rather unique
constuction method using a very thin skin over lots of small stringers
and spars, the airplane was not only well and truly bent, but ended up
wrinkled like a prune. (It's worth noting that one of the changes
that occurred when turning the F4D Skyray into the F5D Skylancer was a
more conventional type of construction.)

--
Pete Stickney
A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many
bad measures. -- Daniel Webster

[Buzzer]

On Mon, 22 Sep 2003 17:00:18 GMT, Juvat >
wrote:

>Buzzer posted:
>
>>B-52 crews in the states trained as they would fight, but
>>fighter crews that were much closer to the "enemy" trained with one
>>hand tied behind their back?
>
>WRT to turning the ALQ-119/131 on when you carried a war pod? Sure.
>But in USAFE we routinely practiced/exercised all aspects of EC.
>
>We got our Mode IV checked at EOR, getting a thumbs up or down from
>the checking us. Did this in TAC and PACAF too.
>
>We routinely did fence checks, ALR-46 in "Training" file rather than
>"Open" or "Priority." Everybody...everybody knew what a ZSU-23/4
>symbology looked like on the RWR. I remember what the F-16 radar
>warning sounds like versus an F-4 radar. I knew that the "batwing" was
>a high band threat and the "airplane" was medium band, and which
>etched ring the four dots should be on...

>Continuing with our everyday fence check...simulate the Pod in "Xmit 2
>with xx buttons depressed." During NATO/USAFE or local exercises we
>used certain local routes to simulate the Mike Plan (min risk ATC
>procedures), and we used actual min risk recovery procedures. We got a
>"mickey" from the Command Post after engine start to program the Have
>Quick radios and checked them in secure mode but didn't use that
>feature inflight since ATC and GCI weren't on the net.
>
>And finally, Wings included pages to their aircrew weapon's guide (AKA
>Ladies' Aid) that specifically covered unclassified ALR-46 and ALQ-119
>operations, testing, and fault remedies. And this was for normal
>day-to-day ops.
>
>The only thing missing was carrying ECM pods routinely, and the lack
>of EW ranges to practice. Once in a great while we could practice with
>training pods on the Ramstein RBS or the Spade Adam range in the UK.

Did they have sims at different bases so you could at least practice
everything all together? They have cargo plane sims.

I guess what really bothers me how did they figure the OR rate for a
pod that was never used? Do the new know it all do it all pods have a
sensor that could tell if the final amp was bad if it was never turned
on?

[Jeff Crowell]

Mike Marron wrote:
> I doubted that ... B) the pod fasteners were designed to take
> shear loads in the threaded area.
>
> I did not "doubt" what you said about them "four bolts running
> straight up into the airframe."

FYI, Mike, shear loads are 90 degrees to the long axis of the bolt.
Loads aligned with the long axis of the bolt are tensile loads.


Jeff

[Mike Marron]

>"Jeff Crowell" > wrote:

>FYI, Mike, shear loads are 90 degrees to the long axis of the bolt.
>Loads aligned with the long axis of the bolt are tensile loads.

The A-frame downtubes on my particular A/C are loaded in
compression. The nose-strut is loaded in tension during flight,
compression on the ground. And your point is?

-Mike Marron

[Walt BJ]

Ed Rasimus > wrote in message >...
> On Sat, 20 Sep 2003 20:06:35 GMT, Buzzer > wrote:
>
> >On Sat, 20 Sep 2003 15:14:04 GMT, Ed Rasimus >
> >wrote:
> >
> SNIP:
> The C with it's wing fold hinge patches was a long way from "worn out"
> and the patches weren't atypical regarding fixes for a lot of various
> types and models of aircraft.
>
> When tactical aircraft cost multiple millions apiece and when the
> taxpayers deserve to get the maximum bang for their bucks and when the
> Congress is reluctant to approve lots of new spending, it isn't really
> a bad decision.
SNIP:

I agree, Ed, except the wheels that be could react a little quicker
when the birds are getting worn out. I was in the USAF when the F86Fs,
F100s, F105s, F4s and KB29s/KB50s/B47s/A26s all were 'retired' when
they started coming apart in the air. That cost us some good pilots.
The B52s and C130s got some heavy reskinning and doublers added to
prolong their lives.
I lost a good friend at Homestead in about 76 when the outer wing came
off during a max performance reversal - a 135* slice at .9M and and
7G- they were nose down and partially inverted and never got out of it
as the bird went into Marco Bay.
When I was working with the DC Guard out of the 31st TFW at Homestead
they were towing a 105 out of the hangar after an engine change. It
was going to be prepped for the required test hop - and a main wing
spar broke during the tow! That was it for their 105s - the previous
summer camp they lost a plane and a pilot when the spar broke during
the pitch-out for landing. Take any machine too many times to the well
and she will, some time, break on you. That, of course, goes for cars
too . . .
Walt BJ

[Harry Andreas]

In article >, "Jeff Crowell"
> wrote:

> Mike Marron wrote:
> > I doubted that ... B) the pod fasteners were designed to take
> > shear loads in the threaded area.
> >
> > I did not "doubt" what you said about them "four bolts running
> > straight up into the airframe."
>
> FYI, Mike, shear loads are 90 degrees to the long axis of the bolt.
> Loads aligned with the long axis of the bolt are tensile loads.

I read that whole convoluted thread with amusement earlier this
week when I returned from travel. So much figurative arm waving...

As a long time mechanical engineer, let me point out a few things
I saw when reading the whole distended session:
1] someone (MIke?) was absolutely correct when he said that bolts
should never be loaded in shear across the threads. There are
special bolts with unthreaded shanks for shear loading.
2]someone said bolts are roll threaded to increase strength, that
is incorrect. the reason roll threading is used is that it does not
create as bad a stress point as cut threads. Cutting threads cuts
across grain flow and roll threading pushes the grain around the
thread. No increases in strength, but less of a decrease.
3] It is perfectly reasonable that 4 bolts going straight up into the
airframe take the entire loads of a pod. Pod mounting points are
primarily loaded in bending with only a little shear. This is overcome
with tensile strength, not shear strength.
4] any good designer can transfer pod flight loads into the airframe
anyway, without putting the entire load through fasteners
5] cadmium is plated onto fasteners to prevent galvanic corrosion
with aluminum in the airframe
6] pre-loading the bolts puts the structure in compression.
Subsequent flight loads unload the compression before the
structure goes in tension. All this depends on the load paths.
7] I have some experience with "little hooks" and different alloys
and different heat treatments. Size doesn't necessarily matter.

ciao

--
Harry Andreas
Engineering raconteur

[Jeff Crowell]

Jeff Crowell wrote:
> >FYI, Mike, shear loads are 90 degrees to the long axis of the bolt.
> >Loads aligned with the long axis of the bolt are tensile loads.

Mike Marron
> The A-frame downtubes on my particular A/C are loaded in
> compression. The nose-strut is loaded in tension during flight,
> compression on the ground. And your point is?

My point is, you've been yapping repeatedly about not loading
bolts in shear across the threads (true, as far as it goes), when
people have repeatedly been telling you that the bolts in
question are oriented vertically "up" into the airframe and
therefore are loaded in tension, not shear.

Pardon me if you knew this--if so, why do you keep bringing
up something that does not apply to the question?


Jeff

[Mike Marron]

>Jeff Crowell wrote:

[blah blah]

>Pardon me if you knew this

OK, ewe be excused.

>-if so, why do you keep bringing up something that does not apply
>to the question?

Er um, I moved on -- YOU keep bringing up something that doesn't
support Chad's contention (i.e: F-4s ripping ECM pods off).

-Mike Marron

[Mike Marron]

> (Harry Andreas) wrote:

>I read that whole convoluted thread with amusement earlier this
>week when I returned from travel. So much figurative arm waving...

>As a long time mechanical engineer, let me point out a few things
>I saw when reading the whole distended session:
>1] someone (MIke?) was absolutely correct when he said that bolts
>should never be loaded in shear across the threads. There are
>special bolts with unthreaded shanks for shear loading.
>2]someone said bolts are roll threaded to increase strength, that
>is incorrect. the reason roll threading is used is that it does not
>create as bad a stress point as cut threads. Cutting threads cuts
>across grain flow and roll threading pushes the grain around the
>thread. No increases in strength, but less of a decrease.
>3] It is perfectly reasonable that 4 bolts going straight up into the
>airframe take the entire loads of a pod. Pod mounting points are
>primarily loaded in bending with only a little shear. This is overcome
>with tensile strength, not shear strength.
>4] any good designer can transfer pod flight loads into the airframe
>anyway, without putting the entire load through fasteners
>5] cadmium is plated onto fasteners to prevent galvanic corrosion
>with aluminum in the airframe
>6] pre-loading the bolts puts the structure in compression.
>Subsequent flight loads unload the compression before the
>structure goes in tension. All this depends on the load paths.
>7] I have some experience with "little hooks" and different alloys
>and different heat treatments. Size doesn't necessarily matter.

>ciao

I was hoping a mechanical engineer type would speak up.
Now getting back to the "nuts & bolts" (pun intended) part of the
issue at hand here, please explain why or why not you think that
an F-4 could pull enough G so as to rip the ECM pod off the belly?

Thanks!

-Mike Marron
CFII, A&P, UFI (fixed-wing, weightshift, land & sea)

[Buzzer]

On Thu, 25 Sep 2003 10:25:50 -0700, (Harry
Andreas) wrote:

>In article >, "Jeff Crowell"
> wrote:
>
>> Mike Marron wrote:
>> > I doubted that ... B) the pod fasteners were designed to take
>> > shear loads in the threaded area.
>> >
>> > I did not "doubt" what you said about them "four bolts running
>> > straight up into the airframe."
>>
>> FYI, Mike, shear loads are 90 degrees to the long axis of the bolt.
>> Loads aligned with the long axis of the bolt are tensile loads.
>
>I read that whole convoluted thread with amusement earlier this
>week when I returned from travel. So much figurative arm waving...
>
>As a long time mechanical engineer, let me point out a few things
>I saw when reading the whole distended session:
>1] someone (MIke?) was absolutely correct when he said that bolts
>should never be loaded in shear across the threads. There are
>special bolts with unthreaded shanks for shear loading.
>2]someone said bolts are roll threaded to increase strength, that
>is incorrect. the reason roll threading is used is that it does not
>create as bad a stress point as cut threads. Cutting threads cuts
>across grain flow and roll threading pushes the grain around the
>thread. No increases in strength, but less of a decrease.
>3] It is perfectly reasonable that 4 bolts going straight up into the
>airframe take the entire loads of a pod. Pod mounting points are
>primarily loaded in bending with only a little shear. This is overcome
>with tensile strength, not shear strength.
>4] any good designer can transfer pod flight loads into the airframe
>anyway, without putting the entire load through fasteners
>5] cadmium is plated onto fasteners to prevent galvanic corrosion
>with aluminum in the airframe
>6] pre-loading the bolts puts the structure in compression.
>Subsequent flight loads unload the compression before the
>structure goes in tension. All this depends on the load paths.
>7] I have some experience with "little hooks" and different alloys
>and different heat treatments. Size doesn't necessarily matter.

When a layman looks at lugs (what I call the assembly/loop the pylon
"hook" circles around) and one is a little smaller than a little
finger, and the other is as big as a thumb the size difference made me
wonder what was going on.

Something for everyone to consider. Everyone has been focused on a pod
coming off an aircraft by the attachment point of the pylon to the
aircraft. Bolts sheared, etc of the adapter plate. (I forgot what that
was called - MWA?

How about the lug on the pod, the plate the lug screws into and how
that plate is attached to the pod?

I don't remember ever sending in the lugs for nondestructive testing
(magnaflux) at Ubon 1967, Korat 1968-70, nor Tyndall 1972 where we
flew the ALE-2 chaff tanks and the ALQ-72 pod on T-33s.

BUT we got caught at Det 1 4677 DSES at Holloman AFB during a mini ORI
for not testing the lugs on our ALE-2 chaff tank spares we kept around
for use on TDY EB-57s around 1973. I can't remember the specifics, but
I think it was a new requirment.

A couple pods ripped off F-4s in SEA because of lug failure in say
1972/73, and they make it a requirment to test all ECM lugs in the Air
Force no matter what they are used on?

[Tex Houston]

"Harry Andreas" > wrote in message
...
> Size doesn't necessarily matter.
>
> ciao
>
> --
> Harry Andreas

May I relay part of your response to a certain young lady?

Tex

[Harry Andreas]

In article >, "Tex Houston"
> wrote:

> "Harry Andreas" > wrote in message
> ...
> > Size doesn't necessarily matter.
> >
> > ciao
> >
> > --
> > Harry Andreas
>
> May I relay part of your response to a certain young lady?
>
> Tex

LOL! Be my guest.

--
Harry Andreas
Engineering raconteur

[Harry Andreas]

In article >, Mike Marron
> wrote:


> I was hoping a mechanical engineer type would speak up.
> Now getting back to the "nuts & bolts" (pun intended) part of the
> issue at hand here, please explain why or why not you think that
> an F-4 could pull enough G so as to rip the ECM pod off the belly?

From what I've seen in the industry, ripping a pod off under normal
(or abnormal) circumstances seems unlikely.
However someone pointed out that maintenance actions could be
to blame. I remember the engine that fell off the DC-10 in Chicago
was blamed on maintenance procedures.

Some possible reasons: corrosion, overtorquing, undertorquing,
misalignment, etc.

--
Harry Andreas
Engineering raconteur

[Walt BJ]

Maybe an ECM pod did fall off a Sparrow well but that does not mean it
was installed correctly to begin with. Sparrow missiles themselevs
weigh a hell of a lot more than any of the pods that fit in the well
did. Now a good-sized country boy with a socket wrench could easily
way over-torque the bolts "Ain't no way this sucker is coming off" and
so overstress the attach bolts that not a heck of lot more stress
would be needed to snap one and fail the rest as a result. Not that
I'm saying one ever did come off. FWIW I had two of my Ds come back
with the G meters pegged both directions and nothing fell of of them.
Walt BJ