A-10 gear fairing

[Kirk Stant]

A question for any Warthog jocks (or fans) out there:

Why is the front of the right gear fairing on all A-10s painted gloss
black? Is is a radome of some sort? If so, what for?

Unless, of course, you would have to kill me if you told me, etc...

Just curious,

Kirk
Old F-4 WSO

[Matt]

I believe it's a Radar Warning Reciever.

"Kirk Stant" > wrote in message
m...
> A question for any Warthog jocks (or fans) out there:
>
> Why is the front of the right gear fairing on all A-10s painted gloss
> black? Is is a radome of some sort? If so, what for?
>
> Unless, of course, you would have to kill me if you told me, etc...
>
> Just curious,
>
> Kirk
> Old F-4 WSO

[Guy Alcala]

Matt wrote:

> "Kirk Stant" > wrote in message
> m...
> > A question for any Warthog jocks (or fans) out there:
> >
> > Why is the front of the right gear fairing on all A-10s painted gloss
> > black? Is is a radome of some sort? If so, what for?
> >
> > Unless, of course, you would have to kill me if you told me, etc...
> >
> > Just curious,
> >
> > Kirk
> > Old F-4 WSO

> I believe it's a Radar Warning Reciever.

Probably not, as the forward RWR antennae are buttons on either side of the
nose, above the gun muzzle. This must be something fairly recent, as it
only seems to appear in photos of grey A-10s.

Guy

[Cub Driver]

>Probably not, as the forward RWR antennae are buttons on either side of the
>nose, above the gun muzzle. This must be something fairly recent, as it
>only seems to appear in photos of grey A-10s.

Well, that's over 10 years, right? Weren't they re-painted as a result
of experience in Desert Storm?

There was a feeling that the A-10s were painted olive drab because the
Air Force was piqued at being forced to acquire an aircraft that did
Army work. Any truth to that?

all the best -- Dan Ford
email: www.danford.net/letters.htm#9

see the Warbird's Forum at www.warbirdforum.com
and the Piper Cub Forum at www.pipercubforum.com

[Kirk Stant]

Cub Driver > wrote in message news
>
> There was a feeling that the A-10s were painted olive drab because the
> Air Force was piqued at being forced to acquire an aircraft that did
> Army work. Any truth to that?
>
> all the best -- Dan Ford
> email: www.danford.net/letters.htm#9
>
> see the Warbird's Forum at www.warbirdforum.com
> and the Piper Cub Forum at www.pipercubforum.com


Dan,

One hears (and reads about) the supposed dislike of the A-10 by the
"Air Force". I wonder where it all started - I never heard anyone
badmouth the Hog during my 20 years in, and everybody who flew it
loved it. The bull**** about "the brass hates it because it isn't
supersonic" is really an insult to the professionalism of the Air
Force. Anyway, the AF wanted the A-10 to get a big piece of stopping
the WP in the Fulda Gap, as well as do CAS (which has always been an
AF mission). In no way was it "forced" on the AF. Now, as a single
role airplane, it is naturally more at risk whenever budget cuts are
in the air, but there is really no way around that - when you are
limited on numbers, your airplane have to be able to do multiple
tasks, and as great as the Hog is for CAS and BAI, it still really
can't do OCA or DCA (well, maybe, against some of the Air Forces out
there!!!).

I think the late Jeff Ethell had a lot to do with some of the bogus
rumors about military aviation. He was great when talking about his
experiences flying WW2 warbirds, but a lot of what he said about
current combat aircraft was often wrong - I cringe when I hear some of
the things he says on Discovery Wings!

Kirk

[Ed Rasimus]

On 24 Sep 2003 08:29:47 -0700, (Kirk Stant)
wrote:

>Cub Driver > wrote in message news
>>
>> There was a feeling that the A-10s were painted olive drab because the
>> Air Force was piqued at being forced to acquire an aircraft that did
>> Army work. Any truth to that?
>>
>> all the best -- Dan Ford
No truth at all. The color is a logical choice because the airplane is
designed to work low against the earth tones. You also see some of the
A-10s have been painted in grays. Does that mean they were expected to
do Navy work?
>
>Dan,
>
>One hears (and reads about) the supposed dislike of the A-10 by the
>"Air Force". I wonder where it all started - I never heard anyone
>badmouth the Hog during my 20 years in, and everybody who flew it
>loved it. The bull**** about "the brass hates it because it isn't
>supersonic" is really an insult to the professionalism of the Air
>Force. Anyway, the AF wanted the A-10 to get a big piece of stopping
>the WP in the Fulda Gap, as well as do CAS (which has always been an
>AF mission). In no way was it "forced" on the AF. Now, as a single
>role airplane, it is naturally more at risk whenever budget cuts are
>in the air, but there is really no way around that - when you are
>limited on numbers, your airplane have to be able to do multiple
>tasks, and as great as the Hog is for CAS and BAI, it still really
>can't do OCA or DCA (well, maybe, against some of the Air Forces out
>there!!!).

Couldn't have said it better myself. In fact, I think in the past I
have said it myself. The idea that the AF is "anti-CAS" or that there
is some sort of elitist panache to supersonic is flat wrong.
>
>I think the late Jeff Ethell had a lot to do with some of the bogus
>rumors about military aviation. He was great when talking about his
>experiences flying WW2 warbirds, but a lot of what he said about
>current combat aircraft was often wrong - I cringe when I hear some of
>the things he says on Discovery Wings!
>
While Jeff did some pretty good historical research ("One Day in a
Long War" is excellent), I've often wondered how an aficionado becomes
an expert without actually military experience. Regardless of the
sincerity and conscientiousness of the research, it's simply a fact
that someone in the civilian world is going to be "out of the loop"
when it comes to tactics development and classified widgetry.

[PirateJohn]

>Couldn't have said it better myself. In fact, I think in the past I
>have said it myself. The idea that the AF is "anti-CAS" or that there
>is some sort of elitist panache to supersonic is flat wrong.
>>


Perhaps. But I remember reading in the Myrtle Beach newspaper that the
commander of MBAFB was in hot water because he had been publicly discussing his
desires to replace the A-10 with F-16's. The reason given in the newspaper IIRC
was that the A-10 was too slow for the assignment.


~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~

Keeper of the Humour List at http://members.aol.com/PirateJohn/pirate1.html

"Mother, mother ocean... I have heard your call" - Jimmy Buffett, A Pirate
Looks At Forty.

[Ed Rasimus]

On 24 Sep 2003 18:04:47 GMT, (PirateJohn)
wrote:

>>Couldn't have said it better myself. In fact, I think in the past I
>>have said it myself. The idea that the AF is "anti-CAS" or that there
>>is some sort of elitist panache to supersonic is flat wrong.
>>>
>
>
>Perhaps. But I remember reading in the Myrtle Beach newspaper that the
>commander of MBAFB was in hot water because he had been publicly discussing his
>desires to replace the A-10 with F-16's. The reason given in the newspaper IIRC
>was that the A-10 was too slow for the assignment.
>

Duh? Lemme see, would I like to keep driving my Yugo or get upgraded
to a Porsche Carrera S?

Of course! Any fighter aviator would be eager to switch from Hogs to
Vipers (except for that occasional strange group that seems to have an
inherited dislike of the electric jet.) And, it isn't much of a
stretch to suggest that the A-10 over the years with improvements in
air defenses could be considered to be too slow for some tasking. I
don't see a conflict in any of that.

But, I reiterate, the idea that the AF is "anti-CAS" is flat wrong.
CAS changes. Weapons change. Tactics change. CAS isn't necessarily
always "enemy in the wire", nape and strafe at 50 feet, "danger
close." It can be stand-off with precision munitions. It can be lased
or GPS'd. It can be anti-armor or anti-personnel. But, it's always
about US guys needing help from other US guys and the AF has never
been reluctant to do that.

And, the idea that the airplane isn't supersonic doesn't mean squat.
Which is more important--the top speed of a Corvette is 163 MPH or the
0-60 time is less than 6 seconds? The ability to have adequate power
to accelerate, to regain altitude, to sustain G is what's important.

There must assuredly has been and still is, a "fighter pilot mafia".
It's a collection of guys that fight hard to get the best equipment to
do the job, whatever it might be. But, don't attribute some sort of
elitism to them and don't suggest that they are anti-CAS.

[Cub Driver]

On 24 Sep 2003 08:29:47 -0700, (Kirk Stant)
wrote:

>One hears (and reads about) the supposed dislike of the A-10 by the
>"Air Force". I wonder where it all started - I never heard anyone
>badmouth the Hog during my 20 years in, and everybody who flew it
>loved it. The bull**** about "the brass hates it because it isn't
>supersonic" is really an insult to the professionalism of the Air
>Force. Anyway, the AF wanted the A-10 to get a big piece of stopping
>the WP in the Fulda Gap, as well as do CAS (which has always been an
>AF mission). In no way was it "forced" on the AF. Now, as a single

Kirk, you must read Campbell's book The Warthog and the Close Air
Support Support, from Naval Institute Press. He was an A-10 pilot (and
A-7s for the Navy before that!) and he certainly lays out the case
that only the power of the U.S. Congress forced the A-10 down the
throat of the Air Force brass, and that the brass spent the next 20
years trying to get rid of it.

Even the supersonic b.s. seems to be pretty well established--thus the
F-16 as the "successor" to the A-10. (The F-16's main virtue as a CAS
aircraft seems to be that it can fly supersonic if it's not carrying
any CAS stores :)

Of course the pilots loved it. It's a great plane.

www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/1557502323/ref=nosim/annals

Not my arguments! Campbell's.



all the best -- Dan Ford
email: www.danford.net/letters.htm#9

see the Warbird's Forum at www.warbirdforum.com
and the Piper Cub Forum at www.pipercubforum.com

[Cub Driver]

On Wed, 24 Sep 2003 15:46:10 GMT, Ed Rasimus >
wrote:

>No truth at all. The color is a logical choice because the airplane is
>designed to work low against the earth tones. You also see some of the
>A-10s have been painted in grays. Does that mean they were expected to
>do Navy work?

I believe that all the AF Warthogs are gray, and were painted thus as
a result of the pilots' unhappiness at flying an olive drab aircraft
at altitude in Desert Storm and of course in Kosovo (15,000 ft!).

Certainly the 75th FS Warthogs in Gulf War II were gray:
www.warbirdforum.com/avg.htm

"The paint scheme had nearly always been dark green--apparently to
show 'solidarity' with the Army" and for camo

A 1997 GAO report on the Gulf War critized the "problematical paint
scheme"

"Accounting for the new higher altitude attack preferences and tacitly
admitting that the green paint scheme had been a factor in Desert
Storm losses, the service repainted Hogs light gray."

(Quotes from Campbell)



all the best -- Dan Ford
email: www.danford.net/letters.htm#9

see the Warbird's Forum at www.warbirdforum.com
and the Piper Cub Forum at www.pipercubforum.com

[Cub Driver]

>Of course! Any fighter aviator would be eager to switch from Hogs to
>Vipers (except for that occasional strange group that seems to have an

Evidently this is not true of Hog drivers. (And anyhow, aren't *all"
fighter pilots strange?)

>But, I reiterate, the idea that the AF is "anti-CAS" is flat wrong.

Ed, you'd better read Campbell's book and then report back. He quotes
page after page of Air Force argument that your experience in Vietnam
was an anomaly that would never be repeated, that interdiction and not
CAS was what we needed, and that the A-1 and the A-10 would only get
in the way when the Russian tanks came through the Fulda Gap.


all the best -- Dan Ford
email: www.danford.net/letters.htm#9

see the Warbird's Forum at www.warbirdforum.com
and the Piper Cub Forum at www.pipercubforum.com

[Ed Rasimus]

On Thu, 25 Sep 2003 04:57:52 -0400, Cub Driver >
wrote:

>
>
>>Of course! Any fighter aviator would be eager to switch from Hogs to
>>Vipers (except for that occasional strange group that seems to have an
>
>Evidently this is not true of Hog drivers. (And anyhow, aren't *all"
>fighter pilots strange?)

Humans all tend to make the best of a bad situation. Take someone
before an assignment and ask them to list their preferences. Not many
folks will put the A-10 ahead of the Viper, Eagle or now, Raptor. Once
assigned and wrapped up in the mission, you then get the syndrom of
"mine is better" regardless of the airplane. Certainly some Hog
drivers love their airplane, but if told the unit was transitioning to
something a little more "swoopy" they'd eat it up.

And, while there may be a commonality of "strangeness", let me
reiterate my oft-stated position that not all folks assigned to fly
tactical aircraft are "fighter pilots."
>
>>But, I reiterate, the idea that the AF is "anti-CAS" is flat wrong.
>
>Ed, you'd better read Campbell's book and then report back. He quotes
>page after page of Air Force argument that your experience in Vietnam
>was an anomaly that would never be repeated, that interdiction and not
>CAS was what we needed, and that the A-1 and the A-10 would only get
>in the way when the Russian tanks came through the Fulda Gap.

I'll try to get to Campbell's book, but having checked the summary on
Amazon, I can almost predict what it says. There was great debate at
the time of acquisition regarding whether we were "reliving the last
war" with the A-10. It would have been a great in-country airplane for
SEA. The real concern was whether the plain-vanilla airplane was going
to be survivable in Europe in a more intense conflict.

Question two, was the definitions of CAS and interdiction. There was
even a transition mission defined, BAI (battlefield area
interdiction)--neither CAS nor true interdiction, but systematic
attacking of the second and third echelon of the advancing horde. If
you did a good BAI job, the requirement for true CAS was minimized.

Issue three, the development of the Army aviation component to better
provide supplemental firepower to artillery. If you got good gunships,
not just gun on Hueys, but Cobras and Apaches optimized for ground
attack and survivability, you lessened the need for "fast movers."

And, problem four, the difficulty in a fluid tactical environment with
deconflicting airspace. You can't be lobbing artillery in where
airplanes are operating. You can't be zooming around willy-nilly at
low altitude of rotary wings are transiting. You must have close
control of the airspace and delivery designations to effectively
employ "danger close." And, for a variety of reasons (economic,
political, practical--pick one,) we simultaneously add the demise of
the airborne FAC in a slow-mover fixed wing.

Did I get the high points? Do I still have to buy the book?

[Ed Rasimus]

On Thu, 25 Sep 2003 04:52:25 -0400, Cub Driver >
wrote:

>On Wed, 24 Sep 2003 15:46:10 GMT, Ed Rasimus >
>wrote:
>
>>No truth at all. The color is a logical choice because the airplane is
>>designed to work low against the earth tones. You also see some of the
>>A-10s have been painted in grays. Does that mean they were expected to
>>do Navy work?
>
>I believe that all the AF Warthogs are gray, and were painted thus as
>a result of the pilots' unhappiness at flying an olive drab aircraft
>at altitude in Desert Storm and of course in Kosovo (15,000 ft!).
>
>Certainly the 75th FS Warthogs in Gulf War II were gray:
>www.warbirdforum.com/avg.htm
>
>"The paint scheme had nearly always been dark green--apparently to
>show 'solidarity' with the Army" and for camo
>
>A 1997 GAO report on the Gulf War critized the "problematical paint
>scheme"
>
>"Accounting for the new higher altitude attack preferences and tacitly
>admitting that the green paint scheme had been a factor in Desert
>Storm losses, the service repainted Hogs light gray."
>
>(Quotes from Campbell)

Well, I recall gray hogs as far back as '85 when we were doing
defensive ACM training support with AT-38s deployed to Davis-Monthan.
For air/air, the gray was much harder to see than the green--partly
contrast against the light desert background and partly silhouette.

From the ground, the color is almost irrelevant. Airplanes against the
sky typically show silhouette black.

[Ed Rasimus]

On Thu, 25 Sep 2003 04:42:55 -0400, Cub Driver >
wrote:

>Even the supersonic b.s. seems to be pretty well established--thus the
>F-16 as the "successor" to the A-10. (The F-16's main virtue as a CAS
>aircraft seems to be that it can fly supersonic if it's not carrying
>any CAS stores :)

The F-16 is only a "successor" to the A-10 by default. The aircraft
was purchased as a successor to the F-4 for the ground attack mission.
The A-10 was purchased nearly simultaneously.

The F-16 is multi-mission capable, the Hog is single task. Which is
more economical in a shrinking budget environment?

There's really no such thing as a "CAS store"--a bomb is a bomb. You
could call the gun a CAS weapon and the Viper is very supersonic with
gun only. You could hang a Mk-80 series low-drag bomb on a pylon and
haul it supersonic (you'd probably damage the fins and tail cone, but
you could go fast.) The point is that while supersonic is an
interesting capability, it has little tactical application except for
maybe an interceptor getting to point of engagement quickly. The
advantage comes in the acceleration and g-sustainability at actual
operating speed.

[Kirk Stant]

Cub Driver > wrote in message news).

> Kirk, you must read Campbell's book The Warthog and the Close Air
> Support Support, from Naval Institute Press. He was an A-10 pilot (and
> A-7s for the Navy before that!) and he certainly lays out the case
> that only the power of the U.S. Congress forced the A-10 down the
> throat of the Air Force brass, and that the brass spent the next 20
> years trying to get rid of it.

I'll have to get his book and read it. However, that position is not
reflected in the actual operational use of the A-10, which has been in
the limelight of every conflict we have faught since we got it - not a
good way to make a plane look bad! There was also a lot of opposition
to the F-4, and to the F-16, and even to the F-111 when they were all
introduced, but they all turned out to be excellent weapons. I think
only the F-15 had no opponents from the start! And we go back to the
problem of single role aircraft - when you are cutting back, they are
the first to go, regardless of how good they are. Once the military
started getting funds again, the A-10 started getting a bunch of
excellent upgrades (LASTE,Aim-9 rails, etc.), and now they have
finally added a decent targeting pod - not something you do to a
"despised" weapon system. If only they would put some new motors on
it...

> Even the supersonic b.s. seems to be pretty well established--thus the
> F-16 as the "successor" to the A-10. (The F-16's main virtue as a CAS
> aircraft seems to be that it can fly supersonic if it's not carrying
> any CAS stores :)

Supersonic performance is so misunderstood by non-military aviators.
Until the current generation of supercruise fighters become
operational, supersonic performance was mainly an air defense asset,
where intercept time was crucial. It also implied a high
thrust-to-weight, which is nice to have in any fighter, but at the
cost of persistence. With the F-16 (and F-4 before, and Mirage, etc)
you have the best of both worlds: clean, you can go fast; load it up,
you can carry lots of stuff that goes boom and still turn and burn.
As a side note, it always amazed me how the brit press badmouthed the
F-15E saying it would be a terrible low altitude fighter bomber
because of it's high wing loading, then praise their industry for
turning an excellent low altitude fighter bomber (Tornado) into an air
defense fighter (Tornado F3).

Back to the F-16 and CAS, it's asset is that there are a lot of them,
they have excellent A/G sensors and targeting systems, they carry a
useful combat load, and they can get to the area fast and survive
pretty good. Not bad for a plane that was originally designed to be a
day only "guns and heaters" dogfigher!

Finally, about the paint - When the primary threat was the WP, all AF
tactical aircraft with an air-to-ground role had a dark green paint
scheme - the European 1, I think it was called - nice dark wraparound
that finally got rid of the idiotic white bellies (and the givaway
belly flash) that worked great in Europe but sucked big time at
Nellis! Then when the F-16 came into the inventory, the fashion
changed to grays, and even the F-4 got a nice gray cammo. A-10s just
took longer, I guess.

The whole subject of aircraft camouflage is fascinating; Keith Ferris
wrote some interesting stuff about it - some of our F-4Cs at Luke had
his schemes on them when I went through RTU and boy were they neat
looking.

All OT, anyway, and still no answer to my original question!

Regards,

Kirk

[John Hairell]

On Thu, 25 Sep 2003 13:24:11 GMT, Ed Rasimus >
wrote:

[stuff snipped]
>
>Issue three, the development of the Army aviation component to better
>provide supplemental firepower to artillery. If you got good gunships,
>not just gun on Hueys, but Cobras and Apaches optimized for ground
>attack and survivability, you lessened the need for "fast movers."
>
>And, problem four, the difficulty in a fluid tactical environment with
>deconflicting airspace. You can't be lobbing artillery in where
>airplanes are operating. You can't be zooming around willy-nilly at
>low altitude of rotary wings are transiting. You must have close
>control of the airspace and delivery designations to effectively
>employ "danger close." And, for a variety of reasons (economic,
>political, practical--pick one,) we simultaneously add the demise of
>the airborne FAC in a slow-mover fixed wing.

Ed,

Didn't you work as an ALO with a division in Germany at one point?
I'd like to hear about your experiences working with ground-pounders,
and your opinions on Army aviation, if any.

John Hairell )

[Tex Houston]

"Kirk Stant" > wrote in message
om...
> Finally, about the paint - When the primary threat was the WP, all AF
> tactical aircraft with an air-to-ground role had a dark green paint
> scheme - the European 1, I think it was called - nice dark wraparound
> that finally got rid of the idiotic white bellies (and the givaway
> belly flash) that worked great in Europe but sucked big time at
> Nellis! Then when the F-16 came into the inventory, the fashion
> changed to grays, and even the F-4 got a nice gray cammo. A-10s just
> took longer, I guess.
> Kirk

Guess you never saw an F-102, F-106 or even an F-101. The name of the paint
was even Air Defense Gray. Nothing new with the advent of the F-16.

Tex

[Steven P. McNicoll]

"Tex Houston" > wrote in message
...
>
> Guess you never saw an F-102, F-106 or even an F-101. The name of the
paint
> was even Air Defense Gray. Nothing new with the advent of the F-16.
>

Well, he did say "tactical aircraft with an air-to-ground role". I don't
recall ever seeing a gray F-102.

[Ed Rasimus]

On Thu, 25 Sep 2003 11:25:25 -0400, John Hairell >
wrote:

>Ed,
>
>Didn't you work as an ALO with a division in Germany at one point?
>I'd like to hear about your experiences working with ground-pounders,
>and your opinions on Army aviation, if any.
>
>John Hairell )

No, emphatically no. Anyone who spends more than one tour (penance) in
the TACS (Tactical Air Control System--i.e., FACs and ALOs) is of
minimal value. Sorry in advance to those career FAC/ALOs that I've
offended.

I was an ALO in the 4th ID, Fort Carson Colorado from '85-'87. This
was after being passed over seven times for O-5 and with an extension
in service for two years. Assignment taken to get a move from Holloman
AFB (great place to fly, lousy place to retire) to Colorado Springs.
Nuff said.

I liked, and more importantly respected, everyone that I ever
encountered in Army Aviation. Mas grande cojones, en todos.

[Kirk Stant]

"Tex Houston" > wrote in message news

Guess you never saw an F-102, F-106 or even an F-101. The name of the
paint
> was even Air Defense Gray. Nothing new with the advent of the F-16.

Tex,

Sure, and even some ADC-tasked F-4s and T-33s (the Keflavic F-4Es come
to mind). Different gray, altogether - I don't think the glossy ADC
Gray was a camouflage at all! I was referring to the air combat (for
lack of a better term) flat multiple shade of gray scheme that the
F-16 introduced and that has quickly spread across the whole world, it
seems. I don't remember seeing any air defense (Guard or Reserve)
F-15s in ADC gray, but I could just be getting old...

Even the Navy switched from it's glossy gray and white paint schemes
to a very flat multiple gray scheme (which seems to really get dirty
on ship!).

Not particularly good looking, but very effective in the air, which is
what counts in the end, after all.

Interestingly, if you look at the late WW2 german camouflage schemes,
especially their nightfighters, they seem to have come to almost the
same conclusion about the best color to hide a plane in the air. By
that time, they probably has so many extra (fuel-less) planes that
their main concern was airborne concealment (to save valuable pilots),
so they moved to shades of gray.

I always thought that the Southeast Asia scheme (green/brown on top,
white bottom) was an amazingly stupid way to "camouflage" an airplane,
unless you are going to park it on a dirt road in the jungle (most
ramps aren't painted green and brown), or upside down in snow. In the
air, if you are close enough to see colors, you might as well turn
your gun on - and the white belly flash would attract aggressors for
miles around when you made a low altitude comm out turn. The
wraparound dark green European 1 scheme was a huge improvement,
although it did take some learning to initially figure out which way
lead was turning in tac spread!

Sigh, those were the days...

Kirk

[Peter Stickney]

In article >,
Ed Rasimus > writes:
> On Thu, 25 Sep 2003 11:25:25 -0400, John Hairell >
> wrote:
>
>>Ed,
>>
>>Didn't you work as an ALO with a division in Germany at one point?
>>I'd like to hear about your experiences working with ground-pounders,
>>and your opinions on Army aviation, if any.
>>
>>John Hairell )
>
> No, emphatically no. Anyone who spends more than one tour (penance) in
> the TACS (Tactical Air Control System--i.e., FACs and ALOs) is of
> minimal value. Sorry in advance to those career FAC/ALOs that I've
> offended.
>
> I was an ALO in the 4th ID, Fort Carson Colorado from '85-'87. This
> was after being passed over seven times for O-5 and with an extension
> in service for two years. Assignment taken to get a move from Holloman
> AFB (great place to fly, lousy place to retire) to Colorado Springs.
> Nuff said.
>
> I liked, and more importantly respected, everyone that I ever
> encountered in Army Aviation. Mas grande cojones, en todos.

Ed, did you work with a particular Brigae whiel you were there?
Tank Boy (The youngest brother in the family) was in D/4/68th
Armor at the same time. (If you saw an early '70s Chevelle with the
New Hampshire license plate "LETHAL", that was him.


--
Pete Stickney
A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many
bad measures. -- Daniel Webster

[Kevin Brooks]

Ed Rasimus > wrote in message >...
> On Thu, 25 Sep 2003 04:57:52 -0400, Cub Driver >
> wrote:
>
> >
> >
> >>Of course! Any fighter aviator would be eager to switch from Hogs to
> >>Vipers (except for that occasional strange group that seems to have an
> >
> >Evidently this is not true of Hog drivers. (And anyhow, aren't *all"
> >fighter pilots strange?)
>
> Humans all tend to make the best of a bad situation. Take someone
> before an assignment and ask them to list their preferences. Not many
> folks will put the A-10 ahead of the Viper, Eagle or now, Raptor. Once
> assigned and wrapped up in the mission, you then get the syndrom of
> "mine is better" regardless of the airplane. Certainly some Hog
> drivers love their airplane, but if told the unit was transitioning to
> something a little more "swoopy" they'd eat it up.
>
> And, while there may be a commonality of "strangeness", let me
> reiterate my oft-stated position that not all folks assigned to fly
> tactical aircraft are "fighter pilots."
> >
> >>But, I reiterate, the idea that the AF is "anti-CAS" is flat wrong.
> >
> >Ed, you'd better read Campbell's book and then report back. He quotes
> >page after page of Air Force argument that your experience in Vietnam
> >was an anomaly that would never be repeated, that interdiction and not
> >CAS was what we needed, and that the A-1 and the A-10 would only get
> >in the way when the Russian tanks came through the Fulda Gap.
>
> I'll try to get to Campbell's book, but having checked the summary on
> Amazon, I can almost predict what it says. There was great debate at
> the time of acquisition regarding whether we were "reliving the last
> war" with the A-10. It would have been a great in-country airplane for
> SEA. The real concern was whether the plain-vanilla airplane was going
> to be survivable in Europe in a more intense conflict.
>
> Question two, was the definitions of CAS and interdiction. There was
> even a transition mission defined, BAI (battlefield area
> interdiction)--neither CAS nor true interdiction, but systematic
> attacking of the second and third echelon of the advancing horde. If
> you did a good BAI job, the requirement for true CAS was minimized.

Defining where CAS ends and BAI or AI begins seems to be a bit murky.
If the definitions as stated by the US Army CGSC are used (CAS being
"in close proximity" to friendly ground units and requiring "detailed
integration" with friendly fire and maneuver, and AI being "at such a
distance...that integration of each air mission with fire and
movement..." is not required), there seems to be a bit of confusion
possible. For example, what do you call a mission against the second
echelon, fifteen or twenty klicks from the nearest friendlies, but
still within the FSCL boundary? It is not in close proximity, but IIRC
all air missions in front of the FSCL require pretty close
integration, lest you conflict with those arty rounds you mention.

>
> Issue three, the development of the Army aviation component to better
> provide supplemental firepower to artillery. If you got good gunships,
> not just gun on Hueys, but Cobras and Apaches optimized for ground
> attack and survivability, you lessened the need for "fast movers."

But the development of Army aviation, while initially aimed at
supplementing artillery, changed quite a bit with the development of
the divisional aviation brigade, which instead became a fourth
maneuver element, as opposed to a fire support element. If your attack
aviation assets are tied up with a deep mission, or with a continuous
attack mission along some axis, then the need for CAS on the part of
the ground maneuver brigades has not really been lessened. I never
thought of the aviation assets as so much substituting for CAS as much
as they *complement* it (JAAT being an example of the latter).

>
> And, problem four, the difficulty in a fluid tactical environment with
> deconflicting airspace. You can't be lobbing artillery in where
> airplanes are operating. You can't be zooming around willy-nilly at
> low altitude of rotary wings are transiting.

That sounds like the now-infamous "where to locate the FSCL" debate
during ODS; haven't heard much about it reappearing during the latest
conflict.

You must have close
> control of the airspace and delivery designations to effectively
> employ "danger close." And, for a variety of reasons (economic,
> political, practical--pick one,) we simultaneously add the demise of
> the airborne FAC in a slow-mover fixed wing.

I believe the use of PGM's in the CAS role is making this a bit easier
in terms of operating CAS in "danger close".

Brooks

>
> Did I get the high points? Do I still have to buy the book?

[Bill Silvey]

"Kevin Brooks" > wrote in message
om

> But the development of Army aviation, while initially aimed at
> supplementing artillery, changed quite a bit with the development of
> the divisional aviation brigade, which instead became a fourth
> maneuver element, as opposed to a fire support element. If your attack
> aviation assets are tied up with a deep mission, or with a continuous
> attack mission along some axis, then the need for CAS on the part of
> the ground maneuver brigades has not really been lessened. I never
> thought of the aviation assets as so much substituting for CAS as much
> as they *complement* it (JAAT being an example of the latter).

But are JAAT and JAWS even *practiced* any more?

--
http://www.delversdungeon.dragonsfoot.org
Remove the X's in my email address to respond.
"Damn you Silvey, and your endless fortunes." - Stephen Weir
I hate furries.

[Kevin Brooks]

(Kirk Stant) wrote in message >...
> Cub Driver > wrote in message news).
>
> > Kirk, you must read Campbell's book The Warthog and the Close Air
> > Support Support, from Naval Institute Press. He was an A-10 pilot (and
> > A-7s for the Navy before that!) and he certainly lays out the case
> > that only the power of the U.S. Congress forced the A-10 down the
> > throat of the Air Force brass, and that the brass spent the next 20
> > years trying to get rid of it.
>
> I'll have to get his book and read it. However, that position is not
> reflected in the actual operational use of the A-10, which has been in
> the limelight of every conflict we have faught since we got it - not a
> good way to make a plane look bad!

And yet on the eve of ODS, the USAF had already announced its plans to
retire the A-10; performance during that conflict resulted in a rather
quick about-face on that.

There was also a lot of opposition
> to the F-4, and to the F-16, and even to the F-111 when they were all
> introduced, but they all turned out to be excellent weapons. I think
> only the F-15 had no opponents from the start!

How many of those opponents to the F-4, or even the F-16, were in the
USAF, though?

And we go back to the
> problem of single role aircraft - when you are cutting back, they are
> the first to go, regardless of how good they are. Once the military
> started getting funds again, the A-10 started getting a bunch of
> excellent upgrades (LASTE,Aim-9 rails, etc.), and now they have
> finally added a decent targeting pod - not something you do to a
> "despised" weapon system. If only they would put some new motors on
> it...

It was more than just the funds issue--as I said earlier, the rails
were already greased for the A-10 to head to AMARC en mass at the time
that ODS kicked off. As late as this past year a senior USAF officer
had to backtrack regarding a memo which purportedly sought to again
kill the A-10; there was a bit of discussion in the group about it at
the time. And I am not sure the A-10 was ever really a "single role"
aircraft; ISTR it was also looked on as a replacement for the A-1 in
the SAR escort role when it came into service, in addition to its
primary attack role, and later FAC role.


>
> > Even the supersonic b.s. seems to be pretty well established--thus the
> > F-16 as the "successor" to the A-10. (The F-16's main virtue as a CAS
> > aircraft seems to be that it can fly supersonic if it's not carrying
> > any CAS stores :)
>
> Supersonic performance is so misunderstood by non-military aviators.
> Until the current generation of supercruise fighters become
> operational, supersonic performance was mainly an air defense asset,
> where intercept time was crucial. It also implied a high
> thrust-to-weight, which is nice to have in any fighter, but at the
> cost of persistence. With the F-16 (and F-4 before, and Mirage, etc)
> you have the best of both worlds: clean, you can go fast; load it up,
> you can carry lots of stuff that goes boom and still turn and burn.
> As a side note, it always amazed me how the brit press badmouthed the
> F-15E saying it would be a terrible low altitude fighter bomber
> because of it's high wing loading, then praise their industry for
> turning an excellent low altitude fighter bomber (Tornado) into an air
> defense fighter (Tornado F3).
>
> Back to the F-16 and CAS, it's asset is that there are a lot of them,
> they have excellent A/G sensors and targeting systems, they carry a
> useful combat load, and they can get to the area fast and survive
> pretty good. Not bad for a plane that was originally designed to be a
> day only "guns and heaters" dogfigher!

Not sure how accurate that is; from what I have read, the F-16 was
planned as a multi-role platform during its initial development phase,
well before it ever entered into service.

>
> Finally, about the paint - When the primary threat was the WP, all AF
> tactical aircraft with an air-to-ground role had a dark green paint
> scheme - the European 1, I think it was called - nice dark wraparound
> that finally got rid of the idiotic white bellies (and the givaway
> belly flash) that worked great in Europe but sucked big time at
> Nellis! Then when the F-16 came into the inventory, the fashion
> changed to grays, and even the F-4 got a nice gray cammo. A-10s just
> took longer, I guess.

Euro 1 was known as the "Green Lizard" IIRC. And if you check into it,
I believe you will find the F-15 was sporting that flat blue-gray
scheme before while the YF-16 was still tooling around in red, white,
and blue.

Brooks

>
> The whole subject of aircraft camouflage is fascinating; Keith Ferris
> wrote some interesting stuff about it - some of our F-4Cs at Luke had
> his schemes on them when I went through RTU and boy were they neat
> looking.
>
> All OT, anyway, and still no answer to my original question!
>
> Regards,
>
> Kirk

[Kevin Brooks]

(Kirk Stant) wrote in message >...
> Cub Driver > wrote in message news).
>
> > Kirk, you must read Campbell's book The Warthog and the Close Air
> > Support Support, from Naval Institute Press. He was an A-10 pilot (and
> > A-7s for the Navy before that!) and he certainly lays out the case
> > that only the power of the U.S. Congress forced the A-10 down the
> > throat of the Air Force brass, and that the brass spent the next 20
> > years trying to get rid of it.
>
> I'll have to get his book and read it. However, that position is not
> reflected in the actual operational use of the A-10, which has been in
> the limelight of every conflict we have faught since we got it - not a
> good way to make a plane look bad!

Not quite. It missed Grenada, where the only CAS missions were flown
by the USN and USAF AC-130's, and it was also not used in Panama,
where IIRC the only fixed wing CAS missions were flown by the ANG
A-7's that were down there on rotation (and that strange F-117
mission...).

Brooks
<snip>

[Kevin Brooks]

"Steven P. McNicoll" > wrote in message t>...
> "Tex Houston" > wrote in message
> ...
> >
> > Guess you never saw an F-102, F-106 or even an F-101. The name of the
> paint
> > was even Air Defense Gray. Nothing new with the advent of the F-16.
> >
>
> Well, he did say "tactical aircraft with an air-to-ground role". I don't
> recall ever seeing a gray F-102.

Actually, I think all of the F-102's were painted either gray (albeit
not the same flat colors used by the later tactical aircraft) or SEA
camo; I believe the type of alloy used on the skin required painting,
which is why you don't see any photos of "silver" F-102's other than
the prototype.

Brooks

[Juvat]

After an exhausting session with Victoria's Secret Police, Kevin
Brooks blurted out:

>How many of those opponents to the F-4, or even the F-16, were in the
>USAF, though?

Against the F-4? Hmmm, guys flying single seat fighters that carried a
gun. "Two seats? WTF do you do with the wasted space?"

How about the HQ Staff folks that were concerrned that if the F-16
were fielded, the F-15 program would suffer. How could the F-15
program suffer? Some bright person would figure a way to task the F-15
for surface attack ("not a pound for air-to-ground") and give the
air-to-air role to the F-16. In Trest's book on Boyd, he mentions the
concerns the F-15 supporters had about the F-16.

And there were more than a few officers above John Boyd that flat out
didn't like him, ergo his pet project.

>Not sure how accurate that is; from what I have read, the F-16 was
>planned as a multi-role platform during its initial development phase,
>well before it ever entered into service.

Read Trest's book on John Boyd. His proposal for the F-16 didn't even
include a radar, much less thinking of carrying a bomb. Boyd's concept
was air-to-air all the way.

Juvat

[dave999]

Asked the crew chief at the last airshow. He showed me the spiral
antenna and the wire which you can see by looking up inside the gear
sponson behind that black plastic cover (not just black paint). Don't
know exactly what it's for tho.

Kirk Stant wrote:

>A question for any Warthog jocks (or fans) out there:
>
>Why is the front of the right gear fairing on all A-10s painted gloss
>black? Is is a radome of some sort? If so, what for?
>
>Unless, of course, you would have to kill me if you told me, etc...
>
>Just curious,
>
>Kirk
>Old F-4 WSO
>
>

--


**GOT JETS?**
http://www.rfsm.net/

Dave Stein -- President
Red Flag Scale Modelers
Las Vegas, Nevada
YOU NEED A HOBBY!

**GET SOME!**
http://www.cheapesthobbies.com/

[Cub Driver]

On Thu, 25 Sep 2003 13:24:11 GMT, Ed Rasimus >
wrote:

>Did I get the high points? Do I still have to buy the book?

Yes, you did, but you still have to get the book. (You don't have to
buy it. A big-time author like you can write NIP and get a review
copy, I betcha.)

What you left out was the continuing USAF dislike of the A-10. It
wasn't just the acquisition; it has lasted for a generation.

Campbell does go to great lengths to define air support, even unto
BAI, but to me this is meaningless. You know it when you need it, and
you need it when the bad guys are swaming over the ridge and there's
no artillery sighted in on your position.

(Under my definition, of course, the A-10 has never been used for air
support. 15,000 feet! That was its minimum altitude over Yugoslavia!
Did Art Kramer ever bomb from that high?)



all the best -- Dan Ford
email: www.danford.net/letters.htm#9

see the Warbird's Forum at www.warbirdforum.com
and the Piper Cub Forum at www.pipercubforum.com

[Steven P. McNicoll]

"Kevin Brooks" > wrote in message
om...
>
> Actually, I think all of the F-102's were painted either gray (albeit
> not the same flat colors used by the later tactical aircraft) or SEA
> camo; I believe the type of alloy used on the skin required painting,
> which is why you don't see any photos of "silver" F-102's other than
> the prototype.
>

Hmmm, most of the photos of F-102s I've seen had them painted white.

[Kevin Brooks]

Juvat > wrote in message >...
> After an exhausting session with Victoria's Secret Police, Kevin
> Brooks blurted out:
>
> >How many of those opponents to the F-4, or even the F-16, were in the
> >USAF, though?
>
> Against the F-4? Hmmm, guys flying single seat fighters that carried a
> gun. "Two seats? WTF do you do with the wasted space?"

Any real evidence of this alleged opposition to the F-4? Let's see,
the F-100. etc., were apparently going to have some problems with the
range requirements into North Vietnam, the F-105, while proving to be
a prettty rugged and capable strike platform that did indeed down a
few Migs, was not exactly what those fighter pilots were thinking of
when you say, "fighter aircraft"...where was this opposition again?

>
> How about the HQ Staff folks that were concerrned that if the F-16
> were fielded, the F-15 program would suffer. How could the F-15
> program suffer? Some bright person would figure a way to task the F-15
> for surface attack ("not a pound for air-to-ground") and give the
> air-to-air role to the F-16. In Trest's book on Boyd, he mentions the
> concerns the F-15 supporters had about the F-16.

I don't recall the opposition against the F-16 as being anything like
that that the A-10 faced early on, as well as later in its career--and
where is all of that anti-F-16 later opposition?

>
> And there were more than a few officers above John Boyd that flat out
> didn't like him, ergo his pet project.
>
> >Not sure how accurate that is; from what I have read, the F-16 was
> >planned as a multi-role platform during its initial development phase,
> >well before it ever entered into service.
>
> Read Trest's book on John Boyd. His proposal for the F-16 didn't even
> include a radar, much less thinking of carrying a bomb. Boyd's concept
> was air-to-air all the way.

Thank goodness that his concept was not what ended up rolling off the
assembly line then, as we know that the F-16 was indeed planned for
multirole use from very early in its development.

Brooks

>
> Juvat

[Kevin Brooks]

"Bill Silvey" > wrote in message >...
> "Kevin Brooks" > wrote in message
> om
>
> > But the development of Army aviation, while initially aimed at
> > supplementing artillery, changed quite a bit with the development of
> > the divisional aviation brigade, which instead became a fourth
> > maneuver element, as opposed to a fire support element. If your attack
> > aviation assets are tied up with a deep mission, or with a continuous
> > attack mission along some axis, then the need for CAS on the part of
> > the ground maneuver brigades has not really been lessened. I never
> > thought of the aviation assets as so much substituting for CAS as much
> > as they *complement* it (JAAT being an example of the latter).
>
> But are JAAT and JAWS even *practiced* any more?

JAAT was still included in the doctrine available in mid-96, which is
the date of publication of my CGSC text.

Brooks

[Ed Rasimus]

On Thu, 25 Sep 2003 23:17:50 -0400, (Peter
Stickney) wrote:

>Ed, did you work with a particular Brigae whiel you were there?
>Tank Boy (The youngest brother in the family) was in D/4/68th
>Armor at the same time. (If you saw an early '70s Chevelle with the
>New Hampshire license plate "LETHAL", that was him.

Yes, I was in 2d Bde. I went to NTC with 4/68 and 1/77.

[Kirk Stant]

(Kevin Brooks) wrote in message news

> Not quite. It missed Grenada, where the only CAS missions were flown
> by the USN and USAF AC-130's, and it was also not used in Panama,
> where IIRC the only fixed wing CAS missions were flown by the ANG
> A-7's that were down there on rotation (and that strange F-117
> mission...).

Well, when you cruise at 250 knots, the war is sometimes going to be
over before you get there!

Just joking of course - and it is a bit odd that the planners didn't
include A-10s in those actions. Anyone know why?

As far as F-15 colors - remember they originally came out in "Air
Superiority Blue" - absolutely the dumbest color ever painted on a
fighter plane! That didn't last long. Not sure if the change to gray
came before or after the F-16 came out - and there have apparently
been several iterations of F-15A/B/C/D gray paint jobs with various
countershadings.

Re 15000' over Kosovo: Where were the troops in contact? Why go lower
(and they did, when necessary) when all you are doing is plinking
tanks? Getting shot down doesn't help the troops in contact - it
isn't like a russian airshow! The idea that you should be eyeball to
eyeball with the enemy doesn't hold up if you have the right weapons,
or if the enemy has the wrong weapons (SA-16/18s).

Kirk

[Kirk Stant]

dave999 > wrote in message >...
> Asked the crew chief at the last airshow. He showed me the spiral
> antenna and the wire which you can see by looking up inside the gear
> sponson behind that black plastic cover (not just black paint). Don't
> know exactly what it's for tho.
>
Thanks. Now if we can just get someone to find out what it is for
(assuming it isn't classified).

More and more curious.

Kirk

[Yeff]

On 26 Sep 2003 08:04:04 -0700, Kirk Stant wrote:

> As far as F-15 colors - remember they originally came out in "Air
> Superiority Blue" - absolutely the dumbest color ever painted on a
> fighter plane!

I remember reading an article about USAF Eagles from Kadena flying up to
Chitose to for a little slap-n-tickle with JASDF F-15s.

The Air Force, regarding the whole thing as the goodwill mission it was,
made sure all their people conformed to 35-10 and all their aircraft were
polished and gleaming.

When they got to Chitose they noticed with some amusement that the JASDF
birds were all rather greasy and dirty. They felt sure they would have
many things to teach their Japanese compatriots... until they got into the
air and had trouble seeing the JASDF Eagles against the gray overcast.

Their robin's-egg blue F-15s were easy to spot, though.

-Jeff B.
yeff at erols dot com

[John Hairell]

On Thu, 25 Sep 2003 22:21:27 GMT, Ed Rasimus >
wrote:

[previous post snipped]
>
>No, emphatically no. Anyone who spends more than one tour (penance) in
>the TACS (Tactical Air Control System--i.e., FACs and ALOs) is of
>minimal value. Sorry in advance to those career FAC/ALOs that I've
>offended.
>
>I was an ALO in the 4th ID, Fort Carson Colorado from '85-'87. This
>was after being passed over seven times for O-5 and with an extension
>in service for two years. Assignment taken to get a move from Holloman
>AFB (great place to fly, lousy place to retire) to Colorado Springs.
>Nuff said.
>
>I liked, and more importantly respected, everyone that I ever
>encountered in Army Aviation. Mas grande cojones, en todos.
>

When I was at Ft. Hood in the late '70s they (Army helicopter pilots)
used to give "orientation rides" to new ALOs and visiting FACs. The
orientation rides often consisted of lots of contour and NOE flying at
extremely low altitudes and for some strange reason many of these ALOs
and FACs got airsick. Not that any Army aviation people would be
doing any of this on purpose, of course.... ;-)

John Hairell )

[Juvat]

After an exhausting session with Victoria's Secret Police,Kevin Brooks
blurted out:

>Any real evidence of this alleged opposition to the F-4? Let's see,
>the F-100. ... the F-105, ... was not exactly what those fighter pilots were thinking of
>when you say, "fighter aircraft"...where was this opposition again?

Let me try again and see if you recognize opposition. Single seat
fighter pilots "opposed" to the extra body sitting in an aircraft that
lacked a gun. Do you see it?...single seat fighter pilots not wanting
to fly with another guy in the jet...and not wanting to fly a fighter
that didn't have a friggin' gun. There were lots of guys that thought
this was not a very smart move on the part of the USAF. One might even
say they were "opposed" to the idea of a two-seat, no gun tactical
fighter. This doesn't suggest an alternative to the two-seated, no-gun
jet...simply opposition to an extra body and no gun.

Then there's the other convenient fact that the USAF was adopting a
USN jet. The corporate culture clash of the USAF vs USN is fairly well
recognized. Part of the "not invented here" POV that is/was reluctant
to embrace the other service's equipment or tactics.

This opposition doesn't negate the eventual acceptance and embracing
to the F-4 by the USAF culture.

See? I'm pretty sure that even in the Army those facts qualify as
opposition.

>I don't recall the opposition against the F-16 as being anything like
>that that the A-10 faced early on,

I agree...but I was addressing your incorrect analysis that there had
been NO USAF opposition to the F-16. Kevin, you're tossing out extra
bits and pieces simply to take the discussion off on a tangent.

>as well as later in its career--and
>where is all of that anti-F-16 later opposition?

There is none. I never suggested there was. My response was addressing
opposition to the introduction of the F-16 into the USAF inventroy.

But if you were ever around WSOs in an F-4 squadron making the
transition to F-16s I think you might have noted some displeasure
toward the Viper. [say 1987-88 at Moody AFB or Osan AB after that]

I flew the F-16, I loved the F-16. However WSOs losing their job in
F-4 squadrons were not uniformly happy. One might even say they were
"opposed" to the F-16...exception were made for the B and D.

>Thank goodness that his concept was not what ended up rolling off the
>assembly line then, as we know that the F-16 was indeed planned for
>multirole use from very early in its development.

Agreed...the "concept" [as opposed to the "plan"] was for a guns and
heater air-to-air jet, as this wonderful airframe has matured it has
successfully taken on many missions not intended by John Boyd.
Thankfully the USAF had other plans.

Juvat

[Buzzer]

On 26 Sep 2003 08:08:25 -0700, (Kirk Stant)
wrote:

>dave999 > wrote in message >...
>> Asked the crew chief at the last airshow. He showed me the spiral
>> antenna and the wire which you can see by looking up inside the gear
>> sponson behind that black plastic cover (not just black paint). Don't
>> know exactly what it's for tho.
>>
>Thanks. Now if we can just get someone to find out what it is for
>(assuming it isn't classified).
>
>More and more curious.
>
>Kirk

Old UHF/TACAN Antenna?

http://www.clubhyper.com/reference/a10ajawsschemesdb_1.htm


Each had the underside UHF/TACAN antenna mounted forward, next to the
nose gear door

All had the old box-style antenna under the nose (to the right of the
gun) and under the tail

[Nick Pedley]

"Steven P. McNicoll" > wrote in message
ink.net...
>
> "Kevin Brooks" > wrote in message
> om...
> >
> > Actually, I think all of the F-102's were painted either gray (albeit
> > not the same flat colors used by the later tactical aircraft) or SEA
> > camo; I believe the type of alloy used on the skin required painting,
> > which is why you don't see any photos of "silver" F-102's other than
> > the prototype.
> >
>
> Hmmm, most of the photos of F-102s I've seen had them painted white.
>
>
Now that's odd, because when I was looking for references to build and paint
a model F-102, all I could find were AD Grey schemes.

Nick

[Cub Driver]

On 26 Sep 2003 08:04:04 -0700, (Kirk Stant)
wrote:

>As far as F-15 colors - remember they originally came out in "Air
>Superiority Blue" -

I like this!

The A-10 was painted "**** It!-- Leave 'em to the Air Force Green".

The Cub is painted "NORDO Yellow".

all the best -- Dan Ford
email: www.danford.net/letters.htm#9

see the Warbird's Forum at www.warbirdforum.com
and the Piper Cub Forum at www.pipercubforum.com

[Kevin Brooks]

Juvat > wrote in message >...
> After an exhausting session with Victoria's Secret Police,Kevin Brooks
> blurted out:
>
> >Any real evidence of this alleged opposition to the F-4? Let's see,
> >the F-100. ... the F-105, ... was not exactly what those fighter pilots were thinking of
> >when you say, "fighter aircraft"...where was this opposition again?
>
> Let me try again and see if you recognize opposition. Single seat
> fighter pilots "opposed" to the extra body sitting in an aircraft that
> lacked a gun. Do you see it?...single seat fighter pilots not wanting
> to fly with another guy in the jet...and not wanting to fly a fighter
> that didn't have a friggin' gun. There were lots of guys that thought
> this was not a very smart move on the part of the USAF. One might even
> say they were "opposed" to the idea of a two-seat, no gun tactical
> fighter. This doesn't suggest an alternative to the two-seated, no-gun
> jet...simply opposition to an extra body and no gun.
>
> Then there's the other convenient fact that the USAF was adopting a
> USN jet. The corporate culture clash of the USAF vs USN is fairly well
> recognized. Part of the "not invented here" POV that is/was reluctant
> to embrace the other service's equipment or tactics.
>
> This opposition doesn't negate the eventual acceptance and embracing
> to the F-4 by the USAF culture.
>
> See? I'm pretty sure that even in the Army those facts qualify as
> opposition.

You really need to cool your jets a bit. Getting your panties in a wad
is not gonna help, now is it? Now...any evidence of this great tide of
opposition available? I have no doubt that just about *every* program
has had *someone* in the service in disagreement; but few (and I have
yet to see anything that indicates thet in the case of either the F-4
or F-16 this was the case) have approached the level of in-service
animosity (to the point of wanting to kill them all off during the
timeframe leading up to ODS) that the A-10 garnered.

>
> >I don't recall the opposition against the F-16 as being anything like
> >that that the A-10 faced early on,
>
> I agree...but I was addressing your incorrect analysis that there had
> been NO USAF opposition to the F-16. Kevin, you're tossing out extra
> bits and pieces simply to take the discussion off on a tangent.

What would be incorrect about this is your statement that I said "NO
USAF opposition". Go back and reread my comment in this regard; since
you snipped it, here it is:

"How many of those opponents to the F-4, or even the F-16, were in the
USAF, though?"

Note that the point here was that there was no tremendous
institutional opposition that approached the level that was apparent
in the case of the A-10--I believe you have now *agreed* that this is
accurate? Did I say there was "no opposition"? Nope. That would be you
trying to insert words into my mouth, I believe.

>
> >as well as later in its career--and
> >where is all of that anti-F-16 later opposition?
>
> There is none. I never suggested there was.

I did not say that you did. I was just pointing out the tremendous
difference in scale of opposition that the A-10 faced in comparison to
*any* opposition that the F-16, or for that matter by any other modern
USAF aircraft procurement project (well, other than the USAF's
animosity towards continuing C-130 production in the form of the J
model, due to Congressional budget insertions--but even the USAF has
flip-flopped on that one, and is supporting procurement of C-130Js and
CC-130J's (where the heck did THAT designation come from?)).

Brooks


My response was addressing
> opposition to the introduction of the F-16 into the USAF inventroy.
>
> But if you were ever around WSOs in an F-4 squadron making the
> transition to F-16s I think you might have noted some displeasure
> toward the Viper. [say 1987-88 at Moody AFB or Osan AB after that]
>
> I flew the F-16, I loved the F-16. However WSOs losing their job in
> F-4 squadrons were not uniformly happy. One might even say they were
> "opposed" to the F-16...exception were made for the B and D.
>
> >Thank goodness that his concept was not what ended up rolling off the
> >assembly line then, as we know that the F-16 was indeed planned for
> >multirole use from very early in its development.
>
> Agreed...the "concept" [as opposed to the "plan"] was for a guns and
> heater air-to-air jet, as this wonderful airframe has matured it has
> successfully taken on many missions not intended by John Boyd.
> Thankfully the USAF had other plans.
>
> Juvat

[Mike Marron]

>Cub Driver > wrote:

>The A-10 was painted "**** It!-- Leave 'em to the Air Force Green".

>The Cub is painted "NORDO Yellow".

Dan, most every day you tempt me to put a filter on you.
all the best -- Mike Marron
http://www.marronair.com/

[Juvat]

After an exhausting session with Victoria's Secret Police, Kevin
Brooks blurted out:

>You really need to cool your jets a bit.

(ouch)

>Getting your panties in a wad is not gonna help, now is it?

Some times it's almost a requirement to point out the obvious...if it
takes a 2" x 4" sorry...some folks are slow, and some keep moving the
target. I may have to use a Louisville Slugger with you.

>Now...any evidence of this great tide of opposition available?

Ummm, have you actually been reading what I'm typing? Now you want
Congressional testimony...okay you win. There was never any opposition
to the F-4 or the F-16. Trest was fabricating about the F-15
supporters (above the rank Internet of aviation expert) trying to
scuttle the F-16. I have no proof of institutional opposition to
either the F-4 or the F-16...and can find no institutional opposition
to the A-10 (but I'm aware of anecdotal opposition, snide remarks and
limited roles).

>"How many of those opponents to the F-4, or even the F-16, were in the
>USAF, though?"
>
>Note that the point here was that there was no tremendous
>institutional opposition that approached the level that was apparent
>in the case of the A-10--

Fair enough, I missed the part where you explained you meant
"tremendous institutional opposition approaching the level" vis-a-vis
the A-10. I'm pretty sure you would characterize any other poster's
alibi like this as "back pedaling."

Keep reading, I'll get to what you describe as INSTITUTIONAL
opposition. Since you didn't specify which institution, I'm going with
USAF.

> Did I say there was "no opposition"? Nope. That would be you
>trying to insert words into my mouth, I believe.

Considering your rapier wit, the question,__"How many of those
opponents to the F-4, or even the F-16, were in the USAF, though?" __
carries a certain amount of ambiguity, leaving you ample wiggle room
to either clarify or back pedal. But I digress.

Here's some "facts" for you Buckwheat, regarding USAF institutional
opposition to the A-10.

"In addition to the F-X air superiority, the Air Force laid plans for
the A-X close-air support aircraft. In June 1966 General McConnell [
CSAF] directed the Air Staff to make analyses of what areas of close
air support were not being filled to the Army's satisfaction....There
was a need of a follow-on Air Force close-air-support aircraft since
it was already evident that the A-7 was too costly and lacked desired
CAS performance capabilites. In September 1966 General McConnell
directed immediate and positive action to obtain a specialized A-X
air-support aircraft for the 1970s."

So the proposal gets rolling in 1966...in 1971 Secretary Seamans [Sec
AF] tells the Senate Appropriations Commitee,

"We are going through an important aircraft development phase in the
Air Force with the A-X [A-9 vs A-10 competition], the B-1, with the
F-15, and with AWACS, and feel it is not a time to procure large
numbers of additional aircraft."

In 1971, outgoing Commander of Tactical Air Command, "General [William
W] Momyer had earlier opposed specialized aircraft, but in 1971 he
conceived that military requirements must be rationally developed
from the future threat toward Europe...The promised intensity of
conflict in Europe, Momyer concluded, established 'a requirement for a
large number of airframes and tend[ed] to emphasize specialization."

17 Jan 1973 Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council selected the
A-10 in the A-X prototype competition.

Also 1973 the Yom Kippur War began to change the viability of the A-X
as planned, at least in some minds.

"A Joint Chiefs of Staff [note Kev, not just USAF] survey team agreed
that a lesson to be learned from the Yom Kippur War was that a
close-support airplane needed to attack at high speed, needed excess
thrust for maneuverability to avoid SAMs and sustain high speed, and
needed a computer-aided bombing system for an accurate first-pass
delivery. Another point raised by the JCS team was that airborne FACs
in slow-moving planes could not have survived in such an intense
air-defense environment "

Guess what the INSTITUTIONAL Air Force response was to the JCS
conclusions? Glad you asked...

"The Air Force's response to these assertions was that there was a
trade-off between speed and relative invulnerability (ability to take
hits) in an aircraft. Speed made it more difficult for a pilot to
acquire a target. Thus this trade-off was being reflected in the A-X
(now the A-10) close-air-support plane. The finding on the
survivability of an airborne FAC was additional support for the A-10,
since it could --unlike a faster aircraft-- find its own targets."

"General Robert J Dixon, Commander of the Tactical Air Command,
expressed his insight in to the Yom Kippur War in a rebuttal to the
generalization that missile defenses brought an era where tactical
aircraft could no longer survive over a battlefield. His judgment was
'less startling but more credible.' Tactical air power would need to
'control the air-space, suppress the defenses, operate as combined
arms team."

[please nod your cranium if you understand "operate as combined arms
team" implies support of the Army]

In November 1975, former CinC USAFE General David C Jones said, "In a
war in Central Europe, the intial and principal task of Allied Air
Forces must be to assist friendly forces in halting the Pact ground
offensive. This requires that NATO air power become immediately and
heavily engaged in close air support operations, while attaining local
air superiority as necessary. Less immediate critical objectives, such
as achieving theater-wide air superiority, must await a REDUCED NEED
FOR CLOSE AIR SUPPORT."

I could go on regarding the USAF A-X versus the USA Cheyenne versus
the Harrier debate, or the 1977 proposal for a FAC-X (two seat A-10)
proposed by the USAF. In none of these can you find your so-called
USAF institutional opposition to the A-10.

I can also point to quotes by USAF Leadership flat out saying the
Light Weight Fighter should not even make it to the prototype phase.
And I can quote CinC USAFE saying CAS is a vital mission, but a
swing-LWF vice single mission jet would be a better option based upon
force structure costs. This applies equally to the single purpose
RF-4. I'm also ignoring the disparity between NATO's the US concept of
how to stop WP armor. (Hint: We included the A-10).

Of course none of this applies because I'm certain you will re-define
what exactly institutional opposition is, or specify some time twenty
years after the A-10 entered the inventrory as proof of "institutional
opposition."

[Cub Driver]

On 27 Sep 2003 16:57:13 -0700, (Kevin Brooks)
wrote:

>is not gonna help, now is it? Now...any evidence of this great tide of
>opposition available? I have no doubt that just about *every* program
>has had *someone* in the service in disagreement; but few (and I have

Absolutely. You're not paying attention: the book is The Warthog & the
Close Air Support Debate, by Douglas Campbell, himself a former A-10
driver. He relates, among many other things, how junior AF officers
testifying before Congress were told in so many words to get on board
if they wanted a happy career and a comfortable retirement.

www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/1557502323/ref=nosim/annals


all the best -- Dan Ford
email: www.danford.net/letters.htm#9

see the Warbird's Forum at www.warbirdforum.com
and the Piper Cub Forum at www.pipercubforum.com

[TJ]

"Kirk Stant" > wrote in message
m...
> A question for any Warthog jocks (or fans) out there:
>
> Why is the front of the right gear fairing on all A-10s painted gloss
> black? Is is a radome of some sort? If so, what for?
>
> Unless, of course, you would have to kill me if you told me, etc...
>
> Just curious,
>
> Kirk
> Old F-4 WSO


I posted your question onto the Warthog territory forum. It is the ILS
antenna. The Mike Badrocke cutaway drawings still have the ILS in the nose
(an early manufacturer concept), but this was moved to the starboard gear
fairing due to Avenger vibration. Info straight from the guys who fly and
fix 'em.

TJ

[Tex Houston]

"TJ" > wrote in message
...
> The Mike Badrocke cutaway drawings still have the ILS in the nose
> (an early manufacturer concept), but this was moved to the starboard gear
> fairing due to Avenger vibration. Info straight from the guys who fly and
> fix 'em.
>
> TJ

Say again type of vibration. There has to be a story here somewhere.

Tex

[Thomas Schoene]

"Tex Houston" > wrote in message

> "TJ" > wrote in message
> ...
> > The Mike Badrocke cutaway drawings still have the ILS in the nose
> > (an early manufacturer concept), but this was moved to the
> > starboard gear fairing due to Avenger vibration. Info straight from
> > the guys who fly and fix 'em.
> >
> > TJ
>
> Say again type of vibration. There has to be a story here somewhere.

How much of a story do you need to explain this? Placing an antenna in
close proximity to a very energetic 30mm gatling gun muzzle seems like an
obvious trouble spot. I'm slightly surprised the RWR antennas are still up
there.

--�
Tom Schoene Replace "invalid" with "net" to e-mail
"If brave men and women never died, there would be nothing
special about bravery." -- Andy Rooney (attributed)

[Tex Houston]

"Thomas Schoene" > wrote in message
ink.net...
> "Tex Houston" > wrote in message
>
> > "TJ" > wrote in message
> > ...
> > > The Mike Badrocke cutaway drawings still have the ILS in the nose
> > > (an early manufacturer concept), but this was moved to the
> > > starboard gear fairing due to Avenger vibration. Info straight from
> > > the guys who fly and fix 'em.
> > >
> > > TJ
> >
> > Say again type of vibration. There has to be a story here somewhere.
>
> How much of a story do you need to explain this? Placing an antenna in
> close proximity to a very energetic 30mm gatling gun muzzle seems like an
> obvious trouble spot. I'm slightly surprised the RWR antennas are still
up
> there.

You still did not explain "Avenger".

Tex

[Yeff]

On Sun, 28 Sep 2003 16:24:27 -0600, Tex Houston wrote:

> You still did not explain "Avenger".

GAU-8A/Avenger 30mm cannon.

-Jeff B.
yeff at erols dot com

[Thomas Schoene]

"Tex Houston" > wrote in message

> "Thomas Schoene" > wrote in message
> ink.net...

> > How much of a story do you need to explain this? Placing an
> > antenna in close proximity to a very energetic 30mm gatling gun
> > muzzle seems like an obvious trouble spot. I'm slightly surprised
> > the RWR antennas are still up there.
>
> You still did not explain "Avenger".

GAU-8/A Avenger. That's the name of the gun!

--�
Tom Schoene Replace "invalid" with "net" to e-mail
"If brave men and women never died, there would be nothing
special about bravery." -- Andy Rooney (attributed)

[Kevin Brooks]

Cub Driver > wrote in message >...
> On 27 Sep 2003 16:57:13 -0700, (Kevin Brooks)
> wrote:
>
> >is not gonna help, now is it? Now...any evidence of this great tide of
> >opposition available? I have no doubt that just about *every* program
> >has had *someone* in the service in disagreement; but few (and I have
>
> Absolutely. You're not paying attention:

Huh? I hate snippage, especially when it tears the substance out of a
message to the point that I have no earthly idea just *what* the heck
it is that you claim I am not paying attention to?

Brooks

the book is The Warthog & the
> Close Air Support Debate, by Douglas Campbell, himself a former A-10
> driver. He relates, among many other things, how junior AF officers
> testifying before Congress were told in so many words to get on board
> if they wanted a happy career and a comfortable retirement.
>
> www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/1557502323/ref=nosim/annals
>
>
> all the best -- Dan Ford

[Kevin Brooks]

Juvat > wrote in message >...
> After an exhausting session with Victoria's Secret Police, Kevin
> Brooks blurted out:
>
> >You really need to cool your jets a bit.
>
> (ouch)

Hey, you want to get nasty, you will get it in return, right? YOU
started down this path; I'd just as soon have continued to keep it in
the "passionate yet respectful" mode, but you seem hell-bent on doing
otherwise, so....

FYI, I was surprised to find that the level of antagonism against the
LWF was indeed more than I had thought; scroll down to the final post
below fo more on that. But in the emeantime, in keeping with your
demand that we have to be a bit testy with all of this....

>
> >Getting your panties in a wad is not gonna help, now is it?
>
> Some times it's almost a requirement to point out the obvious...if it
> takes a 2" x 4" sorry...some folks are slow, and some keep moving the
> target. I may have to use a Louisville Slugger with you.

You are invited to come and try anytime you so choose; I use my real
name in these exchanges. Do folks hiding behind anonymous Usenet names
usually follow through with such threats?

>
> >Now...any evidence of this great tide of opposition available?
>
> Ummm, have you actually been reading what I'm typing? Now you want
> Congressional testimony...okay you win. There was never any opposition
> to the F-4 or the F-16.

Too bad that is not what I claimed--can you conduct a debate without
twisting the other fellow's claims to such extremes?

Trest was fabricating about the F-15
> supporters (above the rank Internet of aviation expert) trying to
> scuttle the F-16. I have no proof of institutional opposition to
> either the F-4 or the F-16...and can find no institutional opposition
> to the A-10 (but I'm aware of anecdotal opposition, snide remarks and
> limited roles).

Well, the proof regarding institutional bias against the A-10 is kind
of hard to refute if you recall the attempt by the USAF to kill them
off what, some thirteen years ago? Not to mention the brouha over the
Deptula memo at ACC last year? Now had you done a bit of research, you
could have presented some real evidence of the LWF disagreement (don't
worry, I did it for you; see the last source I cite below for some of
the info in that regard), but ohhh noooo, it was much easier for you
to just "go negative", huh?

>
> >"How many of those opponents to the F-4, or even the F-16, were in the
> >USAF, though?"
> >
> >Note that the point here was that there was no tremendous
> >institutional opposition that approached the level that was apparent
> >in the case of the A-10--
>
> Fair enough, I missed the part where you explained you meant
> "tremendous institutional opposition approaching the level" vis-a-vis
> the A-10. I'm pretty sure you would characterize any other poster's
> alibi like this as "back pedaling."

Your vitriole is in need of a viable target. "Back-pedaling" is what
one does when he is caught putting words into his opponents statement
that were never there in the first place, and then tries to wiggle his
way out of it instead of saying, "Ooops, I misread your statement, or
did not understand your meaning"...but you would not do that, now,
would you?

>
> Keep reading, I'll get to what you describe as INSTITUTIONAL
> opposition. Since you didn't specify which institution, I'm going with
> USAF.
>
> > Did I say there was "no opposition"? Nope. That would be you
> >trying to insert words into my mouth, I believe.
>
> Considering your rapier wit, the question,__"How many of those
> opponents to the F-4, or even the F-16, were in the USAF, though?" __
> carries a certain amount of ambiguity, leaving you ample wiggle room
> to either clarify or back pedal. But I digress.

Ah...so you WOULD back pedal in such a fashion! Geeze, why don't you
sit back, have a cold one, and consider that you have misinterpreted
my statement (how, I don't know, as the words were not that
ambiguous). And I reserved my "rapier wit" until unleashing it on you
in this message. It was a freakin' *question*, for gosh sakes, posed
in response to your claim that this great swell of internal opposition
to these other programs existed--that you chose to take it to an
extreme of supposedly inferring that I was claiming there was
absolutely NO opposition is a bit strange, and rather illogical.

>
> Here's some "facts" for you Buckwheat, regarding USAF institutional
> opposition to the A-10.

Ah, now to the use of name-calling, eh? Gee, you are really racking up
the maturity points here...

>
> "In addition to the F-X air superiority, the Air Force laid plans for
> the A-X close-air support aircraft. In June 1966 General McConnell [
> CSAF] directed the Air Staff to make analyses of what areas of close
> air support were not being filled to the Army's satisfaction....There
> was a need of a follow-on Air Force close-air-support aircraft since
> it was already evident that the A-7 was too costly and lacked desired
> CAS performance capabilites. In September 1966 General McConnell
> directed immediate and positive action to obtain a specialized A-X
> air-support aircraft for the 1970s."
>
> So the proposal gets rolling in 1966...in 1971 Secretary Seamans [Sec
> AF] tells the Senate Appropriations Commitee,
>
> "We are going through an important aircraft development phase in the
> Air Force with the A-X [A-9 vs A-10 competition], the B-1, with the
> F-15, and with AWACS, and feel it is not a time to procure large
> numbers of additional aircraft."
>
> In 1971, outgoing Commander of Tactical Air Command, "General [William
> W] Momyer had earlier opposed specialized aircraft, but in 1971 he
> conceived that military requirements must be rationally developed
> from the future threat toward Europe...The promised intensity of
> conflict in Europe, Momyer concluded, established 'a requirement for a
> large number of airframes and tend[ed] to emphasize specialization."
>
> 17 Jan 1973 Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council selected the
> A-10 in the A-X prototype competition.
>
> Also 1973 the Yom Kippur War began to change the viability of the A-X
> as planned, at least in some minds.
>
> "A Joint Chiefs of Staff [note Kev, not just USAF] survey team agreed
> that a lesson to be learned from the Yom Kippur War was that a
> close-support airplane needed to attack at high speed, needed excess
> thrust for maneuverability to avoid SAMs and sustain high speed, and
> needed a computer-aided bombing system for an accurate first-pass
> delivery. Another point raised by the JCS team was that airborne FACs
> in slow-moving planes could not have survived in such an intense
> air-defense environment "
>
> Guess what the INSTITUTIONAL Air Force response was to the JCS
> conclusions? Glad you asked...
>
> "The Air Force's response to these assertions was that there was a
> trade-off between speed and relative invulnerability (ability to take
> hits) in an aircraft. Speed made it more difficult for a pilot to
> acquire a target. Thus this trade-off was being reflected in the A-X
> (now the A-10) close-air-support plane. The finding on the
> survivability of an airborne FAC was additional support for the A-10,
> since it could --unlike a faster aircraft-- find its own targets."
>
> "General Robert J Dixon, Commander of the Tactical Air Command,
> expressed his insight in to the Yom Kippur War in a rebuttal to the
> generalization that missile defenses brought an era where tactical
> aircraft could no longer survive over a battlefield. His judgment was
> 'less startling but more credible.' Tactical air power would need to
> 'control the air-space, suppress the defenses, operate as combined
> arms team."
>
> [please nod your cranium if you understand "operate as combined arms
> team" implies support of the Army]
>
> In November 1975, former CinC USAFE General David C Jones said, "In a
> war in Central Europe, the intial and principal task of Allied Air
> Forces must be to assist friendly forces in halting the Pact ground
> offensive. This requires that NATO air power become immediately and
> heavily engaged in close air support operations, while attaining local
> air superiority as necessary. Less immediate critical objectives, such
> as achieving theater-wide air superiority, must await a REDUCED NEED
> FOR CLOSE AIR SUPPORT."
>
> I could go on regarding the USAF A-X versus the USA Cheyenne versus
> the Harrier debate, or the 1977 proposal for a FAC-X (two seat A-10)
> proposed by the USAF. In none of these can you find your so-called
> USAF institutional opposition to the A-10.
>
> I can also point to quotes by USAF Leadership flat out saying the
> Light Weight Fighter should not even make it to the prototype phase.
> And I can quote CinC USAFE saying CAS is a vital mission, but a
> swing-LWF vice single mission jet would be a better option based upon
> force structure costs. This applies equally to the single purpose
> RF-4. I'm also ignoring the disparity between NATO's the US concept of
> how to stop WP armor. (Hint: We included the A-10).
>
> Of course none of this applies because I'm certain you will re-define
> what exactly institutional opposition is, or specify some time twenty
> years after the A-10 entered the inventrory as proof of "institutional
> opposition."

My, you are quite sure of what I will have to say in advance, huh?

Actually, I was a bit surprised to see that the F-16 faced more
internal opposition than I had earlier thought existed (see, it is not
that hard to admit that kind of thing--you ought to try it sometime).
But, as I said before, I still don't see that opposition as being
anywhere in the league of what the A-10 faced during its genesis, not
to mention *throughout* its career (how many times has the USAF tried
to kill the F-16?).

You spend all of this time and effort now trying to what, portray the
A-10 as the USAF's "fair princess"? But just yesterday, our exchange
included, (me): "I don't recall the opposition against the F-16 as
being anything like
that that the A-10 faced early on", and (you), "I agree..." leaving me
in a quandry as to exactly just *what* was the point of all of this
info you have now spouted?

A somewhat different account...

"Yudkin was a bit of a rebel within the Air Force. The establishment
generals (who, by the early '70s, were still dominated by the
nuclear-bomber crowd) hated the idea of the A-X for the same reason
they hated the close-air-support mission: It had nothing to do with
the Air Force's bigger, more glamorous roles. Yudkin couldn't even get
the Air Force R &D directorate to work on the project, so he set up
his own staff to do it. The A-10 rolled onto the tarmac in 1976. The
brass still hated the thing. It survived only because of pork-barrel
politics, it was built by Fairchild Industries in Bethpage, Long
Island, home district of Rep. Joseph Addabbo, who was chairman of the
House appropriations' defense subcommittee. The plan was to build 850
of the planes. By 1986, when Addabbo died, Fairchild had built just
627, and the program came to a crashing halt."

http://slate.msn.com/id/2081906/

And supporting that thesis we have a more professional analysis from a
NDU paper on the very subject of USAF antagonism to the A-10...

"The demise of the Cheyenne precipitated a move by USAF senior
leadership to kill the A-X program. General Ryan, McConnell's
successor, kept the A-X program on track. There is little doubt that
congressional interest in the A-X also played a part in keeping the
program moving."

And...

"The A-7 was a minor threat to the A-10 program compared to the
persistent undercurrent of opposition that followed from the USAF
"high-tech" fighter faction. The program subsequently struggled for
the next several years against subtle attempts to delay and discredit
the A-10. The opposition made an indirect attempt to stop A-10
production in 1975 in a program cancellation recommendation to the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installations and Production."

And...

"Fairchild and its congressional allies also fought an annual battle
against USAF initiatives to cut yearly production
numbers.34Ultimately, the A-10 program remained under pressure well
into the Reagan era."

And...

"There is a fair amount of evidence to indicate that the USAF did not
plan to use the A-10 for any other purpose than to kill the Army's
Cheyenne program--to keep the Army out of the CAS mission. It also
appears that the USAF "high-tech" culture would not have pursued the
A-10 once the Cheyenne was no longer a threat. But by the time this
happened, the program had picked up enough Congressional and OSD
support to resist the dominant "high-tech" USAF culture and their
congressional allies."

And, in a rather good summary...

"In the end, the USAF procured the A-10 because it got a fighter force
expansion it wanted. The inter-agency process was ugly; but it worked
out for the small A-10 lobby and in later combat operations. The Air
Force just had to take some ugly and slow airplanes with the deal."

www.ndu.edu/nwc/writing/AY03/5603/5603P.pdf

You might want to peruse this National Defense University/National War
College paper, as it seems to provide "the rest of the story" (as Paul
Harvey would have said) to accompany those wonderful examples of "USAF
support" of the A-10 program you provided. Or are you going to claim
that the NDU/NWC folks rank somewhere below those "internet" folks you
were commenting about...?

Now, since you will probably again resort to name calling, etc., as
your response, I'll make it easy for you--you can have the last word
in this debate, and I am sure it will be as underwhelming as your
earlier childish rants to "Buckwheat", whoever he is in this case.

Brooks

[TJ]

"Tex Houston" > wrote in message
...
>
> "Thomas Schoene" > wrote in message
> ink.net...
> > "Tex Houston" > wrote in message
> >
> > > "TJ" > wrote in message
> > > ...
> > > > The Mike Badrocke cutaway drawings still have the ILS in the nose
> > > > (an early manufacturer concept), but this was moved to the
> > > > starboard gear fairing due to Avenger vibration. Info straight from
> > > > the guys who fly and fix 'em.
> > > >
> > > > TJ
> > >
> > > Say again type of vibration. There has to be a story here somewhere.
> >
> > How much of a story do you need to explain this? Placing an antenna in
> > close proximity to a very energetic 30mm gatling gun muzzle seems like
an
> > obvious trouble spot. I'm slightly surprised the RWR antennas are still
> up
> > there.
>
> You still did not explain "Avenger".
>
> Tex

I never replied. The response was from Thomas. The 30mm goes by the name
Avenger.

http://www.hill.af.mil/museum/photos/coldwar/gau8.jpg

TJ