What about the AIM-54 Pheonix Missile?

[Flub]

When the US Navy is going to retire all of its F-14 Tomcats, what will
happen with the feared long-range Pheonix missile? As I know, the F-14 is
the only frame that can carry this weapon. Or am I wrong? Will the Super
Hornet use the AIM-54? Or will they retire the AIM-54 also, as it has no
longer such a military value as during the Cold War?

Thx for the Info

[Andreas Parsch]

Flub wrote:

> When the US Navy is going to retire all of its F-14 Tomcats, what will
> happen with the feared long-range Pheonix missile? As I know, the F-14 is
> the only frame that can carry this weapon. Or am I wrong? Will the Super
> Hornet use the AIM-54? Or will they retire the AIM-54 also, as it has no
> longer such a military value as during the Cold War?


Phoenix will be retired together with the Tomcat around 2010(?).

Andreas

[Thomas Schoene]

"Flub" > wrote in message

> When the US Navy is going to retire all of its F-14 Tomcats, what will
> happen with the feared long-range Pheonix missile? As I know, the
> F-14 is the only frame that can carry this weapon. Or am I wrong?
> Will the Super Hornet use the AIM-54? Or will they retire the AIM-54
> also, as it has no longer such a military value as during the Cold
> War?

The F-14As go away by the end of 2004 (if not earlier) and the Bs and Ds by
2007/2008.

I believe Phoenix is actually being retired before the F-14. Earlier this
year, they talked about a "vertical kill" to the Phoenix budget line to free
up money for new programs. If that happened, look for the missile to
disappear by 2004.

No other aircraft can fire Pheonix, but the rnage of AMRAAM keeps creeping
up. At some point, it may be a match to AIM-545 (perhaps with a ramjet
engine like Meteor, perhaps not).

--�
Tom Schoene Replace "invalid" with "net" to e-mail
"If brave men and women never died, there would be nothing
special about bravery." -- Andy Rooney (attributed)

[Kevin Brooks]

Andreas Parsch > wrote in message >...
> Flub wrote:
>
> > When the US Navy is going to retire all of its F-14 Tomcats, what will
> > happen with the feared long-range Pheonix missile? As I know, the F-14 is
> > the only frame that can carry this weapon. Or am I wrong? Will the Super
> > Hornet use the AIM-54? Or will they retire the AIM-54 also, as it has no
> > longer such a military value as during the Cold War?
>
>
> Phoenix will be retired together with the Tomcat around 2010(?).

"By 2007" according to a March 2003 report:

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2003/03/mil-030327-nns05.htm

Brooks

>
> Andreas

[Greg Hennessy]

On Thu, 25 Sep 2003 12:58:58 +0200, Andreas Parsch > wrote:

?
>
>
>Phoenix will be retired together with the Tomcat around 2010(?).

How many are left ? It would have the makings of a seriously long legged
ARM.


greg

--
$ReplyAddress =~ s#\@.*$##; # Delete everything after the '@'
Who lives in a pineapple under the sea? Absorbent and yellow and pourous is he!
If nautical nonsense be something you wish! Then drop on the deck and flop like a fish!

[Harry Andreas]

In article t>, "Thomas
Schoene" > wrote:

> "Flub" > wrote in message
>
> > When the US Navy is going to retire all of its F-14 Tomcats, what will
> > happen with the feared long-range Pheonix missile? As I know, the
> > F-14 is the only frame that can carry this weapon. Or am I wrong?
> > Will the Super Hornet use the AIM-54? Or will they retire the AIM-54
> > also, as it has no longer such a military value as during the Cold
> > War?
>
> The F-14As go away by the end of 2004 (if not earlier) and the Bs and Ds by
> 2007/2008.
>
> I believe Phoenix is actually being retired before the F-14. Earlier this
> year, they talked about a "vertical kill" to the Phoenix budget line to free
> up money for new programs. If that happened, look for the missile to
> disappear by 2004.
>
> No other aircraft can fire Pheonix, but the rnage of AMRAAM keeps creeping
> up. At some point, it may be a match to AIM-545 (perhaps with a ramjet
> engine like Meteor, perhaps not).

That won't help the F-14D fleet though. They can't shoot AIM-120 without
aircraft upgrades and radar software. Have to balance the cost of
that against the cost of keeping some AIM-54s alive.

--
Harry Andreas
Engineering raconteur

[Kevin Brooks]

(Harry Andreas) wrote in message >...
> In article t>, "Thomas
> Schoene" > wrote:
>
> > "Flub" > wrote in message
> >
> > > When the US Navy is going to retire all of its F-14 Tomcats, what will
> > > happen with the feared long-range Pheonix missile? As I know, the
> > > F-14 is the only frame that can carry this weapon. Or am I wrong?
> > > Will the Super Hornet use the AIM-54? Or will they retire the AIM-54
> > > also, as it has no longer such a military value as during the Cold
> > > War?
> >
> > The F-14As go away by the end of 2004 (if not earlier) and the Bs and Ds by
> > 2007/2008.
> >
> > I believe Phoenix is actually being retired before the F-14. Earlier this
> > year, they talked about a "vertical kill" to the Phoenix budget line to free
> > up money for new programs. If that happened, look for the missile to
> > disappear by 2004.
> >
> > No other aircraft can fire Pheonix, but the rnage of AMRAAM keeps creeping
> > up. At some point, it may be a match to AIM-545 (perhaps with a ramjet
> > engine like Meteor, perhaps not).
>
> That won't help the F-14D fleet though. They can't shoot AIM-120 without
> aircraft upgrades and radar software. Have to balance the cost of
> that against the cost of keeping some AIM-54s alive.

Not necessarily. Given that the air threat to the CV's, or for that
matter to their strike packages, is greatly reduced these days, the
USN may be willing to place the major air defense/air superiority
roles solely in the hands of the F-18's with their AIM-120's, and use
the diminishing Tomcat fleet in their "Bombcat" role, with only
AIM-9's for self defense.

Brooks

[tim gueguen]

"Flub" > wrote in message
...
> When the US Navy is going to retire all of its F-14 Tomcats, what will
> happen with the feared long-range Pheonix missile?

Its debateable how feared the Phoenix is. The Iranians claimed a number of
kills from theirs, but the reality is that the Phoenix never saw use in the
role it was designed for, which is defending carrier task groups at long
range from Soviet bomber attack.

tim gueguen 101867

[Tom Cooper]

"tim gueguen" > wrote in message
news:VFPcb.23773$TM4.15531@pd7tw2no...
>
> "Flub" > wrote in message
> ...
> > When the US Navy is going to retire all of its F-14 Tomcats, what will
> > happen with the feared long-range Pheonix missile?
>
> Its debateable how feared the Phoenix is.

Tim,
except in the US and Russian (i.e. Soviet at the time) _public_ (and, of
course, all the possible internet forums and news groups), it was never
"debatable" how "feared" the Phoenix is.

To express it in the words of an Iraqi Su-22-strike leader, in reaction to
one of the Mirage F.1EQs that was escorting his forumation being blown away
by a "non-functioning/not serviceable/useless/can be used only against
bombers" Iranian AIM-54A, in February 1987:
- "F-14! Yalla! Yalla!"...

(translation: "F-14! Run! Run!")

Tom Cooper
Co-Author:
Iran-Iraq War in the Air, 1980-1988:
http://www.acig.org/pg1/content.php
and,
Iranian F-4 Phantom II Units in Combat:
http://www.osprey-publishing.co.uk/title_detail.php/title=S6585

[Brian]

"tim gueguen" > wrote in message
news:VFPcb.23773$TM4.15531@pd7tw2no...
>
> "Flub" > wrote in message
> ...
> > When the US Navy is going to retire all of its F-14 Tomcats, what will
> > happen with the feared long-range Pheonix missile?
>
> Its debateable how feared the Phoenix is. The Iranians claimed a number
of
> kills from theirs, but the reality is that the Phoenix never saw use in
the
> role it was designed for, which is defending carrier task groups at long
> range from Soviet bomber attack.

Ok, we'll put you in the cockpit of a target aircraft and you can debate how
fearful it is;)

[Emmanuel.Gustin]

Kevin Brooks > wrote:

: Not necessarily. Given that the air threat to the CV's, or for that
: matter to their strike packages, is greatly reduced these days, the
: USN may be willing to place the major air defense/air superiority
: roles solely in the hands of the F-18's with their AIM-120's, and use

Well, it does not need to be a 'great' threat to do serious
damage: Look at the achievements of the Argentineans with
only five Exocet missiles. One of the lessons of the Falklands
war (now again conviently forgotten by the British) is that
a fleet really needs a strong BVR defense, capable of
intercepting low-flying aircraft at distances up to 100 km
away.

But AIM-54 is now a relatively old weapon (although upgraded
several times) and it was designed primarily to defend the
fleet against Soviet bombers attacking at high and medium
altitude, launching the very big Soviet cruise missiles of
the period. The threat has changed, the attack profile of
an enemy force would now probably bring them in just a few
feet above the waves, only poppping up to fire their missiles.

It is likely that AIM-120 has better performance against
low-flying targets, although AIM-54's range against
high-flying targets is still unrivalled. The F-18E/AIM-120
combination may actually provide a better fleet defense
than F-14/AIM-54.

Emmanuel Gustin
http://users.skynet.be/Emmanuel.Gustin/

[Tom Cooper]

"Emmanuel.Gustin" > wrote in message
...
> Kevin Brooks > wrote:

<snip>

> But AIM-54 is now a relatively old weapon (although upgraded
> several times) and it was designed primarily to defend the
> fleet against Soviet bombers attacking at high and medium
> altitude, launching the very big Soviet cruise missiles of
> the period. The threat has changed, the attack profile of
> an enemy force would now probably bring them in just a few
> feet above the waves, only poppping up to fire their missiles.

Emanuel,
already the Tu-22Ms could attack approaching at low levels: also, the Kh-22M
had a low-level trajectory selectable.

In the 1990s the threat has changed only in so far that it became more
dangerous: the stuff that could now be eventually attacking USN carriers are
such things like supersonic cruise missiles, and Su-30s that can fire back
(which the Tu-22M-3s couldn't).

> It is likely that AIM-120 has better performance against
> low-flying targets, although AIM-54's range against
> high-flying targets is still unrivalled. The F-18E/AIM-120
> combination may actually provide a better fleet defense
> than F-14/AIM-54.

I strongly doubt this: no version of the F/A-18 matches the speed and/or
endurance of the F-14 - especially not the combination of these two
characteristics.

As you certainly know, Emanuel, it makes a huge difference if one is
intercepting an incoming threat some 100km away from the carrier, or 250km
away.

As next, given the lack of speed and endurance, there is also the lack of
range: the AIM-120 can't - and will for the next ten years or so also not be
able to - intercept enemy at such ranges like the AIM-54 can. The result of
this is that the slower, and shorter-ranged F/A-18s, armed only with
AIM-120s, are in a danger of literaly being overrun by faster,
longer-ranged, and fighters - such like Su-30s - that carry weapons with a
similar (or potentially better) range to that of the AIM-120.

Given the fact that the pk of the AIM-54 in combat against threats of its
time was higher than the pk of the AIM-120 in combat against the threats of
its time, it is doubtfull any F/A-18 would have a serious chance of
intercepting and stopping - just for example - a formation of four such
opponents like Su-30s (regardless how far out from the carrier), without
either coming too late on the station, or being outranged by enemy weapons
and shot down in return, or outrun, or outmaneuvered.... or all of this
combined.

Given that also the new cruise-missiles became much more sophisticated,
faster and longer-ranged than such earlier stuff like Kh-22/AS-4 Kitchens
(which were nifty and malfunctioning weapons any way), this threat did
actually not diminish but is increasing, while the AIM-120-armed F/A-18 has
much less chance of intercepting such threats (especially because of the
lack of speed and the weapons-range) than even the 20-years older
AIM-54-armed F-14...

Tom Cooper
Co-Author:
Iran-Iraq War in the Air, 1980-1988:
http://www.acig.org/pg1/content.php
and,
Iranian F-4 Phantom II Units in Combat:
http://www.osprey-publishing.co.uk/title_detail.php/title=S6585

[Kevin Brooks]

"Tom Cooper" > wrote in message >...
> "Emmanuel.Gustin" > wrote in message
> ...
> > Kevin Brooks > wrote:
>
> <snip>
>
> > But AIM-54 is now a relatively old weapon (although upgraded
> > several times) and it was designed primarily to defend the
> > fleet against Soviet bombers attacking at high and medium
> > altitude, launching the very big Soviet cruise missiles of
> > the period. The threat has changed, the attack profile of
> > an enemy force would now probably bring them in just a few
> > feet above the waves, only poppping up to fire their missiles.
>
> Emanuel,
> already the Tu-22Ms could attack approaching at low levels: also, the Kh-22M
> had a low-level trajectory selectable.
>
> In the 1990s the threat has changed only in so far that it became more
> dangerous: the stuff that could now be eventually attacking USN carriers are
> such things like supersonic cruise missiles, and Su-30s that can fire back
> (which the Tu-22M-3s couldn't).

Well, the fact that we are not exactly looking at a likely
confrontation with a robust Soviet long range naval aviation threat,
as we were in the bad ol' days, does seem to indicate that the threat
of a long range, massed air attack against the CV's (which is what the
AIM-54 was to counter) is greatly reduced; not *gone*, but diminished
quite significantly IMO. That you don't think so would tend to beg the
question--where, and who, do you see posing this "more dangerous"
threat that supersedes the worst of what we faced in the eighties?

>
> > It is likely that AIM-120 has better performance against
> > low-flying targets, although AIM-54's range against
> > high-flying targets is still unrivalled. The F-18E/AIM-120
> > combination may actually provide a better fleet defense
> > than F-14/AIM-54.
>
> I strongly doubt this: no version of the F/A-18 matches the speed and/or
> endurance of the F-14 - especially not the combination of these two
> characteristics.

And with the advent of Aegis, the need for that ever-expanding CAP has
been reduced a bit. What airborne threat out there do you see that the
F/A-18 with AIM-120, supported by AWACS and the normal aerial
refueling packages, and backstopped by Aegis-equipped CG's and DDG's,
can't handle?

>
> As you certainly know, Emanuel, it makes a huge difference if one is
> intercepting an incoming threat some 100km away from the carrier, or 250km
> away.

Back in the days when you were looking at a realistic possibility of a
saturation attack, that would be correct; but those days are now in
the past, thank goodness.

>
> As next, given the lack of speed and endurance, there is also the lack of
> range: the AIM-120 can't - and will for the next ten years or so also not be
> able to - intercept enemy at such ranges like the AIM-54 can.

It doesn't have to. And neither can the AIM-54 reliably operate at the
lower altitudes that the AIM-120 has proven to be quite capable of
handling.

The result of
> this is that the slower, and shorter-ranged F/A-18s, armed only with
> AIM-120s, are in a danger of literaly being overrun by faster,
> longer-ranged, and fighters - such like Su-30s - that carry weapons with a
> similar (or potentially better) range to that of the AIM-120.

Those Su-30's, if they are toting external weapons viable against a
CVN, are not going to be able to seriously outpace the F/A-18's; not
to mention the fact that they will usually find the Hornets *between*
them and their target, not in a tail chase scenario.

>
> Given the fact that the pk of the AIM-54 in combat against threats of its
> time was higher than the pk of the AIM-120 in combat against the threats of
> its time, it is doubtfull any F/A-18 would have a serious chance of
> intercepting and stopping - just for example - a formation of four such
> opponents like Su-30s (regardless how far out from the carrier), without
> either coming too late on the station, or being outranged by enemy weapons
> and shot down in return, or outrun, or outmaneuvered.... or all of this
> combined.

That sounds illogical. You have to grade the AIM-54 against the
threats of the *present* time. And your entire Su-30 scenario is less
than convincing; you keep forgetting that the CVN is the center of the
likely engagement circle, the F/A-18's are in the next ring, and then,
from outside, come your vaunted Su-30's--so how the heck are they
gonna outrun, outgun, and outmaneuver those F-18's that they have to
first get *by*? Not to mention that the vaunted AIM-54 has, in US
service, a combat record of what...zero victories?

>
> Given that also the new cruise-missiles became much more sophisticated,
> faster and longer-ranged than such earlier stuff like Kh-22/AS-4 Kitchens
> (which were nifty and malfunctioning weapons any way), this threat did
> actually not diminish but is increasing, while the AIM-120-armed F/A-18 has
> much less chance of intercepting such threats (especially because of the
> lack of speed and the weapons-range) than even the 20-years older
> AIM-54-armed F-14...

No, the threat is not increasing. It is still there, but nowhere
*near* the scope of the threat that the AIM-54 was intended to defend
against (unless, of course, you think that we are still facing hordes
of Tu-22's, Tu-95's, and even Tu-16's, streaming from the Kola and
bound for the carrier groups in the North Atlantic....).

Brooks

>
> Tom Cooper

[Tom Cooper]

Kevin, you're asking valid questions, no doubt.

> Well, the fact that we are not exactly looking at a likely
> confrontation with a robust Soviet long range naval aviation threat,
> as we were in the bad ol' days, does seem to indicate that the threat
> of a long range, massed air attack against the CV's (which is what the
> AIM-54 was to counter) is greatly reduced; not *gone*, but diminished
> quite significantly IMO. That you don't think so would tend to beg the
> question--where, and who, do you see posing this "more dangerous"
> threat that supersedes the worst of what we faced in the eighties?

As first, the Soviet naval bomber threat was neither as massive nor as
robust as assessed at the time. There were far less Blinders and Backfires
at hand assigned for anti-carrier-ops than believed. Plus, their weapons and
avonics were really "nifty".

More modern weapons - starting already with the "Moskit" (with its pretty
"dumb" quidance system), and then especially Yakhont, are far more serious
threats than any AS-4s were ever. Foremost, the capabilities of these
weapons are such that no saturation is needed any more: they are developed
to fly over or through the envelopes of the AIM-54 and Aegis system, and
their theoretical capabilities should enable them this.

The threat is also there: Moskits are already in service with the Chinese
Navy. Yakhonts not yet, but this is likely to happen in the next few years.
Especially the situation with China is such that a confrontation around
Taiwan is highly likely (as seen already several times), and far less
predictable than in the case of the "I Cold War" (against the USSR).
Besides, the main threat from the Chinese are not dozens of bombers, but
hundreds of multi-role fighters, each of which is far more flexible and
superior to the F/A-18s in anything but avionics.

> And with the advent of Aegis, the need for that ever-expanding CAP has
> been reduced a bit.

The experiences with Aegis from 1988 (the IranAir incident), and again the
recent experiences with the PAC-3 show that this is not the case. You can't
go out with the Aegis cruiser and hope to shot down the potential attackers,
but instead blast either several own fighters returning to the carrier, or a
few airliners. The identification systems are obviously not sophisticated
enough, and the USN - especially not in its "new", "litoral" environment -
also obviously can't hope to have a situation where the Aegis can have a
free field of fire. Consequently, there is still a need for a proper EID/VID
of the potential target - a task the ships can't do properly in every
possible situation from ranges longer than 20 (or even less) nautical miles.
I hope you will not tell me in turn that anybody is going to risk $1 billion
warships by moving them down the threat axis in order to try anything
similar - especially because it is pretty obvious that the "new" interceptor
on the carrier's deck can't accomplish the taks in a manner safe for it and
its crew?

> What airborne threat out there do you see that the
> F/A-18 with AIM-120, supported by AWACS and the normal aerial
> refueling packages, and backstopped by Aegis-equipped CG's and DDG's,
> can't handle?

Threats of Su-30s armed with R-77s, Yakhonts and other advanced weapons that
are about to enter service within the next few years, supported recce
satellites and AEW aircraft based on Israeli/US technology.

The USN is just about to introduce the 7th Generation of Aegis into service:
you don't believe they are doing this for nothing?

> Back in the days when you were looking at a realistic possibility of a
> saturation attack, that would be correct; but those days are now in
> the past, thank goodness.

Yes they are. Instead, in the following years a completely new generation of
anti-shipping weapons will enter service, which will not need to saturate
the defences. The possibility of attacks with single weapons that can
penetrate the layered defences of USN carriers due to their sheer flying
performances will considerably increase.

> > As next, given the lack of speed and endurance, there is also the lack
of
> > range: the AIM-120 can't - and will for the next ten years or so also
not be
> > able to - intercept enemy at such ranges like the AIM-54 can.
>
> It doesn't have to. And neither can the AIM-54 reliably operate at the
> lower altitudes that the AIM-120 has proven to be quite capable of
> handling.

In combat, the AIM-120 was never used at low levels, so I must wonder a
little bit what makes you so sure about it being able to handle low-flying
threats?

On the contrary, the AIM-54A (and a "downgraded" version of it) proved
capable of tackling multiple low-level threats in combat, and was also
successful in combat against low-flying cruise missiles. Certainly, these
were of the same generation like the AIM-54, nothing of the "new breed" that
is about to enter the service, but the point remains that without a proper
replacement for the AIM-54 the USN will stand there with its hands shortened
by two thirds, to say at least...

> The result of
> > this is that the slower, and shorter-ranged F/A-18s, armed only with
> > AIM-120s, are in a danger of literaly being overrun by faster,
> > longer-ranged, and fighters - such like Su-30s - that carry weapons with
a
> > similar (or potentially better) range to that of the AIM-120.
>
> Those Su-30's, if they are toting external weapons viable against a
> CVN, are not going to be able to seriously outpace the F/A-18's; not
> to mention the fact that they will usually find the Hornets *between*
> them and their target, not in a tail chase scenario.

There are multiple factors in this game: as first, the Su-30 is much faster
and has a better acceleration than any Hornet. As second, it is far more
maneuvreable, and has proven this too. As third, it is to carry the weapons
that can overfly the F/A-18/AIM-120 combination. As fourth, the low speed
and endurance of the F/A-18 do not ensure at all that they will always find
themselves "between" the carrier and the Su-30s - especially not in time.

> > Given the fact that the pk of the AIM-54 in combat against threats of
its
> > time was higher than the pk of the AIM-120 in combat against the threats
of
> > its time, it is doubtfull any F/A-18 would have a serious chance of
> > intercepting and stopping - just for example - a formation of four such
> > opponents like Su-30s (regardless how far out from the carrier), without
> > either coming too late on the station, or being outranged by enemy
weapons
> > and shot down in return, or outrun, or outmaneuvered.... or all of this
> > combined.
>
> That sounds illogical. You have to grade the AIM-54 against the
> threats of the *present* time. And your entire Su-30 scenario is less
> than convincing; you keep forgetting that the CVN is the center of the
> likely engagement circle, the F/A-18's are in the next ring, and then,
> from outside, come your vaunted Su-30's--so how the heck are they
> gonna outrun, outgun, and outmaneuver those F-18's that they have to
> first get *by*?

This might sound illogical only if you think that the battles of this kind
are fought in only two dimensions, not in all four. Being on station 100,
200, or even 300km out from the carrier down the threat axis does not ensure
that the F/A-18 will be in proper place and the needed time. Quite on the
contrary: the far superior endurance of the Su-30, just for example, maxes
it flexible enough to maneuver around the threat axis - along which the
F/A-18s can be expected - and goes for the kill "from the other side" (i.e.
several of them go along completely different routes around or away from the
threat axis, where the F/A-18 are most likely to expect). In turn, having
only Hornets at hand narrows down the capability of the CVBG CO to maneuver
them, and also declines his flexibility massively.

Fighting such a battle like that of defending a carrier is basically not
much more but a game of chess, where the figures shot with radar-guided
missiles. You ought to bring your platforms into a proper position, _in
time_, so to ensure that they will be in position in time to acquire the
opponent when this will maneuver through their engagement zones - which are
usually directly ahead of such things like F/A-18s. The volume of the
Hornet's engagement zone, however, is much narrower and shorter than that of
the F-14's, and the plane is also slower, and has shorter endurance, which
means that moving it around - especially at high speeds - will mean spending
lots of fuel, as well as additional problems. Trying to engage diagonally,
for example, would not only shorten the engagement envelope, but also
decrease the chance of success by a considerable margin. To illustrate it a
little bit: while the F-14 can move three or four fields in the single move,
the F/A-18 can - at best - move two. So, you have the F-14 in the place
where you need it within a much shorter time than the F/A-18. Plus, you'll
have still enough fuel after you have moved the F-14, than this would ever
be the case with the F/A-18, and you will still have a much longer reach
with longer-ranged weapons. With other words, you'll remain flexible, and
still have time for corrections of eventual mistakes - which are
unavoidable. Due to the longer range of such weapons like the AIM-54 you'll
also be in position to intimidate the opponent. Given the short range of the
AIM-120 and the short endurance of the F/A-18, you have no time for
correction of mistakes: you have to move them precisely and in time, or
you'll miss the interception point, and end aside or behind the enemy: in
such case, the F/A-18 will - due to its lower speed and the shorter range of
its main armament - also have no chance to catch up with the opponent any
more, while taking AIM-120-shots at anything but an opponent closing towards
the launching platform is cutting the range of that weapon by at least 50%.
Cutting the range of the AIM-54 by 50% mean a max confirmed engagement range
of 100km (against a target trying to outdistance the F-14). But, in the case
of this being done with the AIM-120, you end with barely 15km, and can be
happy if the missile reaches that distance in a test...

The second aspect (having time for corrections), comes also from the much
wider engagement envelope offered by the F-14/AIM-54 combo. The narrow
engagement envelope means that the potential targets will have it much
easier to avoid being engaged by the F/A-18/AIM-120 combination than this
would ever be the case with the F-14/AIM-54. This eases the organization of
the attack immensely, especially to such a flexible attack platform like
Su-30 - which can make huge detours around the area where the F/A-18s can be
expected to operate. With other words, the Su-30 needs not to go through the
F/A-18s in order to reach the carrier: it can easily maneuver at higher
speeds around them in order to reach attack position. In fact, due to the
shorter endurance of the F/A-18 and the shorter range of the AIM-120, the
USN's CVBGs have given up their capability to control wast areas of airspace
around them, and so the potential opponents have much more space to maneuver
for attack.

> Not to mention that the vaunted AIM-54 has, in US
> service, a combat record of what...zero victories?

That's the USN's problem, not even the one of the AIM-54 or the F-14: due to
its own ignorance and arrogance, they attempted to engage an opponent with
weapons that were known to this opponent first-hand. The Iraqis have
suffered immensely from the AIM-54 through the 1980s, consequently they
studied it very intensively, and already by 1988 - when they finally managed
to shot down two IRIAF F-14As - they have also shown that they started
learned how to fly around the engagement envelope of the AIM-54 in order to
bring the Tomcats inside the envelope of their weapons. They have confirmed
this beyond any doubt in 1991, when not a single F-14 came so far to engage
any of their fighters - not even MiG-21s - with AIM-54s. Nobody could expect
them (the Iraqis) to be so stupid not to learn how to avoid the threat after
eight years of fierce engagements by it, or to forget such experiences by
1999. Yet, the huge envelope of the AWG-9/AIM-54, and the need to maneuver
at very high speeds in order to avoid it made them unable to do anything
more with aircraft at hand. If they have had such stuff like Su-30s in
1999 - when the USN F-14Ds fired several AIM-54Cs at them - they could have
first go for causing the Tomcats to spend their Phoenix missiles, then evade
these, and then still have enough fuel to come back and engage on their own
terms.

Do you seriously believe and expect that nobody will ever be able to learn
to do the same against an aircraft with low top speed and shorter
endurance - like F/A-18 - and the main weapon of a much shorter range than
the AIM-54 - namely the AIM-120? And this to remain so "forever"?

> No, the threat is not increasing. It is still there, but nowhere
> *near* the scope of the threat that the AIM-54 was intended to defend
> against (unless, of course, you think that we are still facing hordes
> of Tu-22's, Tu-95's, and even Tu-16's, streaming from the Kola and
> bound for the carrier groups in the North Atlantic....).

As said above: my opinion is that the threat is only decreasing in numbers
(and, no: I'm obviously not talking about "hordes" of Tu-22s; there would be
no such thing even in the case of a WWIII in the 1980s). Numbers of
countries capable of obtaining weapons that are becoming available, and the
numbers of such weapons that could be used in a potential conflict, as well
as the numbers of potential platforms capable of launching are decreasing.
No doubt.

_But_, given the much increased sophistication of such weapons, as well as
their far greater endurance and speed, and their actual superiority in
capability to the future "main fighter" of the USN, the threat is actually
increasing. Given the Soviet and Iraqi experiences with the use of AS-4s and
AS-6s against Iran, I'd say that a whole wing of AS-4-armed Tu-22Ms or
AS-6-armed Tu-16s was actually less of a threat for any USN CVBG than four S
u-30s armed with such stuff like Yakhonts.

Tom Cooper
Co-Author:
Iran-Iraq War in the Air, 1980-1988:
http://www.acig.org/pg1/content.php
and,
Iranian F-4 Phantom II Units in Combat:
http://www.osprey-publishing.co.uk/title_detail.php/title=S6585

[Russell Waterson]

all this has shown is that there is no aircraft and its weapons that are
perfect for that job.
The F 14 / aim 54 and F 18 /aim 120 combos both have weak points.
So what is to be done? Spend more money to find one that works or change
things so that the need will no longer be there.


"Tom Cooper" > wrote in message
...
> Kevin, you're asking valid questions, no doubt.
>
> > Well, the fact that we are not exactly looking at a likely
> > confrontation with a robust Soviet long range naval aviation threat,
> > as we were in the bad ol' days, does seem to indicate that the threat
> > of a long range, massed air attack against the CV's (which is what the
> > AIM-54 was to counter) is greatly reduced; not *gone*, but diminished
> > quite significantly IMO. That you don't think so would tend to beg the
> > question--where, and who, do you see posing this "more dangerous"
> > threat that supersedes the worst of what we faced in the eighties?
>
> As first, the Soviet naval bomber threat was neither as massive nor as
> robust as assessed at the time. There were far less Blinders and Backfires
> at hand assigned for anti-carrier-ops than believed. Plus, their weapons
and
> avonics were really "nifty".
>
> More modern weapons - starting already with the "Moskit" (with its pretty
> "dumb" quidance system), and then especially Yakhont, are far more serious
> threats than any AS-4s were ever. Foremost, the capabilities of these
> weapons are such that no saturation is needed any more: they are developed
> to fly over or through the envelopes of the AIM-54 and Aegis system, and
> their theoretical capabilities should enable them this.
>
> The threat is also there: Moskits are already in service with the Chinese
> Navy. Yakhonts not yet, but this is likely to happen in the next few
years.
> Especially the situation with China is such that a confrontation around
> Taiwan is highly likely (as seen already several times), and far less
> predictable than in the case of the "I Cold War" (against the USSR).
> Besides, the main threat from the Chinese are not dozens of bombers, but
> hundreds of multi-role fighters, each of which is far more flexible and
> superior to the F/A-18s in anything but avionics.
>
> > And with the advent of Aegis, the need for that ever-expanding CAP has
> > been reduced a bit.
>
> The experiences with Aegis from 1988 (the IranAir incident), and again the
> recent experiences with the PAC-3 show that this is not the case. You
can't
> go out with the Aegis cruiser and hope to shot down the potential
attackers,
> but instead blast either several own fighters returning to the carrier, or
a
> few airliners. The identification systems are obviously not sophisticated
> enough, and the USN - especially not in its "new", "litoral" environment -
> also obviously can't hope to have a situation where the Aegis can have a
> free field of fire. Consequently, there is still a need for a proper
EID/VID
> of the potential target - a task the ships can't do properly in every
> possible situation from ranges longer than 20 (or even less) nautical
miles.
> I hope you will not tell me in turn that anybody is going to risk $1
billion
> warships by moving them down the threat axis in order to try anything
> similar - especially because it is pretty obvious that the "new"
interceptor
> on the carrier's deck can't accomplish the taks in a manner safe for it
and
> its crew?
>
> > What airborne threat out there do you see that the
> > F/A-18 with AIM-120, supported by AWACS and the normal aerial
> > refueling packages, and backstopped by Aegis-equipped CG's and DDG's,
> > can't handle?
>
> Threats of Su-30s armed with R-77s, Yakhonts and other advanced weapons
that
> are about to enter service within the next few years, supported recce
> satellites and AEW aircraft based on Israeli/US technology.
>
> The USN is just about to introduce the 7th Generation of Aegis into
service:
> you don't believe they are doing this for nothing?
>
> > Back in the days when you were looking at a realistic possibility of a
> > saturation attack, that would be correct; but those days are now in
> > the past, thank goodness.
>
> Yes they are. Instead, in the following years a completely new generation
of
> anti-shipping weapons will enter service, which will not need to saturate
> the defences. The possibility of attacks with single weapons that can
> penetrate the layered defences of USN carriers due to their sheer flying
> performances will considerably increase.
>
> > > As next, given the lack of speed and endurance, there is also the lack
> of
> > > range: the AIM-120 can't - and will for the next ten years or so also
> not be
> > > able to - intercept enemy at such ranges like the AIM-54 can.
> >
> > It doesn't have to. And neither can the AIM-54 reliably operate at the
> > lower altitudes that the AIM-120 has proven to be quite capable of
> > handling.
>
> In combat, the AIM-120 was never used at low levels, so I must wonder a
> little bit what makes you so sure about it being able to handle low-flying
> threats?
>
> On the contrary, the AIM-54A (and a "downgraded" version of it) proved
> capable of tackling multiple low-level threats in combat, and was also
> successful in combat against low-flying cruise missiles. Certainly, these
> were of the same generation like the AIM-54, nothing of the "new breed"
that
> is about to enter the service, but the point remains that without a proper
> replacement for the AIM-54 the USN will stand there with its hands
shortened
> by two thirds, to say at least...
>
> > The result of
> > > this is that the slower, and shorter-ranged F/A-18s, armed only with
> > > AIM-120s, are in a danger of literaly being overrun by faster,
> > > longer-ranged, and fighters - such like Su-30s - that carry weapons
with
> a
> > > similar (or potentially better) range to that of the AIM-120.
> >
> > Those Su-30's, if they are toting external weapons viable against a
> > CVN, are not going to be able to seriously outpace the F/A-18's; not
> > to mention the fact that they will usually find the Hornets *between*
> > them and their target, not in a tail chase scenario.
>
> There are multiple factors in this game: as first, the Su-30 is much
faster
> and has a better acceleration than any Hornet. As second, it is far more
> maneuvreable, and has proven this too. As third, it is to carry the
weapons
> that can overfly the F/A-18/AIM-120 combination. As fourth, the low speed
> and endurance of the F/A-18 do not ensure at all that they will always
find
> themselves "between" the carrier and the Su-30s - especially not in time.
>
> > > Given the fact that the pk of the AIM-54 in combat against threats of
> its
> > > time was higher than the pk of the AIM-120 in combat against the
threats
> of
> > > its time, it is doubtfull any F/A-18 would have a serious chance of
> > > intercepting and stopping - just for example - a formation of four
such
> > > opponents like Su-30s (regardless how far out from the carrier),
without
> > > either coming too late on the station, or being outranged by enemy
> weapons
> > > and shot down in return, or outrun, or outmaneuvered.... or all of
this
> > > combined.
> >
> > That sounds illogical. You have to grade the AIM-54 against the
> > threats of the *present* time. And your entire Su-30 scenario is less
> > than convincing; you keep forgetting that the CVN is the center of the
> > likely engagement circle, the F/A-18's are in the next ring, and then,
> > from outside, come your vaunted Su-30's--so how the heck are they
> > gonna outrun, outgun, and outmaneuver those F-18's that they have to
> > first get *by*?
>
> This might sound illogical only if you think that the battles of this kind
> are fought in only two dimensions, not in all four. Being on station 100,
> 200, or even 300km out from the carrier down the threat axis does not
ensure
> that the F/A-18 will be in proper place and the needed time. Quite on the
> contrary: the far superior endurance of the Su-30, just for example, maxes
> it flexible enough to maneuver around the threat axis - along which the
> F/A-18s can be expected - and goes for the kill "from the other side"
(i.e.
> several of them go along completely different routes around or away from
the
> threat axis, where the F/A-18 are most likely to expect). In turn, having
> only Hornets at hand narrows down the capability of the CVBG CO to
maneuver
> them, and also declines his flexibility massively.
>
> Fighting such a battle like that of defending a carrier is basically not
> much more but a game of chess, where the figures shot with radar-guided
> missiles. You ought to bring your platforms into a proper position, _in
> time_, so to ensure that they will be in position in time to acquire the
> opponent when this will maneuver through their engagement zones - which
are
> usually directly ahead of such things like F/A-18s. The volume of the
> Hornet's engagement zone, however, is much narrower and shorter than that
of
> the F-14's, and the plane is also slower, and has shorter endurance, which
> means that moving it around - especially at high speeds - will mean
spending
> lots of fuel, as well as additional problems. Trying to engage diagonally,
> for example, would not only shorten the engagement envelope, but also
> decrease the chance of success by a considerable margin. To illustrate it
a
> little bit: while the F-14 can move three or four fields in the single
move,
> the F/A-18 can - at best - move two. So, you have the F-14 in the place
> where you need it within a much shorter time than the F/A-18. Plus, you'll
> have still enough fuel after you have moved the F-14, than this would ever
> be the case with the F/A-18, and you will still have a much longer reach
> with longer-ranged weapons. With other words, you'll remain flexible, and
> still have time for corrections of eventual mistakes - which are
> unavoidable. Due to the longer range of such weapons like the AIM-54
you'll
> also be in position to intimidate the opponent. Given the short range of
the
> AIM-120 and the short endurance of the F/A-18, you have no time for
> correction of mistakes: you have to move them precisely and in time, or
> you'll miss the interception point, and end aside or behind the enemy: in
> such case, the F/A-18 will - due to its lower speed and the shorter range
of
> its main armament - also have no chance to catch up with the opponent any
> more, while taking AIM-120-shots at anything but an opponent closing
towards
> the launching platform is cutting the range of that weapon by at least
50%.
> Cutting the range of the AIM-54 by 50% mean a max confirmed engagement
range
> of 100km (against a target trying to outdistance the F-14). But, in the
case
> of this being done with the AIM-120, you end with barely 15km, and can be
> happy if the missile reaches that distance in a test...
>
> The second aspect (having time for corrections), comes also from the much
> wider engagement envelope offered by the F-14/AIM-54 combo. The narrow
> engagement envelope means that the potential targets will have it much
> easier to avoid being engaged by the F/A-18/AIM-120 combination than this
> would ever be the case with the F-14/AIM-54. This eases the organization
of
> the attack immensely, especially to such a flexible attack platform like
> Su-30 - which can make huge detours around the area where the F/A-18s can
be
> expected to operate. With other words, the Su-30 needs not to go through
the
> F/A-18s in order to reach the carrier: it can easily maneuver at higher
> speeds around them in order to reach attack position. In fact, due to the
> shorter endurance of the F/A-18 and the shorter range of the AIM-120, the
> USN's CVBGs have given up their capability to control wast areas of
airspace
> around them, and so the potential opponents have much more space to
maneuver
> for attack.
>
> > Not to mention that the vaunted AIM-54 has, in US
> > service, a combat record of what...zero victories?
>
> That's the USN's problem, not even the one of the AIM-54 or the F-14: due
to
> its own ignorance and arrogance, they attempted to engage an opponent with
> weapons that were known to this opponent first-hand. The Iraqis have
> suffered immensely from the AIM-54 through the 1980s, consequently they
> studied it very intensively, and already by 1988 - when they finally
managed
> to shot down two IRIAF F-14As - they have also shown that they started
> learned how to fly around the engagement envelope of the AIM-54 in order
to
> bring the Tomcats inside the envelope of their weapons. They have
confirmed
> this beyond any doubt in 1991, when not a single F-14 came so far to
engage
> any of their fighters - not even MiG-21s - with AIM-54s. Nobody could
expect
> them (the Iraqis) to be so stupid not to learn how to avoid the threat
after
> eight years of fierce engagements by it, or to forget such experiences by
> 1999. Yet, the huge envelope of the AWG-9/AIM-54, and the need to maneuver
> at very high speeds in order to avoid it made them unable to do anything
> more with aircraft at hand. If they have had such stuff like Su-30s in
> 1999 - when the USN F-14Ds fired several AIM-54Cs at them - they could
have
> first go for causing the Tomcats to spend their Phoenix missiles, then
evade
> these, and then still have enough fuel to come back and engage on their
own
> terms.
>
> Do you seriously believe and expect that nobody will ever be able to learn
> to do the same against an aircraft with low top speed and shorter
> endurance - like F/A-18 - and the main weapon of a much shorter range than
> the AIM-54 - namely the AIM-120? And this to remain so "forever"?
>
> > No, the threat is not increasing. It is still there, but nowhere
> > *near* the scope of the threat that the AIM-54 was intended to defend
> > against (unless, of course, you think that we are still facing hordes
> > of Tu-22's, Tu-95's, and even Tu-16's, streaming from the Kola and
> > bound for the carrier groups in the North Atlantic....).
>
> As said above: my opinion is that the threat is only decreasing in numbers
> (and, no: I'm obviously not talking about "hordes" of Tu-22s; there would
be
> no such thing even in the case of a WWIII in the 1980s). Numbers of
> countries capable of obtaining weapons that are becoming available, and
the
> numbers of such weapons that could be used in a potential conflict, as
well
> as the numbers of potential platforms capable of launching are decreasing.
> No doubt.
>
> _But_, given the much increased sophistication of such weapons, as well as
> their far greater endurance and speed, and their actual superiority in
> capability to the future "main fighter" of the USN, the threat is actually
> increasing. Given the Soviet and Iraqi experiences with the use of AS-4s
and
> AS-6s against Iran, I'd say that a whole wing of AS-4-armed Tu-22Ms or
> AS-6-armed Tu-16s was actually less of a threat for any USN CVBG than four
S
> u-30s armed with such stuff like Yakhonts.
>
> Tom Cooper
> Co-Author:
> Iran-Iraq War in the Air, 1980-1988:
> http://www.acig.org/pg1/content.php
> and,
> Iranian F-4 Phantom II Units in Combat:
> http://www.osprey-publishing.co.uk/title_detail.php/title=S6585
>
>

[Kevin Brooks]

"Tom Cooper" > wrote in message >...
> Kevin, you're asking valid questions, no doubt.
>
> > Well, the fact that we are not exactly looking at a likely
> > confrontation with a robust Soviet long range naval aviation threat,
> > as we were in the bad ol' days, does seem to indicate that the threat
> > of a long range, massed air attack against the CV's (which is what the
> > AIM-54 was to counter) is greatly reduced; not *gone*, but diminished
> > quite significantly IMO. That you don't think so would tend to beg the
> > question--where, and who, do you see posing this "more dangerous"
> > threat that supersedes the worst of what we faced in the eighties?
>
> As first, the Soviet naval bomber threat was neither as massive nor as
> robust as assessed at the time. There were far less Blinders and Backfires
> at hand assigned for anti-carrier-ops than believed. Plus, their weapons and
> avonics were really "nifty".

It was all those "believed" totals that resulted in programs like the
F-14/AIM-54, though.

>
> More modern weapons - starting already with the "Moskit" (with its pretty
> "dumb" quidance system), and then especially Yakhont, are far more serious
> threats than any AS-4s were ever. Foremost, the capabilities of these
> weapons are such that no saturation is needed any more: they are developed
> to fly over or through the envelopes of the AIM-54 and Aegis system, and
> their theoretical capabilities should enable them this.

Even given the fact that the Soviet long range threat was perceived as
being greater than it was in reality, given hindsight, the fact is
that it *still* dwarfed the *scope* of any air threaqt now faced by
the USN.

>
> The threat is also there: Moskits are already in service with the Chinese
> Navy.

The Chinese Navy is not, as yet, a major threat to USN operations.

>Yakhonts not yet, but this is likely to happen in the next few years.

At which point, the PLAN *still* won't be a major threat to USN
operations.

> Especially the situation with China is such that a confrontation around
> Taiwan is highly likely (as seen already several times), and far less
> predictable than in the case of the "I Cold War" (against the USSR).

I would change "highly likely" to "possible". Combat over Taiwan means
that all of the capital the PRC has put forth to gain WTO memebership,
improved trade relations with western nations, etc., would have been
wasted for little gain. How predictable did you find the Berlin
blockade? Hungary? Berlin II (61-62)? Czechoslovakia in 68? Cuba in
62? Not to mention the myriad of air incidents, including KAL 007 and
a host of US ferret aircraft?

> Besides, the main threat from the Chinese are not dozens of bombers, but
> hundreds of multi-role fighters, each of which is far more flexible and
> superior to the F/A-18s in anything but avionics.

They have *hundreds* that are unquestionably superior to the Hornet?
Come on now--they have their Su-27's, which are maybe equivalent to a
Hornet, minus the pilot quality and support issues (both big issues in
themselves); they can't even depend upon the ability of defeating
decisively the ROCAF, with their F-16's and Mirage 2000's, in the air,
much less the added strength of the USN (not to mention the inevitable
SLCM, ALCM, and B-2 strikes they would be absorbing as body blows).
And you can't just trivialize avionics as you have above--they are the
heart of modern combat aircraft.

>
> > And with the advent of Aegis, the need for that ever-expanding CAP has
> > been reduced a bit.
>
> The experiences with Aegis from 1988 (the IranAir incident),

Hey, did that Aibus get through?

and again the
> recent experiences with the PAC-3 show that this is not the case.

PAC-3 is not a naval missile, for one thing. Second, the report on
PAC-3 has yet to be released from DoD (reportedly will occur soon). I
get the idea that you are focusing on the fratricide issue as the sole
factor applied to determining the effectiveness of the SAM
systems--but that is only a part of the equation. You think your
F-14's tossing Phoenix missiles about over 100 nm away are not going
to be subject to the same kind of frat incidents? How many Iranian
aircraft were frat casualties during the PGW?

You can't
> go out with the Aegis cruiser and hope to shot down the potential attackers,
> but instead blast either several own fighters returning to the carrier, or a
> few airliners.

A bit oversimplified, IMO. The Aegis provides but one layer of the
full defense system.

The identification systems are obviously not sophisticated
> enough, and the USN - especially not in its "new", "litoral" environment -
> also obviously can't hope to have a situation where the Aegis can have a
> free field of fire.

But hey, those same systems are apparently quite capable of handling
waaay beyond VR IFF in the case of Phoenix?! Do you not see the
disconnect in your reasoning between the two here?

Consequently, there is still a need for a proper EID/VID
> of the potential target - a task the ships can't do properly in every
> possible situation from ranges longer than 20 (or even less) nautical miles.
> I hope you will not tell me in turn that anybody is going to risk $1 billion
> warships by moving them down the threat axis in order to try anything
> similar - especially because it is pretty obvious that the "new" interceptor
> on the carrier's deck can't accomplish the taks in a manner safe for it and
> its crew?

Wow, those EID systems on your Tomcats must rival Hubble if they are
picking up and ID'ing targets in the far reaches of the AIM-54
envelope.

>
> > What airborne threat out there do you see that the
> > F/A-18 with AIM-120, supported by AWACS and the normal aerial
> > refueling packages, and backstopped by Aegis-equipped CG's and DDG's,
> > can't handle?
>
> Threats of Su-30s armed with R-77s, Yakhonts and other advanced weapons that
> are about to enter service within the next few years, supported recce
> satellites and AEW aircraft based on Israeli/US technology.

The numbers of which in *any* nation's hands at present dont equal the
threat that the USN faced in the North Atlantic in 1980-85.

>
> The USN is just about to introduce the 7th Generation of Aegis into service:
> you don't believe they are doing this for nothing?

Likewise for the same reason that AIM-54 is likely to go the way of
the dodo, technological progress and a changing threat environment.

>
> > Back in the days when you were looking at a realistic possibility of a
> > saturation attack, that would be correct; but those days are now in
> > the past, thank goodness.
>
> Yes they are. Instead, in the following years a completely new generation of
> anti-shipping weapons will enter service, which will not need to saturate
> the defences. The possibility of attacks with single weapons that can
> penetrate the layered defences of USN carriers due to their sheer flying
> performances will considerably increase.

And your Phoenix/F-14 combination, with its admittedly
less-than-spectacular low altitude performance, is fgonna change this
equation you posit exactly *how*?

>
> > > As next, given the lack of speed and endurance, there is also the lack
> of
> > > range: the AIM-120 can't - and will for the next ten years or so also
> not be
> > > able to - intercept enemy at such ranges like the AIM-54 can.
> >
> > It doesn't have to. And neither can the AIM-54 reliably operate at the
> > lower altitudes that the AIM-120 has proven to be quite capable of
> > handling.
>
> In combat, the AIM-120 was never used at low levels, so I must wonder a
> little bit what makes you so sure about it being able to handle low-flying
> threats?

Repeated test shots, including snap down shots at targets operating
IIRC quite a bit lower than Phoenix ever was designed to handle.

>
> On the contrary, the AIM-54A (and a "downgraded" version of it) proved
> capable of tackling multiple low-level threats in combat, and was also
> successful in combat against low-flying cruise missiles. Certainly, these
> were of the same generation like the AIM-54, nothing of the "new breed" that
> is about to enter the service, but the point remains that without a proper
> replacement for the AIM-54 the USN will stand there with its hands shortened
> by two thirds, to say at least...

Gee, it is amazing that the USN can be so stupid, huh? Or is it a case
of their having a more realistic view of both the threat environment
and the shortcomings of their older systems?

>
> > The result of
> > > this is that the slower, and shorter-ranged F/A-18s, armed only with
> > > AIM-120s, are in a danger of literaly being overrun by faster,
> > > longer-ranged, and fighters - such like Su-30s - that carry weapons with
> a
> > > similar (or potentially better) range to that of the AIM-120.
> >
> > Those Su-30's, if they are toting external weapons viable against a
> > CVN, are not going to be able to seriously outpace the F/A-18's; not
> > to mention the fact that they will usually find the Hornets *between*
> > them and their target, not in a tail chase scenario.
>
> There are multiple factors in this game: as first, the Su-30 is much faster
> and has a better acceleration than any Hornet.

Not with big honking ASM's onboard it does not.

As second, it is far more
> maneuvreable, and has proven this too.

If it can outmaneuver an AIM-120, not to mention the more likely two
AIM-120's, coming in at it from BVR, then it is one heck of an
airplane--but it really can't do that, now can it?

As third, it is to carry the weapons
> that can overfly the F/A-18/AIM-120 combination.

What weapons are going to be launched that operate outside the AIM-120
altitiude envelope? And isn't that possibility one reason why a
layered defense, including Aegis with Standards, is present today?

As fourth, the low speed
> and endurance of the F/A-18 do not ensure at all that they will always find
> themselves "between" the carrier and the Su-30s - especially not in time.

You are aware that those Su's are not going to be "supercruising" in
towards the target from any great range? Do you really think they are
going to be operating above the typical transonic regime that has
typified the vast majority of air-to-air combat, and will continue to
do so for the next few years at least? Care to guess what that
supersonic flight does to the range capability of your posited
Su-armada (and the question of whether they can even get to those
speeds while toting ASM's is another issue)?

>
> > > Given the fact that the pk of the AIM-54 in combat against threats of
> its
> > > time was higher than the pk of the AIM-120 in combat against the threats
> of
> > > its time, it is doubtfull any F/A-18 would have a serious chance of
> > > intercepting and stopping - just for example - a formation of four such
> > > opponents like Su-30s (regardless how far out from the carrier), without
> > > either coming too late on the station, or being outranged by enemy
> weapons
> > > and shot down in return, or outrun, or outmaneuvered.... or all of this
> > > combined.
> >
> > That sounds illogical. You have to grade the AIM-54 against the
> > threats of the *present* time. And your entire Su-30 scenario is less
> > than convincing; you keep forgetting that the CVN is the center of the
> > likely engagement circle, the F/A-18's are in the next ring, and then,
> > from outside, come your vaunted Su-30's--so how the heck are they
> > gonna outrun, outgun, and outmaneuver those F-18's that they have to
> > first get *by*?
>
> This might sound illogical only if you think that the battles of this kind
> are fought in only two dimensions, not in all four. Being on station 100,
> 200, or even 300km out from the carrier down the threat axis does not ensure
> that the F/A-18 will be in proper place and the needed time. Quite on the
> contrary: the far superior endurance of the Su-30, just for example, maxes
> it flexible enough to maneuver around the threat axis - along which the
> F/A-18s can be expected - and goes for the kill "from the other side" (i.e.
> several of them go along completely different routes around or away from the
> threat axis, where the F/A-18 are most likely to expect). In turn, having
> only Hornets at hand narrows down the capability of the CVBG CO to maneuver
> them, and also declines his flexibility massively.

An amazing aircraft if you think it can operate on external lines (so
to speak) at tremendous speed, with a substantial external warload,
and the required fuel to enable it to accomplish all of this external
maneuvering. Frankly, I seriously doubt that it has those
capabilities. And if the threat dictates it, you can figure a couple
of F-18 packages operating in different areas around that CVN (I
really wonder where you get this idea that the USN is intent on
turning its CVN's into some sort of defenseless target).

>
> Fighting such a battle like that of defending a carrier is basically not
> much more but a game of chess, where the figures shot with radar-guided
> missiles. You ought to bring your platforms into a proper position, _in
> time_, so to ensure that they will be in position in time to acquire the
> opponent when this will maneuver through their engagement zones - which are
> usually directly ahead of such things like F/A-18s. The volume of the
> Hornet's engagement zone, however, is much narrower and shorter than that of
> the F-14's, and the plane is also slower, and has shorter endurance, which
> means that moving it around - especially at high speeds - will mean spending
> lots of fuel, as well as additional problems. Trying to engage diagonally,
> for example, would not only shorten the engagement envelope, but also
> decrease the chance of success by a considerable margin. To illustrate it a
> little bit: while the F-14 can move three or four fields in the single move,
> the F/A-18 can - at best - move two. So, you have the F-14 in the place
> where you need it within a much shorter time than the F/A-18. Plus, you'll
> have still enough fuel after you have moved the F-14, than this would ever
> be the case with the F/A-18, and you will still have a much longer reach
> with longer-ranged weapons. With other words, you'll remain flexible, and
> still have time for corrections of eventual mistakes - which are
> unavoidable. Due to the longer range of such weapons like the AIM-54 you'll
> also be in position to intimidate the opponent. Given the short range of the
> AIM-120 and the short endurance of the F/A-18, you have no time for
> correction of mistakes: you have to move them precisely and in time, or
> you'll miss the interception point, and end aside or behind the enemy: in
> such case, the F/A-18 will - due to its lower speed and the shorter range of
> its main armament - also have no chance to catch up with the opponent any
> more, while taking AIM-120-shots at anything but an opponent closing towards
> the launching platform is cutting the range of that weapon by at least 50%.
> Cutting the range of the AIM-54 by 50% mean a max confirmed engagement range
> of 100km (against a target trying to outdistance the F-14). But, in the case
> of this being done with the AIM-120, you end with barely 15km, and can be
> happy if the missile reaches that distance in a test...
>
> The second aspect (having time for corrections), comes also from the much
> wider engagement envelope offered by the F-14/AIM-54 combo. The narrow
> engagement envelope means that the potential targets will have it much
> easier to avoid being engaged by the F/A-18/AIM-120 combination than this
> would ever be the case with the F-14/AIM-54. This eases the organization of
> the attack immensely, especially to such a flexible attack platform like
> Su-30 - which can make huge detours around the area where the F/A-18s can be
> expected to operate. With other words, the Su-30 needs not to go through the
> F/A-18s in order to reach the carrier: it can easily maneuver at higher
> speeds around them in order to reach attack position. In fact, due to the
> shorter endurance of the F/A-18 and the shorter range of the AIM-120, the
> USN's CVBGs have given up their capability to control wast areas of airspace
> around them, and so the potential opponents have much more space to maneuver
> for attack.

The USN apparently does not agree with your assessment. The F-18 is
not quite as slow as you seem to think, they do have aerial tanking
capability to support the CAP, and the AIM-120 has proven so far to be
a rather lethal missile to aircraft ranging from the old Mig-21 to the
Mig-29. And the AIM-54 has proven to be what (and take some of those
Iranian claims with buckets of salt)?

>
> > Not to mention that the vaunted AIM-54 has, in US
> > service, a combat record of what...zero victories?
>
> That's the USN's problem, not even the one of the AIM-54 or the F-14: due to
> its own ignorance and arrogance, they attempted to engage an opponent with
> weapons that were known to this opponent first-hand. The Iraqis have
> suffered immensely from the AIM-54 through the 1980s, consequently they
> studied it very intensively, and already by 1988 - when they finally managed
> to shot down two IRIAF F-14As - they have also shown that they started
> learned how to fly around the engagement envelope of the AIM-54 in order to
> bring the Tomcats inside the envelope of their weapons.


But those Su-30's can't manage that? Sounds like you are positing now
a case that *any* CAP, be it F-14 or F-18 based, is doomed to failure.

They have confirmed
> this beyond any doubt in 1991, when not a single F-14 came so far to engage
> any of their fighters - not even MiG-21s - with AIM-54s. Nobody could expect
> them (the Iraqis) to be so stupid not to learn how to avoid the threat after
> eight years of fierce engagements by it, or to forget such experiences by
> 1999. Yet, the huge envelope of the AWG-9/AIM-54, and the need to maneuver
> at very high speeds in order to avoid it made them unable to do anything
> more with aircraft at hand.

But you posit that the Su's can operate at such high speeds to avoid
the threat and still do the dirty work?

If they have had such stuff like Su-30s in
> 1999 - when the USN F-14Ds fired several AIM-54Cs at them - they could have
> first go for causing the Tomcats to spend their Phoenix missiles, then evade
> these, and then still have enough fuel to come back and engage on their own
> terms.
>
> Do you seriously believe and expect that nobody will ever be able to learn
> to do the same against an aircraft with low top speed and shorter
> endurance - like F/A-18 - and the main weapon of a much shorter range than
> the AIM-54 - namely the AIM-120? And this to remain so "forever"?

What am I thinking? Of course you are right, the USN is dumb, and the
Su is the greatest airplane ever built, capable of things that would
make the F/A-22 green with envy... All sarcasm aside, I fail to see
where the AIM-54 equipped F-14 is essential to USN CV defensive
efforts forever.

Brooks

>
> > No, the threat is not increasing. It is still there, but nowhere
> > *near* the scope of the threat that the AIM-54 was intended to defend
> > against (unless, of course, you think that we are still facing hordes
> > of Tu-22's, Tu-95's, and even Tu-16's, streaming from the Kola and
> > bound for the carrier groups in the North Atlantic....).
>
> As said above: my opinion is that the threat is only decreasing in numbers
> (and, no: I'm obviously not talking about "hordes" of Tu-22s; there would be
> no such thing even in the case of a WWIII in the 1980s). Numbers of
> countries capable of obtaining weapons that are becoming available, and the
> numbers of such weapons that could be used in a potential conflict, as well
> as the numbers of potential platforms capable of launching are decreasing.
> No doubt.
>
> _But_, given the much increased sophistication of such weapons, as well as
> their far greater endurance and speed, and their actual superiority in
> capability to the future "main fighter" of the USN, the threat is actually
> increasing. Given the Soviet and Iraqi experiences with the use of AS-4s and
> AS-6s against Iran, I'd say that a whole wing of AS-4-armed Tu-22Ms or
> AS-6-armed Tu-16s was actually less of a threat for any USN CVBG than four S
> u-30s armed with such stuff like Yakhonts.
>
> Tom Cooper
> Co-Author:
> Iran-Iraq War in the Air, 1980-1988:
> http://www.acig.org/pg1/content.php
> and,
> Iranian F-4 Phantom II Units in Combat:
> http://www.osprey-publishing.co.uk/title_detail.php/title=S6585

[Tom Cooper]

"Kevin Brooks" > wrote in message
om...
> "Tom Cooper" > wrote in message
>...
> > Kevin, you're asking valid questions, no doubt.

<snip>

> > The threat is also there: Moskits are already in service with the
Chinese
> > Navy.
>
> The Chinese Navy is not, as yet, a major threat to USN operations.

Of course it is not.

And on 10 September 2001 there was also no threat from idiots hijacking
airliners and crashing them into the WTC and Pentagon...

(and this despite the fact that already in 1992 the Philippino police
arrested a Pakistani terrorist cell in Manila, which was planning to do that
with 12 aircraft in Hong Kong and the USA....)

> > Especially the situation with China is such that a confrontation around
> > Taiwan is highly likely (as seen already several times), and far less
> > predictable than in the case of the "I Cold War" (against the USSR).
>
> I would change "highly likely" to "possible". Combat over Taiwan means
> that all of the capital the PRC has put forth to gain WTO memebership,
> improved trade relations with western nations, etc., would have been
> wasted for little gain. How predictable did you find the Berlin
> blockade? Hungary? Berlin II (61-62)? Czechoslovakia in 68? Cuba in
> 62? Not to mention the myriad of air incidents, including KAL 007 and
> a host of US ferret aircraft?

Not only that in most of the cases you're talking about (and especially in
the case of the Cuban missile crisis) the USA were taken completely by
surprise, but you now also want to explain that the "modern" threats are
more predictable than the Soviet ones?

Kevin, seriously, on which planet do you live?

> > Besides, the main threat from the Chinese are not dozens of bombers, but
> > hundreds of multi-role fighters, each of which is far more flexible and
> > superior to the F/A-18s in anything but avionics.
>
> They have *hundreds* that are unquestionably superior to the Hornet?
> Come on now--they have their Su-27's,

You're simply underinformed, and that's all. By 2006, the PLAAF and the
PLANAF will have around 400 Su-27/J-11s, Su-30MKKs and similar planes -
supported by A-50s - in service. Go and check the orders they issued in the
last six years to Russia, and the numbers they're receiving each year.

How would you tackle that threat? With a single carrier stationed in Japan,
carrying 48 Hornets, and a wing of 18 F-15Cs based on Okinawa? Oh, man, what
a bloody good exchange rate to start with...

> which are maybe equivalent to a
> Hornet, minus the pilot quality and support issues (both big issues in
> themselves); they can't even depend upon the ability of defeating
> decisively the ROCAF, with their F-16's and Mirage 2000's, in the air,

The ROCAF is already losing the "shadow boxing" that is going on in the air
over the Straits since years: just last year the SU-30s have forced several
of their F-16s to pull out of the area where the Chinese operated.

> much less the added strength of the USN (not to mention the inevitable
> SLCM, ALCM, and B-2 strikes they would be absorbing as body blows).

Oh, this is really developing into a "very serious" one, especially if we're
so far to discuss the "mine is bigger than yours" issue. It could also be
said that you're ignorant of the Chinese threats against such places like
Los Angeles; their capability to blast Taiwan with over 1.000 IRBMs and
attack any USN CVBG that comes their ways with "hordes" of Su-27-likes etc.,
etc., etc.

> > > And with the advent of Aegis, the need for that ever-expanding CAP has
> > > been reduced a bit.
> >
> > The experiences with Aegis from 1988 (the IranAir incident),
>
> Hey, did that Aibus get through?

No: the Aegis prevented it from dropping 300+ people on the deck of the USS
Vincennes...

> and again the
> > recent experiences with the PAC-3 show that this is not the case.
>
> PAC-3 is not a naval missile, for one thing.

So what? Is it equipped with a system that makes it capable of VID over
BVR-ranges? Is it making its users better able to safely identify distant
targets than any (manned) interceptor can do?

> Second, the report on
> PAC-3 has yet to be released from DoD (reportedly will occur soon).

Oh, that's really a "big problem": the PAC-3 crews in question were already
freed of any blame - just like the crew of the USS Vincennes - so the DoD
can now release as many reports as it likes.

> I get the idea that you are focusing on the fratricide issue as the sole
> factor applied to determining the effectiveness of the SAM
> systems--but that is only a part of the equation. You think your
> F-14's tossing Phoenix missiles about over 100 nm away are not going
> to be subject to the same kind of frat incidents?

No. But, at least the F-14 has had the TCS, which was enabling it to VID
bogeys from serious distances. This is something no SAM can do - and
especially no SAM-site or an AAW-warship.

> How many Iranian
> aircraft were frat casualties during the PGW?

They've shot down five of their own F-14s with MIM-23s (plus at least half a
dozen of other fighters), just for example. The IRIAF F-14s haven't shot
down even a single Iranian fighter, regardless the distances and complex
tactical situations in several cases.

> You can't
> > go out with the Aegis cruiser and hope to shot down the potential
attackers,
> > but instead blast either several own fighters returning to the carrier,
or a
> > few airliners.
>
> A bit oversimplified, IMO. The Aegis provides but one layer of the
> full defense system.

It is undeniably another layer of the full system. But, as the word "full"
describes it, it is a part of the system, and a part/layer that comes
between the interceptors and the carrier - not in front of the interceptors,
which you seem to consider it capable of doing.

> The identification systems are obviously not sophisticated
> > enough, and the USN - especially not in its "new", "litoral"
environment -
> > also obviously can't hope to have a situation where the Aegis can have a
> > free field of fire.
>
> But hey, those same systems are apparently quite capable of handling
> waaay beyond VR IFF in the case of Phoenix?! Do you not see the
> disconnect in your reasoning between the two here?

Such things like TCS are. Don't you notice that you permanently forget at
least one factor that makes the difference?

> Consequently, there is still a need for a proper EID/VID
> > of the potential target - a task the ships can't do properly in every
> > possible situation from ranges longer than 20 (or even less) nautical
miles.
> > I hope you will not tell me in turn that anybody is going to risk $1
billion
> > warships by moving them down the threat axis in order to try anything
> > similar - especially because it is pretty obvious that the "new"
interceptor
> > on the carrier's deck can't accomplish the taks in a manner safe for it
and
> > its crew?
>
> Wow, those EID systems on your Tomcats must rival Hubble if they are
> picking up and ID'ing targets in the far reaches of the AIM-54
> envelope.

Well, at least I don't know about a single case (out of several dozens)
where the enemy-IFF-interrogator of an F-14 failed to properly identify the
target. The fact is that this happened in 100% of the cases where the Aegis
was used in "combat".

> > > What airborne threat out there do you see that the
> > > F/A-18 with AIM-120, supported by AWACS and the normal aerial
> > > refueling packages, and backstopped by Aegis-equipped CG's and DDG's,
> > > can't handle?
> >
> > Threats of Su-30s armed with R-77s, Yakhonts and other advanced weapons
that
> > are about to enter service within the next few years, supported recce
> > satellites and AEW aircraft based on Israeli/US technology.
>
> The numbers of which in *any* nation's hands at present dont equal the
> threat that the USN faced in the North Atlantic in 1980-85.

You again missed the point: the modern threats are such that one needs no
dozens or hundreds in order to saturate: today it can become too dangerous
for any USN CVBG to let the opponent fire even a single thing of Yakhont's
caliber...

> > The USN is just about to introduce the 7th Generation of Aegis into
service:
> > you don't believe they are doing this for nothing?
>
> Likewise for the same reason that AIM-54 is likely to go the way of
> the dodo, technological progress and a changing threat environment.

No dispute. But, this doesn't mean that a much more powerful replacement is
needed - but nowhere in sight.

> > Back in the days when you were looking at a realistic possibility of a
> > > saturation attack, that would be correct; but those days are now in
> > > the past, thank goodness.
> >
> > Yes they are. Instead, in the following years a completely new
generation of
> > anti-shipping weapons will enter service, which will not need to
saturate
> > the defences. The possibility of attacks with single weapons that can
> > penetrate the layered defences of USN carriers due to their sheer flying
> > performances will considerably increase.
>
> And your Phoenix/F-14 combination, with its admittedly
> less-than-spectacular low altitude performance, is fgonna change this
> equation you posit exactly *how*?

In my last post I have explained to you that in COMBAT - repeat: combat, not
in testing - the AIM-54 proved capable of tackling low-level targets. The
AIM-120 was fired in combat, and also in the SD-mode, but never against a
target operating at levels bellow 100m. Perhaps some AMRAAMs were test-fired
against such targets like cruise-missiles: this is very likely. But then,
the test-performance of the AIM-54 against such targets is superior to that
of the AIM-120 any way, already on the basis of the range.

> > > > As next, given the lack of speed and endurance, there is also the
lack
> > of
> > > > range: the AIM-120 can't - and will for the next ten years or so
also
> > not be
> > > > able to - intercept enemy at such ranges like the AIM-54 can.
> > >
> > > It doesn't have to. And neither can the AIM-54 reliably operate at the
> > > lower altitudes that the AIM-120 has proven to be quite capable of
> > > handling.
> >
> > In combat, the AIM-120 was never used at low levels, so I must wonder a
> > little bit what makes you so sure about it being able to handle
low-flying
> > threats?
>
> Repeated test shots, including snap down shots at targets operating
> IIRC quite a bit lower than Phoenix ever was designed to handle.

How about details? How many, when and where?

> > On the contrary, the AIM-54A (and a "downgraded" version of it) proved
> > capable of tackling multiple low-level threats in combat, and was also
> > successful in combat against low-flying cruise missiles. Certainly,
these
> > were of the same generation like the AIM-54, nothing of the "new breed"
that
> > is about to enter the service, but the point remains that without a
proper
> > replacement for the AIM-54 the USN will stand there with its hands
shortened
> > by two thirds, to say at least...
>
> Gee, it is amazing that the USN can be so stupid, huh? Or is it a case
> of their having a more realistic view of both the threat environment
> and the shortcomings of their older systems?

Well, not really stupid: just catching-as-catch can - after all the failures
and massive mistakes with the A-12, ATF etc., etc., etc. they had to get
something new on their decks, or face the situation in which the A-6s and
F-14s would start falling apart within few years.

I don't know if you read any of the USN reports and hearings to the Congress
in the last few years: they do not say any more that the F/A-18s are
"better" than the F-14. They say that the F-14 is running out of life (which
is meanwhile undeniable) and the USN simply needs new airframes. So, it's
not any more to "get the best of the best" but to "get at least something".

> > > The result of
> > > > this is that the slower, and shorter-ranged F/A-18s, armed only with
> > > > AIM-120s, are in a danger of literaly being overrun by faster,
> > > > longer-ranged, and fighters - such like Su-30s - that carry weapons
with
> > a
> > > > similar (or potentially better) range to that of the AIM-120.
> > >
> > > Those Su-30's, if they are toting external weapons viable against a
> > > CVN, are not going to be able to seriously outpace the F/A-18's; not
> > > to mention the fact that they will usually find the Hornets *between*
> > > them and their target, not in a tail chase scenario.
> >
> > There are multiple factors in this game: as first, the Su-30 is much
faster
> > and has a better acceleration than any Hornet.
>
> Not with big honking ASM's onboard it does not.

Sigh, I'd like to see acceleration rates for a SH loaded with three bags and
four AIM-120s alone.... Do you really believe it's superior to the Su-30 and
likes?

> As second, it is far more
> > maneuvreable, and has proven this too.
>
> If it can outmaneuver an AIM-120, not to mention the more likely two
> AIM-120's, coming in at it from BVR, then it is one heck of an
> airplane--but it really can't do that, now can it?

The Serbian MiG-29s proved several times they can outmaneuver AIM-120s in
1999 (they outmaneuvered at least three of them). Of course, a fighter
forced to outmaneuver missiles is of not much use. But, if you can get them
busy with one of yours, you still can bring the whole pack around.... Some
call this: "hold him by the nose and punch him in the tights". You might get
surprised that the "others" (than the US Americans) could come to the idea
to use this "tactics".

> As third, it is to carry the weapons
> > that can overfly the F/A-18/AIM-120 combination.
>
> What weapons are going to be launched that operate outside the AIM-120
> altitiude envelope? And isn't that possibility one reason why a
> layered defense, including Aegis with Standards, is present today?

How about trying to get yourself informed about the Yakhont's attack
trajectories?

> As fourth, the low speed
> > and endurance of the F/A-18 do not ensure at all that they will always
find
> > themselves "between" the carrier and the Su-30s - especially not in
time.
>
> You are aware that those Su's are not going to be "supercruising" in
> towards the target from any great range? Do you really think they are
> going to be operating above the typical transonic regime that has
> typified the vast majority of air-to-air combat, and will continue to
> do so for the next few years at least?

I'm meanwhile only sure that you're not completely up-to-date to this topic.
Which is the only recent war in which BVR-air-to-air combats were fought on
a large scale (and in which BOTH sides were firing BVRAAMs)? What were the
usual speeds of the involved aircraft in average BVR-battles in that war?

It might surprise you, Kevin, but the times of subsonic dogfighting at
medium and low levels are past, and people like you should slowly start to
realize this fact. This comes from the sole fact that already approaching an
enemy capable of BVR-shots at high speeds is rapidly decreasing his
engagement envelope...

>Care to guess what that
> supersonic flight does to the range capability of your posited
> Su-armada (and the question of whether they can even get to those
> speeds while toting ASM's is another issue)?

To make one thing clear: I'm not some "Flankeristi", believing the plane can
"do it all, anytime, anywhere". You miss, however, the fact that the
Su-27-family is simply superior to any Hornet in its raw flying
performances. Or worst: you do not miss it: you simply ignore and deny it,
according to the principle: if you say they are not capable of doing it,
they will not be capable of doing it.

> > This might sound illogical only if you think that the battles of this
kind
> > are fought in only two dimensions, not in all four. Being on station
100,
> > 200, or even 300km out from the carrier down the threat axis does not
ensure
> > that the F/A-18 will be in proper place and the needed time. Quite on
the
> > contrary: the far superior endurance of the Su-30, just for example,
maxes
> > it flexible enough to maneuver around the threat axis - along which the
> > F/A-18s can be expected - and goes for the kill "from the other side"
(i.e.
> > several of them go along completely different routes around or away from
the
> > threat axis, where the F/A-18 are most likely to expect). In turn,
having
> > only Hornets at hand narrows down the capability of the CVBG CO to
maneuver
> > them, and also declines his flexibility massively.
>
> An amazing aircraft if you think it can operate on external lines (so
> to speak) at tremendous speed, with a substantial external warload,
> and the required fuel to enable it to accomplish all of this external
> maneuvering. Frankly, I seriously doubt that it has those
> capabilities.

The only problem here is that you chose to ignore what is obviouis. Compare
the published performances to get the proper picture.

Can you - instead of being sarcastic - disprove what I said on the basis of
available data for F/A-18s and Su-30s?

> The USN apparently does not agree with your assessment. The F-18 is
> not quite as slow as you seem to think,

Is it faster than such planes like Su-27/30, Rafale, EF-2000, F-22, just for
example? Has it a better range, higher top speed, longer-ranged weapons?

> they do have aerial tanking capability to support the CAP

Yes, they do. In fact, they not only have such capability, but also need it
badly: just take a look what was the main task of the few F/A-18Fs of the
VFA-41 that arrived in the Gulf in time to "participate" in the war against
Iraq, earlier this year...

>, and the AIM-120 has proven so far to be
> a rather lethal missile to aircraft ranging from the old Mig-21 to the
> Mig-29.

Err, sorry: how many MiG-21s were shot down by AMRAAMs?

> And the AIM-54 has proven to be what (and take some of those
> Iranian claims with buckets of salt)?

The AIM-54 has proven to have a 20% higher pk in combat against contemporary
threats than the AIM-120. You can take these "Iranian claims" with
containers of salt if you don't like them. Just take care to drink enough
water.

> > That's the USN's problem, not even the one of the AIM-54 or the F-14:
due to
> > its own ignorance and arrogance, they attempted to engage an opponent
with
> > weapons that were known to this opponent first-hand. The Iraqis have
> > suffered immensely from the AIM-54 through the 1980s, consequently they
> > studied it very intensively, and already by 1988 - when they finally
managed
> > to shot down two IRIAF F-14As - they have also shown that they started
> > learned how to fly around the engagement envelope of the AIM-54 in order
to
> > bring the Tomcats inside the envelope of their weapons.
>
> But those Su-30's can't manage that? Sounds like you are positing now
> a case that *any* CAP, be it F-14 or F-18 based, is doomed to failure.

You simply chose to ignore the facts: what is your argument here, actually?
That the F/A-18 is "superior" in speed, range and capabilities to all the
possible threats, and there is no problem with the lack of range of the
aircraft or that of the range and kynethic capabilities of the AIM-120, nor
with the fact that the USN's CAPs can't operate agains threats from ranges
away from carrier as safe as before?

Do you want a serious discussion here or are we now about to start with
personal attacks, flamewars and other nonsence?

> > Do you seriously believe and expect that nobody will ever be able to
learn
> > to do the same against an aircraft with low top speed and shorter
> > endurance - like F/A-18 - and the main weapon of a much shorter range
than
> > the AIM-54 - namely the AIM-120? And this to remain so "forever"?
>
> What am I thinking? Of course you are right, the USN is dumb, and the
> Su is the greatest airplane ever built, capable of things that would
> make the F/A-22 green with envy... All sarcasm aside, I fail to see
> where the AIM-54 equipped F-14 is essential to USN CV defensive
> efforts forever.

Surely, when one refuses to think soberly then it makes no sense to talk
with the person.

Thanks for losing my time: no interest.

Tom Cooper
Co-Author:
Iran-Iraq War in the Air, 1980-1988:
http://www.acig.org/pg1/content.php
and,
Iranian F-4 Phantom II Units in Combat:
http://www.osprey-publishing.co.uk/title_detail.php/title=S6585

[Eric Moore]

"Tom Cooper" > wrote in message >...

<snip>
>
> In combat, the AIM-120 was never used at low levels, so I must wonder a
> little bit what makes you so sure about it being able to handle low-flying
> threats?
>

<snip>

During the accidental Blackhawk shootdown in the northern Iraq no-fly
zone a few years back, weren't the UH-60's flying at low-level?


>
> Tom Cooper
> Co-Author:
> Iran-Iraq War in the Air, 1980-1988:
> http://www.acig.org/pg1/content.php
> and,
> Iranian F-4 Phantom II Units in Combat:
> http://www.osprey-publishing.co.uk/title_detail.php/title=S6585

[Gernot Hassenpflug]

Au contraire, your time is much appreciated by others, such as
myself. Not having access easily to documents while away from home
makes rational posts a real pleasure to read and cause for further
thinking.

Many thanks,
Gernot
--
G Hassenpflug * IJN & JMSDF equipment/history fan

[Kevin Brooks]

"Tom Cooper" > wrote in message >...
> "Kevin Brooks" > wrote in message
> om...
> > "Tom Cooper" > wrote in message
> >...
> > > Kevin, you're asking valid questions, no doubt.
>
> <snip>
>
> > > The threat is also there: Moskits are already in service with the
> Chinese
> > > Navy.
> >
> > The Chinese Navy is not, as yet, a major threat to USN operations.
>
> Of course it is not.
>
> And on 10 September 2001 there was also no threat from idiots hijacking
> airliners and crashing them into the WTC and Pentagon...

You need to think a bit about the difference between "major threat"
and "no threat".

>
> (and this despite the fact that already in 1992 the Philippino police
> arrested a Pakistani terrorist cell in Manila, which was planning to do that
> with 12 aircraft in Hong Kong and the USA....)

Uhmmm...the point to this being what?

>
> > > Especially the situation with China is such that a confrontation around
> > > Taiwan is highly likely (as seen already several times), and far less
> > > predictable than in the case of the "I Cold War" (against the USSR).
> >
> > I would change "highly likely" to "possible". Combat over Taiwan means
> > that all of the capital the PRC has put forth to gain WTO memebership,
> > improved trade relations with western nations, etc., would have been
> > wasted for little gain. How predictable did you find the Berlin
> > blockade? Hungary? Berlin II (61-62)? Czechoslovakia in 68? Cuba in
> > 62? Not to mention the myriad of air incidents, including KAL 007 and
> > a host of US ferret aircraft?
>
> Not only that in most of the cases you're talking about (and especially in
> the case of the Cuban missile crisis) the USA were taken completely by
> surprise, but you now also want to explain that the "modern" threats are
> more predictable than the Soviet ones?

You said the Chinese were somehow more unpredictable than the Soviets.
The examples above don't seem to support that thesis. Take it one step
further-- Stalin's endorsement of the DPRK's strike south in 1950 was
rather unpredictable, while the PRC's later entry into the war really
wasn't (that Dougie was still caught with his pants down despite
repeated Chinese warnings is another issue). I don't necessarilly
agree with your thesis in this regard.

>
> Kevin, seriously, on which planet do you live?

The one that you apparently ignore historical fact on, in support of
ill-conceived thesis like the one posed above.

>
> > > Besides, the main threat from the Chinese are not dozens of bombers, but
> > > hundreds of multi-role fighters, each of which is far more flexible and
> > > superior to the F/A-18s in anything but avionics.
> >
> > They have *hundreds* that are unquestionably superior to the Hornet?
> > Come on now--they have their Su-27's,
>
> You're simply underinformed, and that's all. By 2006, the PLAAF and the
> PLANAF will have around 400 Su-27/J-11s, Su-30MKKs and similar planes -
> supported by A-50s - in service. Go and check the orders they issued in the
> last six years to Russia, and the numbers they're receiving each year.

LOL! A-50's? How much of a threat are those
candidates-for-museum-membership? And I already acknowledged thay have
Su's--I just don't see them as the superplane/boogieman that you do.

>
> How would you tackle that threat? With a single carrier stationed in Japan,
> carrying 48 Hornets, and a wing of 18 F-15Cs based on Okinawa? Oh, man, what
> a bloody good exchange rate to start with...

I guess you must have missed out on the fact that the USN tends to
send more than one CVN into an area when the threat increases? That we
don't do so routinely in the South China Sea would seem to indicate
that the PRC is not the immediate tremendous threat that you want to
portray it as being.

>
> > which are maybe equivalent to a
> > Hornet, minus the pilot quality and support issues (both big issues in
> > themselves); they can't even depend upon the ability of defeating
> > decisively the ROCAF, with their F-16's and Mirage 2000's, in the air,
>
> The ROCAF is already losing the "shadow boxing" that is going on in the air
> over the Straits since years: just last year the SU-30s have forced several
> of their F-16s to pull out of the area where the Chinese operated.

Big difference between that "shadow boxing" and being assured of
dominance in a combat scenario.

>
> > much less the added strength of the USN (not to mention the inevitable
> > SLCM, ALCM, and B-2 strikes they would be absorbing as body blows).
>
> Oh, this is really developing into a "very serious" one, especially if we're
> so far to discuss the "mine is bigger than yours" issue.

Getting desperate, huh? You opened the door to this supposedly
tremendous PLAN/PLAAF threat to the CVN's that allegedly surpasses
that faced vis a vis the Soviets at the height of the Cold War. But I
guess it suits your purposes to then dissect the threat and have it
exist in a vacuum when the ability of US forces to counteract your
posited moves is mentioned?

It could also be
> said that you're ignorant of the Chinese threats against such places like
> Los Angeles;

ROFLOL! Yeah, their D-5's are a major current threat; our reataliatory
capability dwarfs their ability to strike continental US (heck, throw
Hawaii into the mix as well) targets by a factor of probably somewhere
around four or five thousand-to-one. You scoff at the very idea that
faced with any real PRC hostilities directed at a CVN the US would be
willing to respond with conventional strikes at the PLAAF/PLAN COG's,
but you find their paltry strategic nuclear force a realistic and
tremendous threat to *LA*? Do you see any lack of logic in that?

their capability to blast Taiwan with over 1.000 IRBMs and
> attack any USN CVBG that comes their ways with "hordes" of Su-27-likes etc.,
> etc., etc.
>
> > > > And with the advent of Aegis, the need for that ever-expanding CAP has
> > > > been reduced a bit.
> > >
> > > The experiences with Aegis from 1988 (the IranAir incident),
> >
> > Hey, did that Aibus get through?
>
> No: the Aegis prevented it from dropping 300+ people on the deck of the USS
> Vincennes...

Nice sidestep. The point being that your drawing this into the
discussion was pointless.

>
> > and again the
> > > recent experiences with the PAC-3 show that this is not the case.
> >
> > PAC-3 is not a naval missile, for one thing.
>
> So what? Is it equipped with a system that makes it capable of VID over
> BVR-ranges? Is it making its users better able to safely identify distant
> targets than any (manned) interceptor can do?

But your F-14 with Phoenix supposedly *is* capable of making a VID of
an aircraft some 100+ miles away?

>
> > Second, the report on
> > PAC-3 has yet to be released from DoD (reportedly will occur soon).
>
> Oh, that's really a "big problem": the PAC-3 crews in question were already
> freed of any blame - just like the crew of the USS Vincennes - so the DoD
> can now release as many reports as it likes.

Ahh...I begin to see where you are coming from with your "I am smarter
than the entire USN combined" schtick.

>
> > I get the idea that you are focusing on the fratricide issue as the sole
> > factor applied to determining the effectiveness of the SAM
> > systems--but that is only a part of the equation. You think your
> > F-14's tossing Phoenix missiles about over 100 nm away are not going
> > to be subject to the same kind of frat incidents?
>
> No. But, at least the F-14 has had the TCS, which was enabling it to VID
> bogeys from serious distances. This is something no SAM can do - and
> especially no SAM-site or an AAW-warship.

BZZZ! Sorry, that does not compute. You are arguing that we are making
a serious mistake in giving up the extended BVR range capability of
the F-14/AIM-54 combination, and then you segue into this
fratricide-at-long-range rant, but the faxct is that your pet pair are
just as susceptable as any SAM to that same problem. If you are going
to argue that VID is required, then you have to give up on the "AIM-54
is vital" argument.

>
> > How many Iranian
> > aircraft were frat casualties during the PGW?
>
> They've shot down five of their own F-14s with MIM-23s (plus at least half a
> dozen of other fighters), just for example. The IRIAF F-14s haven't shot
> down even a single Iranian fighter, regardless the distances and complex
> tactical situations in several cases.

So they say, right?

>
> > You can't
> > > go out with the Aegis cruiser and hope to shot down the potential
> attackers,
> > > but instead blast either several own fighters returning to the carrier,
> or a
> > > few airliners.
> >
> > A bit oversimplified, IMO. The Aegis provides but one layer of the
> > full defense system.
>
> It is undeniably another layer of the full system. But, as the word "full"
> describes it, it is a part of the system, and a part/layer that comes
> between the interceptors and the carrier - not in front of the interceptors,
> which you seem to consider it capable of doing.

I hate to tell you this, but it is *capable* of doing that; a single
misidentification of an Iranian Airbus does not serve to indict the
Aegis system or its capabilities.

>
> > The identification systems are obviously not sophisticated
> > > enough, and the USN - especially not in its "new", "litoral"
> environment -
> > > also obviously can't hope to have a situation where the Aegis can have a
> > > free field of fire.
> >
> > But hey, those same systems are apparently quite capable of handling
> > waaay beyond VR IFF in the case of Phoenix?! Do you not see the
> > disconnect in your reasoning between the two here?
>
> Such things like TCS are. Don't you notice that you permanently forget at
> least one factor that makes the difference?

If you are referring to blade counts, I believe the ability of the
Aegis to do this has been in evidence (and is likely better now than
it was back in the 80's). Now, again, how is your Tomcat going to
positively VID these targets to allow your AIM-54 engagement at over
100 naut miles?

>
> > Consequently, there is still a need for a proper EID/VID
> > > of the potential target - a task the ships can't do properly in every
> > > possible situation from ranges longer than 20 (or even less) nautical
> miles.
> > > I hope you will not tell me in turn that anybody is going to risk $1
> billion
> > > warships by moving them down the threat axis in order to try anything
> > > similar - especially because it is pretty obvious that the "new"
> interceptor
> > > on the carrier's deck can't accomplish the taks in a manner safe for it
> and
> > > its crew?
> >
> > Wow, those EID systems on your Tomcats must rival Hubble if they are
> > picking up and ID'ing targets in the far reaches of the AIM-54
> > envelope.
>
> Well, at least I don't know about a single case (out of several dozens)
> where the enemy-IFF-interrogator of an F-14 failed to properly identify the
> target. The fact is that this happened in 100% of the cases where the Aegis
> was used in "combat".

But hey, your celebrated Aegis-downing-Airbus was found after-the-fact
to have been more a case of operator(s) mishandling of IFF more than
it was the system's fault; but your F-14/Phoenix pairing is incapable
of similar error, huh?

>
> > > > What airborne threat out there do you see that the
> > > > F/A-18 with AIM-120, supported by AWACS and the normal aerial
> > > > refueling packages, and backstopped by Aegis-equipped CG's and DDG's,
> > > > can't handle?
> > >
> > > Threats of Su-30s armed with R-77s, Yakhonts and other advanced weapons
> that
> > > are about to enter service within the next few years, supported recce
> > > satellites and AEW aircraft based on Israeli/US technology.
> >
> > The numbers of which in *any* nation's hands at present dont equal the
> > threat that the USN faced in the North Atlantic in 1980-85.
>
> You again missed the point: the modern threats are such that one needs no
> dozens or hundreds in order to saturate: today it can become too dangerous
> for any USN CVBG to let the opponent fire even a single thing of Yakhont's
> caliber...

You seem to miss the point--the newer threat is within the envelope
and capabilites of the F/A-18/AIM-120 and does not require the F-14's
ability to handle killing a saturation effort. Put another way, how
does the F-14/AIM-54 combo, operating within your must-have-VID
framework, offer anything substantive that the newer system does not?

Keep in mind:

"The AIM-120C-7 (P3I Phase 3), development of which has begun in 1998,
will incorporate improved ECCM with jamming detection, an upgraded
seeker, and longer range. The latter feature was specifically
requested by the U.S. Navy to get a (somewhat) suitable replacement
for the AIM-54 Phoenix very-long range missile..."

www.designation-systems.net/dusrm/m-120.html

It appears the Navy has already instigated the improvements to AIM-120
it felt necessary to handle any capabilities "lost" with the
retirement of the F-14/AIM-54 combo.

>
> > > The USN is just about to introduce the 7th Generation of Aegis into
> service:
> > > you don't believe they are doing this for nothing?
> >
> > Likewise for the same reason that AIM-54 is likely to go the way of
> > the dodo, technological progress and a changing threat environment.
>
> No dispute. But, this doesn't mean that a much more powerful replacement is
> needed - but nowhere in sight.

If the USN really felt this way, they'd either be extending
F-14/AIM-54 service and capabilities, or seeking a like replacement
system. That they are doing neither indicates that your assessment is
off-base.

Even the UK seems to agree that the need for a super-range AAM is
negligable:

"A BAE Systems paper from 1996 - reflecting the UK thinking that led
to the adoption of the BAE Systems Meteor AAM for the Typhoon - points
out that a target beyond 40km range "can feel free to maneuver without
fear of engagement". This is echoed by Robert Shaw, former US Navy
fighter pilot and author of Fighter Combat Tactics. "There is
virtually no missile that you can't outmaneuver at maximum range.""

www.janes.com/aerospace/military/ news/idr/idr010529_1_n.shtml


>
> > > Back in the days when you were looking at a realistic possibility of a
> > > > saturation attack, that would be correct; but those days are now in
> > > > the past, thank goodness.
> > >
> > > Yes they are. Instead, in the following years a completely new
> generation of
> > > anti-shipping weapons will enter service, which will not need to
> saturate
> > > the defences. The possibility of attacks with single weapons that can
> > > penetrate the layered defences of USN carriers due to their sheer flying
> > > performances will considerably increase.
> >
> > And your Phoenix/F-14 combination, with its admittedly
> > less-than-spectacular low altitude performance, is fgonna change this
> > equation you posit exactly *how*?
>
> In my last post I have explained to you that in COMBAT - repeat: combat, not
> in testing - the AIM-54 proved capable of tackling low-level targets.

Any evidence beyond the rants of the Iranians to back that?

The
> AIM-120 was fired in combat, and also in the SD-mode, but never against a
> target operating at levels bellow 100m. Perhaps some AMRAAMs were test-fired
> against such targets like cruise-missiles: this is very likely. But then,
> the test-performance of the AIM-54 against such targets is superior to that
> of the AIM-120 any way, already on the basis of the range.

I wonder how high those Blackhawks were when they got tagged? Not to
mention the fact that AMRAAM has already been adapted to operate in
the low-altitude regime as a ground based system as well as its more
common AAM guise.

"AMRAAM is a follow-on to the AIM-7 Sparrow missile series. The
missile is faster, smaller and lighter, and has improved capabilities
against low-altitude targets...More than 200 of the test missiles were
launched during flight tests at Eglin AFB, Fla.; White Sands Missile
Range, N.M.; and Point Mugu, Calif."

usmilitary.about.com/library/milinfo/ affacts/blaim-120amraam.htm

As to its test history (not to mention its proven combat record):

"Additional AMRAAM operational capabilities include quick flyout,
greater immunity against countermeasures and better lo-level attack
capability. The low-smoke, high-impulse rocket motor reduces the
chances of an enemy sighting either the launch or the oncoming missile
and taking evasive action. AMRAAM capabilities, which have been
demonstrated in over 1,200 flight test and combat launches, include
look-down/shoot-down, multiple launches against multiple targets,
resistance to complex ECM, intercepts of high-flying, low-flying, and
maneuvering targets, and intercepts at very short range in dogfight
situations."

http://www.raytheon.com/products/amraam/

How capable is your AIM-54 against the latest "complex" ECM? And do
you *really* think it is going to be as lethal as AMRAAM against low
altitude targets in a look-down-shoot-down scenario?


>
> > > > > As next, given the lack of speed and endurance, there is also the
> lack
> of
> > > > > range: the AIM-120 can't - and will for the next ten years or so
> also
> not be
> > > > > able to - intercept enemy at such ranges like the AIM-54 can.
> > > >
> > > > It doesn't have to. And neither can the AIM-54 reliably operate at the
> > > > lower altitudes that the AIM-120 has proven to be quite capable of
> > > > handling.
> > >
> > > In combat, the AIM-120 was never used at low levels, so I must wonder a
> > > little bit what makes you so sure about it being able to handle
> low-flying
> > > threats?
> >
> > Repeated test shots, including snap down shots at targets operating
> > IIRC quite a bit lower than Phoenix ever was designed to handle.
>
> How about details? How many, when and where?

No details seem to be available on the net, but you can look at the
Raytheon site given above for a general rundown. Do you *really*
believe the USMC, the Norwegians, etc., would have selected it for
their ground based defense against low-altitude air breathing threats
if it was *incapable* of operating in that regime? And again, do you
*really* believe that the much older Phoenix, designed for its long
range anti-ASM launcher role, s *more* capable in the
look-down/shoot-down role than the AIM-120 is?

>
> > > On the contrary, the AIM-54A (and a "downgraded" version of it) proved
> > > capable of tackling multiple low-level threats in combat, and was also
> > > successful in combat against low-flying cruise missiles. Certainly,
> these
> > > were of the same generation like the AIM-54, nothing of the "new breed"
> that
> > > is about to enter the service, but the point remains that without a
> proper
> > > replacement for the AIM-54 the USN will stand there with its hands
> shortened
> > > by two thirds, to say at least...
> >
> > Gee, it is amazing that the USN can be so stupid, huh? Or is it a case
> > of their having a more realistic view of both the threat environment
> > and the shortcomings of their older systems?
>
> Well, not really stupid: just catching-as-catch can - after all the failures
> and massive mistakes with the A-12, ATF etc., etc., etc. they had to get
> something new on their decks, or face the situation in which the A-6s and
> F-14s would start falling apart within few years.
>
> I don't know if you read any of the USN reports and hearings to the Congress
> in the last few years: they do not say any more that the F/A-18s are
> "better" than the F-14. They say that the F-14 is running out of life (which
> is meanwhile undeniable) and the USN simply needs new airframes. So, it's
> not any more to "get the best of the best" but to "get at least something".

You seem to believe that the USN leadership, en mass, is very callous
in regards to protecting our forces from the prevalent threats of the
day--I don't share that view.

>
> > > > The result of
> > > > > this is that the slower, and shorter-ranged F/A-18s, armed only with
> > > > > AIM-120s, are in a danger of literaly being overrun by faster,
> > > > > longer-ranged, and fighters - such like Su-30s - that carry weapons
> with
> a
> > > > > similar (or potentially better) range to that of the AIM-120.
> > > >
> > > > Those Su-30's, if they are toting external weapons viable against a
> > > > CVN, are not going to be able to seriously outpace the F/A-18's; not
> > > > to mention the fact that they will usually find the Hornets *between*
> > > > them and their target, not in a tail chase scenario.
> > >
> > > There are multiple factors in this game: as first, the Su-30 is much
> faster
> > > and has a better acceleration than any Hornet.
> >
> > Not with big honking ASM's onboard it does not.
>
> Sigh, I'd like to see acceleration rates for a SH loaded with three bags and
> four AIM-120s alone.... Do you really believe it's superior to the Su-30 and
> likes?

It doesn't HAVE to be. It is darned sure capable of operating in the
regime where most enagements occur, and when employed in the defensive
BVR role while protecting its home CVN, it is going to be the other
guy who has to have the extra energy to avoid those incoming
AIM-120's--and when hauling a bunch of its own fuel and big ASM's I am
doubting that the Su-27/30 is going to be your vaunted "superplane"
that you seem to think it is.

>
> > As second, it is far more
> > > maneuvreable, and has proven this too.
> >
> > If it can outmaneuver an AIM-120, not to mention the more likely two
> > AIM-120's, coming in at it from BVR, then it is one heck of an
> > airplane--but it really can't do that, now can it?
>
> The Serbian MiG-29s proved several times they can outmaneuver AIM-120s in
> 1999 (they outmaneuvered at least three of them). Of course, a fighter
> forced to outmaneuver missiles is of not much use. But, if you can get them
> busy with one of yours, you still can bring the whole pack around.... Some
> call this: "hold him by the nose and punch him in the tights". You might get
> surprised that the "others" (than the US Americans) could come to the idea
> to use this "tactics".

Where are these massive losses that US air crews must be sustaining
against these superwarriors? Let's see, how many Yugo air-to-air kills
against US aircraft? Zero. How many Yugo aircraft fell to AIM-120?
More than three IIRC?

>
> > As third, it is to carry the weapons
> > > that can overfly the F/A-18/AIM-120 combination.
> >
> > What weapons are going to be launched that operate outside the AIM-120
> > altitiude envelope? And isn't that possibility one reason why a
> > layered defense, including Aegis with Standards, is present today?
>
> How about trying to get yourself informed about the Yakhont's attack
> trajectories?

Hi-lo is given as 14K meters max cruise altitude.

web.nps.navy.mil/.../Destroyer-Sovremenny-Russia/SS-N-22%20Missile/
SS-N-22%20Sunburn%20(3M-80%20Zubr).doc

Ceiling for the AIM-120 is given in one source as 20K meters. And you
think it is incapable of intercepting the SS-N-26? My, you must have a
very dim view of AMRAAM; first you doubt its low altitude ability, now
you question its ceiling?

http://usfighter.tripod.com/weapons.htm

>
> > As fourth, the low speed
> > > and endurance of the F/A-18 do not ensure at all that they will always
> find
> > > themselves "between" the carrier and the Su-30s - especially not in
> time.
> >
> > You are aware that those Su's are not going to be "supercruising" in
> > towards the target from any great range? Do you really think they are
> > going to be operating above the typical transonic regime that has
> > typified the vast majority of air-to-air combat, and will continue to
> > do so for the next few years at least?
>
> I'm meanwhile only sure that you're not completely up-to-date to this topic.
> Which is the only recent war in which BVR-air-to-air combats were fought on
> a large scale (and in which BOTH sides were firing BVRAAMs)? What were the
> usual speeds of the involved aircraft in average BVR-battles in that war?

Answer the question--do you see the Su-30, loaded with ASM's, as being
a supercruiser, or not?

>
> It might surprise you, Kevin, but the times of subsonic dogfighting at
> medium and low levels are past, and people like you should slowly start to
> realize this fact. This comes from the sole fact that already approaching an
> enemy capable of BVR-shots at high speeds is rapidly decreasing his
> engagement envelope...

Answer the question--is your vaunted Su-30 loaded with SS-N-26's a
supercruiser, or not?

>
> >Care to guess what that
> > supersonic flight does to the range capability of your posited
> > Su-armada (and the question of whether they can even get to those
> > speeds while toting ASM's is another issue)?
>
> To make one thing clear: I'm not some "Flankeristi", believing the plane can
> "do it all, anytime, anywhere". You miss, however, the fact that the
> Su-27-family is simply superior to any Hornet in its raw flying
> performances. Or worst: you do not miss it: you simply ignore and deny it,
> according to the principle: if you say they are not capable of doing it,
> they will not be capable of doing it.

Answer the question--do you believe the Su's are capable of this
vaunted overmatch in speed while toting along a few ASM's and fuel
tanks, or not?

>
> > > This might sound illogical only if you think that the battles of this
> kind
> > > are fought in only two dimensions, not in all four. Being on station
> 100,
> > > 200, or even 300km out from the carrier down the threat axis does not
> ensure
> > > that the F/A-18 will be in proper place and the needed time. Quite on
> the
> > > contrary: the far superior endurance of the Su-30, just for example,
> maxes
> > > it flexible enough to maneuver around the threat axis - along which the
> > > F/A-18s can be expected - and goes for the kill "from the other side"
> (i.e.
> > > several of them go along completely different routes around or away from
> the
> > > threat axis, where the F/A-18 are most likely to expect). In turn,
> having
> > > only Hornets at hand narrows down the capability of the CVBG CO to
> maneuver
> > > them, and also declines his flexibility massively.
> >
> > An amazing aircraft if you think it can operate on external lines (so
> > to speak) at tremendous speed, with a substantial external warload,
> > and the required fuel to enable it to accomplish all of this external
> > maneuvering. Frankly, I seriously doubt that it has those
> > capabilities.
>
> The only problem here is that you chose to ignore what is obviouis. Compare
> the published performances to get the proper picture.

I have, and failed to find anything that indicates that under those
conditions it is an overmatch (just as I found your Yakhont does not
operate outside the max envelope of the AIM-120). Sure, a reltively
clean Su, with decent refueling support (something the PRC is lacking
in at present), would be a nast handful for a Super Hornet
(discounting those pesky issues of pilot quality, support structure
(i.e., AWACS, refueling, etc.)--but such an Su is little threat to a
CVN. Load it up, and it is going to be slogging along at less than
M1.0, and a bit more sluggish than it is clean.

>
> Can you - instead of being sarcastic - disprove what I said on the basis of
> available data for F/A-18s and Su-30s?

You really miss the point. You continue to fall back to this
mano-a-mano F-18 versus Su-30, when the issue is more accurately,
"Aggressing Su-30's loaded with fuel bags and ASM's versus defending
F/A-18E/F's with fuel bags and AIM-120's, backed by AEGIS armed
CG/DDG's".

>
> > The USN apparently does not agree with your assessment. The F-18 is
> > not quite as slow as you seem to think,
>
> Is it faster than such planes like Su-27/30, Rafale, EF-2000, F-22, just for
> example? Has it a better range, higher top speed, longer-ranged weapons?

It operates quite nicely in the same combat speed regime as the Su's
in terms of BVR engagement, which is what is going to be required if
it is defending against this serious threat to its home CVN you posit.

>
> > they do have aerial tanking capability to support the CAP
>
> Yes, they do. In fact, they not only have such capability, but also need it
> badly: just take a look what was the main task of the few F/A-18Fs of the
> VFA-41 that arrived in the Gulf in time to "participate" in the war against
> Iraq, earlier this year...

Yep, and you seem to forget that they were supporting long range
strike missions, not the local CAP. Big difference, huh? Not to
mention that the USAF, and even more so the RAF, have proven quite
capable of handling support for USN aerial refueling requirements.

>
> >, and the AIM-120 has proven so far to be
> > a rather lethal missile to aircraft ranging from the old Mig-21 to the
> > Mig-29.
>
> Err, sorry: how many MiG-21s were shot down by AMRAAMs?

Mea culpa; it appears that all of the victories to date have neen
against the more advanced Mig-29 (and one Mig-25). How many Mig-29's
has the AIM-54 claimed?

>
> > And the AIM-54 has proven to be what (and take some of those
> > Iranian claims with buckets of salt)?
>
> The AIM-54 has proven to have a 20% higher pk in combat against contemporary
> threats than the AIM-120.

Anything to back that up? There have been a fair number of AIM-120
victories, beginning during Southern Watch, extending through Allied
Force...and the only mention of the AIM-54 is from Iranian sources? So
where does your data come from?

You can take these "Iranian claims" with
> containers of salt if you don't like them. Just take care to drink enough
> water.
>
> > > That's the USN's problem, not even the one of the AIM-54 or the F-14:
> due to
> > > its own ignorance and arrogance, they attempted to engage an opponent
> with
> > > weapons that were known to this opponent first-hand. The Iraqis have
> > > suffered immensely from the AIM-54 through the 1980s, consequently they
> > > studied it very intensively, and already by 1988 - when they finally
> managed
> > > to shot down two IRIAF F-14As - they have also shown that they started
> > > learned how to fly around the engagement envelope of the AIM-54 in order
> to
> > > bring the Tomcats inside the envelope of their weapons.
> >
> > But those Su-30's can't manage that? Sounds like you are positing now
> > a case that *any* CAP, be it F-14 or F-18 based, is doomed to failure.
>
> You simply chose to ignore the facts: what is your argument here, actually?
> That the F/A-18 is "superior" in speed, range and capabilities to all the
> possible threats, and there is no problem with the lack of range of the
> aircraft or that of the range and kynethic capabilities of the AIM-120, nor
> with the fact that the USN's CAPs can't operate agains threats from ranges
> away from carrier as safe as before?

No, my argument is that (a) the threat that we face today is smaller
in scope than it was in the early 80's, and (b) that the F/A-18E/F,
apired with AIM-120, is capable of performing the CAP role for the
CVN's. Very simple really.

>
> Do you want a serious discussion here or are we now about to start with
> personal attacks, flamewars and other nonsence?

How does, "But those Su-30's can't manage that? Sounds like you are
positing now a case that *any* CAP, be it F-14 or F-18 based, is
doomed to failure" equate to a flame war? You posit that the Iraqis
were able to develop tactics that negated the AIM-54, yet you also
argue that the F-14 with AIM-54 is required to handle more advanced
Su-30 threats? Appears to be a disconnect in your argument to me.

>
> > > Do you seriously believe and expect that nobody will ever be able to
> learn
> > > to do the same against an aircraft with low top speed and shorter
> > > endurance - like F/A-18 - and the main weapon of a much shorter range
> than
> > > the AIM-54 - namely the AIM-120? And this to remain so "forever"?
> >
> > What am I thinking? Of course you are right, the USN is dumb, and the
> > Su is the greatest airplane ever built, capable of things that would
> > make the F/A-22 green with envy... All sarcasm aside, I fail to see
> > where the AIM-54 equipped F-14 is essential to USN CV defensive
> > efforts forever.
>
> Surely, when one refuses to think soberly then it makes no sense to talk
> with the person.

Thanks for demonstrating an argument only a lawyer could respect--the
fact is that you can't demonstrate that the scope, in terms of sheer
size, of the threat faced today matches, much less surpasses, that
which was faced in the guise of the Soviet threat at the height of the
Cold War, nor have you shown where the F-18 is incapable of defending
the CVN against a real (as opposed to your imaginary Super Flankers
with their amazing high energy abilities exhibited while toting those
all of that fuel and Super Yakhonts that somehow operate above the
ceiling of the AIM-120) present day, or immediate future, threat.

Brooks

>
> Thanks for losing my time: no interest.
>
> Tom Cooper
> Co-Author:
> Iran-Iraq War in the Air, 1980-1988:
> http://www.acig.org/pg1/content.php
> and,
> Iranian F-4 Phantom II Units in Combat:
> http://www.osprey-publishing.co.uk/title_detail.php/title=S6585

[Guy Alcala]

Kevin Brooks wrote:

> "Tom Cooper" > wrote in message >...
> > "Kevin Brooks" > wrote in message
> > om...
> > > "Tom Cooper" > wrote in message
> > >...

<snip>

> > > > Besides, the main threat from the Chinese are not dozens of bombers, but
> > > > hundreds of multi-role fighters, each of which is far more flexible and
> > > > superior to the F/A-18s in anything but avionics.
> > >
> > > They have *hundreds* that are unquestionably superior to the Hornet?
> > > Come on now--they have their Su-27's,
> >
> > You're simply underinformed, and that's all. By 2006, the PLAAF and the
> > PLANAF will have around 400 Su-27/J-11s, Su-30MKKs and similar planes -
> > supported by A-50s - in service. Go and check the orders they issued in the
> > last six years to Russia, and the numbers they're receiving each year.
>
> LOL! A-50's? How much of a threat are those
> candidates-for-museum-membership?

I think you're confusing the A-50 Mainstay with the A-5 Fantan. The A-50 is their AWACS:

http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/a50/

Originally China ordered it with the Israeli Phalcon radar system, but the U.S. put heavy pressure
on Israel to nix the deal, so the Chinese ordered the a/c with the standard Russian radar system.

<snip>

> > > and again the
> > > > recent experiences with the PAC-3 show that this is not the case.
> > >
> > > PAC-3 is not a naval missile, for one thing.
> >
> > So what? Is it equipped with a system that makes it capable of VID over
> > BVR-ranges? Is it making its users better able to safely identify distant
> > targets than any (manned) interceptor can do?
>
> But your F-14 with Phoenix supposedly *is* capable of making a VID of
> an aircraft some 100+ miles away?

See below.

<snip>

> > > I get the idea that you are focusing on the fratricide issue as the sole
> > > factor applied to determining the effectiveness of the SAM
> > > systems--but that is only a part of the equation. You think your
> > > F-14's tossing Phoenix missiles about over 100 nm away are not going
> > > to be subject to the same kind of frat incidents?
> >
> > No. But, at least the F-14 has had the TCS, which was enabling it to VID
> > bogeys from serious distances. This is something no SAM can do - and
> > especially no SAM-site or an AAW-warship.
>
> BZZZ! Sorry, that does not compute. You are arguing that we are making
> a serious mistake in giving up the extended BVR range capability of
> the F-14/AIM-54 combination, and then you segue into this
> fratricide-at-long-range rant, but the faxct is that your pet pair are
> just as susceptable as any SAM to that same problem. If you are going
> to argue that VID is required, then you have to give up on the "AIM-54
> is vital" argument.

see below.

<Snip>

> > > The identification systems are obviously not sophisticated
> > > > enough, and the USN - especially not in its "new", "litoral"
> > environment -
> > > > also obviously can't hope to have a situation where the Aegis can have a
> > > > free field of fire.
> > >
> > > But hey, those same systems are apparently quite capable of handling
> > > waaay beyond VR IFF in the case of Phoenix?! Do you not see the
> > > disconnect in your reasoning between the two here?
> >
> > Such things like TCS are. Don't you notice that you permanently forget at
> > least one factor that makes the difference?
>
> If you are referring to blade counts, I believe the ability of the
> Aegis to do this has been in evidence (and is likely better now than
> it was back in the 80's). Now, again, how is your Tomcat going to
> positively VID these targets to allow your AIM-54 engagement at over
> 100 naut miles?

<snip>

Kevin, TCS is the Television Camera System fitted to some F-14As (and probably Bs, I forget) in
lieu of an IRSTS. The F-14D has both IRSTS and TCS. AFAIK no IIRAF F-14s had TCS or its
predecessor (on the F-4E), TISEO. They didn't have them at the time of delivery, and it's
unlikely that they would have received them since (but given Iran-Contra and the Israeli
connection, who knows). The production contract for TCS was let in 1981, although F-14s used in
AIMVAL/ACEVAL in 1977 had TISEO fitted for that. To my knowledge, range of TCS has never been
officially stated, although there have been unofficial claims of ID on a fighter at 10-20 miles,
with max. ID range on a bomber perhaps as much as 60nm. This assumes ideal conditions, i.e low
humidity, no clouds in the way and no temperature distortions. At least the first two conditions
would be more likely over desert than in a maritime environment. The video of armed Libyan
MiG-23s back in the late '80s just before they were shot down was from the TCS, IIRR.

In short, if the unofficial accounts are in the ballpark, in clear weather TCS would allow a shot
at a decent fraction of the AIM-120's max. head-on range if VID is required, but nowhere near max.
head-on range for the AIM-54. To take a head-on max. range shot with either would almost
certainly require an EID. To take a no-escape-zone shot might be another matter, as TCS range
could well be adequate for that. In the latter case, the AIM-120 is more maneuverable, but the
AIM-54 will probably get there faster. both were designed to be able to hit targets at low
latitudes in LD/SD conditions. One of the successful AIM-54A test shots was on a BQM-34A at M0.75
and 50 feet, with the F-14A firing from 22nm away @ M0.72 and 10kft.

Re the Yakhont's 300 km (162nm) max. range, SOP for navy CAPs is (or was, in the 70s and 80s)
orbit at 150nm out, with the E-2s 200nm out. The latter can add another 180-250nm of warning
radius with radar (depending on target altitude and assuming RCS isn't an issue), more with
passive systems. Radar upgrades now in progress may boost that further. In the case of Taiwan,
it can be expected that E-3s would also be used, and the carriers themselves would most likely be
operating on the far side of the island from the mainland (this has been stated in various
official and semi-official pubs), at least initially.

Guy

[Kevin Brooks]

Guy Alcala > wrote in message >...
> Kevin Brooks wrote:
>
> > "Tom Cooper" > wrote in message >...
> > > "Kevin Brooks" > wrote in message
> > > om...
> > > > "Tom Cooper" > wrote in message
> > > >...
>
> <snip>
>
> > > > > Besides, the main threat from the Chinese are not dozens of bombers, but
> > > > > hundreds of multi-role fighters, each of which is far more flexible and
> > > > > superior to the F/A-18s in anything but avionics.
> > > >
> > > > They have *hundreds* that are unquestionably superior to the Hornet?
> > > > Come on now--they have their Su-27's,
> > >
> > > You're simply underinformed, and that's all. By 2006, the PLAAF and the
> > > PLANAF will have around 400 Su-27/J-11s, Su-30MKKs and similar planes -
> > > supported by A-50s - in service. Go and check the orders they issued in the
> > > last six years to Russia, and the numbers they're receiving each year.
> >
> > LOL! A-50's? How much of a threat are those
> > candidates-for-museum-membership?
>
> I think you're confusing the A-50 Mainstay with the A-5 Fantan. The A-50 is their AWACS:
>
> http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/a50/
>
> Originally China ordered it with the Israeli Phalcon radar system, but the U.S. put heavy pressure
> on Israel to nix the deal, so the Chinese ordered the a/c with the standard Russian radar system.

You are correct; I happened to read an article yesterday about the
F-7MPG which mentioned the A-5 and the lightbulb went off in my head
(a bit late).

>
> <snip>
>
> > > > and again the
> > > > > recent experiences with the PAC-3 show that this is not the case.
> > > >
> > > > PAC-3 is not a naval missile, for one thing.
> > >
> > > So what? Is it equipped with a system that makes it capable of VID over
> > > BVR-ranges? Is it making its users better able to safely identify distant
> > > targets than any (manned) interceptor can do?
> >
> > But your F-14 with Phoenix supposedly *is* capable of making a VID of
> > an aircraft some 100+ miles away?
>
> See below.
>
> <snip>
>
> > > > I get the idea that you are focusing on the fratricide issue as the sole
> > > > factor applied to determining the effectiveness of the SAM
> > > > systems--but that is only a part of the equation. You think your
> > > > F-14's tossing Phoenix missiles about over 100 nm away are not going
> > > > to be subject to the same kind of frat incidents?
> > >
> > > No. But, at least the F-14 has had the TCS, which was enabling it to VID
> > > bogeys from serious distances. This is something no SAM can do - and
> > > especially no SAM-site or an AAW-warship.
> >
> > BZZZ! Sorry, that does not compute. You are arguing that we are making
> > a serious mistake in giving up the extended BVR range capability of
> > the F-14/AIM-54 combination, and then you segue into this
> > fratricide-at-long-range rant, but the faxct is that your pet pair are
> > just as susceptable as any SAM to that same problem. If you are going
> > to argue that VID is required, then you have to give up on the "AIM-54
> > is vital" argument.
>
> see below.
>
> <Snip>
>
> > > > The identification systems are obviously not sophisticated
> > > > > enough, and the USN - especially not in its "new", "litoral"
> environment -
> > > > > also obviously can't hope to have a situation where the Aegis can have a
> > > > > free field of fire.
> > > >
> > > > But hey, those same systems are apparently quite capable of handling
> > > > waaay beyond VR IFF in the case of Phoenix?! Do you not see the
> > > > disconnect in your reasoning between the two here?
> > >
> > > Such things like TCS are. Don't you notice that you permanently forget at
> > > least one factor that makes the difference?
> >
> > If you are referring to blade counts, I believe the ability of the
> > Aegis to do this has been in evidence (and is likely better now than
> > it was back in the 80's). Now, again, how is your Tomcat going to
> > positively VID these targets to allow your AIM-54 engagement at over
> > 100 naut miles?
>
> <snip>
>
> Kevin, TCS is the Television Camera System fitted to some F-14As (and probably Bs, I forget) in
> lieu of an IRSTS. The F-14D has both IRSTS and TCS. AFAIK no IIRAF F-14s had TCS or its
> predecessor (on the F-4E), TISEO. They didn't have them at the time of delivery, and it's
> unlikely that they would have received them since (but given Iran-Contra and the Israeli
> connection, who knows). The production contract for TCS was let in 1981, although F-14s used in
> AIMVAL/ACEVAL in 1977 had TISEO fitted for that. To my knowledge, range of TCS has never been
> officially stated, although there have been unofficial claims of ID on a fighter at 10-20 miles,
> with max. ID range on a bomber perhaps as much as 60nm. This assumes ideal conditions, i.e low
> humidity, no clouds in the way and no temperature distortions. At least the first two conditions
> would be more likely over desert than in a maritime environment. The video of armed Libyan
> MiG-23s back in the late '80s just before they were shot down was from the TCS, IIRR.
>
> In short, if the unofficial accounts are in the ballpark, in clear weather TCS would allow a shot
> at a decent fraction of the AIM-120's max. head-on range if VID is required, but nowhere near max.
> head-on range for the AIM-54.

Exactly. If the argument is that VID is required, the AIM-54 cannot
take advantage of its greater range capability. If EID is allowed,
then the poster's disdain for that capability inherent in the Aegis
system is also reflected in any such capability included in the
(older) AWG-9 system.

To take a head-on max. range shot with either would almost
> certainly require an EID. To take a no-escape-zone shot might be another matter, as TCS range
> could well be adequate for that. In the latter case, the AIM-120 is more maneuverable, but the
> AIM-54 will probably get there faster. both were designed to be able to hit targets at low
> latitudes in LD/SD conditions. One of the successful AIM-54A test shots was on a BQM-34A at M0.75
> and 50 feet, with the F-14A firing from 22nm away @ M0.72 and 10kft.
>
> Re the Yakhont's 300 km (162nm) max. range, SOP for navy CAPs is (or was, in the 70s and 80s)
> orbit at 150nm out, with the E-2s 200nm out. The latter can add another 180-250nm of warning
> radius with radar (depending on target altitude and assuming RCS isn't an issue), more with
> passive systems. Radar upgrades now in progress may boost that further. In the case of Taiwan,
> it can be expected that E-3s would also be used, and the carriers themselves would most likely be
> operating on the far side of the island from the mainland (this has been stated in various
> official and semi-official pubs), at least initially.

Agreed; trying to maneuver into the Straits would be downright
suicidal with *any* level of CAP, since you grant the PLAN/PLAAF/PLA
the privilege of engaging with a goodly chunk of the weapons in their
arsenal, and disposing of the need for a lot of air tanking support
(not their strong suit as yet), etc.

Brooks

>
> Guy

[Tony Volk]

Well, since Guy answered, I think I can post a quick little follow up
opinion. Kevin and Tom seem to be mostly arguing about the utility of the
Super Bug vs. the Tomcat against Chinese Flankers. Most of the talk has
been about BVR. I think I can safely say that modern BVR is most heavily
influenced by avionics (including radar). Stealth and supercruise are not
relevant here (although the F-18E/F is much more stealthy than either the
Flanker or Tomcat, the barn-sized radar-returns of the fighter world). From
this point of view, the latest radars/avionics in the F-18E/F are
generations ahead of anything in baseline Tomcats or Flankers (F-14A,
Su-27B- comparable to current Chinese models), and further ahead of the
F-14D -71/advanced Flankers?? (E/F is probably closer to the V2 equipping
some F-15Cs).
No one here can argue precisely about NCTR because it's so classified,
no one with accurate knowledge would (or should) post it here. However, I
think again we can assume that the much more modern Super Bug has better
NCTR than the F-14D, and MUCH better NCTR than the baseline Tomcat and most
Flanker models (even "advanced" Flankers avionics are not likely much better
than a -14D).
As far as missile technology, the AMRAAM probably has better ECCM,
especially considering how the Russians had access to early versions of the
Phoenix from the Iranians (don't know about the AIM-54C - Tom?). Plus, you
can only carry a couple of Phoenix missiles and still maintain any sort of
credible aircraft performance (heck, a typical fighter vs. fighter load for
the USN doesn't include AIM-54's!). Most crews even doubt the ability to
perform the magic six-missile launch, especially against low-level,
fighter-sized, maneuvering, targets. Plus, the Phoenix has a minimum
engagement range (classified, so I don't know exact range) that is much
larger (i.e., it is less effective) than the AMRAAMs. Roughly around the
range of the Sparrow (F-14 pilots have said that with no Sparrow, there is
an uncomfortable time when you are within minimum -54 range, but beyond the
maximum AIM-9 range!). So, at the reasonably close ranges that are probably
required for NCTR, you'd be within the range of AMRAAMs, which have as good
Fire and Forget performance as AIM-54C. Plus, they are more agile, and have
a closer minimum range. Plus, an F-18E/F can carry far more AIM-120's than
a F-14 can realistically carry "buffaloes" (nicknamed that for a reason!).
So, it looks like unless you are trying to tap multiple targets at
extreme long ranges (and picking up a fighter contact at low level at such
long ranges is highly suspect), it looks like the F-18E/F is the superior
bird (except for perhaps gas/range). As for the overall Chinese threat, the
USN would have to be silly to get close enough for its carriers to be within
easy strike range of Chinese flankers (as Guy mentioned), and certainly in
any wider conflict, the balance of power would rest with the U.S. and its
allies. Furthermore, as Chuck has said, "It's the man, not the machine",
and I'd bet on USN pilots over Chinese pilots any day. So while I think the
Chinese are a credible threat, I don't think they are on par with the USSR
circa 1980s, nor do I think that the Tomcat (especially early models) is a
more effective fighter in this case than Super Bugs. Cheers,

Tony

p.s.- references for this post include Tomcat- Shipborne Superfighter (Jon
Lake), WAPJ (15, 27, 28), and IAPR (1, 7- wish I had the latest one on the
Flanker!)

"Guy Alcala" > wrote in message
...
> Kevin Brooks wrote:
>
> > "Tom Cooper" > wrote in message
>...
> > > "Kevin Brooks" > wrote in message
> > > om...
> > > > "Tom Cooper" > wrote in message
> > > >...
>
> <snip>
>
> > > > > Besides, the main threat from the Chinese are not dozens of
bombers, but
> > > > > hundreds of multi-role fighters, each of which is far more
flexible and
> > > > > superior to the F/A-18s in anything but avionics.
> > > >
> > > > They have *hundreds* that are unquestionably superior to the Hornet?
> > > > Come on now--they have their Su-27's,
> > >
> > > You're simply underinformed, and that's all. By 2006, the PLAAF and
the
> > > PLANAF will have around 400 Su-27/J-11s, Su-30MKKs and similar
planes -
> > > supported by A-50s - in service. Go and check the orders they issued
in the
> > > last six years to Russia, and the numbers they're receiving each year.
> >
> > LOL! A-50's? How much of a threat are those
> > candidates-for-museum-membership?
>
> I think you're confusing the A-50 Mainstay with the A-5 Fantan. The A-50
is their AWACS:
>
> http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/a50/
>
> Originally China ordered it with the Israeli Phalcon radar system, but the
U.S. put heavy pressure
> on Israel to nix the deal, so the Chinese ordered the a/c with the
standard Russian radar system.
>
> <snip>
>
> > > > and again the
> > > > > recent experiences with the PAC-3 show that this is not the case.
> > > >
> > > > PAC-3 is not a naval missile, for one thing.
> > >
> > > So what? Is it equipped with a system that makes it capable of VID
over
> > > BVR-ranges? Is it making its users better able to safely identify
distant
> > > targets than any (manned) interceptor can do?
> >
> > But your F-14 with Phoenix supposedly *is* capable of making a VID of
> > an aircraft some 100+ miles away?
>
> See below.
>
> <snip>
>
> > > > I get the idea that you are focusing on the fratricide issue as the
sole
> > > > factor applied to determining the effectiveness of the SAM
> > > > systems--but that is only a part of the equation. You think your
> > > > F-14's tossing Phoenix missiles about over 100 nm away are not going
> > > > to be subject to the same kind of frat incidents?
> > >
> > > No. But, at least the F-14 has had the TCS, which was enabling it to
VID
> > > bogeys from serious distances. This is something no SAM can do - and
> > > especially no SAM-site or an AAW-warship.
> >
> > BZZZ! Sorry, that does not compute. You are arguing that we are making
> > a serious mistake in giving up the extended BVR range capability of
> > the F-14/AIM-54 combination, and then you segue into this
> > fratricide-at-long-range rant, but the faxct is that your pet pair are
> > just as susceptable as any SAM to that same problem. If you are going
> > to argue that VID is required, then you have to give up on the "AIM-54
> > is vital" argument.
>
> see below.
>
> <Snip>
>
> > > > The identification systems are obviously not sophisticated
> > > > > enough, and the USN - especially not in its "new", "litoral"
> > > environment -
> > > > > also obviously can't hope to have a situation where the Aegis can
have a
> > > > > free field of fire.
> > > >
> > > > But hey, those same systems are apparently quite capable of handling
> > > > waaay beyond VR IFF in the case of Phoenix?! Do you not see the
> > > > disconnect in your reasoning between the two here?
> > >
> > > Such things like TCS are. Don't you notice that you permanently forget
at
> > > least one factor that makes the difference?
> >
> > If you are referring to blade counts, I believe the ability of the
> > Aegis to do this has been in evidence (and is likely better now than
> > it was back in the 80's). Now, again, how is your Tomcat going to
> > positively VID these targets to allow your AIM-54 engagement at over
> > 100 naut miles?
>
> <snip>
>
> Kevin, TCS is the Television Camera System fitted to some F-14As (and
probably Bs, I forget) in
> lieu of an IRSTS. The F-14D has both IRSTS and TCS. AFAIK no IIRAF F-14s
had TCS or its
> predecessor (on the F-4E), TISEO. They didn't have them at the time of
delivery, and it's
> unlikely that they would have received them since (but given Iran-Contra
and the Israeli
> connection, who knows). The production contract for TCS was let in 1981,
although F-14s used in
> AIMVAL/ACEVAL in 1977 had TISEO fitted for that. To my knowledge, range
of TCS has never been
> officially stated, although there have been unofficial claims of ID on a
fighter at 10-20 miles,
> with max. ID range on a bomber perhaps as much as 60nm. This assumes
ideal conditions, i.e low
> humidity, no clouds in the way and no temperature distortions. At least
the first two conditions
> would be more likely over desert than in a maritime environment. The
video of armed Libyan
> MiG-23s back in the late '80s just before they were shot down was from the
TCS, IIRR.
>
> In short, if the unofficial accounts are in the ballpark, in clear weather
TCS would allow a shot
> at a decent fraction of the AIM-120's max. head-on range if VID is
required, but nowhere near max.
> head-on range for the AIM-54. To take a head-on max. range shot with
either would almost
> certainly require an EID. To take a no-escape-zone shot might be another
matter, as TCS range
> could well be adequate for that. In the latter case, the AIM-120 is more
maneuverable, but the
> AIM-54 will probably get there faster. both were designed to be able to
hit targets at low
> latitudes in LD/SD conditions. One of the successful AIM-54A test shots
was on a BQM-34A at M0.75
> and 50 feet, with the F-14A firing from 22nm away @ M0.72 and 10kft.
>
> Re the Yakhont's 300 km (162nm) max. range, SOP for navy CAPs is (or was,
in the 70s and 80s)
> orbit at 150nm out, with the E-2s 200nm out. The latter can add another
180-250nm of warning
> radius with radar (depending on target altitude and assuming RCS isn't an
issue), more with
> passive systems. Radar upgrades now in progress may boost that further.
In the case of Taiwan,
> it can be expected that E-3s would also be used, and the carriers
themselves would most likely be
> operating on the far side of the island from the mainland (this has been
stated in various
> official and semi-official pubs), at least initially.
>
> Guy
>

[Kevin Brooks]

"Tony Volk" > wrote in message >...

> Well, since Guy answered, I think I can post a quick little follow up
> opinion. Kevin and Tom seem to be mostly arguing about the utility of the
> Super Bug vs. the Tomcat against Chinese Flankers. Most of the talk has
> been about BVR. I think I can safely say that modern BVR is most heavily
> influenced by avionics (including radar). Stealth and supercruise are not
> relevant here (although the F-18E/F is much more stealthy than either the
> Flanker or Tomcat, the barn-sized radar-returns of the fighter world).

Good point.

From
> this point of view, the latest radars/avionics in the F-18E/F are
> generations ahead of anything in baseline Tomcats or Flankers (F-14A,
> Su-27B- comparable to current Chinese models), and further ahead of the
> F-14D -71/advanced Flankers?? (E/F is probably closer to the V2 equipping
> some F-15Cs).
> No one here can argue precisely about NCTR because it's so classified,
> no one with accurate knowledge would (or should) post it here. However, I
> think again we can assume that the much more modern Super Bug has better
> NCTR than the F-14D, and MUCH better NCTR than the baseline Tomcat and most
> Flanker models (even "advanced" Flankers avionics are not likely much better
> than a -14D).
> As far as missile technology, the AMRAAM probably has better ECCM,
> especially considering how the Russians had access to early versions of the
> Phoenix from the Iranians (don't know about the AIM-54C - Tom?).

I believe the "improved" ECCM capabilities of the C model are dated
around 1988, so the nod would likely go to AMRAAM in this category.

Plus, you
> can only carry a couple of Phoenix missiles and still maintain any sort of
> credible aircraft performance (heck, a typical fighter vs. fighter load for
> the USN doesn't include AIM-54's!). Most crews even doubt the ability to
> perform the magic six-missile launch, especially against low-level,
> fighter-sized, maneuvering, targets. Plus, the Phoenix has a minimum
> engagement range (classified, so I don't know exact range) that is much
> larger (i.e., it is less effective) than the AMRAAMs. Roughly around the
> range of the Sparrow (F-14 pilots have said that with no Sparrow, there is
> an uncomfortable time when you are within minimum -54 range, but beyond the
> maximum AIM-9 range!). So, at the reasonably close ranges that are probably
> required for NCTR, you'd be within the range of AMRAAMs, which have as good
> Fire and Forget performance as AIM-54C. Plus, they are more agile, and have
> a closer minimum range. Plus, an F-18E/F can carry far more AIM-120's than
> a F-14 can realistically carry "buffaloes" (nicknamed that for a reason!).
> So, it looks like unless you are trying to tap multiple targets at
> extreme long ranges (and picking up a fighter contact at low level at such
> long ranges is highly suspect), it looks like the F-18E/F is the superior
> bird (except for perhaps gas/range). As for the overall Chinese threat, the
> USN would have to be silly to get close enough for its carriers to be within
> easy strike range of Chinese flankers (as Guy mentioned), and certainly in
> any wider conflict, the balance of power would rest with the U.S. and its
> allies. Furthermore, as Chuck has said, "It's the man, not the machine",
> and I'd bet on USN pilots over Chinese pilots any day. So while I think the
> Chinese are a credible threat, I don't think they are on par with the USSR
> circa 1980s, nor do I think that the Tomcat (especially early models) is a
> more effective fighter in this case than Super Bugs. Cheers,

Good summary of the situation.

Brooks

>
> Tony
>
<snip old stuff>

[Tom Cooper]

Guy,
the data about the TCS you posted is OK, and there is no dispute about it. I
can only add, that the IIAF turned down the offer from Pentagon for the sale
of the ALR-23 IRST, and was waiting for the TCS. Given that the revolution
in Iran came in between, in the end none were delivered.

It surprises me, however, that you did not come to the idea that one can
also combine TISEO-equipped F-4Es with F-14s - if this is needed, Guy?

Nevermind, the question I was talking about, however, was not that of the
F-14 having or not having the TCS in the first place, but that of an
interceptor in general - regardless if F-14 or F/A-18, or F-15, or MiG-31 -
being able _contrary to a SAM_ to go out and take a look if this is needed
and there are any kind of uncertainities about the target-ID. The SAMs can't
do that, and SAM-sites or AAW-ships even less. They lack this flexibility.

Given the frequently clogged air traffic in littoral warfare, this is
definitely a point AGAINST using Aegis ships as the first line of air
defence in any kind of such scenarios - like the USN is currently doing.
Especially as during the OIF/IIIPGW recently, they showed again as failable:
the Silkworm that hit a mal in Kuwait City passed peacefully by the two
Aegis-equipped warships of the USN, that were on the northern AAW-station
24/7, half-way down the Silkworms route....

This is bringing me back to what I tried to explain to Kevin already, and he
never understood: a "non-existing threat" did something to US forces that
was
not expected. I.e. a surface-to-ship missile, Silkworm, was used in
surface-to-surface role. It flew along a relatively high trajectory (between
100 and 250m), and it was not prevented from hitting the target.

And, again it was so that this should have been nothing new to the USN
(again something Kevin failed to understand): the use of the Silkworm in
surface-to-surface mode by the Iraqis is well known already since the IPGW
(Iraq-Iran War).

Given such US experiences (which are obviously repeating through the
history), there is nobody who can tell me that such stuff like Yakhonts are
anything but a VERY serious threat for the US forces, especially early
during some potential future conflicts, and especially due to the
capabilities of these new weapons, as well as the predilection of US
skippers and similars to let themselves be taken by surprise.


Regarding this:

> > One of the successful AIM-54A test shots was on a BQM-34A at M0.75
and 50 feet, with the F-14A firing from 22nm away @ M0.72 and 10kft.

As said above: one of the successful wartime AIM-54A-shots was a C.601
(air-launched Silkworm), shot down shortly after released from a
(low-flying) H-6D (Chinese Tu-16s, in Iraqi service) bomber (the bomber was
shot down by the other AIM-54). Two other successful shots were against
sea-skimming AM.39 Exocets (one of these was undertaken simultaneously with
a shot against the Super Etendard that launched the Exocet, and that was
shot down too). I hope we need not quarrel around what kind of challenge
such shots are in wartime, using AWG-9 and AIM-54s downgraded so not to be
entirely able to tackle Western-built ECM/ECCM, and without such support
like that from an E-2C...

> > Re the Yakhont's 300 km (162nm) max. range, SOP for navy CAPs is (or
was, in the 70s and 80s) orbit at 150nm out, with the E-2s 200nm out.

While the E-2Cs were considerably improved, no doubt, and your data about
the Yakhont is basically OK too, the F/A-18s can't stand CAP for any useful
time in armed configuration at a distance of 150nm from the carrier, so this
aspect changed. With other words: the USN would still have no problems in
detecting the incoming threat (except this catches the USS Kitty Hawk during
underway-replenishment, or somebody else, somewhere else, during the "steel
beach party"), but would have a considerable problem intercepting it.


"Tony Volk" > wrote in message
...
> Well, since Guy answered, I think I can post a quick little follow up
> opinion. Kevin and Tom seem to be mostly arguing about the utility of the
> Super Bug vs. the Tomcat against Chinese Flankers.

This is how Kevin and you understood it: I understood is as a discussion
about the usefulness of such platforms like F/A-18 in the naval interceptor
role, and, most of all, the need - especially for the USN - to increase the
effective range of its interceptors and their weapons.

> Most of the talk has
> been about BVR. I think I can safely say that modern BVR is most heavily
> influenced by avionics (including radar). Stealth and supercruise are not
> relevant here (although the F-18E/F is much more stealthy than either the
> Flanker or Tomcat, the barn-sized radar-returns of the fighter world).
From
> this point of view, the latest radars/avionics in the F-18E/F are
> generations ahead of anything in baseline Tomcats or Flankers (F-14A,
> Su-27B- comparable to current Chinese models), and further ahead of the
> F-14D -71/advanced Flankers?? (E/F is probably closer to the V2 equipping
> some F-15Cs).

The E/F will be closer to the APG-63(V)-3 equipped F-15C MSIP-IIs once it
gets its new radar. That radar will enter service around 2005, and - due to
the low initial production rate - will not be widespread in fleet-wide
service before 2008 at best.

Re. _current_ Chinese Su-27-models:

The Chinese have approx 78 Russian made Su-27SKs and Su-27UBKs, approx 76
Su-30MKKs, and more than 100 localy assembled J-11s (Chinese-made Su-27SKs).
So, we're looking at something like 250 _now_, in service with at least
eight regiments, each between 30 and 40 aircraft, and frequently training
the BVR and the use of stand-off PGMs, as well as deployments away from
their main bases. Approx 200 additional airframes are to be added within the
next two or three years, including enough for no less but three regiments of
naval fighters. (for more details, see here:
http://www.china-military.org/units/units_by_aircraft.htm )

What many people - you included, Tony - think, is that most of these
aircraft are the "baseline/vanilla" Su-27s. Theoretically, and on the basis
of their original standards as delivered, and their designations, this is
OK. On a closer look, however, it is not. The PLAAF is well underway with
the SU-27SM program, and already more than 100 kits for this upgrade were
delivered to China in the last two years, enabling the upgrade of all SKs,
UBKs, and J-11s with digital cockpits, R-77-capability, and
PGM-compatibility, with payloads up to 8.000kg (i.e. capability to carry
three Yakhonts per plane) etc. So, regardless if Chinese Su-27s, or
Su-30MKKs, or Su-30MKK-2s, they are a completely different threat than
usually expected.

Furthermore, the topic of the pilot and total force quality was mentioned by
somebody at some point (I think it was you, Tony), with a - pretty
"standard" - conclusion that the Soviets were more dangerous than the
Chinese. I have little doubts that the Soviets are still considered as "the"
air-to-air threat of the 1970s and 1980s in the West (especially the USA),
with the usual explanation for their (Soviet) clients suffering so heavily
on the hand of different smaller - Western-equipped and trained - air forces
in different "local/bush" wars being that their clients "can't fly". A
closer look at the combat performance of Soviet pilots involved in different
local conflicts shows, however, that it's them who "can't fly": I hope
recalling 30 July 1970 is not needed, but I guess that the loss of two
Soviet-flown MiG-25BMs, at least two Tu-22B/KDPs, and no less but three
Soviet-flown MiG-27s (not MiG-23BNs or whatever, but MiG-27s), as well as
quite a number of Soviet-flown MiG-21s and MiG-23s to Iranian F-14s and F-4s
is completely unknown in the public. Perhaps new will also be the fact that
in return the Soviets haven't shot down even a single Iranian fighter.

Quite on the contrary. Worst of all was that during the combat-testing on
the side of Iraq in the war against Iran, also most of their weapons and
ECM-systems proved unable to cope with Western-produced threats. The Kh-22s
(AS-4) just for example: one in 12 would properly function upon launch; the
effective max range of the anti-radar version against such targets like
MIM-23B was less than 20km; even worse was that the top search equipment
mounted on the Tu-22KDPs was not functioning, so that these actually had to
fly deep within the envelope of the I-HAWK in order to find these. The
situation with the ECM-systems on (Soviet, not Iraqi) MiG-25s tested against
Iran was not much different: the RWR was the only one capable of detecting
AWG-9 from safe distances, just for example, but the ECM-systems - not even
those on the MiG-25BM - could do anything against the AWG-9 or the AIM-54. I
hope there is no need to discuss their AAMs from the time, because the list
of problems is much longer...

Certainly, this throws a thick shade over such modern systems like R-77,
Yakhont, etc. But, given the amount of French and Indian high-tech alredy
included in these, they could work, after all. If nothing else, the fact
that the Indians are purchasing the Yakhont and R-77s confirms that at least
these work (the Indian quality standards were increased by a magnitude in
the last ten years, and they're not buying any more everything they can get,
but only the stuff they are ready to accept). My conclusion is: the modern
threat from the combination of Su-27SM/30MKK/MKK-2, R-77, and Yakhont is far
more serious than any threat coming from Soviet AV-MF bomber threat even at
its best times, in early 1980s.

As I'm talking about the example of the Chinese threat (bear in mind I said
the number of similar threats is likely to increase, not decrease in the
following years, given that a number of countries is also purchasing
land-based Moskits and Yakhonts), let me continue developing this thought:
the Chinese are lagging behind in the quality of training and equipment, no
dispute, but they are rapidly advancing too. After many initial problems,
the PLAAF is continuously increasing the number of hours flown and the
intensity as well as reality of pilot training. They regularly fire live
ammo, they regularly do DACM (that's why there is also some attrition in
their Su-27/30-fleet), they regularly conduct out-of-area exercises with
their Flanker-units.

> No one here can argue precisely about NCTR because it's so classified,

There is no real need to argue about the NCTR: in 1991 and 1999 it showed
that it's still not 100% functioning, and can be tricksed by any pilot with
some clue about the basics of BVR, even those with less than 20 hours on the
stick annually. This makes one wondering a lot why are such systems like
advanced Combat Tree/Clear Horizont/Second Look equipment not used any more?
If nothing else, these were functioning 100%, and would do so especially in
the case of Iraqi and Yug MiG-29s.

Indeed, it is interesting that you like to explain about the NCTR, and the
super-turbo radar of the F/A-18E/F etc., but do not even came to the idea to
mention the US-made enemy-IFF-interrogators in use on tactical fighters like
F-4E, F-14, and F-15 of the 1970s and 1980s. How comes this? Is this - right
from the start well-proved and highly successful - technology so much "out"
in the USA today?

> However, I think again we can assume that the much more modern Super
> Bug has better NCTR than the F-14D, and MUCH better NCTR than the
> baseline Tomcat and most Flanker models (even "advanced" Flankers avionics
> are not likely much better than a -14D).

In fact, the AWG-9 was capable of supplying data needed for NCTR processing,
but lacked processors capable of computing the stuff. Consequently, the
F-14A, A+/Bs have got this capability only in the mid-1990s, when better
processors were installed instead. The First fighter with NCTR capability
was the F-15C MSIP-II, introduced in the mid-1980s. The F-14D has got the
NCTR right since introduction in the fleet, while the F/A-18C should have
lacked it until few years back (to be honest, I doubt they have it even
now). Otherwise, the only other fighters that have got the NCTR were the
Tornado F.Mk.3A and the latest Mirage 2000s - both of these in the last few
years.

> As far as missile technology, the AMRAAM probably has better ECCM,
> especially considering how the Russians had access to early versions of
> the Phoenix from the Iranians (don't know about the AIM-54C - Tom?).

No AIM-54s were delivered to Soviets/Russians by Iran. Not a single round.

The former chief of the Iraqi Directorate of Military Intelligence is
babbling something about pieces of a wreck of an Iranian F-14, and a badly
damaged AIM-54 being supplied to the Soviets by Iraqis, in 1983. After 15
years of research to this and related topics and learning about every single
loss of an Iranian F-14, however, I simply can't imagine where could they
have got anything of this kind.

Of course, one Iranian F-14 was flown out by a defecting pilot - but to
Iraq, not to the USSR. And, the people who waited there for it, and took the
plane over were neither speaking Russian, or Arabic, but US-English - with a
light Virginian accent: the operation was called "Night Harvest", and the
wreck of that Tomcat ended burried somewhere in the Saudi Arabian desert...

> Plus, you can only carry a couple of Phoenix missiles and still maintain
> any sort of credible aircraft performance (heck, a typical fighter vs.
> fighter load for the USN doesn't include AIM-54's!).

We're actually moving away from the topic (or back to the original topic),
but the warloads depend heavily on the threat assessment. In the case of
Iranians, a pair consisting of one F-14A armed with two AIM-54s, two or
three Sparrows and two Sidewinders, and the other armed either with Six
Sparrows and two Sidewinders, or "four each", was usually enough to
completely spoil strikes by up to 14 Iraqi fighters (regardless Mirage or
MiGs), and not only send them back home "express & free on delivery", but
also shot down two or three. There were several cases where a single F-14
battled six or eight Mirage F.1s in a dogfight, shot down two, and came away
undamaged...

> Most crews even doubt the ability to
> perform the magic six-missile launch, especially against low-level,
> fighter-sized, maneuvering, targets.

Well, the two claims about this being done over the Persian Gulf were not
yet completely researched (one is particularly problematic, as it seems some
Kuwaiti Mirages got involved too, which neither side likes to talk about),
but a capability of simultaneous engagement of two, three, or four targets
was confirmed. Especially as in one case a single AIM-54A shot down three
MiG-23s flying in a tight formation... ;-))

> Plus, the Phoenix has a minimum
> engagement range (classified, so I don't know exact range) that is much
> larger (i.e., it is less effective) than the AMRAAMs.

It was tested (successfully) down to 4km: the shortest range it crossed in
combat before detonating 4m over the target was 6.500m (there is a nice
TISEO shot from the escorting F-4E, showing a fireball directly over the
MiG-23).

> Roughly around the
> range of the Sparrow (F-14 pilots have said that with no Sparrow, there is
> an uncomfortable time when you are within minimum -54 range, but beyond
the
> maximum AIM-9 range!).

Actually, according to USN, USAF, and IIAF pilots I talked with, one can
fire the AIM-9s from F-14 from a slightly longer range than this is the case
with F-15 or F-16.... The exact reason should be one of the "dogfight" modes
of the AWG-9 - can't recall exactly right now (and I'm too lazy to search in
my files). My guess - repeat: guess - is, however, that the USN F-14-crews
are trained differently (i.e. conservativelly) in employment of the AIM-54
than the Iranian, and so they - just for example - do not expect to use
Phoenix from less than a certain range (should be approx 25-30km). I don't
know the exact reason, but it could be the sole fact that right from the
start of the "Persian King" project, the IIAF considered the AIM-54 as its
"primary air combat" - not "anti-bomber" - weapon, and that this remains the
fact very much right until today with the IRIAF as well.

> So, at the reasonably close ranges that are probably
> required for NCTR, you'd be within the range of AMRAAMs, which have as
good
> Fire and Forget performance as AIM-54C. Plus, they are more agile, and
have
> a closer minimum range. Plus, an F-18E/F can carry far more AIM-120's
than
> a F-14 can realistically carry "buffaloes" (nicknamed that for a reason!).

Clear. Agreed. All of this especially if you don't use any of the Combat
Tree technologies any more...

> So, it looks like unless you are trying to tap multiple targets at
> extreme long ranges (and picking up a fighter contact at low level at such
> long ranges is highly suspect), it looks like the F-18E/F is the superior
> bird (except for perhaps gas/range).

No way. Sorry. I tried to explain this in my post above: this is so _only_
if the requirement is VID, and - in any case where the F/A-18 is used you'll
end overrun by multiple targets, because you can't open fire from the same
range like with the help of the AIM-54, plus you lack the speed and fuel to
maneuver.

Somebody above said that in the BVR it's the radar/avionics that counts.
They certainly do count, as otherwise you can't shot down the enemy: you can
intimade him at best. But the speed and endurance - and even stealth - count
even more, especially as they are effective factors in decreasing the
enemie's engagement envelope, or - even more important - approaching
undetected and firing the first shot in the battle (which is decisive in 80%
of the cases right since the WWI).

Take Iraqi MiG-25s as example: surely, their avionics and weapons suck, so
they haven't hit much but a - what a surprise and coincidence - USN F/A-18C
(oh, and a USAF RQ-1B Predator, in December last year). But, in turn, thanks
to their speed and endurance they also suffered lighter losses to USAF F-15s
(only two were shot down). If nothing else they could run and they could
avoid. The - "much more modern", and definitely equipped with better
avionics & weapons - Mirage F.1s and MiG-29s were shot down in larger
numbers, and for nothing to show in exchange. I hope nobody here is going to
deny that an exchange ratio of 1:2 (or 2:2 if a Stinger-armed Predator -
that fired back - counts?) is better than 1:6 or 8... Hell, the Iraqis even
retired their MiG-29s from service and put them into storage by 1996, but
kept the MiG-25s. Guess why...

> As for the overall Chinese threat, the
> USN would have to be silly to get close enough for its carriers to be
within
> easy strike range of Chinese flankers (as Guy mentioned), and certainly in
> any wider conflict, the balance of power would rest with the U.S. and its
> allies.

Surely. Yet, the problem with the Hornets is that you _have_ to approach
closer in order to hit the enemy (or need an armada of USAF tankers) as the
plane is short-ranged compared to its predecessors. So, you're not really of
any use if you play somewhere behind Taiwan in such scenario...

> Furthermore, as Chuck has said, "It's the man, not the machine",
> and I'd bet on USN pilots over Chinese pilots any day.

See above.

> So while I think the
> Chinese are a credible threat, I don't think they are on par with the USSR
> circa 1980s, nor do I think that the Tomcat (especially early models) is a
> more effective fighter in this case than Super Bugs.

See above.

Tom Cooper
Co-Author:
Iran-Iraq War in the Air, 1980-1988:
http://www.acig.org/pg1/content.php
and,
Iranian F-4 Phantom II Units in Combat:
http://www.osprey-publishing.co.uk/title_detail.php/title=S6585

[Guy Alcala]

Tom Cooper wrote:

> Guy,
> the data about the TCS you posted is OK, and there is no dispute about it. I
> can only add, that the IIAF turned down the offer from Pentagon for the sale
> of the ALR-23 IRST, and was waiting for the TCS. Given that the revolution
> in Iran came in between, in the end none were delivered.
>
> It surprises me, however, that you did not come to the idea that one can
> also combine TISEO-equipped F-4Es with F-14s - if this is needed, Guy?

Mainly because I couldn't remember if any of Iran's F-4s had TISEO, and I didn't
have a reference here which would answer the question. OTOH, as I mentioned
before a visual sensor like TISEO or TCS tends to be far more useful as an A/A
sensor in dry air over desert, than in humid climates with lots of cloud. USAFE
F-4s didn't find it to be particularly useful over Europe for A/A IDs (all those
clouds got in the way), and mainly used it for A/G work. I suspect the Taiwan
Straits would (on average) fall in between desert and northwest Europe as far as
usefulness goes.

> Nevermind, the question I was talking about, however, was not that of the
> F-14 having or not having the TCS in the first place, but that of an
> interceptor in general - regardless if F-14 or F/A-18, or F-15, or MiG-31 -
> being able _contrary to a SAM_ to go out and take a look if this is needed
> and there are any kind of uncertainities about the target-ID. The SAMs can't
> do that, and SAM-sites or AAW-ships even less. They lack this flexibility.

True, but at least my understanding was that the premise on which you're basing
all this is a major PRC attack on Taiwan. See below.

> Given the frequently clogged air traffic in littoral warfare, this is
> definitely a point AGAINST using Aegis ships as the first line of air
> defence in any kind of such scenarios - like the USN is currently doing.

But that's not going to be an issue in a major war that the PRC launches against
Taiwan. There will be no civil air traffic through that area once the war
starts, and determining who is and is not a threat can be as simple a matter as
drawing a line down the middle of the strait and allowing weapons-free on any
air traffic on the far side of the line. No need for VID or EID, just kill
anything 'over there'. If the E-2s or E-3s spot it, it can be engaged no
questions asked. If they want to make it a bit more encompassing, then the RoC
(and/or US) can declare an active war zone in the area bounded by, say, 16 and
30 north, and 114 and 130 east, or whatever is appropriate. Later (once we
start to attack) the situation will get more complex, but Taiwan facing an air
attack from the PRC is about as simple an ID problem as the British faced in the
Falklands TEZ. It's too bad for the Brits that they lacked BVR A/A missiles,
AEW and LD/SD capability, because the Argentine side wouldn't have had a chance
if they had.

Currently AIM-120 outranges the R-77 (per an article in AvLeak earlier this?
year, quoting the chief designer at Vympel who said that the R-77 currently
lacked an up and over capability like the AIM-54 or AIM-120 to maximise its
range, but they were working to add it, along with a motor with reprofiled
burn), and the F-18E/F has a lower frontal RCS than the Su-27, as well as a
better weapons system as a whole. As you noted in your reply to Tony, the
Chinese are upgrading the radar and FCS systems, but then so are we.

> Especially as during the OIF/IIIPGW recently, they showed again as failable:
> the Silkworm that hit a mal in Kuwait City passed peacefully by the two
> Aegis-equipped warships of the USN, that were on the northern AAW-station
> 24/7, half-way down the Silkworms route....
>
> This is bringing me back to what I tried to explain to Kevin already, and he
> never understood: a "non-existing threat" did something to US forces that
> was
> not expected. I.e. a surface-to-ship missile, Silkworm, was used in
> surface-to-surface role. It flew along a relatively high trajectory (between
> 100 and 250m), and it was not prevented from hitting the target.
>
> And, again it was so that this should have been nothing new to the USN
> (again something Kevin failed to understand): the use of the Silkworm in
> surface-to-surface mode by the Iraqis is well known already since the IPGW
> (Iraq-Iran War).
>
> Given such US experiences (which are obviously repeating through the
> history), there is nobody who can tell me that such stuff like Yakhonts are
> anything but a VERY serious threat for the US forces, especially early
> during some potential future conflicts, and especially due to the
> capabilities of these new weapons, as well as the predilection of US
> skippers and similars to let themselves be taken by surprise.

Only if the US acts stupidly. In the case of defending Taiwan, we'd have to be
really stupid to enter the strait before we'd knocked down PRC capability
considerably. We don't need to, with a large unsinkable aircraft carrier
(Taiwan) already in place. Of course, when we did enter the strait, it wouldn't
be with a single CVBG.

> Regarding this:
>
> > > One of the successful AIM-54A test shots was on a BQM-34A at M0.75
> and 50 feet, with the F-14A firing from 22nm away @ M0.72 and 10kft.
>
> As said above: one of the successful wartime AIM-54A-shots was a C.601
> (air-launched Silkworm), shot down shortly after released from a
> (low-flying) H-6D (Chinese Tu-16s, in Iraqi service) bomber (the bomber was
> shot down by the other AIM-54). Two other successful shots were against
> sea-skimming AM.39 Exocets (one of these was undertaken simultaneously with
> a shot against the Super Etendard that launched the Exocet, and that was
> shot down too). I hope we need not quarrel around what kind of challenge
> such shots are in wartime, using AWG-9 and AIM-54s downgraded so not to be
> entirely able to tackle Western-built ECM/ECCM, and without such support
> like that from an E-2C...
>
> > > Re the Yakhont's 300 km (162nm) max. range, SOP for navy CAPs is (or
> was, in the 70s and 80s) orbit at 150nm out, with the E-2s 200nm out.
>
> While the E-2Cs were considerably improved, no doubt, and your data about
> the Yakhont is basically OK too, the F/A-18s can't stand CAP for any useful
> time in armed configuration at a distance of 150nm from the carrier, so this
> aspect changed.

SOP is for BARCAPs to be tanked on station when necessary to extend station
time, and to make sure they always have a 'combat package' of fuel on board; in
Vietnam, IIRR this was 2 or 3,000 lb. for F-4s. They can stay as long as
needed. But at a minimum they can stay out for one launch/recovery cycle (1.5
or 1.75 hours, whatever it is now), unrefueled. After all, on BARCAP they're
flying at max. endurance airspeed, rather than some higher, thirstier tactical
speed. Figure at least an hour on station. Hell, the SAC charts for the
original AV-8B with 4 AIM-9s and gun but NO external fuel, show an on-station
loiter time of 89 minutes @ 150nm. Add a couple of 300 gallon tanks and the
loiter time increases to 2.59 hours. So, if we're going to talk about an F-18C
or E, figuring 4 or 6 x AIM-120 and 2 x AIM-9 plus two or three tanks, there
should be more than adequate time on station plus fuel to intercept, provided
that the carriers are staying back well behind the island.

> With other words: the USN would still have no problems in
> detecting the incoming threat (except this catches the USS Kitty Hawk during
> underway-replenishment, or somebody else, somewhere else, during the "steel
> beach party"), but would have a considerable problem intercepting it.

<snip>

Not in/around Taiwan, they wouldn't. We'd have AWACS and F-15s (or F-22s/F-35s)
in the area plus USAF tankers, as well as E-2Cs and EA-6Bs up along with the
F-18s. If the Sukhois are trying to hit the CVBG, they've got to come to it,
and they've got to come over/around Taiwan to do it. If they just want to pound
Taiwan itself, there's no need to use a/c, as you've already pointed out. But
that assumes that the PRC would be willing to not only lose virtually their
entire foreign trade, but also the damage to its own facilities that would
result (not to mention the potential political upheavals).

Guy

[Tony Volk]

My newsreader is acting up, so I'll reply to you here Tom. That will
hopefully save space too! I'll try to limit my response to points of major
contention. If I don't bring it up, it's either because I think we're
roughly arguing the same thing or that there isn't enough information
available to make a strong claim.

1- First, let me say that I agree with your assessment that China is a
serious threat. As for how serious, I think that without classified data,
we can only make a rough guess at best, and even with classified data, we
could probably make only a slightly rougher guess. So my opinion about
China 2003 vs. USSR ~1987 is just an opinion, and not really worth arguing
in depth given my lack of data.

2- I agree that interceptors are much more flexible and accurate than
shipborne SAMs. However, they lack perseverance, range (other than -54),
and persistence. I think each has its place, and in the case of a mass
attack, were flexibility and accurate NCTR isn't critical, I think shipborne
SAMs have an extremely important role to play in defending the carrier group
(if not the most important role to play). I think you are underestimating
the importance of the Aegis system based on a few events that are not very
similar to the all-out attack on a carrier group we are discussing (at
least, that's what I THINK we are discussing!).

3- I actually am (was) a big advocate of the Super Tomact airframe because
it does offer substantial range improvements over the Hornets' airframe
(Navy gives Tomcat a flat 1600nm range, SuperBug 1200nm combat range, 1600nm
ferrying, so take your pick, and take some salt with it!). I've been kind
of playing devil's advocate here. However, one SERIOUS limitation of early
Tomcat models is their awful engines (BTW, I would love to know how the
TF-30s performed for the Iranians). We both seem to agree that as far as
avionics goes, the SuperBug has the edge.

4- My concerns about China's Flanker quality comes from International Air
Power Review Vol.1, pg. 86-88 (2001). It states that at that point, Chinese
Flankers were flying with R-40s and -73s, no mention of other missiles being
operationally used (so I would be concerned about their familiarity with
newer weapons). It is also mentioned that the Chinese manufacturing of
Flankers hit substantial technical snags that stopped production and
required Russian engineers to be flown in (because the Chinese manufacturing
was not sophisticated enough). If they have access to better technology
(e.g., India, who incidentally, hasn't always been exactly friendly with
China!), I would love to hear details about it (sources would be great-
where did you hear/read about the Flanker upgrades- I should probably ask
Ken Duffey about this!). This thread would've been even more interesting if
it had been India vs. USN!

5- I am not surprised that once their WWII veterans moved on, Soviet pilot
quality decreased dramatically (Balenko's book, and others, doesn't paint a
pretty picture). My comments about Chinese pilots was drawn from their
clashes with Taiwan and Vietnam, none of which were not very flattering for
the Chinese pilots (nor was their performance in Korea). The recent
incident with the USN Orion also doesn't bolster my confidence in Chinese
pilot quality. However, if they are training, then they can certainly
become a much more credible threat.

6- Pheonix vs. Amraam. Thanks for the info about the Iranians and the
Soviets info about the -54. My book Tupelov Bombers (AIRtime Publishing, a
generally very good source) has a discussion of the Backfire (Tu-22M) and
its missiles (k-22) and how they are used to defeat the Tomcat's weapon
systems (specifically, the Pheonix). The author states: "After the fall of
the Shah of Iran in 1979, the Soviet Union managed to obtain one or more
F-14 Tomcat fighters and Pheonix missiles. This gave them a better
appreciation of the strengths and limitations of this element of the
defence, and provided the final evidence of the need for a more modern
missile to arm the Backfire [the k-15]." So you would categorically state
that this was not the case (not that I doubt you, I honestly would like to
get your opinion in the face of such a flat-out contrary statement).
Moving on from that sidenote, we have a couple of other issues to
compare. How many targets can the SuperBug simultaneously engage with its
AMRAAMs? If it's comparable to the F-14/Pheonix combo (and I believe it
is), than that's an equal draw. The AMRAAM has the edge in more modern
ECCM, and better maneuverability. Furthermore, the range advantage enjoyed
by the Tomcat airframe is sharply limited by carrying multiple Pheonix
missiles (ending up towards SuperBug range, especially if you're lugging 4+
Pheonix!). So the Pheonix has range, the AMRAAM probably has better pk.
Just about a draw for me.
As for the minimum range issue, it was a direct, printed quote, so there
certainly is a gap between the -54 and -9 for the USN. It could be that
they train more conservatively. As for the -9, I'd agree with your guess
(would the IRST make a difference too?). I could check this out further,
but this is already turning into a mini-essay!

7- BVR and avionics vs. performance. I still hold to my statement that
avionics dictate BVR. A gun-armed, no radar Mig-25 will lose every time to
a Sopwith Camel that has a spiffy lightweight radar/computer and a single
AMRAAM (to use an absurd example). Being able to see first, and see more
clearly, is the essence of BVR. Performance is surely important, and in
terms of supersonic speed and acceleration, the Tomcat wins here. But, it
is MUCH less stealthy than the low-observeable E/F. So I'd give 2 pts for
avionics to E/F, 1 to -14 for performance, .5 to E/F for stealth. The Su's
can't run away from the oncoming interceptors in this scenario without
letting the interceptors win (as well all know, it's just about the same
thing to get them to turn away and not attack as it is to shoot them down).
So the ability to engage/disengage is kind of moot (also the interceptors
can't turn back or they won't have a carrier to land on!). The situation
with Iraq's Mig-25 is quite different, in that it's used in limited,
surprise hit and runs, something that maximizes its performance advantage
while minimizing its avionics disadvantage (about the only good move Iraq
ever did with its air force against the US!).

8- Something that hasn't been discussed is the overall SA of the two
different forces. With the better US avionics, intelligence (tactical and
strategical assets), shore-based radars on Taiwan, I would give the USN the
edge in SA, which is perhaps the most important aspect of any fight, and
certainly a critical ingredient in a successful BVR operation.

9- So, I stand by my final conclusion that China seems less scary now than
does the USSR in the late 80's, and that the SuperBug is just about as good,
if not better, than the Tomcat. But again, I'll issue the caveat that I'm
an armchair hobbyist with no direct access to hard data, and that this is a
bloody long post that probably has an accidental error or two in it.

10-I'd like to add that I really enjoyed all of the non-attacking posts in
this thread, it is nice to see civil discussion of interesting theoretical
topics (cue Kumbaya about now). I'd also like to add that as this took me
3/4 of an hour to research and write (!!!), I don't think I can keep up a
long-running argument on this, so this'll be my last big reply. I'd welcome
any replies for me (us) to read, but I'd suggest that if you want to get
more replies from me, please email me (just be sure to remove the
removeables in my reply email). It's been fun!

Tony