Why did Britain win the BoB?

[Grantland]

(John Freck) wrote:

>Why did Britain win the BoB?
>
>Let us imagine that we are going to be playing a complex wargame
>assigned to us some 3rd or 4th year military science course. There
>are 20 classmates. Each will have to write a report from either
>GErmany's or Britain's perspective, and the grade will determine your
>standing on your team when the game is played.
>The Battle of the Atlantic is open to play too. In addition, any
>commentary on any matter could boost your grade. Such as commenting
>on mass communications then and now, or anything that seems intersting
>and anytime relevant to military studies.
>
>The setting is July 1st, 1940. What must the Axis do better? And
>what must the Allies do better?
>
>To me it looks like Germany can improve a lot, and Britain only a
>little bit. It is easy for the Axis team to create a shopping list of
>things to do better, or more, or less, but what can be put on the
>Allies list?
>
>John Freck

Britain won the BoB because Churchill bombed Berlin and spoofed Adolf
into diverting the the airfield assaults onto London. EOS.

Grantland

[John Freck]

Why did Britain win the BoB?

Let us imagine that we are going to be playing a complex wargame
assigned to us some 3rd or 4th year military science course. There
are 20 classmates. Each will have to write a report from either
GErmany's or Britain's perspective, and the grade will determine your
standing on your team when the game is played.
The Battle of the Atlantic is open to play too. In addition, any
commentary on any matter could boost your grade. Such as commenting
on mass communications then and now, or anything that seems intersting
and anytime relevant to military studies.

The setting is July 1st, 1940. What must the Axis do better? And
what must the Allies do better?

To me it looks like Germany can improve a lot, and Britain only a
little bit. It is easy for the Axis team to create a shopping list of
things to do better, or more, or less, but what can be put on the
Allies list?

John Freck

[Guy Alcala]

John Freck wrote:

> Why did Britain win the BoB?
>
> Let us imagine that we are going to be playing a complex wargame
> assigned to us some 3rd or 4th year military science course. There
> are 20 classmates. Each will have to write a report from either
> GErmany's or Britain's perspective, and the grade will determine your
> standing on your team when the game is played.
> The Battle of the Atlantic is open to play too. In addition, any
> commentary on any matter could boost your grade. Such as commenting
> on mass communications then and now, or anything that seems intersting
> and anytime relevant to military studies.
>
> The setting is July 1st, 1940. What must the Axis do better?

Intel and analysis. Pound the CH and CHL radar stations from, say,
Bawdsey around to Ventnor, or at least Dover to Ventnor (see
Erprobungsgruppe 210 on 12 August); then, pound them some more and
continue to do so throughout. Hit Supermarine and Hawker earlier. Loose
escort. Ignore London.

In the 'maybe they could have done this if they'd put more emphasis on it'
class, speed up drop tank development and fitting (Me-109E-7). Improve
bomber defensive armament and armor.

>And what must the Allies do better?

Adopt finger four instead of vic or trail. Better ASR, and (if possible)
rescue floats and provision of single-man dinghies would help with pilot
attrition. Abandon the east coast convoys for the time being. Better
camouflage and better protected dispersals on the fighter bases.
Transition the Defiant pilots to single-seat fighters, use them as
replacements or to increase fighter squadron pilot complements if
Hurricanes or Spits aren't available to re-form the squadrons on them.
Ideally an earlier debugging of the cannon would be nice, but I assume
you're limiting this to those things that were changeable in the
historical timeframe.

> To me it looks like Germany can improve a lot, and Britain only a
> little bit. It is easy for the Axis team to create a shopping list of
> things to do better, or more, or less, but what can be put on the
> Allies list?

See above.

Guy

[Cub Driver]

>The setting is July 1st, 1940. What must the Axis do better?

The first thing I would suggest to the German air ministry is that it
develop drop-tanks immediately for the Bf-109.
all the best -- Dan Ford
email: www.danford.net/letters.htm#9

see the Warbird's Forum at www.warbirdforum.com
and the Piper Cub Forum at www.pipercubforum.com

[M. J. Powell]

In message >, Guy Alcala
> writes
>John Freck wrote:
>
>> Why did Britain win the BoB?
>>
>> Let us imagine that we are going to be playing a complex wargame
>> assigned to us some 3rd or 4th year military science course. There
>> are 20 classmates. Each will have to write a report from either
>> GErmany's or Britain's perspective, and the grade will determine your
>> standing on your team when the game is played.
>> The Battle of the Atlantic is open to play too. In addition, any
>> commentary on any matter could boost your grade. Such as commenting
>> on mass communications then and now, or anything that seems intersting
>> and anytime relevant to military studies.
>>
>> The setting is July 1st, 1940. What must the Axis do better?
>>And what must the Allies do better?

Snip
>
>Adopt finger four instead of vic or trail. Better ASR, and (if possible)
>rescue floats and provision of single-man dinghies would help with pilot
>attrition. Abandon the east coast convoys for the time being. Better
>camouflage and better protected dispersals on the fighter bases.
>Transition the Defiant pilots to single-seat fighters, use them as
>replacements or to increase fighter squadron pilot complements if
>Hurricanes or Spits aren't available to re-form the squadrons on them.
>Ideally an earlier debugging of the cannon would be nice, but I assume
>you're limiting this to those things that were changeable in the
>historical timeframe.

Improve the co-operation between 11 Group and 10 Group.

Gag Bader.

Mike
--
M.J.Powell

[The Raven]

"John Freck" > wrote in message
om...
> Why did Britain win the BoB?
>
> Let us imagine that we are going to be playing a complex wargame
> assigned to us some 3rd or 4th year military science course. There
> are 20 classmates. Each will have to write a report from either
> GErmany's or Britain's perspective, and the grade will determine your
> standing on your team when the game is played.
> The Battle of the Atlantic is open to play too. In addition, any
> commentary on any matter could boost your grade. Such as commenting
> on mass communications then and now, or anything that seems intersting
> and anytime relevant to military studies.
>
> The setting is July 1st, 1940. What must the Axis do better? And
> what must the Allies do better?
>
> To me it looks like Germany can improve a lot, and Britain only a
> little bit. It is easy for the Axis team to create a shopping list of
> things to do better, or more, or less, but what can be put on the
> Allies list?
>
> John Freck

Dispersing the aircraft helped a lot, not to mention the underestimation by
the Germans of the British radar, add to that the Germans overestimating the
remaining RAF forces. Some better intelligence by the Germans may have
changed the whole thing for the British.

What would have happened if the Germans had successfully over-run England? I
imagine a bloody period followed by protracted fighting until the US decided
to lend a hand. At which time, the German forces would find themselves both
attacking the British whilst defending themselves from US attacks. If the
channel was cut for German supplies England would be retaken. The losses to
all sides would have been horrendous though.

Just my quick 2 minute thoughts on it.


--
The Raven
http://www.80scartoons.co.uk/batfinkquote.mp3
** President of the ozemail.* and uunet.* NG's
** since August 15th 2000.

[Keith Willshaw]

"The Raven" > wrote in message
...

>
> Dispersing the aircraft helped a lot, not to mention the underestimation
by
> the Germans of the British radar, add to that the Germans overestimating
the
> remaining RAF forces. Some better intelligence by the Germans may have
> changed the whole thing for the British.
>
> What would have happened if the Germans had successfully over-run England?
I
> imagine a bloody period followed by protracted fighting until the US
decided
> to lend a hand. At which time, the German forces would find themselves
both
> attacking the British whilst defending themselves from US attacks. If the
> channel was cut for German supplies England would be retaken. The losses
to
> all sides would have been horrendous though.
>
> Just my quick 2 minute thoughts on it.
>

A succesful invasion was never a realistic proposition.
At best a 'victory' in the BOB would have forced
the RAF to withdraw its forces to the north of London
where they were beyond escorted Luftwaffe range.

However the RAF could still have sallied forth to defend
against an invasion and the Germans simply had neither the
resources to get the invasion force across the channel or
any way of stopping the RN from chopping their force to bits.

see
http://www.flin.demon.co.uk/althist/seal1.htm#part2

Keith

[M. J. Powell]

In message >, The Raven
> writes
>"John Freck" > wrote in message
om...
>> Why did Britain win the BoB?

snip
>>
>> The setting is July 1st, 1940. What must the Axis do better? And
>> what must the Allies do better?

snip
>
>Dispersing the aircraft helped a lot, not to mention the underestimation by
>the Germans of the British radar, add to that the Germans overestimating the
>remaining RAF forces.

I thought they underestimated?

Mike
--
M.J.Powell

[Steven P. McNicoll]

"Keith Willshaw" > wrote in message
...
>
> However the RAF could still have sallied forth to defend
> against an invasion and the Germans simply had neither the
> resources to get the invasion force across the channel or
> any way of stopping the RN from chopping their force to bits.
>

Wouldn't the Luftwaffe be a way of stopping the RN from chopping their force
to bits?

[Keith Willshaw]

"M. J. Powell" > wrote in message
...
> In message >, The Raven
> > writes
> >"John Freck" > wrote in message
> om...
> >> Why did Britain win the BoB?
>
> snip
> >>
> >> The setting is July 1st, 1940. What must the Axis do better? And
> >> what must the Allies do better?
>
> snip
> >
> >Dispersing the aircraft helped a lot, not to mention the underestimation
by
> >the Germans of the British radar, add to that the Germans overestimating
the
> >remaining RAF forces.
>
> I thought they underestimated?
>

Grossly underestimated

At the 3rd Sept meeting at the Hague were the decision to switch
targets to London was made Luftwaffe Intel was stating
that the RAF was down to its last 300 fighters

In reality the RAF was stronger than it had been at the
start of the battle. Moreover they failed to take into account
their own losses. Only Milch who had been around the
bases in Northern France talking to group commanders
had anything like a true picture of the situation.

Keith

[Keith Willshaw]

"Steven P. McNicoll" > wrote in message
.net...
>
> "Keith Willshaw" > wrote in message
> ...
> >
> > However the RAF could still have sallied forth to defend
> > against an invasion and the Germans simply had neither the
> > resources to get the invasion force across the channel or
> > any way of stopping the RN from chopping their force to bits.
> >
>
> Wouldn't the Luftwaffe be a way of stopping the RN from chopping their
force
> to bits?
>
>

Nope. At best the Luftwaffe could intervene in daylight if
they managed to win and maintain air superiority BUT the
invasion force was going to take more than 24 hours to
reach the invasion beaches and the cruisers and destroyers
sortieing from Harwich cwould be in amongst them at
night in the same way the Japanese steamed down the
slot at Guadalcanal. The Germans had no equivalent naval force
to counter those raids.

Keith

[John S. Shinal]

(John Freck) wrote:

>The setting is July 1st, 1940.
>What must the Axis do better?

Adopt a strategy capable of winning and then stick with it.
Whether attacking Radar stations, Sector Stations, Aircraft plants or
POL, the Luftwaffe never continued any single strategy long enough for
it to be crippling to the UKs overall effort.

Quit blaming the weather. Adopt the flexible strategy of
operations vs. weather used later in the battle.

Frei Jagd. Destroy the fighters and eventually the bombers
won't have fighters to worry about.

'Relay' style fighter escort of bombers.

Move Luftflotte 5 to France.

Develop intelligence - poor intel let to poorer targeting.


>what must the Allies do better?

Adopt the US's .50cal machine gun.

Disperse engine manufacture, it's concentrated in only a few
plants. In wargaming, this is one facet that continually worked for me
when acting as the Axis - aero engine manufacture grounded the RAF
when I significantly damaged the factories.

Reduce labor time (especially the exquisite hand fittting) of
aero engine components.

Allow more foreign nationals to fly as pilots, if possible.
A covert agreement with the USAF/USN/USMC like Chennault made ?

I like the other poster's suggestion of rescue floats in the
Channel, and better camoflage of aircraft - let me expand the camo to
include decoys and ack-ack traps over the decoys.



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[Dav1936531]

>From: (John Freck)
>
>
>Why did Britain win the BoB?

Apart from the strategy and technical discussions, the BoB was won by the
superhuman resolve and exhaustive efforts of the RAF. Heroes to a man.

Churchill was exacly correct with his "Never has so much been owed by so many
to so few" statement.
Dave

[Guy Alcala]

"M. J. Powell" wrote:

<snip>

> Improve the co-operation between 11 Group and 10 Group.

Presumably you mean between 11 and 12 Groups, but I agree. After I posted I
realized that the one thing I left off was to have Dowding more aware of the
situation developing between Park and Leigh-Mallory, and for him to step in
and resolve it.

> Gag Bader.

Unnecessary, if Dowding had been on top of things. as simple a matter as
transferring 242 into 11 Group would have solved the problem, as Bader would
have been busy (and happy) fighting instead of sitting around fretting.

Guy

[Guy Alcala]

Dav1936531 wrote:

<snip>

> Churchill was exacly correct with his "Never has so much been owed by so many
> to so few" statement.

To which the standard RAF fighter pilot joke was "He must be referring to our bar
bills." ;-)

Guy

[Paul J. Adam]

In message >, Steven
P. McNicoll > writes
>Wouldn't the Luftwaffe be a way of stopping the RN from chopping their force
>to bits?

The Luftwaffe was fully committed to destroying British coastal
defences, since the landing force would have almost no artillery or
armour, and its naval gunfire support was limited to a couple of dozen
barges carrying 37mm guns.

It was _also_ fully committed to sinking the Royal Navy when it came out
to attack the fleet of barges and flat-bottomed boats; the Luftwaffe had
36 destroyers to sink _immediately_ (the anti-invasion flotilla held
ready with no other mission) plus the rest of the Home Fleet within 24
hours, if those ships were to be kept away from the transports. (We'll
ignore all of Coastal Forces' lighter craft)

Finally, the Luftwaffe was also completely committed to destroying the
RAF on the ground and in the air during the invasion.


So, all the Germans had to do was triple the size of the Luftwaffe and
build themselves a decent Navy and be phenomenally lucky....


It just don't add up.

--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBox<at>jrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

[M. J. Powell]

In message >, Guy Alcala
> writes
>"M. J. Powell" wrote:
>
><snip>
>
>> Improve the co-operation between 11 Group and 10 Group.
>
>Presumably you mean between 11 and 12 Groups, but I agree.

Yes, my mistake. (I was living under the protection of 10 Group at the
time!)

>After I posted I
>realized that the one thing I left off was to have Dowding more aware of the
>situation developing between Park and Leigh-Mallory, and for him to step in
>and resolve it.
>
>> Gag Bader.
>
>Unnecessary, if Dowding had been on top of things. as simple a matter as
>transferring 242 into 11 Group would have solved the problem, as Bader would
>have been busy (and happy) fighting instead of sitting around fretting.

Good point, a bit more circulation would have helped.

Mike
--
M.J.Powell

[robert arndt]

> Britain won the BoB because Churchill bombed Berlin and spoofed Adolf
> into diverting the the airfield assaults onto London. EOS.
>
> Grantland

Let me add that it was a lone German bomber that ditched its bombs
over London that caused the British reprisal raid on Berlin and change
of tactics that: relieved Fighter Command, enabled the airfields and
manufacturing plants to be repaired, and assured the Brits that the
German battle for air supremacy would fail now that civilian targets
were being hit instead of military ones. EOS indeed!

Rob

[Leadfoot]

"John Freck" > wrote in message
om...
> Why did Britain win the BoB?
>
> Let us imagine that we are going to be playing a complex wargame
> assigned to us some 3rd or 4th year military science course. There
> are 20 classmates. Each will have to write a report from either
> GErmany's or Britain's perspective, and the grade will determine your
> standing on your team when the game is played.
> The Battle of the Atlantic is open to play too. In addition, any
> commentary on any matter could boost your grade. Such as commenting
> on mass communications then and now, or anything that seems intersting
> and anytime relevant to military studies.
>
> The setting is July 1st, 1940. What must the Axis do better? And
> what must the Allies do better?
>
> To me it looks like Germany can improve a lot, and Britain only a
> little bit. It is easy for the Axis team to create a shopping list of
> things to do better, or more, or less, but what can be put on the
> Allies list?
>
> John Freck

How successful could the luftwaffe had been if they had simply concentrated
on attacking ports?

[tim gueguen]

"John Freck" > wrote in message
om...
> Why did Britain win the BoB?
>
Geez, how many newsgroups did you try and troll Johnny?

tim gueguen 101867

[John Freck]

"Herbert Pocket" > wrote in message >...


> Agreed, it is hard to pick out any outstanding Allied failures at the
> macroscopic level, though this is probably a consequence of knowing (with
> 20:20 hindsight) that the Allies were ultimately victorious.


<Snip>


> In no particular order:


> A) Earlier recognition of aerial bombing inaccuracies, and development of
> improved assessment, equipment & training (with reference to the RAF's poor
> performance in early bombing missions and the general misbelief that the job
> was being well done).


Herbert Pocket,

Your point A) isn't any scraping the barrel by any means. The Allies
wasted immense resources on bombers and strategic bombing. If
Britain, and the Allies, had cut out four engined bombers in order to
have a large increase in top fighters and a boost to strong, fast,and
long-ranged 2 engined bombers: Then Germany would have had a harder
time much sooner. Hopefully, I'm not reading to much into your
sugggestion, I have long put forward similar notion that most of the
strategic bombing was a waste, or it could have been done with much
less and even better. During the Summer of 1940 the Allies could have
had more fighters and more fuel, and have had the bombers on lower
level missions cutting up Germans energy and transport.

All strategic bombing could have, and should have, been done by long
ranged fighter-bombers, and fast 2-engined bombers, and 100% of the
effort shoud have been against German military targets, energy, and
transport. IN 1947 the USAAF stated that 95% of startegic bombing
reasouces were wasted, only 5% of the strategic bombing effort was
worthwhile. But Christ, that 5% was a knock-out! Viturally, all the
crippling damage done by strategic air attack was done by long-ranged
fighter bombers and 2-engined bombers attacking at low altitude, and
almost no serious damage was done by the wasteful other line.

One hundred Mustangs each with a single 1,000lbs bomb, flying in low
in order to lay down 50+ direct hits on railline is very troublesome
to the GErmans, and did I mention the destoyed and badly damaged
locomotives, loads, and other equipment, and the need for Germany then
to disperse AAA? The Allies can put down 500 fighter-bomb sorties
like that a day in the Rhur by 1943 and sleep in to boot.




John Freck

[Keith Willshaw]

"robert arndt" > wrote in message
om...
> > Britain won the BoB because Churchill bombed Berlin and spoofed Adolf
> > into diverting the the airfield assaults onto London. EOS.
> >
> > Grantland
>
> Let me add that it was a lone German bomber that ditched its bombs
> over London that caused the British reprisal raid on Berlin and change
> of tactics that: relieved Fighter Command, enabled the airfields and
> manufacturing plants to be repaired, and assured the Brits that the
> German battle for air supremacy would fail now that civilian targets
> were being hit instead of military ones. EOS indeed!
>
> Rob

This is in fact an urban legend

The decision to switch targets to London was taken at a Luftwaffe
staff meeting in the Hague on 3rd Sept 1940. The idea came
from the Luftwaffe themselves who believeing their own faulty
intel decided that the RAF was down to its last 300 fighters
decided that the way to destroy them was to attack a target
they had to defend , London.

All the senior Luftwaffe staff officers (except Sperrle IRC)
concurred with the decision wihich delighted Fat Hermann
as he could rush off to der Fuhrer and give him the good news.

Keith

[Keith Willshaw]

"Leadfoot" > wrote in message
news:Jhqgb.9611$hp5.17@fed1read04...
>
> "John Freck" > wrote in message
> om...
> > Why did Britain win the BoB?
> >
> > Let us imagine that we are going to be playing a complex wargame
> > assigned to us some 3rd or 4th year military science course. There
> > are 20 classmates. Each will have to write a report from either
> > GErmany's or Britain's perspective, and the grade will determine your
> > standing on your team when the game is played.
> > The Battle of the Atlantic is open to play too. In addition, any
> > commentary on any matter could boost your grade. Such as commenting
> > on mass communications then and now, or anything that seems intersting
> > and anytime relevant to military studies.
> >
> > The setting is July 1st, 1940. What must the Axis do better? And
> > what must the Allies do better?
> >
> > To me it looks like Germany can improve a lot, and Britain only a
> > little bit. It is easy for the Axis team to create a shopping list of
> > things to do better, or more, or less, but what can be put on the
> > Allies list?
> >
> > John Freck
>
> How successful could the luftwaffe had been if they had simply
concentrated
> on attacking ports?
>
>

Poorly , most of the ports were out of range of single engine fighters,
and were heavily attacked by night bombers as it was.

Keith

[Keith Willshaw]

"John Freck" > wrote in message
om...
> "Herbert Pocket" > wrote in message
>...
>
>
> > Agreed, it is hard to pick out any outstanding Allied failures at the
> > macroscopic level, though this is probably a consequence of knowing
(with
> > 20:20 hindsight) that the Allies were ultimately victorious.
>
>
> <Snip>
>
>
> > In no particular order:
>
>
> > A) Earlier recognition of aerial bombing inaccuracies, and development
of
> > improved assessment, equipment & training (with reference to the RAF's
poor
> > performance in early bombing missions and the general misbelief that
the job
> > was being well done).
>
>
> Herbert Pocket,
>
> Your point A) isn't any scraping the barrel by any means. The Allies
> wasted immense resources on bombers and strategic bombing. If
> Britain, and the Allies, had cut out four engined bombers in order to
> have a large increase in top fighters and a boost to strong, fast,and
> long-ranged 2 engined bombers: Then Germany would have had a harder
> time much sooner. Hopefully, I'm not reading to much into your
> sugggestion, I have long put forward similar notion that most of the
> strategic bombing was a waste, or it could have been done with much
> less and even better. During the Summer of 1940 the Allies could have
> had more fighters and more fuel, and have had the bombers on lower
> level missions cutting up Germans energy and transport.
>

Hardly, the first 4 engined bomber, the Short Stirling didnt
enter service until 1941 and the fighters had absolute priority
on production in 1940. Cancelling all 4 engined bomber production
would have made no difference at all to the BOB

> All strategic bombing could have, and should have, been done by long
> ranged fighter-bombers, and fast 2-engined bombers, and 100% of the
> effort shoud have been against German military targets, energy, and
> transport. IN 1947 the USAAF stated that 95% of startegic bombing
> reasouces were wasted, only 5% of the strategic bombing effort was
> worthwhile. But Christ, that 5% was a knock-out! Viturally, all the
> crippling damage done by strategic air attack was done by long-ranged
> fighter bombers and 2-engined bombers attacking at low altitude, and
> almost no serious damage was done by the wasteful other line.
>

This is flat wrong, most of the oil campaign was carried out by
B-17's, Halifax and Lancaster bombers. The light bombers
of the USAAF were predominantly used to attack transport
infrastructure and tactical targets

> One hundred Mustangs each with a single 1,000lbs bomb, flying in low
> in order to lay down 50+ direct hits on railline is very troublesome
> to the GErmans, and did I mention the destoyed and badly damaged
> locomotives, loads, and other equipment, and the need for Germany then
> to disperse AAA? The Allies can put down 500 fighter-bomb sorties
> like that a day in the Rhur by 1943 and sleep in to boot.
>

But 500 fighter bomer sorties will deliver only 10% of the bombload
of a 1000 bomber Lancaster raid and in any event neither the USSAF
nor the RAF had 500 P-51's in 1943.

Keith

[Guy Alcala]

Leadfoot wrote:

> How successful could the luftwaffe had been if they had simply concentrated
> on attacking ports?

Successful at what? Certainly not successful winning air superiority prior to
an invasion, which was what they were trying to do. They did bomb ports a lot
during the BoB (Portsmouth, Southampton, Portland, Plymouth, London, Bristol
and Liverpool by night), but except where they were able to damage warships
that would otherwise be available to attack the invasion convoys and/or shoot
down a lot of fighters, it was kind of irrelevant. In any case they didn't
want to damage the port facilities on the south coast too much, because they
figured they'd need them eventually to supply their armies. That presumes the
Brits wouldn't have wrecked them as badly as the Germans wrecked the French
ports in 1944/45, and also assumes that Sealion itself had succeeded enough so
that ports would be an issue, which is damned unlikely given the relative naval
strengths and the ever improving condition of the British Army.

Guy

[Cub Driver]

>What would have happened if the Germans had successfully over-run England? I
>imagine a bloody period followed by protracted fighting until the US decided
>to lend a hand. At which time, the German forces would find themselves both
>attacking the B

I'm afraid not. Had Britain (not merely England) been occupied by
Germany, there is no way that the U.S. could have gotten at Europa.
The army was green, the landing craft not yet produced, and the only
aircraft capable of attacking Europa from the U.S. was the B-36, which
couldn't have survived German air defenses and probably wouldn't have
made the slightest difference if it had.

No, I think we would have been content to fight our own war against
Japan.


all the best -- Dan Ford
email: www.danford.net/letters.htm#9

see the Warbird's Forum at www.warbirdforum.com
and the Piper Cub Forum at www.pipercubforum.com

[M. J. Powell]

In message >, robert
arndt > writes
>> Britain won the BoB because Churchill bombed Berlin and spoofed Adolf
>> into diverting the the airfield assaults onto London. EOS.
>>
>> Grantland
>
>Let me add that it was a lone German bomber that ditched its bombs
>over London that caused the British reprisal raid on Berlin and change
>of tactics that: relieved Fighter Command, enabled the airfields and
>manufacturing plants to be repaired, and assured the Brits that the
>German battle for air supremacy would fail now that civilian targets
>were being hit instead of military ones. EOS indeed!

The story I found said that it was a lone bomber, aiming for one of the
Kent airfields, which decided to approach from the north-east over
London. They spotted Croydon and misidentified it as Biggin Hill(?) and
unloaded. Croydon was in the London area.

Mike
--
M.J.Powell

[Leadfoot]

"Guy Alcala" > wrote in message
...
> Leadfoot wrote:
>
> > How successful could the luftwaffe had been if they had simply
concentrated
> > on attacking ports?
>
> Successful at what? Certainly not successful winning air superiority
prior to
> an invasion, which was what they were trying to do. They did bomb ports a
lot
> during the BoB (Portsmouth, Southampton, Portland, Plymouth, London,
Bristol
> and Liverpool by night), but except where they were able to damage
warships
> that would otherwise be available to attack the invasion convoys and/or
shoot
> down a lot of fighters, it was kind of irrelevant. In any case they
didn't
> want to damage the port facilities on the south coast too much, because
they
> figured they'd need them eventually to supply their armies. That presumes
the
> Brits wouldn't have wrecked them as badly as the Germans wrecked the
French
> ports in 1944/45, and also assumes that Sealion itself had succeeded
enough so
> that ports would be an issue, which is damned unlikely given the relative
naval
> strengths and the ever improving condition of the British Army.


I was thinking in terms of starving the British out. Not launching an
invasion that had no chance of success even with air superiority

>
> Guy
>
>

[Steven Vincent]

If Hitler had understood that Britain would not Sue for peace in time
for him to make an assault on the SU as he was already planning then
there was only one option that actually could have done the job.

How about a German Invasion of Eire ? With enough strength maintained
in the French CHannel ports the RN would not have been able to maintain
a close blockade of the Irish ports or the Brittany coast anymore than
it was able to stop reinforcements to Norway. An Air landing / covert
sea operation into the SW or Eire would have been able to establish a
strong air head at least. If Germany can push the British out of
Ireland then they can enforce a close blockade of the rest of the UK and
starve Britain into submission. Meanwhile Britain can't afford to
direct a lot of resources away from the SE to Eire because of the
presence of significant German forces building there.

Note that the Iris Forces at that time would have been totally
ineffective while anti- british feelings would probably mean that
Britain would have had to carry out a counter invasion against an at
least partially hostile population - not a nice thought.

WOuld an unprovoked German invasion of Eire trigger a response from the
US strong enough and quick enough to make a difference ? Given the US
Isolationism and concerns in the Far East I doubt it. Once the UK has
surrendered Germany can withdraw from Eire in response to US political
pressure and both the US and Germany would have understood that.

End result would probably be a United Ireland which quiet a few of the
US Irish lobby would be strongly in favour of :->

So can Germany get a large enough force into Southern Eire quickly
enough while maintaining the Barge threat to the SW at a high enough
level that the UK can't commit enough forces to prevent the occupation
of Eire ?

Sea lion as the fake in the same way that the Allies convinced Hitler
that the invasion of Europe would occur in the Pas du Calais :->




Leadfoot wrote:
> "Guy Alcala" > wrote in message
> ...
>
>>Leadfoot wrote:
>>
>>
>>>How successful could the luftwaffe had been if they had simply
>>
> concentrated
>
>>>on attacking ports?
>>
>>Successful at what? Certainly not successful winning air superiority
>
> prior to
>
>>an invasion, which was what they were trying to do. They did bomb ports a
>
> lot
>
>>during the BoB (Portsmouth, Southampton, Portland, Plymouth, London,
>
> Bristol
>
>>and Liverpool by night), but except where they were able to damage
>
> warships
>
>>that would otherwise be available to attack the invasion convoys and/or
>
> shoot
>
>>down a lot of fighters, it was kind of irrelevant. In any case they
>
> didn't
>
>>want to damage the port facilities on the south coast too much, because
>
> they
>
>>figured they'd need them eventually to supply their armies. That presumes
>
> the
>
>>Brits wouldn't have wrecked them as badly as the Germans wrecked the
>
> French
>
>>ports in 1944/45, and also assumes that Sealion itself had succeeded
>
> enough so
>
>>that ports would be an issue, which is damned unlikely given the relative
>
> naval
>
>>strengths and the ever improving condition of the British Army.
>
>
>
> I was thinking in terms of starving the British out. Not launching an
> invasion that had no chance of success even with air superiority
>
>
>>Guy
>>
>>
>
>
>

[Ben Full]

John Freck.exe failed a turing test with the following:

> Why did Britain win the BoB?
>
> Let us imagine that we are going to be playing a complex wargame
> assigned to us some 3rd or 4th year military science course. There
> are 20 classmates. Each will have to write a report from either
> GErmany's or Britain's perspective, and the grade will determine your
> standing on your team when the game is played.
> The Battle of the Atlantic is open to play too. In addition, any
> commentary on any matter could boost your grade. Such as commenting
> on mass communications then and now, or anything that seems intersting
> and anytime relevant to military studies.
>
> The setting is July 1st, 1940. What must the Axis do better?

Learn to be flexible, learn some of the priciples of war, ie selection and
maintenance of the aim, get rid of Goering and find someone who wasnt such a
yes-kman to Hitler.

£0.02 suplied.

BMFull

[Grantland]

Alan Minyard > wrote:

>On Mon, 06 Oct 2003 14:00:35 GMT, "Steven P. McNicoll"
> wrote:
>
>>
>>"Keith Willshaw" > wrote in message
...
>>>
>>> However the RAF could still have sallied forth to defend
>>> against an invasion and the Germans simply had neither the
>>> resources to get the invasion force across the channel or
>>> any way of stopping the RN from chopping their force to bits.
>>>
>>
>>Wouldn't the Luftwaffe be a way of stopping the RN from chopping their force
>>to bits?
>>
>No, not at the time. the Luftwaffe did not have "air superiority" over
>the Channel, or over Britain. Would the RN have lost ships? Probably,
>but not enough to deter or defeat them.
>
>The Germans had no effective landing craft or amphibious warfare
>ships, and would have been annihilated in trying to cross.

Not if the BoB had been lost.

Grantland
>
>Al Minyard

[Grantland]

"Keith Willshaw" > wrote:

>
>"robert arndt" > wrote in message
om...
>> > Britain won the BoB because Churchill bombed Berlin and spoofed Adolf
>> > into diverting the the airfield assaults onto London. EOS.
>> >
>> > Grantland
>>
>> Let me add that it was a lone German bomber that ditched its bombs
>> over London that caused the British reprisal raid on Berlin and change
>> of tactics that: relieved Fighter Command, enabled the airfields and
>> manufacturing plants to be repaired, and assured the Brits that the
>> German battle for air supremacy would fail now that civilian targets
>> were being hit instead of military ones. EOS indeed!
>>
>> Rob
>
>This is in fact an urban legend
>
>The decision to switch targets to London was taken at a Luftwaffe
>staff meeting in the Hague on 3rd Sept 1940. The idea came
yayayayaya

I see you're still buying the old cover-story guff, Keith. Uhh. By
"Bob" those guys were secretive!

Grantland

[Keith Willshaw]

"Steven Vincent" > wrote in message
...
>
> If Hitler had understood that Britain would not Sue for peace in time
> for him to make an assault on the SU as he was already planning then
> there was only one option that actually could have done the job.
>
> How about a German Invasion of Eire ? With enough strength maintained
> in the French CHannel ports the RN would not have been able to maintain
> a close blockade of the Irish ports or the Brittany coast anymore than
> it was able to stop reinforcements to Norway. An Air landing / covert
> sea operation into the SW or Eire would have been able to establish a
> strong air head at least. If Germany can push the British out of
> Ireland then they can enforce a close blockade of the rest of the UK and
> starve Britain into submission. Meanwhile Britain can't afford to
> direct a lot of resources away from the SE to Eire because of the
> presence of significant German forces building there.
>
> Note that the Iris Forces at that time would have been totally
> ineffective while anti- british feelings would probably mean that
> Britain would have had to carry out a counter invasion against an at
> least partially hostile population - not a nice thought.
>
> WOuld an unprovoked German invasion of Eire trigger a response from the
> US strong enough and quick enough to make a difference ? Given the US
> Isolationism and concerns in the Far East I doubt it. Once the UK has
> surrendered Germany can withdraw from Eire in response to US political
> pressure and both the US and Germany would have understood that.
>

Trouble is that the UK maintained considerable forces in Ulster
and the Germans would have to move a considerable force
in to Ireland to hold the country.

By July 1940 British forces tasked with 'assisting' the Irish Army
in the event of invasion included

53rd (Welsh) Infantry Division
601st Infantry Division
148 Infantry Brigade
plus several locally raised regiments such as the
Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, Royal Irish Rangers,
The Royal Irish Fusiliers, The Royal Ulster Rifles etc

The RAF maintained half a dozen fighter squadrons
in the province and a similar number of coastal command
units

Coastal command were flying recon patrols over the Bay of
Biscay and western approaches it seems probable
that an invasion force large enough to be useful would be
intercepted.


> End result would probably be a United Ireland which quiet a few of the
> US Irish lobby would be strongly in favour of :->
>
> So can Germany get a large enough force into Southern Eire quickly
> enough while maintaining the Barge threat to the SW at a high enough
> level that the UK can't commit enough forces to prevent the occupation
> of Eire ?
>

No. Germany was scraping the bottom of the barrel to
get enough transports to cross the English Channel, moving a
substantial force across the Bay of Biscay was just
not feasible.

> Sea lion as the fake in the same way that the Allies convinced Hitler
> that the invasion of Europe would occur in the Pas du Calais :->
>

Which wont work unless the threat is credible. The real worry came
from the possibility that the Irish might choose to become
allied with Germany and invite them in. This was one of the
scenarios that gave British planners sleepless nights :)

Keith

Keith

[Alan Minyard]

On Mon, 06 Oct 2003 14:00:35 GMT, "Steven P. McNicoll"
> wrote:

>
>"Keith Willshaw" > wrote in message
...
>>
>> However the RAF could still have sallied forth to defend
>> against an invasion and the Germans simply had neither the
>> resources to get the invasion force across the channel or
>> any way of stopping the RN from chopping their force to bits.
>>
>
>Wouldn't the Luftwaffe be a way of stopping the RN from chopping their force
>to bits?
>
No, not at the time. the Luftwaffe did not have "air superiority" over
the Channel, or over Britain. Would the RN have lost ships? Probably,
but not enough to deter or defeat them.

The Germans had no effective landing craft or amphibious warfare
ships, and would have been annihilated in trying to cross.

Al Minyard

[robert arndt]

"Keith Willshaw" > wrote in message >...
> "robert arndt" > wrote in message
> om...
> > > Britain won the BoB because Churchill bombed Berlin and spoofed Adolf
> > > into diverting the the airfield assaults onto London. EOS.
> > >
> > > Grantland
> >
> > Let me add that it was a lone German bomber that ditched its bombs
> > over London that caused the British reprisal raid on Berlin and change
> > of tactics that: relieved Fighter Command, enabled the airfields and
> > manufacturing plants to be repaired, and assured the Brits that the
> > German battle for air supremacy would fail now that civilian targets
> > were being hit instead of military ones. EOS indeed!
> >
> > Rob
>
> This is in fact an urban legend
>
> The decision to switch targets to London was taken at a Luftwaffe
> staff meeting in the Hague on 3rd Sept 1940. The idea came
> from the Luftwaffe themselves who believeing their own faulty
> intel decided that the RAF was down to its last 300 fighters
> decided that the way to destroy them was to attack a target
> they had to defend , London.
>
> All the senior Luftwaffe staff officers (except Sperrle IRC)
> concurred with the decision wihich delighted Fat Hermann
> as he could rush off to der Fuhrer and give him the good news.
>
> Keith

A beg to differ. The lone German bomber ditched its bombs over London
while the Fuhrer's own directive forbid it. The German pilots were
reprimanded for their error even while Goering and the Luftwaffe
senior commanders were planning a switch in tactics.
Regardless, the German bomber incident called for a reprisal raid that
only helped Goerings position and solidified in Hitler's mind the need
to attack London. Although it seems Hitler might have been swayed by
Goering and others in the Luftwaffe, it was Hitler's choice alone and
certainly guaranteed by the reprisal raid on Berlin.
Hitler's September 4, 1940 speech to the German people is filled with
rage over the British raid of Aug 25/26 and promised the destruction
of London. Had the German bomber NOT ditched its bombs over London and
hence, NO reprisal raid thereafter, Hitler might not have agreed to
change tactics on Sept 3, 1940. RAF Fighter Command at that point was
weakened to the point that losses were outstripping replacements and
many of their forward stations and airfields lie in wreckage. It was
the Luftwaffe's opinion at the time that despite losses incurred that
the RAF was already close to defeat, so attacking London made no
difference. A big mistake. Attacking London relieved Fighter Command
at their gravest hour and won them the BoB.

Rob

[Guy Alcala]

"M. J. Powell" wrote:

> In message >, robert
> arndt > writes
> >> Britain won the BoB because Churchill bombed Berlin and spoofed Adolf
> >> into diverting the the airfield assaults onto London. EOS.
> >>
> >> Grantland
> >
> >Let me add that it was a lone German bomber that ditched its bombs
> >over London that caused the British reprisal raid on Berlin and change
> >of tactics that: relieved Fighter Command, enabled the airfields and
> >manufacturing plants to be repaired, and assured the Brits that the
> >German battle for air supremacy would fail now that civilian targets
> >were being hit instead of military ones. EOS indeed!
>
> The story I found said that it was a lone bomber, aiming for one of the
> Kent airfields, which decided to approach from the north-east over
> London. They spotted Croydon and misidentified it as Biggin Hill(?) and
> unloaded. Croydon was in the London area.

No, Croydon was mistakenly attacked (instead of Kenley) on 15 August by a
formation of Me-110s from Erprobungsgruppe 210 led by Rubensdorffer. This
isn't the mistaken attack on London: Hough and Richards "The Battle of
Britain" (while written for a general audience, it still has some useful
info) says that it was during a night bombing raid on August 24/25, and that
the City of London itself was hit, "in Fore Street, near the Barbican", as
well as some scatter elsewhere.

Guy

[M. J. Powell]

In message >, Guy Alcala
> writes
>"M. J. Powell" wrote:
>
>> In message >, robert
>> arndt > writes
>> >> Britain won the BoB because Churchill bombed Berlin and spoofed Adolf
>> >> into diverting the the airfield assaults onto London. EOS.
>> >>
>> >> Grantland
>> >
>> >Let me add that it was a lone German bomber that ditched its bombs
>> >over London that caused the British reprisal raid on Berlin and change
>> >of tactics that: relieved Fighter Command, enabled the airfields and
>> >manufacturing plants to be repaired, and assured the Brits that the
>> >German battle for air supremacy would fail now that civilian targets
>> >were being hit instead of military ones. EOS indeed!
>>
>> The story I found said that it was a lone bomber, aiming for one of the
>> Kent airfields, which decided to approach from the north-east over
>> London. They spotted Croydon and misidentified it as Biggin Hill(?) and
>> unloaded. Croydon was in the London area.
>
>No, Croydon was mistakenly attacked (instead of Kenley) on 15 August by a
>formation of Me-110s from Erprobungsgruppe 210 led by Rubensdorffer. This
>isn't the mistaken attack on London: Hough and Richards "The Battle of
>Britain" (while written for a general audience, it still has some useful
>info) says that it was during a night bombing raid on August 24/25, and that
>the City of London itself was hit, "in Fore Street, near the Barbican", as
>well as some scatter elsewhere.

A raid on the docks at night? Dodgy if you want to miss the City itself.

Mike
--
M.J.Powell

[Steven P. McNicoll]

"Keith Willshaw" > wrote in message
...
>
> Nope. At best the Luftwaffe could intervene in daylight if
> they managed to win and maintain air superiority
>

Aren't we now working under the premise that the Luftwaffe won the BoB and
has air superiority over the channel and southern England?


>
> BUT the
> invasion force was going to take more than 24 hours to
> reach the invasion beaches and the cruisers and destroyers
> sortieing from Harwich cwould be in amongst them at
> night in the same way the Japanese steamed down the
> slot at Guadalcanal. The Germans had no equivalent naval force
> to counter those raids.
>

Why must the German invasion force operate at night?

[Steven P. McNicoll]

"Cub Driver" > wrote in message
...
>
> I'm afraid not. Had Britain (not merely England) been occupied by
> Germany, there is no way that the U.S. could have gotten at Europa.
> The army was green, the landing craft not yet produced, and the only
> aircraft capable of attacking Europa from the U.S. was the B-36, which
> couldn't have survived German air defenses and probably wouldn't have
> made the slightest difference if it had.
>

There was no aircraft capable of attacking Europe from the US during WWII.
The B-36 didn't achieve even nominal operational status until November 1948,
it wasn't truly operational until 1952. However, had the B-36 been
operational ten years earlier, there was nothing German air defenses could
have done to stop it.

[Paul J. Adam]

In message et>,
Steven P. McNicoll > writes
>"Keith Willshaw" > wrote in message
...
>> Nope. At best the Luftwaffe could intervene in daylight if
>> they managed to win and maintain air superiority
>
>Aren't we now working under the premise that the Luftwaffe won the BoB and
>has air superiority over the channel and southern England?

How do they destroy the northern Groups? The RAF can retreat out of
Luftwaffe reach, and surge back south (at a cost).

>> BUT the
>> invasion force was going to take more than 24 hours to
>> reach the invasion beaches and the cruisers and destroyers
>> sortieing from Harwich cwould be in amongst them at
>> night in the same way the Japanese steamed down the
>> slot at Guadalcanal. The Germans had no equivalent naval force
>> to counter those raids.
>
>Why must the German invasion force operate at night?

To have any chance of surviving at all. Night offers at least some
concealment. Also, the Channel has vicious tides and a three-knot barge
starting before dawn will be most unlikely to arrive before dusk... and
trying to land and supply a hastily-improvised invasion in the dark is a
recipe for disaster. The invasion wants to land with a long tail of
daylight available for command, control and resupply: that means at best
an overnight crossing and a morning landing.


The German invasion force lost a tithe of its strength just tied up in
port, and had to be scattered into inland waterways to avoid British
attacks. To quote HQ Naval Group West's report to Berlin on 12 September
1940,

"The harbours at Ostend, Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne cannot be used as
night anchorages for shipping because of the danger of bombing and
shelling. Units of the British Channel Fleet are able to operate almost
unmolested in the Channel."

Hard to launch an invasion when your ports of departure aren't even
usable in darkness...

--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBox<at>jrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

[John Mullen]

"Grantland" > wrote in message
...
> Alan Minyard > wrote:
>
> >On Mon, 06 Oct 2003 14:00:35 GMT, "Steven P. McNicoll"
> > wrote:
> >
> >>
> >>"Keith Willshaw" > wrote in message
> ...
> >>>
> >>> However the RAF could still have sallied forth to defend
> >>> against an invasion and the Germans simply had neither the
> >>> resources to get the invasion force across the channel or
> >>> any way of stopping the RN from chopping their force to bits.
> >>>
> >>
> >>Wouldn't the Luftwaffe be a way of stopping the RN from chopping their
force
> >>to bits?
> >>
> >No, not at the time. the Luftwaffe did not have "air superiority" over
> >the Channel, or over Britain. Would the RN have lost ships? Probably,
> >but not enough to deter or defeat them.
> >
> >The Germans had no effective landing craft or amphibious warfare
> >ships, and would have been annihilated in trying to cross.
>
> Not if the BoB had been lost.

Are you remembering that Churchill had stockpiled and was highly prepared to
use massive amounts of mustard and other CW on them? That would have held
them up somewhat...

John

[Keith Willshaw]

"robert arndt" > wrote in message
om...
> "Keith Willshaw" > wrote in message
>...
> > "robert arndt" > wrote in message
> > om...
> > > > Britain won the BoB because Churchill bombed Berlin and spoofed
Adolf
> > > > into diverting the the airfield assaults onto London. EOS.
> > > >
> > > > Grantland
> > >
> > > Let me add that it was a lone German bomber that ditched its bombs
> > > over London that caused the British reprisal raid on Berlin and change
> > > of tactics that: relieved Fighter Command, enabled the airfields and
> > > manufacturing plants to be repaired, and assured the Brits that the
> > > German battle for air supremacy would fail now that civilian targets
> > > were being hit instead of military ones. EOS indeed!
> > >
> > > Rob
> >
> > This is in fact an urban legend
> >
> > The decision to switch targets to London was taken at a Luftwaffe
> > staff meeting in the Hague on 3rd Sept 1940. The idea came
> > from the Luftwaffe themselves who believeing their own faulty
> > intel decided that the RAF was down to its last 300 fighters
> > decided that the way to destroy them was to attack a target
> > they had to defend , London.
> >
> > All the senior Luftwaffe staff officers (except Sperrle IRC)
> > concurred with the decision wihich delighted Fat Hermann
> > as he could rush off to der Fuhrer and give him the good news.
> >
> > Keith
>
> A beg to differ. The lone German bomber ditched its bombs over London
> while the Fuhrer's own directive forbid it. The German pilots were
> reprimanded for their error even while Goering and the Luftwaffe
> senior commanders were planning a switch in tactics.
> Regardless, the German bomber incident called for a reprisal raid that
> only helped Goerings position and solidified in Hitler's mind the need
> to attack London. Although it seems Hitler might have been swayed by
> Goering and others in the Luftwaffe, it was Hitler's choice alone and
> certainly guaranteed by the reprisal raid on Berlin.
> Hitler's September 4, 1940 speech to the German people is filled with
> rage over the British raid of Aug 25/26 and promised the destruction
> of London. Had the German bomber NOT ditched its bombs over London and
> hence, NO reprisal raid thereafter, Hitler might not have agreed to
> change tactics on Sept 3, 1940.

The minutes of the 3rd September meeting are a matter of record, your
belief not withstanding. At that meeting the date of 7th september was set
for the first raid on London. It was of course presented as a Fuhrer
order but the words used by Goering at that meeting were clear

<Quote>
The tactics that we have now implimented in the last month, that is moving
our fighter squadrons to the Pas de Calais so that they will have more time
over enemy territory with our bombers. The culmination of larger formations
of heavy bombers, that we have drawn from different advanced airfields and
Gruppes. The added support of out Bf110 squadrons that are doing damage in
their bombing role as well as that of the fighter. All this, must be a
formidable sight to the British as they, with a deteriating Air Force try to
penetrate our attacks.
My fellow commanders, we are now on the brink of victory. An assault and an
invasion of England is now more promising than ever before. Our intelligence
has now informed us that the RAF is now down to less than a hundred fighter
aircraft, the airfields protecting London are out of action because of the
superb and accurate bombing of our bomber forces, their communications are
in disarray, and now we are told, their air commanders are arguing with each
other.
Gentlemen, another phase is now almost complete. The RAF is now no longer
the great threat that it used to be, and we can now draw every available
fighter plane that the RAF has into the air, because the next target must be
London itself
</Quote>


> RAF Fighter Command at that point was
> weakened to the point that losses were outstripping replacements and
> many of their forward stations and airfields lie in wreckage. It was
> the Luftwaffe's opinion at the time that despite losses incurred that
> the RAF was already close to defeat, so attacking London made no
> difference. A big mistake. Attacking London relieved Fighter Command
> at their gravest hour and won them the BoB.
>
> Rob

In fact although it wasnt clear to either side at the time it was the
Luftwaffe
that was losing the battle of attrition.

On 1 July 1940 RAF reports showed they had 640 single seat fighters
and 1103 pilots available for action

On 1st Sept 1940 they had 648 fighters and 1142 pilots

Source Steven Bungay , the Most Dangerous Enemy Appendix III

So the RAF had maintained their operational strength

During the same period Milch made a survey of Luftwaffe operational
units (beginning 20 August and lasting 5 days) What he found
was deeply disturbing. On average bomber units with a nominal
strength of 40 aircraft could field no more than 30, many as few as 20

source Milch report of 26/8/40 , Milch papers Vol 51/54 page 9
IWM dept of documents

Fighter units were similarly affected, not only were aircraft in short
supply, at a time when Fighter command had several hundred
spares, but pilot shortages were even worse and new pilots were
arriving at the squadrons with less than 10 hours on single engine
fighters. One new unit I.JG77 trannsferred to France in late
August and lost 7 aircraft on Aug 31 alone.

source Milch 9/9/40 p3 report same collection

Whats interesting is the attitudes of the commanders to the situation
they found themselves in. Dowding was an extremely cautious
commander who regarded the minimum number of pilots
acceptable as being twice that of the number of aircraft
on squadron strength, this meant that when he only had 1142
pilots for 650 aircraft he considered his forces seriously
under strength.

Goering at the same time had fewer pilots than aircraft
and the Germans were training pilots more slowly but
was convinced he was winning !

Fact is that far from being seriously atrrited on 1st September 1940
the RAF fighter squadrons were essentially at full strength
but the Luftwaffe was down to about 75 % of the force they
had available at the start of the BOB

Throughout the battle the RAF was able to send pilots
on leave and rotate entire squadrons out of the combat
area, something that was unthinkable for the Luftwaffe.

The failure to provide adequate replacements for pilots
and machines that would plague the Luftawaffe throughout
the war was already evident in Augsut 1940.

Keith

[Keith Willshaw]

"Steven P. McNicoll" > wrote in message
ink.net...
>
> "Keith Willshaw" > wrote in message
> ...
> >
> > Nope. At best the Luftwaffe could intervene in daylight if
> > they managed to win and maintain air superiority
> >
>
> Aren't we now working under the premise that the Luftwaffe won the BoB and
> has air superiority over the channel and southern England?
>

Sure but they had no airborne radar, like the rest of the
airforces at that time they could only fly such attacks
in daylight.

>
> >
> > BUT the
> > invasion force was going to take more than 24 hours to
> > reach the invasion beaches and the cruisers and destroyers
> > sortieing from Harwich cwould be in amongst them at
> > night in the same way the Japanese steamed down the
> > slot at Guadalcanal. The Germans had no equivalent naval force
> > to counter those raids.
> >
>
> Why must the German invasion force operate at night?
>

Because they have around 30 nautical miles to cover in
barges good for 4 knots , even if we ignore the effects
of the Channel rip currents they would need more than 24 hours
to get the first wave across and then they need to ferry
more troops and supplies using converted river barges
towed by tugboats.

I wouldnt have wanted to be in one of those deathtraps
even if nobody was shooting at me but let loose
30 destroyers and 10 cruisers from harwich and the
result wont be pretty.

Keith

[M. J. Powell]

In message >, Keith Willshaw
> writes
>
>"Steven P. McNicoll" > wrote in message
ink.net...
>>
>> "Keith Willshaw" > wrote in message
>> ...
>> >
>> > Nope. At best the Luftwaffe could intervene in daylight if
>> > they managed to win and maintain air superiority
>> >
>>
>> Aren't we now working under the premise that the Luftwaffe won the BoB and
>> has air superiority over the channel and southern England?
>>
>
>Sure but they had no airborne radar, like the rest of the
>airforces at that time they could only fly such attacks
>in daylight.
>
>>
>> >
>> > BUT the
>> > invasion force was going to take more than 24 hours to
>> > reach the invasion beaches and the cruisers and destroyers
>> > sortieing from Harwich cwould be in amongst them at
>> > night in the same way the Japanese steamed down the
>> > slot at Guadalcanal. The Germans had no equivalent naval force
>> > to counter those raids.
>> >
>>
>> Why must the German invasion force operate at night?
>>
>
>Because they have around 30 nautical miles to cover in
>barges good for 4 knots , even if we ignore the effects
>of the Channel rip currents they would need more than 24 hours
>to get the first wave across and then they need to ferry
>more troops and supplies using converted river barges
>towed by tugboats.
>
>I wouldnt have wanted to be in one of those deathtraps
>even if nobody was shooting at me but let loose
>30 destroyers and 10 cruisers from harwich and the
>result wont be pretty.

Not to mention MTB's at night. Sinking the tugs for the barges would be
enough.

Mike
--
M.J.Powell

[John Freck]

Keith Willshaw wrote:


<Snip>


>> Your point A) isn't any scraping the barrel by any means. The
Allies
>> wasted immense resources on bombers and strategic bombing. If
>> Britain, and the Allies, had cut out four engined bombers in order
to
>> have a large increase in top fighters and a boost to strong,
fast,and
>> long-ranged 2 engined bombers: Then Germany would have had a
harder
>> time much sooner. Hopefully, I'm not reading to much into your
>> sugggestion, I have long put forward similar notion that most of
the
>> strategic bombing was a waste, or it could have been done with
much
>> less and even better. During the Summer of 1940 the Allies could
have
>> had more fighters and more fuel, and have had the bombers on lower
>> level missions cutting up Germans energy and transport.

> Hardly, the first 4 engined bomber, the Short Stirling didnt
> enter service until 1941 and the fighters had absolute priority
> on production in 1940. Cancelling all 4 engined bomber production
> would have made no difference at all to the BOB

The RAF had bomber production going during the BoB. Yes, the RAF did
think fighters were more important than bombers. I would for the sake
of the game eliminate new bomber construction, or only go with the
hottest 2-engined bombers that are in fact or could nearly be top
fighter-bombers if configured that way.


>> All strategic bombing could have, and should have, been done by
long
>> ranged fighter-bombers, and fast 2-engined bombers, and 100% of the
>> effort shoud have been against German military targets, energy, and
>> transport. IN 1947 the USAAF stated that 95% of startegic bombing
>> reasouces were wasted, only 5% of the strategic bombing effort was
>> worthwhile. But Christ, that 5% was a knock-out! Viturally, all
the
>> crippling damage done by strategic air attack was done by
long-ranged
>> fighter bombers and 2-engined bombers attacking at low altitude,
and
>> almost no serious damage was done by the wasteful other line.

> This is flat wrong, most of the oil campaign was carried out by
> B-17's, Halifax and Lancaster bombers. The light bombers
> of the USAAF were predominantly used to attack transport
> infrastructure and tactical targets

I could go down to the libary get direct quotes from the 1947 USA
Almanac. The assessement in 1947 lead to the USAAF, USN, USMC, and
USA Army spending very heavily in other directions than strategic
bombers, not that the strategic bomber is absent even today. Perhaps
the 4-engined bombers were most effective when deployed at low
altitude. What sort of altitude were the attacks on Germany's oil
production carried out at? Of course, 4-engined bomber can run low.
It is just that it is better to use 1 and 2-engined planes. There are
awesome things the Allied could have done if 4-engined bombers are cut
back around 75% or more.
For example, what-if the the Allies funded, resourced, the dreams of
the airbornne generals. In some alternative history story or wargame
we can explore 100,000 strong airborne armies backed by thousands of
trasnport planes. Imagine D-day with a lot more and better supported
airborne troops!


>> One hundred Mustangs each with a single 1,000lbs bomb, flying in
low
>> in order to lay down 50+ direct hits on railline is very
troublesome
>> to the GErmans, and did I mention the destoyed and badly damaged
>> locomotives, loads, and other equipment, and the need for Germany
then
>> to disperse AAA? The Allies can put down 500 fighter-bomb sorties
>> like that a day in the Rhur by 1943 and sleep in to boot.


> But 500 fighter bomer sorties will deliver only 10% of the bombload
> of a 1000 bomber Lancaster raid and in any event neither the USSAF
> nor the RAF had 500 P-51's in 1943.


My little book of WWII Aircraft indicates that the P-51 was in Europe
from 1942.
Any way, the 500 fighters cost something like 1/8 the cost of the
1,000 bombers, and the real bomb load of a Mustang (Ok, my stats are
for a D) is 2,000lbs. The Mustang also has 6 50cals for ground
attack, say for peppering a locomotive. 500*2000=1,000,000 and
1,000*4,000=4,000,000. Plus the fighters will be much much harder to
shoot down, and their bombing will be more accurate as exteremly low
altitude bombing is possible which is very accurate.


John Freck














> Keith

[Guy Alcala]

Keith Willshaw wrote:

> "robert arndt" > wrote in message
> om...
> > "Keith Willshaw" > wrote in message
> >...
> > > "robert arndt" > wrote in message
> > > om...
> > > > > Britain won the BoB because Churchill bombed Berlin and spoofed
> Adolf
> > > > > into diverting the the airfield assaults onto London. EOS.
> > > > >
> > > > > Grantland
> > > >
> > > > Let me add that it was a lone German bomber that ditched its bombs
> > > > over London that caused the British reprisal raid on Berlin and change
> > > > of tactics that: relieved Fighter Command, enabled the airfields and
> > > > manufacturing plants to be repaired, and assured the Brits that the
> > > > German battle for air supremacy would fail now that civilian targets
> > > > were being hit instead of military ones. EOS indeed!
> > > >
> > > > Rob
> > >
> > > This is in fact an urban legend
> > >
> > > The decision to switch targets to London was taken at a Luftwaffe
> > > staff meeting in the Hague on 3rd Sept 1940. The idea came
> > > from the Luftwaffe themselves who believeing their own faulty
> > > intel decided that the RAF was down to its last 300 fighters
> > > decided that the way to destroy them was to attack a target
> > > they had to defend , London.
> > >
> > > All the senior Luftwaffe staff officers (except Sperrle IRC)
> > > concurred with the decision wihich delighted Fat Hermann
> > > as he could rush off to der Fuhrer and give him the good news.
> > >
> > > Keith
> >
> > A beg to differ. The lone German bomber ditched its bombs over London
> > while the Fuhrer's own directive forbid it. The German pilots were
> > reprimanded for their error even while Goering and the Luftwaffe
> > senior commanders were planning a switch in tactics.
> > Regardless, the German bomber incident called for a reprisal raid that
> > only helped Goerings position and solidified in Hitler's mind the need
> > to attack London. Although it seems Hitler might have been swayed by
> > Goering and others in the Luftwaffe, it was Hitler's choice alone and
> > certainly guaranteed by the reprisal raid on Berlin.
> > Hitler's September 4, 1940 speech to the German people is filled with
> > rage over the British raid of Aug 25/26 and promised the destruction
> > of London. Had the German bomber NOT ditched its bombs over London and
> > hence, NO reprisal raid thereafter, Hitler might not have agreed to
> > change tactics on Sept 3, 1940.
>
> The minutes of the 3rd September meeting are a matter of record, your
> belief not withstanding. At that meeting the date of 7th september was set
> for the first raid on London. It was of course presented as a Fuhrer
> order but the words used by Goering at that meeting were clear

FWIW, Hough and Richards state the following, after describing Hitler's speech
on 4 September:

"This public intimation of fresh work for the Luftwaffe followed a meeting
between Huitler and Goering on 30 August. There the Fuehrer had withdrawn his
ban on bombing London [Guy note; after several nights of RAF raids on Berlin
on/subsequent to 25/26 August] and expressed an ardent desire for attacks on the
British capital in retaliation for Bomber Command's raids on Berlin. An
appropriate directive from Goering followed." They then discuss the meeting of
3 September.

I'm hesitant to say this is definitely the case, as this is a work for a general
audience and there are several basic errors in it that never should have
appeared. For instance, it claims that the Me-109E-1 (which they write "109E1")
had "four heavy calibre (roughly .5 inch) machine guns . . . To the more popular
twin heavy machine guns augmented by the much more lethal and longer-ranging
20mm cannon, one in each wing ["109E2" according to them]," although they do go
on to say that the most likely armament was two 20mm and 2 x 7.9mm. So at least
they got that right.


Guy

[Keith Willshaw]

"John Freck" > wrote in message
m...
> Keith Willshaw wrote:
>
>
> <Snip>
>
>
> >> Your point A) isn't any scraping the barrel by any means. The
> Allies
> >> wasted immense resources on bombers and strategic bombing. If
> >> Britain, and the Allies, had cut out four engined bombers in order
> to
> >> have a large increase in top fighters and a boost to strong,
> fast,and
> >> long-ranged 2 engined bombers: Then Germany would have had a
> harder
> >> time much sooner. Hopefully, I'm not reading to much into your
> >> sugggestion, I have long put forward similar notion that most of
> the
> >> strategic bombing was a waste, or it could have been done with
> much
> >> less and even better. During the Summer of 1940 the Allies could
> have
> >> had more fighters and more fuel, and have had the bombers on lower
> >> level missions cutting up Germans energy and transport.
>
> > Hardly, the first 4 engined bomber, the Short Stirling didnt
> > enter service until 1941 and the fighters had absolute priority
> > on production in 1940. Cancelling all 4 engined bomber production
> > would have made no difference at all to the BOB
>
> The RAF had bomber production going during the BoB. Yes, the RAF did
> think fighters were more important than bombers. I would for the sake
> of the game eliminate new bomber construction, or only go with the
> hottest 2-engined bombers that are in fact or could nearly be top
> fighter-bombers if configured that way.
>

Why ?

You cant rapidly switch factories building Whitleys or Wellingtons
to building Spitfires and Hurricanes and new shadow factories
for those aircraft were already entering production, the RAF
had no shortage of airframes in any event.
>
> >> All strategic bombing could have, and should have, been done by
> long
> >> ranged fighter-bombers, and fast 2-engined bombers, and 100% of the
> >> effort shoud have been against German military targets, energy, and
> >> transport. IN 1947 the USAAF stated that 95% of startegic bombing
> >> reasouces were wasted, only 5% of the strategic bombing effort was
> >> worthwhile. But Christ, that 5% was a knock-out! Viturally, all
> the
> >> crippling damage done by strategic air attack was done by
> long-ranged
> >> fighter bombers and 2-engined bombers attacking at low altitude,
> and
> >> almost no serious damage was done by the wasteful other line.
>
> > This is flat wrong, most of the oil campaign was carried out by
> > B-17's, Halifax and Lancaster bombers. The light bombers
> > of the USAAF were predominantly used to attack transport
> > infrastructure and tactical targets
>
> I could go down to the libary get direct quotes from the 1947 USA
> Almanac. The assessement in 1947 lead to the USAAF, USN, USMC, and
> USA Army spending very heavily in other directions than strategic
> bombers, not that the strategic bomber is absent even today.

The USAAF ceased to exist in 1947 and from that date on
the US Army has not operated significant numbers of fixed
wing aircraft

The USAF and Strategic Air Command on the other hand ordered
and operated large numbers of strategic bombers including the
B-29, B-50, B-36, B-47, B-52, B-1 and B-2

> Perhaps
> the 4-engined bombers were most effective when deployed at low
> altitude. What sort of altitude were the attacks on Germany's oil
> production carried out at? Of course, 4-engined bomber can run low.
> It is just that it is better to use 1 and 2-engined planes. There are
> awesome things the Allied could have done if 4-engined bombers are cut
> back around 75% or more.

And awesome things they couldnt have done, fact is a single heavy bomber can
carry more bombs than 6 fighter bombers of WW2 and do so over a
longer distance

> For example, what-if the the Allies funded, resourced, the dreams of
> the airbornne generals. In some alternative history story or wargame
> we can explore 100,000 strong airborne armies backed by thousands of
> trasnport planes. Imagine D-day with a lot more and better supported
> airborne troops!
>

Airborne troops dont do well against armoured formations, see
Arnhem for an example.

>
> >> One hundred Mustangs each with a single 1,000lbs bomb, flying in
> low
> >> in order to lay down 50+ direct hits on railline is very
> troublesome
> >> to the GErmans, and did I mention the destoyed and badly damaged
> >> locomotives, loads, and other equipment, and the need for Germany
> then
> >> to disperse AAA? The Allies can put down 500 fighter-bomb sorties
> >> like that a day in the Rhur by 1943 and sleep in to boot.
>
>
> > But 500 fighter bomer sorties will deliver only 10% of the bombload
> > of a 1000 bomber Lancaster raid and in any event neither the USSAF
> > nor the RAF had 500 P-51's in 1943.
>
>
> My little book of WWII Aircraft indicates that the P-51 was in Europe
> from 1942.

In small numbers as the Mustang I with an Allison engine in RAF service,
I suggest you rely on something a little less lightweight than the
'little book of WW2 aircraft'

> Any way, the 500 fighters cost something like 1/8 the cost of the
> 1,000 bombers, and the real bomb load of a Mustang (Ok, my stats are
> for a D) is 2,000lbs.

So you spend more money per ton of bombs dropped and risk 5 times
as many pilots. RAF losses per ton of bombs dropped were
lowest for the Lancaster bomber and highest for the light bombers.

Losses on the famous precision raids such as those by Mosquito's
on the prison at Amiens and the Shell centre in Copenhagen
varied between 20 and 40 percent. German flak was too good
to routinely operate large numbers of bombers at low level
attacking defended targets


> The Mustang also has 6 50cals for ground
> attack, say for peppering a locomotive. 500*2000=1,000,000 and
> 1,000*4,000=4,000,000. Plus the fighters will be much much harder to
> shoot down, and their bombing will be more accurate as exteremly low
> altitude bombing is possible which is very accurate.
>

You are in error once more, review the data for aircraft losses
in the ground attack role and you'll find Mustangs suffered heavily
due to their liquid cooling system.

The P-47 was far better suited to the ground attack role
but NEITHER was well suited to strategic roles such as
the oil campaign..

Keith

[The Revolution Will Not Be Televised]

On Wed, 08 Oct 2003 06:11:40 GMT, Guy Alcala
> wrote:

>FWIW, Hough and Richards state the following, after describing Hitler's speech
>on 4 September:
>
>"This public intimation of fresh work for the Luftwaffe followed a meeting
>between Huitler and Goering on 30 August. There the Fuehrer had withdrawn his
>ban on bombing London [Guy note; after several nights of RAF raids on Berlin
>on/subsequent to 25/26 August] and expressed an ardent desire for attacks on the
>British capital in retaliation for Bomber Command's raids on Berlin. An
>appropriate directive from Goering followed." They then discuss the meeting of
>3 September.

There are two issues at stake here, the second is the actual German
decision-making process that lead to the deliberate bombing of London
after the withdrawl of Hitler's ban on attacking it. As the Luftwaffe
had been bombing targets in British urban centres at night* since
June, I feel adding London to the target list was only a matter of
time, regardless of what impulses drove the decision at the time.

[*And the night was significant: the Luftwaffe dropped a lot more
tonnage on London by night than they did by day: Hitler's apparent
desire for a retributional policy against London did not begin and end
in the first deliberate daylight attacks on the city, whatever the
peripheral consequences were for Fighter Command)

More important is the issue of whether the first daylight raids on
London were a critical watershed in enabling the RAF to recover from
incipient defeat at the beginning of September. The hard facts are
that they weren't at the position of imminent crisis and defeat, and
the attritional exchanges continued much on the existing basis.

All the Luftwaffe targetting change did was reduce the pressure on
selected forward airfields and their infrastructure. However, the
success or failure of Fighter Command in totality did not rest on the
status of Biggin Hill, Hornchurch and Kenley and their hosted
squadrons in isolation.

What really interests me about this assertion are the emotional
well-springs that fuel it. These seem to be very deeply embedded, and
involve satisfying the basic desire to provide a simplistic
revisionist narrative that appropriates success or failure in the
Battle of Britain to German agency alone, and specifically Hitler in
particular. Surely it is long since time that this myth was laid to
rest, and for it to be understood in the light of the emotional
impetus that created it.

A similar myth is the one about Churchill protecting Enigma by letting
Coventry be bombed. These myths say more about popular prejudices in
regard of the leaders concerned than they do about anything else.
They are resiliant to factual refutal because their primary basis
stands outside factual debate.

Gavin Bailey

--

Another user rings. "I need more space" he says.
"Well, why not move to Texas?", I ask. - The ******* Operator From Hell

[Steven P. McNicoll]

"Paul J. Adam" > wrote in message
>
> To have any chance of surviving at all. Night offers at least some
> concealment.
>

The Germans needed the concealment of night to have a chance of survival
against what? The Royal Navy? Surface vessels could not survive against
determined airpower without air support of their own.

[Steven P. McNicoll]

"Keith Willshaw" > wrote in message
...
>
> Because they have around 30 nautical miles to cover in
> barges good for 4 knots , even if we ignore the effects
> of the Channel rip currents they would need more than 24 hours
> to get the first wave across and then they need to ferry
> more troops and supplies using converted river barges
> towed by tugboats.
>

Why does it take a full day for the first wave to cover 30 miles at 4 knots?


>
> I wouldnt have wanted to be in one of those deathtraps
> even if nobody was shooting at me but let loose
> 30 destroyers and 10 cruisers from harwich and the
> result wont be pretty.
>

They'd certainly get some of the invasion force, but those surface vessels
wouldn't last long against determined airpower without supporting airpower
of their own.

[Paul J. Adam]

In message et>,
Steven P. McNicoll > writes
>"Paul J. Adam" > wrote in message
>> To have any chance of surviving at all. Night offers at least some
>> concealment.
>
>The Germans needed the concealment of night to have a chance of survival
>against what? The Royal Navy? Surface vessels could not survive against
>determined airpower without air support of their own.

Surface vessels could generally endure 1940-41 airpower until their AA
ammunition ran out: that was the point where losses rose rapidly. (See
operations off Norway, Dunkirk, and later Crete for examples).

The trouble is that the RN can sink flat-bottomed river barges a lot
faster than the Luftwaffe can sink cruisers, destroyers, sloops, armed
trawlers, MTBs, MGBs... (particularly once it's a melee situation, and
because instead of embarking troops the warships are in fangs-out combat
mode)


--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBox<at>jrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

[Paul J. Adam]

In message et>,
Steven P. McNicoll > writes
>"Keith Willshaw" > wrote in message
...
>> Because they have around 30 nautical miles to cover in
>> barges good for 4 knots , even if we ignore the effects
>> of the Channel rip currents they would need more than 24 hours
>> to get the first wave across and then they need to ferry
>> more troops and supplies using converted river barges
>> towed by tugboats.
>
>Why does it take a full day for the first wave to cover 30 miles at 4 knots?

Think of the size of the armada and the time it takes to get them all
embarked, out of port, formed up, marshalled and ready. Then start
moving. Then try to get the right barges to the right landing points.
It's not timing one barge over the distance - it's getting the force
loaded up, formed up, across the Channel and unloaded.

Having done this in a peacetime exercise, try again under fire.

>> I wouldnt have wanted to be in one of those deathtraps
>> even if nobody was shooting at me but let loose
>> 30 destroyers and 10 cruisers from harwich and the
>> result wont be pretty.
>
>They'd certainly get some of the invasion force, but those surface vessels
>wouldn't last long against determined airpower without supporting airpower
>of their own.

Couple of days, maybe, until the high-angle ammo ran out. The Germans
run out of invasion shipping long before the RN run out of warships.
>
>

--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBox<at>jrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

[Dave Holford]

"Steven P. McNicoll" wrote:
>
>
> They'd certainly get some of the invasion force, but those surface vessels
> wouldn't last long against determined airpower without supporting airpower
> of their own.


At the risk of drifting even further, and not being a student of Naval
warfare; were there any examples of Germal airpower inflicting
significant damage on allied warships in WWII?

Dave

[John Freck]

"Keith Willshaw" > wrote in message >...



> "John Freck" > wrote in message
> m...



>> Keith Willshaw wrote:



<Snip>



>>> Hardly, the first 4 engined bomber, the Short Stirling didnt
>>> enter service until 1941 and the fighters had absolute priority
>>> on production in 1940. Canceling all 4 engined bomber production
>>> would have made no difference at all to the BOB



>> The RAF had bomber production going during the BoB. Yes, the RAF
did
>> think fighters were more important than bombers. I would for the
sake
>> of the game eliminate new bomber construction, or only go with the
>> hottest 2-engined bombers that are in fact or could nearly be top
>> fighter bombers if configured that way.



> Why ?



Why what to which line I wrote?



> You cant rapidly switch factories building Whitleys or Wellingtons
> to building Spitfires and Hurricanes and new shadow factories
> for those aircraft were already entering production, the RAF
> had no shortage of airframes in any event.



You can to rapidly decrease production of one plane type and increase
production of another.
You may be thinking of a short time frame for the BoB which is just 3
months. During W.W.II USA production jumped hugely in time measured
in months. Some planes were discontinued and others started up with
pretty high numbers off the bat. When a plane was discontinued the
numbers produced dropped to zero in a day, and the factory would be
open the next day getting started making whatever was next, and the
numbers of the new plane jumped up pretty quickly as I recall. Yes,
the 3 month time frame of the BoB is very tight, and this is why I say
my commentary in response to Herbert Pocket's is really more for down
stream. But, without hesitation fighter command can take fuel from
bomber command, spare engines, sheet metal, knobs, and such, and raw
materials. Building a whole new factory to make fighters can be done
in weeks, transferring workers can be done in weeks, diverting raw
materials can be done in 1 day, and the machines used to make fighters
and bombers and all the same, just different patterns of the same
thing. It is really no different that having more shirts and less
pants. You must admit that operationally fighters and bombers consume
pretty much the same stuff in terms of material, skilled workers, and
management. Yes?



>> I could go down to the library get direct quotes from the 1947
USA
>> Almanac. The assessment in 1947 lead to the USAAF, USN, USMC,
and
>> USA Army spending very heavily in other directions than
strategic
>> bombers, not that the strategic bomber is absent even today.



> The USAAF ceased to exist in 1947 and from that date on
> the US Army has not operated significant numbers of fixed
> wing aircraft



The United States Army Air Force = The United States Air Force = The
United States of America
Air Force The USAAF merely changed its name to USAF and became a full
independent branch of the US military establishment.



> The USAF and Strategic Air Command on the other hand ordered
> and operated large numbers of strategic bombers including the
> B-29, B-50, B-36, B-47, B-52, B-1 and B-2



The B-29 pre-dates 1947. The total number of bombers produced of
B-50, B-36, B-47, B-52, B-1, and B-2 don't add up to 1,000, I don't
believe. The number of fighter bombers built since 1947 is over
10,000 as I recall. The ratio is about the same as I recommend for
SimWWII. I cut back and not out.


>> Perhaps
>> the 4-engined bombers were most effective when deployed at low
>> altitude. What sort of altitude were the attacks on Germany's oil
>> production carried out at? Of course, 4-engined bomber can run
low.
>> It is just that it is better to use 1 and 2-engined planes. There
are
>> awesome things the Allied could have done if 4-engined bombers are
cut
>> back around 75% or more.

> And awesome things they couldnt have done, fact is a single heavy bomber can
> carry more bombs than 6 fighter bombers of WW2 and do so over a
> longer distance



While a B-29 can deliver 20,000lbs of bombs and a Coursair only 1
2,000lbs bomb, and yes,
the B-29 can fly 3,000+ miles and the F-4 only 1,000+ miles, the F4
can deliver the bomb more accurately.
The F4 can also strafe enemy trucks, bomb enemy ships, and rocket or
bomb tanks. Heavy fighter cover can mean the enemy has viturally 100%
of trucks operating during daylight or any ground vehicle opeating
during the day in a battle destoyed. Fighter bombers are simply the
best. Figther bomb cant deliver supply to ground units which is wht a
transport can do and some bombers too.


>> For example, what-if the the Allies funded, resourced, the dreams
of
>> the airborne generals. In some alternative history story or
war-game
>> we can explore 100,000 strong airborne armies backed by thousands
of
>> transport planes. Imagine D-day with a lot more and better
supported
>> airborne troops!

> Airborne troops dont do well against armoured formations, see
> Arnhem for an example.

The USAAF stated that 95% of strategic bombing missions were useless,
and that only 5% of the runs made a difference, and that those sorts
of runs can be better done by fighter bombers. They then followed up
and built fighter bombers in greatest numbers: I think the USA
military has more transports than bombers, I just think that to be the
case. US Army tank units didn't do that well against German armor
either. Ordinary light infantry did get better and better against
armor, as I'm sure you know. For highly motivated infantry dealing
with tanks that have had protecting infantry killed there are many
methods where-by ordinary infantry can disable an enemy tank. In this
war-game the airborne have not only more men, but more money and
resources per man. The airborne will have more supply and heavier
supply. What were those best Allied anti-tank guns called? The 7
pounders, or was it 75 pounders? They were 75 mm, I think. I bet one
of those could be air delivered by glider, or parachute, or airplane.
This idea would be an interesting thread by itself; a really, really
robust and huge airborne Allied army with huge air support for close
fire support and logistical support. You have to dream a little for
an interesting war-game variation. That would be 100,000 troops with
2x the real world's funding, and heavy support from the Air Force too.
In addition, Allied fighter bombers were a major anti-tank weapon.



<Snip>



>>> But 500 fighter bomber sorties will deliver only 10% of the bomb
load
>>> of a 1000 bomber Lancaster raid and in any event neither the USSAF
>>> nor the RAF had 500 P-51's in 1943.

>> My little book of W.W.II Aircraft indicates that the P-51 was in
Europe
>> from 1942.


> In small numbers as the Mustang I with an Allison engine in RAF service,
> I suggest you rely on something a little less lightweight than the
> 'little book of WW2 aircraft'

My specifics are less important than the overview point, which is that
fighter bombers can bomb very effectively. I could have used just
‘Allied fighters' and not ‘Mustang' or ‘Hurricane' or ‘Hurricane Super
Marine fighter'. The generalize point is the subject. My book states
that the Mustang was in service in 1942, and my book states that the
Mustang was great on ground attack, and it could carry a 2,000lbs
bomb.


>> Any way, the 500 fighters cost something like 1/8 the cost of the
>> 1,000 bombers, and the real bomb load of a Mustang (Ok, my stats
are
>> for a D) is 2,000lbs.


> So you spend more money per ton of bombs dropped and risk 5 times
> as many pilots. RAF losses per ton of bombs dropped were
> lowest for the Lancaster bomber and highest for the light bombers.


The USAAF in 1947 states in an after action review of Allied bombing
of German that fighter bombers worked best.


> Losses on the famous precision raids such as those by Mosquito's
> on the prison at Amiens and the Shell centre in Copenhagen
> varied between 20 and 40 percent. German flak was too good
> to routinely operate large numbers of bombers at low level
> attacking defended targets

Evaluation of the attrition factors indicates that fighter bombing was
the most effective bombing method in W.W.II.


>> The Mustang also has 6 50cals for ground
>> attack, say for peppering a locomotive. 500*2000=1,000,000 and
>> 1,000*4,000=4,000,000. Plus the fighters will be much much harder
to
>> shoot down, and their bombing will be more accurate as extremely
low
>> altitude bombing is possible which is very accurate.


> You are in error once more, review the data for aircraft losses
> in the ground attack role and you'll find Mustangs suffered heavily
> due to their liquid cooling system.

I read it from a book. The Mustang is considered a potent ground
attack weapon: it was not a failure as a weapon as you state by my
book. Please provide evidence that the Mustang was a failed ground
attack weapon in W.W.II. These details are irrelevant, perhaps, to a
war-game that might only have ‘fighters'. I would imagine that a
future SimWWII would allow for details such as you mention to be
relevant. A Mustang also escorted bombers, but not on all days, and
the Mustang has very good range.

> The P-47 was far better suited to the ground attack role
> but NEITHER was well suited to strategic roles such as
> the oil campaign..

.... Fighter bombers devastated fuel farms in W.W.II... Fuel farms
give in to the bombs of bombers and well to the bombs of fighter
bombers.

John Freck

[Keith Willshaw]

"Steven P. McNicoll" > wrote in message
ink.net...
>
> "Keith Willshaw" > wrote in message
> ...
> >
> > Because they have around 30 nautical miles to cover in
> > barges good for 4 knots , even if we ignore the effects
> > of the Channel rip currents they would need more than 24 hours
> > to get the first wave across and then they need to ferry
> > more troops and supplies using converted river barges
> > towed by tugboats.
> >
>
> Why does it take a full day for the first wave to cover 30 miles at 4
knots?
>

Because the tidal rip through the channel makes a 30 mile trip
as the crow flies into something closer to 60. At the fastest
points of the tidal cycle water is flowing in a East West
direction at around 4 knots. This means that you are not
sailing straight for your landfall but have to make crabwise
progress.

When you get to the invasion beaches the barges have to be towed and
pushed inshore, they have no engines you see. Once on the beach they
have to be rounded up again and towed back to the embarkation ports
for the second wave.

In the single exercise held 50 barges were towed along the French coast
before being ordered to land, only 50% of the troops landed on the
correct beach within an hour of their scheduled time and 10%
never arrived at all.

This in broad daylight, calm seas and with no enemy fire after just
a mile or so of travel.

>
> >
> > I wouldnt have wanted to be in one of those deathtraps
> > even if nobody was shooting at me but let loose
> > 30 destroyers and 10 cruisers from harwich and the
> > result wont be pretty.
> >
>
> They'd certainly get some of the invasion force, but those surface vessels
> wouldn't last long against determined airpower without supporting airpower
> of their own.
>
>

They lasted 3 days off Dunkirk while stationary and dragging troops
on board. Steaming at 30 knots amid the German fleet they'd be
a much harder target and the Luftwaffe would be as likely
to sink their own ships as the RN.

The best post war studies suggested the RN would have lost around
15-20 destroyers and the Germans would have lost several divisions
and what remained of their surface fleet. The Kriegsmarine had
few illusions about the viability of the plan.

The Germans had to face considerable forces in the SE of England alone.

Within the invasion area the British Army had at its disposal
2 Territorial Army Infantry Divisions , 1 Brigade from India
1 Brigade from new Zealand , 1 Armoured Division largely
equipped with the Matilda 2 a tank at least as good as the
current Mk3 Panzer , 1 Canadian Division and 1 Army Tank Brigade

The Gemans had no tank landing vessels at all, the only way they
could anything on the beach that couldnt be manhandled out
of a barge was to use explosives to blow the bows off. This
was a one off trick of course.

The Germans realised they needed to capture a port and decided
to try and capture Dover. Their intention was to try a parachute landing
on the Western heights and seize the port from there.

Trouble is this area was the location of at least one infantry division and
the area was wired, mined and enfiladed by machine gun positions
with artillery pits inland having the area pre-surveyed.

Mean while the clifes were a honeycomb of defensive tunnels
and barracks buried deep in the chalk and the Coastal artilley
was formidable including a couple of 14" guns , 8 6inch emplacements
and a numer of 9.2" mounts

Keith

[John Halliwell]

In article >, robert
arndt > writes
>Regardless, the German bomber incident called for a reprisal raid that
>only helped Goerings position and solidified in Hitler's mind the need
>to attack London. Although it seems Hitler might have been swayed by
>Goering and others in the Luftwaffe, it was Hitler's choice alone and
>certainly guaranteed by the reprisal raid on Berlin.

Wasn't it Dowding who said "The nearness of London to German airfields
will lose them the war"?

--
John

[John Halliwell]

In article et>,
Steven P. McNicoll > writes
>The Germans needed the concealment of night to have a chance of survival
>against what? The Royal Navy? Surface vessels could not survive against
>determined airpower without air support of their own.

You could take Crete as a good example, where the LW had complete air
superiority but the RN still smashed the naval invasion.

The LW had about thirty HE 115 floatplanes able to drop (unreliable)
torpedoes. Level bombing of ships in open water is very inaccurate and
dive bombing requires clear weather to 8,000ft (we're talking about the
English Channel here!), even so the LW bombs (available for dive
bombing) would have struggled to penetrate the large armoured decks of
battleships.

Air support would come from Britain in the form of remnants of Fighter
Command, plus Coastal Command and Bomber Command.

--
John

[Keith Willshaw]

"John Freck" > wrote in message
om...
> "Keith Willshaw" > wrote in message
>...
>

>
> > Why ?
>
>
>
> Why what to which line I wrote?
>

The one which read

> The RAF had bomber production going during the BoB. Yes, the RAF did
> think fighters were more important than bombers. I would for the sake
> of the game eliminate new bomber construction, or only go with the
> hottest 2-engined bombers that are in fact or could nearly be top
> fighter-bombers if configured that way.
>


>
>
> > You cant rapidly switch factories building Whitleys or Wellingtons
> > to building Spitfires and Hurricanes and new shadow factories
> > for those aircraft were already entering production, the RAF
> > had no shortage of airframes in any event.
>
>
>
> You can to rapidly decrease production of one plane type and increase
> production of another.

No sir you cant, retooling a factory and re-training its workforce
takes considerable time during which you produce nothing at all.

> You may be thinking of a short time frame for the BoB which is just 3
> months.

Given that this is the subject of the discussion thats not a reasonable
assumption

>During W.W.II USA production jumped hugely in time measured
> in months. Some planes were discontinued and others started up with
> pretty high numbers off the bat. When a plane was discontinued the
> numbers produced dropped to zero in a day, and the factory would be
> open the next day getting started making whatever was next, and the
> numbers of the new plane jumped up pretty quickly as I recall.

This is simply wrong. Consider as an example the TBM Avenger

The first prototype flew in 1940, the first production models
entered service in 1942 but it took the best part of a year
for GM to produce the first Avenger .

They were given a contract to build 1200 at their Eastern Aircraft plant in
Trenton, New Jersey in March 1942. The first aircraft rolled off the
production lines in March 1943. Even that was a tremendous
achievement and required Grumman to deliver TBF's assembled
with sheet metal screws rather than rivets so they could be repeatedly
assembled and dismantled by the workers in training

Consider further the second Spitfire production plant at Castle Bromwich
in the West Midlands. On April 12,1938 a contract was placed for 1,000
Spitfires to be built at this new factory, aircraft first came off the
production
line in September 1940


> Yes,
> the 3 month time frame of the BoB is very tight, and this is why I say
> my commentary in response to Herbert Pocket's is really more for down
> stream. But, without hesitation fighter command can take fuel from
> bomber command, spare engines, sheet metal, knobs, and such, and raw
> materials.

No they cant, there was no shortage of fuel, the bombers mostly used
different engines and the rest of the stuff is just silly. Once more
there was no shortage of aircraft, the RAF had seveal hundred
complete spares in stock and production was running at 300 a
month by September.

> Building a whole new factory to make fighters can be done
> in weeks, transferring workers can be done in weeks, diverting raw
> materials can be done in 1 day, and the machines used to make fighters
> and bombers and all the same, just different patterns of the same
> thing. It is really no different that having more shirts and less
> pants. You must admit that operationally fighters and bombers consume
> pretty much the same stuff in terms of material, skilled workers, and
> management. Yes?
>
>

You really are totally clueless about production engineering. An
aircraft is an incredibly complex product, even in WW2
it took around 2 years to go from prototype to production.


>
> >> I could go down to the library get direct quotes from the 1947
> USA
> >> Almanac. The assessment in 1947 lead to the USAAF, USN, USMC,
> and
> >> USA Army spending very heavily in other directions than
> strategic
> >> bombers, not that the strategic bomber is absent even today.
>
>
>
> > The USAAF ceased to exist in 1947 and from that date on
> > the US Army has not operated significant numbers of fixed
> > wing aircraft
>
>
>
> The United States Army Air Force = The United States Air Force = The
> United States of America
> Air Force The USAAF merely changed its name to USAF and became a full
> independent branch of the US military establishment.
>

Thats hardly a merely.

>
>
> > The USAF and Strategic Air Command on the other hand ordered
> > and operated large numbers of strategic bombers including the
> > B-29, B-50, B-36, B-47, B-52, B-1 and B-2
>
>
>
> The B-29 pre-dates 1947. The total number of bombers produced of
> B-50, B-36, B-47, B-52, B-1, and B-2 don't add up to 1,000, I don't
> believe. The number of fighter bombers built since 1947 is over
> 10,000 as I recall. The ratio is about the same as I recommend for
> SimWWII. I cut back and not out.
>

Again your lack of a clue is showing

The USA produced 370 B-50's, 380 B-36's, 1300 B-47's
and 740 B-52's

>
> >> Perhaps
> >> the 4-engined bombers were most effective when deployed at low
> >> altitude. What sort of altitude were the attacks on Germany's oil
> >> production carried out at? Of course, 4-engined bomber can run
> low.
> >> It is just that it is better to use 1 and 2-engined planes. There
> are
> >> awesome things the Allied could have done if 4-engined bombers are
> cut
> >> back around 75% or more.
>
> > And awesome things they couldnt have done, fact is a single heavy bomber
can
> > carry more bombs than 6 fighter bombers of WW2 and do so over a
> > longer distance
>
>
>
> While a B-29 can deliver 20,000lbs of bombs and a Coursair only 1
> 2,000lbs bomb, and yes,
> the B-29 can fly 3,000+ miles and the F-4 only 1,000+ miles, the F4
> can deliver the bomb more accurately.

Which is bloody useless if the target is over a 1000 miles away and
even if its in range you need 10 times the number of aircraft and
5 times the number of pilots. Add in the ground staff and the logistics
are impossible.


> The F4 can also strafe enemy trucks, bomb enemy ships, and rocket or
> bomb tanks. Heavy fighter cover can mean the enemy has viturally 100%
> of trucks operating during daylight or any ground vehicle opeating
> during the day in a battle destoyed. Fighter bombers are simply the
> best. Figther bomb cant deliver supply to ground units which is wht a
> transport can do and some bombers too.
>
>

Fighter bombers are an absolute requirement for ground support
but they wont demolish the oil plants which proved to be a
decisive move in WW2. Nor will they destroy the enemys transport
infrastructure

> >> For example, what-if the the Allies funded, resourced, the dreams
> of
> >> the airborne generals. In some alternative history story or
> war-game
> >> we can explore 100,000 strong airborne armies backed by thousands
> of
> >> transport planes. Imagine D-day with a lot more and better
> supported
> >> airborne troops!
>
> > Airborne troops dont do well against armoured formations, see
> > Arnhem for an example.
>
> The USAAF stated that 95% of strategic bombing missions were useless,
> and that only 5% of the runs made a difference, and that those sorts
> of runs can be better done by fighter bombers.

Cite please, I have read the strategic bombingg survey and I dont
recall that as being its conclusions

> They then followed up
> and built fighter bombers in greatest numbers: I think the USA
> military has more transports than bombers, I just think that to be the
> case. US Army tank units didn't do that well against German armor
> either.

Irrelevant. address the issue please , how do you propose
to destroy the German oil industry with fighter bombers

> Ordinary light infantry did get better and better against
> armor, as I'm sure you know.

I know the precise opposite. Unsupported infantry gets
chopped up without anti-tank guns and air cover. Ask
the paras who got caught at Arnhem.

> For highly motivated infantry dealing
> with tanks that have had protecting infantry killed there are many
> methods where-by ordinary infantry can disable an enemy tank.

And how do you propose to kill the enemy infantry ?

Wave a magic wand ?

> In this
> war-game the airborne have not only more men, but more money and
> resources per man. The airborne will have more supply and heavier
> supply. What were those best Allied anti-tank guns called? The 7
> pounders, or was it 75 pounders? They were 75 mm, I think.

Geez you really know nothing do you.

The best British gun was the 17 pounder and the Americans
used their own 3" gun


> I bet one
> of those could be air delivered by glider, or parachute, or airplane.

You'd lose, the 17 pounder weighed 2100 kg, was 4.2 m long
needed a truck to tow it and each round including packing weighed
around 50 pounds. The largest air portable AT gun
was the 6 pounder but damm few of them got into action.

> This idea would be an interesting thread by itself; a really, really
> robust and huge airborne Allied army with huge air support for close
> fire support and logistical support. You have to dream a little for
> an interesting war-game variation. That would be 100,000 troops with
> 2x the real world's funding, and heavy support from the Air Force too.
> In addition, Allied fighter bombers were a major anti-tank weapon.
>
>

Trouble is you are using them strategically and havent a hope of
training enough pilots to fly em all.

>
> <Snip>
>
>
>
> >>> But 500 fighter bomber sorties will deliver only 10% of the bomb
> load
> >>> of a 1000 bomber Lancaster raid and in any event neither the USSAF
> >>> nor the RAF had 500 P-51's in 1943.
>
> >> My little book of W.W.II Aircraft indicates that the P-51 was in
> Europe
> >> from 1942.
>
>
> > In small numbers as the Mustang I with an Allison engine in RAF service,
> > I suggest you rely on something a little less lightweight than the
> > 'little book of WW2 aircraft'
>
> My specifics are less important than the overview point, which is that
> fighter bombers can bomb very effectively. I could have used just
> 'Allied fighters' and not 'Mustang' or 'Hurricane' or 'Hurricane Super
> Marine fighter'. The generalize point is the subject. My book states
> that the Mustang was in service in 1942, and my book states that the
> Mustang was great on ground attack, and it could carry a 2,000lbs
> bomb.
>

The devil is in the details, the Mustang was NOT great in ground
attack, it was intensely vulnerable to ground fire and was not
used in that role in WW2.

>
> >> Any way, the 500 fighters cost something like 1/8 the cost of the
> >> 1,000 bombers, and the real bomb load of a Mustang (Ok, my stats
> are
> >> for a D) is 2,000lbs.
>
>
> > So you spend more money per ton of bombs dropped and risk 5 times
> > as many pilots. RAF losses per ton of bombs dropped were
> > lowest for the Lancaster bomber and highest for the light bombers.
>
>
> The USAAF in 1947 states in an after action review of Allied bombing
> of German that fighter bombers worked best.
>

Cite please, page number and chapter heading


>
> > Losses on the famous precision raids such as those by Mosquito's
> > on the prison at Amiens and the Shell centre in Copenhagen
> > varied between 20 and 40 percent. German flak was too good
> > to routinely operate large numbers of bombers at low level
> > attacking defended targets
>
> Evaluation of the attrition factors indicates that fighter bombing was
> the most effective bombing method in W.W.II.
>
>



It says no such thing, take a look at its conclusions

<Quote>
CONCLUSION
The foregoing pages tell of the results achieved by Allied air power, in
each of its several roles in the war in Europe. It remains to look at the
results as a whole and to seek such signposts as may be of guidance to the
future.
Allied air power was decisive in the war in Western Europe. Hindsight
inevitably suggests
that it might have been employed differently or better in some respects.
Nevertheless, it was decisive. In the air, its victory was complete. At sea,
its contribution, combined with naval power, brought an end to the enemy's
greatest naval threat -- the U-boat; on land, it helped turn the tide
overwhelmingly in favor of Allied ground forces. Its power and superiority
made possible the success of the invasion. It brought the economy which
sustained the enemy's armed forces to virtual collapse, although the full
effects of this collapse had not reached the enemy's front lines when they
were overrun by Allied forces. It brought home to the German people the full
impact of modern war with all its horror and suffering. Its imprint on the
German nation will be lasting.
</Quote>


> >> The Mustang also has 6 50cals for ground
> >> attack, say for peppering a locomotive. 500*2000=1,000,000 and
> >> 1,000*4,000=4,000,000. Plus the fighters will be much much harder
> to
> >> shoot down, and their bombing will be more accurate as extremely
> low
> >> altitude bombing is possible which is very accurate.
>
>
> > You are in error once more, review the data for aircraft losses
> > in the ground attack role and you'll find Mustangs suffered heavily
> > due to their liquid cooling system.
>
> I read it from a book.

Dont tell me , the boys book of wonder weapons right ?

> The Mustang is considered a potent ground
> attack weapon: it was not a failure as a weapon as you state by my
> book. Please provide evidence that the Mustang was a failed ground
> attack weapon in W.W.II.

It wasnt used as a ground attack weapon in WW2, it was in Korea
and took horrible casualties from a much less effective defense
than the German had.

In November 1950 the USAF 95 of the 131 F-51's in combat
almost all to ground fire when strafing. The comparative figures
for the F-80 jets were 44 out of 169

> These details are irrelevant, perhaps, to a
> war-game that might only have 'fighters'. I would imagine that a
> future SimWWII would allow for details such as you mention to be
> relevant. A Mustang also escorted bombers, but not on all days, and
> the Mustang has very good range.
>

And vulnerable cooling system


> > The P-47 was far better suited to the ground attack role
> > but NEITHER was well suited to strategic roles such as
> > the oil campaign..
>
> ... Fighter bombers devastated fuel farms in W.W.II... Fuel farms
> give in to the bombs of bombers and well to the bombs of fighter
> bombers.
>
> John Freck

Utter nonsense, the US Strategic Bombing Survey says the precise
opposite stating that large bombs (2000-4000 lb) were many times
more effective than small bombs and that visual aiming was all but
impossible due to the heavy flak and smoke screens.

Read it for yourself at
http://members.tripod.com/~Sturmvogel/ussbsgensum.html


Keith

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

robert arndt wrote in message >...
>> Britain won the BoB because Churchill bombed Berlin and spoofed Adolf
>> into diverting the the airfield assaults onto London. EOS.
>
>Let me add that it was a lone German bomber that ditched its bombs
>over London

"After dark on the 24th the attacks were stepped up, and
some 170 German aircraft ranged over England from the
borderland to Kent. Largely due to bad navigation bombers
directed to Rochester and the Thameshaven oil-tanks
dropped their loads on the City of London. For the first time
since the Gothas of 1918, Central London was damaged in
an air raid. Fires burned at London Wall, and boroughs like
Islington, Tottenham, Finsbury, Millwall, Stepney, East Ham,
Leyton, Coulsdon and Bethnel Green all received their share."

The Narrow Margin, Wood and Dempster.

The Peoples War by Angus Calder, notes "considerable fires".

Lot of damage by one bomber.

> that caused the British reprisal raid on Berlin and change
>of tactics that: relieved Fighter Command, enabled the airfields and
>manufacturing plants to be repaired, and assured the Brits that the
>German battle for air supremacy would fail now that civilian targets
>were being hit instead of military ones. EOS indeed!


The major attacks on London did achieve what the Luftwaffe
was after, a major effort by Fighter Command, the trouble was
the Luftwaffe then lost the air battles. The afternoon raid on
15th September was 114 bombers escorted by 360 fighters
(20 Bf110), the RAF put round 275 fighters up.

As for aircraft factory raids,

An effective strike on the Shorts works making Stirling bombers
on 15th August.

14 Bf110s against a Vickers factory making Wellingtons on
4th September, plus a small formation to the Shorts works.

Hawkers were hit by a lone bomber on 21st September.

The Supermarine works were hit on 24th (fighter bombers)
and 26th September (major damage).

The switch away from the airfields seems to have been more
important for the control system (since it was co-located on the
airfields) than the ability to fly aircraft from those fields.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

[Guy Alcala]

Keith Willshaw wrote:

> "John Freck" > wrote in message
> om...

<snip>

> > > The USAF and Strategic Air Command on the other hand ordered
> > > and operated large numbers of strategic bombers including the
> > > B-29, B-50, B-36, B-47, B-52, B-1 and B-2
> >
> >
> >
> > The B-29 pre-dates 1947. The total number of bombers produced of
> > B-50, B-36, B-47, B-52, B-1, and B-2 don't add up to 1,000, I don't
> > believe. The number of fighter bombers built since 1947 is over
> > 10,000 as I recall. The ratio is about the same as I recommend for
> > SimWWII. I cut back and not out.
> >
>
> Again your lack of a clue is showing
>
> The USA produced 370 B-50's, 380 B-36's, 1300 B-47's

> and 740 B-52's

I think your B-47 total only considers the 'E' models (1,341). There were also
10 pre-production B-47As, used for development, and 399 'B's, most of which were
later brought up to 'E' standard. And then there were the various RB flavors:
240 'E's, 35 'H's, and 15 'K's.

<snip>

> > My specifics are less important than the overview point, which is that
> > fighter bombers can bomb very effectively. I could have used just
> > 'Allied fighters' and not 'Mustang' or 'Hurricane' or 'Hurricane Super
> > Marine fighter'. The generalize point is the subject. My book states
> > that the Mustang was in service in 1942, and my book states that the
> > Mustang was great on ground attack, and it could carry a 2,000lbs
> > bomb.
> >
>
> The devil is in the details, the Mustang was NOT great in ground
> attack, it was intensely vulnerable to ground fire and was not
> used in that role in WW2.

<snip rest of naive claims by John Freck, as there's only so much ignorance I
can take in a single post>

Keith, yes, it was used for ground attack in WW2, but a radial-engined a/c like
the P-47 was definitely preferred in that role. However, carrying 2 x 1,000 lb.
bombs that Mustang isn't going very far. Even the P-47 preferred to carry
500lbers, for drag, maneuverability and stress reasons.

Guy

[John Freck]

"Keith Willshaw" > wrote in message >...


> "John Freck" > wrote in message
> om...


<Snip>



>> Why what to which line I wrote?



> The one which read



>> The RAF had bomber production going during the BoB. Yes, the RAF
did
>> think fighters were more important than bombers. I would for the
sake
>> of the game eliminate new bomber construction, or only go with the
>> hottest 2-engined bombers that are in fact or could nearly be top
>> fighter-bombers if configured that way.

I have the impression that you can answer the ‘why' to each of the
statements above.
I take it then the ‘why?' was rhetorical. I don't really feel like
doing the detailed history of why Britain at first went with bombers
and fighters and no fighter-bombers. You seem interested and aware,
you are welcome to extend the discussion. Why do you think Britain
didn't develop fighter bombers early like Germany? Compare just
2-engined bombers with long ranged fighter bombers, and tell me which
would have been better for Britain to have during the BoB. Are you
willing to argue that; in a reasonable war-game, that if Britain swaps
all of her 2-engined bombers for fighter-bombers, that Britain will do
worse? Never mind alternative history POD (POint of departure)
"soundness", we are just subbing fighter bombers for bombers in a
game. Which is more important? Which can sub for what?



<Snip>



>> You can to rapidly decrease production of one plane type and
increase
>> production of another.


> No sir you cant, retooling a factory and re-training its workforce
> takes considerable time during which you produce nothing at all.


What retooling? Both use the same job description workers to a tee.
Both use riveters, welders, assemblers, fitters, cutters, pressers,
ect.
Both use the forklifts, ceiling cranes, metal cutters, grinders,
torches,
drills, ect.
Both use large open space-warehouses-with strong ceilings.
Both use the same basic raw materials in nearly identical
configurations, and many parts are only different like 28" waist pants
are different than 60" pants.



>> You may be thinking of a short time frame for the BoB which is just
3
>> months.


> Given that this is the subject of the discussion that's not a reasonable
> assumption



Well, clearly my response to Pocket refers to a 1947 after action
report by the USAAF for the entire WWII. And I provide a 1943
hypothetical long range raid on rail.



>> During W.W.II USA production jumped hugely in time measured
>> in months. Some planes were discontinued and others started up
with
>> pretty high numbers off the bat. When a plane was discontinued the
>> numbers produced dropped to zero in a day, and the factory would be
>> open the next day getting started making whatever was next, and the
>> numbers of the new plane jumped up pretty quickly as I recall.


> This is simply wrong. Consider as an example the TBM Avenger


> The first prototype flew in 1940, the first production models
> entered service in 1942 but it took the best part of a year
> for GM to produce the first Avenger .



Why didn't you use the Corsair as an example?
In this adjustment for the war-game current production models' outputs
are adjusted.
Your example involves bringing a prototype into service and not merely
adding on a new factory.


> They were given a contract to build 1200 at their Eastern Aircraft plant in
> Trenton, New Jersey in March 1942. The first aircraft rolled off the
> production lines in March 1943. Even that was a tremendous
> achievement and required Grumman to deliver TBF's assembled
> with sheet metal screws rather than rivets so they could be repeatedly
> assembled and dismantled by the workers in training



HOw did all aircraft production jump by tens or thousands per year
then?
All major types of aircraft, that is all fighters, bombers, fighter
bombers, and transports all taken together all were jumping up rapidly
for all sides monthly. How was this done, and how is it then that
there can be no flexibility to increase fighter bombers over bombers
from July 1st, 1940 to October 1st, 1940. Early on air bases
themselves were producing large numbers of planes in mini factories:
Every piece of a warplane could be made in the field. I have heard on
the USA's History Channel that nearly 50% of USAAF warplanes were not
made in factories at all but on or near air bases. The mini factories
had stuff like, mini-mills, diamond grinders, drills, metal scissors,
tool and die makers, ect. All of those can be made in a snap, are
common, and on the shelf. I consider it a fact that Britain set up
these mini-mills very quickly and this is a prime reason Britain had
such a high production rate. When Germany started with this method
too, its production went up to. I don't think that it is hard to
boost fighter production from July 1st, 1940 since it was boosted on
an emergency basis. By no means is fighter production structurally
limited like you indicate. Adding more assembly lines to an already
developed plane already in production is easy and quick.
The mini-mills can larger factory lines can be added fast until basic
raw material availability has been tapped. Sorry. Try harder, maybe.




> Consider further the second Spitfire production plant at Castle Bromwich
> in the West Midlands. On April 12,1938 a contract was placed for 1,000
> Spitfires to be built at this new factory, aircraft first came off the
> production line in September 1940.



And now provide further data on how fast additional production was
added.
I don't happen to have Hurricane and Spitfire monthly production
counts from July, August, September, and October 1940: but I suppose
you do. Now how do you account for the increasing counts? From you
examples, I could infer that back in 1938 Britain had pre planned the
build-up and it just so happen the BoB rolled right in just then as
things were picking up steam.



>> Yes,
>> the 3 month time frame of the BoB is very tight, and this is why I
say
>> my commentary in response to Herbert Pocket's is really more for
down
>> stream. But, without hesitation fighter command can take fuel from
>> bomber command, spare engines, sheet metal, knobs, and such, and
raw
>> materials.

> No they cant, there was no shortage of fuel, the bombers mostly used
> different engines and the rest of the stuff is just silly. Once more
> there was no shortage of aircraft, the RAF had seveal hundred
> complete spares in stock and production was running at 300 a
> month by September.



If there was no shortage why were they so concerned to increase
production further?
And I never stated there is a shortage of planes, anyway. I stated
that fighters were more important than bombers in the BoB, and Britain
should have favored fighters even more over bombers than they did. AS
far a a fuel shortage? I have heard in many interviews that the RAF
was very tight on fuel. Just the other day on the Dorothy Reeem show
that what was husbanding fighters to fight "Sea Lion" was not having
fuel to head over ot the fight.
The RAF, RN, and Army were all very worried about fuel conservation.
In addition, I have read that Britain was very interested in
projecting confidence and prowess.



>> Building a whole new factory to make fighters can be done
>> in weeks, transferring workers can be done in weeks, diverting raw
>> materials can be done in 1 day, and the machines used to make
fighters
>> and bombers and all the same, just different patterns of the same
>> thing. It is really no different that having more shirts and less
>> pants. You must admit that operationally fighters and bombers
consume
>> pretty much the same stuff in terms of material, skilled workers,
and
>> management. Yes?



> You really are totally clueless about production engineering. An
> aircraft is an incredibly complex product, even in WW2
> it took around 2 years to go from prototype to production.

There is no point discussing things with a stale noodle either.
The time from first proto-type test flights to first combat plane
mass production date is irrelevant. It would be more relevant for
you to explain how production of a plane in mass production has
production boosted.




>> While a B-29 can deliver 20,000lbs of bombs and a Corsair only 1
>> 2,000lbs bomb, and yes,
>> the B-29 can fly 3,000+ miles and the F-4 only 1,000+ miles, the
F4
>> can deliver the bomb more accurately.

> Which is bloody useless if the target is over a 1000 miles away and
> even if its in range you need 10 times the number of aircraft and
> 5 times the number of pilots. Add in the ground staff and the logistics
> are impossible.



As I have noted many times for you, and you don't seem impressed.
The USAAF held in 1947 that 95% of strategic bombing missed, and only
5% was useful.
What was useful mostly at lower altitudes, which improves accuracy,
was against rail,
and was against energy. The energy raids were at a fairly low
altitude too as I recall.



>> The F4 can also strafe enemy trucks, bomb enemy ships, and rocket
or
>> bomb tanks. Heavy fighter cover can mean the enemy has vitally
100%
>> of trucks operating during daylight or any ground vehicle
operating
>> during the day in a battle destroyed. Fighter bombers are simply
the
>> best. Fighter bomb cant deliver supply to ground units which is
what a
>> transport can do and some bombers too.



> Fighter bombers are an absolute requirement for ground support
> but they wont demolish the oil plants which proved to be a
> decisive move in WW2. Nor will they destroy the enemy's transport
> infrastructure


I have seen WWII film footage from wing cameras showing Mustang
rockets killing a moving locomotive, and causing railcars filled with
munitions to explode. It is very obviously that fighter bombers can
attack bridges, trucks, rail, and ships.



<Snip>



> Cite please, I have read the strategic bombing survey and I dot
> recall that as being its conclusions



Well, I will try to get down there soon and photo-copy it.


<Snip>


> Irrelevant. address the issue please , how do you propose
> to destroy the German oil industry with fighter bombers



Why not?




> I know the precise opposite. Unsupported infantry gets
> chopped up without anti-tank guns and air cover. Ask
> the paras who got caught at Arnhem.

It is not so well known that Red Army infantrymen were brought west
just to teach Allied infantrymen their tactics for dealing with tanks,
and yes they took heavy causatives winning which is better than taking
heavy losses and losing which in turn is better than losing and taking
light casualties, at least for the airborne. Really, in WWII ordinary
infantry units got better at dealing with tanks. Just because 100
tanks move into a contested zone that is 10mi by 10mi (100sq miles)
doesn't mean the ordinary light infantry is automatically defeated.
The infantry can do all sorts of useful defensive things. A lot
depends on the terrain. If there are good wood lines, then ambushes
of enemy trucks and troops is possible.



>> For highly motivated infantry dealing
>> with tanks that have had protecting infantry killed there are many
>> methods where-by ordinary infantry can disable an enemy tank.

> And how do you propose to kill the enemy infantry ?
> Wave a magic wand ?



Are you a drug abuser? Typically, the way light infantry kills other
infantry is by using the suite of light weapons. Among the light
infantry weapons are rifles, mortars, bazookas, pistols, grenades,
machine guns, and mines. A tank can be disabled by having a grenade
put down its barrel, hammering the machine guns, putting a chain
around the tracks, and killing off trucks that would support it.



>> In this
>> war-game the airborne have not only more men, but more money and
>> resources per man. The airborne will have more supply and heavier
>> supply. What were those best Allied anti-tank guns called? The 7
>> pounders, or was it 75 pounders? They were 75 mm, I think.

> Geez you really know nothing do you.



I don't have all the references that might be nice for accurate
detailing.
I find my level of detailing fine for conceptual development.


> The best British gun was the 17 pounder and the Americans
> used their own 3" gun

>> I bet one
>> of those could be air delivered by glider, or parachute, or
airplane.

> You'd lose, the 17 pounder weighed 2100 kg, was 4.2 m long
> needed a truck to tow it and each round including packing weighed
> around 50 pounds. The largest air portable AT gun
> was the 6 pounder but damm few of them got into action.


The Douglas C-47 Dakota/Skytrain Weight empty 17,865lbs operational
31,000lbs
length 19.44 meters.


>> This idea would be an interesting thread by itself; a really,
really
>> robust and huge airborne Allied army with huge air support for
close
>> fire support and logistical support. You have to dream a little
for
>> an interesting war-game variation. That would be 100,000 troops
with
>> 2x the real world's funding, and heavy support from the Air Force
too.
>> In addition, Allied fighter bombers were a major anti-tank weapon.



> Trouble is you are using them strategically and havent a hope of
> training enough pilots to fly em all.



You are on drugs.



<Snip>



>> My specifics are less important than the overview point, which is
that
>> fighter bombers can bomb very effectively. I could have used just
>> 'Allied fighters' and not 'Mustang' or 'Hurricane' or 'Hurricane
Super
>> Marine fighter'. The generalize point is the subject. My book
states
>> that the Mustang was in service in 1942, and my book states that
the
>> Mustang was great on ground attack, and it could carry a 2,000lbs
>> bomb.



> The devil is in the details, the Mustang was NOT great in ground
> attack, it was intensely vulnerable to ground fire and was not
> used in that role in WW2.


What I'm reading indicates that it performed well in dive bombing and
ground attack.
It was during the Korean War that the Mustang was pulled from ground
support for the reasons you stated. Most USA fighters were fighter
bombers and robust ground attackers.




> It says no such thing, take a look at its conclusions
>
> <Quote>
> CONCLUSION
> The foregoing pages tell of the results achieved by Allied air power, in
> each of its several roles in the war in Europe. It remains to look at the
> results as a whole and to seek such signposts as may be of guidance to the
> future.
> Allied air power was decisive in the war in Western Europe.


> *****Hindsight inevitably suggests that it might have been
> employed differently or better in some respects.*****


Any interesting conclusion. Did you read "findings" which detailed
above?


> Nevertheless, it was decisive. In the air, its victory was complete. At sea,
> its contribution, combined with naval power, brought an end to the enemy's
> greatest naval threat -- the U-boat;

> ***** on land, it helped turn the tide overwhelmingly in favor
> ***** of Allied ground forces. Its power and superiority
> ***** made possible the success of the invasion.


Medium bombers and fighter bombers made all of Normandy a major
success and not the heavies.
Anything a medium bomber did during Normandy and the Normandy breakout
could have been done by fighter bombers. The prelude to the Normandy
invasion is just the sort of thing I'm taking about in terms of
tactics and weapons.


> ***** It brought the economy which
> ***** sustained the enemy's armed forces to virtual collapse, although the full
> ***** effects of this collapse had not reached the enemy's front lines when they
> ***** were overrun by Allied forces.


Reread, very carefully what is written above. It says that by May
1945 the effects of strategic bombing against the German economy were
not felt by frontline German troops.


> ***** It brought home to the German people the full
> ***** impact of modern war with all its horror and suffering. Its imprint on the
> ***** German nation will be lasting.


You will find more detailing in the findings. I might be guilty of
using ‘conclusions' when I should have used ‘findings'. In any case,
where is my paraphrasing wrong?


> </Quote>

>> These details are irrelevant, perhaps, to a
>> war-game that might only have 'fighters'. I would imagine that a
>> future SimWWII would allow for details such as you mention to be
>> relevant. A Mustang also escorted bombers, but not on all days,
and
>> the Mustang has very good range.

> And vulnerable cooling system

That is interesting, friend.

John Freck

[Steven Vincent]

John Halliwell wrote:
> In article et>,
> Steven P. McNicoll > writes
>
>>The Germans needed the concealment of night to have a chance of survival
>>against what? The Royal Navy? Surface vessels could not survive against
>>determined airpower without air support of their own.
>
>
> You could take Crete as a good example, where the LW had complete air
> superiority but the RN still smashed the naval invasion.
>
> The LW had about thirty HE 115 floatplanes able to drop (unreliable)
> torpedoes. Level bombing of ships in open water is very inaccurate and
> dive bombing requires clear weather to 8,000ft (we're talking about the
> English Channel here!), even so the LW bombs (available for dive
> bombing) would have struggled to penetrate the large armoured decks of
> battleships.
>
> Air support would come from Britain in the form of remnants of Fighter
> Command, plus Coastal Command and Bomber Command.
>

Add to that Training, Army Co op and anything else the RAF can find.
Also there is the Fleet Air Arm. _. If they can sink the Koninsburg off
Norway they can make a mess of the Channel in the general all out melee
that would ensue.

The LW could indeed hammer the RN in the Channel battle but you have to
ask your self how expendable the RN was when it came to a landing and
how expendable the LW was. There were WW1 battleships around that would
have been pressed into the battle and as the losses on both sides
mounted convoy escorts would have been pulled out of the Atlantic and
Force H from Gib would have been arriving.

It is clear that little of the German Army view took into considerations
the differences between a large river crossing and open Sea.

The Convoy's of Barges would have trouble making 4 knots through the
water. Water that in places can be moving up to 6 knots over the
ground. The presence of minefields and sandbanks means that anything
with more draft than a rowing boat can't cross the channel at right
angles and the need to steer into the tides means the water distance is
greater still. Basically the minimum time has got to be at least one
tide cycle. Also at what state of tide do you want to arrive ? High or
Low water ? - the barges can't cope with significant cross tide effects
while landing. (Powered landing craft and DD tanks had problems in
Normandy!).

[Keith Willshaw]

"John Freck" > wrote in message
m...
> "Keith Willshaw" > wrote in message
>...
>
>
> > "John Freck" > wrote in message
> > om...
>
>
> <Snip>
>
>
>
> >> Why what to which line I wrote?
>
>
>
> > The one which read
>
>
>
> >> The RAF had bomber production going during the BoB. Yes, the RAF
> did
> >> think fighters were more important than bombers. I would for the
> sake
> >> of the game eliminate new bomber construction, or only go with the
> >> hottest 2-engined bombers that are in fact or could nearly be top
> >> fighter-bombers if configured that way.
>
> I have the impression that you can answer the 'why' to each of the
> statements above.
> I take it then the 'why?' was rhetorical. I don't really feel like
> doing the detailed history of why Britain at first went with bombers
> and fighters and no fighter-bombers. You seem interested and aware,
> you are welcome to extend the discussion. Why do you think Britain
> didn't develop fighter bombers early like Germany?

Germany didnt do so either, they fought the BOB with bombers
such as the Do-17, He-111 and JU-88 none of which could
be classed as fighter bombers

> Compare just
> 2-engined bombers with long ranged fighter bombers, and tell me which
> would have been better for Britain to have during the BoB.

They'd have done even better with Tornado GR-4's but they
werent available either.

> Are you
> willing to argue that; in a reasonable war-game, that if Britain swaps
> all of her 2-engined bombers for fighter-bombers, that Britain will do
> worse?

Yes sir.

> Never mind alternative history POD (POint of departure)
> "soundness", we are just subbing fighter bombers for bombers in a
> game. Which is more important? Which can sub for what?
>
>

Neither is an adequate substitute for the other, both
are needed.

>
> <Snip>
>
>
>
> >> You can to rapidly decrease production of one plane type and
> increase
> >> production of another.
>
>
> > No sir you cant, retooling a factory and re-training its workforce
> > takes considerable time during which you produce nothing at all.
>
>
> What retooling? Both use the same job description workers to a tee.
> Both use riveters, welders, assemblers, fitters, cutters, pressers,
> ect.
> Both use the forklifts, ceiling cranes, metal cutters, grinders,
> torches,
> drills, ect.
> Both use large open space-warehouses-with strong ceilings.
> Both use the same basic raw materials in nearly identical
> configurations, and many parts are only different like 28" waist pants
> are different than 60" pants.
>

Wrong.

Consider a single relatively simple part such as an aileron.

You need dies for the press that stamps out the sheets
of aluminum that make the skin and other to stamp out
the ribs, you need a jig so that the rivet holes can be drilled
in the right place and then an assemply jig on which it can be built.

Then you need the captan lathes set up to turn out the pins
the aileron turns on.


>
>
> >> You may be thinking of a short time frame for the BoB which is just
> 3
> >> months.
>
>
> > Given that this is the subject of the discussion that's not a reasonable
> > assumption
>
>
>
> Well, clearly my response to Pocket refers to a 1947 after action
> report by the USAAF for the entire WWII. And I provide a 1943
> hypothetical long range raid on rail.
>

Irrelevant

>
>
> >> During W.W.II USA production jumped hugely in time measured
> >> in months. Some planes were discontinued and others started up
> with
> >> pretty high numbers off the bat. When a plane was discontinued the
> >> numbers produced dropped to zero in a day, and the factory would be
> >> open the next day getting started making whatever was next, and the
> >> numbers of the new plane jumped up pretty quickly as I recall.
>
>
> > This is simply wrong. Consider as an example the TBM Avenger
>
>
> > The first prototype flew in 1940, the first production models
> > entered service in 1942 but it took the best part of a year
> > for GM to produce the first Avenger .
>
>
>
> Why didn't you use the Corsair as an example?

OK the Corsair protoype flew 3 years before it entered squadron service

> In this adjustment for the war-game current production models' outputs
> are adjusted.
> Your example involves bringing a prototype into service and not merely
> adding on a new factory.
>

No sir the GM Avenger plant was producing an aircraft already
in production

>
> > They were given a contract to build 1200 at their Eastern Aircraft
plant in
> > Trenton, New Jersey in March 1942. The first aircraft rolled off the
> > production lines in March 1943. Even that was a tremendous
> > achievement and required Grumman to deliver TBF's assembled
> > with sheet metal screws rather than rivets so they could be repeatedly
> > assembled and dismantled by the workers in training
>
>
>
> HOw did all aircraft production jump by tens or thousands per year
> then?

They didnt

> All major types of aircraft, that is all fighters, bombers, fighter
> bombers, and transports all taken together all were jumping up rapidly
> for all sides monthly. How was this done,

By placing the orders years before

> and how is it then that
> there can be no flexibility to increase fighter bombers over bombers
> from July 1st, 1940 to October 1st, 1940. Early on air bases
> themselves were producing large numbers of planes in mini factories:

Not after 1910 they werent.


> Every piece of a warplane could be made in the field.

What Utter tosh

> I have heard on
> the USA's History Channel that nearly 50% of USAAF warplanes were not
> made in factories at all but on or near air bases. The mini factories
> had stuff like, mini-mills, diamond grinders, drills, metal scissors,
> tool and die makers, ect.

You are either a fool or a troll.

> All of those can be made in a snap, are
> common, and on the shelf. I consider it a fact that Britain set up
> these mini-mills very quickly and this is a prime reason Britain had
> such a high production rate. When Germany started with this method
> too, its production went up to. I don't think that it is hard to
> boost fighter production from July 1st, 1940 since it was boosted on
> an emergency basis. By no means is fighter production structurally
> limited like you indicate. Adding more assembly lines to an already
> developed plane already in production is easy and quick.
> The mini-mills can larger factory lines can be added fast until basic
> raw material availability has been tapped. Sorry. Try harder, maybe.
>
>

Yep definitely a fool

>
>
> > Consider further the second Spitfire production plant at Castle Bromwich
> > in the West Midlands. On April 12,1938 a contract was placed for 1,000
> > Spitfires to be built at this new factory, aircraft first came off the
> > production line in September 1940.
>
>
>
> And now provide further data on how fast additional production was
> added.

I just did

> I don't happen to have Hurricane and Spitfire monthly production
> counts from July, August, September, and October 1940: but I suppose
> you do.

Yep

> Now how do you account for the increasing counts?

That plant at Castle Bromwich which was ordered in 1938

> From you
> examples, I could infer that back in 1938 Britain had pre planned the
> build-up and it just so happen the BoB rolled right in just then as
> things were picking up steam.
>

Bingo , thats exactly right.

>
>
> >> Yes,
> >> the 3 month time frame of the BoB is very tight, and this is why I
> say
> >> my commentary in response to Herbert Pocket's is really more for
> down
> >> stream. But, without hesitation fighter command can take fuel from
> >> bomber command, spare engines, sheet metal, knobs, and such, and
> raw
> >> materials.
>
> > No they cant, there was no shortage of fuel, the bombers mostly used
> > different engines and the rest of the stuff is just silly. Once more
> > there was no shortage of aircraft, the RAF had seveal hundred
> > complete spares in stock and production was running at 300 a
> > month by September.
>
>
>
> If there was no shortage why were they so concerned to increase
> production further?
> And I never stated there is a shortage of planes, anyway. I stated
> that fighters were more important than bombers in the BoB, and Britain
> should have favored fighters even more over bombers than they did. AS
> far a a fuel shortage? I have heard in many interviews that the RAF
> was very tight on fuel. Just the other day on the Dorothy Reeem show
> that what was husbanding fighters to fight "Sea Lion" was not having
> fuel to head over ot the fight.
> The RAF, RN, and Army were all very worried about fuel conservation.
> In addition, I have read that Britain was very interested in
> projecting confidence and prowess.
>
>
>
> >> Building a whole new factory to make fighters can be done
> >> in weeks, transferring workers can be done in weeks, diverting raw
> >> materials can be done in 1 day, and the machines used to make
> fighters
> >> and bombers and all the same, just different patterns of the same
> >> thing. It is really no different that having more shirts and less
> >> pants. You must admit that operationally fighters and bombers
> consume
> >> pretty much the same stuff in terms of material, skilled workers,
> and
> >> management. Yes?
>
>
>
> > You really are totally clueless about production engineering. An
> > aircraft is an incredibly complex product, even in WW2
> > it took around 2 years to go from prototype to production.
>
> There is no point discussing things with a stale noodle either.
> The time from first proto-type test flights to first combat plane
> mass production date is irrelevant. It would be more relevant for
> you to explain how production of a plane in mass production has
> production boosted.
>

I did, you plainly dont understand.

>
>
>
> >> While a B-29 can deliver 20,000lbs of bombs and a Corsair only 1
> >> 2,000lbs bomb, and yes,
> >> the B-29 can fly 3,000+ miles and the F-4 only 1,000+ miles, the
> F4
> >> can deliver the bomb more accurately.
>
> > Which is bloody useless if the target is over a 1000 miles away and
> > even if its in range you need 10 times the number of aircraft and
> > 5 times the number of pilots. Add in the ground staff and the logistics
> > are impossible.
>
>
>
> As I have noted many times for you, and you don't seem impressed.
> The USAAF held in 1947 that 95% of strategic bombing missed, and only
> 5% was useful.
> What was useful mostly at lower altitudes, which improves accuracy,
> was against rail,
> and was against energy. The energy raids were at a fairly low
> altitude too as I recall.
>

Incorrect , I have given you the location of the survey text,
go and read it.

>
>
> >> The F4 can also strafe enemy trucks, bomb enemy ships, and rocket
> or
> >> bomb tanks. Heavy fighter cover can mean the enemy has vitally
> 100%
> >> of trucks operating during daylight or any ground vehicle
> operating
> >> during the day in a battle destroyed. Fighter bombers are simply
> the
> >> best. Fighter bomb cant deliver supply to ground units which is
> what a
> >> transport can do and some bombers too.
>
>
>
> > Fighter bombers are an absolute requirement for ground support
> > but they wont demolish the oil plants which proved to be a
> > decisive move in WW2. Nor will they destroy the enemy's transport
> > infrastructure
>
>
> I have seen WWII film footage from wing cameras showing Mustang
> rockets killing a moving locomotive, and causing railcars filled with
> munitions to explode. It is very obviously that fighter bombers can
> attack bridges, trucks, rail, and ships.
>
>

Attack yes, disrupt yes, destroy no

>
> <Snip>
>
>
>
> > Cite please, I have read the strategic bombing survey and I dot
> > recall that as being its conclusions
>
>
>
> Well, I will try to get down there soon and photo-copy it.
>

I wont hold my breath

>
> <Snip>
>
>
> > Irrelevant. address the issue please , how do you propose
> > to destroy the German oil industry with fighter bombers
>
>
>
> Why not?
>
>
>
>
> > I know the precise opposite. Unsupported infantry gets
> > chopped up without anti-tank guns and air cover. Ask
> > the paras who got caught at Arnhem.
>
> It is not so well known that Red Army infantrymen were brought west
> just to teach Allied infantrymen their tactics for dealing with tanks,

********

> and yes they took heavy causatives winning which is better than taking
> heavy losses and losing which in turn is better than losing and taking
> light casualties, at least for the airborne.

Even better is winning with low casualties which the British and
US armies did


> Really, in WWII ordinary
> infantry units got better at dealing with tanks. Just because 100
> tanks move into a contested zone that is 10mi by 10mi (100sq miles)
> doesn't mean the ordinary light infantry is automatically defeated.
> The infantry can do all sorts of useful defensive things. A lot
> depends on the terrain. If there are good wood lines, then ambushes
> of enemy trucks and troops is possible.
>

If wishes were fishes etc

>
>
> >> For highly motivated infantry dealing
> >> with tanks that have had protecting infantry killed there are many
> >> methods where-by ordinary infantry can disable an enemy tank.
>
> > And how do you propose to kill the enemy infantry ?
> > Wave a magic wand ?
>
>
>
> Are you a drug abuser?

No but I do wonder about you.

> Typically, the way light infantry kills other
> infantry is by using the suite of light weapons. Among the light
> infantry weapons are rifles, mortars, bazookas, pistols, grenades,
> machine guns, and mines. A tank can be disabled by having a grenade
> put down its barrel, hammering the machine guns, putting a chain
> around the tracks, and killing off trucks that would support it.
>

Lots of luck trying that against a Panther

>
>
> >> In this
> >> war-game the airborne have not only more men, but more money and
> >> resources per man. The airborne will have more supply and heavier
> >> supply. What were those best Allied anti-tank guns called? The 7
> >> pounders, or was it 75 pounders? They were 75 mm, I think.
>
> > Geez you really know nothing do you.
>
>
>
> I don't have all the references that might be nice for accurate
> detailing.
> I find my level of detailing fine for conceptual development.
>

Translation: I dont care about mere facts

>
> > The best British gun was the 17 pounder and the Americans
> > used their own 3" gun
>
> >> I bet one
> >> of those could be air delivered by glider, or parachute, or
> airplane.
>
> > You'd lose, the 17 pounder weighed 2100 kg, was 4.2 m long
> > needed a truck to tow it and each round including packing weighed
> > around 50 pounds. The largest air portable AT gun
> > was the 6 pounder but damm few of them got into action.
>
>
> The Douglas C-47 Dakota/Skytrain Weight empty 17,865lbs operational
> 31,000lbs
> length 19.44 meters.
>

So

>
> >> This idea would be an interesting thread by itself; a really,
> really
> >> robust and huge airborne Allied army with huge air support for
> close
> >> fire support and logistical support. You have to dream a little
> for
> >> an interesting war-game variation. That would be 100,000 troops
> with
> >> 2x the real world's funding, and heavy support from the Air Force
> too.
> >> In addition, Allied fighter bombers were a major anti-tank weapon.
>
>
>
> > Trouble is you are using them strategically and havent a hope of
> > training enough pilots to fly em all.
>
>
>
> You are on drugs.
>

Lack of substantive respnse noted

>
>
> <Snip>
>
>
>
> >> My specifics are less important than the overview point, which is
> that
> >> fighter bombers can bomb very effectively. I could have used just
> >> 'Allied fighters' and not 'Mustang' or 'Hurricane' or 'Hurricane
> Super
> >> Marine fighter'. The generalize point is the subject. My book
> states
> >> that the Mustang was in service in 1942, and my book states that
> the
> >> Mustang was great on ground attack, and it could carry a 2,000lbs
> >> bomb.
>
>
>
> > The devil is in the details, the Mustang was NOT great in ground
> > attack, it was intensely vulnerable to ground fire and was not
> > used in that role in WW2.
>
>
> What I'm reading indicates that it performed well in dive bombing and
> ground attack.
> It was during the Korean War that the Mustang was pulled from ground
> support for the reasons you stated. Most USA fighters were fighter
> bombers and robust ground attackers.
>

No most were fighters

>
>
>
> > It says no such thing, take a look at its conclusions
> >
> > <Quote>
> > CONCLUSION
> > The foregoing pages tell of the results achieved by Allied air power, in
> > each of its several roles in the war in Europe. It remains to look at
the
> > results as a whole and to seek such signposts as may be of guidance to
the
> > future.
> > Allied air power was decisive in the war in Western Europe.
>
>
> > *****Hindsight inevitably suggests that it might have been
> > employed differently or better in some respects.*****
>
>
> Any interesting conclusion. Did you read "findings" which detailed
> above?
>

That quote is from The US Strategic bombing survey that you claim to
have read

>
> > Nevertheless, it was decisive. In the air, its victory was complete. At
sea,
> > its contribution, combined with naval power, brought an end to the
enemy's
> > greatest naval threat -- the U-boat;
>
> > ***** on land, it helped turn the tide overwhelmingly in favor
> > ***** of Allied ground forces. Its power and superiority
> > ***** made possible the success of the invasion.
>
>
> Medium bombers and fighter bombers made all of Normandy a major
> success and not the heavies.

Read up a little about the B-17 and Lancaster attacks on Falaise
and the German forces around Caen


> Anything a medium bomber did during Normandy and the Normandy breakout
> could have been done by fighter bombers. The prelude to the Normandy
> invasion is just the sort of thing I'm taking about in terms of
> tactics and weapons.
>

Incorrect, fighter bombers couldnt destroy the German rail
infrastructure and prevent reinforcements arriving, the mediums did

>
> > ***** It brought the economy which
> > ***** sustained the enemy's armed forces to virtual collapse, although
the full
> > ***** effects of this collapse had not reached the enemy's front lines
when they
> > ***** were overrun by Allied forces.
>
>
> Reread, very carefully what is written above. It says that by May
> 1945 the effects of strategic bombing against the German economy were
> not felt by frontline German troops.
>

No its says the FULL effect

>
> > ***** It brought home to the German people the full
> > ***** impact of modern war with all its horror and suffering. Its
imprint on the
> > ***** German nation will be lasting.
>
>
> You will find more detailing in the findings. I might be guilty of
> using 'conclusions' when I should have used 'findings'. In any case,
> where is my paraphrasing wrong?
>

Everywhere

>
> > </Quote>
>
> >> These details are irrelevant, perhaps, to a
> >> war-game that might only have 'fighters'. I would imagine that a
> >> future SimWWII would allow for details such as you mention to be
> >> relevant. A Mustang also escorted bombers, but not on all days,
> and
> >> the Mustang has very good range.
>
> > And vulnerable cooling system
>
> That is interesting, friend.
>

It sure is

Keith

[John Halliwell]

In article >, John Freck
> writes
>I have seen WWII film footage from wing cameras showing Mustang
>rockets killing a moving locomotive, and causing railcars filled with
>munitions to explode. It is very obviously that fighter bombers can
>attack bridges, trucks, rail, and ships.

Have a look at the performance of the Fairey Battle during the battle
for France, perhaps the closest thing to a fighter bomber the RAF had at
the time. They went up against bridges and were almost without exception
shot out of the sky, whole squadrons were lost in minutes.

--
John

[Guy Alcala]

The Revolution Will Not Be Televised wrote:

> On Thu, 9 Oct 2003 10:42:46 +0100, "Keith Willshaw"
> > wrote:
>
> [snip Freckin' idiocy]
>
> >> Now how do you account for the increasing counts?
> >
> >That plant at Castle Bromwich which was ordered in 1938
> >
> > > From you
> >> examples, I could infer that back in 1938 Britain had pre planned the
> >> build-up and it just so happen the BoB rolled right in just then as
> >> things were picking up steam.
> >
> >Bingo , thats exactly right.
>
> Much to the annoyance of the RAF Air Staff, who had been frustrated
> with slow production output with Spitfires at both Supermarines in
> 1938-39 and Castle Bromwich in 1939-40, to the point of replacing the
> management concerned in both instances. In both cases production
> shortfalls were caused by the actual difficulties involved in
> beginning large-scale production runs requiring major investment in
> machine tools, parts manufacture, assembly processes and personnel.
> The RAF wanted that buildup to actually appear in production numbers
> in 1939, not the summer of 1940.

[From Price, referring to the problems getting Castle Bromwich into
production]

[Stanley Woodley, one of the Supermarine personnel brought in to revamp
things at the plant] " 'We were charged with proiducing 10 Spitfires by the
end of June 1940. We knew that in the short time available it was
impossible to meet that date from the resources at Castle Bromwich alone.
But by shipping up from Southhampton large numbers
of finished components, including some fully equipped fuselages, and working
around the clock, the magic "ten in June" was completed.'"

[Price] "The simple fact was that if modifications had to be incorporated,
and they had to be in great numbers, production with semi-skilled labour was
not possible. The answer was to use all the expensive jigs and the
semi-skilled labourers to produce all those components that could be made
that way, while the skilled labour forces at Castle Bromwich and Southampton
produced those components which could not. With this hybrid process
Spitfire production moved ahead rapidly at Castle Bromwich, with 23 aircraft
in July, 37 in August and 56 during the month of September."
[i]
> [snip more loon-shooting by Keith]

And thank goodness he's got the patience -- Freck crossed my threshold of
cluelessness, beyond which I won't make the effort to correct the errors,
some ways back. He's got years of reading to bring him up to speed before
there can be a valuable conversation, and it will have to be a lot more
in-depth and technical than "The Big Picture Book of World War 2 Airplanes"
level that seems to be his current fare. But I try and be charitable; when
I was 11 years old my reading material and knowledge base was equally
limited, I didn't know what I needed to read/study/experience and couldn't
understand/interpret the technical details even if I did find the right
stuff. Hell, my first real wargame (as opposed to chess, "Stratego" and
"Dogfight") was Avalon Hill's "Luftwaffe", given to me when I was 9 or so,
and I couldn't make head or tails of it at the time.

Guy

[WaltBJ]

"Ben Full" > wrote in message >...
> John Freck.exe failed a turing test with the following:
>
> > Why did Britain win the BoB?
> >
> SNIP:
I am puzzled. Where did my posts (2) to this thread go? I made one
point that interception of Me109s bingoing home sucking fumes would
have paid dividends. Well, one pilot made a practice of doing just
that. Joseph Frantisek, Czech pilot, highest scorer (17) during the
BoB, used to sneak off alone and bounce the 109s and whatever else he
could find over the Channel. I found this in a great book from my
local library, "A Question of Honor", by Olson and Cloud, ISBN
0-375-41197-6, copyright2003, published by Knopf. The primary subject
is the Polish airmen in the RAF, and what they did during the BoB and
after. You must read this book! (FWIW oddly enough the father of my
daughter's husband was one of them - Alexander Franzcak. Also odd is
we share the same birthday.)
Walt BJ

[John Freck]

John Halliwell > wrote in message >...


> In article >, John Freck
> > writes


>> I have seen WWII film footage from wing cameras showing Mustang
>> rockets killing a moving locomotive, and causing railcars filled
with
>> munitions to explode. It is very obviously that fighter bombers
can
>> attack bridges, trucks, rail, and ships.


> Have a look at the performance of the Fairey Battle during the battle
> for France, perhaps the closest thing to a fighter bomber the RAF had at
> the time. They went up against bridges and were almost without exception
> shot out of the sky, whole squadrons were lost in minutes.



It would have been nice if the Allies had been able to surpress German
logistics riding on poontoon bridges, but as you say it was attempted
and failed badly. Germany lost more planes than the Allies during the
Fall of France. Germany lost more planes because the planes were
vunerable. What made them vunerable was flying low on ground attack.
Flying low makes a plane vunerable to ground fire and attacking enemy
planes coming from above. It is hard to provide a picture of the
advantages a fighters has on anouther plane coming down from a higher
altitude, but it is similar to the advantages fighters had against the
Stuka during the BoB.
An RAF fighters could attack a diving Stuka starting from 1-2 km away;
the RAF would go into a much softer dive which would allow for the
pilot to track the Stuka in his guns' sights. This "plane of attack"
was stable and lasted for a long march of seconds. The RAF fighters
was firing his planes guns, however, at near maxium ranges. When a
fighters is over head of an enemy plane a similar tracking takes
place. The higher attacking fighter will have a speed boost from
gravitiy, and large evasions moves by the target mean small
adjustments by the attacker. Note only are low flying bomb ladden
fighter bombers vunerable to fighter attack there is the problem of
high quality AAA. Germany's AAA during 1940 seeming proved the point
that planes shouldn't be able to operate at low levels over a properly
run battlefield. Well, fighter bombers today run at over 30,000
typically and drop GPS bombs because ordinary AAA would ripe them up.

During WWII thousands of bombers, fighters, fighter bombers, and
transports were lost to fighters, fighter bombers, and AAA. All of
the above weapons can be brought down. Just pointing out that Axis
and Allied airforces took huge losses on missions isn't enough to
support the claim that the airplane was pointless.


John Freck

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

John Freck wrote in message ...

>Germany lost more planes than the Allies during the
>Fall of France.

RAF losses 10 May to 20 June 1940, forces in England
and France, due to enemy action, 931, includes losses
on the ground.

Luftwaffe aircraft lost May and June 1940 1,129 to enemy
action, 216 not due to enemy action.

French Losses in the region of 800 to 900. Then add the
Belgian and Dutch losses plus the RAF losses from
Norway since the Luftwaffe figures include such losses.

>Germany lost more planes because the planes were
>vunerable. What made them vunerable was flying low on ground attack.

The next departure from reality, the majority of the Luftwaffe
bombing sorties were medium level interdiction sorties,
level bombing. A major reason the losses were high was the
Luftwaffe was not good at escorting those strikes, the speed
bombers like the He111 were expected to be fast enough,
after all they were in Spain.

>Flying low makes a plane vunerable to ground fire and attacking enemy
>planes coming from above.

But this is not allowed to stand in the way of the preferred
lower altitude fighter bomber and twin engined bomber
solution.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

John Freck wrote in message ...
>"Keith Willshaw" > wrote in message >...
>
>
>> "John Freck" > wrote in message
>> om...


>Why do you think Britain
>didn't develop fighter bombers early like Germany?

Because Britain went with the light bomber idea pre war
and was on the defensive in 1940, which meant the RAF
fighter bombers appeared in 1941 versus 1940 for the
Luftwaffe.

>Compare just
>2-engined bombers with long ranged fighter bombers, and tell me which
>would have been better for Britain to have during the BoB.

Easy the twin engined bombers like a Wellington could haul
4,000 pounds of bombs to the invasion ports, a Hurricane
fighter bomber 500 pounds when it came into service in
1941, even the Battles could do twice this.

>Are you
>willing to argue that; in a reasonable war-game, that if Britain swaps
>all of her 2-engined bombers for fighter-bombers, that Britain will do
>worse? Never mind alternative history POD (POint of departure)
>"soundness", we are just subbing fighter bombers for bombers in a
>game. Which is more important? Which can sub for what?

Easily, the damage being done to the invasion fleet was a
factor in the decision not to go and why it had to be dispersed.

>> No sir you cant, retooling a factory and re-training its workforce
>> takes considerable time during which you produce nothing at all.
>
>What retooling? Both use the same job description workers to a tee.
>Both use riveters, welders, assemblers, fitters, cutters, pressers,
>ect.
>Both use the forklifts, ceiling cranes, metal cutters, grinders,
>torches,
>drills, ect.
>Both use large open space-warehouses-with strong ceilings.
>Both use the same basic raw materials in nearly identical
>configurations, and many parts are only different like 28" waist pants
>are different than 60" pants.

A long amount of reading into the concept of machine tools
is clearly in order here. If it was so simple then hours after
the changeover to a new model, day a Spitfire V to IX
then the entire air force should have had the new model.

Effort in man hours, Spitfire production, mark / design / jigging
and tooling

I / 339,400 / 800,000
II / 9,267 / unknown
III / 91,120 / 75,000
V / 90,000 / 105,000
VI 14,340 / 50,000
IX 43,830 / 30,000
XII / 27,210 / 16,000
VII / 86,150 / 150,000
VIII / 24,970 / 250,000
XIV / 26,120 / 17,000
21 / 168,500 / unknown
PR XI / 12,415 / unknown
Seafire I / 10,130 / 18,000
Seafire II / 3,685 / 40,000
Seafire III / 8,938 / 9,000
Seafire XV / 9,150 / unknown
Spitfire on floats 22,260 / 35,000

Figures as of September 1943 for Supermarine works in
Southampton.

Even what looks like trivial design changes imposed
delays and loss of production.

>Why didn't you use the Corsair as an example?

First flew 29 May 1940, ordered 30 June 1941 first
deliveries 3 October 1942.

>HOw did all aircraft production jump by tens or thousands per year
>then?
>All major types of aircraft, that is all fighters, bombers, fighter
>bombers, and transports all taken together all were jumping up rapidly
>for all sides monthly. How was this done, and how is it then that
>there can be no flexibility to increase fighter bombers over bombers
>from July 1st, 1940 to October 1st, 1940. Early on air bases
>themselves were producing large numbers of planes in mini factories:

So if we want the 1910 model aircraft we can do this method.

>Every piece of a warplane could be made in the field. I have heard on
>the USA's History Channel that nearly 50% of USAAF warplanes were not
>made in factories at all but on or near air bases.

This is so wrong it is really funny.

>The mini factories
>had stuff like, mini-mills, diamond grinders, drills, metal scissors,
>tool and die makers, ect. All of those can be made in a snap, are
>common, and on the shelf.

Ah yes, machine tools that take months to build are a snap,
and of course they are all waiting on the shelf for the declaration
of war.

>I consider it a fact that Britain set up
>these mini-mills very quickly and this is a prime reason Britain had
>such a high production rate.

So please detail where all those mini mills are, since no
historian has found one.

>When Germany started with this method
>too, its production went up to.

So again, show the locations.

>I don't think that it is hard to
>boost fighter production from July 1st, 1940 since it was boosted on
>an emergency basis. By no means is fighter production structurally
>limited like you indicate. Adding more assembly lines to an already
>developed plane already in production is easy and quick.
>The mini-mills can larger factory lines can be added fast until basic
>raw material availability has been tapped. Sorry. Try harder, maybe.

It is really hard to punch through such iron clad ignorance
when you cannot see the screen because you are
laughing too much.

>> Consider further the second Spitfire production plant at Castle Bromwich
>> in the West Midlands. On April 12,1938 a contract was placed for 1,000
>> Spitfires to be built at this new factory, aircraft first came off the
>> production line in September 1940.
>
>And now provide further data on how fast additional production was
>added.

Since you are so sure it was easy to ramp it up perhaps
you can provide production figures.

>I don't happen to have Hurricane and Spitfire monthly production
>counts from July, August, September, and October 1940: but I suppose
>you do.

Ah I see no information but absolute certainty about what the
facts are.

>Now how do you account for the increasing counts? From you
>examples, I could infer that back in 1938 Britain had pre planned the
>build-up and it just so happen the BoB rolled right in just then as
>things were picking up steam.

This sort of proves how random chance can make you
right occasionally. The explanation is completely correct
the increases in RAF fighter production in 1940 was due
to decisions taken in 1938 and 1939.

British Fighter output June to October 1940 by type, planned
and actual

Month // Beaufighter P/A // Defiant P/A // Hurricane P/A // Spitfire
P/A // Whirlwind P/A

June // 8/2 // 30/30 // 300/309 // 135/103 // 8/2
July // 14/5 // 50/56 // 220/272 // 140/160 // 4/3
August // 21/25 // 65/38 // 270/251 // 155/163 // 6/1
September // 24/15 // 65/41 // 280/252 // 175/156 // 8/3
October // 40/21 // 50/48 // 300/250 // 231/149 // 10/1

Total British aircraft production in 1940 January 802, February
719, March 860, April 1,081, May 1,279, June 1,591, July 1,665,
August 1,601, September 1,341, October 1,419, November
1,461, December 1,230.

There are two reasons for the summer peak, more good weather
for acceptance flights and people putting in large amounts of
overtime to produce as much as possible, with the inevitable
result of declining production as the workers tired. It took until
March 1941 to beat the peak monthly figure in 1940.

>> No they cant, there was no shortage of fuel, the bombers mostly used
>> different engines and the rest of the stuff is just silly. Once more
>> there was no shortage of aircraft, the RAF had seveal hundred
>> complete spares in stock and production was running at 300 a
>> month by September.
>
>If there was no shortage why were they so concerned to increase
>production further?

Presumably this means fuel and the answer is the air force was
going to become larger in future years. Air forces are energy
intensive, fuelling 1,000 Lancasters is the same amount of energy
needed for 2,000 armoured division miles, say 50 miles for 40
armoured divisions.

>And I never stated there is a shortage of planes, anyway. I stated
>that fighters were more important than bombers in the BoB, and Britain
>should have favored fighters even more over bombers than they did. AS
>far a a fuel shortage?

This is the usual hindsight ruling, and ignores the fact while
the RAF fighter situation became tight the pilot situation
was worse.

>I have heard in many interviews that the RAF
>was very tight on fuel. Just the other day on the Dorothy Reeem show
>that what was husbanding fighters to fight "Sea Lion" was not having
>fuel to head over ot the fight.

Which sort of fiction does this show push? The RAF did not
have a fuel problem in 1940.

>The RAF, RN, and Army were all very worried about fuel conservation.
>In addition, I have read that Britain was very interested in
>projecting confidence and prowess.

Given the problems in shipping fuel to England the British
did take conservation measures, that is all.

>> You really are totally clueless about production engineering. An
>> aircraft is an incredibly complex product, even in WW2
>> it took around 2 years to go from prototype to production.
>
>There is no point discussing things with a stale noodle either.

In that case why not go away?

>The time from first proto-type test flights to first combat plane
>mass production date is irrelevant. It would be more relevant for
>you to explain how production of a plane in mass production has
>production boosted.

It is called laying down additional produciton lines, and training
the work force, which takes around as much time as the original
lines, thanks to the need for things like machine tools and
buildings.

>As I have noted many times for you, and you don't seem impressed.
>The USAAF held in 1947 that 95% of strategic bombing missed, and only
>5% was useful.

Given the basic point most of your claimed facts are fiction
there is no rason to believe what you say, provide the source
of the quote.

>What was useful mostly at lower altitudes, which improves accuracy,
>was against rail,
>and was against energy. The energy raids were at a fairly low
>altitude too as I recall.

Try again the oil targets had the heaviest flak defences, forcing
the bombers to fly at above average heights. The USAAF ETO
heavies dropped 126,191 short tons on oil targets.

Also the USAAF bomb tonnage from heavy bombers on transport
targets for the ETO comes to 226,167 short tons of bombs, this
compares with the total bomb tonnage for medium and fighter
bombers on all targets as 257,043 short tons.

>> Fighter bombers are an absolute requirement for ground support
>> but they wont demolish the oil plants which proved to be a
>> decisive move in WW2. Nor will they destroy the enemy's transport
>> infrastructure
>
>I have seen WWII film footage from wing cameras showing Mustang
>rockets killing a moving locomotive, and causing railcars filled with
>munitions to explode. It is very obviously that fighter bombers can
>attack bridges, trucks, rail, and ships.

This leaves marshalling yards, canals and the oil industry.


>> Irrelevant. address the issue please , how do you propose
>> to destroy the German oil industry with fighter bombers
>
>Why not?

Try the fact it is out of fighter bomber range from England.

>> I know the precise opposite. Unsupported infantry gets
>> chopped up without anti-tank guns and air cover. Ask
>> the paras who got caught at Arnhem.
>
>It is not so well known that Red Army infantrymen were brought west
>just to teach Allied infantrymen their tactics for dealing with tanks,

Ah we are really into the fiction here.

>> And how do you propose to kill the enemy infantry ?
>> Wave a magic wand ?
>
>Are you a drug abuser?

I gather this is the question John Freck is frequently asked.

>I don't have all the references that might be nice for accurate
>detailing.
>I find my level of detailing fine for conceptual development.

Yes folks, live in a fact free zone so improve the elegance of
the proposed solutions.

>> The best British gun was the 17 pounder and the Americans
>> used their own 3" gun
>
>>> I bet one
>>> of those could be air delivered by glider, or parachute, or
>airplane.
>
>> You'd lose, the 17 pounder weighed 2100 kg, was 4.2 m long
>> needed a truck to tow it and each round including packing weighed
>> around 50 pounds. The largest air portable AT gun
>> was the 6 pounder but damm few of them got into action.
>
>The Douglas C-47 Dakota/Skytrain Weight empty 17,865lbs operational
>31,000lbs length 19.44 meters.

So show us how a 17 pounder fitted in and how it could be
delivered by parachute or glider.

>Medium bombers and fighter bombers made all of Normandy a major
>success and not the heavies.

Actually it was the armies that won, assisted by the air forces,
including the heavies striking at important transport targets
as well as Germany in general, keeping the Luftwaffe busy
elsewhere.

>Anything a medium bomber did during Normandy and the Normandy breakout
>could have been done by fighter bombers. The prelude to the Normandy
>invasion is just the sort of thing I'm taking about in terms of
>tactics and weapons.

The medium bombers could travel further with larger bomb
loads, the USAAF bomb tonnage by delivery type 1944

Month / heavies / mediums / fighter bombers
March / 21,346 / 5,062 / 131
April / 27,576 / 9,475 / 1,489
May / 38,029 / 15,156 / 3,689
June / 59,625 / 15,701 / 10,322
July / 46,605 / 9,883 / 6,574
August / 49,305 / 10,716 / 7,745

Not a lot of fighter bomber sorties pre June 1944.

>> ***** It brought the economy which
>> ***** sustained the enemy's armed forces to virtual collapse, although the full
>> ***** effects of this collapse had not reached the enemy's front lines when they
>> ***** were overrun by Allied forces.
>
>
>Reread, very carefully what is written above. It says that by May
>1945 the effects of strategic bombing against the German economy were
>not felt by frontline German troops.

Try "full effects", that is there were still tanks in the vehicle parks
ready for issue as produciton declined. Try the way the Luftwaffe
was crippled by lack of fuel and losses trying to stop the heavy
bombers. Try the way the German explosive situation was so
bad rock salt was being substituted for HE.


Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

[Keith Willshaw]

"John Freck" > wrote in message
om...
> John Halliwell > wrote in message
>...
>
>
> > In article >, John Freck
> > > writes
>
>
> >> I have seen WWII film footage from wing cameras showing Mustang
> >> rockets killing a moving locomotive, and causing railcars filled
> with
> >> munitions to explode. It is very obviously that fighter bombers
> can
> >> attack bridges, trucks, rail, and ships.
>
>
> > Have a look at the performance of the Fairey Battle during the battle
> > for France, perhaps the closest thing to a fighter bomber the RAF had at
> > the time. They went up against bridges and were almost without exception
> > shot out of the sky, whole squadrons were lost in minutes.
>
>
>
> It would have been nice if the Allies had been able to surpress German
> logistics riding on poontoon bridges, but as you say it was attempted
> and failed badly. Germany lost more planes than the Allies during the
> Fall of France.

The Luftwaffe lost around 1200 aircraft of all type
The RAF and French lost around 1600

> Germany lost more planes because the planes were
> vunerable. What made them vunerable was flying low on ground attack.
> Flying low makes a plane vunerable to ground fire and attacking enemy
> planes coming from above.

In fact the Luftwaffe predomiantly used level bombing from medium altitude


>I t is hard to provide a picture of the
> advantages a fighters has on anouther plane coming down from a higher
> altitude, but it is similar to the advantages fighters had against the
> Stuka during the BoB.

And yet you have been advocating the RAF adopt this strategy

> An RAF fighters could attack a diving Stuka starting from 1-2 km away;
> the RAF would go into a much softer dive which would allow for the
> pilot to track the Stuka in his guns' sights. This "plane of attack"
> was stable and lasted for a long march of seconds. The RAF fighters
> was firing his planes guns, however, at near maxium ranges. When a
> fighters is over head of an enemy plane a similar tracking takes
> place. The higher attacking fighter will have a speed boost from
> gravitiy, and large evasions moves by the target mean small
> adjustments by the attacker. Note only are low flying bomb ladden
> fighter bombers vunerable to fighter attack there is the problem of
> high quality AAA. Germany's AAA during 1940 seeming proved the point
> that planes shouldn't be able to operate at low levels over a properly
> run battlefield.

And yet you have been advocating the RAF adopt this strategy


> Well, fighter bombers today run at over 30,000
> typically and drop GPS bombs because ordinary AAA would ripe them up.
>

This is infact untrue, the attack altitudes over Iraq and Serbia
was more like 10,000 ft

> During WWII thousands of bombers, fighters, fighter bombers, and
> transports were lost to fighters, fighter bombers, and AAA. All of
> the above weapons can be brought down. Just pointing out that Axis
> and Allied airforces took huge losses on missions isn't enough to
> support the claim that the airplane was pointless.
>
>

It is if the missions failed, losing aircraft on a succesful mission
may sometimes be justified, if you lose the aircraft and dont
achieve the mission thats a real problem.

Keith

[John Halliwell]

In article >, WaltBJ
> writes
>I am puzzled. Where did my posts (2) to this thread go? I made one
>point that interception of Me109s bingoing home sucking fumes would
>have paid dividends.

One of your posts very similar to the one below appears in
rec.aviation.military.naval not sure if that's what you mean? There's
also an earlier one you posted about bingoing fuel.

Interestingly one of my posts appeared in one ng, when I'd thought I'd
posted it in another? This thread is running in about half a dozen
groups, sometimes multiple times within them group.

> Well, one pilot made a practice of doing just
>that. Joseph Frantisek, Czech pilot, highest scorer (17) during the
>BoB, used to sneak off alone and bounce the 109s and whatever else he
>could find over the Channel. I found this in a great book from my
>local library, "A Question of Honor", by Olson and Cloud, ISBN
>0-375-41197-6, copyright2003, published by Knopf. The primary subject
>is the Polish airmen in the RAF, and what they did during the BoB and
>after. You must read this book! (FWIW oddly enough the father of my
>daughter's husband was one of them - Alexander Franzcak. Also odd is
>we share the same birthday.)

--
John

[John Freck]

"Geoffrey Sinclair" > wrote in message >...


<Snip>


>> Flying low makes a plane vunerable to ground fire and attacking
enemy
>> planes coming from above.


> But this is not allowed to stand in the way of the preferred
> lower altitude fighter bomber and twin engined bomber
> solution.


Have you heard of any success using heavies to take out tanks, trucks,
communications, radar, locomotives, railline, ships, artilllier,
straffing infantry positions, or getting low level photos? Or what
about taking out a pillbox? Heavies did a little bit of the above,
and medium bombers and fighter bombers did the most.
Oh, yes, and fighter bombers fought enemy fighters, fighter bombers,
destoyers, and medium bombers.
A 'destoyers' is a category not used in English speaking militaries,
but it is very similar to a figther bomber.
IT is a cross between a medium bombers and a figher bomber,
conceptually.


The fact is that fighters, fighter bombers, and medium bombers out
number the heavies by quite a bit. What ever the RAF thought of thier
intial fighter bomber laugher defeats and the Luftwaffes stunning
victories; it is clear that the RAF built fighter bombers later and
used them for close support of land, sea, and air forces.

For the BoB? I simply said the RAF could accelerate fighter
production more by negelcting bombers more.
At least the RAF fighter command could get fuel, labor and tools, and
materials to boost what is there and to boost produciton of fighters.
I, at first, said the RAF needs more fighter bombers, but then after
being pointed out to that the RAF had no fighter bombers in current
production: I restated to read 'fighters'.

The RAF needs more fighters and higher readiness fighters over what
they did. Britain will still have bombers that are there.

John Freck











> Geoffrey Sinclair

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

John Freck wrote in message ...
>"Geoffrey Sinclair" > wrote in message >...

><Snip>

Yes, all the errors have to be removed so the subject
can be changed.

>>> Flying low makes a plane vunerable to ground fire and attacking
>>> enemy planes coming from above.
>
>> But this is not allowed to stand in the way of the preferred
>> lower altitude fighter bomber and twin engined bomber
>> solution.
>
>Have you heard of any success using heavies to take out tanks, trucks,
>communications, radar, locomotives, railline, ships, artilllier,
>straffing infantry positions, or getting low level photos? Or what
>about taking out a pillbox? Heavies did a little bit of the above,
>and medium bombers and fighter bombers did the most.

Very good, when in doubt simply define the air war as only
the missions your favourite solution is best at.

You left out marshalling yards, canals, tunnels, bridges, oil
refineries, weapons manufacturing centres etc etc.etc.

>Oh, yes, and fighter bombers fought enemy fighters, fighter bombers,
>destoyers, and medium bombers.

Amazing fact the fighters fought enemy aircraft, the bombers
tried to avoid fighting enemy aircraft.

>A 'destoyers' is a category not used in English speaking militaries,
>but it is very similar to a figther bomber.

As defined by the Luftwaffe pre war it was a long range heavy
fighter, a bomber destroyer and escort. The fighter bomber
idea came later.

>IT is a cross between a medium bombers and a figher bomber,
>conceptually.

Another piece of fiction. In 1938 hauling 1,000 pounds of bombs
had you classified as a medium bomber in the RAF, in 1943
the fighters were hauling up to 2,000 pounds and light bombers
4,000 pounds. The Zestorers ended up as day and night fighters,
and fighter bombers, using Me410s against England at night in 1944.

>For the BoB? I simply said the RAF could accelerate fighter
>production more by negelcting bombers more.

Ah, simply said, using a fact free argument that creates non
existent manufacturing abilities.

>At least the RAF fighter command could get fuel, labor and tools, and
>materials to boost what is there and to boost produciton of fighters.

You really have zero idea about what it takes to build an
aircraft. An existing line could be pushed harder for a
while with everyone working overtime, a line nearly in
service could be rushed into service. The idea that you
could suspend Wellington production to give you more
Spitfires is a joke, especially within two to three months.

>I, at first, said the RAF needs more fighter bombers, but then after
>being pointed out to that the RAF had no fighter bombers in current
>production: I restated to read 'fighters'.

I see you rewrite current history as much as you do the events
of 60 or more years ago.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

[John Freck]

"Geoffrey Sinclair" > wrote in message >...



> John Freck wrote in message ...



>> Keith Willshaw wrote in message ...


>> Why do you think Britain didn't develop
>> fighter bombers early like Germany?



> Because Britain went with the light bomber idea pre war
> and was on the defensive in 1940, which meant the RAF
> fighter bombers appeared in 1941 versus 1940 for the
> Luftwaffe.



Well, then: Why did they like the line up they went with more than
other options?



>> Compare just 2-engined bombers with long ranged
>> fighter bombers, and tell me which would have
>> been better for Britain to have during the BoB.



> Easy the twin engined bombers like a Wellington could haul
> 4,000 pounds of bombs to the invasion ports, a Hurricane
> fighter bomber 500 pounds when it came into service in
> 1941, even the Battles could do twice this.



Don't you kind of think, however, that Britain needed fighters
(fighter bombers can fight fighters, shoot down bombers, destroyers,
and transports) during the Battle of Britain more than bombers? If
Britain had the same number of a additional fighters as Britain had
bombers, then Germany would do even worse. Germany would lose more
planes faster. From July 1st, 1940 there are still bombers around to
do stuff by the hundreds if not thousands, as I recall. I'm just
providing to fighter command even a higher priority for fuel, labor
and tools, manufacturing, maintenance, and materials.



>> Are you willing to argue that; in a reasonable
>> war-game, that if Britain swaps all of her
>> 2-engined bombers for fighter bombers, that
>> Britain will do worse? Never mind alternative
>> history POD (POint of departure) "soundness",
>> we are just subbing fighter bombers for bombers
>> in a game. Which is more important? Which can
>> sub for what?



> Easily, the damage being done to the invasion
> fleet was a factor in the decision not to go
> and why it had to be dispersed.



Fighter bombers did well against naval targets, and fighter bombers
can defend against bombers and fighter bombers.



>>> No sir you cant, retooling a factory
>>> and re-training its workforce takes
>>> considerable time during which you
>>> produce nothing at all.



>> What retooling? Both use the same job description
>> workers to a tee. Both use riveters, welders,
>> assemblers, fitters, cutters, pressers, ect.
>> Both use the forklifts, ceiling cranes, metal
>> cutters, metal benders, grinders, torches, drills, ect.
>> Both use large open space-warehouses-with strong ceilings.
>> Both use the same basic raw materials in nearly identical
>> configurations, and many parts are only different like 28"
>> waist pants are different than 60" pants.



> A long amount of reading into the concept of machine tools
> is clearly in order here. If it was so simple then hours after
> the changeover to a new model, day a Spitfire V to IX
> then the entire air force should have had the new model.



We are discussing increase current model monthly production counts,
and not as you insist over and over and over, that we are discussing
accelerating the time from prototypes first test flight to first
months mass production. Mass production of the Hurricane had been
established by July 1st, 1940 and the Spitfire was on immediate path
for start-up to mass production. Did the Spitfire stay on production
targets projected from March 1938, or September 1939, or January 1940,
or June 1940, or December 1941? It has been my impression as an
American that new airplane production surpassed all projection by
government and corporate economists.



<Snipped 50+ lines on trasnistioning to newer models>



>> Why didn't you use the Corsair as an example?



> First flew 29 May 1940, ordered 30 June 1941 first
> deliveries 3 October 1942.



This Corsair information is relevant to increasing Hurricane
production from July 1st, 1940, exactly how? It might somehow be
relevant to increasing Tempest production for July 1st, 1940. Is it
relevant to Spitfire productions exceeding economists projections from
July 1, 1940? Please, give me a clue, and just go into some great
detail!



>> HOw did all aircraft production jump by tens
>> or thousands per year then? All major types
>> of aircraft, that is all fighters, bombers,
>> fighter bombers, and transports all taken
>> together all were jumping up rapidly for all
>> sides monthly. How was this done, and how
>> is it then that there can be no flexibility
>> to increase fighter bombers over bombers from
>> July 1st, 1940 to October 1st, 1940. Early on
>> air bases themselves were producing large
>> numbers of planes in mini factories:



> So if we want the 1910 model
> aircraft we can do this method.



I think you need to understand that historians are not all they are
cracked up to be, you missed some interesting information on
manufacturing in W.W.II.



>> Every piece of a warplane could be made in
>> the field. I have heard on the USA's
>> History Channel that nearly 50% of USAAF
>> warplanes were not made in factories at
>> all but on or near air bases.



> This is so wrong it is really funny.



The United States military very robust maintenance of machines during
W.W.II. On board every large aircraft carrier there were, and still
are, factories capable of making any mechanical part needed for any
airplane the aircraft carrier carries. The scale of Allied, and Axis,
repair and mantenicen was huge and sophisticated. YOu might be a
historian, and as such you might not realize that people have been
making planes in small garages for a long time.
The repair and maintenance made complete airplanes in W.W.II. You
need to have your nose out for the sort on information in relaying to
you. There is a moderator of soc.history.wwii who pontificate on the
Axis logistical situation in the Mediterreans from 1940-1943. The
book he liked to quote had no mention of German, and Axis, military
barges augmenting Axis supply in Africa--but they existed, as do
mini-mills and small aircraft factories on and near air bases during
W.W.II. You will just have to keep a nose out. It is really sad how
ignorant some "experts" are around here. I suppose you don't think
that a mini-mill can even exist.



>> The mini factories had stuff like, mini-mills,
>> diamond grinders, drills, metal scissors,
>> tool and die makers, ect. All of those can
>> be made in a snap, are common, and on the shelf.



> Ah yes, machine tools that take months to build are a snap,
> and of course they are all waiting on the shelf for the declaration
> of war.



Friend, the Hurricane's production was augmented this way, and repair
and manitience was upgrade very quickly as to allow them to make
planes. What machine tool for the Hurricane can't be made very fast?



>> I consider it a fact that Britain set up these mini-mills
>> very quickly and this is a prime reason Britain had
>> such a high production rate.



> So please detail where all those mini mills are, since no
> historian has found one.



You have never come across one in books you read
because the historian who write them are ignorant of them.
The exist today, as yesterday, on board every capital class
USN aircraft carrier, and still today on large air force bases.
Look, why don't you invest more time called me dumb, and then
I might be more motivated to show you I'm right. Or you can look
for, or nose for, a documentary on the B-26 which repeats fairly
often on the US History Channel.



>> When Germany started with this method
>> too, its production went up to.



> So again, show the locations.



You have to provoke me more. Provoke me like, Phillip McGregor,
provoked me into proving that the Axis used military barges to supply
its armies and air forces in Africa. He never knew they built 700
very large landingcrafts, barges, that could deliver on most any beach
on the shores of Africa, or Black Sea, or Baltic Sea. He would rant
about trucks rolling thousands of miles to deliver fuel and other
stuff from ports in Libya. His book's author had it that way. Buddy,
Allied and Axis both used mini factories for weapons' repair to the
scale as allowing for new construction near the action. I have met
gunsmiths, former soldiers, who have very small furnaces in garages.
The can make, literally, an M-16, their own bullets, or a host of
metal parts. If you keep a look out you will discover what I'm
talking about. I'm sure it didn't peak your interest, and that's all.



>> I don't think that it is hard to boost fighter
>> production from July 1st, 1940 since it was
>> boosted on an emergency basis. By no means
>> is fighter production structurally limited
>> like you indicate. Adding more assembly
>> lines to an already developed plane already
>> in production is easy and quick. The mini-mills
>> can larger factory lines can be added fast
>> until basic raw material availability has
>> been tapped. Sorry. Try harder, maybe.



> It is really hard to punch through such iron clad ignorance
> when you cannot see the screen because you are
> laughing too much.



It is really sad in your case.



>>> Consider further the second Spitfire
>>> production plant at Castle Bromwich
>>> in the West Midlands. On April 12,1938
>>> a contract was placed for 1,000 Spitfires
>>> to be built at this new factory, aircraft
>>> first came off the production line in
>>> September 1940.



>> And now provide further data on how
>> fast additional production was added.



> Since you are so sure it was
> easy to ramp it up perhaps you
> can provide production figures.



Now, it is whether, it was ‘easy' or ‘hard' to have production
sky-rocket past the projections of government and corporate
economists! Ok, we can break horns here, if we're not careful. How
do you like this? ‘It is hard, very hard and difficult, for brave
smart Brits to have fighter production sky-rocket past the projections
of government and corporate projections.'



What is easy, is for me to suggest 60+ years latter that Britain
should have put even more effort into making that sky-rocket happen
sooner, or harder, or more intensely. They should have put even more
pressure on bomber command for resources.



>> I don't happen to have Hurricane and Spitfire
>> monthly production counts from July, August,
>> September, and October 1940: but I suppose you do.



> Ah I see no information but absolute certainty about what the
> facts are.



As this debate goes on I might show that USA production exceed
economists projections. I don't feel like doing the homework. If I
had an aid, I might assign her to do some research, but this is chat.



>> Now how do you account for the increasing
>> counts? From you examples, I could infer
>> that back in 1938 Britain had pre planned the
>> build-up and it just so happen the BoB rolled
>> right in just then as things were picking up steam.



> This sort of proves how random chance can make you
> right occasionally. The explanation is completely correct
> the increases in RAF fighter production in 1940 was due
> to decisions taken in 1938 and 1939.


> British Fighter output June to October 1940 by type, planned
> and actual


> Month // Beau fighter P/A // Defiant P/A // Hurricane P/A // Spitfire
> P/A // Whirlwind P/A


> June // 8/2 // 30/30 // 300/309 // 135/103 // 8/2
> July // 14/5 // 50/56 // 220/272 // 140/160 // 4/3
> August // 21/25 // 65/38 // 270/251 // 155/163 // 6/1
> September // 24/15 // 65/41 // 280/252 // 175/156 // 8/3
> October // 40/21 // 50/48 // 300/250 // 231/149 // 10/1

> Total British aircraft production in 1940 January 802, February
> 719, March 860, April 1,081, May 1,279, June 1,591, July 1,665,
> August 1,601, September 1,341, October 1,419, November
> 1,461, December 1,230.



Production doubled. Well, I have it that aviation production
expansion was faster than projected by far, maybe this is a USA
artifact and not a Brit thing after all. Are you positive that RAF
front line strength was unaffected by on-or-near base manufacturing?
And that this on-ronear-base manufacturing was rapidly expanded?
Since you are interested, here is a related problem: How to boost the
French's readiness. If you were to prepare the French's air force
from January 1940, what would you spend on? How would you spending
work? How would it be similar to Britain's better preparedness?


So, you have it that production numbers were right in line with
economic projections from 1938-? To when? When did, if ever, did
British aircraft production exceed projections, and I don't mean
monthly, fringing projections!



> There are two reasons for the summer peak, more good weather
> for acceptance flights and people putting in large amounts of
> overtime to produce as much as possible, with the inevitable
> result of declining production as the workers tired. It took until
> March 1941 to beat the peak monthly figure in 1940.


Bomber production was going up according to my atlas, and rapidly.




>> I have heard in many interviews that the RAF
>> was very tight on fuel. Just the other day
>> on the Dorothy Reeem show that what was
>> husbanding fighters to fight "Sea Lion"
>> was not having fuel to head over ot the fight.



> Which sort of fiction does this show push?
> The RAF did not have a fuel problem in 1940.




Why were resource husbanded long after any serious military analyst
thought Sea Lion was any threat at all. Even when all the top
commanders and top insider intelligence staff officers who know that
was real feared an invasion, Germany did very little other than BoB to
prepare of Sea Lion. Germany during Britain's greatest anxiety was not
doing logical preparation for an invasion: But still Britain husbanded
resources vigorously, really strenuously. Britain was in a
conservation mode to the hilt and this was not just propaganda.


>> The RAF, RN, and Army were all very worried
>> about fuel conservation. In addition, I have
>> read that Britain was very interested in
>> projecting confidence and prowess.



> Given the problems in shipping fuel to England the British
> did take conservation measures, that is all.



NO. Britain was not simply conserving. It done with great sense of
emergency, top national priority, for the survival of the nation, all
sectors had inspectors and enforcers. The government mean business,
there was tremendous mass media attention. You write the fiction
according to the people who lived it and fought the BoB. Britain will
tremendous dramatic energy--conserved energy like victory of defeat
hung in the balance, and the top and inside, and the bottom and
outside all thought it was the truth. Your emotional casting is
Monday morning quarterbacking for a winning team; and this QB cares to
cast the tight game as "effortless." You are understating a situation
you didn't live though, and the people who did live thru it don't like
the way you cast the situation.


<Snip>



> In that case why not go away?



It is somewhat fun to debate. You see, I know that in your hardest
heart you really do think, project, that Britain simply went with some
conservation measures. And you think, and write with complete ablam.
Well, the USA military history reader demands differently than you,
and will win since the American emotional reaction is accurate. Your
emotional reaction is s form of denial.



John Freck

[Grantland]

(robert arndt) wrote:

>> Britain won the BoB because Churchill bombed Berlin and spoofed Adolf
>> into diverting the the airfield assaults onto London. EOS.
>>
>> Grantland
>
>Let me add that it was a lone German bomber that ditched its bombs
>over London that caused the British reprisal raid on Berlin and change
>of tactics that: relieved Fighter Command, enabled the airfields and
>manufacturing plants to be repaired, and assured the Brits that the
>German battle for air supremacy would fail now that civilian targets
>were being hit instead of military ones. EOS indeed!
>
>Rob

Well I could dispute the provenance of the "ditched" bombs, and the
absolute *need* to take heat off the airfields.. but Keith would chide
me. 'Can't have that.

Grantland

[Keith Willshaw]

"John Freck" > wrote in message
om...
> "Geoffrey Sinclair" > wrote in message
>...
>
>
> <Snip>
>
>
> >> Flying low makes a plane vunerable to ground fire and attacking
> enemy
> >> planes coming from above.
>
>
> > But this is not allowed to stand in the way of the preferred
> > lower altitude fighter bomber and twin engined bomber
> > solution.
>
>
> Have you heard of any success using heavies to take out tanks, trucks,
> communications, radar, locomotives, railline, ships, artilllier,
> straffing infantry positions, or getting low level photos?

Well yes actually on the night prior to D-Day 1211 aircraft of bomber
command attacked the German forces behind the beacheads
dropping over 5000 tons of bombs on roads , troop concentrations,
marshalling yards, radar sites, gun emplacements and railway junctions.

> Or what
> about taking out a pillbox? Heavies did a little bit of the above,
> and medium bombers and fighter bombers did the most.
> Oh, yes, and fighter bombers fought enemy fighters, fighter bombers,
> destoyers, and medium bombers.

Not without dumping their bombs they didnt

> A 'destoyers' is a category not used in English speaking militaries,
> but it is very similar to a figther bomber.
> IT is a cross between a medium bombers and a figher bomber,
> conceptually.
>


The Zerstorer in Luftwaffe service was a failure in the
Battle of Britian

>
> The fact is that fighters, fighter bombers, and medium bombers out
> number the heavies by quite a bit. What ever the RAF thought of thier
> intial fighter bomber laugher defeats and the Luftwaffes stunning
> victories; it is clear that the RAF built fighter bombers later and
> used them for close support of land, sea, and air forces.
>

The luftwaffe were mostly using aircraft like the Ju-87, Do-17
and He-111, none of which were fighter bombers, those arrived
later in the war.

> For the BoB? I simply said the RAF could accelerate fighter
> production more by negelcting bombers more.

And you were simply wrong

> At least the RAF fighter command could get fuel, labor and tools, and
> materials to boost what is there and to boost produciton of fighters.

This has been shown to be incorrect

> I, at first, said the RAF needs more fighter bombers, but then after
> being pointed out to that the RAF had no fighter bombers in current
> production: I restated to read 'fighters'.
>

Which is why the RAF ordered the new factories in 1938,
by the time of the BOB it was WAY too late to switch.

> The RAF needs more fighters and higher readiness fighters over what
> they did. Britain will still have bombers that are there.
>


Bombers arent there unless you build them especially
when losses are as high as they were.

Keith

[Keith Willshaw]

"John Freck" > wrote in message
om...
> "Geoffrey Sinclair" > wrote in message
>...
>

>
> > Because Britain went with the light bomber idea pre war
> > and was on the defensive in 1940, which meant the RAF
> > fighter bombers appeared in 1941 versus 1940 for the
> > Luftwaffe.
>
>
>
> Well, then: Why did they like the line up they went with more than
> other options?
>

Because the theory that almost eveyone subscribed to that
the bomber would always get through proved false. What
was a great shock was the efiiciency of the German light
flak.

>
>
> >> Compare just 2-engined bombers with long ranged
> >> fighter bombers, and tell me which would have
> >> been better for Britain to have during the BoB.
>
>
>
> > Easy the twin engined bombers like a Wellington could haul
> > 4,000 pounds of bombs to the invasion ports, a Hurricane
> > fighter bomber 500 pounds when it came into service in
> > 1941, even the Battles could do twice this.
>
>
>
> Don't you kind of think, however, that Britain needed fighters
> (fighter bombers can fight fighters, shoot down bombers, destroyers,
> and transports) during the Battle of Britain more than bombers? If
> Britain had the same number of a additional fighters as Britain had
> bombers, then Germany would do even worse. Germany would lose more
> planes faster. From July 1st, 1940 there are still bombers around to
> do stuff by the hundreds if not thousands, as I recall.

You recall incorrectly. The RAF were giving maximum priority
to fighters and bomber command had only 500 or so bombers
ready for operations in 1940 and many of those were obsolete
types like the battle and whitley

> I'm just
> providing to fighter command even a higher priority for fuel, labor
> and tools, manufacturing, maintenance, and materials.
>

It already had the highest priority but you cant fit a Hercules Radial
engine from a bomber into a fighter or use the geodesic airframe
line for the Wellington to build Spitfires.

>
>
> >> Are you willing to argue that; in a reasonable
> >> war-game, that if Britain swaps all of her
> >> 2-engined bombers for fighter bombers, that
> >> Britain will do worse? Never mind alternative
> >> history POD (POint of departure) "soundness",
> >> we are just subbing fighter bombers for bombers
> >> in a game. Which is more important? Which can
> >> sub for what?
>
>
>
> > Easily, the damage being done to the invasion
> > fleet was a factor in the decision not to go
> > and why it had to be dispersed.
>
>
>
> Fighter bombers did well against naval targets, and fighter bombers
> can defend against bombers and fighter bombers.
>

Please provide us with details of the number of raids
land based fighter bombers made against German
Naval bases.

>
>
> >>> No sir you cant, retooling a factory
> >>> and re-training its workforce takes
> >>> considerable time during which you
> >>> produce nothing at all.
>
>
>
> >> What retooling? Both use the same job description
> >> workers to a tee. Both use riveters, welders,
> >> assemblers, fitters, cutters, pressers, ect.
> >> Both use the forklifts, ceiling cranes, metal
> >> cutters, metal benders, grinders, torches, drills, ect.
> >> Both use large open space-warehouses-with strong ceilings.
> >> Both use the same basic raw materials in nearly identical
> >> configurations, and many parts are only different like 28"
> >> waist pants are different than 60" pants.
>
>
>
> > A long amount of reading into the concept of machine tools
> > is clearly in order here. If it was so simple then hours after
> > the changeover to a new model, day a Spitfire V to IX
> > then the entire air force should have had the new model.
>
>
>
> We are discussing increase current model monthly production counts,
> and not as you insist over and over and over, that we are discussing
> accelerating the time from prototypes first test flight to first
> months mass production. Mass production of the Hurricane had been
> established by July 1st, 1940 and the Spitfire was on immediate path
> for start-up to mass production.

No it was IN mass production

> Did the Spitfire stay on production
> targets projected from March 1938, or September 1939, or January 1940,
> or June 1940, or December 1941? It has been my impression as an
> American that new airplane production surpassed all projection by
> government and corporate economists.
>

True but that happened as a result of massive investment years
before production started

>
>
> <Snipped 50+ lines on trasnistioning to newer models>
>
>
>
> >> Why didn't you use the Corsair as an example?
>
>
>
> > First flew 29 May 1940, ordered 30 June 1941 first
> > deliveries 3 October 1942.
>
>
>
> This Corsair information is relevant to increasing Hurricane
> production from July 1st, 1940, exactly how? It might somehow be
> relevant to increasing Tempest production for July 1st, 1940. Is it
> relevant to Spitfire productions exceeding economists projections from
> July 1, 1940? Please, give me a clue, and just go into some great
> detail!
>
>

No new fighter factory produced aircraft in less than 18 months

No existing production line be retooled over night


>
> >> HOw did all aircraft production jump by tens
> >> or thousands per year then? All major types
> >> of aircraft, that is all fighters, bombers,
> >> fighter bombers, and transports all taken
> >> together all were jumping up rapidly for all
> >> sides monthly. How was this done, and how
> >> is it then that there can be no flexibility
> >> to increase fighter bombers over bombers from
> >> July 1st, 1940 to October 1st, 1940. Early on
> >> air bases themselves were producing large
> >> numbers of planes in mini factories:
>
>
>
> > So if we want the 1910 model
> > aircraft we can do this method.
>
>
>
> I think you need to understand that historians are not all they are
> cracked up to be, you missed some interesting information on
> manufacturing in W.W.II.
>

Quote ONE historian who states that airbases produced their
own aircraft during WW"


Keith

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

This will probably appear in the wrong spot, thanks to
a malfuncitoning news server.

John Freck wrote in message ...
>"Geoffrey Sinclair" > wrote in message >...
>
>> John Freck wrote in message ...
>
>>> Keith Willshaw wrote in message ...
>
>>> Why do you think Britain didn't develop
>>> fighter bombers early like Germany?
>
>> Because Britain went with the light bomber idea pre war
>> and was on the defensive in 1940, which meant the RAF
>> fighter bombers appeared in 1941 versus 1940 for the
>> Luftwaffe.
>
>Well, then: Why did they like the line up they went with more than
>other options?

Could you consider using english as the method of
expression? The straight answer to what I think is
your question was the light bomber idea was proved
expensive, while a purpose designed airframe could
carry more bombs it was more vulnerable than fighters.
In 1944 this would not have mattered for the allies but it
did in 1941 when production priorities were set. It also
meant fewer types of aircraft to produce and maintain.

>>> Compare just 2-engined bombers with long ranged
>>> fighter bombers, and tell me which would have
>>> been better for Britain to have during the BoB.
>
>> Easy the twin engined bombers like a Wellington could haul
>> 4,000 pounds of bombs to the invasion ports, a Hurricane
>> fighter bomber 500 pounds when it came into service in
>> 1941, even the Battles could do twice this.
>
>Don't you kind of think, however, that Britain needed fighters
>(fighter bombers can fight fighters, shoot down bombers, destroyers,
>and transports) during the Battle of Britain more than bombers?

Not to replace bombers striking the invasion fleet.

>If
>Britain had the same number of a additional fighters as Britain had
>bombers, then Germany would do even worse. Germany would lose more
>planes faster. From July 1st, 1940 there are still bombers around to
>do stuff by the hundreds if not thousands, as I recall. I'm just
>providing to fighter command even a higher priority for fuel, labor
>and tools, manufacturing, maintenance, and materials.

You have zero idea of how long it takes to switch production
of different types and have invented a non existent fuel crisis.

Actually fighter command had a high pre war priority, partly
due to the fact the aircraft and their airbases cost less.

It would be good for you to consider checking out the actual
strength of Bomber Command in 1940. A big raid was
100 aircraft, the average number of aircraft flown was less
than 100 per day.

>>> Are you willing to argue that; in a reasonable
>>> war-game, that if Britain swaps all of her
>>> 2-engined bombers for fighter bombers, that
>>> Britain will do worse? Never mind alternative
>>> history POD (POint of departure) "soundness",
>>> we are just subbing fighter bombers for bombers
>>> in a game. Which is more important? Which can
>>> sub for what?
>
>> Easily, the damage being done to the invasion
>> fleet was a factor in the decision not to go
>> and why it had to be dispersed.
>
>Fighter bombers did well against naval targets, and fighter bombers
>can defend against bombers and fighter bombers.

Fine so show us the fighter bomber strikes on ships
in harbour, how many they sank and how many
fighter bombers were lost. Then show us how well
the fighter bombers did at night strikes.

>>>> No sir you cant, retooling a factory
>>>> and re-training its workforce takes
>>>> considerable time during which you
>>>> produce nothing at all.
>
>>> What retooling? Both use the same job description
>>> workers to a tee. Both use riveters, welders,
>>> assemblers, fitters, cutters, pressers, ect.
>>> Both use the forklifts, ceiling cranes, metal
>>> cutters, metal benders, grinders, torches, drills, ect.
>>> Both use large open space-warehouses-with strong ceilings.
>>> Both use the same basic raw materials in nearly identical
>>> configurations, and many parts are only different like 28"
>>> waist pants are different than 60" pants.
>
>> A long amount of reading into the concept of machine tools
>> is clearly in order here. If it was so simple then hours after
>> the changeover to a new model, day a Spitfire V to IX
>> then the entire air force should have had the new model.
>
>We are discussing increase current model monthly production counts,
>and not as you insist over and over and over, that we are discussing
>accelerating the time from prototypes first test flight to first
>months mass production.

You still do not get it do you, to accelerate production requires
significant effort throughout the supply chain. And it seems
you intend to keep trying to pretend a new production line
could be set up nearly instantaneously.

>Mass production of the Hurricane had been
>established by July 1st, 1940 and the Spitfire was on immediate path
>for start-up to mass production.

The Spitfire was in major production in 1940, the problem
was the second, larger factory, had not come on line as
planned.

>Did the Spitfire stay on production
>targets projected from March 1938, or September 1939, or January 1940,
>or June 1940, or December 1941? It has been my impression as an
>American that new airplane production surpassed all projection by
>government and corporate economists.

It has been your impression, from what figures can anyone
ask? The Spitfire production was behind projections
until at least the end of 1940, thanks to the initial problems
building it and the problems starting the second production
line.

><Snipped 50+ lines on trasnistioning to newer models>

putting it back in to prove someone cannot count, maybe
it will get through the jigging and tooling costs are for
setting up a production line.

Effort in man hours, Spitfire production, mark / design / jigging
and tooling

I / 339,400 / 800,000
II / 9,267 / unknown
III / 91,120 / 75,000
V / 90,000 / 105,000
VI 14,340 / 50,000
IX 43,830 / 30,000
XII / 27,210 / 16,000
VII / 86,150 / 150,000
VIII / 24,970 / 250,000
XIV / 26,120 / 17,000
21 / 168,500 / unknown
PR XI / 12,415 / unknown
Seafire I / 10,130 / 18,000
Seafire II / 3,685 / 40,000
Seafire III / 8,938 / 9,000
Seafire XV / 9,150 / unknown
Spitfire on floats 22,260 / 35,000

>>> Why didn't you use the Corsair as an example?
>
>> First flew 29 May 1940, ordered 30 June 1941 first
>> deliveries 3 October 1942.
>
>This Corsair information is relevant to increasing Hurricane
>production from July 1st, 1940, exactly how?

You are the one who suggested people look at Corsiars
so tell us yourself.

> It might somehow be
>relevant to increasing Tempest production for July 1st, 1940. Is it
>relevant to Spitfire productions exceeding economists projections from
>July 1, 1940? Please, give me a clue, and just go into some great
>detail!

On your current output you do not have a clue.

>>> HOw did all aircraft production jump by tens
>>> or thousands per year then? All major types
>>> of aircraft, that is all fighters, bombers,
>>> fighter bombers, and transports all taken
>>> together all were jumping up rapidly for all
>>> sides monthly. How was this done, and how
>>> is it then that there can be no flexibility
>>> to increase fighter bombers over bombers from
>>> July 1st, 1940 to October 1st, 1940. Early on
>>> air bases themselves were producing large
>>> numbers of planes in mini factories:
>
>> So if we want the 1910 model
>> aircraft we can do this method.
>
>I think you need to understand that historians are not all they are
>cracked up to be, you missed some interesting information on
>manufacturing in W.W.II.

No I prefer to go with the idea some users of the internet are
not all they are cracked up to be, and the historians are
much more likely to be correct.

>>> Every piece of a warplane could be made in
>>> the field. I have heard on the USA's
>>> History Channel that nearly 50% of USAAF
>>> warplanes were not made in factories at
>>> all but on or near air bases.
>
>> This is so wrong it is really funny.
>
>The United States military very robust maintenance of machines during
>W.W.II. On board every large aircraft carrier there were, and still
>are, factories capable of making any mechanical part needed for any
>airplane the aircraft carrier carries.

Oh my ribs, I cannot laugh this much, Does any mechanical
part include wing spars, tyres, fuselage sections or do we
have someone confusing minor repairs with major production.

It is a wonder we do not see the aircraft production total of
say the USS Essex. What is the current output of F-18s
from the USS Nimitz?

>The scale of Allied, and Axis,
>repair and mantenicen was huge and sophisticated. YOu might be a
>historian, and as such you might not realize that people have been
>making planes in small garages for a long time.

Fine I would like 1,000 Spitfires from your garage and within
2 months of now. Start immediately, you should be able to
have the tools in by the end of the week, given your claims
about their availability, and then crank out the aircraft.

Show us the great flexibilty, Bf109 day one, Fw190 day two,
Hurricane day three, P-47 day four, P-38 day five and a
Hayate day six, then rest, the following week a mixture of
Lancasters, Ju-88s, G4M1, B-24s, Pe2s would be nice.

>The repair and maintenance made complete airplanes in W.W.II. You
>need to have your nose out for the sort on information in relaying to
>you.

This is quite funny, apparently all those RAF Civilian Maintenance
Units were not only back yard affairs but made their own parts,
not fitting parts like spars sent from the manufacturers. The salvage
units did sometimes put written off aircraft back into the air, by
creatively using their stock of salvaged parts.

>There is a moderator of soc.history.wwii who pontificate on the
>Axis logistical situation in the Mediterreans from 1940-1943. The
>book he liked to quote had no mention of German, and Axis, military
>barges augmenting Axis supply in Africa--but they existed, as do
>mini-mills and small aircraft factories on and near air bases during
>W.W.II. You will just have to keep a nose out. It is really sad how
>ignorant some "experts" are around here. I suppose you don't think
>that a mini-mill can even exist.

Yes the laughter value is quit high, the fleet of low freeboard
barges supplying Rommel across an Ocean. The need to
simply state over and over there were aircraft manufacturing
plants on airbases, plants no one else has ever heard of,
and when asked for proof, simply restate the claim and go
boating.

I doubt this will matter, but try and read the following British
histories,

Design and Development of weapons, by Postan, Hay and Scott
British War Production by Postan
British War Economy Hancock and Gowing.
Factories and Plant by Hornby

And for the UK fuel situation,

Oil; a study of war-time policy and administration, by Payton-Smith.

They all make it clear the aircraft were built in factories
that took years to bring to full production and that the RAF
was not short of fuel.

>>> The mini factories had stuff like, mini-mills,
>>> diamond grinders, drills, metal scissors,
>>> tool and die makers, ect. All of those can
>>> be made in a snap, are common, and on the shelf.
>
>> Ah yes, machine tools that take months to build are a snap,
>> and of course they are all waiting on the shelf for the declaration
>> of war.
>
>Friend, the Hurricane's production was augmented this way, and repair
>and manitience was upgrade very quickly as to allow them to make
>planes.

Try and provide proof instead of simply repeating fiction.

>What machine tool for the Hurricane can't be made very fast?

It depends on what part of the aircraft you are talking
about, the engine or airframe for example. For the
airframe it is the jigging and tooling to produce the
components accurately.

>>> I consider it a fact that Britain set up these mini-mills
>>> very quickly and this is a prime reason Britain had
>>> such a high production rate.
>
>> So please detail where all those mini mills are, since no
>> historian has found one.
>
>You have never come across one in books you read
>because the historian who write them are ignorant of them.

Translation there is no evidence they exist as a method
of producing aircraft, only the truth bringer has seen them.

>The exist today, as yesterday, on board every capital class
>USN aircraft carrier, and still today on large air force bases.

So how many F-18s does the average USN carrier
produce a year? What is the production rate of the
standard USAF airbase?

>Look, why don't you invest more time called me dumb, and then
>I might be more motivated to show you I'm right.

Yes folks, it is easier to be fact free so why take the effort
to learn, or even back up statements.

>Or you can look
>for, or nose for, a documentary on the B-26 which repeats fairly
>often on the US History Channel.

So tell us all how many B-26s were made at USAAF airbases?

>>> When Germany started with this method
>>> too, its production went up to.
>
>> So again, show the locations.
>
>You have to provoke me more.

Yes folks no facts.

>Provoke me like, Phillip McGregor,
>provoked me into proving that the Axis used military barges to supply
>its armies and air forces in Africa. He never knew they built 700
>very large landingcrafts, barges, that could deliver on most any beach
>on the shores of Africa, or Black Sea, or Baltic Sea. He would rant
>about trucks rolling thousands of miles to deliver fuel and other
>stuff from ports in Libya. His book's author had it that way.

The only problem with barges, sending them across the ocean,
bad move that. Supplying Rommel with barges from Italy is
another losing strategy.

It seems after being shown as being so wrong by one person
the only thing to do is go into another area and try to pretend
to be right.

> Buddy,
>Allied and Axis both used mini factories for weapons' repair to the
>scale as allowing for new construction near the action.

Ah I see the ability to make basic repairs is turned into the
ability to make whole machines. So every backyard
mechanic can turn out vehicles in numbers, silly then to
create mass production lines, go back to the craft system.

>I have met
>gunsmiths, former soldiers, who have very small furnaces in garages.
>The can make, literally, an M-16, their own bullets, or a host of
>metal parts. If you keep a look out you will discover what I'm
>talking about. I'm sure it didn't peak your interest, and that's all.

Tell me how many bridges and canyons did they sell
you after the demonstration?

>>> I don't think that it is hard to boost fighter
>>> production from July 1st, 1940 since it was
>>> boosted on an emergency basis. By no means
>>> is fighter production structurally limited
>>> like you indicate. Adding more assembly
>>> lines to an already developed plane already
>>> in production is easy and quick. The mini-mills
>>> can larger factory lines can be added fast
>>> until basic raw material availability has
>>> been tapped. Sorry. Try harder, maybe.
>
>> It is really hard to punch through such iron clad ignorance
>> when you cannot see the screen because you are
>> laughing too much.
>
>It is really sad in your case.

I am having too much fun.

>>>> Consider further the second Spitfire
>>>> production plant at Castle Bromwich
>>>> in the West Midlands. On April 12,1938
>>>> a contract was placed for 1,000 Spitfires
>>>> to be built at this new factory, aircraft
>>>> first came off the production line in
>>>> September 1940.
>
>>> And now provide further data on how
>>> fast additional production was added.
>
>> Since you are so sure it was
>> easy to ramp it up perhaps you
>> can provide production figures.
>
>Now, it is whether, it was ‘easy' or ‘hard' to have production
>sky-rocket past the projections of government and corporate
>economists! Ok, we can break horns here, if we're not careful.

I just love the rhetoric, hard to lock horns with those who
have crashed and burnt.

> How do you like this? ‘It is hard, very hard and difficult, for brave
>smart Brits to have fighter production sky-rocket past the projections
>of government and corporate projections.'

Oh my ribs, no production figures just a slogan, wow, the
good old marketing approach, use a slogan shouting success
to cover failure.

>What is easy, is for me to suggest 60+ years latter that Britain
>should have put even more effort into making that sky-rocket happen
>sooner, or harder, or more intensely. They should have put even more
>pressure on bomber command for resources.

This is really funny, the absolute hindsight historian now in full
retreat to motherhood statements, that the RAF could have
ramped up production earlier, how about 1930?

>>> I don't happen to have Hurricane and Spitfire
>>> monthly production counts from July, August,
>>> September, and October 1940: but I suppose you do.
>
>> Ah I see no information but absolute certainty about what the
>> facts are.
>
>As this debate goes on I might show that USA production exceed
>economists projections. I don't feel like doing the homework. If I
>had an aid, I might assign her to do some research, but this is chat.

I doubt anyone is holding their breath for facts from John Freck.
It seems the fact one country can exceed production targets in
an area means all countries can do so quickly and easily.
Remember apparently the British can change production in
a matter of days.

>>> Now how do you account for the increasing
>>> counts? From you examples, I could infer
>>> that back in 1938 Britain had pre planned the
>>> build-up and it just so happen the BoB rolled
>>> right in just then as things were picking up steam.
>
>> This sort of proves how random chance can make you
>> right occasionally. The explanation is completely correct
>> the increases in RAF fighter production in 1940 was due
>> to decisions taken in 1938 and 1939.
>
>
>> British Fighter output June to October 1940 by type, planned
>> and actual
>
>
>> Month // Beau fighter P/A // Defiant P/A // Hurricane P/A // Spitfire
>> P/A // Whirlwind P/A
>
>
>> June // 8/2 // 30/30 // 300/309 // 135/103 // 8/2
>> July // 14/5 // 50/56 // 220/272 // 140/160 // 4/3
>> August // 21/25 // 65/38 // 270/251 // 155/163 // 6/1
>> September // 24/15 // 65/41 // 280/252 // 175/156 // 8/3
>> October // 40/21 // 50/48 // 300/250 // 231/149 // 10/1
>
>> Total British aircraft production in 1940 January 802, February
>> 719, March 860, April 1,081, May 1,279, June 1,591, July 1,665,
>> August 1,601, September 1,341, October 1,419, November
>> 1,461, December 1,230.
>
>Production doubled. Well, I have it that aviation production
>expansion was faster than projected by far, maybe this is a USA
>artifact and not a Brit thing after all.

Note by the way "he has it" but will not share it.

>Are you positive that RAF
>front line strength was unaffected by on-or-near base manufacturing?

Positive, there was no on or near base manufacturing.

>And that this on-ronear-base manufacturing was rapidly expanded?

There was zero, nil, none, near or on base manufacturing.

>Since you are interested, here is a related problem: How to boost the
>French's readiness. If you were to prepare the French's air force
>from January 1940, what would you spend on? How would you spending
>work? How would it be similar to Britain's better preparedness?

How about you actually detail with supported facts and
references your claims about the British first. Since it
is clear you have no idea of what actually happened
and what could be done. It is a waste of time to repeat
the same absurdities about the French.

>So, you have it that production numbers were right in line with
>economic projections from 1938-? To when? When did, if ever, did
>British aircraft production exceed projections, and I don't mean
>monthly, fringing projections!

Are we talking about a particular type, a particular category
or the overall total? Why not look up the references on how
the RAF armed for war? The histories I mentioned earlier
have pages of tables on projected and actual aircraft
production, including the times production was ahead of
projections and when it was behind.

Then there are the many studies on how the RAF mobilised
before WWII.

>> There are two reasons for the summer peak, more good weather
>> for acceptance flights and people putting in large amounts of
>> overtime to produce as much as possible, with the inevitable
>> result of declining production as the workers tired. It took until
>> March 1941 to beat the peak monthly figure in 1940.
>
>Bomber production was going up according to my atlas, and rapidly.

Your atlas? Medium bomber production for 1940 January
96, peaked at 242 in July, back to 166 by December, light
bombers in January 86, peaked at 177 in August back to 134
in December.

In 1939 the Gloster Hurricane production line came into
service, 32 in 1939, 1,211 in 1940. The second Wellington
line produced 3 aircraft in 1939 and 487 in 1940.

In 1940 the Halifax, Manchester and Stirling production lines
came into service, as did the second Spitfire line, the Whirlwind
line, the Beaufighter line and the third Wellington line.

I should add production went down in the third quarter due to
plant dispersal.

>>> I have heard in many interviews that the RAF
>>> was very tight on fuel. Just the other day
>>> on the Dorothy Reeem show that what was
>>> husbanding fighters to fight "Sea Lion"
>>> was not having fuel to head over ot the fight.
>
>> Which sort of fiction does this show push?
>> The RAF did not have a fuel problem in 1940.
>
>Why were resource husbanded long after any serious military analyst
>thought Sea Lion was any threat at all.

Ah I see, the British keep fuel reserves because of the
unpredicability of war equals a fuel shortage that can
effect operations. Try the UK oil history.

>Even when all the top
>commanders and top insider intelligence staff officers who know that
>was real feared an invasion, Germany did very little other than BoB to
>prepare of Sea Lion. Germany during Britain's greatest anxiety was not
>doing logical preparation for an invasion: But still Britain husbanded
>resources vigorously, really strenuously. Britain was in a
>conservation mode to the hilt and this was not just propaganda.

Please provide a reference that shows RAF operations were
hampered by a lack of fuel in 1940. By the way according to
the British history on oil avgas consumption in England was
always below expectations except for a period in 1944.

>>> The RAF, RN, and Army were all very worried
>>> about fuel conservation. In addition, I have
>>> read that Britain was very interested in
>>> projecting confidence and prowess.

>> Given the problems in shipping fuel to England the British
>> did take conservation measures, that is all.

>NO. Britain was not simply conserving. It done with great sense of
>emergency, top national priority, for the survival of the nation, all
>sectors had inspectors and enforcers.

Hey how about that, not only was there rationing but there
were rationing inspectors.

Please show where the RAF was hampered by a lack of fuel.

>The government mean business,
>there was tremendous mass media attention. You write the fiction
>according to the people who lived it and fought the BoB.

Ah I see, I report what the people did and that is fiction.

>Britain will
>tremendous dramatic energy--conserved energy like victory of defeat
>hung in the balance, and the top and inside, and the bottom and
>outside all thought it was the truth.

Inside and out, back to front, cliche to cliche and fact free as well.

>Your emotional casting is
>Monday morning quarterbacking for a winning team; and this QB cares to
>cast the tight game as "effortless." You are understating a situation
>you didn't live though, and the people who did live thru it don't like
>the way you cast the situation.

Ah I see I am watching someone who went through it or
else claims to know large numbers of people who did.

><Snip>
>
>> In that case why not go away?
>
>It is somewhat fun to debate. You see, I know that in your hardest
>heart you really do think, project, that Britain simply went with some
>conservation measures.

Ah I see, the idea the British rationed fuel automatically
equals a shortage so bad it affected RAF operations.

>And you think, and write with complete ablam.

Complete ablam, zowie, kaboosh, pow, zap.

>Well, the USA military history reader demands differently than you,
>and will win since the American emotional reaction is accurate. Your
>emotional reaction is s form of denial.

I see all those visits to psychiatrists have given you the jargon.
By the way emotional responses are when no facts are given
just repeated I am right, note John, all you have done is keep
saying you are right without presenting facts.

I see the grand plan now, I can repair a row boat therefore I
can build battleships, if I ration fuel then I must have had to
cancel opearations for lack of fuel, not cut out non essential
fuel use, I can sail along the coast in barges therefore I can
supply an army across an ocean by barge.

We still await how many 17 pounders were delivered by air,
how fighter bombers were to attack oil plants in 1943 and
early 1944 and indeed how many fighter bomber attacks
were done on economic targets, and so on, it is interesting
to see how much has been deleted from the non reply.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

[John Freck]

rec.aviation.military


"Geoffrey Sinclair" > wrote in message >...



Responding to everything will take too long. I will respond to some.
Thank you for spending the time to write such long responses.



>> Well, then: Why did they like the line up they went with more >>
than other options?



> Could you consider using english as the method of
> expression? ...



It reads fine to me.



<Snip>



> You still do not get it do you, to accelerate
> production requires significant effort throughout
> the supply chain. And it seems you intend to
> keep trying to pretend a new production line
> could be set up nearly instantaneously.



Production did double. You maintain this was strictly due to
structural decisions made in 1938 bearing fruit and overtime.
You didn't mention expanded purchasing from the USA of materials,
fuel, machines, parts, and weapons as significant either. I do
believe that structural decisions of the near and far past have
explanatory power, for sure! I do think that overtime, and expanded
purchasing of goods, services, and materials form abroad can also
explain how an increase in production adn strenght is possible.
Either you or Keith stated that "overtime" was a major reason
production soared in the short-term. Historically, Britain's RAF did
manage an emergency expansion of fighter production. By taking
workers, materials, floor space from bombers over to fighters it seems
to me as if this historical artifact of doubling fighter production in
months can be increased. It is after all, a historical fact of the
earth; I'm just making it even more so for some imagined SimWWII.



>> Mass production of the Hurricane had been
>> established by July 1st, 1940 and the
>> Spitfire was on immediate path
>> for start-up to mass production.



> The Spitfire was in major production in 1940, the problem
> was the second, larger factory, had not come on line as
> planned.



Why can't they tap the USA machine tools' market, and other commercial
stocks. USA machine tools are right up with Germany and Sweden, and
they are for export too.



<Snip>



> No I prefer to go with the idea some users of the internet are
> not all they are cracked up to be, and the historians are
> much more likely to be correct.



Historians are a lot like journalists. There is just too much going
on... Important angles get missed. If an angle is esoteric, not
glamours, or uncomfortable to the core audience, then important angles
and information can be missed altogether.


<Snip 200+ lines making fun of aircraft parts manufacture at small
factories near or on W.W.II air bases>



>> There is a moderator of soc.history.wwii
>> who pontificate on the Axis logistical
>> situation in the Mediterreans from 1940-1943.
>> The book he liked to quote had no mention
>> of German, and Axis, military barges augmenting
>> Axis supply in Africa--but they existed, as do
>> mini-mills and small aircraft factories on and
>> near air bases during W.W.II. You will just
>> have to keep a nose out. It is really sad how
>> ignorant some "experts" are around here. I
>> suppose you don't think that a mini-mill
>> can even exist.



> Yes the laughter value is quit high, the fleet of low freeboard
> barges supplying Rommel across an Ocean. The need to
> simply state over and over there were aircraft manufacturing
> plants on air bases, plants no one else has ever heard of,
> and when asked for proof, simply restate the claim and go
> boating.



> I doubt this will matter, but try and read the following British
> histories,



> Design and Development of weapons, by Postan, Hay and Scott
> British War Production by Postan
> British War Economy Hancock and Gowing.
> Factories and Plant by Horny



If you read them and your knowledge, attitude, and general awareness
is coming from the goofs who wrote those books, then be ill-informed.
Today, the USA has just the sort of operations I recall hearing of in
documentaries on the History Channel--look up jet engine parts
manufacturing. There were more companies in the past than today to
boot.


As far as Germany using sea going (not ocean going) barges to support
Africa? I have evidence your books are good for ass wipe.
Important, on-topic, material missed by writers of books--what's next!
That's life. Books about the past are inherently incomplete;
similar to news reports about the day. It is even possible news
reports of severe fuel conservation in Britain after July 1st, 1940
were over-stated hot air intended to sell papers, or something other
than the square truth. Maybe, the British and Common Wealth readers of
military histry place biasing demands on history writers to
demonstrate a powerful, competent, confident Britain and Common
Wealth. Come on--you believe that Britain and the Common Wealth were
fully equal partners with the USA, and not that the UK and Common
wealth became "vassal" to USA power and interests. I think it is a
fact that Britain became a vassal power to the USA, and you don't!



http://www.warships1.com/German_amphibs.htm
http://www2.arnes.si/~gbasia/dtm/dtm.htm



The barges existed, were well used, and even Rommel liked them well
enough to have them ship fuel right up near the front. Those nasty
1,000+ mile fuel runs across the desert are greatly in error. They
used f)c&ing huge landing crafts and delivered right to the front
line. I know, many "logistical" military historians missed them all
together.



<Snip>



How can you write such drivel?



> We still await how many 17 pounders were delivered by air,
> how fighter bombers were to attack oil plants in 1943 and
> early 1944 and indeed how many fighter bomber attacks
> were done on economic targets, and so on, it is interesting
> to see how much has been deleted from the non reply.



The fact that the Allies didn't do something doesn't automatically
mean they could not have done it. You see, if you didn't understand
the last sentence, then it is unlikely you will understand the next
sentences. If the Allies cut way back on heavy bombers, this will
allow them to spend more elsewhere, such as spending a lot more on the
airborne. The suggested improvement is for a 100,000 troop airborne
with 2x spending per troop over the actual historical spending. This
means 17 pounders are delivered in the imagined SimWWII. This is a
difference the Allied game player goes with, so it is different from
the historical W.W.II. If you still don't understand the first
sentence, then goodnight.




John Freck

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

John Freck wrote in message ...


>"Geoffrey Sinclair" > wrote in message >...
>
>Responding to everything will take too long. I will respond to some.

Translation, unable to respond to facts so delete them and go
post the same claims elsewhere.

>Thank you for spending the time to write such long responses.


cut and past makes it easy.


>> You still do not get it do you, to accelerate
>> production requires significant effort throughout
>> the supply chain. And it seems you intend to
>> keep trying to pretend a new production line
>> could be set up nearly instantaneously.
>
>Production did double. You maintain this was strictly due to
>structural decisions made in 1938 bearing fruit and overtime.

Correct, "strictly" is too strong, but almost all is correct. Average
day shift working week in July 1940 63.6 hours, the night shifts
worked even longer weeks.

>You didn't mention expanded purchasing from the USA of materials,
>fuel, machines, parts, and weapons as significant either.

Parts of the 1938 decisions related to purchasing of materials
from overseas. By the way UK machine tool exports doubled
in 1938 and 1939 compared with 1937 thanks to large orders
from the USSR.

There was trade going on, the UK was importing machine tools
from many countries, during WWII the US supplied around half
the UK imports.

> I do
>believe that structural decisions of the near and far past have
>explanatory power, for sure! I do think that overtime, and expanded
>purchasing of goods, services, and materials form abroad can also
>explain how an increase in production adn strenght is possible.
>Either you or Keith stated that "overtime" was a major reason
>production soared in the short-term. Historically, Britain's RAF did
>manage an emergency expansion of fighter production. By taking
>workers, materials, floor space from bombers over to fighters it seems
>to me as if this historical artifact of doubling fighter production in
>months can be increased.

Since you intend to keep deleting the basic facts there is only
so much people can do to point out you do not have a clue
about what you are talking about.

There is no easy way to switch production of something as
complex as an aircraft. It takes years to build up production
lines. There is no way converting a bomber factory to a
fighter factory would happen in the time it took to fight the
Battle of Britain. It takes thousands of hours to set up for
a production run.

Effort in man hours, Spitfire production, mark / design / jigging
and tooling

I / 339,400 / 800,000
II / 9,267 / unknown
III / 91,120 / 75,000
V / 90,000 / 105,000
VI 14,340 / 50,000
IX 43,830 / 30,000
XII / 27,210 / 16,000
VII / 86,150 / 150,000
VIII / 24,970 / 250,000
XIV / 26,120 / 17,000
21 / 168,500 / unknown
PR XI / 12,415 / unknown
Seafire I / 10,130 / 18,000
Seafire II / 3,685 / 40,000
Seafire III / 8,938 / 9,000
Seafire XV / 9,150 / unknown
Spitfire on floats 22,260 / 35,000

Figures as of September 1943 for Supermarine works in
Southampton.

Even what looks like trivial design changes imposed
delays and loss of production.

British Fighter output June to October 1940 by type, planned
and actual

Month // Beaufighter P/A // Defiant P/A // Hurricane P/A // Spitfire
P/A // Whirlwind P/A

June // 8/2 // 30/30 // 300/309 // 135/103 // 8/2
July // 14/5 // 50/56 // 220/272 // 140/160 // 4/3
August // 21/25 // 65/38 // 270/251 // 155/163 // 6/1
September // 24/15 // 65/41 // 280/252 // 175/156 // 8/3
October // 40/21 // 50/48 // 300/250 // 231/149 // 10/1

Total British aircraft production in 1940 January 802, February
719, March 860, April 1,081, May 1,279, June 1,591, July 1,665,
August 1,601, September 1,341, October 1,419, November
1,461, December 1,230.

There are two reasons for the summer peak, more good weather
for acceptance flights and people putting in large amounts of
overtime to produce as much as possible, with the inevitable
result of declining production as the workers tired. It took until
March 1941 to beat the peak monthly figure in 1940, partly
thanks to the dispesal of plants.

Also total fighter production was April 256, May 325, June 446,
July 496, August 476, September 469. The "new" production
lines, Beaufighter and Whirlwind, help the production figures,
June 4, July 8, August 26, September 18. Then add the new
Spitfire factory coming on line, producing 125 Spitfires between
6 June and 30 September. So in all June to September the
British produced 1,885 fighters, 181 or 10% from the new
production lines. Then add the Glosters Hurricane line coming
into full production, since it started in late 1939.

>It is after all, a historical fact of the
>earth; I'm just making it even more so for some imagined SimWWII.


I believe the machines you want are the Star Trek replicators.

>>> Mass production of the Hurricane had been
>>> established by July 1st, 1940 and the
>>> Spitfire was on immediate path
>>> for start-up to mass production.
>
>> The Spitfire was in major production in 1940, the problem
>> was the second, larger factory, had not come on line as
>> planned.
>
>Why can't they tap the USA machine tools' market, and other commercial
>stocks. USA machine tools are right up with Germany and Sweden, and
>they are for export too.

The UK was importing US machine tools, the problem which
does not seem to register is the time it took to create a
production line.

><Snip>
>> No I prefer to go with the idea some users of the internet are
>> not all they are cracked up to be, and the historians are
>> much more likely to be correct.
>
>Historians are a lot like journalists. There is just too much going
>on... Important angles get missed. If an angle is esoteric, not
>glamours, or uncomfortable to the core audience, then important angles
>and information can be missed altogether.

I see, the claimed "fact" that airbases could and did manufacture
large numbers of aircraft and that aircraft carriers could to the
same thing, is "esoteric". That is the numbers are supposed to
be so small as to be insignificant. Alternatively the details have
been suppressed by "dark forces" and only the truth bringer knows
about them.

><Snip 200+ lines making fun of aircraft parts manufacture at small
>factories near or on W.W.II air bases>

Translation, all the unanswerable facts deleted.

>>> There is a moderator of soc.history.wwii
>>> who pontificate on the Axis logistical
>>> situation in the Mediterreans from 1940-1943.
>>> The book he liked to quote had no mention
>>> of German, and Axis, military barges augmenting
>>> Axis supply in Africa--but they existed, as do
>>> mini-mills and small aircraft factories on and
>>> near air bases during W.W.II. You will just
>>> have to keep a nose out. It is really sad how
>>> ignorant some "experts" are around here. I
>>> suppose you don't think that a mini-mill
>>> can even exist.
>
>> Yes the laughter value is quit high, the fleet of low freeboard
>> barges supplying Rommel across an Ocean. The need to
>> simply state over and over there were aircraft manufacturing
>> plants on air bases, plants no one else has ever heard of,
>> and when asked for proof, simply restate the claim and go
>> boating.
>
>> I doubt this will matter, but try and read the following British
>> histories,
>
>> Design and Development of weapons, by Postan, Hay and Scott
>> British War Production by Postan
>> British War Economy Hancock and Gowing.
>> Factories and Plant by Horny
>
>If you read them and your knowledge, attitude, and general awareness
>is coming from the goofs who wrote those books, then be ill-informed.

I doubt this will matter, but try and read the following British
histories,

Design and Development of weapons, by Postan, Hay and Scott
British War Production by Postan
British War Economy Hancock and Gowing.
Factories and Plant by Hornby

And for the UK fuel situation,

Oil; a study of war-time policy and administration, by Payton-Smith.

They all make it clear the aircraft were built in factories
that took years to bring to full production and that the RAF
was not short of fuel.

>Today, the USA has just the sort of operations I recall hearing of in
>documentaries on the History Channel--look up jet engine parts
>manufacturing. There were more companies in the past than today to
>boot.

Yes folks just remember because an aircraft plant in Australia
makes ailerons for Boeing that plant can churn out 747s, 767s,
B-52s, etc. to order with only a short delay.

Maybe the clue will eventually be noticed and the difference
between manufacture and assembly will be understood plus
the idea of sub contracting.

>As far as Germany using sea going (not ocean going) barges to support
>Africa? I have evidence your books are good for ass wipe.

Ah I see, you should have said you obtain your information
from reading the toilet paper, the dolphins do have some
quite wise sayings.

>Important, on-topic, material missed by writers of books--what's next!
> That's life. Books about the past are inherently incomplete;
>similar to news reports about the day. It is even possible news
>reports of severe fuel conservation in Britain after July 1st, 1940
>were over-stated hot air intended to sell papers, or something other
>than the square truth.

All you have to do now is tell us where these reports of
the severe fuel shortages are, since the UK history on
oil, that is a whole book devoted to the subject of liquid
fuels, makes no mention of severe fuel shortage in
England during the war. And certainly no mention of
fuel problems cramping RAF operations.

>Maybe, the British and Common Wealth readers of
>military histry place biasing demands on history writers to
>demonstrate a powerful, competent, confident Britain and Common
>Wealth.

Ah I see when unable to provide evidence simply
announce everyone else is a liar.

>Come on--you believe that Britain and the Common Wealth were
>fully equal partners with the USA, and not that the UK and Common
>wealth became "vassal" to USA power and interests. I think it is a
>fact that Britain became a vassal power to the USA, and you don't!


This is quite funny, in 1942 the US in Europe was the second
banana, it beacome number 1 in 1944. As for vassal states
it is clear the need for an off topic rant has become urgent to
detract from the lack of facts. Last time I checked the US is
so powerful it can obtain its own way much more easily than
anyone else, but not everything everytime.

>http://www.warships1.com/German_amphibs.htm
>http://www2.arnes.si/~gbasia/dtm/dtm.htm
>
>The barges existed, were well used, and even Rommel liked them well
>enough to have them ship fuel right up near the front. Those nasty
>1,000+ mile fuel runs across the desert are greatly in error. They
>used f)c&ing huge landing crafts and delivered right to the front
>line. I know, many "logistical" military historians missed them all
>together.

Ah I see the idea some supplies were sent by barge along the
coast (Hear of the RN inshore squadron by the way?) means
none were sent by truck. As opposed to the quartermasters
using both methods of transport as appropriate.


><Snip>

>How can you write such drivel?

Yes folks the only way to respond is to delete the text and then
put in the editorial about how bad it was. Some of the deleted
text.

"So how many F-18s does the average USN carrier
produce a year? What is the production rate of the
standard USAF airbase?"

"Ah I see the ability to make basic repairs is turned into the
ability to make whole machines. So every backyard
mechanic can turn out vehicles in numbers, silly then to
create mass production lines, go back to the craft system."

"I doubt anyone is holding their breath for facts from John Freck.
It seems the fact one country can exceed production targets in
an area means all countries can do so quickly and easily.
Remember apparently the British can change production in
a matter of days."

"Why not look up the references on how
the RAF armed for war? The histories I mentioned earlier
have pages of tables on projected and actual aircraft
production, including the times production was ahead of
projections and when it was behind.

Then there are the many studies on how the RAF mobilised
before WWII."

>> We still await how many 17 pounders were delivered by air,
>> how fighter bombers were to attack oil plants in 1943 and
>> early 1944 and indeed how many fighter bomber attacks
>> were done on economic targets, and so on, it is interesting
>> to see how much has been deleted from the non reply.

>The fact that the Allies didn't do something doesn't automatically
>mean they could not have done it.

Yes we are heading for the end game.

>You see, if you didn't understand
>the last sentence, then it is unlikely you will understand the next
>sentences.

Translation, no facts so time to jump to a new topic.

>If the Allies cut way back on heavy bombers, this will
>allow them to spend more elsewhere, such as spending a lot more on the
>airborne. The suggested improvement is for a 100,000 troop airborne
>with 2x spending per troop over the actual historical spending. This
>means 17 pounders are delivered in the imagined SimWWII.

Yes folks apparently having twice the number of US paratroops
means the C-47 can fit and drop a 17 pounder gun. So if we
go to 4 times the paratroops it can trop say a 155mm gun,
at 10 times the number of paratroops presumably the C-47
can then carry a Pershing and so on.

On the other hand maybe the paratroops drop with their own
mini mill and make the guns themselves after deployment,
or maybe make C-130s to fly in the guns.

We will just ignore the fact that airforces and armies are not
interchangable, the air forces use much less manpower but
more industry per man. We will also just ignore the problems
paratroopers had in combat, they needed support from the
regular ground forces if the enemy had heavy weapons present,
except the HG Parachute Panzer division of course, always
wondered how they could ever paradrop a Panther.

>This is a
>difference the Allied game player goes with, so it is different from
>the historical W.W.II.

So a game with fictional abilites is the truth and the histories
are the fiction.

>If you still don't understand the first
>sentence, then goodnight.


Ah they have arrived with your sedative I gather.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.