russia vs. japan in 1941 [WAS: Re: 50% of NAZI oil..]

In article >, "Bill
Silvey" > wrote:

> Then there was the fact that the Reds did nothing while Japan massacred
> hundreds of thousands of Chinese in the '30s. Stalin only declared war on
> Japan *after* Japan had lost, just to gain Kamchatka. 100% fact.

russia fought japan until the german invasion of russia. you don't have
to look in obscure sources to find out about it.

readers of rec.aviation.military are undoubtably familiar with the
accounts of the flying tigers in china. these books describe the
russian conflict with china in this period, both as mercenaries for
china and direct conflict on the soviet border.

[Steven James Forsberg]

In sci.military.naval wrote:
: In article >, "Bill
: Silvey" > wrote:

:> Then there was the fact that the Reds did nothing while Japan massacred
:> hundreds of thousands of Chinese in the '30s. Stalin only declared war on
:> Japan *after* Japan had lost, just to gain Kamchatka. 100% fact.

100% fact? Hmmmm, wasn't Kamchatka already in Soviet hands?
Perhaps you are thinking of Sakhalin and some of the Kurile islands?

regards,
-----------------------------------------------------------------

[Keith Willshaw]

> wrote in message
...
> In article >, "Bill
> Silvey" > wrote:
>
> > Then there was the fact that the Reds did nothing while Japan massacred
> > hundreds of thousands of Chinese in the '30s. Stalin only declared war
on
> > Japan *after* Japan had lost, just to gain Kamchatka. 100% fact.
>
> russia fought japan until the german invasion of russia. you don't have
> to look in obscure sources to find out about it.
>


While the Soviets gave some aid to the chinese communists
and sent them some advisors it was minor and the only soviet
military involvement was in the form of the Nomonhan incident
in May1939 as a result of a Japanese incursion into Soviet
territory. The Japanese were given such a beating that they
hurriedly signed a non-aggression pact with the USSR which held
until August 1945. Indeed in 1945 the Japanese peace faction were
trying to contact the western allies via the USSR since it was a neutral.


Keith

[The Black Monk]

> wrote in message >...
> In article >, "Bill
> Silvey" > wrote:
>
> > Then there was the fact that the Reds did nothing while Japan massacred
> > hundreds of thousands of Chinese in the '30s. Stalin only declared war on
> > Japan *after* Japan had lost, just to gain Kamchatka. 100% fact.
>
> russia fought japan until the german invasion of russia. you don't have
> to look in obscure sources to find out about it.
>
> readers of rec.aviation.military are undoubtably familiar with the
> accounts of the flying tigers in china. these books describe the
> russian conflict with china in this period, both as mercenaries for
> china and direct conflict on the soviet border.


Indeed.

At Khalkyn Gol between May and September 1939 the Japanese were
crushed by Zhukov, sustaining over 80,000 casualties to the Russians'
11,130. Within a single week the Japanses lost 25,000 men. The
entire Japanese 6th army was completely destroyed.

The Battle of Khalkin Gol was Zhukov's illustration of Deep
Penetration tactics. The use of deception tactics, extremely fast
tanks and mechanized forces to outflank an opponent's defenses, and
the combination of aerial, airborne, and ground troops lead to the
complete destruction of the Japanese 6th Army and to Japan's loss of a
sphere of influence in the Mongolian and Far Eastern regions.

This battle also featured the first successful use of air-to-air
missiles. Five Polikarpov I-16 Type 10 fighters under the command of
Capt. Zvonarev claimed destruction two Mitsubishi A5M by RS-82
unguided rockets.

Historians describe a conflict within the Japanese military about
whether to attack the USSR or the USA. The complete defeat att he
hands of the Soviets made that decision: Pearl Harbor happened because
the Japanese chose to attack the weaker foe.

BM

[John Mullen]

"The Black Monk" > wrote in message
om...
> > wrote in message
>...
> > In article >, "Bill
> > Silvey" > wrote:
> >
> > > Then there was the fact that the Reds did nothing while Japan
massacred
> > > hundreds of thousands of Chinese in the '30s. Stalin only declared
war on
> > > Japan *after* Japan had lost, just to gain Kamchatka. 100% fact.
> >
> > russia fought japan until the german invasion of russia. you don't have
> > to look in obscure sources to find out about it.
> >
> > readers of rec.aviation.military are undoubtably familiar with the
> > accounts of the flying tigers in china. these books describe the
> > russian conflict with china in this period, both as mercenaries for
> > china and direct conflict on the soviet border.
>
>
> Indeed.
>
> At Khalkyn Gol between May and September 1939 the Japanese were
> crushed by Zhukov, sustaining over 80,000 casualties to the Russians'
> 11,130. Within a single week the Japanses lost 25,000 men. The
> entire Japanese 6th army was completely destroyed.
>
> The Battle of Khalkin Gol was Zhukov's illustration of Deep
> Penetration tactics. The use of deception tactics, extremely fast
> tanks and mechanized forces to outflank an opponent's defenses, and
> the combination of aerial, airborne, and ground troops lead to the
> complete destruction of the Japanese 6th Army and to Japan's loss of a
> sphere of influence in the Mongolian and Far Eastern regions.
>
> This battle also featured the first successful use of air-to-air
> missiles. Five Polikarpov I-16 Type 10 fighters under the command of
> Capt. Zvonarev claimed destruction two Mitsubishi A5M by RS-82
> unguided rockets.
>
> Historians describe a conflict within the Japanese military about
> whether to attack the USSR or the USA. The complete defeat att he
> hands of the Soviets made that decision: Pearl Harbor happened because
> the Japanese chose to attack the weaker foe.

Great post!

And, by choosing the eastern, Pacific route of expansion rather than the
western, they ensured that the Navy rather than the Army would have
precedence in the Japanese junta of the time. These guys made an absolute
art-form of inter-service rivalry!

Interesting to speculate what if they had pursued the western route instead.
Of course if they and the Nazis had been proper allies instead of
mistrustful (as well as untrustworthy!) basket cases, they'd have been
having this discussion in late 1940 or so.

Think Germany and Japan, working together in a coordinated way, could have
beaten the Soviets without bringing the US or UK into the war?

Germany has Barbarossa but without having Fall Gelb first. Japan
consolidates in China then attacks Siberia.

And then perhaps done Western Europe afterwards. Assume a 1938/9
understanding greater than actually happened.

John

[yp11]

On 20 Oct 2003 12:19:08 -0700, (The Black
Monk) wrote:

> wrote in message >...
>> In article >, "Bill
>> Silvey" > wrote:
>>
>> > Then there was the fact that the Reds did nothing while Japan massacred
>> > hundreds of thousands of Chinese in the '30s. Stalin only declared war on
>> > Japan *after* Japan had lost, just to gain Kamchatka. 100% fact.
>>
>> russia fought japan until the german invasion of russia. you don't have
>> to look in obscure sources to find out about it.
>>
>> readers of rec.aviation.military are undoubtably familiar with the
>> accounts of the flying tigers in china. these books describe the
>> russian conflict with china in this period, both as mercenaries for
>> china and direct conflict on the soviet border.
>
>
>Indeed.
>
>At Khalkyn Gol between May and September 1939 the Japanese were
>crushed by Zhukov, sustaining over 80,000 casualties to the Russians'
>11,130. Within a single week the Japanses lost 25,000 men. The
>entire Japanese 6th army was completely destroyed.
>
>The Battle of Khalkin Gol was Zhukov's illustration of Deep
>Penetration tactics. The use of deception tactics, extremely fast
>tanks and mechanized forces to outflank an opponent's defenses, and
>the combination of aerial, airborne, and ground troops lead to the
>complete destruction of the Japanese 6th Army and to Japan's loss of a
>sphere of influence in the Mongolian and Far Eastern regions.
>
>This battle also featured the first successful use of air-to-air
>missiles. Five Polikarpov I-16 Type 10 fighters under the command of
>Capt. Zvonarev claimed destruction two Mitsubishi A5M by RS-82
>unguided rockets.
>
>Historians describe a conflict within the Japanese military about
>whether to attack the USSR or the USA. The complete defeat att he
>hands of the Soviets made that decision: Pearl Harbor happened because
>the Japanese chose to attack the weaker foe.
>
>BM

Although it is quite true that in 1938 and again in 1939 Japanese and
Soviet troops fought fairly severe battles on the Manchurian and
Mongolian borders, these hostilities were terminated as abruptly as
they began, without there being a declaration of war between the two
countries.

Then, in 1941 , when the Japanese Foreign Minister, Yosuke Matsuoka,
visited Moscow shortly before the German attack on the Soviet Union,
the two governments reached an agreement, called "a Neutrality Pact",
providing that either side would remain neutral if the other were
attacked by third parties. The Japanese kept their word and despite
joining Germany in the Second World War, they never attacked the
Soviet Union during the course of the war. Had the Japanese attacked
USSR from the East when Germany was attacking from the West, the
result of the war might have been very different.

On the other hand, Stalin broke the agreement with the Japanese as
soon as this was convenient to him, i.e. immediately after the
capitulation of Germany. In the final analysis Stalin didn't get much
out of it, namely he got the possession of southern Sakhalin and the
Kuriles. That's about all. The Americans prevented him from grabbing
part of Manchuria which was his initial intent. There was the
traditional sentimentality of the Americans about China which put them
squarely on the side of China (not knowing that it would soon become
Communist).

Yuri

[phil hunt]

On Tue, 21 Oct 2003 00:08:25 +0100, John Mullen > wrote:
>
>Think Germany and Japan, working together in a coordinated way, could have
>beaten the Soviets without bringing the US or UK into the war?

The UK entered the war because of the German invasion of Poland. If
instead of this, Germany, Poland and Japan had ganged up on Russia,
it's likely the UK would not have intervened. Ditto for the USA.

--
"It's easier to find people online who openly support the KKK than
people who openly support the RIAA" -- comment on Wikipedia
(Email: >, but first subtract 275 and reverse
the last two letters).

[L'acrobat]

"The Black Monk" > wrote in message
om...

>
> Historians describe a conflict within the Japanese military about
> whether to attack the USSR or the USA. The complete defeat att he
> hands of the Soviets made that decision: Pearl Harbor happened because
> the Japanese chose to attack the weaker foe.

Actually Pearl harbour happened because there was oil to the south and Japan
needed it nobody knew about the Siberian oil reserves at the time..

Without that oil the gains made in China would collapse, the attack south
was always meant to be a limited operation to secure resources, not to
defeat the US and C'wealth - once secured, it was intended that the focus
would move back to the main objective, China.

[Vassil]

yp11 > wrote in
> Then, in 1941 , when the Japanese Foreign Minister, Yosuke Matsuoka,
> visited Moscow shortly before the German attack on the Soviet Union,
> the two governments reached an agreement, called "a Neutrality Pact",
> providing that either side would remain neutral if the other were
> attacked by third parties. The Japanese kept their word and despite
> [...]
> On the other hand, Stalin broke the agreement with the Japanese as
> soon as this was convenient to him, i.e. immediately after the
> capitulation of Germany. In the final analysis Stalin didn't get much
> out of it, namely he got the possession of southern Sakhalin and the
> Kuriles. That's about all. The Americans prevented him from grabbing
> part of Manchuria which was his initial intent. There was the
> traditional sentimentality of the Americans about China which put them
> squarely on the side of China (not knowing that it would soon become
> Communist).
>
> Yuri

I thought Stalin promised to attack Japan 3 months after May 9th, which is
exactly what he did. In a way, he was trying to keep both his promises for
as long as he could.

Interestingly, though, if the Americans expected Stalin to attack within
three months of May 9th, why would they be in such a hurry to drop the two
nuclear bombs... :)

Vassil

[Hugo S. Cunningham]

On 20 Oct 2003 12:19:08 -0700, (The Black
Monk) wrote:

[...]

>At Khalkyn Gol between May and September 1939 the Japanese were
>crushed by Zhukov, sustaining over 80,000 casualties to the Russians'
>11,130. Within a single week the Japanses lost 25,000 men. The
>entire Japanese 6th army was completely destroyed.
>
>The Battle of Khalkin Gol was Zhukov's illustration of Deep
>Penetration tactics. The use of deception tactics, extremely fast
>tanks and mechanized forces to outflank an opponent's defenses, and
>the combination of aerial, airborne, and ground troops lead to the
>complete destruction of the Japanese 6th Army and to Japan's loss of a
>sphere of influence in the Mongolian and Far Eastern regions.
>
>This battle also featured the first successful use of air-to-air
>missiles. Five Polikarpov I-16 Type 10 fighters under the command of
>Capt. Zvonarev claimed destruction two Mitsubishi A5M by RS-82
>unguided rockets.
>
>Historians describe a conflict within the Japanese military about
>whether to attack the USSR or the USA. The complete defeat att he
>hands of the Soviets made that decision:

Also, Hitler did not *ask* for Japan's assistance when he was planning
Barbarossa in the spring of 1941. Instead, he hid his plans from
visiting Japanese foreign minister Matsuoka in March 1941, and
encouraged Matsuoka to sign a non-aggression pact with Stalin in April
1941. In retrospect, this was a disastrous mistake by Hitler; at the
time, he probably expected to walk over Russia easily, and didn't want
to share the spoils.
By the time stiff Soviet resistance changed Hitler's mind and he
sought Japanese intervention in late summer 1941, it was too late:
Japan was preoccupied with US President F.D. Roosevelt's oil embargo,
announced on 26 July.

>Pearl Harbor happened because
>the Japanese chose to attack the weaker foe.

Their hand was forced by FDR's oil embargo (by diplomatic arrangement
with Great Britain and the Netherlands government-in-exile, then in
control of Indonesia).

Perhaps they would have done better to take a defensive attitude
toward the US fleet at Pearl Harbor while seizing the oil fields in
Indonesia. Pearl Harbor vaporized isolationist sentiment in the USA,
while a far-off colonial war might not have.

--Hugo S. Cunningham

[L'acrobat]

"Hugo S. Cunningham" > wrote in message
...

>
> Perhaps they would have done better to take a defensive attitude
> toward the US fleet at Pearl Harbor while seizing the oil fields in
> Indonesia. Pearl Harbor vaporized isolationist sentiment in the USA,
> while a far-off colonial war might not have.

IMO opinion that was their best credible move, but not a good one - they had
no good options, given the revulsion the Japs had generated in the USA over
Nanking and the atrocity prone nature of the Japanese military, attacking
south where these atrocities would inevitably be directed against whites
(the race would have mattered a lot back then), throw in the fact that it
would be a pretty clear defiance of the purpose of the embargo and the US
would probably have come in anyway.

The big difference is that the US fleet would have been intact and the PI
would have been a lot more secure, also the USA might not have been at war
with Germany (unless Hitler repeated his idiot declaration).

Honestly, Japans best bet was probably to side with the Allies against
Germany and hope that by supporting them, they could buy silence on the
Chinese front, but I doubt it was politically feasible in Japan or USA.

[Keith Willshaw]

"John Mullen" > wrote in message
...

>
> Great post!
>
> And, by choosing the eastern, Pacific route of expansion rather than the
> western, they ensured that the Navy rather than the Army would have
> precedence in the Japanese junta of the time. These guys made an absolute
> art-form of inter-service rivalry!
>

Well yes but the army retained the upper hand, its not as if they
were doing nothing. There was this little war going on in China
If you read Yamamoto's biography its clear that the navy OPPOSED
war with the western powers.

> Interesting to speculate what if they had pursued the western route
instead.
> Of course if they and the Nazis had been proper allies instead of
> mistrustful (as well as untrustworthy!) basket cases, they'd have been
> having this discussion in late 1940 or so.
>
> Think Germany and Japan, working together in a coordinated way, could have
> beaten the Soviets without bringing the US or UK into the war?
>

No. The Americans woud still have cutt off their oil and Japan would
have to make a grab for Malaya and the NEI

> Germany has Barbarossa but without having Fall Gelb first. Japan
> consolidates in China then attacks Siberia.
>

Witl all their forces the Japanese were unable to consolidate
China and with their poor transport and meagre infrastructure
they couldnt possibly have made deep inroads into Siberia.

> And then perhaps done Western Europe afterwards. Assume a 1938/9
> understanding greater than actually happened.
>

It doesnt help, Japan simply lacked the manpower and resources.

Keith

[Cub Driver]

There are some notes on Nomonhan at www.warbirdforum.com/nomonhan.htm

all the best -- Dan Ford
email: www.danford.net/letters.htm#9

see the Warbird's Forum at www.warbirdforum.com
and the Piper Cub Forum at www.pipercubforum.com

[Cub Driver]

>Without that oil the gains made in China would collapse, the attack south
>was always meant to be a limited operation to secure resource

I don't think that an attack waged on a 4,000-mile front could fairly
be called limited.

It was intended to be a six-month operation, followed by a lifetime
occupation of a defense zone too vast to be challenged by the U.S.
navy. But the hoped-for brevity of the war doesn't suggest that it was
minor. After all, Germany invaded and occupied most of continental
Europe in nine months. That wasn't limited!
all the best -- Dan Ford
email: www.danford.net/letters.htm#9

see the Warbird's Forum at www.warbirdforum.com
and the Piper Cub Forum at www.pipercubforum.com

[Cub Driver]

>Well yes but the army retained the upper hand, its not as if they
>were doing nothing. There was this little war going on in China
>If you read Yamamoto's biography its clear that the navy OPPOSED
>war with the western powers.

Where in the world did you get this information? The Japanese army
longed to attack Russia. The Japanese navy longed to attack into the
"southern treasure chest", incidentally liberating Asia from British,
Dutch, and American imperialism.

War with the western powers (American, British, Dutch) was precisely
the navy's grand strategy, and the one that prevailed in the summer of
1941. The army had a busy six months, scrambling to get ready for a
war it had never planned for. This was of course the reason that the
Japanese army air force went to war with fewer than 100
retractable-gear Ki-43 Hayabusa fighters, the army's equivalent of the
navy Zero.

all the best -- Dan Ford
email: www.danford.net/letters.htm#9

see the Warbird's Forum at www.warbirdforum.com
and the Piper Cub Forum at www.pipercubforum.com

[L'acrobat]

"Cub Driver" > wrote in message
...
> >Without that oil the gains made in China would collapse, the attack south
> >was always meant to be a limited operation to secure resource
>
> I don't think that an attack waged on a 4,000-mile front could fairly
> be called limited.
>
> It was intended to be a six-month operation, followed by a lifetime
> occupation of a defense zone too vast to be challenged by the U.S.
> navy. But the hoped-for brevity of the war doesn't suggest that it was
> minor. After all, Germany invaded and occupied most of continental
> Europe in nine months. That wasn't limited!

It was a limited operation in that its goal was not to defeat the C'wealth
or the USA strategically, it was to simply push them back outside the
planned area of fortifications and then dig in.

A limited operation does not have to be minor, it just has to have well
defined limits.

[Keith Willshaw]

"Cub Driver" > wrote in message
...
>
> >Well yes but the army retained the upper hand, its not as if they
> >were doing nothing. There was this little war going on in China
> >If you read Yamamoto's biography its clear that the navy OPPOSED
> >war with the western powers.
>
> Where in the world did you get this information? The Japanese army
> longed to attack Russia. The Japanese navy longed to attack into the
> "southern treasure chest", incidentally liberating Asia from British,
> Dutch, and American imperialism.
>

From the biography of Admiral Yamamoto which was written
by Hiroyuki Agawa published by Kodansha International

> War with the western powers (American, British, Dutch) was precisely
> the navy's grand strategy, and the one that prevailed in the summer of
> 1941. The army had a busy six months, scrambling to get ready for a
> war it had never planned for.


The decision to go to war with America was taken by the
Japanese cabinet after the fall of the government led by Prince Konoye
The Konoye government had been following a policy of
attempting to negotiate a solution with the USA, the navy
minister in this government was Admiral Yamamoto who
had advised that war with the USA should be avoided at
all costs.


The Japanese leader who took over in Oct 1941 was of course
General Hideki Tojo who was a hard liner and it was under
his leadership and that of the army that the decison for war
was taken

Its a matter of record that Yamamoto was against this policy and the he
was sent to sea to avoid assassination by the pro-war faction.

> This was of course the reason that the
> Japanese army air force went to war with fewer than 100
> retractable-gear Ki-43 Hayabusa fighters, the army's equivalent of the
> navy Zero.
>

The Ki-43 'Oscar' was an entirely different aircraft from the zero of
course and its only real opposition in the initial attacks were
the Brewster Buffaloes of the RAF in Singapore. On the one
occasion it encountered the handful of Hurricanes available
they came off very much second best.

Keith

[Stuart Wilkes]

"John Mullen" > wrote in message >...

<snip great post>

> Great post!

It was.

> And, by choosing the eastern, Pacific route of expansion rather than the
> western, they ensured that the Navy rather than the Army would have
> precedence in the Japanese junta of the time. These guys made an absolute
> art-form of inter-service rivalry!
>
> Interesting to speculate what if they had pursued the western route instead.
> Of course if they and the Nazis had been proper allies instead of
> mistrustful (as well as untrustworthy!) basket cases, they'd have been
> having this discussion in late 1940 or so.
>
> Think Germany and Japan, working together in a coordinated way, could have
> beaten the Soviets without bringing the US or UK into the war?

Yes and no. Yes, Germany can attack the Soviets without the West
getting in the way. Skip the occupation of Prague, and go straight
for Poland. Poland is not well thought-of in the West, since they
joined in on the carveup of Czechoslovakia. Then occupy the Baltic
States. Now start the Anti-Bolshevik Crusade.

But they won't win.

> Germany has Barbarossa but without having Fall Gelb first.

Germany looted a huge amount of gold, fuel, weapons, ammo, food,
trucks, and industrial production from occupied France. It came to
~15 gigabucks (1940 dollars) IIRC. Without these resources, the
German effort in the East is likely to fall a great deal short.

> Japan consolidates in China

That will never happen.

> then attacks Siberia.

And gets trounced as bad as they did in 1937 - 1939.

And there's no oil they can get to in Siberia, even if they do win,
which they won't.

> And then perhaps done Western Europe afterwards. Assume a 1938/9
> understanding greater than actually happened.

Dosen't help. Neither has what it takes, although the West might
support the Axis if it looks like the Bolshies are about to win it
all.

Stuart Wilkes

[John Mullen]

"Stuart Wilkes" > wrote in message
om...
> "John Mullen" > wrote in message
>...
>
> <snip great post>
>
> > Great post!
>
> It was.
>
> > And, by choosing the eastern, Pacific route of expansion rather than the
> > western, they ensured that the Navy rather than the Army would have
> > precedence in the Japanese junta of the time. These guys made an
absolute
> > art-form of inter-service rivalry!
> >
> > Interesting to speculate what if they had pursued the western route
instead.
> > Of course if they and the Nazis had been proper allies instead of
> > mistrustful (as well as untrustworthy!) basket cases, they'd have been
> > having this discussion in late 1940 or so.
> >
> > Think Germany and Japan, working together in a coordinated way, could
have
> > beaten the Soviets without bringing the US or UK into the war?
>
> Yes and no. Yes, Germany can attack the Soviets without the West
> getting in the way. Skip the occupation of Prague, and go straight
> for Poland. Poland is not well thought-of in the West, since they
> joined in on the carveup of Czechoslovakia. Then occupy the Baltic
> States. Now start the Anti-Bolshevik Crusade.
>
> But they won't win.
>
> > Germany has Barbarossa but without having Fall Gelb first.
>
> Germany looted a huge amount of gold, fuel, weapons, ammo, food,
> trucks, and industrial production from occupied France. It came to
> ~15 gigabucks (1940 dollars) IIRC.

OTOH they alsoguaranteed a fight with the UK, then still (just!) the world's
leading military power.

>Without these resources, the
> German effort in the East is likely to fall a great deal short.
>
> > Japan consolidates in China
>
> That will never happen.

Even without trying to take on the US?

> > then attacks Siberia.
>
> And gets trounced as bad as they did in 1937 - 1939.
>
> And there's no oil they can get to in Siberia, even if they do win,
> which they won't.

Even without trying to take on the US?

> > And then perhaps done Western Europe afterwards. Assume a 1938/9
> > understanding greater than actually happened.
>
> Dosen't help. Neither has what it takes, although the West might
> support the Axis if it looks like the Bolshies are about to win it
> all.

Now that would be an interesting thought! Certainly lead to a different
history...

John

[Keith Willshaw]

"John Mullen" > wrote in message
...
> "Stuart Wilkes" > wrote in message
> om...
> > "John Mullen" > wrote in message
> >...
> >
> > Germany looted a huge amount of gold, fuel, weapons, ammo, food,
> > trucks, and industrial production from occupied France. It came to
> > ~15 gigabucks (1940 dollars) IIRC.
>
> OTOH they alsoguaranteed a fight with the UK, then still (just!) the
world's
> leading military power.
>

By what measure ?

The RN may have been arguably the strongest although
the USN was surely equal or better. The RAF was able
to hold its own on the defensive (just) but it was in no
shape to launch any real attacks on the nemey and the
army was pitifully small in comparison to that of Germany
and was for the most part less well equipped and led.



> >Without these resources, the
> > German effort in the East is likely to fall a great deal short.
> >
> > > Japan consolidates in China
> >
> > That will never happen.
>
> Even without trying to take on the US?
>

Yes, the amount of help that reached the Chinese before the
repoening of the Burma Road in 1944 was little more than token
and the Japanese simply lacked the manpower to effectively
subjugate China.

> > > then attacks Siberia.
> >
> > And gets trounced as bad as they did in 1937 - 1939.
> >
> > And there's no oil they can get to in Siberia, even if they do win,
> > which they won't.
>
> Even without trying to take on the US?
>

Yep, there still wasnt any oil in Siberia and that was the limiting factor
for Japan.

Keith

[John Mullen]

"Keith Willshaw" > wrote in message
...
>
> "John Mullen" > wrote in message
> ...
> > "Stuart Wilkes" > wrote in message
> > om...
> > > "John Mullen" > wrote in message
> > >...
> > >
> > > Germany looted a huge amount of gold, fuel, weapons, ammo, food,
> > > trucks, and industrial production from occupied France. It came to
> > > ~15 gigabucks (1940 dollars) IIRC.
> >
> > OTOH they alsoguaranteed a fight with the UK, then still (just!) the
> world's
> > leading military power.
> >
>
> By what measure ?
>
> The RN may have been arguably the strongest although
> the USN was surely equal or better. The RAF was able
> to hold its own on the defensive (just) but it was in no
> shape to launch any real attacks on the nemey and the
> army was pitifully small in comparison to that of Germany
> and was for the most part less well equipped and led.
>

1) RN was still (slightly) stronger than the USN (see 3 below). RAF was, as
you say, able (just) to do its job in defending the UK. The army was not
nearly as pitifully small as in WW1 and could count on massive reinforcement
in logistics from the colonies, which the aforementioned RN and RAF would
guarantee would (mostly) get through.

2) Although leadership in all three services still had its share of idiots
(blame the class/caste system which was still a major factor then), we at
least had the advantage that most officers, particularly at higher levels,
had experience of fighting in WW1, an advantage shared only by Germany of
the other major participants.

In Churchill, once he was PM, and for all his many faults, we had a truly
great war leader with not only an intimate knowledge of the minutiae of
warfare but also a developing ability to delegate.

3) As far as equipment goes, while the army in particular was poorly
equipped and the RN still largely depended on WW1 vintage ships, the RAF had
(just!) begun to equip with truly first-rate kit, some exceptions like the
Battle and Stirling accepted. Unlike (for example) the US, we also had (2)
above which meant that particularly in ASW tactics and naval gunnery we had
very much more of a clue than in WW1. Radar was another good thing, as was
cryptography. Overall, these factors IMO gave us the edge over the US in the
1939-40 time frame.

Of course:

4) By the end of the war, the US had grown and left us way behind.

5) We couldn't possibly have prevailed without their (largely
self-interested) help.

> > >Without these resources, the
> > > German effort in the East is likely to fall a great deal short.
> > >
> > > > Japan consolidates in China
> > >
> > > That will never happen.
> >
> > Even without trying to take on the US?
> >
>
> Yes, the amount of help that reached the Chinese before the
> repoening of the Burma Road in 1944 was little more than token
> and the Japanese simply lacked the manpower to effectively
> subjugate China.
>
> > > > then attacks Siberia.
> > >
> > > And gets trounced as bad as they did in 1937 - 1939.
> > >
> > > And there's no oil they can get to in Siberia, even if they do win,
> > > which they won't.
> >
> > Even without trying to take on the US?
> >
>
> Yep, there still wasnt any oil in Siberia and that was the limiting factor
> for Japan.

Accepted. I still think it's an interesting thought experiment to imagine
what happens if Germany and Japan get their act together and do some proper
joint planning either before or even during the war. The Panama Canal comes
to mind.

John

[Stuart Wilkes]

"John Mullen" > wrote in message >...
> "Stuart Wilkes" > wrote in message
> om...
> > "John Mullen" > wrote in message
> >...

<snip>

> > > Think Germany and Japan, working together in a coordinated way, could
> > > have beaten the Soviets without bringing the US or UK into the war?
> >
> > Yes and no. Yes, Germany can attack the Soviets without the West
> > getting in the way. Skip the occupation of Prague, and go straight
> > for Poland. Poland is not well thought-of in the West, since they
> > joined in on the carveup of Czechoslovakia. Then occupy the Baltic
> > States. Now start the Anti-Bolshevik Crusade.
> >
> > But they won't win.
> >
> > > Germany has Barbarossa but without having Fall Gelb first.
> >
> > Germany looted a huge amount of gold, fuel, weapons, ammo, food,
> > trucks, and industrial production from occupied France. It came to
> > ~15 gigabucks (1940 dollars) IIRC.
>
> OTOH they also guaranteed a fight with the UK, then still (just!) the
> world's leading military power.

A power that in 1939-1940 really didn't do much to hurt Germany.

Once France was conquered, Germany proceeded to garrison it with green
recruits training on captured Czechoslovak, Polish, and French
equipment, or 35-40 year old Privates in fortress regiments with old
weapons and no transport, or, in time, with shattered wrecks of
divisions recovering from their experiences in the East. All fed and
housed at French expense (which was the real point).

Conquering and looting France was a huge money-maker for the Germans,
and without those resources a German war effort in the East quickly
runs out of (financial, then actual) gas.

> >Without these resources, the
> > German effort in the East is likely to fall a great deal short.
> >
> > > Japan consolidates in China
> >
> > That will never happen.
>
> Even without trying to take on the US?

There's really nothing Japan can do to force China to make peace, the
US or no.

> > > then attacks Siberia.
> >
> > And gets trounced as bad as they did in 1937 - 1939.
> >
> > And there's no oil they can get to in Siberia, even if they do win,
> > which they won't.
>
> Even without trying to take on the US?

There's even less the Japanese can do to the USSR that will force them
to make peace. The IJA is configured for a (fruitless) infantry war
in China. It has neither the armor, artillery, or logistics for a
mechanized war against the Soviets.

It would be like bringing a Samurai sword to Kursk...

Stuart Wilkes

[ZZBunker]

"John Mullen" > wrote in message >...
> "Stuart Wilkes" > wrote in message
> om...
> > "John Mullen" > wrote in message
> >...
> >
> > <snip great post>
> >
> > > Great post!
> >
> > It was.
> >
> > > And, by choosing the eastern, Pacific route of expansion rather than the
> > > western, they ensured that the Navy rather than the Army would have
> > > precedence in the Japanese junta of the time. These guys made an
> absolute
> > > art-form of inter-service rivalry!
> > >
> > > Interesting to speculate what if they had pursued the western route
> instead.
> > > Of course if they and the Nazis had been proper allies instead of
> > > mistrustful (as well as untrustworthy!) basket cases, they'd have been
> > > having this discussion in late 1940 or so.
> > >
> > > Think Germany and Japan, working together in a coordinated way, could
> have
> > > beaten the Soviets without bringing the US or UK into the war?
> >
> > Yes and no. Yes, Germany can attack the Soviets without the West
> > getting in the way. Skip the occupation of Prague, and go straight
> > for Poland. Poland is not well thought-of in the West, since they
> > joined in on the carveup of Czechoslovakia. Then occupy the Baltic
> > States. Now start the Anti-Bolshevik Crusade.
> >
> > But they won't win.
> >
> > > Germany has Barbarossa but without having Fall Gelb first.
> >
> > Germany looted a huge amount of gold, fuel, weapons, ammo, food,
> > trucks, and industrial production from occupied France. It came to
> > ~15 gigabucks (1940 dollars) IIRC.
>
> OTOH they alsoguaranteed a fight with the UK, then still (just!) the world's
> leading military power.
>
> >Without these resources, the
> > German effort in the East is likely to fall a great deal short.
> >
> > > Japan consolidates in China
> >
> > That will never happen.
>
> Even without trying to take on the US?
>
> > > then attacks Siberia.
> >
> > And gets trounced as bad as they did in 1937 - 1939.
> >
> > And there's no oil they can get to in Siberia, even if they do win,
> > which they won't.
>
> Even without trying to take on the US?
>
> > > And then perhaps done Western Europe afterwards. Assume a 1938/9
> > > understanding greater than actually happened.
> >
> > Dosen't help. Neither has what it takes, although the West might
> > support the Axis if it looks like the Bolshies are about to win it
> > all.
>
> Now that would be an interesting thought! Certainly lead to a different
> history...

WWII would not have ended any other way.
Since we although we didn't tell the morons in Europe,
we obviously would have killed every German and Russian
in every industrial city in Europe rather than let them build an
Atomic Bomb before we did.

[Keith Willshaw]

"John Mullen" > wrote in message
...
> "Keith Willshaw" > wrote in message
> ...
> >
> >
>
> 1) RN was still (slightly) stronger than the USN (see 3 below). RAF was,
as
> you say, able (just) to do its job in defending the UK. The army was not
> nearly as pitifully small as in WW1 and could count on massive
reinforcement
> in logistics from the colonies, which the aforementioned RN and RAF would
> guarantee would (mostly) get through.
>

There was nothing much in it

In 1914 the BEF had 6 British Infantry Divisions, 2 Indian Infantry
Divisions
1 British Cavalry division and 1 Indian Calavry Brigade

In 1939 their were 2 regular infantry divisions in the Aldershot zone , 1 in
the
Eastern Zone at Colchester, 2 TA Divisions in the London Zone, 1 regular
division in the Northern Zone , 1 TA Division in Scotland, 1 Armored
Division
and 1 regular infantry Division in Southern command and 2 TA Divisions in
Wales

In total 5 Regular Infantry divisions, 4 of TA Infantry and 1 Armored
Division
not all of the TA divisions were suitable for short term use


> 2) Although leadership in all three services still had its share of idiots
> (blame the class/caste system which was still a major factor then), we at
> least had the advantage that most officers, particularly at higher levels,
> had experience of fighting in WW1, an advantage shared only by Germany of
> the other major participants.
>

The French were involved rather heavily in WW1 you'll find

> In Churchill, once he was PM, and for all his many faults, we had a truly
> great war leader with not only an intimate knowledge of the minutiae of
> warfare but also a developing ability to delegate.
>

And had screwed up royally at Gallipoli , the British Army was no more
ready for amphibious warfare in Norway in 1940 than it had been
in the Dardanelles

> 3) As far as equipment goes, while the army in particular was poorly
> equipped and the RN still largely depended on WW1 vintage ships, the RAF
had
> (just!) begun to equip with truly first-rate kit, some exceptions like the
> Battle and Stirling accepted.

The Stirling didnt arrive in numbers until 1942 I think you'll find.


Unlike (for example) the US, we also had (2)
> above which meant that particularly in ASW tactics and naval gunnery we
had
> very much more of a clue than in WW1. Radar was another good thing, as was
> cryptography. Overall, these factors IMO gave us the edge over the US in
the
> 1939-40 time frame.
>

Damm few ships had radar in 1939/40

soc.culture groups trimmed from reply

Keith

[The Black Monk]

"John Mullen" > wrote in message >...
> > >
> >
> > Yep, there still wasnt any oil in Siberia and that was the limiting factor
> > for Japan.
>
> Accepted. I still think it's an interesting thought experiment to imagine
> what happens if Germany and Japan get their act together and do some proper
> joint planning either before or even during the war. The Panama Canal comes
> to mind.
>
> John

I think that Germany would only have had a chance if it had done what
Spengler envisioned it should do - become the leader of Europe. Had
Germany attacked the USSR with the motive of liberating its captive
peoples - through establishing friendly semi-puppet republics as was
done following Russia's collapse during World War I - it is likely
that Moscow would have fallen. And if I recall correctly, Stalin
would have been ready to offer terms had Moscow been taken.
Intelligent, not fanatic, leadership would have accepted such terms,
which would have meant the gain of the Baltics, Ukraine, and probably
the Caucuses. Had the Germans been statesmen they would not have had
to contend with resistence in eastern Europe, indeed they would
probably have had several 100,000 more allied troops. It is likely
that even within Russia some friendly troops cpuld be had. Not
Vlasov's sullen war criminals, but free cossacks from the Don, Terek
or Kuban fighting willingly against their oppresors. If the Germans
had wanted to make the war into a crusade for Europe (naturally at the
expense of a few unfortunates - the French and Poles) they would have
stood a chance of winning. Instead, of course, Hitler's war was a
crusade only for his grotesque and evil ideology, as bad as if not
worse than the Bolshevism he fought. In this world, the British
would not have held onto the middle east with its oil, and the world
would have been a much different place for the past fifty years.

This alternative strategy is not as far-fetched as it seems. Elements
in the Wehrmacht were outraged at the Nazi mistreatment of Eastern
Europeans, and even within the Nazi party there was for example
Rosenberg, an ethnic German from Estonia, who envisioned an allied
puppet Ukraine stretching from "Lviv to Saratov" (there as an
interesting article about this in the Ukrainian Weekly a year or so
ago).

Unfortunately, rather than statesmen Germany was led by madmen.
Hitler's racial theories prevented him from making Germany a leader of
Europe in the manner that America would later be. As Spengler
predicted in 1936, Hitler's sick reich didn't last 10 years.

BM

[Keith Willshaw]

"The Black Monk" > wrote in message
om...
> "John Mullen" > wrote in message
>...
> > > >
> > >
> > > Yep, there still wasnt any oil in Siberia and that was the limiting
factor
> > > for Japan.
> >
> > Accepted. I still think it's an interesting thought experiment to
imagine
> > what happens if Germany and Japan get their act together and do some
proper
> > joint planning either before or even during the war. The Panama Canal
comes
> > to mind.
> >
> > John
>
> I think that Germany would only have had a chance if it had done what
> Spengler envisioned it should do - become the leader of Europe. Had
> Germany attacked the USSR with the motive of liberating its captive
> peoples - through establishing friendly semi-puppet republics as was
> done following Russia's collapse during World War I - it is likely
> that Moscow would have fallen. And if I recall correctly, Stalin
> would have been ready to offer terms had Moscow been taken.
> Intelligent, not fanatic, leadership would have accepted such terms,

However intelligent leaders would not have embarked on such
a war in the first place. The lessons of history are clear enough
on the wisdom of invading Russia and frankly the possible gains
were never going to be worth the cost.


> which would have meant the gain of the Baltics, Ukraine, and probably
> the Caucuses.

The Caucasian oil fields were never really achievable. Even had the
German forces got across the mountains the Soviets had ample
time to blow up the facilities.

Keith

[raymond o'hara]

"The Black Monk" > wrote in message
om...
> "John Mullen" > wrote in message
>...
> > > >
> > >
> > > Yep, there still wasnt any oil in Siberia and that was the limiting
factor
> > > for Japan.
> >
> > Accepted. I still think it's an interesting thought experiment to
imagine
> > what happens if Germany and Japan get their act together and do some
proper
> > joint planning either before or even during the war. The Panama Canal
comes
> > to mind.
> >
> > John
>
> I think that Germany would only have had a chance if it had done what
> Spengler envisioned it should do - become the leader of Europe. Had
> Germany attacked the USSR with the motive of liberating its captive
> peoples - through establishing friendly semi-puppet republics as was
> done following Russia's collapse during World War I - it is likely
> that Moscow would have fallen. And if I recall correctly, Stalin
> would have been ready to offer terms had Moscow been taken.
> Intelligent, not fanatic, leadership would have accepted such terms,
> which would have meant the gain of the Baltics, Ukraine, and probably
> the Caucuses. Had the Germans been statesmen they would not have had
> to contend with resistence in eastern Europe, indeed they would
> probably have had several 100,000 more allied troops. It is likely
> that even within Russia some friendly troops cpuld be had. Not
> Vlasov's sullen war criminals, but free cossacks from the Don, Terek
> or Kuban fighting willingly against their oppresors. If the Germans
> had wanted to make the war into a crusade for Europe (naturally at the
> expense of a few unfortunates - the French and Poles) they would have
> stood a chance of winning. Instead, of course, Hitler's war was a
> crusade only for his grotesque and evil ideology, as bad as if not
> worse than the Bolshevism he fought. In this world, the British
> would not have held onto the middle east with its oil, and the world
> would have been a much different place for the past fifty years.
>
> This alternative strategy is not as far-fetched as it seems. Elements
> in the Wehrmacht were outraged at the Nazi mistreatment of Eastern
> Europeans, and even within the Nazi party there was for example
> Rosenberg, an ethnic German from Estonia, who envisioned an allied
> puppet Ukraine stretching from "Lviv to Saratov" (there as an
> interesting article about this in the Ukrainian Weekly a year or so
> ago).
>
> Unfortunately, rather than statesmen Germany was led by madmen.
> Hitler's racial theories prevented him from making Germany a leader of
> Europe in the manner that America would later be. As Spengler
> predicted in 1936, Hitler's sick reich didn't last 10 years.
>
> BM


this has been said a thousand times before in a hundred books . the truth is
if they were reasonable thoughtful men they wouldn't have been nazies .

[Mikhail Medved]

"John Mullen" > wrote in message >...
> "Stuart Wilkes" > wrote in message
> om...
> > "John Mullen" > wrote in message
> >...
> >
> > <snip great post>
> >
> > > Great post!
> >
> > It was.
> >
> > > And, by choosing the eastern, Pacific route of expansion rather than the
> > > western, they ensured that the Navy rather than the Army would have
> > > precedence in the Japanese junta of the time. These guys made an
> absolute
> > > art-form of inter-service rivalry!
> > >
> > > Interesting to speculate what if they had pursued the western route
> instead.
> > > Of course if they and the Nazis had been proper allies instead of
> > > mistrustful (as well as untrustworthy!) basket cases, they'd have been
> > > having this discussion in late 1940 or so.
> > >
> > > Think Germany and Japan, working together in a coordinated way, could
> have
> > > beaten the Soviets without bringing the US or UK into the war?
> >
> > Yes and no. Yes, Germany can attack the Soviets without the West
> > getting in the way. Skip the occupation of Prague, and go straight
> > for Poland. Poland is not well thought-of in the West, since they
> > joined in on the carveup of Czechoslovakia. Then occupy the Baltic
> > States. Now start the Anti-Bolshevik Crusade.
> >
> > But they won't win.
> >
> > > Germany has Barbarossa but without having Fall Gelb first.
> >
> > Germany looted a huge amount of gold, fuel, weapons, ammo, food,
> > trucks, and industrial production from occupied France. It came to
> > ~15 gigabucks (1940 dollars) IIRC.
>
> OTOH they alsoguaranteed a fight with the UK, then still (just!) the world's
> leading military power.

Any proof to that opinion? The "leading military power" was removed
from the continent in a few weeks of actual fighting. The biggest
battle was the battle of Alamein, in which they fiught a small German
corps.

The Navy was strong, of course, but so far no-one won a war on
continent with only the Navy.

Of course, if that makes you feel beeter...

> >Without these resources, the
> > German effort in the East is likely to fall a great deal short.
> >
> > > Japan consolidates in China
> >
> > That will never happen.
>
> Even without trying to take on the US?
>
> > > then attacks Siberia.
> >
> > And gets trounced as bad as they did in 1937 - 1939.
> >
> > And there's no oil they can get to in Siberia, even if they do win,
> > which they won't.
>
> Even without trying to take on the US?
>
> > > And then perhaps done Western Europe afterwards. Assume a 1938/9
> > > understanding greater than actually happened.
> >
> > Dosen't help. Neither has what it takes, although the West might
> > support the Axis if it looks like the Bolshies are about to win it
> > all.
>
> Now that would be an interesting thought! Certainly lead to a different
> history...
>
> John

[John Mullen]

"Keith Willshaw" > wrote in message
...
>
> "John Mullen" > wrote in message
> ...
> > "Keith Willshaw" > wrote in message
> > ...
> > >
> > >
> >
> > 1) RN was still (slightly) stronger than the USN (see 3 below). RAF was,
> as
> > you say, able (just) to do its job in defending the UK. The army was not
> > nearly as pitifully small as in WW1 and could count on massive
> reinforcement
> > in logistics from the colonies, which the aforementioned RN and RAF
would
> > guarantee would (mostly) get through.
> >
>
> There was nothing much in it
>
> In 1914 the BEF had 6 British Infantry Divisions, 2 Indian Infantry
> Divisions
> 1 British Cavalry division and 1 Indian Calavry Brigade
>
> In 1939 their were 2 regular infantry divisions in the Aldershot zone , 1
in
> the
> Eastern Zone at Colchester, 2 TA Divisions in the London Zone, 1 regular
> division in the Northern Zone , 1 TA Division in Scotland, 1 Armored
> Division
> and 1 regular infantry Division in Southern command and 2 TA Divisions in
> Wales
>
> In total 5 Regular Infantry divisions, 4 of TA Infantry and 1 Armored
> Division
> not all of the TA divisions were suitable for short term use
>
>
> > 2) Although leadership in all three services still had its share of
idiots
> > (blame the class/caste system which was still a major factor then), we
at
> > least had the advantage that most officers, particularly at higher
levels,
> > had experience of fighting in WW1, an advantage shared only by Germany
of
> > the other major participants.
> >
>
> The French were involved rather heavily in WW1 you'll find

For sure, but not (with all respect) in the second. They were invaded,
defeated, surrendered, collaborated or resisted according to taste, and then
liberated themselves with the help of a third of a million US and UK troops.
For most of the war, most of the time, most of them weren't involved.

> > In Churchill, once he was PM, and for all his many faults, we had a
truly
> > great war leader with not only an intimate knowledge of the minutiae of
> > warfare but also a developing ability to delegate.
> >
>
> And had screwed up royally at Gallipoli

And served his time in the political wilderness for it.

>the British Army was no more
> ready for amphibious warfare in Norway in 1940 than it had been
> in the Dardanelles

Was much more ready for it at Normandy though, at least partly for the bad
experience at the Dardanelles.

> > 3) As far as equipment goes, while the army in particular was poorly
> > equipped and the RN still largely depended on WW1 vintage ships, the RAF
> had
> > (just!) begun to equip with truly first-rate kit, some exceptions like
the
> > Battle and Stirling accepted.
>
> The Stirling didnt arrive in numbers until 1942 I think you'll find.

My mistake. I remembered it as a crap early war big bomber.

> Unlike (for example) the US, we also had (2)
> > above which meant that particularly in ASW tactics and naval gunnery we
> had
> > very much more of a clue than in WW1. Radar was another good thing, as
was
> > cryptography. Overall, these factors IMO gave us the edge over the US in
> the
> > 1939-40 time frame.
> >
>
> Damm few ships had radar in 1939/40

True. But airfields benefitted from radar detection of raids, and the ships
that did have it benefitted big-style, whether against surface ships or
U-Boots.

> soc.culture groups trimmed from reply

John

[John Mullen]

"Mikhail Medved" > wrote in message
om...

(snip)

> > OTOH they alsoguaranteed a fight with the UK, then still (just!) the
world's
> > leading military power.
>
> Any proof to that opinion? The "leading military power" was removed
> from the continent in a few weeks of actual fighting. The biggest
> battle was the battle of Alamein, in which they fiught a small German
> corps.

That battle was actually on the continent of Africa. The real biggest land
battle didn't come until 1944 when we teamed up with the US to invade
German-occupied France. Meantime we were fighting in the air, at sea, and in
the minor theatres like N Africa. Would have become important had we lost
though, doubt it not.

> The Navy was strong, of course, but so far no-one won a war on
> continent with only the Navy.

We did not badly to win the air and sea battles with Nazi Germany. Neither
was easy and both had costs attached. Of course we couldn't have won overall
without the support of the USA and the USSR, both of which in their own ways
hedged their bets until the decision to enter the war was forced upon them.
Of the two, that of the USSR was IMO the less honourable.

> Of course, if that makes you feel beeter...

Having a fairly balanced view about history, and exchanging ideas with
people about it, both definitely make me feel better.

John

[kirill]

The Black Monk wrote:
>
> Instead, of course, Hitler's war was a
> crusade only for his grotesque and evil ideology, as bad as if not
> worse than the Bolshevism he fought.

There is simply no comparison between the explicit genocide
promulgated by the Nazi ideology and the de facto repressive
implementation of "communism" in the USSR. All this talk
about "famine holocausts" is nothing but revisionist and
Nazi apologist drivel especially considering that it originates
from areas that never suffered through any Soviet famine and
which actively supported Hitler during WWII.

[Christophe Chazot]

"John Mullen" > a écrit dans le message news:
...
> "Keith Willshaw" > wrote in message
> ...
(snip)

> >
> > The French were involved rather heavily in WW1 you'll find
>
> For sure, but not (with all respect) in the second. They were invaded,
> defeated, surrendered, collaborated or resisted according to taste, and
then
> liberated themselves with the help of a third of a million US and UK
troops.
> For most of the war, most of the time, most of them weren't involved.

Figures dont't really agree, you know. France sent 8,410,000 soldiers to the
front. Out of them, 1,357,800 were killed and 3,595,000 wounded. The only
country that suffered higher losses in this war was Russia.

Yours,
Christophe

[Seraphim]

"Keith Willshaw" > wrote in news:bn3guk
:

> "Cub Driver" > wrote in message
> ...
>>
>> >Well yes but the army retained the upper hand, its not as if they
>> >were doing nothing. There was this little war going on in China
>> >If you read Yamamoto's biography its clear that the navy OPPOSED
>> >war with the western powers.
>>
>> Where in the world did you get this information? The Japanese army
>> longed to attack Russia. The Japanese navy longed to attack into the
>> "southern treasure chest", incidentally liberating Asia from British,
>> Dutch, and American imperialism.
>>
>
> From the biography of Admiral Yamamoto which was written
> by Hiroyuki Agawa published by Kodansha International

Right, but how do you jump from "Admiral Yamamoto opposed the war" to
"The Navy opposed the war"?

Admiral Yamamoto was fairly atypical among Japanese Navel offices in that
he had spent a fair amount of time in the US. He therefor had a somewhat
better appreciation than most in Japan of the ability of America to
simply crush Japan in terms of Industrial output.

[B2431]

>From: kirill
>Date: 10/21/2003 10:38 PM Central Daylight Time
>Message-id: >
>
>
>
>The Black Monk wrote:
>>
>> Instead, of course, Hitler's war was a
>> crusade only for his grotesque and evil ideology, as bad as if not
>> worse than the Bolshevism he fought.
>
>There is simply no comparison between the explicit genocide
>promulgated by the Nazi ideology and the de facto repressive
>implementation of "communism" in the USSR. All this talk
>about "famine holocausts" is nothing but revisionist and
>Nazi apologist drivel especially considering that it originates
>from areas that never suffered through any Soviet famine and
>which actively supported Hitler during WWII.
>
Ok, the Nazis had a semi open program of mass murder (read leibensraum,
transportation to the occupied territories etc) and the Soviets had a secret
program. That does not change the fact that many millions of innocent civilions
were deliberately murdered in both cases. The Nazis only had 12 years vs. the
Lenin-Stalin period's 36. Stalin's gulags were in business before the Nazi
concentration camp system. The gulag system's goldmines gave the average inmate
a life expectansy of 30 days. Stalin starved to death many hundreds of
thousands of people in his collectivization program.Stalins purges killed
millions more. His program of random arrest and vanishings of millions of
people was at least as effective as Hitler's nacht und nebel programs .

Without minimizing Nazi atrocities the Soviets did far worse. Of course the
Soviet system of elimination of "enemies of the state" was simply carrying on
the tradition of the Tsars. Had the Nazis lasted as long as Stalin I would
guess they would have had numbers exceding the Soviet's.

Dan, U.S. Air Force, retired

[John Mullen]

"Christophe Chazot" > wrote in message
...
>
> "John Mullen" > a écrit dans le message news:
> ...
> > "Keith Willshaw" > wrote in message
> > ...
> (snip)
>
> > >
> > > The French were involved rather heavily in WW1 you'll find
> >
> > For sure, but not (with all respect) in the second. They were invaded,
> > defeated, surrendered, collaborated or resisted according to taste, and
> then
> > liberated themselves with the help of a third of a million US and UK
> troops.
> > For most of the war, most of the time, most of them weren't involved.
>
> Figures dont't really agree, you know. France sent 8,410,000 soldiers to
the
> front. Out of them, 1,357,800 were killed and 3,595,000 wounded. The only
> country that suffered higher losses in this war was Russia.

For WW2? Seems awfully high and the figures I have certainly don't agree. On
Googling, I keep getting

France military 250,000 civilian 350,000 total 600,000

which sounds more reasonable, although still obviously a lot. After summer
1940 very few French were 'at the front', although I know about the Free
French movement and the heroism of the Resistance etc.

France only learned from WW1 that war was to be avoided (perfectly sensible)
and that a defensive strategy would deter Germany (turned out not to be true
as we know). Many in Britain made the same mistakes, but you were unlucky
enough to be before us in the firing line.

John

[Stuart Wilkes]

"John Mullen" > wrote in message >...

<snip>

> We did not badly to win the air and sea battles with Nazi Germany. Neither
> was easy and both had costs attached. Of course we couldn't have won overall
> without the support of the USA and the USSR, both of which in their own ways
> hedged their bets until the decision to enter the war was forced upon them.

Not by their choice. The Soviets had alliances with Czechoslovakia
and France since 1935, and offered Great Britain and France a full-up
Triple Alliance with all the trimmings on 17 April 1939. Too bad
Chamberlain refused to take it seriously, preferring to pursue
Anglo-German agreement.

> Of the two, that of the USSR was IMO the less honourable.

They had been excluded from the prewar European diplomacy, and their
alliance offers to the Western Allies refused. Once that was clear,
they looked after themselves. Nothing dishonorable about that.

Stuart Wilkes

[Cub Driver]

The book title, by the way, is Flyboys: A True Story of Courage, by
James Bradley. After initially being put off by the moral equivalence
(oh sure, the Japanese murdered, cooked, and ate bits of seven
American fliers off Chichi Jima, but hey! Americans behaved badly at
the Battle of Wounded Knee!), I've decided it's worth the read.

www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0316105848/ref=nosim/annals

all the best -- Dan Ford
email: www.danford.net/letters.htm#9

see the Warbird's Forum at www.warbirdforum.com
and the Piper Cub Forum at www.pipercubforum.com

[Cub Driver]

>A limited operation does not have to be minor, it just has to have well
>defined limits.

Shucks, by that definition, the U.S. fought World War II as a limited
operation.

a) defeat Germany

b) defeat Japan

What limits could be better defined than those?

all the best -- Dan Ford
email: www.danford.net/letters.htm#9

see the Warbird's Forum at www.warbirdforum.com
and the Piper Cub Forum at www.pipercubforum.com

[Cub Driver]

>The Japanese leader who took over in Oct 1941 was of course
>General Hideki Tojo who was a hard liner and it was under
>his leadership and that of the army that the decison for war
>was taken

It was taken at the Imperial Conference in September. Everything after
that was merely a decision not to turn back.

all the best -- Dan Ford
email: www.danford.net/letters.htm#9

see the Warbird's Forum at www.warbirdforum.com
and the Piper Cub Forum at www.pipercubforum.com

[Keith Willshaw]

"Stuart Wilkes" > wrote in message
om...
> "John Mullen" > wrote in message
>...
>
> <snip>
>
> > We did not badly to win the air and sea battles with Nazi Germany.
Neither
> > was easy and both had costs attached. Of course we couldn't have won
overall
> > without the support of the USA and the USSR, both of which in their own
ways
> > hedged their bets until the decision to enter the war was forced upon
them.
>
> Not by their choice. The Soviets had alliances with Czechoslovakia
> and France since 1935, and offered Great Britain and France a full-up
> Triple Alliance with all the trimmings on 17 April 1939. Too bad
> Chamberlain refused to take it seriously, preferring to pursue
> Anglo-German agreement.
>

Given that Stalin had

1) Reneged on his agreements with Czechoslovakia when that nation
asked the Soviets to intervene in 1938

2) Just finished decimating the Red Army by killing three out of five Soviet
marshals, fifteen out of sixteen army commanders, sixty out of 67
corps commanders, and 136 out of 199 divisional commanders
and 36,761 officers.

3) Had just presided over the man made famine in the Ukraine

Its scarcely suprising that Soviet promises were viewed with
a degree of scepticism.


> > Of the two, that of the USSR was IMO the less honourable.
>
> They had been excluded from the prewar European diplomacy, and their
> alliance offers to the Western Allies refused. Once that was clear,
> they looked after themselves. Nothing dishonorable about that.
>

The secret codicils to the Soviet-German non-aggression pact
were scarcely honorable , neither was the Soviet invasion
of the Baltic states and Finland, unless you consider that
the Finnish hordes poised to sweep across the borders
of the USSR were a major threat to the Rodina.

Fact is Stalin was already secretly negotiating with Germany in
1938 and thought he could cut a cosy deal with his buddy
Adolf and carve up Central Europe between them.

Oops

Keith

[Cub Driver]

>Figures dont't really agree, you know. France sent 8,410,000 soldiers to the
>front. Out of them, 1,357,800 were killed and 3,595,000 wounded. The only
>country that suffered higher losses in this war was Russia.

There must have been close to a million slave laborers (guest workers,
if you prefer) sent to Germany. I've seen newsreels of them returning,
still in their 1940 uniforms.

all the best -- Dan Ford
email: www.danford.net/letters.htm#9

see the Warbird's Forum at www.warbirdforum.com
and the Piper Cub Forum at www.pipercubforum.com

[E. Barry Bruyea]

On Wed, 22 Oct 2003 02:42:58 +0100, "John Mullen" > wrote:

>"Mikhail Medved" > wrote in message
om...
>
>(snip)
>
>> > OTOH they alsoguaranteed a fight with the UK, then still (just!) the
>world's
>> > leading military power.
>>
>> Any proof to that opinion? The "leading military power" was removed
>> from the continent in a few weeks of actual fighting. The biggest
>> battle was the battle of Alamein, in which they fiught a small German
>> corps.
>
>That battle was actually on the continent of Africa. The real biggest land
>battle didn't come until 1944 when we teamed up with the US to invade
>German-occupied France. Meantime we were fighting in the air, at sea, and in
>the minor theatres like N Africa. Would have become important had we lost
>though, doubt it not.

North Africa was hardly a minor theatre, in that given a German win,
the loss of mid-east oil & Suez would have been critical to the war
effort.


>
>> The Navy was strong, of course, but so far no-one won a war on
>> continent with only the Navy.
>
>We did not badly to win the air and sea battles with Nazi Germany. Neither
>was easy and both had costs attached. Of course we couldn't have won overall
>without the support of the USA and the USSR, both of which in their own ways
>hedged their bets until the decision to enter the war was forced upon them.
>Of the two, that of the USSR was IMO the less honourable.
>
>> Of course, if that makes you feel beeter...
>
>Having a fairly balanced view about history, and exchanging ideas with
>people about it, both definitely make me feel better.
>
>John
>

[E. Barry Bruyea]

On 22 Oct 2003 02:44:52 -0700, (Stuart Wilkes)
wrote:

>"John Mullen" > wrote in message >...
>
><snip>
>
>> We did not badly to win the air and sea battles with Nazi Germany. Neither
>> was easy and both had costs attached. Of course we couldn't have won overall
>> without the support of the USA and the USSR, both of which in their own ways
>> hedged their bets until the decision to enter the war was forced upon them.
>
>Not by their choice. The Soviets had alliances with Czechoslovakia
>and France since 1935, and offered Great Britain and France a full-up
>Triple Alliance with all the trimmings on 17 April 1939. Too bad
>Chamberlain refused to take it seriously, preferring to pursue
>Anglo-German agreement.

The only way that an treaty with the USSR could have been signed is to
accede to Stalin's demand for a free rein in the Baltic, an agreement
not likely to have gone well with any of the Western powers. Stalin
finally got it from Hitler, which is what he was after.


>
>> Of the two, that of the USSR was IMO the less honourable.
>
>They had been excluded from the prewar European diplomacy, and their
>alliance offers to the Western Allies refused. Once that was clear,
>they looked after themselves. Nothing dishonorable about that.
>
>Stuart Wilkes

[Mortimer Schnerd, RN]

Cub Driver wrote:
> The book title, by the way, is Flyboys: A True Story of Courage, by
> James Bradley. After initially being put off by the moral equivalence
> (oh sure, the Japanese murdered, cooked, and ate bits of seven
> American fliers off Chichi Jima, but hey! Americans behaved badly at
> the Battle of Wounded Knee!), I've decided it's worth the read.
>
> www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0316105848/ref=nosim/annals


Thanks, Dan. I just ordered a copy myself at $14.00 plus shipping.



--
Mortimer Schnerd, RN


http://www.mortimerschnerd.com

[Andy Spark]

In article >, John
Mullen > wrote:

> > The RN may have been arguably the strongest although
> > the USN was surely equal or better. The RAF was able
> > to hold its own on the defensive (just) but it was in no
> > shape to launch any real attacks on the nemey and the
> > army was pitifully small in comparison to that of Germany
> > and was for the most part less well equipped and led.

> 1) RN was still (slightly) stronger than the USN (see 3 below). RAF was, as
> you say, able (just) to do its job in defending the UK. The army was not
> nearly as pitifully small as in WW1 and could count on massive reinforcement
> in logistics from the colonies, which the aforementioned RN and RAF would
> guarantee would (mostly) get through.


No the RAF was more than capable of holding out against the Luftwaffe.
The germans had the wrong aircraft the wrong tactics and well, just
about everything. -Even had they worked out what the strange looking
towers round the south coast were for and demolished them, enabling
them to knock out the RAF's frontline airfields, all the RAF would have
had to do was to pull their fighters back to the North of London (out
of the limited range of the german bombers) and continue sniping away.
-The RAF ended the Battle of Britain materially stronger than when it
started. -Of course they enjoyed the advantage of being able to recover
their downed pilots, and a large proportion of even the most badly
damaged aircraft, but they also enjoyed the most sophisticated command
and control system in existance at the time, together with professional
leadership, and an operational ethos which did not glorify the few aces
at the expense of the majority of canon fodder. I could go on but I
would recommend instead that you read "The Most Dangerous Enemy" by
Stephen Bungay.

Favourite quote from a German pilot, assured that the RAF was on it's
last legs sometime in September 1940

"Oh look, here come the last 50 Spitfires ..... again"

[Peter Skelton]

On Wed, 22 Oct 2003 05:58:19 +0200, "Christophe Chazot"
> wrote:

>
>"John Mullen" > a écrit dans le message news:
...
>> "Keith Willshaw" > wrote in message
>> ...
>(snip)
>
>> >
>> > The French were involved rather heavily in WW1 you'll find
>>
>> For sure, but not (with all respect) in the second. They were invaded,
>> defeated, surrendered, collaborated or resisted according to taste, and
>then
>> liberated themselves with the help of a third of a million US and UK
>troops.
>> For most of the war, most of the time, most of them weren't involved.
>
>Figures dont't really agree, you know. France sent 8,410,000 soldiers to the
>front. Out of them, 1,357,800 were killed and 3,595,000 wounded. The only
>country that suffered higher losses in this war was Russia.

That number is WWI French deaths, not casualties. Germany lost
1,900,000 appoximately, probably somewhat more than Russian
(haven't seen figures I trusted for Russia) Austria-Hungarian
losses were about equal to the French.

Peter Skelton

[Owe Jessen]

Am 21 Oct 2003 16:09:53 -0700, schrieb (The
Black Monk) :
>
>Unfortunately, rather than statesmen Germany was led by madmen.
>Hitler's racial theories prevented him from making Germany a leader of
>Europe in the manner that America would later be. As Spengler
>predicted in 1936, Hitler's sick reich didn't last 10 years.
>

If Germany would have been lead by statesmen and not madmen it would
not have waged war, me thinks.


Owe
--
My from-adress is valid and being read.
www.owejessen.de

[The Black Monk]

"raymond o'hara" > wrote in message >...
> "The Black Monk" > wrote in message
> om...
> > "John Mullen" > wrote in message
> >...
> > > > >
> > > >
> > > > Yep, there still wasnt any oil in Siberia and that was the limiting
> factor
> > > > for Japan.
> > >
> > > Accepted. I still think it's an interesting thought experiment to
> imagine
> > > what happens if Germany and Japan get their act together and do some
> proper
> > > joint planning either before or even during the war. The Panama Canal
> comes
> > > to mind.
> > >
> > > John
> >
> > I think that Germany would only have had a chance if it had done what
> > Spengler envisioned it should do - become the leader of Europe. Had
> > Germany attacked the USSR with the motive of liberating its captive
> > peoples - through establishing friendly semi-puppet republics as was
> > done following Russia's collapse during World War I - it is likely
> > that Moscow would have fallen. And if I recall correctly, Stalin
> > would have been ready to offer terms had Moscow been taken.
> > Intelligent, not fanatic, leadership would have accepted such terms,
> > which would have meant the gain of the Baltics, Ukraine, and probably
> > the Caucuses. Had the Germans been statesmen they would not have had
> > to contend with resistence in eastern Europe, indeed they would
> > probably have had several 100,000 more allied troops. It is likely
> > that even within Russia some friendly troops cpuld be had. Not
> > Vlasov's sullen war criminals, but free cossacks from the Don, Terek
> > or Kuban fighting willingly against their oppresors. If the Germans
> > had wanted to make the war into a crusade for Europe (naturally at the
> > expense of a few unfortunates - the French and Poles) they would have
> > stood a chance of winning. Instead, of course, Hitler's war was a
> > crusade only for his grotesque and evil ideology, as bad as if not
> > worse than the Bolshevism he fought. In this world, the British
> > would not have held onto the middle east with its oil, and the world
> > would have been a much different place for the past fifty years.
> >
> > This alternative strategy is not as far-fetched as it seems. Elements
> > in the Wehrmacht were outraged at the Nazi mistreatment of Eastern
> > Europeans, and even within the Nazi party there was for example
> > Rosenberg, an ethnic German from Estonia, who envisioned an allied
> > puppet Ukraine stretching from "Lviv to Saratov" (there as an
> > interesting article about this in the Ukrainian Weekly a year or so
> > ago).
> >
> > Unfortunately, rather than statesmen Germany was led by madmen.
> > Hitler's racial theories prevented him from making Germany a leader of
> > Europe in the manner that America would later be. As Spengler
> > predicted in 1936, Hitler's sick reich didn't last 10 years.
> >
> > BM
>
>
> this has been said a thousand times before in a hundred books . the truth is
> if they were reasonable thoughtful men they wouldn't have been nazies .

Of course!

BM

[The Black Monk]

kirill > wrote in message >...
> The Black Monk wrote:
> >
> > Instead, of course, Hitler's war was a
> > crusade only for his grotesque and evil ideology, as bad as if not
> > worse than the Bolshevism he fought.
>
> There is simply no comparison between the explicit genocide
> promulgated by the Nazi ideology and the de facto repressive
> implementation of "communism" in the USSR.

Well, the Nazis were at least honest about their brutality. For the
millions who were sacrificed for the purpose of building the worker's
paradise it is small consolation that some of their murderers thought
that they were building a better world rather than just destroying
subhumans.

> All this talk
> about "famine holocausts" is nothing but revisionist and
> Nazi apologist drivel especially considering that it originates
> from areas that never suffered through any Soviet famine and
> which actively supported Hitler during WWII.

I dispute the latter statements. OF course talk of the famine was
greatest in areas not under soviet control, where news was suppressed.
My grandfather and a few others - a small minority of people from
"velyka ukrainia" within the diaspora lived through the Famine, had
family that died during it. While obviously the post-Stalin USSR
could not be compared to Nazi Germany (though it was still worse than,
for example, Franco's Spain), Stalinism, and Pol Pot's communism were
not much different.

respectfully,

BM

[Fred J. McCall]

Owe Jessen > wrote:

:Am 21 Oct 2003 16:09:53 -0700, schrieb (The
:Black Monk) :
:>
:>Unfortunately, rather than statesmen Germany was led by madmen.
:>Hitler's racial theories prevented him from making Germany a leader of
:>Europe in the manner that America would later be. As Spengler
:>predicted in 1936, Hitler's sick reich didn't last 10 years.
:
:If Germany would have been lead by statesmen and not madmen it would
:not have waged war, me thinks.

And if Germany had been fairly treated by the victors of WWI, rather
than robbed blind, and hadn't had such sensible options as Anshluss
foreclosed, she might have been led by statesmen rather than madmen.


--
"Now this is the Law of the Jungle --
as old and as true as the sky;
And the Wolf that shall keep it may prosper,
but the Wolf that shall break it must die.
As the creeper that girdles the tree-trunk
the Law runneth forward and back --
For the strength of the Pack is the Wolf,
and the strength of the Wolf is the Pack."

-- "The Law of the Jungle", Rudyard Kipling

[Christophe]

According to the first line, we were talking about WW1 :
> > > > The French were involved rather heavily in WW1 you'll find


"John Mullen" > a écrit dans le message news:
...
> "Christophe Chazot" > wrote in message
> ...
> >
> > "John Mullen" > a écrit dans le message news:
> > ...
> > > "Keith Willshaw" > wrote in message
> > > ...
> > (snip)
> >
> > > >
> > > > The French were involved rather heavily in WW1 you'll find
> > >

(snip)

> France only learned from WW1 that war was to be avoided (perfectly
sensible)
> and that a defensive strategy would deter Germany (turned out not to be
true
> as we know). Many in Britain made the same mistakes, but you were unlucky
> enough to be before us in the firing line.
>
> John
>

Yep. "Too few, too late" was also true for the french armies...

Christophe

[Stuart Wilkes]

E. Barry Bruyea > wrote in message >...
> On 22 Oct 2003 02:44:52 -0700, (Stuart Wilkes)
> wrote:
>
> >"John Mullen" > wrote in message >...
> >
> ><snip>
> >
> >> We did not badly to win the air and sea battles with Nazi Germany. Neither
> >> was easy and both had costs attached. Of course we couldn't have won
> >> overall without the support of the USA and the USSR, both of which in
> >> their own ways hedged their bets until the decision to enter the war was
> >> forced upon them.
> >
> >Not by their choice. The Soviets had alliances with Czechoslovakia
> >and France since 1935, and offered Great Britain and France a full-up
> >Triple Alliance with all the trimmings on 17 April 1939. Too bad
> >Chamberlain refused to take it seriously, preferring to pursue
> >Anglo-German agreement.
>
> The only way that an treaty with the USSR could have been signed is to
> accede to Stalin's demand for a free rein in the Baltic,

Yes, it is much better, from the point of view of an appeasing Western
Conservative, for Nazi Germany to have free rein in the Baltic.

> an agreement not likely to have gone well with any of the Western powers.

Indeed, the Western powers were concerned to keep the Baltic States
out of Soviet hands. However, in the Anglo-German negotiations of the
summer of 1939, the British offered to recognize Eastern Europe as a
German sphere of influence. Last time I checked, the Baltic States
are in Eastern Europe. So the Western powers were indeed resolved to
keep the Baltic States out of Soviet hands, in order to preserve them
for the Nazi variety.

> Stalin finally got it from Hitler, which is what he was after.

Indeed. After all, the prospects of Operation Barbarossa are much
improved if it is launched against the 1938 Soviet borders.

Stuart Wilkes

[Peter Twydell]

In article >, The Black
Monk > writes
> wrote in message >...
>> In article >, "Bill
>> Silvey" > wrote:
>>
>> > Then there was the fact that the Reds did nothing while Japan massacred
>> > hundreds of thousands of Chinese in the '30s. Stalin only declared war on
>> > Japan *after* Japan had lost, just to gain Kamchatka. 100% fact.
>>
>> russia fought japan until the german invasion of russia. you don't have
>> to look in obscure sources to find out about it.
>>
>> readers of rec.aviation.military are undoubtably familiar with the
>> accounts of the flying tigers in china. these books describe the
>> russian conflict with china in this period, both as mercenaries for
>> china and direct conflict on the soviet border.
>
>
>Indeed.
>
>At Khalkyn Gol between May and September 1939 the Japanese were
>crushed by Zhukov, sustaining over 80,000 casualties to the Russians'
>11,130. Within a single week the Japanses lost 25,000 men. The
>entire Japanese 6th army was completely destroyed.
>
>The Battle of Khalkin Gol was Zhukov's illustration of Deep
>Penetration tactics. The use of deception tactics, extremely fast
>tanks and mechanized forces to outflank an opponent's defenses, and
>the combination of aerial, airborne, and ground troops lead to the
>complete destruction of the Japanese 6th Army and to Japan's loss of a
>sphere of influence in the Mongolian and Far Eastern regions.
>
>This battle also featured the first successful use of air-to-air
>missiles. Five Polikarpov I-16 Type 10 fighters under the command of
>Capt. Zvonarev claimed destruction two Mitsubishi A5M by RS-82
>unguided rockets.
>
It depends on your definitions. Aerial rockets had been used in WW I, to
destroy balloons rather than enemy heavier-than-air craft.
See: http://www.firstworldwar.com/atoz/leprieur.htm

>Historians describe a conflict within the Japanese military about
>whether to attack the USSR or the USA. The complete defeat att he
>hands of the Soviets made that decision: Pearl Harbor happened because
>the Japanese chose to attack the weaker foe.
>
>BM

--
Peter

Ying tong iddle-i po!

[Tarver Engineering]

"Fred J. McCall" > wrote in message
...
> Owe Jessen > wrote:
>
> :Am 21 Oct 2003 16:09:53 -0700, schrieb (The
> :Black Monk) :
> :>
> :>Unfortunately, rather than statesmen Germany was led by madmen.
> :>Hitler's racial theories prevented him from making Germany a leader of
> :>Europe in the manner that America would later be. As Spengler
> :>predicted in 1936, Hitler's sick reich didn't last 10 years.
> :
> :If Germany would have been lead by statesmen and not madmen it would
> :not have waged war, me thinks.
>
> And if Germany had been fairly treated by the victors of WWI, rather
> than robbed blind, and hadn't had such sensible options as Anshluss
> foreclosed, she might have been led by statesmen rather than madmen.

I think the meth-amphetamines would have still done their paranoid
schizoprenic work on the minds of the people. Adolph was a very charismatic
man.

[Keith Willshaw]

"Stuart Wilkes" > wrote in message
om...
> E. Barry Bruyea > wrote in message
>...
> > On 22 Oct 2003 02:44:52 -0700, (Stuart Wilkes)
> > wrote:

>
> Indeed, the Western powers were concerned to keep the Baltic States
> out of Soviet hands. However, in the Anglo-German negotiations of the
> summer of 1939, the British offered to recognize Eastern Europe as a
> German sphere of influence. Last time I checked, the Baltic States
> are in Eastern Europe. So the Western powers were indeed resolved to
> keep the Baltic States out of Soviet hands, in order to preserve them
> for the Nazi variety.
>

What Anglo German negotiations ?

From March onwards (when Germany seized the remains of
Czechoslovakia) there was a deterioration of relations which made everbody
understand the inevitability of war

In April Germany denounced the Anglo German Naval Agreement

The Germans alsocomplained about the negotiations
Britain was pursuing with the USSR complaining that
Britain and the Soviet Union were trying to encircle
Germany.

They need not have feared since it was the Soviets who scuppered
any chance of an alliance to oppose Germany when Molotov
first sharply criticized the British suggestions of a defensive alliance
against Germany and Italy and then rejected a series of drafts in
negotiations
with the British and French governments and demanded guarantees for the
Baltic states, insurance against internal revolution, and the right to send
Red Army troops into Poland in the event of a German invasion.

These demands were clearly impossible to accept and were almost
certainly intended to end all such talks as the USSR was already
secretly negotiating with Germany.

It was of course Stalin who offered Germany a free hand in Western
Europe while the USSR would have a free hand in the east and
split Poland between them.


Keith

[Stuart Wilkes]

"Keith Willshaw" > wrote in message >...
> "Stuart Wilkes" > wrote in message
> om...
> > "John Mullen" > wrote in message
> >...
> >
> > <snip>
> >
> > > We did not badly to win the air and sea battles with Nazi Germany.
> Neither
> > > was easy and both had costs attached. Of course we couldn't have won
> overall
> > > without the support of the USA and the USSR, both of which in their own
> ways
> > > hedged their bets until the decision to enter the war was forced upon
> them.
> >
> > Not by their choice. The Soviets had alliances with Czechoslovakia
> > and France since 1935, and offered Great Britain and France a full-up
> > Triple Alliance with all the trimmings on 17 April 1939. Too bad
> > Chamberlain refused to take it seriously, preferring to pursue
> > Anglo-German agreement.
> >
>
> Given that Stalin had
>
> 1) Reneged on his agreements with Czechoslovakia when that nation
> asked the Soviets to intervene in 1938

False. The Czechoslovak government never made any request for Soviet
aid. The Czechoslovak government decided on their own that they would
accept the Munich dictate. In his memoirs, Benes maintains that the
Soviets were willing to go beyond the committments they had made,
should the Czechoslovak government desire. The Czechoslovak
government made no such request.

> 2) Just finished decimating the Red Army by killing three out of five Soviet
> marshals, fifteen out of sixteen army commanders, sixty out of 67
> corps commanders, and 136 out of 199 divisional commanders
> and 36,761 officers.

Hm. One wonders how this purged Soviet Army managed to inflict over 3
times as many German KIA in the first seven weeks of Barbarossa as the
combined Franco-Anglo-Belgian-Dutch armies managed in the six-week
campaign in the West.

And the purges themselves had no impact on Western estimates of the
Soviet military. They derided it before the Purges, and the derided
it after the Purges. Tukhachevskii was discovered in the West to have
been a military genius only after he was safely dead.

> 3) Had just presided over the man made famine in the Ukraine
>
> Its scarcely suprising that Soviet promises were viewed with
> a degree of scepticism.
>
>
> > > Of the two, that of the USSR was IMO the less honourable.
> >
> > They had been excluded from the prewar European diplomacy, and their
> > alliance offers to the Western Allies refused. Once that was clear,
> > they looked after themselves. Nothing dishonorable about that.
>
> The secret codicils to the Soviet-German non-aggression pact
> were scarcely honorable,

With Chamberlain determined on Anglo-German agreement, it would have
been highly unwise for the Soviets to pass up the offer.

> neither was the Soviet invasion
> of the Baltic states and Finland,

It also would have been unwise for the Soviets to have let Germany
occupy the Baltic States.

> unless you consider that
> the Finnish hordes poised to sweep across the borders
> of the USSR were a major threat to the Rodina.
>
> Fact is Stalin was already secretly negotiating with Germany in 1938

And the British had been <openly> negotiating with Nazi Germany since
1935, concluding agreements that permitted German naval rearmament, as
well as selling Czechoslovakia out.

> and thought he could cut a cosy deal with his buddy
> Adolf and carve up Central Europe between them.

No sense letting "good old Neville" hand it all to Adolpf.

> Oops

Got a better alternative for him?

I thought not.

Stuart Wilkes

[L'acrobat]

"Cub Driver" > wrote in message
...
>
> >A limited operation does not have to be minor, it just has to have well
> >defined limits.
>
> Shucks, by that definition, the U.S. fought World War II as a limited
> operation.
>
> a) defeat Germany
>
> b) defeat Japan
>
> What limits could be better defined than those?
>

Don't be such an idiot.

The Allies fought to defeat Germany and Japan on a strategic level.

Japan fought a limited war in the South Pacific to simply exclude the Allies
from interfering with their supplies.

The South Pacific was a sideshow for Japan and all operations in the South
Pacific were limited and to support the main aim. China.

[Keith Willshaw]

"Stuart Wilkes" > wrote in message
m...
> "Keith Willshaw" > wrote in message
>...
> > "Stuart Wilkes" > wrote in message
> > om...
> > > "John Mullen" > wrote in message
> > >...
> > >
> > > <snip>
> > >
> > > > We did not badly to win the air and sea battles with Nazi Germany.
> > Neither
> > > > was easy and both had costs attached. Of course we couldn't have won
> > overall
> > > > without the support of the USA and the USSR, both of which in their
own
> > ways
> > > > hedged their bets until the decision to enter the war was forced
upon
> > them.
> > >
> > > Not by their choice. The Soviets had alliances with Czechoslovakia
> > > and France since 1935, and offered Great Britain and France a full-up
> > > Triple Alliance with all the trimmings on 17 April 1939. Too bad
> > > Chamberlain refused to take it seriously, preferring to pursue
> > > Anglo-German agreement.
> > >
> >
> > Given that Stalin had
> >
> > 1) Reneged on his agreements with Czechoslovakia when that nation
> > asked the Soviets to intervene in 1938
>
> False. The Czechoslovak government never made any request for Soviet
> aid. The Czechoslovak government decided on their own that they would
> accept the Munich dictate. In his memoirs, Benes maintains that the
> Soviets were willing to go beyond the committments they had made,
> should the Czechoslovak government desire. The Czechoslovak
> government made no such request.
>

This is incorrect, the Soviet government did not respond
to Benes when he appealed for help under the terms
of the 1935 treaty. The Soviets prevaricated knowing
all too well what the consequences would be.

> > 2) Just finished decimating the Red Army by killing three out of five
Soviet
> > marshals, fifteen out of sixteen army commanders, sixty out of 67
> > corps commanders, and 136 out of 199 divisional commanders
> > and 36,761 officers.
>
> Hm. One wonders how this purged Soviet Army managed to inflict over 3
> times as many German KIA in the first seven weeks of Barbarossa as the
> combined Franco-Anglo-Belgian-Dutch armies managed in the six-week
> campaign in the West.
>

While losing ten times as many men

> And the purges themselves had no impact on Western estimates of the
> Soviet military. They derided it before the Purges, and the derided
> it after the Purges. Tukhachevskii was discovered in the West to have
> been a military genius only after he was safely dead.
>

The purges had clear and direct effects on the Soviet military
which was found to be inadequate to the task of defeating
mighty Finland

> > 3) Had just presided over the man made famine in the Ukraine
> >
> > Its scarcely suprising that Soviet promises were viewed with
> > a degree of scepticism.
> >
> >
> > > > Of the two, that of the USSR was IMO the less honourable.
> > >
> > > They had been excluded from the prewar European diplomacy, and their
> > > alliance offers to the Western Allies refused. Once that was clear,
> > > they looked after themselves. Nothing dishonorable about that.
> >
> > The secret codicils to the Soviet-German non-aggression pact
> > were scarcely honorable,
>
> With Chamberlain determined on Anglo-German agreement, it would have
> been highly unwise for the Soviets to pass up the offer.
>

Chamberlain was determined on peace, nothing more and
nothing less.

> > neither was the Soviet invasion
> > of the Baltic states and Finland,
>
> It also would have been unwise for the Soviets to have let Germany
> occupy the Baltic States.
>

That happened anyway dies to Stalis destruction
of the red army.

> > unless you consider that
> > the Finnish hordes poised to sweep across the borders
> > of the USSR were a major threat to the Rodina.
> >
> > Fact is Stalin was already secretly negotiating with Germany in 1938
>
> And the British had been <openly> negotiating with Nazi Germany since
> 1935, concluding agreements that permitted German naval rearmament, as
> well as selling Czechoslovakia out.
>

Nations tend to negotiate openly with each other, its
called diplomacy I believe.

> > and thought he could cut a cosy deal with his buddy
> > Adolf and carve up Central Europe between them.
>
> No sense letting "good old Neville" hand it all to Adolpf.
>

Neville didnt had Poland to Adolf, he declared
war insted, handing Poland to Adolf was Uncle Joe's
doing.

> > Oops
>
> Got a better alternative for him?

Sure, stop selling the Nazis war materials would be a good start.
Hell the Russians supplied Germany with the fuel for Barbarossa.

Keith

[Keith Willshaw]

"Stuart Wilkes" > wrote in message
m...
> "Keith Willshaw" > wrote in message
>...
> > "Stuart Wilkes" > wrote in message
> > om...
> > > "John Mullen" > wrote in message
> > >...
> > >
> > > <snip>
> > >
> > > > We did not badly to win the air and sea battles with Nazi Germany.
> > Neither
> > > > was easy and both had costs attached. Of course we couldn't have won
> > overall
> > > > without the support of the USA and the USSR, both of which in their
own
> > ways
> > > > hedged their bets until the decision to enter the war was forced
upon
> > them.
> > >
> > > Not by their choice. The Soviets had alliances with Czechoslovakia
> > > and France since 1935, and offered Great Britain and France a full-up
> > > Triple Alliance with all the trimmings on 17 April 1939. Too bad
> > > Chamberlain refused to take it seriously, preferring to pursue
> > > Anglo-German agreement.
> > >
> >
> > Given that Stalin had
> >
> > 1) Reneged on his agreements with Czechoslovakia when that nation
> > asked the Soviets to intervene in 1938
>
> False. The Czechoslovak government never made any request for Soviet
> aid. The Czechoslovak government decided on their own that they would
> accept the Munich dictate. In his memoirs, Benes maintains that the
> Soviets were willing to go beyond the committments they had made,
> should the Czechoslovak government desire. The Czechoslovak
> government made no such request.
>

This is incorrect, the Soviet government did not respond
to Benes when he appealed for help under the terms
of the 1935 treaty. The Soviets prevaricated knowing
all too well what the consequences would be.

> > 2) Just finished decimating the Red Army by killing three out of five
Soviet
> > marshals, fifteen out of sixteen army commanders, sixty out of 67
> > corps commanders, and 136 out of 199 divisional commanders
> > and 36,761 officers.
>
> Hm. One wonders how this purged Soviet Army managed to inflict over 3
> times as many German KIA in the first seven weeks of Barbarossa as the
> combined Franco-Anglo-Belgian-Dutch armies managed in the six-week
> campaign in the West.
>

While losing ten times as many men

> And the purges themselves had no impact on Western estimates of the
> Soviet military. They derided it before the Purges, and the derided
> it after the Purges. Tukhachevskii was discovered in the West to have
> been a military genius only after he was safely dead.
>

The purges had clear and direct effects on the Soviet military
which was found to be inadequate to the task of defeating
mighty Finland

> > 3) Had just presided over the man made famine in the Ukraine
> >
> > Its scarcely suprising that Soviet promises were viewed with
> > a degree of scepticism.
> >
> >
> > > > Of the two, that of the USSR was IMO the less honourable.
> > >
> > > They had been excluded from the prewar European diplomacy, and their
> > > alliance offers to the Western Allies refused. Once that was clear,
> > > they looked after themselves. Nothing dishonorable about that.
> >
> > The secret codicils to the Soviet-German non-aggression pact
> > were scarcely honorable,
>
> With Chamberlain determined on Anglo-German agreement, it would have
> been highly unwise for the Soviets to pass up the offer.
>

Chamberlain was determined on peace, nothing more and
nothing less.

> > neither was the Soviet invasion
> > of the Baltic states and Finland,
>
> It also would have been unwise for the Soviets to have let Germany
> occupy the Baltic States.
>

That happened anyway dies to Stalis destruction
of the red army.

> > unless you consider that
> > the Finnish hordes poised to sweep across the borders
> > of the USSR were a major threat to the Rodina.
> >
> > Fact is Stalin was already secretly negotiating with Germany in 1938
>
> And the British had been <openly> negotiating with Nazi Germany since
> 1935, concluding agreements that permitted German naval rearmament, as
> well as selling Czechoslovakia out.
>

Nations tend to negotiate openly with each other, its
called diplomacy I believe.

> > and thought he could cut a cosy deal with his buddy
> > Adolf and carve up Central Europe between them.
>
> No sense letting "good old Neville" hand it all to Adolpf.
>

Neville didnt had Poland to Adolf, he declared
war insted, handing Poland to Adolf was Uncle Joe's
doing.

> > Oops
>
> Got a better alternative for him?

Sure, stop selling the Nazis war materials would be a good start.
Hell the Russians supplied Germany with the fuel for Barbarossa.

Keith

[L'acrobat]

"Andy Spark" > wrote in message
...

> No the RAF was more than capable of holding out against the Luftwaffe.
> The germans had the wrong aircraft the wrong tactics and well, just
> about everything. -Even had they worked out what the strange looking
> towers round the south coast were for and demolished them, enabling
> them to knock out the RAF's frontline airfields, all the RAF would have
> had to do was to pull their fighters back to the North of London (out
> of the limited range of the german bombers) and continue sniping away.
> -The RAF ended the Battle of Britain materially stronger than when it
> started. -Of course they enjoyed the advantage of being able to recover
> their downed pilots, and a large proportion of even the most badly
> damaged aircraft,

It is interesting to look at the number of available fighter pilots for
fighter command throughout the BoB and note that it never declined below the
1259 available in the week ending July 6, it is also interesting to note
that the number of 'immediately available' single engined fighters in
storage units never dropped below 191.

Not minimising the importance of the battle, nor the bravery of the pilots,
but the BoB was not the 'near run thing' that it is frequently portrayed as.

[John Mullen]

"Christophe" > wrote in message >...
> According to the first line, we were talking about WW1 :
> > > > > The French were involved rather heavily in WW1 you'll find

Je suis vraiment desolee que tu m'as malcompris!

'For sure, but not (with all respect) in the second'

Tout que j'ai dit est de la guerre deuxieme, pas la premiere.

J'espere bien que tu m'excuse pour tous mes faux en francais.

John

>
> "John Mullen" > a écrit dans le message news:
> ...
> > "Christophe Chazot" > wrote in message
> > ...
> > >
> > > "John Mullen" > a écrit dans le message news:
> > > ...
> > > > "Keith Willshaw" > wrote in message
> > > > ...
> > > (snip)
> > >
> > > > >
> > > > > The French were involved rather heavily in WW1 you'll find
> > > >
>
> (snip)
>
> > France only learned from WW1 that war was to be avoided (perfectly
> sensible)
> > and that a defensive strategy would deter Germany (turned out not to be
> true
> > as we know). Many in Britain made the same mistakes, but you were unlucky
> > enough to be before us in the firing line.
> >
> > John
> >
>
> Yep. "Too few, too late" was also true for the french armies...
>
> Christophe

[WaltBJ]

Comments in no particular order:
1) From my readings I gained the information that the Japanese Army
wanted to go south (ie, not fight the Russians) and the Japanese navy
wanted to go north (ie, not fight the US and the UK.) The Army won.
(ASIR the minister of war was army.)
2) The 30-40 (ISTR?) Russian Army divisions facing the Japanese in
Siberia/Mongolia were released to the Western front after Sorge
informed the Stavka the Japanese were not going to attack Russia. This
really turned the tide after the attack on Moscow had failed and fresh
winter-hardened SovArmy troops attacked.
3) As I recall Yamamoto had said (more or less) "I can run wild for
six months - after that I can give no guarantee." His experience in
the US included a large amount of travel including the Texas oil
fields and the various manufacturing plants.
4) Had Hitler not begun exterminating the Ukrainians the Soviet Army
would have had a much tougher time. As it was the behind-the-lines
forces, regular and guerrilla, gave the road-bound German supply lines
fits. With the Ukrainian populace with him, as they were at the very
first few days, that wouldn't have been nearly so severe a problem.
The country 'ocean' would have been 'anti-fish', to paraphrase Mao.
Walt BJ
Walt BJ

[Rostyslaw J. Lewyckyj]

Stuart Wilkes wrote:

> Hm. One wonders how this purged Soviet Army managed to inflict over 3
> times as many German KIA in the first seven weeks of Barbarossa as the
> combined Franco-Anglo-Belgian-Dutch armies managed in the six-week
> campaign in the West.

What were the numbers of soldiers involved in the two campaigns that
you are comparing. i.e:
Size of armies in the west and the casualties?
Size of the armies in Barbarossa and the casualties?
>
> And the purges themselves had no impact on Western estimates of the
> Soviet military. They derided it before the Purges, and the derided
> it after the Purges.

The effect on the estimates is of course irrelevant. What matters is
the actual effect!

> Tukhachevskii was discovered in the West to have
> been a military genius only after he was safely dead.
>
How does the fact that Tukhachevskii was judged to have been a genius
matter? Moreover how does the timing of this recognition matter?
Just what does it matter whether he was safely dead or unsafely? alive?
Perhaps your phrasing sounds good, but what is it supposed to show?
--
Rpstyk

[Fred J. McCall]

"Tarver Engineering" > wrote:

:"Fred J. McCall" > wrote in message
.. .
:> Owe Jessen > wrote:
:>
:> :Am 21 Oct 2003 16:09:53 -0700, schrieb (The
:> :Black Monk) :
:> :>
:> :>Unfortunately, rather than statesmen Germany was led by madmen.
:> :>Hitler's racial theories prevented him from making Germany a leader of
:> :>Europe in the manner that America would later be. As Spengler
:> :>predicted in 1936, Hitler's sick reich didn't last 10 years.
:> :
:> :If Germany would have been lead by statesmen and not madmen it would
:> :not have waged war, me thinks.
:>
:> And if Germany had been fairly treated by the victors of WWI, rather
:> than robbed blind, and hadn't had such sensible options as Anshluss
:> foreclosed, she might have been led by statesmen rather than madmen.
:
:I think the meth-amphetamines would have still done their paranoid
:schizoprenic work on the minds of the people. Adolph was a very charismatic
:man.

Then you should stop using the meth.

[Peter Stickney]

In article >,
Fred J. McCall > writes:
> Owe Jessen > wrote:
>
>:Am 21 Oct 2003 16:09:53 -0700, schrieb (The
>:Black Monk) :
>:>
>:>Unfortunately, rather than statesmen Germany was led by madmen.
>:>Hitler's racial theories prevented him from making Germany a leader of
>:>Europe in the manner that America would later be. As Spengler
>:>predicted in 1936, Hitler's sick reich didn't last 10 years.
>:
>:If Germany would have been lead by statesmen and not madmen it would
>:not have waged war, me thinks.
>
> And if Germany had been fairly treated by the victors of WWI, rather
> than robbed blind, and hadn't had such sensible options as Anshluss
> foreclosed, she might have been led by statesmen rather than madmen.

I really don't think that that was the case. The near-simultaneous
collapse of the two phases of Imperial German society in late 1918 -
the defeat of the Army's Kaiserschlacht in France, and the collapse of
the Home Front or civilian ability to support the war, due to a
combination of lack of resources due to the British (and later,
Anglo-American) blockade of all German shipping, and the rise of the
various Communist and Anarchist rebellions in late 1918, left Germany
without a clear r sense that they had, in fact, lost the war. The
Front-Line veterans, and the Army General Staff (Who'd been running
the shpw by fair means or foul since just before the outbreak of the
First World War) felt that they'd been stabbed in the back by the
surrender by the REMFs in Berlin. As far as they were concerned, they
may of suffered some setbacks, but they hadn't lost. The Home Front
felt that they'd been let down by the Army, which surrendered after s
relatively small seris of setbacks. After all, the Army was still
deep within French terretory, wasn't it? This wasn't really true - the
Kaiser's Government had it right, and Germany had reached the point ot
total exhaustion - but we're dealing with emotions here, and not
fact. This general feeling that they hadn't really lost, and that if
they only tried a little harder next time, they'd win, pervaded most
aspects of German society in the 1920s and 1930s.

That was one of the motivations behind the "Unconditional Surrender"
demands of the Allies in the Second World War. They wanted the
Germans to be in no doubt that they'd lost, by losing in that manner,
it put out most of the smouldering embers, if you will, of resentment
that gave Hitler such a receptive audience.

That's not to say that Germany wasn't treated with excessive harshness
at Versailles. But when you balance the Treaty mandated reparations
against the forgiveness of those debts by the British and American
governments, and the loans and loan guarantees provided to teh Weimar
Republic, it's not really a serious issue.

--
Pete Stickney
A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many
bad measures. -- Daniel Webster

[Keith Willshaw]

"Christophe Chazot" > wrote in message
...

> > John
>
> My apologies, I thought it was about 1914-18.
>
> What happened to our army in 1939-40 had little to do with what was
achieved
> in 1917-18...
>

Actually I suspect it did. The horror of WW1 was so strong in the generation
of 1940 that they were determined to avoid it happening again.

This is I think what lay behind the reluctance to take the offensive
against Germany in 1939 when their troops were busy in Poland.


Keith

[Seraphim]

"Christophe Chazot" > wrote in

> "John Mullen" > a écrit
>> "Christophe" > wrote
>>
>>> According to the first line, we were talking about WW1 :
>>>>>>> The French were involved rather heavily in WW1 you'll find
>>
>> Je suis vraiment desolee que tu m'as malcompris!
>>
>> 'For sure, but not (with all respect) in the second'
>>
>> Tout que j'ai dit est de la guerre deuxieme, pas la premiere.
>>
>> J'espere bien que tu m'excuse pour tous mes faux en francais.
>
> My apologies, I thought it was about 1914-18.
>
> What happened to our army in 1939-40 had little to do with what was
> achieved in 1917-18...

I've always thought it had everything to do with it. World War I basically
destroyed the cream of a generation for France. After the horrors of the
first war, it was decided that sending their men off to die in the trenches
was stupid, and that they were better off just making things so difficult
on the enemy that an attack would never come. Unfortunately for the French,
the attack did come, but not where they had prepared for it, and due to
this France did not have the means avaible to respond properly.
In short, the French army got their butt kicked in WWII because they
were trying to avoild another WWI.

[Seraphim]

"Christophe" > wrote in news:bn6dv5$pk9$1@news-
reader3.wanadoo.fr:

>
> "Cub Driver" > a écrit dans le message news:
> ...
> (snip)
>> There must have been close to a million slave laborers (guest workers,
>> if you prefer) sent to Germany. I've seen newsreels of them returning,
>> still in their 1940 uniforms.
>>
>> all the best -- Dan Ford
>> email: www.danford.net/letters.htm#9
>
> Mmh... we were talking about WW1, not WW2.

No we wern't.

John said:
> For sure, but not (with all respect) in the second.
With "the second" refering to the second world war. The focus of his
whole post was the 2nd war.

Do wich you responded:
> Figures dont't really agree, you know. France sent 8,410,000 soldiers
to
> the front. Out of them, 1,357,800 were killed and 3,595,000 wounded.
The
> only country that suffered higher losses in this war was Russia.

These figures have nothing to do with WWII, yet you used them to try to
counteract the argument that the french didn't really fight in that war.

While you may have been talking about WWI, the person you were responding
to wasn't, and it was your responsibility to mention if you were planing
to switch the discussion back to a previous topic (not that the post
would have made much sense that way, as you appeared to be trying to
debunk John's claim that the french basiclly crumbled under the German
attack in 1940, and trying to do that by pointing to WWI is quite simply
stupid).

[Stuart Wilkes]

"Rostyslaw J. Lewyckyj" > wrote in message >...
> Stuart Wilkes wrote:
>
> > Hm. One wonders how this purged Soviet Army managed to inflict over 3
> > times as many German KIA in the first seven weeks of Barbarossa as the
> > combined Franco-Anglo-Belgian-Dutch armies managed in the six-week
> > campaign in the West.
>
> What were the numbers of soldiers involved in the two campaigns that
> you are comparing. i.e:

Suprisingly equal, Rostyk. I'm suprised you didn't know that.

> Size of armies in the west and the casualties?

Well, the French Army alone suffered 1.9 million KIA and prisoners in
the campaign in the West, while the combined
Franco-Anglo-Belgian-Dutch armies inflicted ~27,000 KIA on the
Germans. In this case, the the Germans faced Anglo-French Armies
that were fully mobilized and alerted, their governments having
declared war on Nazi Germany nine months previous.

> Size of the armies in Barbarossa and the casualties?

The Soviet Army suffered ~2 million KIA and prisoners at the hands of
the German-Italian-Finnish-Romanian-Hungarian Armies, during the first
9 weeks of Barbarossa, while inflicting ~83,000 KIA on the German Army
alone in the first 7 weeks of Barbarossa. In this case, the Germans
faced unprepared unalerted, peacetime-strength Rifle Divisions (~6000
men) far from their assigned battle positions, which is one of the
advantages you get when you do a sneak attack. Ask the Japanese (c.f.
Jap sneak attacks on Port Arthur, Pearl Harbor) about the general
tactical advantages of a sneak attack on unprepared enemies.

> > And the purges themselves had no impact on Western estimates of the
> > Soviet military. They derided it before the Purges, and the derided
> > it after the Purges.
>
> The effect on the estimates is of course irrelevant.

Mr. Wilshaw brought them up to show that Western skepticism about
Soviet promises was warranted. My reply shows that they had little
actual effect on the West's perception of the Soviets.

> What matters is the actual effect!

And by comparison to the performance of the advanced Western countries
the year before, it does not seem that the effect was particularly
great.

> > Tukhachevskii was discovered in the West to have
> > been a military genius only after he was safely dead.
> >
> How does the fact that Tukhachevskii was judged to have been a genius
> matter?

It shows that the Purges had little effect on Western perceptions of
Soviet military effectiveness prior to WWII.

> Moreover how does the timing of this recognition matter?
> Just what does it matter whether he was safely dead or unsafely? alive?
> Perhaps your phrasing sounds good, but what is it supposed to show?

That the Purges really had little actual effect on Western perceptions
of Soviet military effectiveness and reliability. The Soviets were
totally discounted as a factor, both before the Purges and after.

Stuart Wilkes

[Stuart Wilkes]

"Keith Willshaw" > wrote in message >...
> "Stuart Wilkes" > wrote in message
> om...
> > E. Barry Bruyea > wrote in message
> >...
> > > On 22 Oct 2003 02:44:52 -0700, (Stuart Wilkes)
> > > wrote:
>
> >
> > Indeed, the Western powers were concerned to keep the Baltic States
> > out of Soviet hands. However, in the Anglo-German negotiations of the
> > summer of 1939, the British offered to recognize Eastern Europe as a
> > German sphere of influence. Last time I checked, the Baltic States
> > are in Eastern Europe. So the Western powers were indeed resolved to
> > keep the Baltic States out of Soviet hands, in order to preserve them
> > for the Nazi variety.
> >
>
> What Anglo German negotiations ?

The ones described in Ambassador von Dirksen's cable from London to
Berlin of 24 July 1939:

"General ideas as to how a peaceful adjustment with Germany could be
undertaken seem to have crystallized... On the basis of political
appeasement, which in to ensure the principle of non-aggression and to
achieve a delimitation of political spheres of interest by means of a
comprehensive formula, a broad economic program is being worked out...
About these plans entertained by leading circles, State Advisor
Wohlthat, who, on British initiative, had long talks about them during
his stay in London last week, will be able to give more detailed
information. The problem that is puuzzling the sponsors of these
plans most is how to start the negotiations. Public opinion is so
inflamed, that if these plans of negotiations with Germany were to
bedcome public they would immediately be torpoedoed by Churchill and
others with the cry 'No second Munich!' or 'No return to appeasement!'

The persons engaged in drawing up a list of points for negotiation
therefore realize that the preparatory steps vis-a-vis Germany must be
shrouded in the utmost secrecy. Only when Germany's willingness to
negotiate has been ascertained, and at leaset unanimity regarding the
program, perhaps regarding certain general principles, has been
attained, will the British government feel strong enough to inform the
public of its intentions and of the steps it has already taken. If it
could in this way hold out the prospect of an Anglo-German adjustment,
it is convinced that the public would greet the news with the greatest
joy, and the obstructionists would be reduced to silence. So much is
expected from the realization of this plan that it is even considered
a most effective election cry, one which would assure the government
parties a victory in the autumn elections, and with it the retention
of power for another five years.

....In conclusion, I should like to point out that the German-Polish
problem has found a place in this tendency toward an adjustment with
Germany, inasmuch as it is believed that in the event of an
Anglo-German adjustment the solution of the Polish problem will be
easier, since a calmer atmosphere will facilitate the negotiations,
and the British interest in Poland will be diminished."

Zachary Shore "What Hitler Knew" Oxford University Press, 2003, pgs
117-118, citing Dirksen's report of 24 July 1939.

Unfortunately for these Anglo-German discussions, on 11 August this
cable was circulated to the German Embassy in Moscow, whose
communications were not secure...

> From March onwards (when Germany seized the remains of
> Czechoslovakia) there was a deterioration of relations which made everbody
> understand the inevitability of war

Sure, once the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact put paid to the idea of
Anglo-German agreement:

"For all the other acts of brutality at home and aggression
without, Herr Hitler had been able to offer an excuse, inadequate
indeed,
but not fantastic. The need for order and discipline in Europe,
for strength at the centre to withstand the incessant infiltration of
false and revolutionary ideas - this is certainly no more than the
conventional excuse offered by every military dictator who has ever
suppressed the liberties of his own people or advanced the conquest
of his neighbors. Nevertheless, so long as the excuse was offered
with sincerity, and in Hitler's case the appearance of sincerity were
not lacking over a period of years, the world's judgement of the man
remained more favorable than its judgement of his actions. The faint
possibility of an ultimate settlement with Herr Hitler still, in these
circumstances, remained, however abominable his methods, however
deceitful his diplomacy, however intolerant he might show himself of
the rights of other European peoples, he still claimed to stand
ultimately for something which was a common European interest, and
which therefore could conceivably provide some day a basis for
understanding with other nations equally determined not to sacrifice
their traditional institutions and habits on the bloodstained altars
of the World Revolution.

The conclusion of the German-Soviet pact removed even this faint
possibility of an honorable peace."

Lord Lloyd of Dolobran "The British Case" Eyre & Spottiswoode Limited.
London, 1939, pgs 54-5, with a preface by Lord Halifax, the Foreign
Secretary.

And Lord Lloyd was no isolated right-wing crank. Within months of his
book being published, he was a member of Churchill's Cabinet, the
Secretary of State for Colonies.

> In April Germany denounced the Anglo German Naval Agreement
>
> The Germans alsocomplained about the negotiations
> Britain was pursuing with the USSR complaining that
> Britain and the Soviet Union were trying to encircle
> Germany.

And the British offered to end those talks.

> They need not have feared since it was the Soviets who scuppered
> any chance of an alliance to oppose Germany when Molotov
> first sharply criticized the British suggestions of a defensive alliance
> against Germany and Italy and then rejected a series of drafts in
> negotiations

Actually, it was the Soviet draft of 17 April 1939 that formed the
basis of the discussions, and as late as 19 August 1939, a mere week
before the planned start date for the German invasion of Poland, the
British delegation at the Moscow military staff talks had no authority
to commit to <anything>.

> with the British and French governments and demanded guarantees for the
> Baltic states,

Yes.

> insurance against internal revolution,

Not quite. A change in a country's policy in favor of Nazi Germany,
such as that successfully engineered by HMG in the case of
Czechoslovakia. This was clearly a legitimate Soviet concern, since
it had clear, recent precedents.

> and the right to send
> Red Army troops into Poland in the event of a German invasion.

And this was considered nothing more than the minimum requirement of
the military situation, at least according to the (British) Deputy
Chiefs of Staff:

"We feel that this is no time for half measures and that every effort
should be made to persuade Poland and Roumania to agree to the use of
their territory by Russian forces. In our opinion it is only logical
that the Russians should be given every facility for rendering
assistance and putting their maximum weight into the scale on the
side of the anti-aggression powers. We consider it so important to
meet the Russians in this matter that, if necessary, the strongest
pressure should be exerted on Poland and Roumania to persuade them to
adopt a helpful attitude.

It is perfectly clear that without early and effective Russian
assistance, the Poles cannot hope to stand up to a German attack for
more than a limited time... The supply of arms and war material is
not enough. If the Russians are to collaborate in resisting German
aggression against Poland or Roumania they can only do so effectively
on Polish or Roumanian soil; and...if permission for this were
withheld till war breaks out, it would then be too late. The most the
Allies could then hope for would be to avenge Poland and Roumania and
perhaps restore their independence as a result of the defeat of
Germanyin a long war.

Without immediate and effective Russian assistance the longer that war
would be, and the less chance there would be of either Poland or
Roumania emerging at the end of it as independent states in anything
like their present form.

We suggest that it is now necessary to present this unpalatable truth
with absolute frankness to both the Poles and to the Roumanians. To
the Poles especially it ought to be pointed out that they have
obligations to us as well as we to them; and that it is unreasonable
for them to expect us blindly to implement our guarantee to them if,
at the same time, they will not co-operate in measures designed for a
common purpose.

The conclusion of a treaty with Russia appears to us to be the best
way of preventing a war. ... At the worst if the negotiations with
Russia break down, a Russo-German rapproachment may take place of
which the probable consequence will be that Russia and Germany
decide to share the spoils and concert in a new partition of the
Eastern European States."

Committee on Imperial Defense, Deputy Chiefs of Staff Subcommittee
meeting of August 16, 1939. Quoted in Sidney Aster "1939 The Making
of the Second World War" and Michael Carley "1939 - The Alliance that
Never Was and the Coming of World War II"

To summarize, the Deputy Chiefs of Staff considered that the OTL
policy of Neville Chamberlain and the Polish government on this point
would lead to a disasterous Soviet-German agreement, and a war, and
that "Without immediate and effective Russian assistance the longer
that war would be, and the less chance there would be of either Poland
or Roumania emerging at the end of it as independent states in
anything like their present form.".

The Deputy Chiefs of Staff were very clear that the position was
grave, that the Soviets were vital for resisting German aggression,
and that there was no time to be wasted in coming to agreement with
them. Unfortunately, Chamberlain preferred to pursue Anglo-German
agreement.

> These demands were clearly impossible to accept and were almost
> certainly intended to end all such talks as the USSR was already
> secretly negotiating with Germany.

No, these Soviet proposals were nothing more than the minimum of what
was militarily necessary for successful resistance to Nazi Germany.
No wonder Chamberlain had no interest in them.

> It was of course Stalin who offered Germany a free hand in Western
> Europe while the USSR would have a free hand in the east and
> split Poland between them.

Much better than letting Nazi Germany get it all.

Stuart Wilkes

[John Mullen]

E. Barry Bruyea > wrote in message >...
> On Wed, 22 Oct 2003 02:42:58 +0100, "John Mullen" > wrote:
>
> >"Mikhail Medved" > wrote in message
> om...
> >
> >(snip)
> >
> >> > OTOH they alsoguaranteed a fight with the UK, then still (just!) the
> world's
> >> > leading military power.
> >>
> >> Any proof to that opinion? The "leading military power" was removed
> >> from the continent in a few weeks of actual fighting. The biggest
> >> battle was the battle of Alamein, in which they fiught a small German
> >> corps.
> >
> >That battle was actually on the continent of Africa. The real biggest land
> >battle didn't come until 1944 when we teamed up with the US to invade
> >German-occupied France. Meantime we were fighting in the air, at sea, and in
> >the minor theatres like N Africa. Would have become important had we lost
> >though, doubt it not.
>
> North Africa was hardly a minor theatre, in that given a German win,
> the loss of mid-east oil & Suez would have been critical to the war
> effort.

Agreed. That was why I said 'Would have become important had we lost
though, doubt it not.'

John

[Stuart Wilkes]

"Keith Willshaw" > wrote in message >...
> "Stuart Wilkes" > wrote in message
> m...
> > "Keith Willshaw" > wrote in message
> >...
> > > "Stuart Wilkes" > wrote in message
> > > om...
> > > > "John Mullen" > wrote in message
> >...
> > > >
> > > > <snip>
> > > >
> > > > > We did not badly to win the air and sea battles with Nazi Germany.
> Neither
> > > > > was easy and both had costs attached. Of course we couldn't have won
> overall
> > > > > without the support of the USA and the USSR, both of which in their
> own
> ways
> > > > > hedged their bets until the decision to enter the war was forced
> upon
> them.
> > > >
> > > > Not by their choice. The Soviets had alliances with Czechoslovakia
> > > > and France since 1935, and offered Great Britain and France a full-up
> > > > Triple Alliance with all the trimmings on 17 April 1939. Too bad
> > > > Chamberlain refused to take it seriously, preferring to pursue
> > > > Anglo-German agreement.
> > > >
> > >
> > > Given that Stalin had
> > >
> > > 1) Reneged on his agreements with Czechoslovakia when that nation
> > > asked the Soviets to intervene in 1938
> >
> > False. The Czechoslovak government never made any request for Soviet
> > aid. The Czechoslovak government decided on their own that they would
> > accept the Munich dictate. In his memoirs, Benes maintains that the
> > Soviets were willing to go beyond the committments they had made,
> > should the Czechoslovak government desire. The Czechoslovak
> > government made no such request.
> >
>
> This is incorrect, the Soviet government did not respond
> to Benes when he appealed for help under the terms
> of the 1935 treaty.

The date and text of Benes' appeal please.

> The Soviets prevaricated knowing
> all too well what the consequences would be.

The date and text of the Soviet reply Benes' alledged appeal, please.

In his memoirs, Benes does not say that he made any such appeal:

"In September, 1938, therefore, we were left in military, as well as
political, isolation with the Soviet Union to prepare our defense
against a Nazi attack. We were alos well aware not only of our own
moral, political, and military prepardness, but also had a general
picture of the condition of Western Europe; as well as of Nazi Germany
and Fascist Italy, in regard to these matters.

At that moment indeed Europe was in every respect ripe to accept
without a fight the orders of the Berchtesgaden corporal. When
Czechoslovakia vigorously resisted his dictation in the September
negotiations with our German citizens, we first of all recieved a
joint note from the British and French governments on September 19th,
1938, insisting that we should accept without amendment the draft of a
capitulation based essentially on an agreement reached by Hitler and
Chamberlain at Berchtesgaden on September 15th. When we refused,
there arrived from France and Great Britain on September 21st an
ultimatum accompanied by emphatic personal interventions in Prague
during the night on the part of the Ministers of both countries and
repeated later in writing. We were informed that if we did not accept
their plan for the cession of the so-called Sudeten regions, they
would leave us to our fate, which, they said, we had brought upon
ourselves. They explained that they certainly would not go to war
with Germany just 'to keep the Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia'. I
felt very keenly the fact that there were at athat time so few in
France and Great Britain who understood that something much more
serious was at stake for Europe than the retention of the so-called
Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia.

The measure of this fearful European development was now full,
precipitating Europe into ruin. Through three dreadful years I had
watched the whole tragedy unfolding, knowing to the full what was at
stake. We had resisted desperately with all our strength.

And then, from Munich, during the night of September 30th our State
and Nation recieved the stunning blow: Without our participationand in
spite of the mobilization of our whole Army, the Munich Agreement -
fatal for Europe and the whole world - was concluded and signed by the
four Great Powers - and then was forced upon us."

Dr. Eduard Benes "Memoirs", Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1954,
pgs 42 - 43.

Again, no such appeal recorded. In fact, the Czechoslovak government
rejected the idea of even making such an appeal.

Here's how Czechoslovak Information Minister Vavrecka put it on
30 September 1938:

"We had to consider that it would take the Russian Army weeks to come
to our aid - perhaps too late, for by that time millions of our men,
women, and children would have been slaughtered. It was even more
important to consider that our war by the side of the Soviet Union
would not only have been a fight against Germany but it would have
been interpreted as a fight on the side of Bolshevism. And then
perhaps all Europe would have been drawn into the war against us
and Russia."

So, faced with the prospect of a general European war against
themselves and the USSR, the Czechoslovak government decided to
accept the Munich dictate, and did not request Soviet help.

Later, Benes writes:

"I do not intend to examine here in detail the policy of the Soviet
Union from Munich to the beginning of the Soviet-German war. I will
mention only the necessary facts. Even today it is still a delicate
question. The events preceeding Munich and between Munich and the
Soviet Union's entry into World War II have been used, and in a
certain sense, misused, against Soviet policy both before and after
Munich. I will only repeat that before Munich the Soviet Union was
prepared to fulfill its treaty with France and with Czechoslovakia in
the case of a German attack."

Memoirs, pg 131.

It sounds to me, Keith, that Benes did not feel he had been let down
by the Soviets.

> > > 2) Just finished decimating the Red Army by killing three out of five
> Soviet
> > > marshals, fifteen out of sixteen army commanders, sixty out of 67
> > > corps commanders, and 136 out of 199 divisional commanders
> > > and 36,761 officers.
> >
> > Hm. One wonders how this purged Soviet Army managed to inflict over 3
> > times as many German KIA in the first seven weeks of Barbarossa as the
> > combined Franco-Anglo-Belgian-Dutch armies managed in the six-week
> > campaign in the West.
>
> While losing ten times as many men

Actually, no.

In the Western campaign, France alone lost 1.9 million KIA and
prisoners, while the combined Franco-Anglo-Belgian-Dutch Armies
inflicted ~27,000 KIA on the Germans.

In the first nine weeks of Barbarossa, the Soviet Army lost 2 million
KIA and prisoners at the hands of the
German-Italian-Finnish-Romanian-Hungarian Armies, while inflicting
~83,000 KIA on the German Army alone in the first 7 weeks of
Barbarossa.

> > And the purges themselves had no impact on Western estimates of the
> > Soviet military. They derided it before the Purges, and the derided
> > it after the Purges. Tukhachevskii was discovered in the West to have
> > been a military genius only after he was safely dead.
> >
>
> The purges had clear and direct effects on the Soviet military
> which was found to be inadequate to the task of defeating
> mighty Finland

But fully adequate to crush the Japanese. Considering how that very
same IJA defeated the US Army in the Phillipines and crushed the
Commonwealth forces at Singapore, we Westerners should consider
ourselves lucky we never really tangled with the Finns ;)

<snip>

> > Got a better alternative for him?
>
> Sure, stop selling the Nazis war materials would be a good start.

Why, to provoke a German attack in 1940?

Stuart Wilkes

[Fred J. McCall]

Seraphim > wrote:

:I've always thought it had everything to do with it. World War I basically
:destroyed the cream of a generation for France. After the horrors of the
:first war, it was decided that sending their men off to die in the trenches
:was stupid, and that they were better off just making things so difficult
:on the enemy that an attack would never come. Unfortunately for the French,
:the attack did come, but not where they had prepared for it, and due to
:this France did not have the means avaible to respond properly.

France had the means to respond properly. They had more and better
armor than the Germans did.

: In short, the French army got their butt kicked in WWII because they
:were trying to avoild another WWI.

No, the French army got their butt kicked in WWII because their
generals were idiots and didn't use the forces they had properly.


--
"Adrenaline is like exercise, but without the excessive gym fees."
-- Professor Walsh, "Buffy the Vampire Slayer"

[Keith Willshaw]

"Stuart Wilkes" > wrote in message
om...
> "Keith Willshaw" > wrote in message
>...
> > "Stuart Wilkes" > wrote in message
> > om...
> > > E. Barry Bruyea > wrote in message
> > >...
> > > > On 22 Oct 2003 02:44:52 -0700, (Stuart Wilkes)
> > > > wrote:
> >
> > >
> > > Indeed, the Western powers were concerned to keep the Baltic States
> > > out of Soviet hands. However, in the Anglo-German negotiations of the
> > > summer of 1939, the British offered to recognize Eastern Europe as a
> > > German sphere of influence. Last time I checked, the Baltic States
> > > are in Eastern Europe. So the Western powers were indeed resolved to
> > > keep the Baltic States out of Soviet hands, in order to preserve them
> > > for the Nazi variety.
> > >
> >
> > What Anglo German negotiations ?
>
> The ones described in Ambassador von Dirksen's cable from London to
> Berlin of 24 July 1939:
>
> "General ideas as to how a peaceful adjustment with Germany could be
> undertaken seem to have crystallized... On the basis of political
> appeasement, which in to ensure the principle of non-aggression and to
> achieve a delimitation of political spheres of interest by means of a
> comprehensive formula, a broad economic program is being worked out...
> About these plans entertained by leading circles, State Advisor
> Wohlthat, who, on British initiative, had long talks about them during
> his stay in London last week, will be able to give more detailed
> information. The problem that is puuzzling the sponsors of these
> plans most is how to start the negotiations. Public opinion is so
> inflamed, that if these plans of negotiations with Germany were to
> bedcome public they would immediately be torpoedoed by Churchill and
> others with the cry 'No second Munich!' or 'No return to appeasement!'
>

So we have a report of discussions within the German embassy
about PLANS for negotiation not negotiations themselves
and certainly no offers of recognition as you claimed.

> The persons engaged in drawing up a list of points for negotiation

A confirmation that at this point no negotiations have occurred


> therefore realize that the preparatory steps vis-a-vis Germany must be
> shrouded in the utmost secrecy. Only when Germany's willingness to
> negotiate has been ascertained, and at leaset unanimity regarding the
> program, perhaps regarding certain general principles, has been
> attained, will the British government feel strong enough to inform the
> public of its intentions and of the steps it has already taken. If it
> could in this way hold out the prospect of an Anglo-German adjustment,
> it is convinced that the public would greet the news with the greatest
> joy, and the obstructionists would be reduced to silence. So much is
> expected from the realization of this plan that it is even considered
> a most effective election cry, one which would assure the government
> parties a victory in the autumn elections, and with it the retention
> of power for another five years.
>

So we have is the German belief that Britain would not in fact declare
war over Poland but would if forced negotiate, they were wrong

> ...In conclusion, I should like to point out that the German-Polish
> problem has found a place in this tendency toward an adjustment with
> Germany, inasmuch as it is believed that in the event of an
> Anglo-German adjustment the solution of the Polish problem will be
> easier, since a calmer atmosphere will facilitate the negotiations,
> and the British interest in Poland will be diminished."
>

Wishful thinking in action since on the 14th July Sir Nevile Henderson
discussed with Baron von Weizsäcker, German State Secretary at the Ministry
for Foreign Affairs, a statement by one of the German Under-Secretaries that
"Herr Hitler was convinced that England would never fight over Danzig." Sir
Nevile Henderson repeated the affirmation already made by His Majesty's
Government that, in the event of German aggression, Great Britain would
support Poland in resisting force by force

<snip>


> > From March onwards (when Germany seized the remains of
> > Czechoslovakia) there was a deterioration of relations which made
everbody
> > understand the inevitability of war
>
> Sure, once the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact put paid to the idea of
> Anglo-German agreement:
>
> "For all the other acts of brutality at home and aggression
> without, Herr Hitler had been able to offer an excuse, inadequate
> indeed,
> but not fantastic. The need for order and discipline in Europe,
> for strength at the centre to withstand the incessant infiltration of
> false and revolutionary ideas - this is certainly no more than the
> conventional excuse offered by every military dictator who has ever
> suppressed the liberties of his own people or advanced the conquest
> of his neighbors. Nevertheless, so long as the excuse was offered
> with sincerity, and in Hitler's case the appearance of sincerity were
> not lacking over a period of years, the world's judgement of the man
> remained more favorable than its judgement of his actions. The faint
> possibility of an ultimate settlement with Herr Hitler still, in these
> circumstances, remained, however abominable his methods, however
> deceitful his diplomacy, however intolerant he might show himself of
> the rights of other European peoples, he still claimed to stand
> ultimately for something which was a common European interest, and
> which therefore could conceivably provide some day a basis for
> understanding with other nations equally determined not to sacrifice
> their traditional institutions and habits on the bloodstained altars
> of the World Revolution.
>
> The conclusion of the German-Soviet pact removed even this faint
> possibility of an honorable peace."
>
> Lord Lloyd of Dolobran "The British Case" Eyre & Spottiswoode Limited.
> London, 1939, pgs 54-5, with a preface by Lord Halifax, the Foreign
> Secretary.
>
> And Lord Lloyd was no isolated right-wing crank. Within months of his
> book being published, he was a member of Churchill's Cabinet, the
> Secretary of State for Colonies.
>

No he was a realist, the Soviet German pact was clearly intended
to give Germany a free hand to start a war against the West.
There's no suggestion here that Lloyd was in favour of such
an agreement or was stating that such an agreement was being negotiated.

He's simply pointing that AFTER the pact was signed it was clear
that Germany was planning war with Soviet connivance.


> > In April Germany denounced the Anglo German Naval Agreement
> >
> > The Germans alsocomplained about the negotiations
> > Britain was pursuing with the USSR complaining that
> > Britain and the Soviet Union were trying to encircle
> > Germany.
>
> And the British offered to end those talks.
>

Molotov ended those talks.

> > They need not have feared since it was the Soviets who scuppered
> > any chance of an alliance to oppose Germany when Molotov
> > first sharply criticized the British suggestions of a defensive
alliance
> > against Germany and Italy and then rejected a series of drafts in
> > negotiations
>
> Actually, it was the Soviet draft of 17 April 1939 that formed the
> basis of the discussions, and as late as 19 August 1939, a mere week
> before the planned start date for the German invasion of Poland, the
> British delegation at the Moscow military staff talks had no authority
> to commit to <anything>.
>


<snip>

>
> Without immediate and effective Russian assistance the longer that war
> would be, and the less chance there would be of either Poland or
> Roumania emerging at the end of it as independent states in anything
> like their present form.
>
> We suggest that it is now necessary to present this unpalatable truth
> with absolute frankness to both the Poles and to the Roumanians. To
> the Poles especially it ought to be pointed out that they have
> obligations to us as well as we to them; and that it is unreasonable
> for them to expect us blindly to implement our guarantee to them if,
> at the same time, they will not co-operate in measures designed for a
> common purpose.
>
> The conclusion of a treaty with Russia appears to us to be the best
> way of preventing a war. ... At the worst if the negotiations with
> Russia break down, a Russo-German rapproachment may take place of
> which the probable consequence will be that Russia and Germany
> decide to share the spoils and concert in a new partition of the
> Eastern European States."
>


Clear evidence that the British were attempting to come
to an agreement with the USSR

Thank You

>
> > These demands were clearly impossible to accept and were almost
> > certainly intended to end all such talks as the USSR was already
> > secretly negotiating with Germany.
>
> No, these Soviet proposals were nothing more than the minimum of what
> was militarily necessary for successful resistance to Nazi Germany.
> No wonder Chamberlain had no interest in them.
>
> > It was of course Stalin who offered Germany a free hand in Western
> > Europe while the USSR would have a free hand in the east and
> > split Poland between them.
>
> Much better than letting Nazi Germany get it all.
>

Germany did get it all

Keith

[Tarver Engineering]

"Fred J. McCall" > wrote in message
...
> "Tarver Engineering" > wrote:
>
> :"Fred J. McCall" > wrote in message
> .. .
> :> Owe Jessen > wrote:
> :>
> :> :Am 21 Oct 2003 16:09:53 -0700, schrieb (The
> :> :Black Monk) :
> :> :>
> :> :>Unfortunately, rather than statesmen Germany was led by madmen.
> :> :>Hitler's racial theories prevented him from making Germany a leader
of
> :> :>Europe in the manner that America would later be. As Spengler
> :> :>predicted in 1936, Hitler's sick reich didn't last 10 years.
> :> :
> :> :If Germany would have been lead by statesmen and not madmen it would
> :> :not have waged war, me thinks.
> :>
> :> And if Germany had been fairly treated by the victors of WWI, rather
> :> than robbed blind, and hadn't had such sensible options as Anshluss
> :> foreclosed, she might have been led by statesmen rather than madmen.
> :
> :I think the meth-amphetamines would have still done their paranoid
> :schizoprenic work on the minds of the people. Adolph was a very
charismatic
> :man.
>
> Then you should stop using the meth.

Widespread meth addiction was part of German society prior to WWII. Just
work straight through the night and pay those war debts.

[Snuffy Smith]

"Stuart Wilkes" > wrote in message
om...
> "Rostyslaw J. Lewyckyj" > wrote in message
>...
> > Stuart Wilkes wrote:
> >
> > > Hm. One wonders how this purged Soviet Army managed to inflict over 3
> > > times as many German KIA in the first seven weeks of Barbarossa as the
> > > combined Franco-Anglo-Belgian-Dutch armies managed in the six-week
> > > campaign in the West.
> >
> > What were the numbers of soldiers involved in the two campaigns that
> > you are comparing. i.e:
>
> Suprisingly equal, Rostyk. I'm suprised you didn't know that.
>

Maybe he has better things to do than spend his whole life worrying about
ancient history like you?

> > Size of armies in the west and the casualties?
>
> Well, the French Army alone suffered 1.9 million KIA and prisoners in
> the campaign in the West, while the combined
> Franco-Anglo-Belgian-Dutch armies inflicted ~27,000 KIA on the
> Germans. In this case, the the Germans faced Anglo-French Armies
> that were fully mobilized and alerted, their governments having
> declared war on Nazi Germany nine months previous.
>
> > Size of the armies in Barbarossa and the casualties?
>
> The Soviet Army suffered ~2 million KIA and prisoners at the hands of
> the German-Italian-Finnish-Romanian-Hungarian Armies, during the first
> 9 weeks of Barbarossa, while inflicting ~83,000 KIA on the German Army
> alone in the first 7 weeks of Barbarossa. In this case, the Germans
> faced unprepared unalerted, peacetime-strength Rifle Divisions (~6000
> men) far from their assigned battle positions, which is one of the
> advantages you get when you do a sneak attack. Ask the Japanese (c.f.
> Jap sneak attacks on Port Arthur, Pearl Harbor) about the general
> tactical advantages of a sneak attack on unprepared enemies.
>
> > > And the purges themselves had no impact on Western estimates of the
> > > Soviet military. They derided it before the Purges, and the derided
> > > it after the Purges.
> >
> > The effect on the estimates is of course irrelevant.
>
> Mr. Wilshaw brought them up to show that Western skepticism about
> Soviet promises was warranted. My reply shows that they had little
> actual effect on the West's perception of the Soviets.
>
> > What matters is the actual effect!
>
> And by comparison to the performance of the advanced Western countries
> the year before, it does not seem that the effect was particularly
> great.
>
> > > Tukhachevskii was discovered in the West to have
> > > been a military genius only after he was safely dead.
> > >
> > How does the fact that Tukhachevskii was judged to have been a genius
> > matter?
>
> It shows that the Purges had little effect on Western perceptions of
> Soviet military effectiveness prior to WWII.
>
> > Moreover how does the timing of this recognition matter?
> > Just what does it matter whether he was safely dead or unsafely? alive?
> > Perhaps your phrasing sounds good, but what is it supposed to show?
>
> That the Purges really had little actual effect on Western perceptions
> of Soviet military effectiveness and reliability. The Soviets were
> totally discounted as a factor, both before the Purges and after.
>
> Stuart Wilkes

[Jim McLaughlin]

Seraphim" first wrote:

>
> :I've always thought it had everything to do with it. World War I
basically
> :destroyed the cream of a generation for France. After the horrors of the
> :first war, it was decided that sending their men off to die in the
trenches
> :was stupid, and that they were better off just making things so difficult
> :on the enemy that an attack would never come. Unfortunately for the
French,
> :the attack did come, but not where they had prepared for it, and due to
> :this France did not have the means avaible to respond properly.
>
> France had the means to respond properly. They had more and better
> armor than the Germans did.
>
> : In short, the French army got their butt kicked in WWII because they
> :were trying to avoild another WWI.
>
"Fred J. McCall" then wrote:

> No, the French army got their butt kicked in WWII because their
> generals were idiots and didn't use the forces they had properly.
>


Strikes me you are both saying the same thing. French were terrified of
losses on the scale of WW1, therefore set up their forces and fortifications
to prevent another "trench warfare" war.

Germans didn't "co-operate" in the sense that "blitzkrieg" as carried
out in June 1940 was not "trench warfare".

The pre WW II set ups of French static defenses and Army command were
not designed to counter the "blitzkrieg" as practiced by the invaders in WW
II, but might have been effective in parts of WW I. The French command and
the BEF were not able to fluidly change their preconceived tactics /
strategy to cope with a different tactic / strategy set by the invaders.

Sounds to me like the classic "fully prepared to fight the last war"
scenario, both with respect to pre WW II defenses and Army structure, and
with the rigidity of the French command determined to avoid WW I scale
manpower losses by refighting WW I from behind fixed defenses, as described
by Seraphim, magnified by inability of the French command to adapt to
changes in strategy / tactics.

[Peter Skelton]

On Thu, 23 Oct 2003 17:13:18 GMT, "Jim McLaughlin"
> wrote:

>Seraphim" first wrote:
>
>>
>> :I've always thought it had everything to do with it. World War I
>basically
>> :destroyed the cream of a generation for France. After the horrors of the
>> :first war, it was decided that sending their men off to die in the
>trenches
>> :was stupid, and that they were better off just making things so difficult
>> :on the enemy that an attack would never come. Unfortunately for the
>French,
>> :the attack did come, but not where they had prepared for it, and due to
>> :this France did not have the means avaible to respond properly.
>>
>> France had the means to respond properly. They had more and better
>> armor than the Germans did.
>>
>> : In short, the French army got their butt kicked in WWII because they
>> :were trying to avoild another WWI.
>>
>"Fred J. McCall" then wrote:
>
>> No, the French army got their butt kicked in WWII because their
>> generals were idiots and didn't use the forces they had properly.
>>
>
>
> Strikes me you are both saying the same thing. French were terrified of
>losses on the scale of WW1, therefore set up their forces and fortifications
>to prevent another "trench warfare" war.
>
> Germans didn't "co-operate" in the sense that "blitzkrieg" as carried
>out in June 1940 was not "trench warfare".
>
> The pre WW II set ups of French static defenses and Army command were
>not designed to counter the "blitzkrieg" as practiced by the invaders in WW
>II, but might have been effective in parts of WW I. The French command and
>the BEF were not able to fluidly change their preconceived tactics /
>strategy to cope with a different tactic / strategy set by the invaders.
>
> Sounds to me like the classic "fully prepared to fight the last war"
>scenario, both with respect to pre WW II defenses and Army structure, and
>with the rigidity of the French command determined to avoid WW I scale
>manpower losses by refighting WW I from behind fixed defenses, as described
>by Seraphim, magnified by inability of the French command to adapt to
>changes in strategy / tactics.


They'd have gotten their butts kicked in the last war too, didn't
have reserves, didn't have telephones at HQ, unbelievable stuff.

Didn't help either that the Germans seem to have gotten hold of
the French/British troop dispositions. Security is also something
that had been heard of in WWI.

Peter Skelton

[Christophe Chazot]

"Seraphim" > a écrit dans le message news:
...
> "Christophe" > wrote in news:bn6dv5$pk9$1@news-
> reader3.wanadoo.fr:
(snip)
> > Mmh... we were talking about WW1, not WW2.
>
> No we wern't.

OK, I had not understood properly, as I said in a previous post.

(snip further considerations)

[Christophe Chazot]

"Keith Willshaw" > a écrit dans le message
news: ...
>
> "Christophe Chazot" > wrote in message
> ...
>
> > > John
> >
> > My apologies, I thought it was about 1914-18.
> >
> > What happened to our army in 1939-40 had little to do with what was
> achieved
> > in 1917-18...
> >
>
> Actually I suspect it did. The horror of WW1 was so strong in the
generation
> of 1940 that they were determined to avoid it happening again.
>
> This is I think what lay behind the reluctance to take the offensive
> against Germany in 1939 when their troops were busy in Poland.
>
>
> Keith

I was talking about what happened to our army in a strictly military field.
The morale questions were important too, and the massacre of WW1 certainly
had a reverse effect on the will to fight again 20 years later, as you
quote. By the way, the reluctance to take offensive in 1939 was also due to
the lack of drive of general Gamelin, a peacetime chief of staff who had
been promoted for peacetime reasons but who seriously lacked the required
skills for such a job at such a time. It was also due to some technical and
logistical shortfalls, that resulted from the budget cuts all along the
1930s and that were not corrected until it was too late, but that's a bit
off-topic on naval newsgroup.
Regards,
Christophe

[Christophe Chazot]

"Seraphim" > a écrit dans le message news:
...
(snip)
> > What happened to our army in 1939-40 had little to do with what was
> > achieved in 1917-18...
>
> I've always thought it had everything to do with it. World War I basically
> destroyed the cream of a generation for France. After the horrors of the
> first war, it was decided that sending their men off to die in the
trenches
> was stupid, and that they were better off just making things so difficult
> on the enemy that an attack would never come. Unfortunately for the
French,
> the attack did come, but not where they had prepared for it, and due to
> this France did not have the means avaible to respond properly.
> In short, the French army got their butt kicked in WWII because they
> were trying to avoild another WWI.

Or because they stuck too hard to the illusion that they had fought the last
one of their history, an illusion certainly linked to the horrors of WW1.

Christophe

[Stuart Wilkes]

"Keith Willshaw" > wrote in message >...
> "Stuart Wilkes" > wrote in message
> om...
> > "Keith Willshaw" > wrote in message
> >...
> > > "Stuart Wilkes" > wrote in message
> > > om...
> > > > E. Barry Bruyea > wrote in message
> >...
> > > > > On 22 Oct 2003 02:44:52 -0700, (Stuart Wilkes)
> > > > > wrote:
>
> > > >
> > > > Indeed, the Western powers were concerned to keep the Baltic States
> > > > out of Soviet hands. However, in the Anglo-German negotiations of the
> > > > summer of 1939, the British offered to recognize Eastern Europe as a
> > > > German sphere of influence. Last time I checked, the Baltic States
> > > > are in Eastern Europe. So the Western powers were indeed resolved to
> > > > keep the Baltic States out of Soviet hands, in order to preserve them
> > > > for the Nazi variety.
> > > >
> > >
> > > What Anglo German negotiations ?
> >
> > The ones described in Ambassador von Dirksen's cable from London to
> > Berlin of 24 July 1939:
> >
> > "General ideas as to how a peaceful adjustment with Germany could be
> > undertaken seem to have crystallized... On the basis of political
> > appeasement, which in to ensure the principle of non-aggression and to
> > achieve a delimitation of political spheres of interest by means of a
> > comprehensive formula, a broad economic program is being worked out...
> > About these plans entertained by leading circles, State Advisor
> > Wohlthat, who, on British initiative, had long talks about them during
> > his stay in London last week, will be able to give more detailed
> > information. The problem that is puuzzling the sponsors of these
> > plans most is how to start the negotiations. Public opinion is so
> > inflamed, that if these plans of negotiations with Germany were to
> > bedcome public they would immediately be torpoedoed by Churchill and
> > others with the cry 'No second Munich!' or 'No return to appeasement!'
> >
>
> So we have a report of discussions within the German embassy

No. As I show below, they quite accurately report the content of the
discussions between Wohlthat and Sir Horace Wilson. The latter was
not, to my knowlege, assigned to the German embassy.

> about PLANS for negotiation not negotiations themselves
> and certainly no offers of recognition as you claimed.

How does that explain the discussions State Advisor Wohlthat had in
London, on British initiative...

It dosen't of course.

> > The persons engaged in drawing up a list of points for negotiation
>
> A confirmation that at this point no negotiations have occurred

Nonsense. The discussions Wohlthat held with Sir Horace Wilson are
mentioned specifically. Wohlthat and Wilson met on 6 June, 7 July, 19
July, 21 July, and 31 July.

Here's Zachary Shore "What Hitler Knew" Oxford University Press, 2003,
pg 89, on these negotiations:

"Sir Horace presented a detailed plan for Anglo-German accord that
began with a proposal of a nonaggression pact. ... There would be a
recognition of spheres of influence. Eastern and southeastern Europe
were to be designated as Germany's sphere. Third, there would be
agreements on arms limitations for land, sea, and air power
(Chamberlain had long sought an air pact with Germany, as this was a
particular concern for British security.) Fourth, colonial issues
would be resolved, including how best to develope Africa. ... Sir
Horace Wilson said that the conclusion of a non-aggression pact would
release Britain from her commitments to Poland; thus, the Danzig
question would lose much of its importance for Britain."

Wohlthat asked what authority lay behind these British proposals.

"When asked whether Chamberlain had approved these plans, Wilson
asserted that the Prime Minister had given his full consent." - Shore
pg 90.

> > therefore realize that the preparatory steps vis-a-vis Germany must be
> > shrouded in the utmost secrecy.

So you think these were discussions "...vis-a-vis Germany..." held
between the German themselves. Or, you're just trying to weasle out
of their uncomfortable implications.

The latter, I think.

> > Only when Germany's willingness to
> > negotiate has been ascertained,

One might think that the German Embassy might already have an idea of
Germany's willingness to negotiate. Or, you're just trying to weasle
out of their uncomfortable implications.

The latter, I think.

> > and at leaset unanimity regarding the
> > program, perhaps regarding certain general principles, has been
> > attained, will the British government feel strong enough to inform the
> > public of its intentions and of the steps it has already taken. If it
> > could in this way hold out the prospect of an Anglo-German adjustment,
> > it is convinced that the public would greet the news with the greatest
> > joy, and the obstructionists would be reduced to silence. So much is
> > expected from the realization of this plan that it is even considered
> > a most effective election cry, one which would assure the government
> > parties a victory in the autumn elections, and with it the retention
> > of power for another five years.
> >
>
> So we have is the German belief that Britain would not in fact declare
> war over Poland but would if forced negotiate, they were wrong

They had not the slightest indication of a serious British intention
to go to Poland's aid.

> > ...In conclusion, I should like to point out that the German-Polish
> > problem has found a place in this tendency toward an adjustment with
> > Germany, inasmuch as it is believed that in the event of an
> > Anglo-German adjustment the solution of the Polish problem will be
> > easier, since a calmer atmosphere will facilitate the negotiations,
> > and the British interest in Poland will be diminished."
>
> Wishful thinking in action since on the 14th July Sir Nevile Henderson
> discussed with Baron von Weizsäcker, German State Secretary at the Ministry
> for Foreign Affairs, a statement by one of the German Under-Secretaries that
> "Herr Hitler was convinced that England would never fight over Danzig." Sir
> Nevile Henderson repeated the affirmation already made by His Majesty's
> Government that, in the event of German aggression, Great Britain would
> support Poland in resisting force by force

And what did HMG do in the interval to acquire the capability to
support Poland in resisting by force? Hitler saw no such actions or
preparations. Hence, he discounted the threat. In Halder's war diary
entry for 14 August, concerning a discussion he had with Hitler that
day, Hitler is noted as saying that the British haven't even given a
loan to the Poles, indicating that they think the Polish position
bankrupt, and not worth spending money on.

Hitler had another test of British intentions:

From Shore, pg 112, on German Foreign Ministry official Erich Kordt's
contact with Sir Robert Vansittart:

"I learned from Hewel that Hitler said...that it it comes to the
conclusion of an alliance between the Western powers and the Soviet
Union, then he would cancel the action against Poland... But if the
Western Powers embarass themselves and go home empty-handed, then I
can smash Poland without the danger of a conflict with the West."

Shore goes onto say:

"Kordt related this information to (British Foreign Office Chief
Diplomatic Advisor) Vansittart because he, along with Weizacker, hoped
that the British would be sufficiently disturbed by the news that they
themselves would conclude an alliance with the Soviets and discourage
Hitler from war."

Shore goes on to note the increasing pressure on Chamberlain to
conclude the Grand Alliance, but he manfully resisted. Far from being
disturbed into a hasty alliance with the USSR, he increased contacts
with Germany. "Rather than seeking to discourage Hitler by
intensifying the triple alliance talks, Chamberlain did precisely the
opposite." (pg 114)

> <snip>
>
>
> > > From March onwards (when Germany seized the remains of
> > > Czechoslovakia) there was a deterioration of relations which made
> > > everbody understand the inevitability of war
> >
> > Sure, once the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact put paid to the idea of
> > Anglo-German agreement:
> >
> > "For all the other acts of brutality at home and aggression
> > without, Herr Hitler had been able to offer an excuse, inadequate
> > indeed,
> > but not fantastic. The need for order and discipline in Europe,
> > for strength at the centre to withstand the incessant infiltration of
> > false and revolutionary ideas - this is certainly no more than the
> > conventional excuse offered by every military dictator who has ever
> > suppressed the liberties of his own people or advanced the conquest
> > of his neighbors. Nevertheless, so long as the excuse was offered
> > with sincerity, and in Hitler's case the appearance of sincerity were
> > not lacking over a period of years, the world's judgement of the man
> > remained more favorable than its judgement of his actions. The faint
> > possibility of an ultimate settlement with Herr Hitler still, in these
> > circumstances, remained, however abominable his methods, however
> > deceitful his diplomacy, however intolerant he might show himself of
> > the rights of other European peoples, he still claimed to stand
> > ultimately for something which was a common European interest, and
> > which therefore could conceivably provide some day a basis for
> > understanding with other nations equally determined not to sacrifice
> > their traditional institutions and habits on the bloodstained altars
> > of the World Revolution.
> >
> > The conclusion of the German-Soviet pact removed even this faint
> > possibility of an honorable peace."
> >
> > Lord Lloyd of Dolobran "The British Case" Eyre & Spottiswoode Limited.
> > London, 1939, pgs 54-5, with a preface by Lord Halifax, the Foreign
> > Secretary.
> >
> > And Lord Lloyd was no isolated right-wing crank. Within months of his
> > book being published, he was a member of Churchill's Cabinet, the
> > Secretary of State for Colonies.
> >
>
> No he was a realist,

A realist... who retained a touching faith in Hitler's "sincerity"
right up until the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. ROTFL!!

> the Soviet German pact was clearly intended
> to give Germany a free hand to start a war against the West.
>
> There's no suggestion here that Lloyd was in favour of such
> an agreement or was stating that such an agreement was being negotiated.

It shows that that Hitler was thought worthy of the benefit of every
doubt, until the M-R Pact.

> He's simply pointing that AFTER the pact was signed it was clear
> that Germany was planning war with Soviet connivance.

It shows that as long as the merest, threadbare shred of a hope of a
possibility of a chance that maybe, someday, in the course of time,
Hitler will join HMG in an anti-Soviet agreement, it is sufficient
reason to trust Hitler's sincerity and continue to judge him as better
than his actions.

> > > In April Germany denounced the Anglo German Naval Agreement
> > >
> > > The Germans alsocomplained about the negotiations
> > > Britain was pursuing with the USSR complaining that
> > > Britain and the Soviet Union were trying to encircle
> > > Germany.
> >
> > And the British offered to end those talks.
>
> Molotov ended those talks.

Once they were clearly going nowhere. After all, nobody on the
British delegation he was talking to had any authority to agree to
anything.

> > > They need not have feared since it was the Soviets who scuppered
> > > any chance of an alliance to oppose Germany when Molotov
> > > first sharply criticized the British suggestions of a defensive
> alliance
> > > against Germany and Italy and then rejected a series of drafts in
> > > negotiations
> >
> > Actually, it was the Soviet draft of 17 April 1939 that formed the
> > basis of the discussions, and as late as 19 August 1939, a mere week
> > before the planned start date for the German invasion of Poland, the
> > British delegation at the Moscow military staff talks had no authority
> > to commit to <anything>.
> >
>
>
> <snip>
>
> >
> > Without immediate and effective Russian assistance the longer that war
> > would be, and the less chance there would be of either Poland or
> > Roumania emerging at the end of it as independent states in anything
> > like their present form.
> >
> > We suggest that it is now necessary to present this unpalatable truth
> > with absolute frankness to both the Poles and to the Roumanians. To
> > the Poles especially it ought to be pointed out that they have
> > obligations to us as well as we to them; and that it is unreasonable
> > for them to expect us blindly to implement our guarantee to them if,
> > at the same time, they will not co-operate in measures designed for a
> > common purpose.
> >
> > The conclusion of a treaty with Russia appears to us to be the best
> > way of preventing a war. ... At the worst if the negotiations with
> > Russia break down, a Russo-German rapproachment may take place of
> > which the probable consequence will be that Russia and Germany
> > decide to share the spoils and concert in a new partition of the
> > Eastern European States."
>
>
> Clear evidence that the British were attempting to come
> to an agreement with the USSR

Clear evidence that the Deputy Chiefs of Staff thought the Soviet
position a very good idea. Too bad PM Chamberlain wasn't convinced.
The Soviet position was refused, despite this advice from the Deputy
Chiefs of Staff. The British delegation at the Moscow military staff
talks was not authorized to agree to it. Clear evidence that the
British government had no intention to come to an agreement with the
USSR, despite this good advice from the Deputy Chiefs of Staff.

> Thank You

More twisting, worming, weasling from you. But you're clearly
helpless.

> > > These demands were clearly impossible to accept and were almost
> > > certainly intended to end all such talks as the USSR was already
> > > secretly negotiating with Germany.
> >
> > No, these Soviet proposals were nothing more than the minimum of what
> > was militarily necessary for successful resistance to Nazi Germany.
> > No wonder Chamberlain had no interest in them.
> >
> > > It was of course Stalin who offered Germany a free hand in Western
> > > Europe while the USSR would have a free hand in the east and
> > > split Poland between them.
> >
> > Much better than letting Nazi Germany get it all.
>
> Germany did get it all

After paying a much higher price in blood than they would have if
they'd gotten it straight from Poland.

Stuart Wilkes

[Christophe Chazot]

"Fred J. McCall" > a écrit dans le message news:
...
> Seraphim > wrote:
(snip)
> France had the means to respond properly. They had more and better
> armor than the Germans did.

Yes, but other aspects are to be taken in consideration, like the almost
complete lack of radio equipment, the lack of mobile logistics, and so on.

> : In short, the French army got their butt kicked in WWII because they
> :were trying to avoild another WWI.
>
> No, the French army got their butt kicked in WWII because their
> generals were idiots and didn't use the forces they had properly.

Despite what I have just written above, I agree with you on this point. Our
irresponsible politicians had promoted generals that could not harm.

Regards,
Christophe

[Christophe Chazot]

"Peter Skelton" > a écrit dans le message news:
...

(snip)

> They'd have gotten their butts kicked in the last war too, didn't
> have reserves, didn't have telephones at HQ, unbelievable stuff.

Unbelievable, indeed, but a logical consequence of the sending the army in
Belgium. The defensive strategy (or whatever one call it) that prevailed
prewar had planned that, in cas of an attack, all the national telephone
system would pass under military rule and will be used as the main military
communication system. This was supposed to save money in prewar budgets,
even if it seems a bit irresponsible (a phone net was easily saturated by
military traffic, this net was not dense enough in some areas including the
Ardennes, a HQ was unable to relocate once it had found a practical
settlement, etc. you can pile up critics as high as you wish).
When the government sent the main battle force of the army in Belgium, it
cut the army from its main phone system... and general Gamelin did not raise
any finger to say that the plan was pointless, forcing his divisions to
communicate by pigeons, bicycles, cavalry and the like. Because, of course,
no wide radio net had been procured, since the national telephone was
here...

Regards,
Christophe
(grand son of a radio operator in the Armée des Alpes)

[Peter Skelton]

On Thu, 23 Oct 2003 21:59:47 +0200, "Christophe Chazot"
> wrote:

>
>"Peter Skelton" > a écrit dans le message news:
...
>
>(snip)
>
>> They'd have gotten their butts kicked in the last war too, didn't
>> have reserves, didn't have telephones at HQ, unbelievable stuff.
>
>Unbelievable, indeed, but a logical consequence of the sending the army in
>Belgium. The defensive strategy (or whatever one call it) that prevailed
>prewar had planned that, in cas of an attack, all the national telephone
>system would pass under military rule and will be used as the main military
>communication system.

Correct but the turkey in command didn't even have a civilian
phone (let alone radio) at his chalet. He intended to depend on
messengers.



Peter Skelton

[L'acrobat]

"Fred J. McCall" > wrote in message
...
> Seraphim > wrote:
>
> :I've always thought it had everything to do with it. World War I
basically
> :destroyed the cream of a generation for France. After the horrors of the
> :first war, it was decided that sending their men off to die in the
trenches
> :was stupid, and that they were better off just making things so difficult
> :on the enemy that an attack would never come. Unfortunately for the
French,
> :the attack did come, but not where they had prepared for it, and due to
> :this France did not have the means avaible to respond properly.
>
> France had the means to respond properly. They had more and better
> armor than the Germans did.

Their armour was not better than the German armour, you have fallen into the
common trap of only comparing how big the gun was and how thick the armour
plating was.

[Keith Willshaw]

"L'acrobat" > wrote in message
...

> > France had the means to respond properly. They had more and better
> > armor than the Germans did.
>
> Their armour was not better than the German armour, you have fallen into
the
> common trap of only comparing how big the gun was and how thick the armour
> plating was.
>

There are pros and cons on either side, the big difference
was doctrine. If the Germans had the French tanks and
vice versa the Germans would still have won.

Keith

[Seraphim]

"Keith Willshaw" > wrote in
:

>
> "L'acrobat" > wrote in message
> ...
>
>>> France had the means to respond properly. They had more and better
>>> armor than the Germans did.

The French had ~3400 tanks, vs ~3200 German ones. Not a huge difference.

>> Their armour was not better than the German armour, you have fallen
>> into the
>> common trap of only comparing how big the gun was and how thick the
>> armour plating was.
>
> There are pros and cons on either side, the big difference
> was doctrine. If the Germans had the French tanks and
> vice versa the Germans would still have won.

Probably true, but it would have been much harder for the Germans. French
tanks were *slow*. Of the 3,473 French tanks, ~1,400 were only capable of
12mph on roads, and another 1,000 or so could only do 18mph. Compare that
to the 3,200+ German tanks that were all capable of 25+mph. The size of
your gun, and the thickness of your armor doesn't matter if you never get
to engage another tank.

[Seraphim]

Fred J. McCall > wrote in
:

> Seraphim > wrote:
>
>:I've always thought it had everything to do with it. World War I
>:basically destroyed the cream of a generation for France. After the
>:horrors of the first war, it was decided that sending their men off to
>:die in the trenches was stupid, and that they were better off just
>:making things so difficult on the enemy that an attack would never
>:come. Unfortunately for the French, the attack did come, but not where
>:they had prepared for it, and due to this France did not have the
>:means avaible to respond properly.
>
> France had the means to respond properly. They had more and better
> armor than the Germans did.

The french had ~210 more tanks than the Germans. This is out of forces that
were measured in the thousands. However, the French majority tanks were
SLOW, makeing it very difficult to get them into positions where they could
actually do something productive.

>: In short, the French army got their butt kicked in WWII
>: because they
>:were trying to avoild another WWI.
>
> No, the French army got their butt kicked in WWII because their
> generals were idiots and didn't use the forces they had properly.

Right, but why didn't they use the forces they had?

[Nik Simpson]

Seraphim wrote:
> Fred J. McCall > wrote in
> :
>
>> No, the French army got their butt kicked in WWII because their
>> generals were idiots and didn't use the forces they had properly.
>
> Right, but why didn't they use the forces they had?


I think that's covered under "their generals were idiots."

If anybody wants a really good read on the subject I highly recommend Ernest
R. May's "Strange Victory."


--
Nik Simpson

[Stuart Wilkes]

"Snuffy Smith" > wrote in message >...
> "Stuart Wilkes" > wrote in message
> om...
> > "Rostyslaw J. Lewyckyj" > wrote in message
> >...
> > > Stuart Wilkes wrote:
> > >
> > > > Hm. One wonders how this purged Soviet Army managed to inflict over 3
> > > > times as many German KIA in the first seven weeks of Barbarossa as the
> > > > combined Franco-Anglo-Belgian-Dutch armies managed in the six-week
> > > > campaign in the West.
> > >
> > > What were the numbers of soldiers involved in the two campaigns that
> > > you are comparing. i.e:
> >
> > Suprisingly equal, Rostyk. I'm suprised you didn't know that.
>
> Maybe he has better things to do than spend his whole life worrying about
> ancient history like you?

He had a question, and he knew who to ask for an accurate answer: Me.

He knows better than to ask you, because he knows that all he would
get from you is some ill-tempered spleen-venting mixed up with
spiteful lies.

Stuart Wilkes

[Dennis]

Seraphim wrote:
>
> > There are pros and cons on either side, the big difference
> > was doctrine. If the Germans had the French tanks and
> > vice versa the Germans would still have won.
>
> Probably true, but it would have been much harder for the Germans. French
> tanks were *slow*. Of the 3,473 French tanks, ~1,400 were only capable of
> 12mph on roads, and another 1,000 or so could only do 18mph. Compare that
> to the 3,200+ German tanks that were all capable of 25+mph. The size of
> your gun, and the thickness of your armor doesn't matter if you never get
> to engage another tank.

Yes. Also, the fighting compartment of the German
tanks was much better, so they could fight on the
move. They had radios for fast coordination, which the
French tanks mostly lacked. Most importantly, there
was logistic support, air support from the Stukas, and
rapid coordination for them to move very rapidly - all
of which the French lacked, and which could not have
been at all quickly corrected.

Dennis

[Stuart Wilkes]

(The Black Monk) wrote in message >...

<snip>

> Had the Germans been statesmen they would not have had
> to contend with resistence in eastern Europe,

See below.

> indeed they would probably have had several 100,000 more allied troops

German troops in France in 1941 were equipped largely with captured
Czechoslovak, Polish, Yugoslav, and French equipment. The troops of
Germany's sattelites were equipped with their own (generally poor)
equipment, and the Germans gave them very little to make up the
equipment deficiencies in the Italian, Romanian, Hungarian, and
Finnish armies.

So the Germans would have faced severe problems equipping any great
number of additional troops, at least before Speer's rationalization
of the German war economy starts to boost output.

<snip>

> This alternative strategy is not as far-fetched as it seems.

Unfortunately, this strategy fails to take account of the logistical
and material constraints under which Nazi Germany waged Barbarossa.

German transportation assets, such as the captured Soviet rail
network, the German truck fleet, German draft animals, and fuel supply
proved insufficient for the transportation of ammunition and vehicle
and aircraft fuel only. And German draft horses died by the hundred
thousand during Barbarossa, because they couldn't survive the
conditions the East. For the Axis forces in the East therefore, their
food, warm clothing, shelter, survivable draft animals, and fuel for
heat had to come at the expense of the population in the areas they
occupied, who had little enough to begin with. The German Army
couldn't afford to trade for these things, since trade items from
Germany would tie up train capacity that was already insufficient for
the transportation of vehicle fuel and ammunition. So German Army
requirements for food, warm clothing, shelter, survivable draft
animals, and fuel for heat had to come by uncompensated requisition
from people who have little to begin with.

In no event will this be popular, no matter what the German policy
behind it is.

In every event this will provoke resistance, no matter what the German
policy behind it is.

It is likely that a German policy that is not explicitly genocidal
will provoke less resistance than the historical one, but the
occupation is still sufficiently harsh that resistance is manifested.

The impact of this on the course and outcome of the war in the East is
open to question.

> Elements in the Wehrmacht were outraged at the Nazi mistreatment
> of Eastern Europeans,

Indeed some were. But a look at the German logistics system shows
that there was no real alternative for them, apart from not waging war
in the East at all.

Stuart Wilkes

[Joe Osman]

Christophe Chazot wrote:
>
> "Keith Willshaw" > a écrit dans le message
> news: ...
> >
> > "Christophe Chazot" > wrote in message
> > ...
> >
> > > > John
> > >
> > > My apologies, I thought it was about 1914-18.
> > >
> > > What happened to our army in 1939-40 had little to do with what was
> > achieved
> > > in 1917-18...
> > >
> >
> > Actually I suspect it did. The horror of WW1 was so strong in the
> generation
> > of 1940 that they were determined to avoid it happening again.
> >
> > This is I think what lay behind the reluctance to take the offensive
> > against Germany in 1939 when their troops were busy in Poland.
> >
> >
> > Keith
>
> I was talking about what happened to our army in a strictly military field.
> The morale questions were important too, and the massacre of WW1 certainly
> had a reverse effect on the will to fight again 20 years later, as you
> quote. By the way, the reluctance to take offensive in 1939 was also due to
> the lack of drive of general Gamelin, a peacetime chief of staff who had
> been promoted for peacetime reasons but who seriously lacked the required
> skills for such a job at such a time. It was also due to some technical and
> logistical shortfalls, that resulted from the budget cuts all along the
> 1930s and that were not corrected until it was too late, but that's a bit
> off-topic on naval newsgroup.
> Regards,
> Christophe

I seem to recall that The French began WWI with an offensive
into Germany and received heavy losses, which probably made
them reluctant to do so in WWII.

Joe


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[The Revolution Will Not Be Televised]

On 23 Oct 2003 12:39:28 -0700, (Stuart Wilkes)
wrote:

>> > The ones described in Ambassador von Dirksen's cable from London to
>> > Berlin of 24 July 1939:
>> >
>> > "General ideas as to how a peaceful adjustment with Germany could be
>> > undertaken seem to have crystallized... On the basis of political
>> > appeasement, which in to ensure the principle of non-aggression and to
>> > achieve a delimitation of political spheres of interest by means of a
>> > comprehensive formula, a broad economic program is being worked out...
>> > About these plans entertained by leading circles, State Advisor
>> > Wohlthat, who, on British initiative, had long talks about them during
>> > his stay in London last week, will be able to give more detailed
>> > information. The problem that is puuzzling the sponsors of these
>> > plans most is how to start the negotiations. Public opinion is so
>> > inflamed, that if these plans of negotiations with Germany were to
>> > bedcome public they would immediately be torpoedoed by Churchill and
>> > others with the cry 'No second Munich!' or 'No return to appeasement!'
>> >
>>
>> So we have a report of discussions within the German embassy
>
>No. As I show below, they quite accurately report the content of the
>discussions between Wohlthat and Sir Horace Wilson. The latter was
>not, to my knowlege, assigned to the German embassy.

No, they quite accurately report what Wohlthat _reported_ were the
content of the discussions he had with Horace Wilson on 21st July
1939. Wilson not only denied that he had met Wohlthat on that date,
but denied offering Germany a non-aggression treaty during his
acknowledged contacts with Wohlthat at earlier and later meetings.

I suspect that where there are conflicting accounts of such contacts
on the Soviet side in regard to non-aggression pacts in the context of
German ambitions towards Poland in 1939, your reading will be a little
less convinced of the definative nature of the diplomatic feelers in
question.

>> about PLANS for negotiation not negotiations themselves
>> and certainly no offers of recognition as you claimed.
>
>How does that explain the discussions State Advisor Wohlthat had in
>London, on British initiative...

Actually, my reading of the source you quote is that Wohlthat asked
permission from Goring to pursue economic contacts with the British in
June 1939. [page 88]

>> > The persons engaged in drawing up a list of points for negotiation
>>
>> A confirmation that at this point no negotiations have occurred
>
>Nonsense. The discussions Wohlthat held with Sir Horace Wilson are
>mentioned specifically. Wohlthat and Wilson met on 6 June, 7 July, 19
>July, 21 July, and 31 July.

Not according to Wilson. Which account you believe (Wilson or
Wohlthat] is up to you. In most cases people seem to allow their
interpretation to be dictated by their prejudices, and I don't think
you're an exception.

>Here's Zachary Shore "What Hitler Knew" Oxford University Press, 2003,
>pg 89, on these negotiations:
>
>"Sir Horace presented a detailed plan for Anglo-German accord that
>began with a proposal of a nonaggression pact. ... There would be a
>recognition of spheres of influence. Eastern and southeastern Europe
>were to be designated as Germany's sphere. Third, there would be
>agreements on arms limitations for land, sea, and air power
>(Chamberlain had long sought an air pact with Germany, as this was a
>particular concern for British security.) Fourth, colonial issues
>would be resolved, including how best to develope Africa. ... Sir
>Horace Wilson said that the conclusion of a non-aggression pact would
>release Britain from her commitments to Poland; thus, the Danzig
>question would lose much of its importance for Britain."
>
>Wohlthat asked what authority lay behind these British proposals.
>
>"When asked whether Chamberlain had approved these plans, Wilson
>asserted that the Prime Minister had given his full consent." - Shore
>pg 90.

Notice how, on page 89, Shore refers to this as "Sir Horace [Wilson]
then supposedly presented his interlocutor with a draft formula for
Anglo-German cooperation, but this memorandum has never been found."
Shore is quite careful to use terms like "allegedly" and "supposedly"
in this respect, qualifications which I note you drop when you present
these interpretations as unchallenged fact, which, in fact, they are
not.

>> > therefore realize that the preparatory steps vis-a-vis Germany must be
>> > shrouded in the utmost secrecy.
>
>So you think these were discussions "...vis-a-vis Germany..." held
>between the German themselves.

Who knows, given that all you have is one German civil servant's
opinion of what was discussed and what this meant?

> Or, you're just trying to weasle out
>of their uncomfortable implications.
>
>The latter, I think.

I think you should be very careful when casting this sort of language
around, given that in fact the basic thrust of the source you quote,
at least in regard to secret Anglo-German contacts in June-July 1939
contradicts your basic assertion that Hitler was aware of them and
they informed his decision in regard to attacking Poland. Shore makes
it explictly clear that there was no evidence that Hitler was aware of
them, in contrast to Ribbentrop.

>> > Only when Germany's willingness to
>> > negotiate has been ascertained,
>
>One might think that the German Embassy might already have an idea of
>Germany's willingness to negotiate. Or, you're just trying to weasle
>out of their uncomfortable implications.

I think we can take the readiness of Germany to negotiate on the basis
of Wilson's efforts from the conclusion they reached (a conclusion, I
note in passing, that you don't seek to widely publicise in your
references to Shore):

"Just two weeks before the outbreak of war, the Anglo-German talks
reached their finale. Whether he had proposed them or not,
Chamberlain finally received a response to his or Sir Horace's secret
overtures. On August 20, Fritz Hesse, the German embassy advisor,
wrote to Sir Horace on Ribbentrop's instructions. The German
government, Wilson was told, had no interest whatsoever in
negotiations with Britain." [page 99]

>> So we have is the German belief that Britain would not in fact declare
>> war over Poland but would if forced negotiate, they were wrong
>
>They had not the slightest indication of a serious British intention
>to go to Poland's aid.

This is where I am convinced you are using references in bad faith.
In fact Shore makes it clear that the source *you* are utilising to
indicate underlying British policy in the form of Wohlstadt's and
Dirksen reports, explictly contradicts this:

"Unable to gain an audience with Ribbentrop, Dirksen decided to send
yet another report summarising his previous cables and stressing his
conviction that Britain would fight to defend Poland." [page 98]
Shore claims this report was sent to Weizsacker and Ribbentrop. Note
that phrase ".. stressing his conviction that Britain would fight to
defend Poland."

Now, either you didn't read that last sentence or you are seeking to
selectively distort the actual meaning of the references you quote to
support your position.

Anybody taking Dirksen's report's of his own and Wohlstadt's activity
seriously, as you do, should be able to account for the fact that they
stressed that the British _were_ in fact prepared to fight over Poland
in accordance with their guarantee. This appears to flatly contradict
what you believe on the matter, on the basis of what you have posted
in this thread so far.

>> > ...In conclusion, I should like to point out that the German-Polish
>> > problem has found a place in this tendency toward an adjustment with
>> > Germany, inasmuch as it is believed that in the event of an
>> > Anglo-German adjustment the solution of the Polish problem will be
>> > easier, since a calmer atmosphere will facilitate the negotiations,
>> > and the British interest in Poland will be diminished."
>>
>> Wishful thinking in action since on the 14th July Sir Nevile Henderson
>> discussed with Baron von Weizsäcker, German State Secretary at the Ministry
>> for Foreign Affairs, a statement by one of the German Under-Secretaries that
>> "Herr Hitler was convinced that England would never fight over Danzig." Sir
>> Nevile Henderson repeated the affirmation already made by His Majesty's
>> Government that, in the event of German aggression, Great Britain would
>> support Poland in resisting force by force
>
>And what did HMG do in the interval to acquire the capability to
>support Poland in resisting by force? Hitler saw no such actions or
>preparations. Hence, he discounted the threat.

Hitler's wish-fulfillment isn't the issue at hand. What he was told
about British intentions and what the British had established as their
intentions are. Ribbentrop was claiming to Ciano that the British
wouldn't fight over Poland on 11 August, and Hitler similarly on 12
August. Clearly, Ribbentrop at least knew of Dirksen's report by
then, which contradicted this. [page 98 again] So much for the value
of that report to the decision-making process in the Nazi hierarchy.

I personally suspect, as usual, that the Nazis selectively chose to
believe whatever bits of that report which fit in with Hitler's
perceived plan and their exisiting prejudices, and discarded the rest.
That would seem to have some parallel in this thread, at least.

>> No he was a realist,
>
>A realist... who retained a touching faith in Hitler's "sincerity"
>right up until the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. ROTFL!!

Unlike Stalin, who's sense of realism managed to believe with touching
faith in Hitler's "sincerity" after the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and up
until the panzers rolled across his borders. Seems a very modified
form of 'realism' in regard to the "sincerity" of Hitler's treaty
undertakings to me. Are you rolling about laughing at _that_
ridiculous faith in Hitler's word, I wonder?

>It shows that as long as the merest, threadbare shred of a hope of a
>possibility of a chance that maybe, someday, in the course of time,
>Hitler will join HMG in an anti-Soviet agreement, it is sufficient
>reason to trust Hitler's sincerity and continue to judge him as better
>than his actions.

Not what Chamberlain was saying to his sisters on 23rd July, was it?

>> > And the British offered to end those talks.
>>
>> Molotov ended those talks.
>
>Once they were clearly going nowhere. After all, nobody on the
>British delegation he was talking to had any authority to agree to
>anything.

And he gave them how long to alter their stance before initiating the
conclusion of a non-aggression pact which carved up Poland and the
rest of Eastern Europe into spheres of interest? I note this kind of
deal seems to excite your criticism when Chamberlain might be
interpreted as trying it, but not when Stalin actually _does_ it. To
refer to the source you quote once more, Shore makes it clear that
Stalin was soliciting a deal with Hitler in March 1939.

Gavin Bailey




--

"Will Boogie Down For Food".- Sign held by Disco Stu outside the unemployment office.

[Keith Willshaw]

"Joe Osman" > wrote in message
...
> Christophe Chazot wrote:
> >

>
> I seem to recall that The French began WWI with an offensive
> into Germany and received heavy losses, which probably made
> them reluctant to do so in WWII.
>

Hardly

WW1 began with the Germans attacking through Belgium
following the Schlieffen plan. In subsequent offensives the
French did indeed suffer horrendous casualties.

Keith

[Christophe Chazot]

"Nik Simpson" > a écrit dans le message news:
...

> If anybody wants a really good read on the subject I highly recommend
Ernest
> R. May's "Strange Victory."

Or Marc Bloch's "Strange defeat" (L'étrange défaite), written by a medievist
who had fought the first war and who did not believed what he saw when he
volunteered for the second one, at age 53.

Yours,
Christophe

[Nik Simpson]

Christophe Chazot wrote:
> "Nik Simpson" > a écrit dans le message news:
> ...
>
>> If anybody wants a really good read on the subject I highly
>> recommend Ernest R. May's "Strange Victory."
>
> Or Marc Bloch's "Strange defeat" (L'étrange défaite), written by a
> medievist who had fought the first war and who did not believed what
> he saw when he volunteered for the second one, at age 53.
>
Strange Victory is almost written as a companion piece to Strange Defeat and
makes frequent references to it.


--
Nik Simpson

[Vince Brannigan]

Keith Willshaw wrote:
> "Joe Osman" > wrote in message
> ...
>
>>Christophe Chazot wrote:
>>
>
>>I seem to recall that The French began WWI with an offensive
>>into Germany and received heavy losses, which probably made
>>them reluctant to do so in WWII.
>>
>
>
> Hardly
>
> WW1 began with the Germans attacking through Belgium
> following the Schlieffen plan. In subsequent offensives the
> French did indeed suffer horrendous casualties.
>

It's a mix of both On 3 August Germany attacked belgium.
They did not pass Charleroi until Until Aug 22. (althought they were
fighting the french in Belgium

On august 8 Joffre ordered the French offensive into Alsace Teh Germswn
wer suppsoed to withdraw and trap the French from behind but they made
the studid decison to contest the french advance.

http://www.firstworldwar.com/battles/lorraine.htm

[Keith Willshaw]

"Vince Brannigan" > wrote in message
...
>
>
> Keith Willshaw wrote:
> > "Joe Osman" > wrote in message
> > ...
> >
> >>Christophe Chazot wrote:
> >>
> >
> >>I seem to recall that The French began WWI with an offensive
> >>into Germany and received heavy losses, which probably made
> >>them reluctant to do so in WWII.
> >>
> >
> >
> > Hardly
> >
> > WW1 began with the Germans attacking through Belgium
> > following the Schlieffen plan. In subsequent offensives the
> > French did indeed suffer horrendous casualties.
> >
>
> It's a mix of both On 3 August Germany attacked belgium.
> They did not pass Charleroi until Until Aug 22. (althought they were
> fighting the french in Belgium
>

and the BEF

> On august 8 Joffre ordered the French offensive into Alsace Teh Germswn
> wer suppsoed to withdraw and trap the French from behind but they made
> the studid decison to contest the french advance.
>
> http://www.firstworldwar.com/battles/lorraine.htm
>

The 3rd coming before the 8th it would seem that the
opening gambit was indeed a German attack and
the fact of the French offensive having occurred on the 8th
would appear to make it subsequent.

In any event French losses around Mulhouse were light,
the town itself having been taken without serious opposition
the French were subsequently on the defensive.

Keith

[Cub Driver]

On 24 Oct 2003 06:03:33 -0700, (Stuart Wilkes)
wrote:

>German troops in France in 1941 were equipped largely with captured
>Czechoslovak, Polish, Yugoslav, and French equipment. The troops of
>Germany's sattelites were equipped with their own (generally poor)

etc.

Good post. Thank you!


all the best -- Dan Ford
email: www.danford.net/letters.htm#9

see the Warbird's Forum at www.warbirdforum.com
and the Piper Cub Forum at www.pipercubforum.com

[Cub Driver]

>russia fought japan until the german invasion of russia. you don't have
>to look in obscure sources to find out about it.

Well, not really. While there was a major border war at Nomonhan in
1939, that was entirely defensive on Russia's part. Once the Japanese
withdrew, there was no further military action. Nearly two years
passed between Nomonhan and Germany's invasion of Russia.
>
>readers of rec.aviation.military are undoubtably familiar with the
>accounts of the flying tigers in china. these books describe the
>russian conflict with china in this period, both as mercenaries for
>china and direct conflict on the soviet border.

Russia did provide planes and indeed entire squadrons (planes, pilots,
and I assume ground crews) to fight on behalf of the Chinese
Nationalist government in 1938. By the end of 1940, these had all been
withdrawn. Indeed, it was the loss of the Russian squadrons that
prompted Chiang Kai-shek to send Claire Chennault to Washington in the
winter of 1940-41 to help organize a volunteer American air force to
fight in China--the genesis of the AVG Flying Tigers.


all the best -- Dan Ford
email: www.danford.net/letters.htm#9

see the Warbird's Forum at www.warbirdforum.com
and the Piper Cub Forum at www.pipercubforum.com

[Stuart Wilkes]

(The Revolution Will Not Be Televised) wrote in message >...
> On 23 Oct 2003 12:39:28 -0700, (Stuart Wilkes)
> wrote:
> >No. As I show below, they quite accurately report the content of the
> >discussions between Wohlthat and Sir Horace Wilson. The latter was
> >not, to my knowlege, assigned to the German embassy.
>
> No, they quite accurately report what Wohlthat _reported_ were the
> content of the discussions he had with Horace Wilson on 21st July
> 1939. Wilson not only denied that he had met Wohlthat on that date,
> but denied offering Germany a non-aggression treaty during his
> acknowledged contacts with Wohlthat at earlier and later meetings.

"I don't recall. It's not in my appointment book.... I suggest that
it is not necessary to pay much attention to Wohlthat." isn't a
denial.

And of course, the paying of little attention to Wohlthat is
facilitated by his files in the Public Records Office being sealed
until 2015.

> I suspect that where there are conflicting accounts of such contacts
> on the Soviet side in regard to non-aggression pacts in the context of
> German ambitions towards Poland in 1939, your reading will be a little
> less convinced of the definative nature of the diplomatic feelers in
> question.

Why? The German accounts of these negotiation show continued Soviet
suspicion of the Germans, and go so far as to say, as late as 4 August
1939, that the Soviets remain determined to sign with the British and
French if their conditions are met. Mr. Willshaw made a feeble
attempt to show that these Soviet conditions were unreasonable, but I
notice that he hasn't really responded to my showing that British
military types thought them just what the situation required.

> >> about PLANS for negotiation not negotiations themselves
> >> and certainly no offers of recognition as you claimed.
> >
> >How does that explain the discussions State Advisor Wohlthat had in
> >London, on British initiative...
>
> Actually, my reading of the source you quote is that Wohlthat asked
> permission from Goring to pursue economic contacts with the British in
> June 1939. [page 88]

How does this contradict Dirksen's cable of 24 July?

> >> > The persons engaged in drawing up a list of points for negotiation
> >>
> >> A confirmation that at this point no negotiations have occurred
> >
> >Nonsense. The discussions Wohlthat held with Sir Horace Wilson are
> >mentioned specifically. Wohlthat and Wilson met on 6 June, 7 July, 19
> >July, 21 July, and 31 July.
>
> Not according to Wilson.

"I have no recollection... My book shows seven appointments and there
is no mention of Wohlthat... I suggest that it is unnecessary to pay
much attention to Wohlthat..."

> Which account you believe (Wilson or Wohlthat] is up to you.

On the one hand, we have the German account. On the other we have "I
have no recollection..." and the sealing of the relevant British files
until 2015.

> In most cases people seem to allow their interpretation to be dictated
> by their prejudices, and I don't think you're an exception.
>
> >Here's Zachary Shore "What Hitler Knew" Oxford University Press, 2003,
> >pg 89, on these negotiations:
> >
> >"Sir Horace presented a detailed plan for Anglo-German accord that
> >began with a proposal of a nonaggression pact. ... There would be a
> >recognition of spheres of influence. Eastern and southeastern Europe
> >were to be designated as Germany's sphere. Third, there would be
> >agreements on arms limitations for land, sea, and air power
> >(Chamberlain had long sought an air pact with Germany, as this was a
> >particular concern for British security.) Fourth, colonial issues
> >would be resolved, including how best to develope Africa. ... Sir
> >Horace Wilson said that the conclusion of a non-aggression pact would
> >release Britain from her commitments to Poland; thus, the Danzig
> >question would lose much of its importance for Britain."
> >
> >Wohlthat asked what authority lay behind these British proposals.
> >
> >"When asked whether Chamberlain had approved these plans, Wilson
> >asserted that the Prime Minister had given his full consent." - Shore
> >pg 90.
>
> Notice how, on page 89, Shore refers to this as "Sir Horace [Wilson]
> then supposedly presented his interlocutor with a draft formula for
> Anglo-German cooperation, but this memorandum has never been found."
> Shore is quite careful to use terms like "allegedly" and "supposedly"
> in this respect, qualifications which I note you drop when you present
> these interpretations as unchallenged fact, which, in fact, they are
> not.

"I have no recollection..." is not a challenge to a statement of fact.

> >> > therefore realize that the preparatory steps vis-a-vis Germany must be
> >> > shrouded in the utmost secrecy.
> >
> >So you think these were discussions "...vis-a-vis Germany..." held
> >between the German themselves.
>
> Who knows, given that all you have is one German civil servant's
> opinion of what was discussed and what this meant?

Confirmed by another German civil servant's (Dirksen's) account of
discussions held on 3 August 1939 with the very same Sir Horace
Wilson.

I wonder what his appointment book has to say about that.

> > Or, you're just trying to weasle out
> >of their uncomfortable implications.
> >
> >The latter, I think.
>
> I think you should be very careful when casting this sort of language
> around,

Mr. Willshaw tried to portray Dirksen's cable as a report of
discussions within the German embassy about plans for negotiations.

"So we have a report of discussions within the German embassy
about PLANS for negotiation not negotiations themselves
and certainly no offers of recognition as you claimed"

He later tried to portray the Deputy Chiefs of Staff's favorable
opinion of one of the Soviet conditions as evidence the British side
were serious about the Moscow staff talks, despite the fact that the
British delegation wasn't authorized to agree to it.

> given that in fact the basic thrust of the source you quote,
> at least in regard to secret Anglo-German contacts in June-July 1939
> contradicts your basic assertion that Hitler was aware of them and
> they informed his decision in regard to attacking Poland.

I do not assert that Hitler was informed of the Wohlthat-Wilson or the
Dirksen-Wilson talks.

I asserted that Hitler saw no evidence of British preparations to go
to Poland's aid in the event of a German attack on Poland.

> Shore makes it explictly clear that there was no evidence that Hitler
> was aware of them, in contrast to Ribbentrop.
>
> >> > Only when Germany's willingness to
> >> > negotiate has been ascertained,
> >
> >One might think that the German Embassy might already have an idea of
> >Germany's willingness to negotiate. Or, you're just trying to weasle
> >out of their uncomfortable implications.
>
> I think we can take the readiness of Germany to negotiate on the basis
> of Wilson's efforts from the conclusion they reached (a conclusion, I
> note in passing, that you don't seek to widely publicise in your
> references to Shore):
>
> "Just two weeks before the outbreak of war, the Anglo-German talks
> reached their finale. Whether he had proposed them or not,
> Chamberlain finally received a response to his or Sir Horace's secret
> overtures. On August 20, Fritz Hesse, the German embassy advisor,
> wrote to Sir Horace on Ribbentrop's instructions. The German
> government, Wilson was told, had no interest whatsoever in
> negotiations with Britain." [page 99]

Indeed. The Germans turned down negotiations with the British on 20
August 1939. And Chamberlain's concept of "...germany and England as
pillars of European peace and buttresses against Communism" crashed
into ruins.

> >> So we have is the German belief that Britain would not in fact declare
> >> war over Poland but would if forced negotiate, they were wrong
> >
> >They had not the slightest indication of a serious British intention
> >to go to Poland's aid.
>
> This is where I am convinced you are using references in bad faith.

I do not reference Shore for this, but the war diary of
Colonel-General Franz Halder, Chief of the German General Staff, entry
for 14 August 1939 describing one of Hitler's monologues:

"Britain, unlike in 1914, will not allow herself to blunder into a war
drawn out over years. Talk of Britain wanting a long war is
discounted. ... Britain has not gained in naval power over the last
year. On land, it will be months before stepped-up conscription can
take effect in the form of efficient fighting units. Progress in the
air: bombers, fighters, improved ground organization. Air defense has
not made any basic imporvements. On the whole, everything is still in
the developing stage, similar to ours in 1934.

....

All these factors argue for the liklihood of Britain and France
refraining from entering the war, particularly since they are not
under any compulsion.

Pacts are not yet ratified. Formula: "Aid with all our power" lacks
good faith. Proof: Britain does not give Poland any money to buy
arms in other countries.

....

Further evidence that no determined action is expected on the part of
Britain may be inferred from Poland's attitude. Poland would be even
more insolent if she knew she had the unqualified backing of Britain.
Britain has strongly remonstrated with Poland over the latest Polish
notes and is a continually restraining influence. Tapped telephone
conversations in Poland! Even now Britain is putting out feelers to
find out how the Fuehrer envisages developments after Poland's
disposal."

"The Halder War Diary, 1939-1942" edited by Charles burdick and
Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, presidio Press, 1988, pgs 23-24.

It appears that Hitler was not greatly impressed by the British
efforts to acquire the capability to go to Poland's aid in the event
of a german attack on Poland.

> In fact Shore makes it clear that the source *you* are utilising to
> indicate underlying British policy in the form of Wohlstadt's and
> Dirksen reports, explictly contradicts this:
>
> "Unable to gain an audience with Ribbentrop, Dirksen decided to send
> yet another report summarising his previous cables and stressing his
> conviction that Britain would fight to defend Poland." [page 98]
> Shore claims this report was sent to Weizsacker and Ribbentrop. Note
> that phrase ".. stressing his conviction that Britain would fight to
> defend Poland."
>
> Now, either you didn't read that last sentence or you are seeking to
> selectively distort the actual meaning of the references you quote to
> support your position.
>
> Anybody taking Dirksen's report's of his own and Wohlstadt's activity
> seriously, as you do, should be able to account for the fact that they
> stressed that the British _were_ in fact prepared to fight over Poland
> in accordance with their guarantee. This appears to flatly contradict
> what you believe on the matter, on the basis of what you have posted
> in this thread so far.

Again, Hitler himself saw little reason to be impressed.

> >> > ...In conclusion, I should like to point out that the German-Polish
> >> > problem has found a place in this tendency toward an adjustment with
> >> > Germany, inasmuch as it is believed that in the event of an
> >> > Anglo-German adjustment the solution of the Polish problem will be
> >> > easier, since a calmer atmosphere will facilitate the negotiations,
> >> > and the British interest in Poland will be diminished."
> >>
> >> Wishful thinking in action since on the 14th July Sir Nevile Henderson
> >> discussed with Baron von Weizsäcker, German State Secretary at the Ministry
> >> for Foreign Affairs, a statement by one of the German Under-Secretaries that
> >> "Herr Hitler was convinced that England would never fight over Danzig." Sir
> >> Nevile Henderson repeated the affirmation already made by His Majesty's
> >> Government that, in the event of German aggression, Great Britain would
> >> support Poland in resisting force by force
> >
> >And what did HMG do in the interval to acquire the capability to
> >support Poland in resisting by force? Hitler saw no such actions or
> >preparations. Hence, he discounted the threat.
>
> Hitler's wish-fulfillment isn't the issue at hand. What he was told
> about British intentions and what the British had established as their
> intentions are.

And he was little impressed with British efforts to back those
intentions with forceful military action.

> Ribbentrop was claiming to Ciano that the British
> wouldn't fight over Poland on 11 August, and Hitler similarly on 12
> August. Clearly, Ribbentrop at least knew of Dirksen's report by
> then, which contradicted this. [page 98 again] So much for the value
> of that report to the decision-making process in the Nazi hierarchy.
>
> I personally suspect, as usual, that the Nazis selectively chose to
> believe whatever bits of that report which fit in with Hitler's
> perceived plan and their exisiting prejudices, and discarded the rest.
> That would seem to have some parallel in this thread, at least.
>
> >> No he was a realist,
> >
> >A realist... who retained a touching faith in Hitler's "sincerity"
> >right up until the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. ROTFL!!
>
> Unlike Stalin, who's sense of realism managed to believe with touching
> faith in Hitler's "sincerity" after the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and up
> until the panzers rolled across his borders.

No. Before agreeing to Ribbentrop's visit, Stalin had agent
information, backed by decrypts of German diplomatic cables, that
showed that the Germans intended good relations to last about two
years.

He understood that he was merely buying time and depth. Which was
more than the British were offering him...

He had the news of Hitler signing the Barbarossa Directive within the
week of Hitler signing it.

In April 1941 he decared a "Special Period of Military Threat",
mobilized several Military Districts in the far East, and covertly
transferred forces from these Districts to the west. This initated
the process of "creeping up to war".

In May, he ordered a 99-division strategic reserve formed on the
Dneipr.

> Seems a very modified
> form of 'realism' in regard to the "sincerity" of Hitler's treaty
> undertakings to me. Are you rolling about laughing at _that_
> ridiculous faith in Hitler's word, I wonder?

No, because I know that Stalin <had> no faith in Hitler's word.

> >It shows that as long as the merest, threadbare shred of a hope of a
> >possibility of a chance that maybe, someday, in the course of time,
> >Hitler will join HMG in an anti-Soviet agreement, it is sufficient
> >reason to trust Hitler's sincerity and continue to judge him as better
> >than his actions.
>
> Not what Chamberlain was saying to his sisters on 23rd July, was it?

As long as you bring up his sisters, why was he telling them in
mid-September 1939 that
> >> > And the British offered to end those talks.
> >>
> >> Molotov ended those talks.
> >
> >Once they were clearly going nowhere. After all, nobody on the
> >British delegation he was talking to had any authority to agree to
> >anything.
>
> And he gave them how long to alter their stance before initiating the
> conclusion of a non-aggression pact which carved up Poland and the
> rest of Eastern Europe into spheres of interest?

About four months, since the Soviet alliance offer to Great Britain
and France of 17 April 1939. But since Dirksen's 24 July cable
circulated through the insecure German embassy in Moscow on 11 August
1939, he may have thought he had reason for alacrity.

> I note this kind of
> deal seems to excite your criticism when Chamberlain might be
> interpreted as trying it, but not when Stalin actually _does_ it.

Shore shows that the British were informed how to stop Hitler - Agree
to the Soviet alliance offer. Chamberlain didn't want to.

> To refer to the source you quote once more, Shore makes it clear that
> Stalin was soliciting a deal with Hitler in March 1939.

Is he to leave the field entirely to the British?

Stuart Wilkes

[The Revolution Will Not Be Televised]

On 25 Oct 2003 02:34:14 -0700, (Stuart Wilkes)
wrote:

>> No, they quite accurately report what Wohlthat _reported_ were the
>> content of the discussions he had with Horace Wilson on 21st July
>> 1939. Wilson not only denied that he had met Wohlthat on that date,
>> but denied offering Germany a non-aggression treaty during his
>> acknowledged contacts with Wohlthat at earlier and later meetings.
>
>"I don't recall. It's not in my appointment book.... I suggest that
>it is not necessary to pay much attention to Wohlthat." isn't a
>denial.

Would you like to quote the relevant sections of Shore in relation to
what Wilson said to the 1951 inquiry in their entireity, or would you
prefer to leave that to me? You chose to disbelieve Wilson's denial
and emphasise Wohlthat's version of events. Fine. Just don't claim
contested opinions without supporting evidence as "accurate fact".

>And of course, the paying of little attention to Wohlthat is
>facilitated by his files in the Public Records Office being sealed
>until 2015.

I'd prefer it if your conspiracy theories actually had a little more
in the way of evidence behind them. I'm not confident on your
prognostications on the contents of hitherto secret files on the basis
of your handling of Shore's text in this thread.

>> I suspect that where there are conflicting accounts of such contacts
>> on the Soviet side in regard to non-aggression pacts in the context of
>> German ambitions towards Poland in 1939, your reading will be a little
>> less convinced of the definative nature of the diplomatic feelers in
>> question.
>
>Why? The German accounts of these negotiation show continued Soviet
>suspicion of the Germans,

....as they do of the Allies. Note that, as Shore observed and I have
echoed, Stalin had his choice. The wisdom of that choice is
self-evident on the basis of what happened subsequently.

> >> about PLANS for negotiation not negotiations themselves
>> >> and certainly no offers of recognition as you claimed.
>> >
>> >How does that explain the discussions State Advisor Wohlthat had in
>> >London, on British initiative...
>>
>> Actually, my reading of the source you quote is that Wohlthat asked
>> permission from Goring to pursue economic contacts with the British in
>> June 1939. [page 88]
>
>How does this contradict Dirksen's cable of 24 July?

I observe the wriggling involved in holding you to account for your
own statements based on a reference which I presume you didn't
anticipate anybody would actually check you up on.

I don't see Wohlthat's contacts as a "British initative", as you
claim, and this appears to be an opinion shared by Shore, whose
account gave me the impression Wohlthat was the initiator in regard to
the discussions with Hudson and Wilson. What Kemsley did was far more
closely linked with Chamberlain (and Halifax) and represented a direct
contact with Hitler. Notice how that fared. Which is why, I presume,
you don't refer to it when presenting your interpretation of
Chamberlain's alledged policies in regard to secret contacts with
Germany. I'd be more impressed if you could account for evidence
which appears to contradict your assertions.

>> >> > The persons engaged in drawing up a list of points for negotiation
>> >>
>> >> A confirmation that at this point no negotiations have occurred
>> >
>> >Nonsense. The discussions Wohlthat held with Sir Horace Wilson are
>> >mentioned specifically. Wohlthat and Wilson met on 6 June, 7 July, 19
>> >July, 21 July, and 31 July.
>>
>> Not according to Wilson.
>
>"I have no recollection... My book shows seven appointments and there
>is no mention of Wohlthat... I suggest that it is unnecessary to pay
>much attention to Wohlthat..."

I prefer to have more than one disputed source to base my historical
interpretation upon. Clearly your differ with this approach.

>> Which account you believe (Wilson or Wohlthat] is up to you.
>
>On the one hand, we have the German account. On the other we have "I
>have no recollection..." and the sealing of the relevant British files
>until 2015.

So you have one unsupported personal account and an absence of
evidence which you are now using as evidence. I presume you can
understand why that might make your approach questionable to other
people.

>> Notice how, on page 89, Shore refers to this as "Sir Horace [Wilson]
>> then supposedly presented his interlocutor with a draft formula for
>> Anglo-German cooperation, but this memorandum has never been found."
>> Shore is quite careful to use terms like "allegedly" and "supposedly"
>> in this respect, qualifications which I note you drop when you present
>> these interpretations as unchallenged fact, which, in fact, they are
>> not.
>
>"I have no recollection..." is not a challenge to a statement of fact.

There is no established fact in this case, just Wohlthat's recorded
opinion, which is denied by the other party. In the absence of any
further evidence, your position simply seems to be based upon
indulging emotional prejudice rather than a rational evaluation of the
value of the evidence in question. You prefer to believe Wohlthat
rather than Wilson. Fine. But without any further evidence, this is
a question of belief and conjuecture. Nothing more. You, however,
have characterised it as "accurate fact". It is clearly not, and if
you had any pretensions to objectivity you would acknowledge it as
such.

>> Who knows, given that all you have is one German civil servant's
>> opinion of what was discussed and what this meant?
>
>Confirmed by another German civil servant's (Dirksen's) account of
>discussions held on 3 August 1939 with the very same Sir Horace
>Wilson.
>
>I wonder what his appointment book has to say about that.

Given the propensity of officials from both sides to hear what they
wanted to hear, and how you seem to parallel this, I frankly doubt
that hard evidence is material to your convictions on the issue.

>> given that in fact the basic thrust of the source you quote,
>> at least in regard to secret Anglo-German contacts in June-July 1939
>> contradicts your basic assertion that Hitler was aware of them and
>> they informed his decision in regard to attacking Poland.
>
>I do not assert that Hitler was informed of the Wohlthat-Wilson or the
>Dirksen-Wilson talks.

What you said was, and I quote:

"They had not the slightest indication of a serious British intention
to go to Poland's aid."

They did. Even from Dirksen and Wohlthat. Thus the contradiction
with what you originally claimed. All the other stuff about the
Russian alliance being another test of intention is just that; another
issue. You can certainly argue that the one informed the other, as
Shore does, but in this case you are referring to the credibility of
the British guarantee to Poland, not the military consequences.

>> I think we can take the readiness of Germany to negotiate on the basis
>> of Wilson's efforts from the conclusion they reached (a conclusion, I
>> note in passing, that you don't seek to widely publicise in your
>> references to Shore):
>>
>> "Just two weeks before the outbreak of war, the Anglo-German talks
>> reached their finale. Whether he had proposed them or not,
>> Chamberlain finally received a response to his or Sir Horace's secret
>> overtures. On August 20, Fritz Hesse, the German embassy advisor,
>> wrote to Sir Horace on Ribbentrop's instructions. The German
>> government, Wilson was told, had no interest whatsoever in
>> negotiations with Britain." [page 99]
>
>Indeed. The Germans turned down negotiations with the British on 20
>August 1939.

This was the formal dismissal. It was evident long beforehand that
the Germans had no serious intention of reaching any kind of
agreement. This is the kind of policy which you criticise the British
for when the Russians are the object of the same kind of
procrastination or evasion. I note the strange flexibility of
judgement on a similar policy when different nationalities are
involved.

> And Chamberlain's concept of "...germany and England as
>pillars of European peace and buttresses against Communism" crashed
>into ruins.

And Chamberlain's other policy of confronting German aggression with
force in the last resort came into action. Meanwhile, Stalin's policy
of reaching a non-aggression pact with Hitler and carving up spheres
of influence in eastern Europe went ahead full steam.

>> >> So we have is the German belief that Britain would not in fact declare
>> >> war over Poland but would if forced negotiate, they were wrong
>> >
>> >They had not the slightest indication of a serious British intention
>> >to go to Poland's aid.
>>
>> This is where I am convinced you are using references in bad faith.
>
>I do not reference Shore for this,

Just as well, as he contradicts you. If you are going to use sources
so selectively, you should be open about where your analysis diverges
from theirs. This shouldn't take you being called on it when you
clearly contradict a source you quote to support your position.

but the war diary of
>Colonel-General Franz Halder, Chief of the German General Staff, entry
>for 14 August 1939 describing one of Hitler's monologues:
>
>"Britain, unlike in 1914, will not allow herself to blunder into a war
>drawn out over years. Talk of Britain wanting a long war is
>discounted. ... Britain has not gained in naval power over the last
>year. On land, it will be months before stepped-up conscription can
>take effect in the form of efficient fighting units. Progress in the
>air: bombers, fighters, improved ground organization. Air defense has
>not made any basic imporvements. On the whole, everything is still in
>the developing stage, similar to ours in 1934.

Frankly, I don't find any of Hitler's monologues or table-talk to be
particularly credible as a measure of intimate intention. Would you
like to quote what Shore had to say about Hitler's statement of
intention towards the German generals and others at this point? What
Hitler gave were rationalisations for decisions he made on irrational
basis or made under very different rationales for the one he claimed.
I could sit here and quote literally dozens of examples of Hitler
berating his generals with dubious, contradictory or planly erroneous
statements, especially when it came to understating or dismissing
resistance to his policies.

In this instance all you have is what Hitler said to Halder to justify
his policy. I wouldn't confuse that with actual fact or even a
credible interpretation of fact. Neither would any historian. Nor
any objective layman.

>All these factors argue for the liklihood of Britain and France
>refraining from entering the war, particularly since they are not
>under any compulsion.

You really do sound like a less hysterical version of Ribbentrop here.
In reality the Germans had plenty of warnings. They chose to discount
them.

>> Anybody taking Dirksen's report's of his own and Wohlstadt's activity
>> seriously, as you do, should be able to account for the fact that they
>> stressed that the British _were_ in fact prepared to fight over Poland
>> in accordance with their guarantee. This appears to flatly contradict
>> what you believe on the matter, on the basis of what you have posted
>> in this thread so far.
>
>Again, Hitler himself saw little reason to be impressed.

[as I said before...]

>> Hitler's wish-fulfillment isn't the issue at hand. What he was told
>> about British intentions and what the British had established as their
>> intentions are.
>
>And he was little impressed with British efforts to back those
>intentions with forceful military action.

Hitler, as always, chose to believe in his chosen policy and
discounted inconvenient contradictions to this policy from wherever
they came. You can adhere to this illusion of Hitler as a rationalist
as long as you want, but I'm afraid it's a minority view and likely to
remain one.

Meanwhile, whether Hitler had made a realistic appreciation of British
inability to militarily assist Polish resistance directly is not the
issue. Your assertions about the German administrations
understandings of the British to go to war over Poland are. I
appreciate eliding points like these makes it easier to avoid being
held accountable for specific distortions that you make, but we don't
all play that game.

>> >A realist... who retained a touching faith in Hitler's "sincerity"
>> >right up until the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. ROTFL!!
>>
>> Unlike Stalin, who's sense of realism managed to believe with touching
>> faith in Hitler's "sincerity" after the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and up
>> until the panzers rolled across his borders.
>
>No.

Then you must be in posession of revolutionary new evidence that
reveals that Stalin wasn't suprised or shocked by Barbarossa. I
suggest you publish this fast and overturn the existing historical
consensus of Soviet suprise at the German attack in 1941. If the
steps Stalin took to mobilise reserve forces in depth in early 1941
impress you as evidence of a firm resolve to deal with Hitler, you
must have a similar appreciation of British rearmament after 1936 to
share with us (and specifically the British CHiefs of Staff
recognising Germany as the next major threat to Britain), not to
mention the introduction of peacetime conscription (regardless of
Chamberlain's stated objections to such a policy before he actually
did it). But I image we'll be waiting for a long time to see that. I
won't hold my breath.

> Before agreeing to Ribbentrop's visit, Stalin had agent
>information, backed by decrypts of German diplomatic cables, that
>showed that the Germans intended good relations to last about two
>years.

>He understood that he was merely buying time and depth.

How much time and how much depth were still factors that he got
entirely wrong.

> Which was
>more than the British were offering him...

He got all that the British could offer in the second half of 1941,
and it was insignificant beside the resistance of the Soviet forces
and the mistakes of the Soviet command and government.

>He had the news of Hitler signing the Barbarossa Directive within the
>week of Hitler signing it.

And he clearly discounted it. So much for his perspicacity when it
came to German intentions. He gambled on reaching an accomodation
with Hitler, and failed. He wasn't the first, but it doesn't say much
for his "realism" and perception of Hitlers "sincerity" that he was
the last.

>> Seems a very modified
>> form of 'realism' in regard to the "sincerity" of Hitler's treaty
>> undertakings to me. Are you rolling about laughing at _that_
>> ridiculous faith in Hitler's word, I wonder?
>
>No, because I know that Stalin <had> no faith in Hitler's word.

Yet he still made an agreement with Hitler and was still suprised when
Hitler broke it.

>> >Once they were clearly going nowhere. After all, nobody on the
>> >British delegation he was talking to had any authority to agree to
>> >anything.
>>
>> And he gave them how long to alter their stance before initiating the
>> conclusion of a non-aggression pact which carved up Poland and the
>> rest of Eastern Europe into spheres of interest?
>
>About four months, since the Soviet alliance offer to Great Britain
>and France of 17 April 1939.

But the emisaries you refer to were not challenged by the Russians to
reveal their "authority to agree to anything" until when, 12th August
1939. Please don't seek to move the goalposts once you have
established them.

But since Dirksen's 24 July cable
>circulated through the insecure German embassy in Moscow on 11 August
>1939, he may have thought he had reason for alacrity.

He might. And thus ended up crediting Hitler's word on the basis of
an unsupported communication from a minor German official. He thought
the Nazis were more credible than the British, and paid the price
later.

>> I note this kind of
>> deal seems to excite your criticism when Chamberlain might be
>> interpreted as trying it, but not when Stalin actually _does_ it.
>
>Shore shows that the British were informed how to stop Hitler - Agree
>to the Soviet alliance offer. Chamberlain didn't want to.

His cabinet had other ideas, and in the final analysis he did admit he
was prepared to conclude it one way or the other. Meanwhile Shore
shows a lot of things you were happy to omit from your references to
his analysis.

>> To refer to the source you quote once more, Shore makes it clear that
>> Stalin was soliciting a deal with Hitler in March 1939.
>
>Is he to leave the field entirely to the British?

I give up. I have better things to do than waste time with Trots
bizarrely defending Stalin.

Gavin Bailey

--

"Will Boogie Down For Food".- Sign held by Disco Stu outside the unemployment office.

[Tank Fixer]

In article >,
says...
>
> The book title, by the way, is Flyboys: A True Story of Courage, by
> James Bradley. After initially being put off by the moral equivalence
> (oh sure, the Japanese murdered, cooked, and ate bits of seven
> American fliers off Chichi Jima, but hey! Americans behaved badly at
> the Battle of Wounded Knee!), I've decided it's worth the read.

There were Japanese soldiers at Wounded Knee ?


--
When dealing with propaganda terminology one sometimes always speaks in
variable absolutes. This is not to be mistaken for an unbiased slant.

[Cub Driver]

>> The book title, by the way, is Flyboys: A True Story of Courage, by
>> James Bradley. After initially being put off by the moral equivalence
>> (oh sure, the Japanese murdered, cooked, and ate bits of seven
>> American fliers off Chichi Jima, but hey! Americans behaved badly at
>> the Battle of Wounded Knee!), I've decided it's worth the read.
>
>There were Japanese soldiers at Wounded Knee ?

No, there were American soldiers.

The Japanese treated their enemies badly, but hey! so did the
Americans. (Mind you, I have not yet read the book. The moral
equivalance of Chichi Jima and Wounded Knee was pointed out by a
reviewer.)

You will find this sort of equivalance in most people edcuated after
say 1980. It was famously express by a high-school student who wrote
that the Americans dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima, so the
Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor.

all the best -- Dan Ford
email:

see the Warbird's Forum at www.warbirdforum.com
and the Piper Cub Forum at www.pipercubforum.com

[Autocollimator]

>Subject: Re: Flyboys
>From: Cub Driver
>Date: 10/27/03 3:08 AM Pacific Standard Time
>Message-id:

>The Japanese treated their enemies badly, but hey! so did the
>Americans.

While the Japs were beheading American flyers we were sending German prisoners
to Kansas where they got better food and medical attention than they ever had
in their miserable Nazi lives, Many stayed to marry American woman and are
among us to this day. Your comparison to how the Japs treated prisoners and how
we did is odious and disgusting. I can only attribute it your ignorance of
the history of the period.. Now why don't you take your crappy Piper Cub and
shove it where the sun don't shine..Imbecile.

[Steven P. McNicoll]

"Cub Driver" > wrote in message
...
>
> The Japanese treated their enemies badly, but hey! so did the
> Americans.
>

Different eras. During WWII the Americans treated their enemy captives far
better than the Japanese treated their enemy captives.

[Steven P. McNicoll]

"Autocollimator" > wrote in message
...
>
> Now why don't you take your crappy Piper Cub and
> shove it where the sun don't shine.
>

Some Piper Cubs are nicer than other Piper Cubs, but there are no crappy
Piper Cubs.

[Mike Marron]

>"Steven P. McNicoll" > wrote:
>>"Autocollimator" > wrote in message

>>Now why don't you take your crappy Piper Cub and
>>shove it where the sun don't shine.

>Some Piper Cubs are nicer than other Piper Cubs, but there are no crappy
>Piper Cubs.

We've had some heated arguments in the past, but on this I agree
with you 100,000,001-percent (just like there ain't no such thang as
bad pussy -- just that some pussy is better than other pussy! ;))

signed,
....Still waiting for the hooded coward to take off his "anonomator"
Halloween mask and reveal his real name.

[Jack]

in article , Autocollimator at
wrote on 2003/10/27 8:26:

>> Subject: Re: Flyboys
>> From: Cub Driver
>> Date: 10/27/03 3:08 AM Pacific Standard Time
>> Message-id:
>
>> The Japanese treated their enemies badly, but hey! so did the
>> Americans.

>> You will find this sort of equivalance in most people edcuated after
>> say 1980. It was famously express by a high-school student who wrote
>> that the Americans dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima, so the
>> Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor.

> Your comparison to how the Japs treated prisoners and how
> we did is odious and disgusting. I can only attribute it your ignorance of
> the history of the period.


AC,

Try reading for the author's meaning (perhaps even reading his entire post)
instead of doing an e.rorschack and exposing your quirks to the world at
large.

http://www.deltabravo.net/custody/rorschach.htm



Jack

[Cub Driver]

> Your comparison to how the Japs treated prisoners and how
>we did is odious and disgusting.

Not my comparison. The author's comparison. Can't you read?

>I can only attribute it your ignorance of
>the history of the period.

Actually, I know a great deal about it, since I lived through it.

Plonk!

all the best -- Dan Ford
email:

see the Warbird's Forum at www.warbirdforum.com
and the Piper Cub Forum at www.pipercubforum.com

[Cub Driver]

>Different eras. During WWII the Americans treated their enemy captives far
>better than the Japanese treated their enemy captives.

(Or than the Japanese treated their own soldiers, for that matter!)

all the best -- Dan Ford
email:

see the Warbird's Forum at www.warbirdforum.com
and the Piper Cub Forum at www.pipercubforum.com

[John Keeney]

"Autocollimator" > wrote in message
...
> >Subject: Re: Flyboys
> >From: Cub Driver
> >Date: 10/27/03 3:08 AM Pacific Standard Time
> >Message-id:
>
> >The Japanese treated their enemies badly, but hey! so did the
> >Americans.
>
> While the Japs were beheading American flyers we were sending German
prisoners
> to Kansas where they got better food and medical attention than they ever
had
> in their miserable Nazi lives, Many stayed to marry American woman and are
> among us to this day. Your comparison to how the Japs treated prisoners
and how
> we did is odious and disgusting. I can only attribute it your ignorance
of
> the history of the period.. Now why don't you take your crappy Piper Cub
and
> shove it where the sun don't shine..Imbecile.

Some people are utterly incapable of appreciating context.

[Drazen Kramaric]

On 23 Oct 2003 03:20:56 -0700, (Stuart Wilkes)
wrote:


>> What were the numbers of soldiers involved in the two campaigns that
>> you are comparing. i.e:
>
>Suprisingly equal, Rostyk. I'm suprised you didn't know that.

Post the numbers, then.
>
>> Size of armies in the west and the casualties?
>
>Well, the French Army alone suffered 1.9 million KIA and prisoners in
>the campaign in the West, while the combined
>Franco-Anglo-Belgian-Dutch armies inflicted ~27,000 KIA on the
>Germans.

Your numbers are correct, but do not tell the whole story. France
surrendered because it had no more manpower nor space to continue the
war so all their remaining soldiers went to POW camps. Had you
included only POWs captured prior to cease fire the numbers would be
more correct, but would represent argument against your thesis, that
Red Army represented the most efficient enemy realistically possible.


>In this case, the Germans faced unprepared unalerted, peacetime-strength
>Rifle Divisions (~6000 men) far from their assigned battle positions, which is one of the
>advantages you get when you do a sneak attack.

You are representing this as 3,000,000 German soldiers appeared out of
nowehere next to the Soviet border. The primary person responsible for
Red Army been caught napping is the man you feel was justified in
invading Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Finland under the
pretext of "security in case of German attack".

Why don't you address that fact for a change?


Drax

[Stuart Wilkes]

(Drazen Kramaric) wrote in message >...
> On 23 Oct 2003 03:20:56 -0700, (Stuart Wilkes)
> wrote:
>
>
> >> What were the numbers of soldiers involved in the two campaigns that
> >> you are comparing. i.e:
> >
> >Suprisingly equal, Rostyk. I'm suprised you didn't know that.
>
> Post the numbers, then.
> >
> >> Size of armies in the west and the casualties?
> >
> >Well, the French Army alone suffered 1.9 million KIA and prisoners in
> >the campaign in the West, while the combined
> >Franco-Anglo-Belgian-Dutch armies inflicted ~27,000 KIA on the
> >Germans.
>
> Your numbers are correct, but do not tell the whole story.

Numbers rarely do.

> France surrendered because it had no more manpower nor space to continue
> the war so all their remaining soldiers went to POW camps.

And the Soviet government did not surrender, nor did it fail to employ
its air force, nor did it fly a suprisingly intact air force to North
Africa.

> Had you included only POWs captured prior to cease fire the numbers
> would be more correct,

Why? If the French government left assets unemployed and surrendered
them, why should that count against the Soviets?

> but would represent argument against your thesis, that
> Red Army represented the most efficient enemy realistically possible.

Did I say efficient? Nope. More determined and more effective at
killing German troops? Sure.

> >In this case, the Germans faced unprepared unalerted, peacetime-strength
> >Rifle Divisions (~6000 men) far from their assigned battle positions, which
> >is one of the advantages you get when you do a sneak attack.
>
> You are representing this as 3,000,000 German soldiers appeared out of
> nowehere next to the Soviet border.

Was it a sneak attack, or not Drax?

> The primary person responsible for Red Army been caught napping

He took a calculated risk on being able to delay a German attack until
1942.

> is the man you feel was justified in invading Poland, Estonia, Latvia,
> Lithuania and Finland under the pretext of "security in case of German
> attack".

I do not believe that the attack on Finland was justified.

> Why don't you address that fact for a change?

I have, Drax.

What I don't get is your eternal insistence on either the Germans
being given the opportunity to conquer all of Poland and occupy the
Baltic States.

Stuart Wilkes

[Tank Fixer]

In article >,
says...
>
> >> The book title, by the way, is Flyboys: A True Story of Courage, by
> >> James Bradley. After initially being put off by the moral equivalence
> >> (oh sure, the Japanese murdered, cooked, and ate bits of seven
> >> American fliers off Chichi Jima, but hey! Americans behaved badly at
> >> the Battle of Wounded Knee!), I've decided it's worth the read.
> >
> >There were Japanese soldiers at Wounded Knee ?
>
> No, there were American soldiers.
>
> The Japanese treated their enemies badly, but hey! so did the
> Americans. (Mind you, I have not yet read the book. The moral
> equivalance of Chichi Jima and Wounded Knee was pointed out by a
> reviewer.)
>

Ok, I get the connection now.

> You will find this sort of equivalance in most people edcuated after
> say 1980. It was famously express by a high-school student who wrote
> that the Americans dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima, so the
> Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor.

I get to deal with this as I have two in HS right now. Fortunatly they
learned to read ata young age and have access to my small library plus
knwo how to use the public library...




--
When dealing with propaganda terminology one sometimes always speaks in
variable absolutes. This is not to be mistaken for an unbiased slant.

[Drazen Kramaric]

On 28 Oct 2003 10:15:27 -0800, (Stuart Wilkes)
wrote:


>> France surrendered because it had no more manpower nor space to continue
>> the war so all their remaining soldiers went to POW camps.
>
>And the Soviet government did not surrender

Correct. Unlike French government, it still had the territory,
manpower and industrial resources to continue the fight with. However,
just like French government, Soviet government tried to negotiate a
cease fire. The difference is that Hitler rebuffed Soviet approach,
but accepted the French (contrary to the wishes of some senior German
generals). Had Hitler refused Petain's request for the cease fire,
French government would probably left metropolitan France and settled
in Algeria. It would still leave Germans as masters of France.

>nor did it fail to employ its air force

You will be well advised to check the number of aircraft (+1500)
Germans lost in the Battle for France.

>nor did it fly a suprisingly intact air force to North Africa.

It wasn't intact and was definitely defeated. Luftwaffe also had
hundreds if not thousands of aircraft scattered on the airfields in
Germany on May 8th, 1945. So what? They still lost the war.


>Why? If the French government left assets unemployed and surrendered
>them, why should that count against the Soviets?

It refutes the story you are trying to sell.
>
>> but would represent argument against your thesis, that
>> Red Army represented the most efficient enemy realistically possible.
>
>Did I say efficient? Nope. More determined and more effective at
>killing German troops? Sure.

First, there were much more Germans and their allies deployed on the
front line in 1941 than in 1940. Check the figures. Second, the ratio
of losses was appaling as well as the territory lost. The only reason
Soviet Union did not surrender is that it was big enough and by that I
don't mean on this tiny strip of Polish and Rumanian territory stolen
in 1939 and 1940.


>> You are representing this as 3,000,000 German soldiers appeared out of
>> nowehere next to the Soviet border.
>
>Was it a sneak attack, or not Drax?

Hey, few message ago you were writing about the defensive measures
Stalin adopted and were using that as a proof that he wasn't surprised
and that he expected German attack in 1941. Make up your mind, either
Stalin was wise by making treaty with Hitler and made all the
necessary preparations for the inevitable German attack in 1941 or he
took Hitler by his word and left the country unprepared for the
invasion announced as early as first edition of "Mein Kampf".
>
>> The primary person responsible for Red Army been caught napping
>
>He took a calculated risk on being able to delay a German attack until
>1942.

By pretending that attack was not going to happen? Again, make up your
mind. You wrote how Stalin had a directive for Barbarossa, we all know
British were bombarding Stalin with reports about German preparations,
the concentration of Wehrmach in Poland was impossible to hide, Sorge
was reporting about German attack and yet, Red Army was a victim of a
"sneak attack"? Do you seriously thinking that formal declaration of
war delivered by German ambassador few hours prior to the attack was
going to help?

>> is the man you feel was justified in invading Poland, Estonia, Latvia,
>> Lithuania and Finland under the pretext of "security in case of German
>> attack".
>
>I do not believe that the attack on Finland was justified.

Was annexation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania justified when Soviet
Union already had military bases in the area?


>What I don't get is your eternal insistence on either the Germans
>being given the opportunity to conquer all of Poland and occupy the
>Baltic States.

No, my eternal insistence is on Stalin declaring war on Germany and
joining the existing anti-German coalition in field. This was an
obvious proof of Stalin taking Hitler's word over western declaration
of war.


Drax

[Stuart Wilkes]

(Drazen Kramaric) wrote in message >...
> On 28 Oct 2003 10:15:27 -0800, (Stuart Wilkes)
> wrote:
>
>
> >> France surrendered because it had no more manpower nor space to continue
> >> the war so all their remaining soldiers went to POW camps.
> >
> >And the Soviet government did not surrender
>
> Correct. Unlike French government, it still had the territory,
> manpower and industrial resources to continue the fight with. However,
> just like French government, Soviet government tried to negotiate a
> cease fire.

The Soviets discussed it, with the Bulgarian Ambassador in Moscow.
When and to whom was the offer actually made?

> The difference is that Hitler rebuffed Soviet approach,
> but accepted the French (contrary to the wishes of some senior German
> generals). Had Hitler refused Petain's request for the cease fire,
> French government would probably left metropolitan France and settled
> in Algeria. It would still leave Germans as masters of France.
>
> >nor did it fail to employ its air force
>
> You will be well advised to check the number of aircraft (+1500)
> Germans lost in the Battle for France.

"The French fighter force had available to it during the battle more
than 2900 modern aircraft. At no time did it have more than one-fifth
of these deployed against the Germans. The operational rate of the
fighter force was 0.9 sorties per aircraft per day at the height of
the battle. (German fighter units flew up to four sorties per aircraft
per day.) Yet in spite of committing only a minor portion of its
resources at a low usage rate, the fighter force accounted for between
600 and 1000 of the 1439 German aircraft destroyed during the battle."

http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1985/sep-oct/kirkland.html

One wonders at the possible result if they had fought with more
committment.

> >nor did it fly a suprisingly intact air force to North Africa.
>
> It wasn't intact and was definitely defeated.

Really.

"By 15 June, the French and German air forces were at approximate
parity with about 2400 aircraft each, but the French were operating
from their own turf, and they had the support of the RAF. Mastery of
the air was there for the seizing, but on 17 June the French air staff
began to order its units to fly to North Africa. The justification put
forth by the air staff was that the army was destroyed and could not
protect the airfields.

An examination of which units were ordered to North Africa and which
were left behind reveals much about the motivation behind the
evacuation. The units flown to North Africa were those regular air
force squadrons with the most modern and effective aircraft--all of
the squadrons equipped with the Curtiss 75A (10), Dewoitine 520 (10),
Amiot 354 (8), Bloch 174 (18), Farman 222 (4), Douglas DB-7 (8), and
Martin 167 (10), plus most of those with the Lioré et Olivier 451 (12
of 18). Those left behind included all of the air force reserve
units--47 observation squadrons and 12 fighter squadrons--and all of
the units closely connected with the army (the observation squadrons,
the 10 assault bomber squadrons, and 7 night fighter squadrons
converted to the ground assault role)."

Same link as above

> Luftwaffe also had
> hundreds if not thousands of aircraft scattered on the airfields in
> Germany on May 8th, 1945. So what? They still lost the war.

A difference being that the French could import AvGas?

> >Why? If the French government left assets unemployed and surrendered
> >them, why should that count against the Soviets?
>
> It refutes the story you are trying to sell.

Nonsense.

Did the French leave large assets unemployed, only to surreneder them?

> >> but would represent argument against your thesis, that
> >> Red Army represented the most efficient enemy realistically possible.
> >
> >Did I say efficient? Nope. More determined and more effective at
> >killing German troops? Sure.
>
> First, there were much more Germans and their allies deployed on the
> front line in 1941 than in 1940.

I don't doubt it.

> Check the figures. Second, the ratio
> of losses was appaling as well as the territory lost.

I never said that the Soviets didn't take appalling losses in 1941. I
said that they fought back better than the West did in the Battle of
France.

> The only reason
> Soviet Union did not surrender is that it was big enough and by that I
> don't mean on this tiny strip of Polish and Rumanian territory stolen
> in 1939 and 1940.

And I never said that that 150km was decisive. I've said that Soviet
margins were thin in 1941, and that extra territory did impact the
1941 campaign in a way that reduced German success.

I see this as a Good Thing.

> >> You are representing this as 3,000,000 German soldiers appeared out of
> >> nowehere next to the Soviet border.
> >
> >Was it a sneak attack, or not Drax?
>
> Hey, few message ago you were writing about the defensive measures
> Stalin adopted and were using that as a proof that he wasn't surprised
> and that he expected German attack in 1941.

I wrote nothing so absurd.

> Make up your mind, either
> Stalin was wise by making treaty with Hitler and made all the
> necessary preparations for the inevitable German attack in 1941 or he
> took Hitler by his word and left the country unprepared for the
> invasion announced as early as first edition of "Mein Kampf".

My mind is perfectly clear on it.

Stalin believed there was a risk of German attack in 1941, that risk
growing to a near-certainty in 1942. While he believed Germany would
not attack while at war with Great Britain, he mobilized reserves in
case he was wrong.

> >> The primary person responsible for Red Army been caught napping
> >
> >He took a calculated risk on being able to delay a German attack until
> >1942.
>
> By pretending that attack was not going to happen? Again, make up your
> mind.

I'm quite clear on it.

> You wrote how Stalin had a directive for Barbarossa,

For preparations, yes.

> we all know
> British were bombarding Stalin with reports about German preparations,

Including during a time that British intelligence believed that the
German preparations for Barbarossa were really intended to pressure
the Soviets into a closer relationship with Germany.

> the concentration of Wehrmach in Poland was impossible to hide,

Indeed. The GRU tracked the German buildup closely. What was unclear
was the political intention behind it.

> >> is the man you feel was justified in invading Poland, Estonia, Latvia,
> >> Lithuania and Finland under the pretext of "security in case of German
> >> attack".
> >
> >I do not believe that the attack on Finland was justified.
>
> Was annexation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania justified when Soviet
> Union already had military bases in the area?

Would 70k troops in a few bases have been enough in the event of a
German attack?

> >What I don't get is your eternal insistence on either the Germans
> >being given the opportunity to conquer all of Poland and occupy the
> >Baltic States.
>
> No, my eternal insistence is on Stalin declaring war on Germany and
> joining the existing anti-German coalition in field.

Where "in the field" were the Western elements of the anti-German
coalition fighting the German Army in September 1939? Why should the
Soviets shoulder the committment of hostilities on two fronts with no
guarantee of the Western Allies hitting Germany with any vigor?

Stuart Wilkes

[Stuart Wilkes' mom]

I always said Stuey would never amount to anything.


"Drazen Kramaric" > wrote in message
...
> On 23 Oct 2003 03:20:56 -0700, (Stuart Wilkes)
> wrote:
>
>
> >> What were the numbers of soldiers involved in the two campaigns that
> >> you are comparing. i.e:
> >
> >Suprisingly equal, Rostyk. I'm suprised you didn't know that.
>
> Post the numbers, then.
> >
> >> Size of armies in the west and the casualties?
> >
> >Well, the French Army alone suffered 1.9 million KIA and prisoners in
> >the campaign in the West, while the combined
> >Franco-Anglo-Belgian-Dutch armies inflicted ~27,000 KIA on the
> >Germans.
>
> Your numbers are correct, but do not tell the whole story. France
> surrendered because it had no more manpower nor space to continue the
> war so all their remaining soldiers went to POW camps. Had you
> included only POWs captured prior to cease fire the numbers would be
> more correct, but would represent argument against your thesis, that
> Red Army represented the most efficient enemy realistically possible.
>
>
> >In this case, the Germans faced unprepared unalerted, peacetime-strength
> >Rifle Divisions (~6000 men) far from their assigned battle positions,
which is one of the
> >advantages you get when you do a sneak attack.
>
> You are representing this as 3,000,000 German soldiers appeared out of
> nowehere next to the Soviet border. The primary person responsible for
> Red Army been caught napping is the man you feel was justified in
> invading Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Finland under the
> pretext of "security in case of German attack".
>
> Why don't you address that fact for a change?
>
>
> Drax

[Stuart Wilkes]

"Stuart Wilkes' mom" > wrote in message >...
> I always said Stuey would never amount to anything.

Add another one to the list of Mark's spiteful lies. Really, Mark,
you should know by now that there's no real satisfaction in that.

Stuart Wilkes

> "Drazen Kramaric" > wrote in message
> ...
> > On 23 Oct 2003 03:20:56 -0700, (Stuart Wilkes)
> > wrote:
> >
> >
> > >> What were the numbers of soldiers involved in the two campaigns that
> > >> you are comparing. i.e:
> > >
> > >Suprisingly equal, Rostyk. I'm suprised you didn't know that.
> >
> > Post the numbers, then.
> > >
> > >> Size of armies in the west and the casualties?
> > >
> > >Well, the French Army alone suffered 1.9 million KIA and prisoners in
> > >the campaign in the West, while the combined
> > >Franco-Anglo-Belgian-Dutch armies inflicted ~27,000 KIA on the
> > >Germans.
> >
> > Your numbers are correct, but do not tell the whole story. France
> > surrendered because it had no more manpower nor space to continue the
> > war so all their remaining soldiers went to POW camps. Had you
> > included only POWs captured prior to cease fire the numbers would be
> > more correct, but would represent argument against your thesis, that
> > Red Army represented the most efficient enemy realistically possible.
> >
> >
> > >In this case, the Germans faced unprepared unalerted, peacetime-strength
> > >Rifle Divisions (~6000 men) far from their assigned battle positions,
> which is one of the
> > >advantages you get when you do a sneak attack.
> >
> > You are representing this as 3,000,000 German soldiers appeared out of
> > nowehere next to the Soviet border. The primary person responsible for
> > Red Army been caught napping is the man you feel was justified in
> > invading Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Finland under the
> > pretext of "security in case of German attack".
> >
> > Why don't you address that fact for a change?
> >
> >
> > Drax

[Stuart Wilkes' mom]

"Stuart Wilkes" > wrote in message
om...
> "Stuart Wilkes' mom" > wrote in message
>...
> > I always said Stuey would never amount to anything.
>
> Add another one to the list of Mark's spiteful lies. Really, Mark,
> you should know by now that there's no real satisfaction in that.
>
> Stuart Wilkes
>

I'm just proving my point...that you can't talk about anything unless it's
about WWII.

You are the world's most boring person.

> > "Drazen Kramaric" > wrote in
message
> > ...
> > > On 23 Oct 2003 03:20:56 -0700, (Stuart Wilkes)
> > > wrote:
> > >
> > >
> > > >> What were the numbers of soldiers involved in the two campaigns
that
> > > >> you are comparing. i.e:
> > > >
> > > >Suprisingly equal, Rostyk. I'm suprised you didn't know that.
> > >
> > > Post the numbers, then.
> > > >
> > > >> Size of armies in the west and the casualties?
> > > >
> > > >Well, the French Army alone suffered 1.9 million KIA and prisoners in
> > > >the campaign in the West, while the combined
> > > >Franco-Anglo-Belgian-Dutch armies inflicted ~27,000 KIA on the
> > > >Germans.
> > >
> > > Your numbers are correct, but do not tell the whole story. France
> > > surrendered because it had no more manpower nor space to continue the
> > > war so all their remaining soldiers went to POW camps. Had you
> > > included only POWs captured prior to cease fire the numbers would be
> > > more correct, but would represent argument against your thesis, that
> > > Red Army represented the most efficient enemy realistically possible.
> > >
> > >
> > > >In this case, the Germans faced unprepared unalerted,
peacetime-strength
> > > >Rifle Divisions (~6000 men) far from their assigned battle positions,
> > which is one of the
> > > >advantages you get when you do a sneak attack.
> > >
> > > You are representing this as 3,000,000 German soldiers appeared out of
> > > nowehere next to the Soviet border. The primary person responsible for
> > > Red Army been caught napping is the man you feel was justified in
> > > invading Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Finland under the
> > > pretext of "security in case of German attack".
> > >
> > > Why don't you address that fact for a change?
> > >
> > >
> > > Drax

[Stuart Wilkes]

"Stuart Wilkes' mom" > wrote in message >...
> "Stuart Wilkes" > wrote in message
> om...
> > "Stuart Wilkes' mom" > wrote in message
> >...
> > > I always said Stuey would never amount to anything.
> >
> > Add another one to the list of Mark's spiteful lies. Really, Mark,
> > you should know by now that there's no real satisfaction in that.
> >
> > Stuart Wilkes
> >
>
> I'm just proving my point...that you can't talk about anything unless it's
> about WWII.

The reiteration of your spiteful lie is still a spiteful lie.

> You are the world's most boring person.

Mark is so hurt by me exposing his poorly-researched howlers and
repeated, reiterated spiteful lies, that he's reduced to munging silly
e-mail addresses.

But since he's helpless in matters of logic and evidence, he does what
he can.

Stuart Wilkes


> > > "Drazen Kramaric" > wrote in
> message
> > > ...
> > > > On 23 Oct 2003 03:20:56 -0700, (Stuart Wilkes)
> > > > wrote:
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > >> What were the numbers of soldiers involved in the two campaigns
> that
> > > > >> you are comparing. i.e:
> > > > >
> > > > >Suprisingly equal, Rostyk. I'm suprised you didn't know that.
> > > >
> > > > Post the numbers, then.
> > > > >
> > > > >> Size of armies in the west and the casualties?
> > > > >
> > > > >Well, the French Army alone suffered 1.9 million KIA and prisoners in
> > > > >the campaign in the West, while the combined
> > > > >Franco-Anglo-Belgian-Dutch armies inflicted ~27,000 KIA on the
> > > > >Germans.
> > > >
> > > > Your numbers are correct, but do not tell the whole story. France
> > > > surrendered because it had no more manpower nor space to continue the
> > > > war so all their remaining soldiers went to POW camps. Had you
> > > > included only POWs captured prior to cease fire the numbers would be
> > > > more correct, but would represent argument against your thesis, that
> > > > Red Army represented the most efficient enemy realistically possible.
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > >In this case, the Germans faced unprepared unalerted,
> peacetime-strength
> > > > >Rifle Divisions (~6000 men) far from their assigned battle positions,
> which is one of the
> > > > >advantages you get when you do a sneak attack.
> > > >
> > > > You are representing this as 3,000,000 German soldiers appeared out of
> > > > nowehere next to the Soviet border. The primary person responsible for
> > > > Red Army been caught napping is the man you feel was justified in
> > > > invading Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Finland under the
> > > > pretext of "security in case of German attack".
> > > >
> > > > Why don't you address that fact for a change?
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > Drax

[ruskgb]

(The Black Monk) wrote in message >...
> kirill > wrote in message >...
> > The Black Monk wrote:
> > >


> I dispute the latter statements. OF course talk of the famine was
> greatest in areas not under soviet control, where news was suppressed.
> My grandfather and a few others - a small minority of people from
> "velyka ukrainia" within the diaspora lived through the Famine, had
> family that died during it. While obviously the post-Stalin USSR
> could not be compared to Nazi Germany (though it was still worse than,
> for example, Franco's Spain), Stalinism, and Pol Pot's communism were
> not much different.
>
> respectfully,
>


You forgot to add one important detail that your grandpa is cretin.
But if he is cretin his tales are good only for residents of
cretin-houses. Don't forget to remind your grandpa the right address
where he can be understood the best.

[Drazen Kramaric]

On 29 Oct 2003 10:39:24 -0800, (Stuart Wilkes)
wrote:


>> Correct. Unlike French government, it still had the territory,
>> manpower and industrial resources to continue the fight with. However,
>> just like French government, Soviet government tried to negotiate a
>> cease fire.
>
>The Soviets discussed it, with the Bulgarian Ambassador in Moscow.
>When and to whom was the offer actually made?

Since Bulgarian ambassador persuaded Soviet government not to pursue
this for a moment, nothing emerged from this initiative. Nevertheless,
Soviet government contemplated the similar move Petain's did.


>> You will be well advised to check the number of aircraft (+1500)
>> Germans lost in the Battle for France.
>
>"The French fighter force had available to it during the battle more
>than 2900 modern aircraft.

Actually, French air force possessed less than 1,000 modern combat
aircraft according to "The Oxford Companion to the Second World War".


>One wonders at the possible result if they had fought with more
>committment.

They fought with as much commitment as their organisation and
equipment allowed. Most of French air units were under double chain of
command, both from army and air force commanders.


>"By 15 June, the French and German air forces were at approximate
>parity with about 2400 aircraft each, but the French were operating
>from their own turf, and they had the support of the RAF. Mastery of
>the air was there for the seizing, but on 17 June the French air staff
>began to order its units to fly to North Africa. The justification put
>forth by the air staff was that the army was destroyed and could not
>protect the airfields.

By June 15th, Paris was captured by Germans and the organised
resistance from army collapsed. Most of serviceable French aircraft
already had to abandon their original airfields due to German advance
in May and had little time to reorganise for the second phase of
German attack ("Fall Rot"). The numbers you have are misleading since
most of these aircraft lacked equipment (tyres, propellers, radios)
and pilots to fly them. The statement that "mastery of
the air was there for the seizing" is pure nonsense.
>
>An examination of which units were ordered to North Africa and which
>were left behind reveals much about the motivation behind the
>evacuation. The units flown to North Africa were those regular air
>force squadrons with the most modern and effective aircraft--all of
>the squadrons equipped with the Curtiss 75A (10), Dewoitine 520 (10),
>Amiot 354 (8), Bloch 174 (18), Farman 222 (4), Douglas DB-7 (8), and
>Martin 167 (10), plus most of those with the Lioré et Olivier 451 (12
>of 18). Those left behind included all of the air force reserve
>units--47 observation squadrons and 12 fighter squadrons--and all of
>the units closely connected with the army (the observation squadrons,
>the 10 assault bomber squadrons, and 7 night fighter squadrons
>converted to the ground assault role)."

Since the campaign for France was definitely lost by June 17th, there
was every sense to save the remainder of air force to serve the
interests of France, whether to continue the war on the Allied side
(like Polish air force whose pilots also escaped from Poland) or to
serve as bargaining point in negotiations (like French navy did).
>
>Same link as above

The link does not serve as any reliable source of information about
the Battle for France. I rather read books.

>A difference being that the French could import AvGas?

They could not since Germans were about to overrun the ports within a
fortnight.



>Did the French leave large assets unemployed, only to surreneder them?

They did not. They fought for as long as they could, then they asked
for truce.


>I never said that the Soviets didn't take appalling losses in 1941. I
>said that they fought back better than the West did in the Battle of
>France.

Your only argument is that total number of Germans killed in USSR from
June 22nd to August 4th was larger than the number of Germans killed
from May 10th to June 22nd. Let's talk the total number of forces
engaged, ratio of losses sustained during the fighting and the ammount
of territory lost.


>And I never said that that 150km was decisive. I've said that Soviet
>margins were thin in 1941, and that extra territory did impact the
>1941 campaign in a way that reduced German success.

I'd say that these 150 kilometres were by the order of magnitude less
important than Stalin's incompetance in defensive preparations.
>
>I see this as a Good Thing.

Only if you take Stalin's policy as a given.


>> Hey, few message ago you were writing about the defensive measures
>> Stalin adopted and were using that as a proof that he wasn't surprised
>> and that he expected German attack in 1941.
>
>I wrote nothing so absurd.

OK, if you say so. I am not going to dig the Google for you. So, do
you maintain that Stalin was surprised by German attack?


>Stalin believed there was a risk of German attack in 1941, that risk
>growing to a near-certainty in 1942. While he believed Germany would
>not attack while at war with Great Britain, he mobilized reserves in
>case he was wrong.

In the light of what you wrote above, do you think that Stalin
believed Britain was going to be defeated by 1942 in order to allow
"near certain" attack on Soviet Union?


>> You wrote how Stalin had a directive for Barbarossa,
>
>For preparations, yes.

So, he "knew" preparations have started.

>> we all know British were bombarding Stalin with reports about German preparations,
>
>Including during a time that British intelligence believed that the
>German preparations for Barbarossa were really intended to pressure
>the Soviets into a closer relationship with Germany.

Even if true, this is irrelevant. Britain was trying to warn Stalin
about the impeding German attack. So we have warnings by Britain and
copy of Barbarossa directive in Stalin's hands.
>
>> the concentration of Wehrmach in Poland was impossible to hide,
>
>Indeed. The GRU tracked the German buildup closely. What was unclear
>was the political intention behind it.

Excuse me? "Mein Kampf", Barbarossa directive, British and Soviet
agents' warnings and finally the military intelligence data confirming
German build up on the Soviet borders? What else did Stalin need? A
written declaration of war in triplicate?

So, do you think Stalin had more reason to believe Hitler's word and
be "surprised" by attack than Chamberlain's declaration of war against
Germany or Churchill's warnings?


>> Was annexation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania justified when Soviet
>> Union already had military bases in the area?
>
>Would 70k troops in a few bases have been enough in the event of a
>German attack?

You can always pressure the respective governments to allow more
troops into their countries to match the German build-up. No need to
annex the countries and murder tens of thousands of citizens because
you _might_ be invaded.


>Where "in the field" were the Western elements of the anti-German
>coalition fighting the German Army in September 1939?

On French border. I can list you the armies involved of you like. It
still betters the Soviet elements fighting the German Army in
September 1939.

>Why should the Soviets shoulder the committment of hostilities on two fronts with no
>guarantee of the Western Allies hitting Germany with any vigor?

Because it is better to fight Germans in Poland alongside Polish army
than wait for Germany to deliver concentrated attack and then fight at
the gates of Leningrad, Moscow and Rostove. That's why.


Drax

[Stuart Wilkes]

(Drazen Kramaric) wrote in message >...
> On 29 Oct 2003 10:39:24 -0800, (Stuart Wilkes)
> wrote:
>
>
> >> Correct. Unlike French government, it still had the territory,
> >> manpower and industrial resources to continue the fight with. However,
> >> just like French government, Soviet government tried to negotiate a
> >> cease fire.
> >
> >The Soviets discussed it, with the Bulgarian Ambassador in Moscow.
> >When and to whom was the offer actually made?
>
> Since Bulgarian ambassador persuaded Soviet government not to pursue
> this for a moment, nothing emerged from this initiative. Nevertheless,
> Soviet government contemplated the similar move Petain's did.

Then they really didn't "try to negotiate a cease fire", did they
Drax?

No they didn't.

> >> You will be well advised to check the number of aircraft (+1500)
> >> Germans lost in the Battle for France.
> >
> >"The French fighter force had available to it during the battle more
> >than 2900 modern aircraft.
>
> Actually, French air force possessed less than 1,000 modern combat
> aircraft according to "The Oxford Companion to the Second World War".

And my source, a paper from the USAF School of Advanced Airpower
Studies, disagrees with your source.

> >One wonders at the possible result if they had fought with more
> >committment.
>
> They fought with as much commitment as their organisation and
> equipment allowed.

Committing less than a fifth of the available air force at any given
time, and that not exceeding one sortie a day.

<snip>

> >Same link as above
>
> The link does not serve as any reliable source of information about
> the Battle for France. I rather read books.

It's the USAF School of Advanced Airpower Studies, at Maxwell Air
Force Base. I think they know a thing or six about air power.

<snip>

> >I never said that the Soviets didn't take appalling losses in 1941. I
> >said that they fought back better than the West did in the Battle of
> >France.
>
> Your only argument is that total number of Germans killed in USSR from
> June 22nd to August 4th was larger than the number of Germans killed
> from May 10th to June 22nd. Let's talk the total number of forces
> engaged, ratio of losses sustained during the fighting and the ammount
> of territory lost.

Go ahead Drax, why don't you? If you've got a point to make, then do
it.

> >And I never said that that 150km was decisive. I've said that Soviet
> >margins were thin in 1941, and that extra territory did impact the
> >1941 campaign in a way that reduced German success.
>
> I'd say that these 150 kilometres were by the order of magnitude less
> important than Stalin's incompetance in defensive preparations.

What has one thing to do with the other?

Will not having the 150km magically make everything else better? And
who did defended against a German attack better at the time?

> >I see this as a Good Thing.
>
> Only if you take Stalin's policy as a given.

Nothing about not having the 150km necessarily makes anything else
better.

> >> Hey, few message ago you were writing about the defensive measures
> >> Stalin adopted and were using that as a proof that he wasn't surprised
> >> and that he expected German attack in 1941.
> >
> >I wrote nothing so absurd.
>
> OK, if you say so. I am not going to dig the Google for you. So, do
> you maintain that Stalin was surprised by German attack?

He was indeed suprised that Germany would attack prior to making peace
with Great Britain.

> >Stalin believed there was a risk of German attack in 1941, that risk
> >growing to a near-certainty in 1942. While he believed Germany would
> >not attack while at war with Great Britain, he mobilized reserves in
> >case he was wrong.
>
> In the light of what you wrote above, do you think that Stalin
> believed Britain was going to be defeated by 1942 in order to allow
> "near certain" attack on Soviet Union?

He seemed to have believed what His Majesty's Ambassador, Sir Stafford
Cripps, was telling him, that an Anglo-German peace was a possibility
not to be excluded.

> >> You wrote how Stalin had a directive for Barbarossa,
> >
> >For preparations, yes.
>
> So, he "knew" preparations have started.

Absolutely.

> >> we all know British were bombarding Stalin with reports about German
> >> preparations,
> >
> >Including during a time that British intelligence believed that the
> >German preparations for Barbarossa were really intended to pressure
> >the Soviets into a closer relationship with Germany.
>
> Even if true, this is irrelevant. Britain was trying to warn Stalin
> about the impeding German attack.

No Britain wasn't. At the time of the warning, what the British
feared was closer German-Soviet relations. At the time it was given,
the warning was intended to disrupt the German-Soviet discussions the
British feared were going on.

> So we have warnings by Britain and
> copy of Barbarossa directive in Stalin's hands.
> >
> >> the concentration of Wehrmach in Poland was impossible to hide,
> >
> >Indeed. The GRU tracked the German buildup closely. What was unclear
> >was the political intention behind it.
>
> Excuse me? "Mein Kampf", Barbarossa directive, British and Soviet
> agents' warnings and finally the military intelligence data confirming
> German build up on the Soviet borders? What else did Stalin need?
>
> A written declaration of war in triplicate?

Information concerning the specifics of Hitler's decisions. The date
specified in the Barbarossa Directive had come and gone. A couple
other possible start dates the GRU and NKVD had ascertained had also
come and gone. Compared to these earlier dates, what reason is there
to believe, on say 20 June, that there's something special about 22
June 1941?

> So, do you think Stalin had more reason to believe Hitler's word

You've not shown that he believed Hitler's word.

> >> Was annexation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania justified when Soviet
> >> Union already had military bases in the area?
> >
> >Would 70k troops in a few bases have been enough in the event of a
> >German attack?
>
> You can always pressure the respective governments to allow more
> troops into their countries to match the German build-up.

And are they going to agree to let you set up a fortified line where
you think you need to? Will they let you dig their country up to that
degree? The degree of pressure that would be required for that
amounts more or less to annexation.

> No need to
> annex the countries and murder tens of thousands of citizens because
> you _might_ be invaded.
>
> >Where "in the field" were the Western elements of the anti-German
> >coalition fighting the German Army in September 1939?
>
> On French border. I can list you the armies involved of you like.

If you would please. And tell us how many casualties they inflicted
on the German Armed Forces in September 1939.

> It still betters the Soviet elements fighting the German Army in
> September 1939.

Never said it wasn't.

> >Why should the Soviets shoulder the committment of hostilities on two
> >fronts with no guarantee of the Western Allies hitting Germany with
> > any vigor?
>
> Because it is better to fight Germans in Poland alongside Polish army

The Polish Army itself didn't think so. The Polish Army itself didn't
want anything of the sort.

> than wait for Germany to deliver concentrated attack and then fight at
> the gates of Leningrad, Moscow and Rostove. That's why.

Except that in September 1939 there's not any reason for anyone to
believe that France will go belly-up in six weeks in May-June 1940.

Stuart Wilkes

[Nicholas Smid]

"Stuart Wilkes' mom" > wrote in message
t...
> I always said Stuey would never amount to anything.
>
>
> "Drazen Kramaric" > wrote in
message
> ...
> > On 23 Oct 2003 03:20:56 -0700, (Stuart Wilkes)
> > wrote:
> >
> >
> > >> What were the numbers of soldiers involved in the two campaigns that
> > >> you are comparing. i.e:
> > >
> > >Suprisingly equal, Rostyk. I'm suprised you didn't know that.
> >
> > Post the numbers, then.
> > >
Rawest numbers for jan 1939
Germany 1,500,000 troops
Holland 60,000
Belgium 80,000
France 700,000
Britain 154,000
total 994,000

in divisions the Germans had 136 against 136
To keep some navy in this well the German navy at the time might be able to
beat Hollands but it was totaly out classed by both major powers
In aircaft it was about 4500 against about 5900, though the Germans did have
a lower proportion of obsaleat types.

> > >> Size of armies in the west and the casualties?
> > >
> > >Well, the French Army alone suffered 1.9 million KIA and prisoners in
> > >the campaign in the West, while the combined
> > >Franco-Anglo-Belgian-Dutch armies inflicted ~27,000 KIA on the
> > >Germans.
> >
> > Your numbers are correct, but do not tell the whole story. France
> > surrendered because it had no more manpower nor space to continue the
> > war so all their remaining soldiers went to POW camps. Had you
> > included only POWs captured prior to cease fire the numbers would be

The Vichy government maintained a large army untill the end of 42, at which
point alot of it went over to the allies. Also alot of units, especully
reserve units, disbanded themselves late in the campain and went home where
they were left as civies.

> > more correct, but would represent argument against your thesis, that
> > Red Army represented the most efficient enemy realistically possible.
> >
> >
> > >In this case, the Germans faced unprepared unalerted,
peacetime-strength
> > >Rifle Divisions (~6000 men) far from their assigned battle positions,
> which is one of the
> > >advantages you get when you do a sneak attack.
> >
Except the only person the attack was a surprise to was the boss, due to
willful self deseption and a willingness to shoot anyone who dared to tell
him the truth, it dose speck volumes for the courage of many in the Red army
that they went on trying however. The trouble was that a large chunk of the
Red army was in its battle possitions, the possitions were just insainly
chosin. being in the middle of a major re equipment cycle and doctran change
didn't help much ether.

> > You are representing this as 3,000,000 German soldiers appeared out of
> > nowehere next to the Soviet border. The primary person responsible for
> > Red Army been caught napping is the man you feel was justified in
> > invading Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Finland under the
> > pretext of "security in case of German attack".
> >
> > Why don't you address that fact for a change?
> >
Moving the boarder west probably saved Russia in 41, if preperations had
been made with any degree of compatence they should have done far better.
The failiers rest 110% with the guy at the top and his cronies, though
atleast he had the ability once the war started to learn from his errors if
not as fast as might be desired. Atleast he was smart enough to recognise
talent and from the middle of 42 mostly listen to people who knew what they
were talking about.
> >
> > Drax
>
>

[ZZBunker]

"Nicholas Smid" > wrote in message >...
> "Stuart Wilkes' mom" > wrote in message
> t...
> > I always said Stuey would never amount to anything.
> >
> >
> > "Drazen Kramaric" > wrote in
> message
> > ...
> > > On 23 Oct 2003 03:20:56 -0700, (Stuart Wilkes)
> > > wrote:
> > >
> > >
> > > >> What were the numbers of soldiers involved in the two campaigns that
> > > >> you are comparing. i.e:
> > > >
> > > >Suprisingly equal, Rostyk. I'm suprised you didn't know that.
> > >
> > > Post the numbers, then.
> > > >
> Rawest numbers for jan 1939
> Germany 1,500,000 troops
> Holland 60,000
> Belgium 80,000
> France 700,000
> Britain 154,000
> total 994,000
>
> in divisions the Germans had 136 against 136
> To keep some navy in this well the German navy at the time might be able to
> beat Hollands but it was totaly out classed by both major powers
> In aircaft it was about 4500 against about 5900, though the Germans did have
> a lower proportion of obsaleat types.

The Germans didn't need much of a Navy in WWII,
since they were attacking North Africa, the
Middle East, France, and Russia, not the US.

And especially since they were fighting
with tanks, rockets, and missles,
and the rest of Europe was fighting with horses and cannons.

And since it was the invasions of
Sicily, Normany, and Norway that saved
Russia's ass from certain anniolation, you're
missing several other armies in
the analysis.








>
> > > >> Size of armies in the west and the casualties?
> > > >
> > > >Well, the French Army alone suffered 1.9 million KIA and prisoners in
> > > >the campaign in the West, while the combined
> > > >Franco-Anglo-Belgian-Dutch armies inflicted ~27,000 KIA on the
> > > >Germans.
> > >
> > > Your numbers are correct, but do not tell the whole story. France
> > > surrendered because it had no more manpower nor space to continue the
> > > war so all their remaining soldiers went to POW camps. Had you
> > > included only POWs captured prior to cease fire the numbers would be
>
> The Vichy government maintained a large army untill the end of 42, at which
> point alot of it went over to the allies. Also alot of units, especully
> reserve units, disbanded themselves late in the campain and went home where
> they were left as civies.
>
> > > more correct, but would represent argument against your thesis, that
> > > Red Army represented the most efficient enemy realistically possible.
> > >
> > >
> > > >In this case, the Germans faced unprepared unalerted,
> peacetime-strength
> > > >Rifle Divisions (~6000 men) far from their assigned battle positions,
> which is one of the
> > > >advantages you get when you do a sneak attack.
> > >
> Except the only person the attack was a surprise to was the boss, due to
> willful self deseption and a willingness to shoot anyone who dared to tell
> him the truth, it dose speck volumes for the courage of many in the Red army
> that they went on trying however. The trouble was that a large chunk of the
> Red army was in its battle possitions, the possitions were just insainly
> chosin. being in the middle of a major re equipment cycle and doctran change
> didn't help much ether.
>
> > > You are representing this as 3,000,000 German soldiers appeared out of
> > > nowehere next to the Soviet border. The primary person responsible for
> > > Red Army been caught napping is the man you feel was justified in
> > > invading Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Finland under the
> > > pretext of "security in case of German attack".
> > >
> > > Why don't you address that fact for a change?
> > >
> Moving the boarder west probably saved Russia in 41, if preperations had
> been made with any degree of compatence they should have done far better.
> The failiers rest 110% with the guy at the top and his cronies, though
> atleast he had the ability once the war started to learn from his errors if
> not as fast as might be desired. Atleast he was smart enough to recognise
> talent and from the middle of 42 mostly listen to people who knew what they
> were talking about.
> > >
> > > Drax
> >
> >

[Ivan Grozny]

"ZZBunker" > wrote in message
om...
> "Nicholas Smid" > wrote in message
>...
> > "Stuart Wilkes' mom" > wrote in message
> > t...
> > > I always said Stuey would never amount to anything.
> > >
> > >
> > > "Drazen Kramaric" > wrote in
> > message
> > > ...
> > > > On 23 Oct 2003 03:20:56 -0700, (Stuart Wilkes)
> > > > wrote:
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > >> What were the numbers of soldiers involved in the two campaigns
that
> > > > >> you are comparing. i.e:
> > > > >
> > > > >Suprisingly equal, Rostyk. I'm suprised you didn't know that.
> > > >
> > > > Post the numbers, then.
> > > > >
> > Rawest numbers for jan 1939
> > Germany 1,500,000 troops
> > Holland 60,000
> > Belgium 80,000
> > France 700,000
> > Britain 154,000
> > total 994,000
> >
> > in divisions the Germans had 136 against 136
> > To keep some navy in this well the German navy at the time might be able
to
> > beat Hollands but it was totaly out classed by both major powers
> > In aircaft it was about 4500 against about 5900, though the Germans did
have
> > a lower proportion of obsaleat types.
>
> The Germans didn't need much of a Navy in WWII,
> since they were attacking North Africa, the
> Middle East, France, and Russia, not the US.
>

Where is pathetic loser Stuart Wilkes when you need him?
So they weren't attacking the US? German submarines routinely sank US ships
in US coastal waters, especially early on. They also routinely sank US
merchant marine vessels in international waters. Doenitz pleaded with Hitler
for more ships and subs. If Germany didn't need a navy, why was Doenitz
asking for them?

> And especially since they were fighting
> with tanks, rockets, and missles,
> and the rest of Europe was fighting with horses and cannons.
>

Wrong. Germany used horses throughout the war like all the other continental
European countries. The US used motorized vehicles almost exclusively. The
V-1 and V-2 had no strategic impact.

> And since it was the invasions of
> Sicily, Normany, and Norway that saved
> Russia's ass from certain anniolation, you're
> missing several other armies in
> the analysis.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> >
> > > > >> Size of armies in the west and the casualties?
> > > > >
> > > > >Well, the French Army alone suffered 1.9 million KIA and prisoners
in
> > > > >the campaign in the West, while the combined
> > > > >Franco-Anglo-Belgian-Dutch armies inflicted ~27,000 KIA on the
> > > > >Germans.
> > > >
> > > > Your numbers are correct, but do not tell the whole story. France
> > > > surrendered because it had no more manpower nor space to continue
the
> > > > war so all their remaining soldiers went to POW camps. Had you
> > > > included only POWs captured prior to cease fire the numbers would be
> >
> > The Vichy government maintained a large army untill the end of 42, at
which
> > point alot of it went over to the allies. Also alot of units, especully
> > reserve units, disbanded themselves late in the campain and went home
where
> > they were left as civies.
> >
> > > > more correct, but would represent argument against your thesis, that
> > > > Red Army represented the most efficient enemy realistically
possible.
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > >In this case, the Germans faced unprepared unalerted,
> > peacetime-strength
> > > > >Rifle Divisions (~6000 men) far from their assigned battle
positions,
> > which is one of the
> > > > >advantages you get when you do a sneak attack.
> > > >
> > Except the only person the attack was a surprise to was the boss, due to
> > willful self deseption and a willingness to shoot anyone who dared to
tell
> > him the truth, it dose speck volumes for the courage of many in the Red
army
> > that they went on trying however. The trouble was that a large chunk of
the
> > Red army was in its battle possitions, the possitions were just insainly
> > chosin. being in the middle of a major re equipment cycle and doctran
change
> > didn't help much ether.
> >
> > > > You are representing this as 3,000,000 German soldiers appeared out
of
> > > > nowehere next to the Soviet border. The primary person responsible
for
> > > > Red Army been caught napping is the man you feel was justified in
> > > > invading Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Finland under the
> > > > pretext of "security in case of German attack".
> > > >
> > > > Why don't you address that fact for a change?
> > > >
> > Moving the boarder west probably saved Russia in 41, if preperations had
> > been made with any degree of compatence they should have done far
better.
> > The failiers rest 110% with the guy at the top and his cronies, though
> > atleast he had the ability once the war started to learn from his errors
if
> > not as fast as might be desired. Atleast he was smart enough to
recognise
> > talent and from the middle of 42 mostly listen to people who knew what
they
> > were talking about.
> > > >
> > > > Drax
> > >
> > >

[David E. Powell]

"Ivan Grozny" > wrote in message
...
>
> "ZZBunker" > wrote in message
> om...
> > "Nicholas Smid" > wrote in message
> >...
> > > "Stuart Wilkes' mom" > wrote in message
> > > t...
> > > > I always said Stuey would never amount to anything.
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > "Drazen Kramaric" > wrote in
> > > message
> > > > ...
> > > > > On 23 Oct 2003 03:20:56 -0700, (Stuart Wilkes)
> > > > > wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > >> What were the numbers of soldiers involved in the two campaigns
> that
> > > > > >> you are comparing. i.e:
> > > > > >
> > > > > >Suprisingly equal, Rostyk. I'm suprised you didn't know that.
> > > > >
> > > > > Post the numbers, then.
> > > > > >
> > > Rawest numbers for jan 1939
> > > Germany 1,500,000 troops
> > > Holland 60,000
> > > Belgium 80,000
> > > France 700,000
> > > Britain 154,000
> > > total 994,000
> > >
> > > in divisions the Germans had 136 against 136
> > > To keep some navy in this well the German navy at the time might be
able
> to
> > > beat Hollands but it was totaly out classed by both major powers
> > > In aircaft it was about 4500 against about 5900, though the Germans
did
> have
> > > a lower proportion of obsaleat types.
> >
> > The Germans didn't need much of a Navy in WWII,
> > since they were attacking North Africa, the
> > Middle East, France, and Russia, not the US.
>
> Where is pathetic loser Stuart Wilkes when you need him?
> So they weren't attacking the US? German submarines routinely sank US
ships
> in US coastal waters, especially early on. They also routinely sank US
> merchant marine vessels in international waters. Doenitz pleaded with
Hitler
> for more ships and subs. If Germany didn't need a navy, why was Doenitz
> asking for them?

Yes... Operation Drumbeat, off the US Atlantic coast and in the Gulf of
Mexico, caught the US quite hard early on in 1942. Also, it took time for
the US to get the convoy doctrine and patrol aircraft up and running. And to
get the lights turned off in the coastal towns at night....

> > And especially since they were fighting
> > with tanks, rockets, and missles,
> > and the rest of Europe was fighting with horses and cannons.
>
> Wrong. Germany used horses throughout the war like all the other
continental
> European countries. The US used motorized vehicles almost exclusively. The
> V-1 and V-2 had no strategic impact.

Right again. People tend to forget that while the Whermacht used motorized
forces for blitzkrieg style attacks and front line action, the supply chain
of the German Armed forces relied very heavily on horse drawn wagons and
such, in terms of supply chain. Especially in the Eastern Front, where
trucks bogged down in mud bad, (though carts were also troubled.) Besides,
when one is short on diesel fuel and gasoline, finding food for a horse can
be easier. Up to the end of the war, the Germans used horses. As for the V-1
and V-2, yes, they were terror weapons. But by the time they came out,
German cities were taking far more damage from Allied air raids than their
V-weapons could inflict on the Allies. Also, disinformation, antiaircraft
guns and bulked up fighter defenses helped protect London against V-1
attacks after a while. One of the Western Allies' greatest contributions to
the war was the bombing campaign.

> > And since it was the invasions of
> > Sicily, Normany, and Norway that saved
> > Russia's ass from certain anniolation, you're
> > missing several other armies in
> > the analysis.

The battles of Stalingrad and Kursk occured before June of 1944, I believe.
Also, the Germans had forces tied down by the Allied invasion of Italy. It
was the D-Day attack that opened the way in the west, however. Kesselring
and the Apennine mountains were quite nasty delaying forces in Italy.

Though the allies did tie down German and Axis forces there. Hitler's war on
many fronts was a grand mistake. Not to mention the garrison requirements of
the countries he had already taken. From France and the Low Countries in the
west to Yugoslavia and Greece in the east.

This by no means takes anything from the bravery of the Russian people and
soldiers that fought, however. From the gates of Moscow to Leningrad to the
Reichschanchellery in Berlin, they did a ton of damage, and took a lot, too.
Not to mention the footage I have seen of people setting up factories and
working hot steel in buildings with no roofs on yet and snow coming down.
There aren't words for that kind of bravery.

> > > > > >> Size of armies in the west and the casualties?
> > > > > >
> > > > > >Well, the French Army alone suffered 1.9 million KIA and
prisoners
> in
> > > > > >the campaign in the West, while the combined
> > > > > >Franco-Anglo-Belgian-Dutch armies inflicted ~27,000 KIA on the
> > > > > >Germans.
> > > > >
> > > > > Your numbers are correct, but do not tell the whole story. France
> > > > > surrendered because it had no more manpower nor space to continue
> the
> > > > > war so all their remaining soldiers went to POW camps. Had you
> > > > > included only POWs captured prior to cease fire the numbers would
be
> > >
> > > The Vichy government maintained a large army untill the end of 42, at
> which
> > > point alot of it went over to the allies. Also alot of units,
especully
> > > reserve units, disbanded themselves late in the campain and went home
> where
> > > they were left as civies.
> > >
> > > > > more correct, but would represent argument against your thesis,
that
> > > > > Red Army represented the most efficient enemy realistically
> possible.
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > >In this case, the Germans faced unprepared unalerted,
> > > peacetime-strength
> > > > > >Rifle Divisions (~6000 men) far from their assigned battle
> positions,
> > > which is one of the
> > > > > >advantages you get when you do a sneak attack.
> > > > >
> > > Except the only person the attack was a surprise to was the boss, due
to
> > > willful self deseption and a willingness to shoot anyone who dared to
> tell
> > > him the truth, it dose speck volumes for the courage of many in the
Red
> army
> > > that they went on trying however. The trouble was that a large chunk
of
> the
> > > Red army was in its battle possitions, the possitions were just
insainly
> > > chosin. being in the middle of a major re equipment cycle and doctran
> change
> > > didn't help much ether.
> > >
> > > > > You are representing this as 3,000,000 German soldiers appeared
out
> of
> > > > > nowehere next to the Soviet border. The primary person responsible
> for
> > > > > Red Army been caught napping is the man you feel was justified in
> > > > > invading Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Finland under the
> > > > > pretext of "security in case of German attack".
> > > > >
> > > > > Why don't you address that fact for a change?
> > > > >
> > > Moving the boarder west probably saved Russia in 41, if preperations
had
> > > been made with any degree of compatence they should have done far
> better.
> > > The failiers rest 110% with the guy at the top and his cronies, though
> > > atleast he had the ability once the war started to learn from his
errors
> if
> > > not as fast as might be desired. Atleast he was smart enough to
> recognise
> > > talent and from the middle of 42 mostly listen to people who knew what
> they
> > > were talking about.
> > > > >
> > > > > Drax
> > > >
> > > >
>
>

[Actual Oxyclean User]

"David E. Powell" > wrote in message
s.com...
> "Ivan Grozny" > wrote in message
> ...
> >
> > "ZZBunker" > wrote in message
> > om...
> > > "Nicholas Smid" > wrote in message
> > >...
> > > > "Stuart Wilkes' mom" > wrote in message
> > > > t...
> > > > > I always said Stuey would never amount to anything.
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > "Drazen Kramaric" > wrote
in
> > > > message
> > > > > ...
> > > > > > On 23 Oct 2003 03:20:56 -0700, (Stuart
Wilkes)
> > > > > > wrote:
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > >> What were the numbers of soldiers involved in the two
campaigns
> > that
> > > > > > >> you are comparing. i.e:
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >Suprisingly equal, Rostyk. I'm suprised you didn't know that.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Post the numbers, then.
> > > > > > >
> > > > Rawest numbers for jan 1939
> > > > Germany 1,500,000 troops
> > > > Holland 60,000
> > > > Belgium 80,000
> > > > France 700,000
> > > > Britain 154,000
> > > > total 994,000
> > > >
> > > > in divisions the Germans had 136 against 136
> > > > To keep some navy in this well the German navy at the time might be
> able
> > to
> > > > beat Hollands but it was totaly out classed by both major powers
> > > > In aircaft it was about 4500 against about 5900, though the Germans
> did
> > have
> > > > a lower proportion of obsaleat types.
> > >
> > > The Germans didn't need much of a Navy in WWII,
> > > since they were attacking North Africa, the
> > > Middle East, France, and Russia, not the US.
> >
> > Where is pathetic loser Stuart Wilkes when you need him?
> > So they weren't attacking the US? German submarines routinely sank US
> ships
> > in US coastal waters, especially early on. They also routinely sank US
> > merchant marine vessels in international waters. Doenitz pleaded with
> Hitler
> > for more ships and subs. If Germany didn't need a navy, why was Doenitz
> > asking for them?
>
> Yes... Operation Drumbeat, off the US Atlantic coast and in the Gulf of
> Mexico, caught the US quite hard early on in 1942. Also, it took time for
> the US to get the convoy doctrine and patrol aircraft up and running. And
to
> get the lights turned off in the coastal towns at night....
>
> > > And especially since they were fighting
> > > with tanks, rockets, and missles,
> > > and the rest of Europe was fighting with horses and cannons.
> >
> > Wrong. Germany used horses throughout the war like all the other
> continental
> > European countries. The US used motorized vehicles almost exclusively.
The
> > V-1 and V-2 had no strategic impact.
>
> Right again. People tend to forget that while the Whermacht used motorized
> forces for blitzkrieg style attacks and front line action, the supply
chain
> of the German Armed forces relied very heavily on horse drawn wagons and
> such, in terms of supply chain. Especially in the Eastern Front, where
> trucks bogged down in mud bad, (though carts were also troubled.) Besides,
> when one is short on diesel fuel and gasoline, finding food for a horse
can
> be easier. Up to the end of the war, the Germans used horses. As for the
V-1
> and V-2, yes, they were terror weapons. But by the time they came out,
> German cities were taking far more damage from Allied air raids than their
> V-weapons could inflict on the Allies. Also, disinformation, antiaircraft
> guns and bulked up fighter defenses helped protect London against V-1
> attacks after a while. One of the Western Allies' greatest contributions
to
> the war was the bombing campaign.
>
> > > And since it was the invasions of
> > > Sicily, Normany, and Norway that saved
> > > Russia's ass from certain anniolation, you're
> > > missing several other armies in
> > > the analysis.
>
> The battles of Stalingrad and Kursk occured before June of 1944, I
believe.
> Also, the Germans had forces tied down by the Allied invasion of Italy. It
> was the D-Day attack that opened the way in the west, however. Kesselring
> and the Apennine mountains were quite nasty delaying forces in Italy.
>
> Though the allies did tie down German and Axis forces there. Hitler's war
on
> many fronts was a grand mistake. Not to mention the garrison requirements
of
> the countries he had already taken. From France and the Low Countries in
the
> west to Yugoslavia and Greece in the east.
>
> This by no means takes anything from the bravery of the Russian people and
> soldiers that fought, however. From the gates of Moscow to Leningrad to
the
> Reichschanchellery in Berlin, they did a ton of damage, and took a lot,
too.
> Not to mention the footage I have seen of people setting up factories and
> working hot steel in buildings with no roofs on yet and snow coming down.
> There aren't words for that kind of bravery.
>

You need to be a little more specific about bravery when you talk about the
Russians. Much of their bravery came at the muzzle of an NKVD rifle. The
Moscow panic was brutally surpressed by the NKVD. If you didn't work long
hard hours in those factories, you could be shot. NKVD units were generally
interspersed with regular units. Anyone not showing sufficient enthusiasm
for marching into a Nazi machine gun nest would be shot in the back. The end
of the war did not bring relief but did bring into being the gulag system of
slave labor.

Then there is the issue of the Russians that welcomed the Nazis hoping to
get rid of the Communists. Ukranians, although not Russians, were often
quite happy to see the Germans, especially remembering that Stalin's famine
caused about 4 million of them to die.

While Chechans were storming the Reichstag, their families back home were
being deported to Siberia.

> > > > > > >> Size of armies in the west and the casualties?
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >Well, the French Army alone suffered 1.9 million KIA and
> prisoners
> > in
> > > > > > >the campaign in the West, while the combined
> > > > > > >Franco-Anglo-Belgian-Dutch armies inflicted ~27,000 KIA on the
> > > > > > >Germans.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Your numbers are correct, but do not tell the whole story.
France
> > > > > > surrendered because it had no more manpower nor space to
continue
> > the
> > > > > > war so all their remaining soldiers went to POW camps. Had you
> > > > > > included only POWs captured prior to cease fire the numbers
would
> be
> > > >
> > > > The Vichy government maintained a large army untill the end of 42,
at
> > which
> > > > point alot of it went over to the allies. Also alot of units,
> especully
> > > > reserve units, disbanded themselves late in the campain and went
home
> > where
> > > > they were left as civies.
> > > >
> > > > > > more correct, but would represent argument against your thesis,
> that
> > > > > > Red Army represented the most efficient enemy realistically
> > possible.
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > >In this case, the Germans faced unprepared unalerted,
> > > > peacetime-strength
> > > > > > >Rifle Divisions (~6000 men) far from their assigned battle
> > positions,
> > > > which is one of the
> > > > > > >advantages you get when you do a sneak attack.
> > > > > >
> > > > Except the only person the attack was a surprise to was the boss,
due
> to
> > > > willful self deseption and a willingness to shoot anyone who dared
to
> > tell
> > > > him the truth, it dose speck volumes for the courage of many in the
> Red
> > army
> > > > that they went on trying however. The trouble was that a large chunk
> of
> > the
> > > > Red army was in its battle possitions, the possitions were just
> insainly
> > > > chosin. being in the middle of a major re equipment cycle and
doctran
> > change
> > > > didn't help much ether.
> > > >
> > > > > > You are representing this as 3,000,000 German soldiers appeared
> out
> > of
> > > > > > nowehere next to the Soviet border. The primary person
responsible
> > for
> > > > > > Red Army been caught napping is the man you feel was justified
in
> > > > > > invading Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Finland under
the
> > > > > > pretext of "security in case of German attack".
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Why don't you address that fact for a change?
> > > > > >
> > > > Moving the boarder west probably saved Russia in 41, if preperations
> had
> > > > been made with any degree of compatence they should have done far
> > better.
> > > > The failiers rest 110% with the guy at the top and his cronies,
though
> > > > atleast he had the ability once the war started to learn from his
> errors
> > if
> > > > not as fast as might be desired. Atleast he was smart enough to
> > recognise
> > > > talent and from the middle of 42 mostly listen to people who knew
what
> > they
> > > > were talking about.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Drax
> > > > >
> > > > >
> >
> >
>
>

[Stuart Wilkes]

"Actual Oxyclean User" > wrote in message >...

<snip>

> You need to be a little more specific about bravery when you talk about the
> Russians.

Indeed.

> Much of their bravery came at the muzzle of an NKVD rifle.

Actually Mark, only a tiny bit of it came from NKVD rifles, since
there was very little NKVD to go around. There was no NKVD when
Zhukov trounded the Japanese. There was no NKVD when Col.
Polosukhin's 32nd Rifle Division gutted 40th Panzercorps at Borodino.
There was no NKVD when Col. Katukov's 4th Tank Bde sliced and diced
4th Panzer Division on the approach to Tula. further examples can be
supplied.

So there's another one of your spiteful lies exposed.

> The Moscow panic was brutally surpressed by the NKVD.

Apparently, Mark would prefer it if it had spread. What alternative
was there?

> If you didn't work long hard hours in those factories, you could be shot.

Apparently, Mark would prefer it if those factories had produced less.
What alternative was there?

> NKVD units were generally interspersed with regular units.

Yeah, around one battalion per Front. That works out to about 1% of
the force.

> Anyone not showing sufficient enthusiasm
> for marching into a Nazi machine gun nest would be shot in the back.

Yet another spiteful lie. No denying that it happened occasionally,
but it was far from "anyone".

> The end of the war did not bring relief

Sure it did. No Germans killing people by the tens of millions, after
all.

> but did bring into being the gulag system of slave labor.
>
> Then there is the issue of the Russians that welcomed the Nazis hoping to
> get rid of the Communists. Ukranians, although not Russians, were often

A minority were. But from the vast majority, the Germans got nothing
but hatred and opposition. Hence the unsustainable casualties the
Germans suffered, from the very start of the war.

> quite happy to see the Germans,

Oh yeah, I remember the staged newsreels of people lined up neatly in
front of villages and then running simultaneously towards German tanks
to greet them. I don't buy anything so hokey, but it's no suprise
that you do.

The reality is that the Germans found the most bitter, determined
resistance they had run into up to that point in the war when they
attacked the USSR.

> especially remembering that Stalin's famine
> caused about 4 million of them to die.
>
> While Chechans were storming the Reichstag, their families back home were
> being deported to Siberia.

And where were Japanese-Americans when Lt. Daniel Inoue was wounded in
the action that got him a Distinguished Service Cross?

Stuart Wilkes

[Actual Oxyclean User]

"Stuart Wilkes" > wrote in message
om...
> "Actual Oxyclean User" > wrote in message
>...
>
> <snip>
>
> > You need to be a little more specific about bravery when you talk about
the
> > Russians.
>
> Indeed.
>
> > Much of their bravery came at the muzzle of an NKVD rifle.
>
> Actually Mark, only a tiny bit of it came from NKVD rifles, since
> there was very little NKVD to go around.

But enough to instill fear...which was the main objective anyway.

There was no NKVD when
> Zhukov trounded the Japanese.

And there was no NKVD when millions of Russians ran as fast as their little
feet could carry them in front of the advancing Barbarossa frat house party.

There was no NKVD when Col.
> Polosukhin's 32nd Rifle Division gutted 40th Panzercorps at Borodino.
> There was no NKVD when Col. Katukov's 4th Tank Bde sliced and diced
> 4th Panzer Division on the approach to Tula. further examples can be
> supplied.
>
> So there's another one of your spiteful lies exposed.
>
> > The Moscow panic was brutally surpressed by the NKVD.
>
> Apparently, Mark would prefer it if it had spread. What alternative
> was there?
>

Communication? Apparently this is an abstract concept for Russians. Still
is.

> > If you didn't work long hard hours in those factories, you could be
shot.
>
> Apparently, Mark would prefer it if those factories had produced less.
> What alternative was there?
>

In the US we didn't seem to have a problem. We didn't trump up phoney
charges to get free slave labor. Not even interned Japanese were subjected
to forced labor. The worst the German POWs had it was working in vegetable
gardens to grow their own food. I guess that's why so many German POWs
didn't want to be repatriated. Willy Von Braun didn't think it was so bad
here.

> > NKVD units were generally interspersed with regular units.
>
> Yeah, around one battalion per Front. That works out to about 1% of
> the force.
>
> > Anyone not showing sufficient enthusiasm
> > for marching into a Nazi machine gun nest would be shot in the back.
>
> Yet another spiteful lie. No denying that it happened occasionally,
> but it was far from "anyone".
>

But no such "NKVD" units accompanied American soldiers, not even 1%.

> > The end of the war did not bring relief
>
> Sure it did. No Germans killing people by the tens of millions, after
> all.
>

And the Soviets simply picked up where the Nazis left off.

> > but did bring into being the gulag system of slave labor.
> >
> > Then there is the issue of the Russians that welcomed the Nazis hoping
to
> > get rid of the Communists. Ukranians, although not Russians, were often
>
> A minority were. But from the vast majority, the Germans got nothing
> but hatred and opposition. Hence the unsustainable casualties the
> Germans suffered, from the very start of the war.
>

Nyet. Byelorussians, Ukranians and Balts were quite happy to see the Nazis
march into their towns...as were many Russians. The problem arose in the
fact that there were two competing philosophies in the German military...one
that wanted to "allie" with the conquered and the hardliners who took a more
racist approach. The hardliners won out. You know this very well Stuey so
quit the smoke screen.

> > quite happy to see the Germans,
>
> Oh yeah, I remember the staged newsreels of people lined up neatly in
> front of villages and then running simultaneously towards German tanks
> to greet them. I don't buy anything so hokey, but it's no suprise
> that you do.
>

Yes, of course. You were there and interviewed every person. Opinion, not
fact. This is why nobody should believe any of your "history". You are
incapable of separating your personal bias from historical fact.

> The reality is that the Germans found the most bitter, determined
> resistance they had run into up to that point in the war when they
> attacked the USSR.
>

No. When the Germans attacked the USSR, they ran and surrendered by the
millions. This is historical fact. Determined resitance did not happen until
Stalingrad....and only because Stalin decided to make a meat grinder out of
it i.e. the Soviets sent there to fight had no choice in the matter.

> > especially remembering that Stalin's famine
> > caused about 4 million of them to die.
> >
> > While Chechans were storming the Reichstag, their families back home
were
> > being deported to Siberia.
>
> And where were Japanese-Americans when Lt. Daniel Inoue was wounded in
> the action that got him a Distinguished Service Cross?
>

They were be given food, clothing and shelter and protective custody. How
many of those Japanese-Americans returned to Japan after the war?
Another Stuey smoke screen where you try to cast one isolated incident as
general policy. This sounds like Stuey hipocrisy to me. According to you,
the Soviets were justified in committing mass murder during the Moscow panic
but the US was wrong to gather together potential saboteurs. This double
standard is nothing new for you.

> Stuart Wilkes, apologist for mass murder.

[Rostyslaw J. Lewyckyj]

Actual Oxyclean User wrote:

> "David E. Powell" > wrote in message
> s.com...
>
>>Not to mention the footage I have seen of people setting up factories and
>>working hot steel in buildings with no roofs on yet and snow coming down.
>>There aren't words for that kind of bravery.
>
> You need to be a little more specific about bravery when you talk about the
> Russians. Much of their bravery came at the muzzle of an NKVD rifle. The
> Moscow panic was brutally surpressed by the NKVD. If you didn't work long
> hard hours in those factories, you could be shot. NKVD units were generally
> interspersed with regular units. Anyone not showing sufficient enthusiasm
> for marching into a Nazi machine gun nest would be shot in the back. The end
> of the war did not bring relief but did bring into being the gulag system of
> slave labor.
>
> Then there is the issue of the Russians that welcomed the Nazis hoping to
> get rid of the Communists. Ukranians, although not Russians, were often
> quite happy to see the Germans, especially remembering that Stalin's famine
> caused about 4 million of them to die.
>
> While Chechans were storming the Reichstag, their families back home were
> being deported to Siberia.
>
Oxycleam
Your comments would be much more credible, if you had your 'facts'
in better shape.
The gulag was in official existance from ~1919 through 1956. It did
not come into existance at the end of WW2. Moreover political prisons
and forced labor camps have existed in the Russian empire longer than
just that. E.g. construction battalions for St. Petersburg and the
Vyshnii Volochek System of canals.
The 1932-33 Holodomor claimed about 7 million not 4.

--
Rostyk

[Actual Oxyclean User]

"Rostyslaw J. Lewyckyj" > wrote in message
...
> Actual Oxyclean User wrote:
>
> > "David E. Powell" > wrote in message
> > s.com...
> >
> >>Not to mention the footage I have seen of people setting up factories
and
> >>working hot steel in buildings with no roofs on yet and snow coming
down.
> >>There aren't words for that kind of bravery.
> >
> > You need to be a little more specific about bravery when you talk about
the
> > Russians. Much of their bravery came at the muzzle of an NKVD rifle. The
> > Moscow panic was brutally surpressed by the NKVD. If you didn't work
long
> > hard hours in those factories, you could be shot. NKVD units were
generally
> > interspersed with regular units. Anyone not showing sufficient
enthusiasm
> > for marching into a Nazi machine gun nest would be shot in the back. The
end
> > of the war did not bring relief but did bring into being the gulag
system of
> > slave labor.
> >
> > Then there is the issue of the Russians that welcomed the Nazis hoping
to
> > get rid of the Communists. Ukranians, although not Russians, were often
> > quite happy to see the Germans, especially remembering that Stalin's
famine
> > caused about 4 million of them to die.
> >
> > While Chechans were storming the Reichstag, their families back home
were
> > being deported to Siberia.
> >
> Oxycleam
> Your comments would be much more credible, if you had your 'facts'
> in better shape.
> The gulag was in official existance from ~1919 through 1956. It did
> not come into existance at the end of WW2. Moreover political prisons
> and forced labor camps have existed in the Russian empire longer than
> just that. E.g. construction battalions for St. Petersburg and the
> Vyshnii Volochek System of canals.
> The 1932-33 Holodomor claimed about 7 million not 4.
>

I don't think Stalin kept count.

> --
> Rostyk
>
>
>

[Stuart Wilkes]

"Actual Oxyclean User" > wrote in message >...
> "Stuart Wilkes" > wrote in message
> om...
> > "Actual Oxyclean User" > wrote in message
> >...
> >
> > <snip>
> >
> > > You need to be a little more specific about bravery when you talk about
> > > the Russians.
> >
> > Indeed.
> >
> > > Much of their bravery came at the muzzle of an NKVD rifle.
> >
> > Actually Mark, only a tiny bit of it came from NKVD rifles, since
> > there was very little NKVD to go around.
>
> But enough to instill fear...which was the main objective anyway.
>
> There was no NKVD when
> > Zhukov trounded the Japanese.
>
> And there was no NKVD when millions of Russians ran as fast as their little
> feet could carry them in front of the advancing Barbarossa frat house party.

That's because it was a war of racial extermination, Mark. It's
generally smart to run away from one of those if you can.

> > There was no NKVD when Col.
> > Polosukhin's 32nd Rifle Division gutted 40th Panzercorps at Borodino.
> > There was no NKVD when Col. Katukov's 4th Tank Bde sliced and diced
> > 4th Panzer Division on the approach to Tula. further examples can be
> > supplied.
> >
> > So there's another one of your spiteful lies exposed.
> >
> > > The Moscow panic was brutally surpressed by the NKVD.
> >
> > Apparently, Mark would prefer it if it had spread. What alternative
> > was there?
> >
>
> Communication?

Communicate what, with a war of racial extermination on the way?

> Apparently this is an abstract concept for Russians. Still is.
>
> > > If you didn't work long hard hours in those factories, you could be
> shot.
> >
> > Apparently, Mark would prefer it if those factories had produced less.
> > What alternative was there?
> >
>
> In the US we didn't seem to have a problem.

We weren't being subjected to a war of racial extermination. There
was no Wehrmacht on our territory killing tens of millions of us and
occupying the most extensively-developed part of our country.

> We didn't trump up phoney
> charges to get free slave labor. Not even interned Japanese were subjected
> to forced labor. The worst the German POWs had it was working in vegetable
> gardens to grow their own food. I guess that's why so many German POWs
> didn't want to be repatriated. Willy Von Braun didn't think it was so bad
> here.
>
> > > NKVD units were generally interspersed with regular units.
> >
> > Yeah, around one battalion per Front. That works out to about 1% of
> > the force.
> >
> > > Anyone not showing sufficient enthusiasm
> > > for marching into a Nazi machine gun nest would be shot in the back.
> >
> > Yet another spiteful lie. No denying that it happened occasionally,
> > but it was far from "anyone".
>
> But no such "NKVD" units accompanied American soldiers, not even 1%.

We weren't being subjected to a war of racial extermination. There
was no Wehrmacht on our territory killing tens of millions of us.

> > > The end of the war did not bring relief
> >
> > Sure it did. No Germans killing people by the tens of millions, after
> > all.
>
> And the Soviets simply picked up where the Nazis left off.

Prove it.

> > > but did bring into being the gulag system of slave labor.
> > >
> > > Then there is the issue of the Russians that welcomed the Nazis hoping
> to
> > > get rid of the Communists. Ukranians, although not Russians, were often
> >
> > A minority were. But from the vast majority, the Germans got nothing
> > but hatred and opposition. Hence the unsustainable casualties the
> > Germans suffered, from the very start of the war.
> >
>
> Nyet. Byelorussians, Ukranians and Balts were quite happy to see the Nazis
> march into their towns...as were many Russians.

Said Dr. Goebbels, and his intellectual heirs down to the present day.
A group that includes you.

> The problem arose in the
> fact that there were two competing philosophies in the German military...one
> that wanted to "allie" with the conquered and the hardliners who took a more
> racist approach.

Except that the guy at the top, whose opinion was the only one that
counted on the matter, wanted all the
"JewBolshevikRiddenSubhumanSlavs" gone.

> The hardliners won out.

The other sort on this question counted for nothing.

> You know this very well Stuey so quit the smoke screen.

Quel smokescreen?

> > > quite happy to see the Germans,
> >
> > Oh yeah, I remember the staged newsreels of people lined up neatly in
> > front of villages and then running simultaneously towards German tanks
> > to greet them. I don't buy anything so hokey, but it's no suprise
> > that you do.
> >
>
> Yes, of course. You were there and interviewed every person. Opinion, not
> fact.

A better-grounded opinion than yours.

> This is why nobody should believe any of your "history". You are
> incapable of separating your personal bias from historical fact.

Sez the source of repeated howling errors and spiteful lies.

> > The reality is that the Germans found the most bitter, determined
> > resistance they had run into up to that point in the war when they
> > attacked the USSR.
> >
>
> No.

Okay Mark, when had they run into fiercer and more determined
resistance up to that point in the war?

> When the Germans attacked the USSR, they ran and surrendered by the
> millions. This is historical fact.

And where didn't this happen wherever the Germas attacked, up to that
point in the war?

> Determined resitance did not happen until Stalingrad

The Germans themselves didn't think so.

>....and only because Stalin decided to make a meat grinder out of
> it i.e. the Soviets sent there to fight had no choice in the matter.

Actually, Zhukov set that up, at Yelnia, in August 1941. Stopped Army
Group center in its tracks, and forced the Germans into a two-Corps
withdrawl. First time they had had to do one of those to that point
in the war.

> > > especially remembering that Stalin's famine
> > > caused about 4 million of them to die.
> > >
> > > While Chechans were storming the Reichstag, their families back home
> > > were being deported to Siberia.
> >
> > And where were Japanese-Americans when Lt. Daniel Inoue was wounded in
> > the action that got him a Distinguished Service Cross?
> >
>
> They were be given food, clothing and shelter and protective custody. How
> many of those Japanese-Americans returned to Japan after the war?
> Another Stuey smoke screen where you try to cast one isolated incident as
> general policy.

How much Japanese-American collaboration with Imperial Japan was
there?

> This sounds like Stuey hipocrisy to me.

Sez the spiteful liar.

> According to you,
> the Soviets were justified in committing mass murder during the Moscow panic

Would you have preferred it to have gone on?

> but the US was wrong to gather together potential saboteurs.

How many sabotage plots were found among Japanese-Americans Mark?

> This double standard is nothing new for you.

Sez the spiteful liar who wanted to nuke a city of two million,
99.999% of whom never attacked the US, and the remainder who did were
former US proteges.

.net>

"I hope like hell the US does use the nuclear option. It sounds like
they're
going to get us into another Viet Nam...screw this long engagement
crap. It
will just get more Americans killed. Fry the *******s.

Let Kabul be the example."

Stuart Wilkes

[Rostyslaw J. Lewyckyj]

Actual Oxyclean User wrote:
> "Rostyslaw J. Lewyckyj" > wrote in message
> ...
>
>>The 1932-33 Holodomor claimed about 7 million not 4.
>
> I don't think Stalin kept count.
>
Yeah... You're right
I can't argue with your logic