December 6,1941

[BOB URZ]

I have often wondered. Given a 24 hour advanced notice that an attack
was eminent in 72 hours or less, what would have been the outcome at
Pearl Harbor? Say on dec 6, Pearl was given intel that an attack would
come anytime in the next 72 hours.

What could have been done differently to affect the outcome?
Granted at that point in the war, some of the hardware was not up
to snuff with the Japanese. With a 24 hour warning, how many fighter
aircraft could have been prepared, armed, and either flying or on
alert? What (if any) could have been used for night operations?
What would have been the likely outcome of an even plane
dogfight scenario?

Given the 24 hour warning time, where would you position the
carriers that were out at sea and why? Offensive or defensive?

What about the surface ships in the harbor. In or out?
Was there better way to position them against air attack?

What combination of aircraft could have been marshalled for an
offensive strike against the carrier group at the range they
were at? Were there enough trained aviators to even attempt this
at this time? Were the Japanese aviators better trained and equipped
at this point in the war?

Would the crude land based radar have been any major help with the
advanced warning and defensive attack ?

Would the US fleet have attempted to put to sea to go after the Japanese
task force, or stay close in for the defence against the possible
invasion of Hawaii? Was the fleet safer at sea knowing the
japs were coming, or safer in the harbor?


It would make an interesting movie.....


BOB




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[Keith Willshaw]

"BOB URZ" > wrote in message
...
> I have often wondered. Given a 24 hour advanced notice that an attack
> was eminent in 72 hours or less, what would have been the outcome at
> Pearl Harbor? Say on dec 6, Pearl was given intel that an attack would
> come anytime in the next 72 hours.
>
> What could have been done differently to affect the outcome?

They could have issued ammunition for the army fixed AA guns
instead of keeping it in depots (the army didnt like its shells
getting dirty - no kidding)

The USAAF could have been alert with some fighters airbornes
and the rest properly dispersed instead of parked together in the
middle of the field lacking only a neon sign saying 'bomb here'

The fleet could have been on a higher state of readiness instead
of enjoying a sunday morning lie in

They could have taken some basic precautions like rigging torpedo
nets.


> Granted at that point in the war, some of the hardware was not up
> to snuff with the Japanese. With a 24 hour warning, how many fighter
> aircraft could have been prepared, armed, and either flying or on
> alert?

The army hearings estimated that if they had been alert between 70 and
80 fighters could have been in the air.

> What (if any) could have been used for night operations?
> What would have been the likely outcome of an even plane
> dogfight scenario?
>
> Given the 24 hour warning time, where would you position the
> carriers that were out at sea and why? Offensive or defensive?
>

They were too far way to make an effective counterstrike or defense.

> What about the surface ships in the harbor. In or out?
> Was there better way to position them against air attack?
>

The BB's could have been sent back to the West Coast.

> What combination of aircraft could have been marshalled for an
> offensive strike against the carrier group at the range they
> were at? Were there enough trained aviators to even attempt this
> at this time? Were the Japanese aviators better trained and equipped
> at this point in the war?
>

There really wasnt an effective strike force available.

> Would the crude land based radar have been any major help with the
> advanced warning and defensive attack ?
>

The land based radar detected the incoming attack very succesfully,
trouble is the information center couldnt handle the data and
simply assumed the aircraft were friendly, no IFF was available.

> Would the US fleet have attempted to put to sea to go after the Japanese
> task force, or stay close in for the defence against the possible
> invasion of Hawaii? Was the fleet safer at sea knowing the
> japs were coming, or safer in the harbor?
>

Safer halfway to San Francisco, sortieing against the carriers
was a hopeless task, they were too slow to catch them and
would likley have lost more men as ships were sunk in the
deep ocean and would not have been salvageable.

Keith

[JDupre5762]

>I have often wondered. Given a 24 hour advanced notice that an attack
>was eminent in 72 hours or less, what would have been the outcome at
>Pearl Harbor? Say on dec 6, Pearl was given intel that an attack would
>come anytime in the next 72 hours.

It might well have been worse in some ways. I understand that part of the
Navy's planning was to move the fleet out of the harbor to a different
anchorage that was much deeper. So if some of the ships could have been
torpedoed or sunk by bombs there they might well have been unrecoverable.

John Dupre'

[David Lesher]

BOB URZ > writes:

>I have often wondered. Given a 24 hour advanced notice that an attack
>was eminent in 72 hours or less, what would have been the outcome at
>Pearl Harbor? Say on dec 6, Pearl was given intel that an attack would
>come anytime in the next 72 hours.

>What could have been done differently to affect the outcome?

If the fleet had been dispersed, the attackers might have gone
after the fuel storage area. If I recall, it was mostly above ground.


http://www.cpf.navy.mil/pearlharbor/media/0501redhillavailability.html


During the attack on Pearl Harbor, the fuel tank farm at
the Pearl Harbor Navy Supply Depot was a strategic target
that was extremely vulnerable but was not attached and
remained undamaged through two waves of bombing.

This tank farm held the entire fuel oil supply for the
United States Pacific Fleet. A single bomb could have
destroyed over four and a half million barrels of oil and
would have prolonged the war for years, according to Admiral
Chester Nimitz.
--
A host is a host from coast to
& no one will talk to a host that's close........[v].(301) 56-LINUX
Unless the host (that isn't close).........................pob 1433
is busy, hung or dead....................................20915-1433

[Vicente Vazquez]

"Keith Willshaw" > escreveu na mensagem
...
> > Given the 24 hour warning time, where would you position the
> > carriers that were out at sea and why? Offensive or defensive?
> They were too far way to make an effective counterstrike or defense.

Keith,

Sorry if this is a stupid question, but AFAIK, the Enterprise had some of
its Dauntless (VS-6) on patrol while on her way to Pearl when they were
engaged by jap planes returning to the carriers. One of them (pilot was
Ensign McCarthy, IIRC) was shot down. Devastators from VT-6 were launched to
find and attack the jap force, but their search was fruitless. With a 24h
advanced warning, could the Enterprise be put in a "favorable" position to
attack the jap force, if this could be located? Did she have enough
"firepower" to do face the jap fleet alone?

Tks in advance,

Vicente

[Mike1]

(Resisting "But Roosevelt *did* know urge")

"Keith Willshaw" > wrote:

>"BOB URZ" > wrote in message
...
>> I have often wondered. Given a 24 hour advanced notice that an attack
>> was eminent in 72 hours or less, what would have been the outcome at
>> Pearl Harbor? Say on dec 6, Pearl was given intel that an attack would
>> come anytime in the next 72 hours.
>>
>> What could have been done differently to affect the outcome?
>
>They could have issued ammunition for the army fixed AA guns
>instead of keeping it in depots (the army didnt like its shells
>getting dirty - no kidding)
>
>The USAAF could have been alert with some fighters airbornes
>and the rest properly dispersed instead of parked together in the
>middle of the field lacking only a neon sign saying 'bomb here'
>
>The fleet could have been on a higher state of readiness instead
>of enjoying a sunday morning lie in
>
>They could have taken some basic precautions like rigging torpedo
>nets.


Carrier aircraft could have flown to land-based fields, refueled there,
then attacked the Jap carriers as they approached.

Subs may have also have been able to intercept.

--

Reply to sans two @@, or your reply won't reach me.

"An election is nothing more than an advance auction of stolen goods."
-- Ambrose Bierce

[John Keeney]

"BOB URZ" > wrote in message
...
> I have often wondered. Given a 24 hour advanced notice that an attack
> was eminent in 72 hours or less, what would have been the outcome at
> Pearl Harbor? Say on dec 6, Pearl was given intel that an attack would
> come anytime in the next 72 hours.

Depends on if it was clear the attack was by air instead of clandestine.
The area commanders were preparing for sabotage which had the
effect of creating excellent targets. Convince them the attack was
coming from carrier aircraft and lots changes.

> What could have been done differently to affect the outcome?

Disperse the air assets, fly CAP, sortie the fleet and have AAA
emplacements set, armed and manned. PAY ATTENTION to the
radar crew.
There are other things you would do, such as moving the army into
defensive positions, that as history played out wouldn't have meant
much but could have under different circumstances.

> Granted at that point in the war, some of the hardware was not up
> to snuff with the Japanese. With a 24 hour warning, how many fighter
> aircraft could have been prepared, armed, and either flying or on
> alert? What (if any) could have been used for night operations?

Catalinas for patrol, nobody was going to attack Pearl at night in '41:
that would have required night carrier ops.

> What would have been the likely outcome of an even plane
> dogfight scenario?
>
> Given the 24 hour warning time, where would you position the
> carriers that were out at sea and why? Offensive or defensive?

With as many other surface combatants as I could round up.
If I then have time to position that group I'ld try for a place off
to the side of the expected approach so as to be able to trail
enemy planes back to their fleet.
As I recall it, one of the carriers was coming back from a delivery
run dropping off aircraft at Wake(?); that ship would need fighter
flown out to it.

> What about the surface ships in the harbor. In or out?

Out, moving targets are harder to hit -if they can be found at all-,
have freer use of their AA guns and they can try to intercept the
Japanese fleet.

> Was there better way to position them against air attack?
>
> What combination of aircraft could have been marshalled for an
> offensive strike against the carrier group at the range they
> were at? Were there enough trained aviators to even attempt this
> at this time? Were the Japanese aviators better trained and equipped
> at this point in the war?
>
> Would the crude land based radar have been any major help with the
> advanced warning and defensive attack ?

The radar historically picked up the inbound attack flight and the
information was called in to head quarters, it was dismissed.
Acted on in real history a lot more American fighters could have
been gotten into the air which would have decreased the efficiency of
the attack. An effective defense could have been attempted. Given a
24 or more hours of head start the US fleet would have taken
trivial losses compared to reality; perhaps the USS Arizona could
have sailed to Coregidor before it fell.

> Would the US fleet have attempted to put to sea to go after the Japanese
> task force, or stay close in for the defense against the possible
> invasion of Hawaii? Was the fleet safer at sea knowing the
> japs were coming, or safer in the harbor?

They would likely have attempted to engage the op fleet but not chased
them more than a day or two. 24 hours is short notice to provision
the entire Pacific fleet in Pearl Harbor and concern for undetected
invasion fleets would be in everybodys' mind.

[John Keeney]

"David Lesher" > wrote in message
...
> BOB URZ > writes:
>
> >I have often wondered. Given a 24 hour advanced notice that an attack
> >was eminent in 72 hours or less, what would have been the outcome at
> >Pearl Harbor? Say on dec 6, Pearl was given intel that an attack would
> >come anytime in the next 72 hours.
>
> >What could have been done differently to affect the outcome?
>
> If the fleet had been dispersed, the attackers might have gone
> after the fuel storage area. If I recall, it was mostly above ground.
>
>
> http://www.cpf.navy.mil/pearlharbor/media/0501redhillavailability.html
>
>
> During the attack on Pearl Harbor, the fuel tank farm at
> the Pearl Harbor Navy Supply Depot was a strategic target
> that was extremely vulnerable but was not attached and
> remained undamaged through two waves of bombing.
>
> This tank farm held the entire fuel oil supply for the
> United States Pacific Fleet. A single bomb could have
> destroyed over four and a half million barrels of oil and
> would have prolonged the war for years, according to Admiral
> Chester Nimitz.

It's only been in recent years (late 1990s?) that the US declassed
that there were underground fuel tanks in the mountains around
Pearl Harbor and they had been there '41. I seem to recall reports
of the fuel stored in them on Dec 7th, '41, but I don't recall what
it was.

[Keith Willshaw]

"Vicente Vazquez" > wrote in message
...
>
> "Keith Willshaw" > escreveu na mensagem
> ...
> > > Given the 24 hour warning time, where would you position the
> > > carriers that were out at sea and why? Offensive or defensive?
> > They were too far way to make an effective counterstrike or defense.
>
> Keith,
>
> Sorry if this is a stupid question, but AFAIK, the Enterprise had some of
> its Dauntless (VS-6) on patrol while on her way to Pearl when they were
> engaged by jap planes returning to the carriers. One of them (pilot was
> Ensign McCarthy, IIRC) was shot down. Devastators from VT-6 were launched
to
> find and attack the jap force, but their search was fruitless. With a 24h
> advanced warning, could the Enterprise be put in a "favorable" position to
> attack the jap force, if this could be located? Did she have enough
> "firepower" to do face the jap fleet alone?
>

I think the likely outcome would have been the loss of the Enterprise
and her air crews, a far more valuable asset than the old battleships
that were lost.

Keith

[Stephen Harding]

Keith Willshaw wrote:

> "BOB URZ" > wrote in message
>
> > I have often wondered. Given a 24 hour advanced notice that an attack
> > was eminent in 72 hours or less, what would have been the outcome at
> > Pearl Harbor? Say on dec 6, Pearl was given intel that an attack would
> > come anytime in the next 72 hours.
> >
> > What could have been done differently to affect the outcome?

> The USAAF could have been alert with some fighters airbornes
> and the rest properly dispersed instead of parked together in the
> middle of the field lacking only a neon sign saying 'bomb here'

[...]

> The army hearings estimated that if they had been alert between 70 and
> 80 fighters could have been in the air.

[...]

> > What (if any) could have been used for night operations?
> > What would have been the likely outcome of an even plane
> > dogfight scenario?

Given the quality of Japanese aircraft and especially pilots in Dec 1941,
along with the American P-40 and pilots trained to dogfight, the AAF
wouldn't have done much better in actual A-A combat against the Japanese
than happened with no warning.

Perhaps the good part of having no warning was that more pilots lived,
while their aircraft died. Somewhat similar to Navy ships being sunk
in harbor (salvageable; lower loss of crew) versus open water.

It took time for US pilots to learn dogfighting Japanese fighters
wasn't good policy. That would have been unknown on Dec 7.

About the best the AAF could have salvaged with advanced notice and
preparation, was the saving of more aircraft, but I think such notice
would have killed more pilots; a net loss over the total surprise
that actually occurred.


SMH

[Bernardz]

In article >, jdupre5762
@aol.com says...
> >I have often wondered. Given a 24 hour advanced notice that an attack
> >was eminent in 72 hours or less, what would have been the outcome at
> >Pearl Harbor? Say on dec 6, Pearl was given intel that an attack would
> >come anytime in the next 72 hours.
>
> It might well have been worse in some ways. I understand that part of the
> Navy's planning was to move the fleet out of the harbor to a different
> anchorage that was much deeper. So if some of the ships could have been
> torpedoed or sunk by bombs there they might well have been unrecoverable.

Were any of the ships that were recovered worth much anyway?

Most of the effort that went into recovery was done for national pride
to deny the Japanese as much of a victory as possible.


--
People are not apathetic in a bookie shop.

13th saying of Bernard

[Keith Willshaw]

"Bernardz" > wrote in message
news:MPG.1a1cc45edfb975c29896ec@news...
> In article >, jdupre5762
> @aol.com says...
> > >I have often wondered. Given a 24 hour advanced notice that an attack
> > >was eminent in 72 hours or less, what would have been the outcome at
> > >Pearl Harbor? Say on dec 6, Pearl was given intel that an attack would
> > >come anytime in the next 72 hours.
> >
> > It might well have been worse in some ways. I understand that part of
the
> > Navy's planning was to move the fleet out of the harbor to a different
> > anchorage that was much deeper. So if some of the ships could have been
> > torpedoed or sunk by bombs there they might well have been
unrecoverable.
>
> Were any of the ships that were recovered worth much anyway?
>

Hell yes, they were used throughout the later part of the war.

> Most of the effort that went into recovery was done for national pride
> to deny the Japanese as much of a victory as possible.
>

Perhaps but do recall that the ships in the USN line at the battle
of the Surigao Strait, part of the largest naval battle of WW2
was made up of Battleships salvaged from Pearl Harbor.

Revenge was sweet that day.

Keith

[Keith Willshaw]

"Stephen Harding" > wrote in message
...
> Keith Willshaw wrote:
>
> > "BOB URZ" > wrote in message
> >
> > > I have often wondered. Given a 24 hour advanced notice that an attack
> > > was eminent in 72 hours or less, what would have been the outcome at
> > > Pearl Harbor? Say on dec 6, Pearl was given intel that an attack would
> > > come anytime in the next 72 hours.
> > >
> > > What could have been done differently to affect the outcome?
>
> > The USAAF could have been alert with some fighters airbornes
> > and the rest properly dispersed instead of parked together in the
> > middle of the field lacking only a neon sign saying 'bomb here'
>
> [...]
>
> > The army hearings estimated that if they had been alert between 70 and
> > 80 fighters could have been in the air.
>
> [...]
>
> > > What (if any) could have been used for night operations?
> > > What would have been the likely outcome of an even plane
> > > dogfight scenario?
>
> Given the quality of Japanese aircraft and especially pilots in Dec 1941,
> along with the American P-40 and pilots trained to dogfight, the AAF
> wouldn't have done much better in actual A-A combat against the Japanese
> than happened with no warning.
>

The handful of pilots who did get airborne managed to shoot down
a number of enemy aircraft, as many as 11 while losing 4 of their
own number, 3 of whom were shot down by 'friendly' AAA


> Perhaps the good part of having no warning was that more pilots lived,
> while their aircraft died. Somewhat similar to Navy ships being sunk
> in harbor (salvageable; lower loss of crew) versus open water.
>
> It took time for US pilots to learn dogfighting Japanese fighters
> wasn't good policy. That would have been unknown on Dec 7.
>
> About the best the AAF could have salvaged with advanced notice and
> preparation, was the saving of more aircraft, but I think such notice
> would have killed more pilots; a net loss over the total surprise
> that actually occurred.
>

Perhaps they would have learned those lessons a little earlier.

Keith

[Keith Willshaw]

"BobMac" > wrote in message
...
> Keith Willshaw wrote:
>

>
> IIRC, part of the commo net consisted of the radar operator running down
> the road to a gas station, to beg the use of their phone... Okay,
> hindsight's 20/20...
>

By the time of the attack the radar sets had a phone and reported
sighting the raid to the information room. The problem was there
was no system in place to make use of the fact that a raid had
been spotted or to tell the difference between expected friendly
aircraft and unexpected bad guys.

Keith

[Bill Jameson]

Vicente Vazquez wrote:
>
> "Keith Willshaw" > escreveu na mensagem
> ...
> > > Given the 24 hour warning time, where would you position the
> > > carriers that were out at sea and why? Offensive or defensive?
> > They were too far way to make an effective counterstrike or defense.
>
> Keith,
>
> Sorry if this is a stupid question, but AFAIK, the Enterprise had some of
> its Dauntless (VS-6) on patrol while on her way to Pearl when they were
> engaged by jap planes returning to the carriers. One of them (pilot was
> Ensign McCarthy, IIRC) was shot down. ...

In "The Big 'E'" by Comdr. Edward P. Stafford, USN; published 1962,
Scouting Six was engaged by the Japanese as they attempted to land at Ford
Island, Pearl Harbor, 8:20-8:35 am 12/7/41.

Bill Jameson

[Alan Minyard]

On 12 Nov 2003 00:16:58 GMT, (JDupre5762) wrote:

>>I have often wondered. Given a 24 hour advanced notice that an attack
>>was eminent in 72 hours or less, what would have been the outcome at
>>Pearl Harbor? Say on dec 6, Pearl was given intel that an attack would
>>come anytime in the next 72 hours.
>
>It might well have been worse in some ways. I understand that part of the
>Navy's planning was to move the fleet out of the harbor to a different
>anchorage that was much deeper. So if some of the ships could have been
>torpedoed or sunk by bombs there they might well have been unrecoverable.
>
>John Dupre'

And what anchorage would that be?? The Hawaiian Island are rather remote.

Al Minyard

[James Linn]

"Mike1" > wrote in message
...
>
> (Resisting "But Roosevelt *did* know urge")
>
Watched a documentary on Camp X, a place east of Toronto that trained
British, Canadian and later US Intelligence types including SOE, OSS, FBI,
USNMI etc.

One of the functions of the Camp was also as a distant adjunct to Bletchley
Park. They interviewed a female operator who claims that the information
sent to the US officials in regards to Pearl Harbour was sent 8 days
previous to Dec 7, and stated that hostile action imminent, within 8
days(from memory). There was also some prediction that it would have been on
a Sunday.

Take that for whatever its worth. There is no proof that the warning got to
anyone in power.


James Linn

[Keith Willshaw]

"James Linn" > wrote in message
...
>
> "Mike1" > wrote in message
> ...
> >
> > (Resisting "But Roosevelt *did* know urge")
> >
> Watched a documentary on Camp X, a place east of Toronto that trained
> British, Canadian and later US Intelligence types including SOE, OSS, FBI,
> USNMI etc.
>
> One of the functions of the Camp was also as a distant adjunct to
Bletchley
> Park. They interviewed a female operator who claims that the information
> sent to the US officials in regards to Pearl Harbour was sent 8 days
> previous to Dec 7, and stated that hostile action imminent, within 8
> days(from memory). There was also some prediction that it would have been
on
> a Sunday.
>
> Take that for whatever its worth. There is no proof that the warning got
to
> anyone in power.
>

********

There was no definite signals information pointing to
Pearl Harbor for the simple and adequate reason that
the Japanese never transmitted any. Not only did
the fleet maintain radio silence but fake messages
were transmitted from the region around Japan
to make people belive it was still in home waters.

Furthermore Bletchley Park was NOT reading the
Japanese Naval cipher at the time.

I recommend the book "The Emperors Codes"
by Michael Smith for the true story of British
work on Japanese ciphers and codes.

That said there was an expectation that war with Japan
was imminent and Pearl Harbor in common with
all other commands had been issued a war warning.

Keith

[No Spam!]

BOB URZ wrote:

> I have often wondered. Given a 24 hour advanced notice that an attack
> was eminent in 72 hours or less, what would have been the outcome at
> Pearl Harbor? Say on dec 6, Pearl was given intel that an attack would
> come anytime in the next 72 hours.
....snipped...
> It would make an interesting movie.....
>
> BOB

Assumption:
- They really believed the warning and took it seriously.

They could have sortied all naval vessels out of Pearl Harbor and
dispersed them out to sea. Perhaps the individual ships would have been
more vulnerable (if they were found), but I don't know if the Japanese,
on finding Pearl empty, had the fuel or the interest in doing an open
ocean search or just going back.

However, because they concentrated on bombing the ships, the critical
repair, maintenance and logistics facilities and stores were left
virtually untouched. If they got to Pearl and found no ships, would they
have seriously hit those other facilities and caused even more damage
than they did?

We also could have had a serious CAP up and assumed the unknown
incomings on radar were hostile instead of just... unknown. What
difference would this have made? Unknown.

More importantly, on a strategic level, if we had known about the attack
in advance, would the US have reacted as strongly and been as committed
to the war? Morale is always a critical (but often overlooked) factor.
Without "a day that will live in infamy", what would have been the US's
reaction? Would we have been as committed?

[Stephen Harding]

Keith Willshaw wrote:

> The handful of pilots who did get airborne managed to shoot down
> a number of enemy aircraft, as many as 11 while losing 4 of their
> own number, 3 of whom were shot down by 'friendly' AAA

I *think* by the time AAF aircraft got airborne, the Japanese Zero escort
had largely separated from its charges, given the surprise of the attack.

If surprise had not been achieved, fighter escort probably would have
stuck with its dive/torpedo bomber assignments. I think attacking P-40s
would have had a much more difficult time.

This assumes a true air battle over Pearl would have played out just
as it did in the SWPA or Central Pacific area a year later. I don't see
why it would not have.

> > About the best the AAF could have salvaged with advanced notice and
> > preparation, was the saving of more aircraft, but I think such notice
> > would have killed more pilots; a net loss over the total surprise
> > that actually occurred.
> >
>
> Perhaps they would have learned those lessons a little earlier.

They were lessons waiting to be learned. The sooner the better I guess.


SMH

[Keith Willshaw]

"No Spam!" > wrote in message
...
> BOB URZ wrote:
>

>
> More importantly, on a strategic level, if we had known about the attack
> in advance, would the US have reacted as strongly and been as committed
> to the war?

Hell Yes , an attack on its major bases could hardly be overlooked
and the losses in the Phillipines would have been just as great.
It would still have been a day of infamy.

Keith

[mah]

Bernardz wrote:
>
> Were any of the ships that were recovered worth much anyway?
>

If my brains cells aren't totally rotted away, I believe they were used
for pre-invasion bombardment in the island hopping campaigns. While big
gun cruisers were the norm in WW II, a battleship can throw a lot of
metal.

>
> Most of the effort that went into recovery was done for national pride
> to deny the Japanese as much of a victory as possible.
>

National pride was an important issue, but was the space needed to keep
the harbor open to refit and provision other ships? If battleship row
was unavailable, how many ships could Pearl Harbor support in a timely
fashion?

my 0.02

MAH

[Keith Willshaw]

"BobMac" > wrote in message
...
> Keith Willshaw wrote:
>
> >
> > There was no definite signals information pointing to
> > Pearl Harbor for the simple and adequate reason that
> > the Japanese never transmitted any. Not only did
> > the fleet maintain radio silence but fake messages
> > were transmitted from the region around Japan
> > to make people belive it was still in home waters.
> >
>
> Keith, IIRC, there was a German request to their Washington embassy for
> some information on specific topics, which was intercepted several
> months before Pearl Harbour (by the Brits, _I_ _think_ - it's been a
> while.) About two thirds of the request concerned information about
> American facilities and units in the Pacific theatre. It was obvious
> that the original writer of the requests did not speak English, and
> there was a strong likelihood (based on mistakes in nomenclature) that
> the original writer was a native Japanese speaker.
>

It would be surprising if the Japanese had not been collecting
data on US fleet anchorages, I am sure the US Naval attache
in Tokyo was doing the same thing

> (I saw this quoted in a general-audience book on Secret Intelligence.
> They used it as an exercise in analysis of data.)
>
> The obvious conclusion was that Somebody was going to do Something
> pretty soon to American units or facilities in the Pacific. That
> somebody would be an aggressive nation more or less allied with Germany,
> and with the ability to mount some kind of an offensive in the Pacific,
> where the common language was Japanese. (Hmm... who could it be, who
> Could it be?)
>

That much was known, a war warning had been issued to all
US commands days before the attack, everyone KNEW
a war was coming, the question was where and when and the
smart money was on a joint attack on the Phillipines and
Malaya. Thats why Force Z had been dispatched after all.

As for Pearl I am sure the USN had detailed plans of the IJN bases
in the home islands and Truk, this could hardly be read as a
warning of an early intent to attack them without warning.

> The document was dismissed as unimportant by, IIRC, the head of the FBI,
> on the grounds that he didn't like the messenger who brought it. Now, I
> don't believe in conspiracy theories, but stupid decisions for
> irrelevant reasons, I don't just believe in - I've seen it done!
>

The FBI had no juridstiction in matters of naval policy and
would have been right not to be surprised IMHO. Naval
attaches are supposed to ask questions, its what they are
paid for. The real scandal was how little had been done to put
Pearl Harbor on a war footing even after the war warning
had been released.

Keith

[Paul J. Adam]

In message >,
Mike1 > writes
>Carrier aircraft could have flown to land-based fields, refueled there,
>then attacked the Jap carriers as they approached.

Consider how effective US aviation was against IJN forces in early 1942.
No chance of a Midway Moment (catching carriers in the midst of a
mission change), however bravely the USN crews try to press their
attacks.

>Subs may have also have been able to intercept.

And if they get to fire, and hit, so what? They're at the start of the
learning curve of "why don't USN torpedoes work?" in December 1941.

--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBox<at>jrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

[Paul J. Adam]

In message >, John Keeney >
writes
>Catalinas for patrol, nobody was going to attack Pearl at night in '41:
>that would have required night carrier ops.

Taranto was a night raid... it could be done, it _had_ been done.

--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBox<at>jrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

[John Carrier]

Good points. A sortie to safety might have been best, but if they had been
caught a lot of hardware and good men would have gone to the bottom. Any
attempt to engage with the battle line would have likely been disastrous.
Staying put, condition zebra set and GQ at 7:00 am with fighter cover may
well have proven best ... I doubt they would have imagined the need for
torpedo nets (a shame, had they been rigged, the damage would have been far
less).

OTOH, the devastating losses forced the US to abandon traditional thinking.
The battle line was obsolete. The cargru was the wave of the future. It
all came to fruition at Midway.

I still think the Pearl Harbor strike was one of the most brilliantly
planned and executed tactical air strikes of all time. Strategically, it
was wrong. Geopolitically, it was dead wrong.

R / John

"Keith Willshaw" > wrote in message
...
>
> "BOB URZ" > wrote in message
> ...
> > I have often wondered. Given a 24 hour advanced notice that an attack
> > was eminent in 72 hours or less, what would have been the outcome at
> > Pearl Harbor? Say on dec 6, Pearl was given intel that an attack would
> > come anytime in the next 72 hours.
> >
> > What could have been done differently to affect the outcome?
>
> They could have issued ammunition for the army fixed AA guns
> instead of keeping it in depots (the army didnt like its shells
> getting dirty - no kidding)
>
> The USAAF could have been alert with some fighters airbornes
> and the rest properly dispersed instead of parked together in the
> middle of the field lacking only a neon sign saying 'bomb here'
>
> The fleet could have been on a higher state of readiness instead
> of enjoying a sunday morning lie in
>
> They could have taken some basic precautions like rigging torpedo
> nets.
>
>
> > Granted at that point in the war, some of the hardware was not up
> > to snuff with the Japanese. With a 24 hour warning, how many fighter
> > aircraft could have been prepared, armed, and either flying or on
> > alert?
>
> The army hearings estimated that if they had been alert between 70 and
> 80 fighters could have been in the air.
>
> > What (if any) could have been used for night operations?
> > What would have been the likely outcome of an even plane
> > dogfight scenario?
> >
> > Given the 24 hour warning time, where would you position the
> > carriers that were out at sea and why? Offensive or defensive?
> >
>
> They were too far way to make an effective counterstrike or defense.
>
> > What about the surface ships in the harbor. In or out?
> > Was there better way to position them against air attack?
> >
>
> The BB's could have been sent back to the West Coast.
>
> > What combination of aircraft could have been marshalled for an
> > offensive strike against the carrier group at the range they
> > were at? Were there enough trained aviators to even attempt this
> > at this time? Were the Japanese aviators better trained and equipped
> > at this point in the war?
> >
>
> There really wasnt an effective strike force available.
>
> > Would the crude land based radar have been any major help with the
> > advanced warning and defensive attack ?
> >
>
> The land based radar detected the incoming attack very succesfully,
> trouble is the information center couldnt handle the data and
> simply assumed the aircraft were friendly, no IFF was available.
>
> > Would the US fleet have attempted to put to sea to go after the Japanese
> > task force, or stay close in for the defence against the possible
> > invasion of Hawaii? Was the fleet safer at sea knowing the
> > japs were coming, or safer in the harbor?
> >
>
> Safer halfway to San Francisco, sortieing against the carriers
> was a hopeless task, they were too slow to catch them and
> would likley have lost more men as ships were sunk in the
> deep ocean and would not have been salvageable.
>
> Keith
>
>

[Keith Willshaw]

"John Carrier" > wrote in message
...
> Good points. A sortie to safety might have been best, but if they had
been
> caught a lot of hardware and good men would have gone to the bottom. Any
> attempt to engage with the battle line would have likely been disastrous.
> Staying put, condition zebra set and GQ at 7:00 am with fighter cover may
> well have proven best ... I doubt they would have imagined the need for
> torpedo nets (a shame, had they been rigged, the damage would have been
far
> less).
>

Thet didnt have to imagine the need, the FAA had shown at Taranto that
you COULD sir drop torpeddoes in shallow water.

> OTOH, the devastating losses forced the US to abandon traditional
thinking.
> The battle line was obsolete. The cargru was the wave of the future. It
> all came to fruition at Midway.
>
> I still think the Pearl Harbor strike was one of the most brilliantly
> planned and executed tactical air strikes of all time. Strategically, it
> was wrong. Geopolitically, it was dead wrong.
>

The whole decision to wage war on the USA was disastrous,
once that decision was made however the Japanese navy
had to make the most of the opportunity that they were
offered. Yamamoto knew he could not fight a long war
and the only possible chance, slim as it was, was to destroy
the US Pacific fleet as an offensive unit while other forces
seized the Phillipines and NEI.

Keith

[John Keeney]

"Paul J. Adam" > wrote in message
...
> In message >, John Keeney >
> writes
> >Catalinas for patrol, nobody was going to attack Pearl at night in '41:
> >that would have required night carrier ops.
>
> Taranto was a night raid... it could be done, it _had_ been done.

But that wasn't Pearl. But I concede your point that I'm applying
my own prejudices in a tactically unsound way.

[John Keeney]

"Keith Willshaw" > wrote in message
...
>
> "Vicente Vazquez" > wrote in message
> ...
> >
> > "Keith Willshaw" > escreveu na mensagem
> > ...
> > > > Given the 24 hour warning time, where would you position the
> > > > carriers that were out at sea and why? Offensive or defensive?
> > > They were too far way to make an effective counterstrike or defense.
> >
> > Keith,
> >
> > Sorry if this is a stupid question, but AFAIK, the Enterprise had some
of
> > its Dauntless (VS-6) on patrol while on her way to Pearl when they were
> > engaged by jap planes returning to the carriers. One of them (pilot was
> > Ensign McCarthy, IIRC) was shot down. Devastators from VT-6 were
launched
> to
> > find and attack the jap force, but their search was fruitless. With a
24h
> > advanced warning, could the Enterprise be put in a "favorable" position
to
> > attack the jap force, if this could be located? Did she have enough
> > "firepower" to do face the jap fleet alone?
> >
>
> I think the likely outcome would have been the loss of the Enterprise
> and her air crews, a far more valuable asset than the old battleships
> that were lost.

I suspect the demonstrated Japanese inclination of the historic
event to withdraw and husband resources would have prevailed
and they would have declined a prolonged fleet battle. After
their attack, how were their av-gas and munitions supplies looking?

[Marc Reeve]

Alan Minyard > wrote:
> On 12 Nov 2003 00:16:58 GMT, (JDupre5762) wrote:
>
> >>I have often wondered. Given a 24 hour advanced notice that an attack
> >>was eminent in 72 hours or less, what would have been the outcome at
> >>Pearl Harbor? Say on dec 6, Pearl was given intel that an attack would
> >>come anytime in the next 72 hours.
> >
> >It might well have been worse in some ways. I understand that part of the
> >Navy's planning was to move the fleet out of the harbor to a different
> >anchorage that was much deeper. So if some of the ships could have been
> >torpedoed or sunk by bombs there they might well have been unrecoverable.
> >
> >John Dupre'
>
> And what anchorage would that be?? The Hawaiian Island are rather remote.
>
On exercises, the Pacific Fleet frequently anchored off Lahaina (Maui)
rather than returning to Pearl Harbor. This is probably the "other
anchorage" that Dupre' is referencing. And the water is a lot deeper off
of Lahaina, for sure...

-Marc
--
Marc Reeve
actual email address after removal of 4s & spaces is
c4m4r4a4m4a4n a4t c4r4u4z4i4o d4o4t c4o4m

[Marc Reeve]

Keith Willshaw > wrote:
> "Bernardz" > wrote in message
> news:MPG.1a1cc45edfb975c29896ec@news...
> > In article >, jdupre5762
> > @aol.com says...
> > > >I have often wondered. Given a 24 hour advanced notice that an attack
> > > >was eminent in 72 hours or less, what would have been the outcome at
> > > >Pearl Harbor? Say on dec 6, Pearl was given intel that an attack would
> > > >come anytime in the next 72 hours.
> > >
> > > It might well have been worse in some ways. I understand that part of
> > > the Navy's planning was to move the fleet out of the harbor to a
> > > different anchorage that was much deeper. So if some of the ships
> > > could have been torpedoed or sunk by bombs there they might well have
> > > been unrecoverable.

The anchorage in question was off of Lahaina (Maui).
> >
> > Were any of the ships that were recovered worth much anyway?
> >
>
> Hell yes, they were used throughout the later part of the war.

Mostly for pre-invasion bombardment. Which had effects that were
decidedly debatable. Did rattle the defenders' cages if nothing else.
>
> > Most of the effort that went into recovery was done for national pride
> > to deny the Japanese as much of a victory as possible.
> >
>
> Perhaps but do recall that the ships in the USN line at the battle
> of the Surigao Strait, part of the largest naval battle of WW2
> was made up of Battleships salvaged from Pearl Harbor.

Well, two "salvaged" (West Virginia and California) and three repaired
(Maryland and Tennessee were inboard of West Virginia & California,
Pennsylvania was already in drydock on 7 December).
>
> Revenge was sweet that day.
>
Damn straight, even though it was a bit one-sided - six battleships
mounting a total of 58 large-caliber guns, vs. 1 battleship, 1 cruiser &
1 destroyer (the rest of the Southern Force had been taken out by
torpedo attacks from PT boats and destroyers.). The Battle Line opened
fire at 0353 and had pretty much obliterated the one Japanese battleship
by 0408, when the Cease Fire was passed. The cruiser (the eternally
battered Mogami) and destroyer retreated with heavy damage, only to be
sunk by aircraft the following morning.

(There, I got a military aviation reference in the last sentence.)

-Marc
--
Marc Reeve
actual email address after removal of 4s & spaces is
c4m4r4a4m4a4n a4t c4r4u4z4i4o d4o4t c4o4m

[Bernardz]

> >
> > Most of the effort that went into recovery was done for national pride
> > to deny the Japanese as much of a victory as possible.
> >
>
> National pride was an important issue, but was the space needed to keep
> the harbor open to refit and provision other ships? If battleship row
> was unavailable, how many ships could Pearl Harbor support in a timely
> fashion?

I doubt that they were worth the money.

They were used apparently a lot of money was spent on California, West
Virginia and Nevada. A lot was lost on the Oglala when she went down.

Bit of the Cassin and the Downes were put into new ships just to taunt
the Japanese.

>
> my 0.02
>
> MAH
>

--
People are not apathetic in a bookie shop.

13th saying of Bernard

[David P Benjamin]

Paul J. Adam ) wrote:
: In message >,
: Mike1 > writes
: >Carrier aircraft could have flown to land-based fields, refueled there,
: >then attacked the Jap carriers as they approached.

: Consider how effective US aviation was against IJN forces in early 1942.
: No chance of a Midway Moment (catching carriers in the midst of a
: mission change), however bravely the USN crews try to press their
: attacks.

: >Subs may have also have been able to intercept.

: And if they get to fire, and hit, so what? They're at the start of the
: learning curve of "why don't USN torpedoes work?" in December 1941.

Not to mention that USN practice against fleet units was to
fire on sonar indications. The realization that the IJN wasn't
really good at ASW would come later.


--
David Benjamin

[Alan Minyard]

On Wed, 12 Nov 2003 10:09:50 -0500, "James Linn" > wrote:

>
>"Mike1" > wrote in message
...
>>
>> (Resisting "But Roosevelt *did* know urge")
>>
>Watched a documentary on Camp X, a place east of Toronto that trained
>British, Canadian and later US Intelligence types including SOE, OSS, FBI,
>USNMI etc.
>
>One of the functions of the Camp was also as a distant adjunct to Bletchley
>Park. They interviewed a female operator who claims that the information
>sent to the US officials in regards to Pearl Harbour was sent 8 days
>previous to Dec 7, and stated that hostile action imminent, within 8
>days(from memory). There was also some prediction that it would have been on
>a Sunday.
>
>Take that for whatever its worth. There is no proof that the warning got to
>anyone in power.
>
>
>James Linn
>
We knew that *something* was in the works, but everyone (including the Brits)
thought that the attack would come in the PI, the Dutch East Indies, etc. No
one foresaw the attack on Pearl.

Al Minyard

[Seraphim]

(Marc Reeve) wrote in
:
> Keith Willshaw > wrote:
>> "Bernardz" > wrote:
>>
>>> Most of the effort that went into recovery was done for national
>>> pride to deny the Japanese as much of a victory as possible.
>>
>> Perhaps but do recall that the ships in the USN line at the battle
>> of the Surigao Strait, part of the largest naval battle of WW2
>> was made up of Battleships salvaged from Pearl Harbor.
>
> Well, two "salvaged" (West Virginia and California) and three
> repaired (Maryland and Tennessee were inboard of West Virginia &
> California, Pennsylvania was already in drydock on 7 December).

Well, Pennsylvania never actually had a chance to fire her guns at
Surigao Strait, so it could be argued that she didn't really "take part"
in the battle.

[Drazen Kramaric]

On Tue, 11 Nov 2003 16:57:14 -0600, BOB URZ
> wrote:

>I have often wondered. Given a 24 hour advanced notice that an attack
>was eminent in 72 hours or less, what would have been the outcome at
>Pearl Harbor? Say on dec 6, Pearl was given intel that an attack would
>come anytime in the next 72 hours.

If Japanese found out Americans were ready three days before the
attack was scheduled, Nagumo was under order to abort the mission.


Drax

[Marc Reeve]

Seraphim > wrote:
> (Marc Reeve) wrote in
> :
> > Keith Willshaw > wrote:
> >> "Bernardz" > wrote:
> >>
> >>> Most of the effort that went into recovery was done for national
> >>> pride to deny the Japanese as much of a victory as possible.
> >>
> >> Perhaps but do recall that the ships in the USN line at the battle
> >> of the Surigao Strait, part of the largest naval battle of WW2
> >> was made up of Battleships salvaged from Pearl Harbor.
> >
> > Well, two "salvaged" (West Virginia and California) and three
> > repaired (Maryland and Tennessee were inboard of West Virginia &
> > California, Pennsylvania was already in drydock on 7 December).
>
> Well, Pennsylvania never actually had a chance to fire her guns at
> Surigao Strait, so it could be argued that she didn't really "take part"
> in the battle.

True dat. Can't recall whether it was because she had non-functional
radar, or no radar at all (being the least damaged of the Pearl Harbor
battleships, she didn't get as extensive a rebuild as the others.)

-Marc
--
Marc Reeve
actual email address after removal of 4s & spaces is
c4m4r4a4m4a4n a4t c4r4u4z4i4o d4o4t c4o4m