What if we ignored N. Africa and the MTO? [Archive]

Cub Driver

December 1st 03, 11:31 PM

>There is a real question of whether we had the ability to launch any
>invasion of Europe in 1943, let alone sucessfully. Our costly
>"learning experiences" in Tunisia do raise the question of how ready
>the US was to take on the Wehrmacht.

If the Allies (not just the U.S.) had landed in France in November
1942, they would have been massacred.

The U.S. Army at the Battle of Kasserine Pass in February 1943 was
indeed no match for the German army (properly called the Heer, not the
Wehrmacht). It was a fairly inexpensive graduate course in the
realities of combat. The USAAF, however, fared very well in comparison
to the Luftwaffe. And the USN was streets ahead of the Kriegsmarine.

Note also that the North African campaign proved the ability of the
United States to launch an invasion across 4,000 miles of open
ocean--something never done before, and rarely since. That was quite
an accomplishment. It also turned a German ally -- the French colonial
army -- into a member of the Allied forces, and thus paved the way for
the Free French role in 1944.

>Later on, a lot of German troops were tied up in the MTO keeping us
>tied up in the MTO. Interesting question who came out ahead there...

Given that German and Italian prisoners are generally numbered well to
the north of 300,000, there is no question but that the North African
campaign was an astounding success for the Allies. Tunisia was an Axis
defeat on the scale of Stalingrad.

Sicily too was a splendid victory. It's true that the Allies got
bogged down in Italy in 1944, but that was largely because resources
were diverted to the invasion of France. I don't think it's fair to
say that the U.S. was "tied up" in Italy. We could have left any time
we wanted to. It was the Germans who were tied down.

all the best -- Dan Ford
email:

see the Warbird's Forum at www.warbirdforum.com
and the Piper Cub Forum at www.pipercubforum.com

Seraphim

December 2nd 03, 04:31 AM

(ArtKramr) wrote in
:

> What then? The war in central Europe (ETO) could have gotten our
> full resouces, D Day would have been a year earlier and the war
> would have been over a lot sooner, German troops in No. Africa and
> the MTO would have simply been isolated and would died on the vine.
> Why not?

To just list what I see as some reasons (In no particular order):

Lack of experience: The invasions of North Africa, Sicily, Salerno, and
Anzio were learning experiences for the Allies. There would have likely
been a lot of mistakes made without them.

U-boats: The U-boat menace wasn't really under control until mid 1943.
This would have added extra difficulties in supplying a large army in
mainland Europe (this is one of the reasons that the destruction of the
German airforce didn't really get started till 1944).

Aircraft: In 1943 the German airforce was more intact than in 1944.
The Allies would have been dealing with a significantly stronger
Luftwaffe while at the same time lacking some of their better aircraft.

Italy (and MTO operations in general): Knocking Italy out of the war
was worth a lot to the Allies, both on land and at sea. Germany was
forced to devote units to Italy that could have been used elsewhere
(like repelling an allied landing), and British navel assets were able
to devote their energies to tasks other than trying to counter Italian
and German ships (a task which tied up several British capital ships
for most of the early war). Isolating the Germans in North Africa would
have taken a lot of material, and would have been very difficult. An
in-the-war Italy and the need to contest the Germans in the MTO would
have still been a big equipment sink (definitely bigger than the
Italian sideshow in 1944 was).

Lack of specialized equipment: The Allies had a lot of specialized
equipment that played an important part in the D-Day operations. An
invasion in 1943 would have most likely lacked things like enough
specialized landing craft, the more interesting supply solutions, and
specialized tanks.

John Keeney

December 2nd 03, 06:43 AM

"ArtKramr" > wrote in message
...
> What then? The war in central Europe (ETO) could have gotten our full
> resouces, D Day would have been a year earlier and the war would have
been
> over a lot sooner, German troops in No. Africa and the MTO would have
simply
> been isolated and would died on the vine. Why not?

Because the Axis keeps a lot of natural resources available.
The Med becomes an axis lake with secure lines of communication
to Africa and greatly simplifying that beyond.
Heck, with out North African bases there's not even an attack
on Ploesti.

Bernardz

December 2nd 03, 09:47 AM

In article >, gme6
@cornell.edu says...
> (ArtKramr) wrote in
> :
>
> > What then? The war in central Europe (ETO) could have gotten our
> > full resouces, D Day would have been a year earlier and the war
> > would have been over a lot sooner, German troops in No. Africa and
> > the MTO would have simply been isolated and would died on the vine.
> > Why not?
>
> To just list what I see as some reasons (In no particular order):
>
> Lack of experience: The invasions of North Africa, Sicily, Salerno, and
> Anzio were learning experiences for the Allies. There would have likely
> been a lot of mistakes made without them.

Perhaps a better plan might have been rather then fight a war in North
Africa do a direct invasion of Sicily from Egypt.

As it was North Africa costs the Axis dearly. IIRC about 25% of axis
strength.

>
> U-boats: The U-boat menace wasn't really under control until mid 1943.
> This would have added extra difficulties in supplying a large army in
> mainland Europe (this is one of the reasons that the destruction of the
> German airforce didn't really get started till 1944).
>
> Aircraft: In 1943 the German airforce was more intact than in 1944.
> The Allies would have been dealing with a significantly stronger
> Luftwaffe while at the same time lacking some of their better aircraft.
>
> Italy (and MTO operations in general): Knocking Italy out of the war
> was worth a lot to the Allies, both on land and at sea. Germany was
> forced to devote units to Italy that could have been used elsewhere
> (like repelling an allied landing), and British navel assets were able
> to devote their energies to tasks other than trying to counter Italian
> and German ships (a task which tied up several British capital ships
> for most of the early war). Isolating the Germans in North Africa would
> have taken a lot of material, and would have been very difficult. An
> in-the-war Italy and the need to contest the Germans in the MTO would
> have still been a big equipment sink (definitely bigger than the
> Italian sideshow in 1944 was).

As it was in 1944, Italy diverted almost a million German troops from
more important fronts. It cost the Allies almost as much but they could
afford it.

>
> Lack of specialized equipment: The Allies had a lot of specialized
> equipment that played an important part in the D-Day operations. An
> invasion in 1943 would have most likely lacked things like enough
> specialized landing craft, the more interesting supply solutions, and
> specialized tanks.

Not as much as you would think. The invasion of Sicily involved more
landing crafts then D-Day.

--
Intelligence does not imply reason or purpose

17th saying of Bernard

Keith Willshaw

December 2nd 03, 10:57 AM

"Bernardz" > wrote in message
news:MPG.1a370ac351885d1d989763@news...
> In article >, gme6

>
> Perhaps a better plan might have been rather then fight a war in North
> Africa do a direct invasion of Sicily from Egypt.
>

Look at a map, without control of Algeria, Tunisia and Libya your invasion
convoy will have to go round the Cape through the Suez Canal and then fight
its way through an area where the axis have air bases on both sides of the
Med

> As it was North Africa costs the Axis dearly. IIRC about 25% of axis
> strength.
>

Hardly a compelling argument for not fighting them there then.

>
> >
> > U-boats: The U-boat menace wasn't really under control until mid 1943.
> > This would have added extra difficulties in supplying a large army in
> > mainland Europe (this is one of the reasons that the destruction of the
> > German airforce didn't really get started till 1944).
> >
> > Aircraft: In 1943 the German airforce was more intact than in 1944.
> > The Allies would have been dealing with a significantly stronger
> > Luftwaffe while at the same time lacking some of their better aircraft.
> >
> > Italy (and MTO operations in general): Knocking Italy out of the war
> > was worth a lot to the Allies, both on land and at sea. Germany was
> > forced to devote units to Italy that could have been used elsewhere
> > (like repelling an allied landing), and British navel assets were able
> > to devote their energies to tasks other than trying to counter Italian
> > and German ships (a task which tied up several British capital ships
> > for most of the early war). Isolating the Germans in North Africa would
> > have taken a lot of material, and would have been very difficult. An
> > in-the-war Italy and the need to contest the Germans in the MTO would
> > have still been a big equipment sink (definitely bigger than the
> > Italian sideshow in 1944 was).
>
> As it was in 1944, Italy diverted almost a million German troops from
> more important fronts. It cost the Allies almost as much but they could
> afford it.
>
>
> >
> > Lack of specialized equipment: The Allies had a lot of specialized
> > equipment that played an important part in the D-Day operations. An
> > invasion in 1943 would have most likely lacked things like enough
> > specialized landing craft, the more interesting supply solutions, and
> > specialized tanks.
>
>
> Not as much as you would think. The invasion of Sicily involved more
> landing crafts then D-Day.
>

Operation Husky involved around 3000 ships and landing craft while
overlord utilised in excess of 5000. While both invasions involved a
similar size assault force, 3 Commonwealth and 2 US divisions the rate
of reinforcement in subsequent waves was much higher in Normand
which in part was a result of the lessons learned in Sicily.

Keith

Bernardz

December 2nd 03, 03:17 PM

In article >,
says...
> >
> > Perhaps a better plan might have been rather then fight a war in North
> > Africa do a direct invasion of Sicily from Egypt.
> >
>
> Look at a map, without control of Algeria, Tunisia and Libya your invasion
> convoy will have to go round the Cape through the Suez Canal and then fight

You probably find that more then enough supplies came as almost all
supplies to the army in Egypt came that way anyway.

> its way through an area where the axis have air bases on both sides of the
> Med

Point taken. They probably could have done it but it is risky.

>
> > As it was North Africa costs the Axis dearly. IIRC about 25% of axis
> > strength.
> >
>
> Hardly a compelling argument for not fighting them there then.

It is as long as Russia held! From the US and Britain point of view,
they needed the war as they showed the world that while Russia was
losing so much that they were fighting too. It also enabled them to
learn as others have pointed out.

I would argue from Axis view the whole war in North Africa was an
expensive waste. A best all he could do was win in the Suez for awhile.
Which the Allies could and did get on without it.

As a result large numbers of German troops and air force were uselessly
stuck at the end of a long supply line carrying large numbers of useless
Italians soldiers.

The effect in some parts of the German military was quite dramatic for
example large numbers of German transport planes were diverted and lost
over North Africa at a time when they were badly needed in Russia.

Apparently Hitler originally wanted to defend only a small part of
Africa, that is what he should have done.

--
Intelligence does not imply reason or purpose

17th saying of Bernard

Keith Willshaw

December 2nd 03, 06:15 PM

"Bernardz" > wrote in message
news:MPG.1a375818f316f17f989769@news...
> In article >,
> says...
> > >
> > > Perhaps a better plan might have been rather then fight a war in North
> > > Africa do a direct invasion of Sicily from Egypt.
> > >
> >
> > Look at a map, without control of Algeria, Tunisia and Libya your
invasion
> > convoy will have to go round the Cape through the Suez Canal and then
fight
>
> You probably find that more then enough supplies came as almost all
> supplies to the army in Egypt came that way anyway.
>

For the British eighth army that's certainly true but the Torch convoys
sailed from the US and Britain. The Sicily invasion force staged
out of the North African ports

>
> > its way through an area where the axis have air bases on both sides of
the
> > Med
>
> Point taken. They probably could have done it but it is risky.
>
> >
> > > As it was North Africa costs the Axis dearly. IIRC about 25% of axis
> > > strength.
> > >
> >
> > Hardly a compelling argument for not fighting them there then.
>
> It is as long as Russia held! From the US and Britain point of view,
> they needed the war as they showed the world that while Russia was
> losing so much that they were fighting too. It also enabled them to
> learn as others have pointed out.
>

They also needed to hold the Middle East oil fields and
Suez canal. Allowing the Germans to seize those would
have altered the whole strategic balance. A third Reich
with unlimited oil supplies doesn't bear thinking about.

> I would argue from Axis view the whole war in North Africa was an
> expensive waste. A best all he could do was win in the Suez for awhile.
> Which the Allies could and did get on without it.
>

This was true of much of the Axis war strategy. The capture of Norway
and Denmark were pyhricc victories as they tied down 20 or more
German divisions to hold down nations that had been effectively giving
them everything they wanted anyway.

> As a result large numbers of German troops and air force were uselessly
> stuck at the end of a long supply line carrying large numbers of useless
> Italians soldiers.
>

Which was bad for them and good for the allies.

> The effect in some parts of the German military was quite dramatic for
> example large numbers of German transport planes were diverted and lost
> over North Africa at a time when they were badly needed in Russia.
>
> Apparently Hitler originally wanted to defend only a small part of
> Africa, that is what he should have done.
>

This was an impractical proposition however. Sooner or later the
allies were going to assemble a large force and push them out.

Keith

Cub Driver

December 3rd 03, 12:20 AM

>As a result large numbers of German troops and air force were uselessly
>stuck at the end of a long supply line carrying large numbers of useless
>Italians soldiers.

Not entirely useless. At Tunis, the Italians were still fighting the
day after the Germans surrendered.

all the best -- Dan Ford
email:

see the Warbird's Forum at www.warbirdforum.com
and the Piper Cub Forum at www.pipercubforum.com

Gernot Hassenpflug

December 3rd 03, 04:42 AM

Bernardz > writes:

> In article >,
> says...
> As a result large numbers of German troops and air force were uselessly
> stuck at the end of a long supply line carrying large numbers of useless
> Italians soldiers.

Oops, you've not read the better books then, have you? Ach, I'll leave
it to Keith to disembowel you. I don't advise you try this on the
sci.military.naval group :-)

> The effect in some parts of the German military was quite dramatic for
> example large numbers of German transport planes were diverted and lost
> over North Africa at a time when they were badly needed in Russia.

That is a good point, but hardly subtle. The Germans and everybody
else always had too few of these.

> Apparently Hitler originally wanted to defend only a small part of
> Africa, that is what he should have done.

What you say above is in contradiction to this. He should have left
Africa completely. But hey, that's not what an alliance is about. If
you want to keep it, that is.

--
G Hassenpflug * IJN & JMSDF equipment/history fan

Cub Driver

December 3rd 03, 10:33 AM

>> Apparently Hitler originally wanted to defend only a small part of
>> Africa, that is what he should have done.
>
>What you say above is in contradiction to this. He should have left
>Africa completely. But hey, that's not what an alliance is about. If
>you want to keep it, that is.

The Axis nations seemed not to grasp the notion of alliances. Germany
had a perfectly good ally on its northern flank in the war against
Russia, but instead of supplying materiel to Finland, it *sold* the
stuff. Not only did it sell the Bf-109s--it even charged the Finns for
the aircraft it captured in France and sent north to the FAF, which
was already equipped with numerous foreign aircraft as a result of the
Winter War of 1939-1940.

As for Japan--better not go into how the Japanese treated the
"liberated" nations of Southeast Asia.

all the best -- Dan Ford
email:

see the Warbird's Forum at www.warbirdforum.com
and the Piper Cub Forum at www.pipercubforum.com

Bernardz

December 3rd 03, 01:42 PM

In article >,
says...
>
> "Bernardz" > wrote in message
> news:MPG.1a375818f316f17f989769@news...
> > In article >,
> > says...
> > > >
> > > > Perhaps a better plan might have been rather then fight a war in North
> > > > Africa do a direct invasion of Sicily from Egypt.
> > > >
> > >
> > > Look at a map, without control of Algeria, Tunisia and Libya your
> invasion
> > > convoy will have to go round the Cape through the Suez Canal and then
> fight
> >
> > You probably find that more then enough supplies came as almost all
> > supplies to the army in Egypt came that way anyway.
> >
>
> For the British eighth army that's certainly true but the Torch convoys
> sailed from the US and Britain.
> The Sicily invasion force staged out of the North African ports

Torch were dependent on British forces for the majority contribution.
I think you will find that almost all supplies went though the Suez
until very late in the war.

>
> >
> > > its way through an area where the axis have air bases on both sides of
> the
> > > Med
> >
> > Point taken. They probably could have done it but it is risky.
> >
> > >
> > > > As it was North Africa costs the Axis dearly. IIRC about 25% of axis
> > > > strength.
> > > >
> > >
> > > Hardly a compelling argument for not fighting them there then.
> >
> > It is as long as Russia held! From the US and Britain point of view,
> > they needed the war as they showed the world that while Russia was
> > losing so much that they were fighting too. It also enabled them to
> > learn as others have pointed out.
> >
>
> They also needed to hold the Middle East oil fields and
> Suez canal. Allowing the Germans to seize those would
> have altered the whole strategic balance. A third Reich
> with unlimited oil supplies doesn't bear thinking about.

What Middle Eastern oil fields in the early 1940s in the Middle East?
Probably Egypt is Hitler best bet but its not much.

The Gulf is a long way away from Egypt. If Hitler could not get the
adequate supplies to Egypt, I cannot see him making the Gulf.

But even if he did make it, the Gulf oil fields there were just starting
up. IIRC Gulf oil production was very small about 40,000 barrels per
day. I doubt they would get that as the British had established plans in
place to make sure that they were destroyed if the Germans came. It
would be like what the Japanese in the Pacific or the Germans in Russia
found when the captured the oil fields, they had been destroyed already.

No way the mid-east could have been developed quickly enough to meet the
oil needs even the most desperate powers of the time.

Worst case for the Allies, Hitler has a whole lot more borders to
defend.

>
> > I would argue from Axis view the whole war in North Africa was an
> > expensive waste. A best all he could do was win in the Suez for awhile.
> > Which the Allies could and did get on without it.
> >
>
> This was true of much of the Axis war strategy. The capture of Norway
> and Denmark were pyhricc victories as they tied down 20 or more
> German divisions to hold down nations that had been effectively giving
> them everything they wanted anyway.
>
> > As a result large numbers of German troops and air force were uselessly
> > stuck at the end of a long supply line carrying large numbers of useless
> > Italians soldiers.
> >
>
> Which was bad for them and good for the allies.
>
> > The effect in some parts of the German military was quite dramatic for
> > example large numbers of German transport planes were diverted and lost
> > over North Africa at a time when they were badly needed in Russia.
> >
> > Apparently Hitler originally wanted to defend only a small part of
> > Africa, that is what he should have done.
> >
>
> This was an impractical proposition however. Sooner or later the
> allies were going to assemble a large force and push them out.

Agreed no matter what strategy Hitler used. After Hitler declared war on
the US and found himself at war with Britain, Russia and the US, it was
just a matter of time.

--
Intelligence does not imply reason or purpose

17th saying of Bernard

Bernardz

December 3rd 03, 01:42 PM

In article >, says...
> > The effect in some parts of the German military was quite dramatic for
> > example large numbers of German transport planes were diverted and lost
> > over North Africa at a time when they were badly needed in Russia.
>
> That is a good point, but hardly subtle.

It was an example nothing else.

> The Germans and everybody
> else always had too few of these.

Your point being. The loss of these planes really hurt.

>
> > Apparently Hitler originally wanted to defend only a small part of
> > Africa, that is what he should have done.
>
> What you say above is in contradiction to this. He should have left
> Africa completely. But hey, that's not what an alliance is about. If
> you want to keep it, that is.
>

Alliance is why Hitler originally only wanted to defend a small part.
Without Italy he would have defended none of it.

--
Intelligence does not imply reason or purpose

17th saying of Bernard

Keith Willshaw

December 3rd 03, 02:14 PM

"Bernardz" > wrote in message
news:MPG.1a38909ef387a918989772@news...
> In article >,
> says...
> >

> >
> > For the British eighth army that's certainly true but the Torch convoys
> > sailed from the US and Britain.
> > The Sicily invasion force staged out of the North African ports
>
> Torch were dependent on British forces for the majority contribution.
> I think you will find that almost all supplies went though the Suez
> until very late in the war.
>

The Torch convoys entered the med via Gibraltar
http://www.combinedops.com/Torch.htm

You are incorrect with regard to the routing of supplies for the
Torch landing and suubsequent operations.

> >
> > >
> > > > its way through an area where the axis have air bases on both sides
of
> > the
> > > > Med
> > >
> > > Point taken. They probably could have done it but it is risky.
> > >
> > > >
> > > > > As it was North Africa costs the Axis dearly. IIRC about 25% of
axis
> > > > > strength.
> > > > >
> > > >
> > > > Hardly a compelling argument for not fighting them there then.
> > >
> > > It is as long as Russia held! From the US and Britain point of view,
> > > they needed the war as they showed the world that while Russia was
> > > losing so much that they were fighting too. It also enabled them to
> > > learn as others have pointed out.
> > >
> >
> > They also needed to hold the Middle East oil fields and
> > Suez canal. Allowing the Germans to seize those would
> > have altered the whole strategic balance. A third Reich
> > with unlimited oil supplies doesn't bear thinking about.
>
> What Middle Eastern oil fields in the early 1940s in the Middle East?

The ones in Iraq and Iran that were suppling Britain with
a lot of its oil, the first Iranian reserves came on line
before WW1 and the Iraqi ones during the 20's

> Probably Egypt is Hitler best bet but its not much.
>
> The Gulf is a long way away from Egypt. If Hitler could not get the
> adequate supplies to Egypt, I cannot see him making the Gulf.
>

The fields in the ME supplied the British forces in Egypt rather effectively

> But even if he did make it, the Gulf oil fields there were just starting
> up. IIRC Gulf oil production was very small about 40,000 barrels per
> day. I doubt they would get that as the British had established plans in
> place to make sure that they were destroyed if the Germans came. It
> would be like what the Japanese in the Pacific or the Germans in Russia
> found when the captured the oil fields, they had been destroyed already.
>

You are fixated on the Gulf. The Northern Iraqi fields went into production
in the 1920's and their was a pipeline to Haifa on the med. The British
force
that suppressed the German fomented Iraqi coup during WW2 travelled
from Palestine to Iraq along the pipeline road.

> No way the mid-east could have been developed quickly enough to meet the
> oil needs even the most desperate powers of the time.
>

It was already developed, US companies , BP, Shell, and Compagnie Française
Pëtrole
began operations in Iraq in 1928

> Worst case for the Allies, Hitler has a whole lot more borders to
> defend.
>

And a lot of oil

>
>
> >
> > > I would argue from Axis view the whole war in North Africa was an
> > > expensive waste. A best all he could do was win in the Suez for
awhile.
> > > Which the Allies could and did get on without it.
> > >
> >
> > This was true of much of the Axis war strategy. The capture of Norway
> > and Denmark were pyhricc victories as they tied down 20 or more
> > German divisions to hold down nations that had been effectively giving
> > them everything they wanted anyway.
> >
> > > As a result large numbers of German troops and air force were
uselessly
> > > stuck at the end of a long supply line carrying large numbers of
useless
> > > Italians soldiers.
> > >
> >
> > Which was bad for them and good for the allies.
> >
> > > The effect in some parts of the German military was quite dramatic for
> > > example large numbers of German transport planes were diverted and
lost
> > > over North Africa at a time when they were badly needed in Russia.
> > >
> > > Apparently Hitler originally wanted to defend only a small part of
> > > Africa, that is what he should have done.
> > >
> >
> > This was an impractical proposition however. Sooner or later the
> > allies were going to assemble a large force and push them out.
>
> Agreed no matter what strategy Hitler used. After Hitler declared war on
> the US and found himself at war with Britain, Russia and the US, it was
> just a matter of time.
>
>

After Germany invaded Russia it was just a matter of time before
the red army appeared on the horizon.

Keith

Paul F Austin

December 4th 03, 01:30 AM

"ArtKramr" wrote
> What then? The war in central Europe (ETO) could have gotten our full
> resouces, D Day would have been a year earlier and the war would have
been
> over a lot sooner, German troops in No. Africa and the MTO would have
simply
> been isolated and would died on the vine. Why not?

Mainly because we would have been handed our heads, trying to invade in
mid-1943. The short reason would be that the Sovs wouldn't have whittled
down the Wehrmacht enough at that point to make a Western Front possible.
Also the Brits wouldn't go. Churchill and the Imperial General Staff were
scared stiff of a direct confrontation with the Wehrmacht based on their
experience in 1940.

phil hunt

December 4th 03, 03:09 AM

On Wed, 03 Dec 2003 05:33:25 -0500, Cub Driver > wrote:
>>
>>What you say above is in contradiction to this. He should have left
>>Africa completely. But hey, that's not what an alliance is about. If
>>you want to keep it, that is.
>
>The Axis nations seemed not to grasp the notion of alliances. Germany
>had a perfectly good ally on its northern flank in the war against
>Russia, but instead of supplying materiel to Finland, it *sold* the
>stuff. Not only did it sell the Bf-109s--it even charged the Finns for
>the aircraft it captured in France and sent north to the FAF, which
>was already equipped with numerous foreign aircraft as a result of the
>Winter War of 1939-1940.

Not only that, they wouldn't let Hungary -- which had a large arms
industry -- copy German weapons.

--
"It's easier to find people online who openly support the KKK than
people who openly support the RIAA" -- comment on Wikipedia
(Email: >, but first subtract 275 and reverse
the last two letters).

Bernardz

December 4th 03, 11:02 AM

In article >,=20
says...
>=20
> "Bernardz" > wrote in message
> news:MPG.1a38909ef387a918989772@news...
> > In article >,
> > says...
> > >
>=20
> > >
> > > For the British eighth army that's certainly true but the Torch convo=
ys
> > > sailed from the US and Britain.
> > > The Sicily invasion force staged out of the North African ports
> >
> > Torch were dependent on British forces for the majority contribution.
> > I think you will find that almost all supplies went though the Suez
> > until very late in the war.
> >
>=20
> The Torch convoys entered the med via Gibraltar
> http://www.combinedops.com/Torch.htm

Yes. The exception that proves the rule. It was too dangerous for a=20
regular supply convoy. Only very important convoys went though that=20
route. I repeat almost all supplies went to the British Eight army and=20
that was around the cape though the Suez. Cost a lot in shipping to go=20
that long route.

>=20
> You are incorrect with regard to the routing of supplies for the
> Torch landing and suubsequent operations.

I never said anything about subsequent.=20
=20
>=20
> > >
> > > >
> > > > > its way through an area where the axis have air bases on both si=
des
> of
> > > the
> > > > > Med
> > > >
> > > > Point taken. They probably could have done it but it is risky.
> > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > > As it was North Africa costs the Axis dearly. IIRC about 25% of
> axis
> > > > > > strength.
> > > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > Hardly a compelling argument for not fighting them there then.
> > > >
> > > > It is as long as Russia held! From the US and Britain point of view=
,
> > > > they needed the war as they showed the world that while Russia was
> > > > losing so much that they were fighting too. It also enabled them to
> > > > learn as others have pointed out.
> > > >
> > >
> > > They also needed to hold the Middle East oil fields and
> > > Suez canal. Allowing the Germans to seize those would
> > > have altered the whole strategic balance. A third Reich
> > > with unlimited oil supplies doesn't bear thinking about.
> >
> > What Middle Eastern oil fields in the early 1940s in the Middle East?
>=20
> The ones in Iraq and Iran that were suppling Britain with
> a lot of its oil, the first Iranian reserves came on line
> before WW1 and the Iraqi ones during the 20's

Never denied that either.

>=20
> > Probably Egypt is Hitler best bet but its not much.
> >
> > The Gulf is a long way away from Egypt. If Hitler could not get the
> > adequate supplies to Egypt, I cannot see him making the Gulf.
> >
>=20
> The fields in the ME supplied the British forces in Egypt rather effectiv=
ely
>=20
> > But even if he did make it, the Gulf oil fields there were just startin=
g
> > up. IIRC Gulf oil production was very small about 40,000 barrels per
> > day. I doubt they would get that as the British had established plans i=
n
> > place to make sure that they were destroyed if the Germans came. It
> > would be like what the Japanese in the Pacific or the Germans in Russia
> > found when the captured the oil fields, they had been destroyed already=
..
> >
>=20
> You are fixated on the Gulf. The Northern Iraqi fields went into producti=
on
> in the 1920's and their was a pipeline to Haifa on the med. The British
> force
> that suppressed the German fomented Iraqi coup during WW2 travelled
> from Palestine to Iraq along the pipeline road.
>=20
> > No way the mid-east could have been developed quickly enough to meet th=
e
> > oil needs even the most desperate powers of the time.
> >
>=20
> It was already developed, US companies , BP, Shell, and Compagnie Fran=E7=
aise
> P=EBtrole
> began operations in Iraq in 1928
>=20
> > Worst case for the Allies, Hitler has a whole lot more borders to
> > defend.
> >
>=20
> And a lot of oil

I hope this table comes out they rarely do on the usenet. It comes out=20
of a discussion I had awhile ago on a similar subject

Here are some crude oil production figures for 1945=20
Source: American Petroleum Institute, Petroleum Facts & Figures 1959=20

........................Crude Oil
........................Production
Country..................(thousand barrels/day)

United States................66%
Mexico........................1.7%
Venezuela.....................12.5%
Russia/USSR..................5.7%
Rumania......................1.3% =20
East Indies..................0.3%
Persia/Iran..................5.0%
All Others...................7.1%

The significant oil fields in the region is in Iran which is a lot=20
further still.=20

[Notes Rumania is very low because of the destruction in the war]

If Hitler could not make it to the canal, he ain't going to make it to=20
Iran. If he did make it to Iran, the British would make sure that there=20
would be that there would be so much damage to the oil fields and the=20
pipelines that it will be a long time before the fields would be of any=20
use.=20

Hitler took an oil field in Russia too never got a drop out of it. The=20
Japanese took some in the Pacific and got very little out of it too.

>=20
> >
> >
> > >
> > > > I would argue from Axis view the whole war in North Africa was an
> > > > expensive waste. A best all he could do was win in the Suez for
> awhile.
> > > > Which the Allies could and did get on without it.
> > > >
> > >
> > > This was true of much of the Axis war strategy. The capture of Norway
> > > and Denmark were pyhricc victories as they tied down 20 or more
> > > German divisions to hold down nations that had been effectively givin=
g
> > > them everything they wanted anyway.
> > >
> > > > As a result large numbers of German troops and air force were
> uselessly
> > > > stuck at the end of a long supply line carrying large numbers of
> useless
> > > > Italians soldiers.
> > > >
> > >
> > > Which was bad for them and good for the allies.
> > >
> > > > The effect in some parts of the German military was quite dramatic =
for
> > > > example large numbers of German transport planes were diverted and
> lost
> > > > over North Africa at a time when they were badly needed in Russia.
> > > >
> > > > Apparently Hitler originally wanted to defend only a small part of
> > > > Africa, that is what he should have done.
> > > >
> > >
> > > This was an impractical proposition however. Sooner or later the
> > > allies were going to assemble a large force and push them out.
> >
> > Agreed no matter what strategy Hitler used. After Hitler declared war o=
n
> > the US and found himself at war with Britain, Russia and the US, it was
> > just a matter of time.
> >
> >
>=20
> After Germany invaded Russia it was just a matter of time before
> the red army appeared on the horizon.

I really am unsure about this.

It *might* be possible for Hitler to win the East. Say an early German=20
assault on Leningrad and then once it falls, a very risky direct assault=20
on Moscow and pray that the Russian army on his flanks in Kiev don't do=20
him much damage.=20

In any case whether Britain and Russia together could have defeated=20
Germany without the US is debatable. But it is hard to see how the US=20
could have stayed out. In any case with all three Britain, US and=20
Russia, it was only a matter of time before Hitler was finished.

After the failure of Moscow, I agree.=20

--=20
Intelligence does not imply reason or purpose

17th saying of Bernard

Keith Willshaw

December 4th 03, 12:22 PM

"Bernardz" > wrote in message
news:MPG.1a39bf46de8212ec98977d@news...
In article >,
says...
>
> "Bernardz" > wrote in message
> news:MPG.1a38909ef387a918989772@news...
> > In article >,
> > says...
> > >
>
> > >
> > > For the British eighth army that's certainly true but the Torch
convoys
> > > sailed from the US and Britain.
> > > The Sicily invasion force staged out of the North African ports
> >
> > Torch were dependent on British forces for the majority contribution.
> > I think you will find that almost all supplies went though the Suez
> > until very late in the war.
> >
>
> The Torch convoys entered the med via Gibraltar
> http://www.combinedops.com/Torch.htm

Yes. The exception that proves the rule. It was too dangerous for a
regular supply convoy. Only very important convoys went though that
route. I repeat almost all supplies went to the British Eight army and
that was around the cape though the Suez. Cost a lot in shipping to go
that long route.

That was only true up until the time of the capture of North Africa

By the time Scicily was invaded the allies had already taken
the Italian Island of Pantalleria and between the airfields
they had there and those on Malta were able to re-open the
Med to traffic.

It indeed cost a lot in shipping to go around the Cape
which is why they didnt do it when it could be avoided.
Troopships and supplies from East Africa and Australia
would come through the Suez Canal but the rest came
via the straits of Gibraltar.

The invasion of Scicily and Italy involved substantial
US and Canadian forces who most certainly did not
travel round the cape and neither did their supplies.

>>
>> You are incorrect with regard to the routing of supplies for the
>> Torch landing and suubsequent operations.

>I never said anything about subsequent.

Of course you did, you said

> Torch were dependent on British forces for the majority contribution.
> I think you will find that almost all supplies went though the Suez
> until very late in the war.

Its a matter of record that the Torch force and its supplies
came in via Gibraltar

>> Perhaps a better plan might have been rather then fight a war in North
>> Africa do a direct invasion of Sicily from Egypt.

<snip>

>>>
>>> What Middle Eastern oil fields in the early 1940s in the Middle East?
>
>> The ones in Iraq and Iran that were suppling Britain with
>> a lot of its oil, the first Iranian reserves came on line
>> before WW1 and the Iraqi ones during the 20's

> Never denied that either.

You asked a question, I answered it.

> And a lot of oil

I hope this table comes out they rarely do on the usenet. It comes out
of a discussion I had awhile ago on a similar subject

> Here are some crude oil production figures for 1945
> Source: American Petroleum Institute, Petroleum Facts & Figures 1959

<snip>

> The significant oil fields in the region is in Iran which is a lot
> further still.

No there were large fields in Norther Iraq around Mosul
which were routed via pipeline to Haifa

> [Notes Rumania is very low because of the destruction in the war]

> If Hitler could not make it to the canal, he ain't going to make it to
> Iran. If he did make it to Iran, the British would make sure that there
> would be that there would be so much damage to the oil fields and the
> pipelines that it will be a long time before the fields would be of any
> use.

All of which is only possible if the British defend the Middle East
take a look atv the title of this thread

> Hitler took an oil field in Russia too never got a drop out of it. The
> Japanese took some in the Pacific and got very little out of it too.

The only fields the German took in Russia were some very
small fields, the whole Satalingrad campaign was part of an
attempt to seize the Caucasian oilfields

<snip>

>>
>> After Germany invaded Russia it was just a matter of time before
>> the red army appeared on the horizon.

> I really am unsure about this.

> It *might* be possible for Hitler to win the East. Say an early German
> assault on Leningrad and then once it falls, a very risky direct assault
> on Moscow and pray that the Russian army on his flanks in Kiev don't do
> him much damage.

Germany captured Kiev in 1941 BEFORE they attempted the
assault on Moscow. By that time they already had Leningrad
besieged. The only Soviet army in good enough shape in
1941 to launch an offensive was the Siberian force and they
had to be held back until the Soviets were sure which way
the Japanese were going to jump. It was that force which
shocked the Germans in the Soviet winter offensive of 1941/42

> In any case whether Britain and Russia together could have defeated
> Germany without the US is debatable. But it is hard to see how the US
> could have stayed out. In any case with all three Britain, US and
> Russia, it was only a matter of time before Hitler was finished.

Once the Germans failed to knock the USSR out of the war in 1941
it was just a matter of time until the vast manpower and industrial
resources of the Russians overwhelmed them.

The Wehrmach was in retreat on the eastern front BEFORE D-Day

Keith

Gernot Hassenpflug

December 4th 03, 03:24 PM

Cub Driver > writes:

>>> Apparently Hitler originally wanted to defend only a small part of
>>> Africa, that is what he should have done.
>>
>>What you say above is in contradiction to this. He should have left
>>Africa completely. But hey, that's not what an alliance is about. If
>>you want to keep it, that is.
>
> The Axis nations seemed not to grasp the notion of alliances. Germany
> had a perfectly good ally on its northern flank in the war against
> Russia, but instead of supplying materiel to Finland, it *sold* the
> stuff. Not only did it sell the Bf-109s--it even charged the Finns for
> the aircraft it captured in France and sent north to the FAF, which
> was already equipped with numerous foreign aircraft as a result of the
> Winter War of 1939-1940.

Ooh, was that the revenge of the Jews? If they can't do anything about
the holocaust quickly, maybe giving advice like that to the Germans
was a form of revenge :-)

> As for Japan--better not go into how the Japanese treated the
> "liberated" nations of Southeast Asia.

Seeing as they saw those as a source of raw materials and market for
goods, one can take a fair guess! But do you know some details (sorry,
it would take me days, if not weeks, to find something and read
it). In the case of military stuff, what could they give or even sell,
having too few themselves? I am thinking of Manchukuo and Thailand,
among others perhaps, which were equipped with Japanese aircraft. Any
facts on how these ended up there?

--
G Hassenpflug * IJN & JMSDF equipment/history fan

Gernot Hassenpflug

December 4th 03, 03:31 PM

Bernardz > writes:

>> After Germany invaded Russia it was just a matter of time before
>> the red army appeared on the horizon.
>
> I really am unsure about this.
>
> It *might* be possible for Hitler to win the East. Say an early German
> assault on Leningrad and then once it falls, a very risky direct assault
> on Moscow and pray that the Russian army on his flanks in Kiev don't do
> him much damage.

You're kidding, right? Look at Russian history! Even Tsushima, as
terrible a defeat as can happen to a Navy, with demoralized crews,
they fought many ships until the water closed over them, or no more
ammunition remained or no guns could fire. Pray.... yeah right! :-)

--
G Hassenpflug * IJN & JMSDF equipment/history fan

Grantland

December 4th 03, 04:10 PM

Gernot Hassenpflug > wrote:

>Cub Driver > writes:
>
>>>> Apparently Hitler originally wanted to defend only a small part of
>>>> Africa, that is what he should have done.
>>>
>>>What you say above is in contradiction to this. He should have left
>>>Africa completely. But hey, that's not what an alliance is about. If
>>>you want to keep it, that is.
>>
>> The Axis nations seemed not to grasp the notion of alliances. Germany
>> had a perfectly good ally on its northern flank in the war against
>> Russia, but instead of supplying materiel to Finland, it *sold* the
>> stuff. Not only did it sell the Bf-109s--it even charged the Finns for
>> the aircraft it captured in France and sent north to the FAF, which
>> was already equipped with numerous foreign aircraft as a result of the
>> Winter War of 1939-1940.
>
>Ooh, was that the revenge of the Jews? If they can't do anything about
>the holocaust quickly, maybe giving advice like that to the Germans
>was a form of revenge :-)
>
>> As for Japan--better not go into how the Japanese treated the
>> "liberated" nations of Southeast Asia.
>
>Seeing as they saw those as a source of raw materials and market for
>goods, one can take a fair guess! But do you know some details (sorry,
>it would take me days, if not weeks, to find something and read
>it). In the case of military stuff, what could they give or even sell,
>having too few themselves? I am thinking of Manchukuo and Thailand,
>among others perhaps, which were equipped with Japanese aircraft. Any
>facts on how these ended up there?
>
>--
>G Hassenpflug * IJN & JMSDF equipment/history fan

Is you're sister called Jude?
wally

Chris Mark

December 4th 03, 05:26 PM

>From: Gernot Hassenpflug

> I am thinking of Manchukuo and Thailand,
>among others perhaps, which were equipped with Japanese aircraft. Any
>facts on how these ended up there?

I once knew a retired Japanese construction engineer who said that during the
"Fifteen Year War" he worked as an employee of a civilian contractor on a
number of projects in Chosen and Manshu as he called Korea and Manchuria.
Among these was a factory in Manchuria to build Nakajimas. So that's how
Manchuria might have got Japanese aircraft. He also worked on a similar project
in Java but got some unpleasant tropical disease and went home before it was
completed.
Incidentally, he said he was not drafted until well into 1945 and was trained
to resist a US assault on the homeland. He was damned glad when the war ended
without him ever to fire a shot--or have a shot fired at him. I remember once
we clinked glasses to the toast, "Thank God for the atomic bomb!"
Allowed him to get back into construction and make several mints in the postwar
Japanese building boom, most of which in his retirement he blew playing golf at
various exclusive country clubs or in the gambling dens and houses of ill
repute of Reno and environs. He was good buddies with a friend of mine who
retired to Reno after a similar career in construction on the US side. During
the Big One he'd been in a wire company in the Ardennes and in the occupation
of Germany. Had a jolly German wife who this Japanese guy seemed utterly
fascinated with. She was about twice his size....well, I'm rambling...
Military aviation content, at one point these two bought a PBY they intended to
fix up as a flying RV and tour the south seas islands in. Don't know how that
turned out.

Chris Mark

Glenn Dowdy

December 4th 03, 07:30 PM

"Paul F Austin" > wrote in message
...
>
> "ArtKramr" wrote
> > What then? The war in central Europe (ETO) could have gotten our full
> > resouces, D Day would have been a year earlier and the war would have
> been
> > over a lot sooner, German troops in No. Africa and the MTO would have
> simply
> > been isolated and would died on the vine. Why not?
>
> Mainly because we would have been handed our heads, trying to invade in
> mid-1943.

I just read "An Army at Dawn". Given the mistakes the Allies made invading
North Africa, trying to invade France without the lessons we learned in
Operation Torch would have been disastrous.

Glenn D.

Cub Driver

December 4th 03, 08:16 PM

>I am thinking of Manchukuo and Thailand,
>among others perhaps, which were equipped with Japanese aircraft. Any
>facts on how these ended up there?

I don't know, but I suspect they were sold. Of course they weren't
front-line aircraft. The army I know provided Ki-27 "Nate" fighters to
both those satellites. (Type 97 Army Fighter :)

More significantly, Japan turned over a sentai (group) of Nakajima
Ki-43-IIB Hayabusa fighters to the Royal Thai air force in the spring
of 1944. Richard Bueschel says that one squadron served in China under
Japanese command.

Several countires including France used captured Hayabusas postwar.

all the best -- Dan Ford
email:

see the Warbird's Forum at www.warbirdforum.com
and the Piper Cub Forum at www.pipercubforum.com

Joe Osman

December 4th 03, 10:16 PM

Gernot Hassenpflug wrote:
>
> Cub Driver > writes:
>
> >>> Apparently Hitler originally wanted to defend only a small part of
> >>> Africa, that is what he should have done.
> >>
> >>What you say above is in contradiction to this. He should have left
> >>Africa completely. But hey, that's not what an alliance is about. If
> >>you want to keep it, that is.
> >
> > The Axis nations seemed not to grasp the notion of alliances. Germany
> > had a perfectly good ally on its northern flank in the war against
> > Russia, but instead of supplying materiel to Finland, it *sold* the
> > stuff. Not only did it sell the Bf-109s--it even charged the Finns for
> > the aircraft it captured in France and sent north to the FAF, which
> > was already equipped with numerous foreign aircraft as a result of the
> > Winter War of 1939-1940.
>
> Ooh, was that the revenge of the Jews? If they can't do anything about
> the holocaust quickly, maybe giving advice like that to the Germans
> was a form of revenge :-)
>
> > As for Japan--better not go into how the Japanese treated the
> > "liberated" nations of Southeast Asia.
>
> Seeing as they saw those as a source of raw materials and market for
> goods, one can take a fair guess! But do you know some details (sorry,
> it would take me days, if not weeks, to find something and read
> it). In the case of military stuff, what could they give or even sell,
> having too few themselves? I am thinking of Manchukuo and Thailand,
> among others perhaps, which were equipped with Japanese aircraft. Any
> facts on how these ended up there?
>
> --
> G Hassenpflug * IJN & JMSDF equipment/history fan

The Thai ones were probably replacements for the aircraft
the Thais lost in their war with Vichy France. The Thais
were more or less under Japanese occupation, so probably had
no choice about where to buy replacement aircraft. Thailand
actually declared war against the US, but the US more or
less ignored that fact and never treated the Thais as
enemies.

Joe

-----= Posted via Newsfeeds.Com, Uncensored Usenet News =-----
http://www.newsfeeds.com - The #1 Newsgroup Service in the World!
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Cub Driver

December 5th 03, 10:28 AM

>The Thai ones were probably replacements for the aircraft
>the Thais lost in their war with Vichy France. The Thais

The Royal Thai air force had some Curtiss 75 (P-36 type) Hawks,
perhaps with fixed landing gear. The Japanese shot down a few of these
when they moved into Thailand on Dec 7/8, and the survivors must have
been pretty weary by 1943.

>were more or less under Japanese occupation, so probably had
>no choice about where to buy replacement aircraft. Thailand
>actually declared war against the US, but the US more or
>less ignored that fact and never treated the Thais as
>enemies.

The Thai ambassador in Washington simply declared himself the
representative of the Free Tais (well, whatever) and stayed in his
embassy throughout the war.

You have to admire a nation that resilient. Thailand is I believe the
only (or anyone one of the few) Asian nations that was never ruled by
a foreign power. Even the Japanese followed the niceties of being an
ally, not an occupier. By the summer of 1945, British agents were
operating more or less openly in Bangkok.

all the best -- Dan Ford
email:

see the Warbird's Forum at www.warbirdforum.com
and the Piper Cub Forum at www.pipercubforum.com

Drazen Kramaric

December 6th 03, 08:07 PM

On Mon, 1 Dec 2003 16:07:18 -0000, "Keith Willshaw"
> wrote:

>Because there is no way the invasion could have been successfully launched
>in 1943.

I disagree.

>The troops,

There were as many divisions available as they were used between June
6th 1944 and August 1st 1944 on the Normandy bridgehead.

>landing craft

Allies had enough landing craft to perform Husky in summer 1943 and
Torch in autumn 1942. There were certainly enough craft to land the
five divisions of the first wave and immediate support.

>and aircraft were simply not available

Allies had in ETO and MTO at least twice as much aircraft (without
counting strategic bombers) than Luftwaffe had in total. Throughout
1943, Luftwaffe was incapable of preventing Allied air, naval and
ground operations in the Mediterranean. In case of 1943 invasion,
Allied assets that couldn't have been used in the Mediterranean (Air
Defense of Great Britain) would have been utilised.

>Some 5000 ships and landing craft, 600,000 tons of supplies and 200,000
>vehicles had to be assembled

These were the forces needed to arrive to German border within three
months of D-day, but such requirement would not be necessary condition
for the success of 1943 invasion.

>in addition to the armies and then there's the little matter of winning air superiority
>over the landing beaches. Without the decimation of the Luftwaffe in late 1943 and
>early 1944 and lacking long range escort fighters any attempted invasion
>would have been exceptionally risky.

Luftwaffe was incapable of defeating Allied air forces in the
Mediterranean. By mid 1943, Allies had twice as much fighters
available as Luftwaffe had. Allied did not need long range escorts for
air superiority over La Manche and bridgehead.

>As for the MTO it was simply not possible to isolate the German and
>Italian armies and ignore them.

Operation Torch was not necessary. If it was skipped, Allies would
have had the resources to establish a second front in north-western
France in 1943.

>Had they been able to seize the Suez canal and middle east

It's long way from El Agheila to Iraq.

>they would have had access to virtually unlimited oil supplies from Iraq

The wells that would have been thoroughly wrecked by retreating
British. It would have taken at least six months to repair the
damages.

In addition, Italy lacked enough tankers to carry the oil.

>As it was the forces captured when Tunisia fell were greater than
>those captured at Stalingrad and not only was Italy knocked out of
>the war but the Germans had to garrison that country as well
>thus diverting troops who could have been used to defend
>Northern France.

Italian troops were disarmed and sent to work in Germany thus freeing
Germans to man the garrison divisions deployed to replace Italian
divisions. Italians were more efficient working in German war economy
than in Italian one.

Drax

ArtKramr

December 6th 03, 08:28 PM

>Subject: Re: What if we ignored N. Africa and the MTO?
>From: (Drazen Kramaric)
>Date: 12/6/03 12:07 PM Pacific Standard Time
>Message-id:

>and aircraft were simply not available
>
>Allies had in ETO and MTO at least twice as much aircraft (without
>counting strategic bombers) than Luftwaffe had in total. Throughout
>1943, Luftwaffe was incapable of preventing Allied air, naval and
>ground operations in the Mediterranean. In case of 1943 invasion,
>Allied assets that couldn't have been used in the Mediterranean (Air
>Defense of Great Britain) would have been utilised.
>
>>Some 5000 ships and landing craft, 600,000 tons of supplies and 200,000
>>vehicles had to be assembled
>
>These were the forces needed to arrive to German border within three
>months of D-day, but such requirement would not be necessary condition
>for the success of 1943 invasion.
>
>>in addition to the armies and then there's the little matter of winning air
>superiority
>>over the landing beaches. Without the decimation of the Luftwaffe in late
>1943 and
>>early 1944 and lacking long range escort fighters any attempted invasion
>>would have been exceptionally risky.
>
>Luftwaffe was incapable of defeating Allied air forces in the
>Mediterranean. By mid 1943, Allies had twice as much fighters
>available as Luftwaffe had. Allied did not need long range escorts for
>air superiority over La Manche and bridgehead.
>
>
>>As for the MTO it was simply not possible to isolate the German and
>>Italian armies and ignore them.
>
>Operation Torch was not necessary. If it was skipped, Allies would
>have had the resources to establish a second front in north-western
>France in 1943.
>

And Monte's entire 8th Army would have been in England and could have been
used in an invasion along with the supporting RAF aircraft The invasion a year
earlier was very possible had the MTO and African campaigns not taken place..

Regards,

Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

Cub Driver

December 6th 03, 09:36 PM

> Throwing the inexperienced US Army on some West-European
>beach,

In 1944, the army might be more experienced, but the troops were not.
The Americans put new troops onto the beach at Omaha, rather than
moving combat-experienced men from Italy or some such place.

all the best -- Dan Ford
email:

see the Warbird's Forum at www.warbirdforum.com
and the Piper Cub Forum at www.pipercubforum.com

Paul J. Adam

December 6th 03, 09:53 PM

In message >, Paul F Austin
> writes
>"ArtKramr" wrote
>> What then? The war in central Europe (ETO) could have gotten our full
>> resouces, D Day would have been a year earlier and the war would have
>been
>> over a lot sooner, German troops in No. Africa and the MTO would have
>simply
>> been isolated and would died on the vine. Why not?
>
>Mainly because we would have been handed our heads, trying to invade in
>mid-1943. The short reason would be that the Sovs wouldn't have whittled
>down the Wehrmacht enough at that point to make a Western Front possible.
>Also the Brits wouldn't go. Churchill and the Imperial General Staff were
>scared stiff of a direct confrontation with the Wehrmacht based on their
>experience in 1940.

And at Dieppe in 1942; that experimental raid, while a bloody tactical
failure, probably saved a great many lives in showing just how difficult
opposed amphibious operations really were and what equipment and
training was needed to have a chance at success. Merely throwing brave
troops at the beach and hoping for the best was proved to be a recipe
for disaster.

--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBox<at>jrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

Keith Willshaw

December 6th 03, 11:21 PM

"Drazen Kramaric" > wrote in message
...
> On Mon, 1 Dec 2003 16:07:18 -0000, "Keith Willshaw"
> > wrote:
>
>
> >Because there is no way the invasion could have been successfully
launched
> >in 1943.
>
> I disagree.
>
>
> >The troops,
>
> There were as many divisions available as they were used between June
> 6th 1944 and August 1st 1944 on the Normandy bridgehead.
>

There werent as many available for the follow up
waves however.

> >landing craft
>
> Allies had enough landing craft to perform Husky in summer 1943 and
> Torch in autumn 1942. There were certainly enough craft to land the
> five divisions of the first wave and immediate support.
>

But not the follow up forces

> >and aircraft were simply not available
>
> Allies had in ETO and MTO at least twice as much aircraft (without
> counting strategic bombers) than Luftwaffe had in total. Throughout
> 1943, Luftwaffe was incapable of preventing Allied air, naval and
> ground operations in the Mediterranean. In case of 1943 invasion,
> Allied assets that couldn't have been used in the Mediterranean (Air
> Defense of Great Britain) would have been utilised.
>

The Luftwaffed most certainly did cause casualties in Italy in 1943

> >Some 5000 ships and landing craft, 600,000 tons of supplies and 200,000
> >vehicles had to be assembled
>
> These were the forces needed to arrive to German border within three
> months of D-day, but such requirement would not be necessary condition
> for the success of 1943 invasion.
>

That depends on what you mean by success. Sitting in an enclave
under artillery attack isnt typically considered a success

> >in addition to the armies and then there's the little matter of winning
air superiority
> >over the landing beaches. Without the decimation of the Luftwaffe in late
1943 and
> >early 1944 and lacking long range escort fighters any attempted invasion
> >would have been exceptionally risky.
>
> Luftwaffe was incapable of defeating Allied air forces in the
> Mediterranean. By mid 1943, Allies had twice as much fighters
> available as Luftwaffe had. Allied did not need long range escorts for
> air superiority over La Manche and bridgehead.
>

But they did to defeat the German air force in the West
which was much stronger than taht in the med.

>
> >As for the MTO it was simply not possible to isolate the German and
> >Italian armies and ignore them.
>
> Operation Torch was not necessary. If it was skipped, Allies would
> have had the resources to establish a second front in north-western
> France in 1943.
>

But not to advance into Germany and win the war which
is the point.

>
> >Had they been able to seize the Suez canal and middle east
>
> It's long way from El Agheila to Iraq.
>

Its a long way fro El Agheila to El Alamein but they managed that

> >they would have had access to virtually unlimited oil supplies from Iraq
>
> The wells that would have been thoroughly wrecked by retreating
> British. It would have taken at least six months to repair the
> damages.
>

Which gives them lots of oil in 1944

> In addition, Italy lacked enough tankers to carry the oil.
>
>
> >As it was the forces captured when Tunisia fell were greater than
> >those captured at Stalingrad and not only was Italy knocked out of
> >the war but the Germans had to garrison that country as well
> >thus diverting troops who could have been used to defend
> >Northern France.
>
> Italian troops were disarmed and sent to work in Germany thus freeing
> Germans to man the garrison divisions deployed to replace Italian
> divisions. Italians were more efficient working in German war economy
> than in Italian one.
>

How many German workers do you think were suitable to
provide army replacements in 1943 ?

Keith

Keith Willshaw

December 6th 03, 11:23 PM

"ArtKramr" > wrote in message
...

> >
>
> And Monte's entire 8th Army would have been in England and could have
been
> used in an invasion along with the supporting RAF aircraft The invasion a
year
> earlier was very possible had the MTO and African campaigns not taken
place..
>
>

No the 8th army was stopping the German sweeping through Egypt
and Palestine at the time.

Do you think it would have been a good idea to allow them
to take the Suez Canal, Egypy and Tel Aviv ?

Keith

Keith Willshaw

December 6th 03, 11:28 PM

"Cub Driver" > wrote in message
...
>
> > Throwing the inexperienced US Army on some West-European
> >beach,
>
> In 1944, the army might be more experienced, but the troops were not.
> The Americans put new troops onto the beach at Omaha, rather than
> moving combat-experienced men from Italy or some such place.
>

The US divisions that landed at Omaha were from the 1st Infantry
Division which HAD taken part in the Torch invasions and
fought in North Africa and Sicily

Keith

Guy Alcala

December 7th 03, 04:11 AM

Keith Willshaw wrote:

> "Cub Driver" > wrote in message
> ...
> >
> > > Throwing the inexperienced US Army on some West-European
> > >beach,
> >
> > In 1944, the army might be more experienced, but the troops were not.
> > The Americans put new troops onto the beach at Omaha, rather than
> > moving combat-experienced men from Italy or some such place.
> >
>
> The US divisions that landed at Omaha were from the 1st Infantry
> Division which HAD taken part in the Torch invasions and
> fought in North Africa and Sicily

It was two RLTs from the 1st ID along with an RLT from the 29th ID (plus
the Rangers) who landed in the first wave. Here's General Bradley's
comments on his choice of the 1st ID, from his book "A Soldier's Story":

"When Overlord was expanded to include Utah Beach, we paired the 4th
Infantry with the 29th as the second assault division. But although both
divisions had undergone extensive amphibious training, neither had as yet
come under fire. Rather than chance a landing with two inexperienced
divisions, I looked around for a veteran division to include in the lineup.

"In all of England there was only one experienced assault division. Once
more the Big Red One was to carry the heavy end of our stick . . . .

"Although I disliked subjecting the 1st to still another landing [Guy:
their third], I felt that as a commander I had no other choice. My job was
to get ashore, establish a lodgement, and destroy the German. In the
accomplishment of that mission there was little room for the niceties of
justice. I felt compelled to employ the best troops I had, to minimize the
risks and hoist the odds in our favor in any way that I could. As a
result, the division that deserved compassion as a reward for its previous
ordeal now became the inevitable choice for our most difficult job.
Whatever the injustice, it is better that war heap its burdens unfairly
than that victory be jeopardized in an effort to equalize the ordeal."
[pp. 236-237]

and then

"In planning the assault, originally we had counted upon a thin crust of
two static divisions between Caen and Cherbourg. Rommel was known to have
concentrated his better reserves behind the beach. Among them was the
352nd Division which had been assembled at St. Lo.

"Just before boarding the Augusta in Plymouth harbor, Dickson [Guy:
Bradley's G-2] learned that the 352nd had been moved from St. Lo. to the
assault beaches for a defense exercise. He promptly forwarded this
information to V Corps and the 1st Division but was unable to give it to
the troops already 'sealed' aboard their craft.

"Had a less experienced division than the 1st Infantry stumbled into this
crack resistance, it might easily have been thrown back into the Channel.
Unjust though it was, my choice of the 1st to spearhead the invasion
probably saved us Omaha Beach and a catastrophe on the landing." [ibid,
pg. 272]

As to there being more than enough landing craft in 1943, the problem would
have been the distribution by type. The invasion beaches in Normandy had
unusually shallow slopes, IIRR in the region of 1:150 or more. Without
large numbers of LSTs (which IIRR only entered service at the end of 1942
or in mid-1943, I forget which), LCTs, LSUs and similar shallow draft
beaching craft, the rate of unloading would have been much slowed by the
need to unload deep draft ships offshore and lighter their loads in. The
buildup would have been even more prolonged than it was, especially given
that air superiority would not have been achieved yet. We probably could
have gotten ashore, but we wouldn't have had the huge advantage in
logistics over the Germans that we had in the Med from late '42 on, or in
the ETO in 1944.

Considering the early American experiences in North Africa, where the
Germans treated the inexperienced U.S. troops and their commanders several
very painful lessons, I'd say the odds of success would be rather poor in
1943, given how difficult it still was in 1944 despite a considerable
improvement in the allies favor, in both the balance of forces and the
strategic situation. Attempting a landing in 1942 would have just been
Dieppe on a larger scale.

OTOH, the Atlantic Wall would have been almost non-existent in 1943, and
the Sherman wouldn't have been so badly outclassed by as many of the German
tanks as it was in 1944. Even so, C2 and training were a long way from the
1944 standard.

Guy

Kevin Brooks

December 7th 03, 06:17 AM

"Keith Willshaw" > wrote in message
...
>
> "Cub Driver" > wrote in message
> ...
> >
> > > Throwing the inexperienced US Army on some West-European
> > >beach,
> >
> > In 1944, the army might be more experienced, but the troops were not.
> > The Americans put new troops onto the beach at Omaha, rather than
> > moving combat-experienced men from Italy or some such place.
> >
>
> The US divisions that landed at Omaha were from the 1st Infantry
> Division which HAD taken part in the Torch invasions and
> fought in North Africa and Sicily

Only partly correct, Keith. The 116th RCT from the 29th Inf Div was also in
the first wave, along with the 1st ID's 16th RCT. Immediately following were
the 115th RCT from the 29th and the 18RCT from the 1st. This was indeed the
29th ID's baptism of fire during WWII.

Brooks

>
> Keith
>
>

Kevin Brooks

December 7th 03, 06:33 AM

"Guy Alcala" > wrote in message
. ..
> Keith Willshaw wrote:
>
> > "Cub Driver" > wrote in message
> > ...
> > >
> > > > Throwing the inexperienced US Army on some West-European
> > > >beach,
> > >
> > > In 1944, the army might be more experienced, but the troops were not.
> > > The Americans put new troops onto the beach at Omaha, rather than
> > > moving combat-experienced men from Italy or some such place.
> > >
> >
> > The US divisions that landed at Omaha were from the 1st Infantry
> > Division which HAD taken part in the Torch invasions and
> > fought in North Africa and Sicily
>
> It was two RLTs from the 1st ID along with an RLT from the 29th ID (plus
> the Rangers) who landed in the first wave. Here's General Bradley's
> comments on his choice of the 1st ID, from his book "A Soldier's Story":

I don't think so, Guy; the spearhead was only *two* RCT's, the 16th from the
1st ID and the 116th from the 29th ID. The schedule had the next two RCT's
(18th from 1st ID and 115th from the 29th) following at about H+3. And when
you read the accounts of what happened that morning on the beach, it is
quite apparent that there was not a danged bit of difference between the
performance of the previously unblooded 29th troops and those veterans (what
there was of them--ISTR the Big Red One already had picked up its share of
green replacements since its previous efforts). Furthermore, while it is
true that the these lead elements were all under the command of the 1st ID
HQ, that entity had darned little to do with what happened that morning, and
in fact it was IIRC the 29th ID's ADC, BG Norm Cota, who was instrumental in
getting the stagnated effort moving off the beach proper and up the
Vierville Draw?

<snip>

> "Had a less experienced division than the 1st Infantry stumbled into this
> crack resistance, it might easily have been thrown back into the Channel.
> Unjust though it was, my choice of the 1st to spearhead the invasion
> probably saved us Omaha Beach and a catastrophe on the landing." [ibid,
> pg. 272]

As much as I respect and admire Bradley, the fact is that the above is
after-the-fact window dressing. In fact the performance of the 29th ID
troops and their leaders on the beach and as they seized the beachhead was
as much, if not more, responsible for the success gained at Omaha as was the
efforts of their 1st ID counterparts. The proof is in the pudding, as they
say, and the pudding demonstrated that the 29th was indeed just as capable
as the 1st ID was on 6 June 1944.

<snip further stuff I don't disagree with>

Brooks

Guy Alcala

December 7th 03, 08:18 AM

Kevin Brooks wrote:

> "Guy Alcala" > wrote in message
> . ..
> > Keith Willshaw wrote:
> >
> > > "Cub Driver" > wrote in message
> > > ...
> > > >
> > > > > Throwing the inexperienced US Army on some West-European
> > > > >beach,
> > > >
> > > > In 1944, the army might be more experienced, but the troops were not.
> > > > The Americans put new troops onto the beach at Omaha, rather than
> > > > moving combat-experienced men from Italy or some such place.
> > > >
> > >
> > > The US divisions that landed at Omaha were from the 1st Infantry
> > > Division which HAD taken part in the Torch invasions and
> > > fought in North Africa and Sicily
> >
> > It was two RLTs from the 1st ID along with an RLT from the 29th ID (plus
> > the Rangers) who landed in the first wave. Here's General Bradley's
> > comments on his choice of the 1st ID, from his book "A Soldier's Story":
>
> I don't think so, Guy; the spearhead was only *two* RCT's, the 16th from the
> 1st ID and the 116th from the 29th ID.

That's what I thought, from remembering the details in Adrian Lewis' "Omaha
Beach: A Flawed Victory" (well worth the read). I was sure on the 16th and
116th, but couldn't remember if the 18th (or 26th) came in at the same time or
subsequently, and blanked completely on the follow-on for the 29th. But I only
had Bradley handy, and he says it was two and one, although I may be
misunderstanding him. He (or more likely an aide) wrote:

"The assault force on Omaha was to make contact with the British on its left
while at the same time establishing a link with Utah on its right. If one
division were to be given both missions, it would have been dispersed across a
25-mile front. And as the follow-up divisions came in, it would have become
necessary to reassemble the 1st Division in one corner of Omaha Beach. To avoid
the traffic snarl that would otherwise have jammed up the beach, I shaped the
Omaha attack force with two regiments from the 1st Division, the third from the
29th. Thus while the 1st Division concentrated to the left of the beachhead,
the 29th would advance to the right. the follow-up division would then come
into the whole between them."

IIRC, Lewis says that the actual assault planning was Gerow's (and Huebner's)
responsibility, so either Bradley is misremembering things, or his definition of
'assault force'and 'attack force' is more expansive than 'first wave'. But then
he leaves out any mention of a second regiment from the 29th in the second wave,
so I don't know what he had in mind. Elsewhere, he mentions that there were
three naval forces in the American sector -- one for each beach, and a third
with the two follow-on divisions, the 2nd for Omaha and the 90th for Utah, so
maybe that's where he draws the line. OTOH, I've just found (pg. 270) where he
mentions the "two assault regiments on Omaha," so clearly there's some confusion
by the author(s).

Ah well, that's what I get for not waiting to post until I could access a source
more dedicated to the subject. In any case, we're agreed that units of both the
1st and 29th participated in the landings, which was the main point in my
original reply to Keith.

> The schedule had the next two RCT's
> (18th from 1st ID and 115th from the 29th) following at about H+3. And when
> you read the accounts of what happened that morning on the beach, it is
> quite apparent that there was not a danged bit of difference between the
> performance of the previously unblooded 29th troops and those veterans (what
> there was of them--ISTR the Big Red One already had picked up its share of
> green replacements since its previous efforts).

Sure did. OTOH, they at least had a cadre of combat-experienced troops and
small-unit commanders, which couldn't be said for the 29th. ISTR that the 29th
was very similar to my dad's division*, in that some of the senior commanders
had combat experience, but probably not at the battalion level and below.

(*The 99th, which disembarked in Le Havre in October. He said that the 99th CG,
MG Lauer, had been in North Africa, but that the division was green. Naturally,
he was in no position to know the background and experience of every company and
field grade officer in the infantry regiments, so take his opinion for what it's
worth.)

> Furthermore, while it is
> true that the these lead elements were all under the command of the 1st ID
> HQ, that entity had darned little to do with what happened that morning, and
> in fact it was IIRC the 29th ID's ADC, BG Norm Cota, who was instrumental in
> getting the stagnated effort moving off the beach proper and up the
> Vierville Draw?

Cota seems to have played a part, although just how much of one depends on which
history you read. Some say that it was the small unit leaders that got things
moving, and that Robert Mitchum and the other senior commanders on the beach
were essentially irrelevant. I suspect the truth lies somewhere in the middle,
but take your pick as to which way you lean.

> <snip>
>
> > "Had a less experienced division than the 1st Infantry stumbled into this
> > crack resistance, it might easily have been thrown back into the Channel.
> > Unjust though it was, my choice of the 1st to spearhead the invasion
> > probably saved us Omaha Beach and a catastrophe on the landing." [ibid,
> > pg. 272]
>
> As much as I respect and admire Bradley, the fact is that the above is
> after-the-fact window dressing.

I'm not sure what his justification for that would be. Why would he care which
unit performed well? The gist of his remarks (much of which I've left out)
seems to be that he was sorry that he had to use the 1st given their tiredness,
and the troops' felt that it was someone else's turn. He makes no bones about
the fact that their assignment to the landing was bitterly resented by many in
the division. It's kind of surprising to me that he devotes as much space to
his reasons for selecting them as he did. His tone sounds almost apologetic
about having used them, but it's almost as if he wants _them_ to know why he
considered it essential that he did, instead of one of the new, green divisions.

In fact the performance of the 29th ID

> troops and their leaders on the beach and as they seized the beachhead was
> as much, if not more, responsible for the success gained at Omaha as was the
> efforts of their 1st ID counterparts. The proof is in the pudding, as they
> say, and the pudding demonstrated that the 29th was indeed just as capable
> as the 1st ID was on 6 June 1944.

I'm not sure I agree, although it's been awhile since I read detailed accounts
so my memory may be playing me false. The slaughter of Company A/116th Infantry
during the approach and landing (92% casualties on D-Day IIRR, quite accurately
depicted in "Saving Private Ryan") as well as (IIRR) other units of the regiment
stalling at the water line would seem to indicate otherwise. But I'll have to
refresh my memory of who actually wound up where (as opposed to where they were
supposed to land) and did what before arguing the point.

Guy

Drazen Kramaric

December 7th 03, 12:55 PM

On Tue, 2 Dec 2003 18:15:25 -0000, "Keith Willshaw"
> wrote:

>They also needed to hold the Middle East oil fields and
>Suez canal. Allowing the Germans to seize those would
>have altered the whole strategic balance. A third Reich
>with unlimited oil supplies doesn't bear thinking about.

By the time Third Reich would be able to bring these wells into the
production (repairment, building of tanker fleet), it would have been
too late. Americans would be in fight for real.

>This was true of much of the Axis war strategy. The capture of Norway
>and Denmark were pyhricc victories as they tied down 20 or more
>German divisions to hold down nations that had been effectively giving
>them everything they wanted anyway.

If it weren't for German invasion of Norway, British were going to
land sometime in Spring 1940. Germans could not allow for Britain to
sit in Narvik. Troops deployed in Norway were not first class anyway,
most of them were either coast defense troops or 7xx class divisions.
Fighting troops deployed in Norway took part in the war against Soviet
Union.

Drax

Alan Minyard

December 7th 03, 02:42 PM

On Fri, 05 Dec 2003 00:24:04 +0900, Gernot Hassenpflug > wrote:

>Cub Driver > writes:
>
>>>> Apparently Hitler originally wanted to defend only a small part of
>>>> Africa, that is what he should have done.
>>>
>>>What you say above is in contradiction to this. He should have left
>>>Africa completely. But hey, that's not what an alliance is about. If
>>>you want to keep it, that is.
>>
>> The Axis nations seemed not to grasp the notion of alliances. Germany
>> had a perfectly good ally on its northern flank in the war against
>> Russia, but instead of supplying materiel to Finland, it *sold* the
>> stuff. Not only did it sell the Bf-109s--it even charged the Finns for
>> the aircraft it captured in France and sent north to the FAF, which
>> was already equipped with numerous foreign aircraft as a result of the
>> Winter War of 1939-1940.
>
>Ooh, was that the revenge of the Jews? If they can't do anything about
>the holocaust quickly, maybe giving advice like that to the Germans
>was a form of revenge :-)
>
>> As for Japan--better not go into how the Japanese treated the
>> "liberated" nations of Southeast Asia.
>
>Seeing as they saw those as a source of raw materials and market for
>goods, one can take a fair guess! But do you know some details (sorry,
>it would take me days, if not weeks, to find something and read
>it). In the case of military stuff, what could they give or even sell,
>having too few themselves? I am thinking of Manchukuo and Thailand,
>among others perhaps, which were equipped with Japanese aircraft. Any
>facts on how these ended up there?

No, they saw them as sub-human trash, and treated them as such. Remember the
"rape of Nanking"? The "Bataan Death March"? Manila? etc. The Japanese
behaved like depraved animals.

Al Minyard

Kevin Brooks

December 7th 03, 03:42 PM

"Guy Alcala" > wrote in message
. ..
> Kevin Brooks wrote:
>
> > "Guy Alcala" > wrote in message
> > . ..
> > > Keith Willshaw wrote:
> > >
> > > > "Cub Driver" > wrote in message
> > > > ...
> > > > >
> > > > > > Throwing the inexperienced US Army on some West-European
> > > > > >beach,
> > > > >
> > > > > In 1944, the army might be more experienced, but the troops were
not.
> > > > > The Americans put new troops onto the beach at Omaha, rather than
> > > > > moving combat-experienced men from Italy or some such place.
> > > > >
> > > >
> > > > The US divisions that landed at Omaha were from the 1st Infantry
> > > > Division which HAD taken part in the Torch invasions and
> > > > fought in North Africa and Sicily
> > >
> > > It was two RLTs from the 1st ID along with an RLT from the 29th ID
(plus
> > > the Rangers) who landed in the first wave. Here's General Bradley's
> > > comments on his choice of the 1st ID, from his book "A Soldier's
Story":
> >
> > I don't think so, Guy; the spearhead was only *two* RCT's, the 16th from
the
> > 1st ID and the 116th from the 29th ID.
>
> That's what I thought, from remembering the details in Adrian Lewis'
"Omaha
> Beach: A Flawed Victory" (well worth the read). I was sure on the 16th and
> 116th, but couldn't remember if the 18th (or 26th) came in at the same
time or
> subsequently, and blanked completely on the follow-on for the 29th. But I
only
> had Bradley handy, and he says it was two and one, although I may be
> misunderstanding him. He (or more likely an aide) wrote:
>
> "The assault force on Omaha was to make contact with the British on its
left
> while at the same time establishing a link with Utah on its right. If one
> division were to be given both missions, it would have been dispersed
across a
> 25-mile front. And as the follow-up divisions came in, it would have
become
> necessary to reassemble the 1st Division in one corner of Omaha Beach. To
avoid
> the traffic snarl that would otherwise have jammed up the beach, I shaped
the
> Omaha attack force with two regiments from the 1st Division, the third
from the
> 29th. Thus while the 1st Division concentrated to the left of the
beachhead,
> the 29th would advance to the right. the follow-up division would then
come
> into the whole between them."
>
> IIRC, Lewis says that the actual assault planning was Gerow's (and
Huebner's)
> responsibility, so either Bradley is misremembering things, or his
definition of
> 'assault force'and 'attack force' is more expansive than 'first wave'.
But then
> he leaves out any mention of a second regiment from the 29th in the second
wave,
> so I don't know what he had in mind. Elsewhere, he mentions that there
were
> three naval forces in the American sector -- one for each beach, and a
third
> with the two follow-on divisions, the 2nd for Omaha and the 90th for Utah,
so
> maybe that's where he draws the line. OTOH, I've just found (pg. 270)
where he
> mentions the "two assault regiments on Omaha," so clearly there's some
confusion
> by the author(s).
>
> Ah well, that's what I get for not waiting to post until I could access a
source
> more dedicated to the subject. In any case, we're agreed that units of
both the
> 1st and 29th participated in the landings, which was the main point in my
> original reply to Keith.
>
> > The schedule had the next two RCT's
> > (18th from 1st ID and 115th from the 29th) following at about H+3. And
when
> > you read the accounts of what happened that morning on the beach, it is
> > quite apparent that there was not a danged bit of difference between the
> > performance of the previously unblooded 29th troops and those veterans
(what
> > there was of them--ISTR the Big Red One already had picked up its share
of
> > green replacements since its previous efforts).
>
> Sure did. OTOH, they at least had a cadre of combat-experienced troops
and
> small-unit commanders, which couldn't be said for the 29th. ISTR that the
29th
> was very similar to my dad's division*, in that some of the senior
commanders
> had combat experience, but probably not at the battalion level and below.
>
> (*The 99th, which disembarked in Le Havre in October. He said that the
99th CG,
> MG Lauer, had been in North Africa, but that the division was green.
Naturally,
> he was in no position to know the background and experience of every
company and
> field grade officer in the infantry regiments, so take his opinion for
what it's
> worth.)
>
> > Furthermore, while it is
> > true that the these lead elements were all under the command of the 1st
ID
> > HQ, that entity had darned little to do with what happened that morning,
and
> > in fact it was IIRC the 29th ID's ADC, BG Norm Cota, who was
instrumental in
> > getting the stagnated effort moving off the beach proper and up the
> > Vierville Draw?
>
> Cota seems to have played a part, although just how much of one depends on
which
> history you read. Some say that it was the small unit leaders that got
things
> moving, and that Robert Mitchum and the other senior commanders on the
beach
> were essentially irrelevant. I suspect the truth lies somewhere in the
middle,
> but take your pick as to which way you lean.
>
> > <snip>
> >
> > > "Had a less experienced division than the 1st Infantry stumbled into
this
> > > crack resistance, it might easily have been thrown back into the
Channel.
> > > Unjust though it was, my choice of the 1st to spearhead the invasion
> > > probably saved us Omaha Beach and a catastrophe on the landing."
[i]
> > > pg. 272]
> >
> > As much as I respect and admire Bradley, the fact is that the above is
> > after-the-fact window dressing.
>
> I'm not sure what his justification for that would be. Why would he care[/color]
which
> unit performed well?

I don't necessarily think there was some sort of sinister intention
involved. But it is not uncommon for even the most self-effacing of famous
people (and I have always admired Bradley for his relative modesty) to "over
analyze" their own contributions a bit.

The gist of his remarks (much of which I've left out)
> seems to be that he was sorry that he had to use the 1st given their
tiredness,
> and the troops' felt that it was someone else's turn. He makes no bones
about
> the fact that their assignment to the landing was bitterly resented by
many in
> the division. It's kind of surprising to me that he devotes as much space
to
> his reasons for selecting them as he did. His tone sounds almost
apologetic
> about having used them, but it's almost as if he wants _them_ to know why
he
> considered it essential that he did, instead of one of the new, green
divisions.

And there may be the reason for that analysis--it justified thrusting those
veteran troops once again "into the breach". I have little doubt that he had
at the time real concerns about assigning completely unblooded units to the
first wave, and this was undoubtedly his reasoning. But what i am pointing
out is a benefit of "Monday morning quarterbacking"--that in fact the 29'ers
did just as well as their 1st ID brethren that morning.

>
>
>
> In fact the performance of the 29th ID
>
> > troops and their leaders on the beach and as they seized the beachhead
was
> > as much, if not more, responsible for the success gained at Omaha as was
the
> > efforts of their 1st ID counterparts. The proof is in the pudding, as
they
> > say, and the pudding demonstrated that the 29th was indeed just as
capable
> > as the 1st ID was on 6 June 1944.
>
> I'm not sure I agree, although it's been awhile since I read detailed
accounts
> so my memory may be playing me false. The slaughter of Company A/116th
Infantry
> during the approach and landing (92% casualties on D-Day IIRR, quite
accurately
> depicted in "Saving Private Ryan") as well as (IIRR) other units of the
regiment
> stalling at the water line would seem to indicate otherwise.

No, what that indicates is that like the rest of the force, 16th RCT
included, they were the victims of confused close in navigation and
hellacious beachead resistance. You can do a Google on "Omaha Beach" and
come up with a site that indicates that until the 1st ID ADC came trundling
ashore his own 16th RCT troops were sitting tight to cover near Sur de
M---(can't recall the actual name of the draw). In the various articles and
books I have read regarding the assault, there was no apparent difference
between the performance of the two RCT's that morning other than the fate of
where they were landed (and they were often intermixed) and what kind of
opposition was facing that particular stretch of beach. The only reference
to differing performance I found was that later in the day the 29th sector
required additional mopping up due to having to reduce bypassed and cut-off
German defenders, but how much of that was due to inexperience and how much
was due to differing terrain or a different view of what was meant by moving
inland ASAP is unknown. IIRC it was not until after this phase that the 29th
ID assumed actual command of its two RCT's that were ashore (probably about
the same time its third RCT, the 175th, came ashore I'd imagine).

Brooks

But I'll have to
> refresh my memory of who actually wound up where (as opposed to where they
were
> supposed to land) and did what before arguing the point.
>
> Guy
>
>

L'acrobat

December 9th 03, 01:17 AM

"Keith Willshaw" > wrote in message
...
>
> "ArtKramr" > wrote in message
> ...
>
> > >
> >
> > And Monte's entire 8th Army would have been in England and could have
> been
> > used in an invasion along with the supporting RAF aircraft The invasion
a
> year
> > earlier was very possible had the MTO and African campaigns not taken
> place..
> >
> >
>
> No the 8th army was stopping the German sweeping through Egypt
> and Palestine at the time.
>
> Do you think it would have been a good idea to allow them
> to take the Suez Canal, Egypy and Tel Aviv ?

Even if you believe that it is a good idea to let the Italians have all that
(not suggesting you do), all you would gain is an 8th Army that had no
combat experience and would likely have the same problems that they ran into
early in the middle east, without the German supply problems to let them
regroup.

Keith Willshaw

December 9th 03, 07:58 AM

"L'acrobat" > wrote in message
...
>
>
> Even if you believe that it is a good idea to let the Italians have all
that
> (not suggesting you do), all you would gain is an 8th Army that had no
> combat experience and would likely have the same problems that they ran
into
> early in the middle east, without the German supply problems to let them
> regroup.
>
>

A valid point, both the Commonwealth and US Armie learned to fight the
Germans in North Africa and it was those lessons that led
to the evolution of not only the tactics required but the weapons.

The development of fighter bombers, better tanks and anti-tank
guns and mine clearance equipment all came from the north
african campaign

Keith

Joe Osman

December 9th 03, 10:55 PM

Emmanuel Gustin wrote:
>
> "ArtKramr" > wrote in message
> ...
>
> > What then? The war in central Europe (ETO) could have gotten our full
> > resouces, D Day would have been a year earlier and the war would have
> been
> > over a lot sooner, German troops in No. Africa and the MTO would have
> simply
> > been isolated and would died on the vine. Why not?
>
> It would have been playing into the German's hands. They had
> a strong, experienced fighting force, but their industry was no
> match for the growing power of the Allies; they were doomed
> to lose a long war but might still be able to win a battle -- if it
> came soon enough. The logical strategy for the Allied was to
> use their position surrounding the axis forces and their numerical
> strength to wound and wear down the beast; then to go in for the
> kill. Throwing the inexperienced US Army on some West-European
> beach, as Marshall would have wanted to do, would have given
> the Germans their one single opportunity to actually win the war;
> and they still had the strength to use it.
>
> The American forces were still being built up when the plans
> for 'Roundup', as the 1943 invasion was called, were being
> discussed in the spring and summer of 1942. There wasn't
> a single complete US division in Britain when Marshall and
> Hopkins came to London with their invasion plan; the first
> units of the 8th AF had not arrived yet. The U-boote were
> still slaughtering the naval traffic right off the US coast and
> German forces were still advancing in North Africa and
> Russia. It was simply a bad time to propose an invasion for
> the next year.
>
> But preparations for the 1944 invasion were in fact started at
> the end of 1942; the British General Morgan was appointed to
> prepare the invasion plan, with the grand title of chief of staff
> of the supreme commander (who of course had not been
> appointed yet). Together with the joint chiefs of staff in
> Washington, Morgan's team did their best -- which involved
> planning the shipping of non-existent divisions in non-existent
> ships to the enemy shore. Morgan's plan did not survive the
> criticism of the commanders who had to execute it, and Overlord
> was a much bigger operation, but the general can hardly be blamed
> for that.
>
> --
> Emmanuel Gustin
> Emmanuel.Gustin -rem@ve- skynet dot be
> Flying Guns Page: http://users.skynet.be/Emmanuel.Gustin/

Landing craft availability was always a problem. I don't
know if the US had the means to get enough into the ETO for
a 1943 attempt.

Joe

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David Nicholls

December 10th 03, 02:23 AM

"L'acrobat" > wrote in message
...
>
> "Keith Willshaw" > wrote in message
> ...
> >
> > "ArtKramr" > wrote in message
> > ...
> >
> > > >
> > >
> > > And Monte's entire 8th Army would have been in England and could have
> > been
> > > used in an invasion along with the supporting RAF aircraft The
invasion
> a
> > year
> > > earlier was very possible had the MTO and African campaigns not taken
> > place..
> > >
> > >
> >
> > No the 8th army was stopping the German sweeping through Egypt
> > and Palestine at the time.
> >
> > Do you think it would have been a good idea to allow them
> > to take the Suez Canal, Egypy and Tel Aviv ?
>
> Even if you believe that it is a good idea to let the Italians have all
that
> (not suggesting you do), all you would gain is an 8th Army that had no
> combat experience and would likely have the same problems that they ran
into
> early in the middle east, without the German supply problems to let them
> regroup.
>
>
What finally killed the German military machine was lack of oil! If they
(or their Italian allies) had control of the Middle East and the
Mediteranean they would not have had any oil shortages! Also if one assumes
German control of Middle East it would have totally changes the dynamics of
the southern Russian campaigns

David

Drazen Kramaric

December 11th 03, 08:14 AM

On Sat, 6 Dec 2003 23:21:57 -0000, "Keith Willshaw"
> wrote:

>There werent as many available for the follow up
>waves however.

In 1944, Allies used around 35 divisions in the period between June
6th, 1944 and August 1st, 1944. Within that period, Allies invaded,
repelled German counterattacks, established a bridgehead, liberated a
major port and on the last day, broke through the German front.

Same number of divisions would have been on Allied disposal if it
weren't for operation Torch.

>> Allies had enough landing craft to perform Husky in summer 1943 and
>> Torch in autumn 1942. There were certainly enough craft to land the
>> five divisions of the first wave and immediate support.
>>
>
>But not the follow up forces

It depends upon what do you call the "follow up" forces. The vessels
used in Torch and Husky (which wouldn't have happened) should have
been enough until the capture of the major port.

>The Luftwaffed most certainly did cause casualties in Italy in 1943

In no case Allies suffered prohibitive losses anywhere in the
Mediterranean during 1943. Quite the contrary, it was Luftwaffe that
was taking higher losses and was incapable of preventing Allies from
conducting all sorts of air missions.

>That depends on what you mean by success. Sitting in an enclave
>under artillery attack isnt typically considered a success

I'd call an establishment of second front in northwest France by
Autumn 1943 a success.

>But they did to defeat the German air force in the West
>which was much stronger than taht in the med.

In same way, Allied air forces in the West would have been
proportionally stronger if it weren't for redeployment of US air
groups to the Mediterranean. In addition, RAF Fighter Command could
have been utilised.

>But not to advance into Germany and win the war which
>is the point.

Had Allies established a second front in France by Autumn 1943, they
would have won the war, there is no question about it. It is not
correct to demand the same tempo of advance from 1943 invasion as it
was historically achieved in 1944 because Allies were stronger in 1944
and Germans were weaker. But if Allies liberate Paris in April 1944
that they are definitely ahead of historical schedule.

Allies could afford additional year by spending Soviet lives. There is
little doubt that invading in 1944 was sound political move, I am not
entirely convinced that American and British lives thus saved were
more worth that Soviet ones who were lost in that year when Germans
could deploy the bulk of their ground forces in Russia.

>Its a long way fro El Agheila to El Alamein but they managed that

And were stopped. And could not move any further given the historical
level of logistics on their disposal.

>Which gives them lots of oil in 1944

By 1944 it doesn't matter any more since Americans are in the theatre
in strength and I don't think a lot of oil automatically means a lot
of tankers or an increased capacity of raphineries or significant
increase of tanks or fighters produced.

Note that captured oil fields in Indonesia never reached the prewar
level of production.

>How many German workers do you think were suitable to
>provide army replacements in 1943 ?

Enough to cover all sectors previously held by Italians.

Drax
remove NOSPAM for reply

Peter Stickney

December 14th 03, 04:55 AM

In article >,
"Paul J. Adam" > writes:
> In message >, Paul F Austin
> > writes
>>"ArtKramr" wrote
>>> What then? The war in central Europe (ETO) could have gotten our full
>>> resouces, D Day would have been a year earlier and the war would have
>>been
>>> over a lot sooner, German troops in No. Africa and the MTO would have
>>simply
>>> been isolated and would died on the vine. Why not?
>>
>>Mainly because we would have been handed our heads, trying to invade in
>>mid-1943. The short reason would be that the Sovs wouldn't have whittled
>>down the Wehrmacht enough at that point to make a Western Front possible.
>>Also the Brits wouldn't go. Churchill and the Imperial General Staff were
>>scared stiff of a direct confrontation with the Wehrmacht based on their
>>experience in 1940.
>
> And at Dieppe in 1942; that experimental raid, while a bloody tactical
> failure, probably saved a great many lives in showing just how difficult
> opposed amphibious operations really were and what equipment and
> training was needed to have a chance at success. Merely throwing brave
> troops at the beach and hoping for the best was proved to be a recipe
> for disaster.

Well, Dieppe did teach that a compromised operation, launched with no
support by a megalomanaical idiot with no authority to do so, using
untrained troops and inadequate equipment against prepared defences
was a Very Bad Idea.

How Mountbatten (Who ordered the operation without the required
coordination with teh RAF or RN, and without the required approval of
his higher-ups, to the point of lieing to his own staff about it)
managed to survive that fiasco is asonishing. Lesser screwups in the
U.S. had found themselves cahiered (Kimmel and Short), or placed in
charge of the Coastal Defences of Wyoming (Fredenhall).

Mind you, Mountbatten got the job of head of S.O.E. after losing,
what, 2-3 Destroyers that he'd been commanding?

I'd have to say that Dieppe was more an example of failure in Command,
rather than of the difficulty of staging a cross-Channel invasion.

Not that the Allies would have been ready much before 1944 anyway.

--
Pete Stickney
A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many
bad measures. -- Daniel Webster