In message >, Kevin Brooks
> writes
>"Paul J. Adam" > wrote in message
...
>> Trained gun-fitters and repair teams, and the logistic pipeline to
>> support them, cost money.
>
>But you are claiming we would retain the gun pods--don't they already then
>have to maintain these skills?
Sure, but you can scale back sharply when you're maintaining a MTE fit
rather than a fleet-wide fit. Training is more of an issue and a more
significant risk.
>> Try costing up the aircraft,
>
>They have to bore holes in the sky anyway--having them chunk up hours on the
>range instead of doing touch-and-go's seems to be of little impact.
How many fast-jet sorties are flown for purposes of 'wheels up, flew
around, wheels down'?
If you want strafing practice to be useful, the pilots need to know
whether they did well or badly (and if they did badly, what to improve).
None of this is simple, easy or cheap in a modern world.
>Keep in
>mind that the strafe mission is not their highest priority training event.
Why not, if it's operationally vital?
>> the range,
>The range would undoubtedly be a multi-use facility (i.e., unlikely to have
>a range dedicated to strafe only), so that is no argument.
If it's multi-use then time spent strafing is time it's not usable for
other missions. That's a serious cost, especially when you're not
exactly awash in live-fire range facilities to start with.
That's before you even _start_ on the effort needed to keep the range
clear, score the passes, clean up afterwards...
>the targets (whether air-to-air
>> or air-to-ground),
>
>Yeah, putting up a target panel of fabric must be extremely expensive...
How many times have US units been attacked by large stationary panels of
motionless fabric? Real targets move, use camouflage and obscurants, and
are (if guns are required) close to similar-looking friendly units.
>the equipment to provide useful feedback and training
>> (because 'pulled trigger, gun made loud noise, came home, landed' is not
>> useful training) and it adds up with alarming rapidity.
>Gee, they have to grade all kinds of exercises already--I'd suspect a bit of
>gun camera footage of the strafe pass would be acceptable.
I bow to your obviously superior experience of gunnery ranges: since
I've only worked the damn things I can't compete with your assertions
and enthusiasm.
>> I'd heard the A-10s got pulled early due to hot/high problems, and given
>> the frequent sniping at the F-16's range I'm surprised to hear it doing
>> significant long-range loiter.
>
>The 354th FW *did* do "significant long-range loiter" during that operation
>with their F-16's, so that argument is meaningless.
I'd be interested in some numbers, given the very significant problems
experienced with keeping F-16s stacked in kill boxes during Gulf War 1
(fifteen minutes or less was common, with 'dump targets' getting heavily
hit when aircraft arrived, waited, and left without hot targets)
>> According to
>>
>> http://www.csis.org/burke/hd/reports/afghanlessons_airwar_exec.pdf
>>
>> the US flew 17,500 combat sorties over Afghanistan, of which you've
>> heard of several failed strafes ('danger close' sorties where the gun
>> passes failed to stop the enemy, leading to 'even more dangerously
>> close' use of other munitions) and two cases where the enemy was
>> 'suppressed'. Guesstimate two aircraft in each case for eight sorties
>> with a 50% success rate.
>
>Failed to stop the enemy? How much suppression did they achieve?
The description by a participant of the enemy in a static defensive
position continuing to fire despite repeated strafes, until they were
taken out by a LGB, indicates a lack of effectiveness.
>And here
>you go with your McNamaresque number crunching again...
Hey, Kevin, _you're_ the one suggesting that "rounds fired = results".
Perhaps we should count the 20mm rounds fired during those strafes and
calculate the body count?
The strafing passes were intended to deter, defeat or destroy the enemy
in that position. They clearly failed to do so.
>war cannot always be
>resolved into neat little statistical piles. Witness the recognition lately
>of the fact that the old attrition models for simulations are just plain
>inaccurate as all get out.
'Lately'?
>> It's not an enormously convincing argument that the existing gun
>> armament is a potent and essential CAS tool, is it?
>
>Your strawman. I have said from the beginning that it is a last resort,
>only-when-nothing-else-should-be-tried-first tool,
One which is important enough to be fitted to all tactical aircraft, now
and forever, without doubt or question.
>and as such preserves
>flexibility for the system beyond that which exists sans guns. But hey, you
>tell me what the groundpounder who finds himself with a nasty situation
>located in that 25-to-500 meter danger-close gap in CAS coverage that
>results when no gun is available is supposed to do.
Get your head down and use available ordnance.
Now, what do you say to the groundpounder who finds a strafing pass or
two _doesn't_ stop the enemy?
>Either the gun needs
>> to be made significantly more effective in order to increase its
>> lethality and utilisation... or it needs replacing with something better
>> able to provide _effective_ close fire to troops in combat.
>
>But this is, by my own admission, a "niche" capability that probably does
>not merit much more resource dedication than it has already received.
And yet it is a sacrosanct future fit.
Can't do without it... but can't possibly improve on it either.
See the contradiction yet?
>A
>nice-to-have capability for use when none of the other tools are initially
>suitable or acceptable.
Is there a real need or not? (The evidence suggests there is). Is a
fixed aircraft gun the best solution? (The evidence strongly suggests
not).
>> Burdening most of your tactical air fleet with a thousand pounds of
>> ballast that's used on 0.05% of combat sorties is
>
>I guess the USAF is utterly clueless then, as they seem to disagree with
>you.
They don't pay my salary or ask my advice.
I notice that the USMC do seem to agree with me, as far as their version
of the JSF goes.
>I'd note that a fair portion of your own RAF was apparently not happy
>with the loss of the gun from the Typhoon. Do you know something none of
>these folks do?
That it's a lot more expensive to maintain the capability than most seem
to think (the idea that sorties are free, ranges sit fully manned but
unused for opportunity use, and logistic pipelines cost nothing).
I'd personally argue that once you've designed the gun into the aircraft
you might as well bite the bullet and keep it, but to do so means
finding the same saving in a different area: and the gun was the least
indispensible capability.
>> And you describe above how in at least one case, strafing failed to
>> deter the enemy and heavier weapons had to be resorted to.
>
>You are really having a problem with the idea that the ground commander
>would prefer to work *up* the risk ladder, don't you?
When the "low risk" option failed and the "high risk" option needed
using anyway, then it's a problem. (If the enemy had been advancing,
then the "high risk" option that actually succeeded might instead have
become OBE...)
An "option" that actually just wastes time is not a good option in my
opinion.
>Not jumping in and
>placing his ground troops at maximum risk from the outset?
Is the only risk from your own CAS?
>Odd, since you
>were so risk adverse when it came to allowing the CAS assets down into the
>weeds to make these sort of attacks.
Particularly since 'danger close' target identification is a very
difficult art even when you can give it full attention.
>> Similarly, one drag on developing a weapon for danger-close CAS is the
>> airy claim that "that's what the gun is for" when its effectiveness is
>> patchy (some reports of 'suppression' when it was used, but others where
>> the enemy declined to be deterred)
>Gee, if it really sucked so much, why did those CCT's keep calling for
>strafe as opposed to bombs in the first place?
How many times had they called for strafe against live enemies and seen
the results before? Combat is a learning experience.
>> Sounds like there's a need for a similar weight and accuracy of fire as
>> the AC-130 can deliver, but with the survivability of a fast jet.
>>
>> In your scenario, neither aircraft is particularly suitable: if the
>> AC-130 can't survive the SAM threat, repeated passes by fast movers will
>> also get them speared by those improved MANPADS (especially since
>> they're delivering a lot less firepower and so *need* to make multiple
>> passes through the weapon envelope of an alerted enemy... this is what
>> is technically known as a Really Bad Idea).
>
>Really Worse Idea is not being able to deliver support when the risk is
>assessed and accepted.
Which is where you end up with an enemy with improved air defences, if
your only 'danger close' argument is a fixed gun.
>> So where's the evidence for that?
>
>The same place as your evidence that the gun is worthless--a product of the
>argument. If you don't have a gun, and the bad guys are in so tight that you
>*can't* resort to a bomb,
Not the case here, note - or rather, when the guns failed then bombs had
to be used risks or not.
Suppose the enemy are even closer and the guns still don't stop them.
What then?
>then you are effectively saying CAS is out of the
>picture, so any increased losses could be attributed to that, at least in
>part.
Trouble is, saying "whether the gun is effective or not, it's all we've
got, so we must have it" is a thoroughly circular argument.
Why the fevered opposition to considering alternatives? "The USAF don't
use that", "that's an Army weapon", "nobody's cleared it for fast
movers" all sound suspiciously like excuses rather than reasons.
>> And the only options are 20mm cannon or 2000lb bombs? Think again. If
>> this is a genuine and frequent need, neither weapon is appropriate.
>
>Nobody said "frequent". I have noted before that you seem ready to place
>combat into the "nice neat box" category, where all things happen according
>to plan, and there is a playbook for handling the proceedings.
Your imagination, not reality. (I'm not the one advocating keeping a
'marginal infrequent' capability on the entire TacAir fleet).
>That just is
>not the way it happens. Which is why flexibility is important. And I hate to
>say it, but I think your empathy is a bit lacking--if it *were* you hugging
>the dirt up close and personal and well within the danger close margin for
>bombs, and you had the option of starting with guns and then working up
>through higher risk alternatives, I suspect you'd do that as opposed to
>starting with the more risky "big bang". It is a bit easier to say you
>wouldn't when you are not facing that dilemma.
And when that decision is made, and the Bad Guys keep shooting despite
strafe passes, and you take casualties?
Life isn't simple, and working your way up from "safe" to "risky"
options is sometimes a luxury.
Just out of interest, how close is "danger close" for mortar fire?
Officially it's 250 metres, but what's the _real_ danger close?
>> No, we're talking about current and future procurement.
>
>We have been using Anaconda as the point of discussion-the M61 was used in
>that role by both USAF and (IIRC) USN aircraft during that operation.
And using the results of that to inform future planning. Some new kit
may be integrated onto existing platforms, other issues may be for the
future.
Existing aircraft have the fit they do, it's the next step that's
controllable.
>> Unless you plan your only combat to be action replays, then you need to
>> learn what worked and what didn't; decide what lessons are valid and
>> which were special cases; and then plan for the future so you do more of
>> what worked, less of what didn't work and learn from the Lessons
>> Identified.
>Well, since it looks like the 25mm is going to be our next major gun caliber
>for the fast movers, maybe that will satisfy some of your concern.
So the F/A-22 is flying with a deficient weapon? :) How many lives will
_that_ cost? (I'll wager that USAF F-22s take as many air-to-air gun
shots as F-15s have)
>> About as acceptable as declaring that there's no particular problem that
>> a few strafing passes won't completely solve.
>
>Why would you claim that? I did not say any such thing.
So what did thegun actually _achieve_? Wasted some time while failing
to prevent the enemy returning fire, seems to be all.
>What I have been
>saying is that when the ground guys find themselves in such a knife fight
>and CAS is available, it is sure nice for that CAS to be able to contribute
>to the fight.
No argument at all. It needs to destroy the enemy: failing that, to
suppress and disrupt them enough to seriously interfere with their
operations.
>If it is successful in suppressing the bad guys (and I imagine
>that it usually will at least be able to achieve short-term suppression),
"Imagining" is not much use, Kevin.
>I can't understand what you find disagreeable about allowing
>those ground troops to escalate the risk level as needed, as opposed to
>having to accept that greater risk of fratricide from the outset if you have
>no gun capability.
Nothing at all - I want them to have an _effective_ option to use.
>> I'm not the one claiming four situations in 17,500 sorties demonstrates
>> a completely untouchable situation, Kevin.
>
>Neither am I; I shy away from such meaningless statistics.
But you're claiming that all tactical aircraft *must* have guns for just
this option.
>I recognize that
>strafe is the least preferable manner of delivering effective CAS.
So would a more effective and survivable method not be desirable?
Apparently not: it's "guns or nothing" for close engagements, now and
forever.
>I also
>recognize that there is a lot of ground radiating out from between 25 meters
>and (let's assume for the SDB which will shortly be in the inventory) maybe
>200 meters, and retaining the ability to conduct immediate CAS requests
>against such targets may very well mean the difference between
>success/failure for the mission or life/death for the troops.
Then why is the idea of looking at alternatives to cover that zone so
abhorrent?
>> Who has the option of operating above the light AAA, though MANPADS are
>> a problem there too.
>
>It does not matter how high he is operating-we don't like using the gunships
>for daylight operations. Khafji put paid to that approach.
It's a bloody expensive capability if you're limited to 50% utilisation,
but that's just my opinion.
You're happy to have fighters make predictable passes through MANPADS
and AAA come what may, but flying an AC-130 in daylight is Completely
Impossible? Weird priorities.
>> Given that the mortars should be one to two miles back at least (for
>> 81mm tubes, more for 120s) and artillery five to ten miles, that is one
>> _hell_ of a light AA gun or man-portable SAM that can detect and hit a
>> cargo flight at that distance while in contact with friendly troops and
>> under artillery fire. It's a *lot* easier to acquire and shoot at the
>> Big Loud Plane that just flew overhead.
>
>Here is where your "should be" falls apart on the rocks of reality.
How many ammunition resupply flights were shot down, then?
>During
>Anaconda the troops found themselves engaged a lot earlier, and a lot more
>heavily, than they predicted-that is war, with all of its uncertainty.
This is true, but irrelevant. How many resupply flights were shot down?
(The lesson might be "it hurts to underestimate an opponent" and
learning it might be more useful than bolting guns into yet another
generation of aircraft, but that's just me)
>So, I
>'d assume (though I have not read anything to corroborate this) that the
>plan was to have the mortars set up somewhere near the initial LZ's to cover
>the troops movement to contact.
I'm wary of assumptions - bear in mind the troops allegedly went in
without artillery support, it not being judged necessary. (Whoops...)
>By making contact a lot earlier than
>anticipated, that put the mortars up near the close fight, and made the
>resupply mission rather hazardous.
It seemed more that they had more missions than capability to fire,
rather than having their resupply destroyed.
>Tube arty in this case was another
>matter-Hagenbach, the MG in charge, has to shoulder the load for failing to
>have a firebase set up within range, but he apparently did not anticipate
>getting into a knifefight that precluded the use of the usual CAS delivered
>bombs from the outset. Which is why those CCT's ended up begging for
>strafing runs, again and again.
Precisely how many runs, out of interest? Both accounts of the battle
we've discussed indicate strafe was called but ineffective at the
start... and indicate that while bombs were called and used throughout,
strafe only seemed to feature in the first phase (against the bunker
that resisted it, until a PGM solved the problem)
And again, this comes into the category of planning for failure and
obsessing about "if we can't supply our mortars, don't bring artillery,
and then land right on top of the enemy, _then_ we need this capability"
- this isn't a convincing argument of why every tactical fighter in the
US inventory needs to have it available.
>> In at least one case the main armament had to be used anyway,
>> danger-close be damned.
>
> ONLY as a last resort.
Point being that the strafing runs were a time-wasting distraction.
>Common sense dictates that you don't start off
>treating a simple puncture wound to your hand by amputating the arm at the
>elbow, though that option may be exercised later if the mere cleaning and
>bandaging of the wound does not prevent blood poisoning.
Unless the septicaemia has spread by then or developed into gangrene
while you fiddle about with bandages. (Also, perhaps you need somewhere
between 'bandage and pray' and 'chop it off at the elbow'?)
>Likewise, those CCT
>'s did not jump directly to the risky use of bombs in a danger close
>situation until they had exhausted their other less risky options.
Luckily, the target wasn't advancing.
>> In four cases, with patchy results at best.
>
> They DID it, which is more than they could have done had they lacked
>those guns.
And they got very little result from it where results are available.
>> How about improving ground-to-air comms to shorten the targeting cycle?
>> More fuel, meaning more loiter time per aircraft, for more responsive
>> support? Both reduce the time needed from call-for-fire to delivery;
>> meaning instead of 'suppressing' the enemy with strafing passes, they
>> can be engaged with destructive weapons because they've had less time to
>> close. Or more payload, for a new munition that's got both short
>> danger-close and high lethality on target
>
> Huh? They "closed" almost instantaneously in this event, from what I
>have read. There was no detection of the bad guys in strength at 1000 meters
>followed by maneuver to within danger-close limits-for gosh sakes, they
>would have just pasted the guys with CAS delivered PGM's at the outset if
>they had known they were there.
So you're now defining capability based on one battle?
>> How many missions did they fly the next day? None. How much ordnance did
>> they deliver? None.
>
> And they hung around because the guys on the ground were in deep do-do
>and needed that support right then, not tomorrow. Tomorrow is meaningless if
>you are likely to die today.
Who's "you", Kevin? One unit of troops in contact? Don't the units
moving through them tomorrow who will be in contact but with less
support count?
Either this is an essential capability, or it isn't. If it's not
essential and the troops can cope without it, what's the problem with
doing without? If it _is_ essential but you lose a lot of aircraft
delivering it, there's a clear need to improve it.
>> And how many helicopters were available to fly sorties the next day, and
>> the day after, and how many men could have died as a result? Or, what
>> was cancelled because the air support they needed for backup suddenly
>> wasn't there?
>
> They were able to bring in replacement helos: IIRC some USMC AH-1W's
>showed up to handle the attack helo role subsequent to having those Apaches
>get shot up.
And where were they brought in _from_? Okay, if you've got so much
capability you totally overwhelm the foe then who cares? But that's not
always the case: realistically, "brought in as replacements" in one
theatre means "taken away from" another area.
>> Losing a half-squadron of AH-64s in a single incident suggests that
>> there's a serious capability gap, not that the existing systems are just
>> fine.
>>
>> Similarly, 88% attrition is _not_ sustainable.
>
> Any source for that number? ISTR reading that most of those helos were
>back up within the week (I only recall one being a write off at the time)?
My sources said seven of eight grounded for repairs of which two were
repaired and five never flew again (at least not in that conflict)
>> Because those were the only two options available to them, and neither
>> sound satisfactory: the LGBs worryingly lethal over too large an area,
>> the gun runs inadequately lethal.
>
> And they requested the gun runs in preference to the bombs-case
>closed.
Case reopened when they called for the bombs _anyway_ because the guns
failed to do the job.
By all means plan your procurement on "first request". I'll stick to
"what actually worked".
>> Tells me they need another option available to them.
>
> That may be, but I know of no other option that we can count on always
>being onboard the loadout of the CAS packages.
In other words, every US tactical aircraft _must_ have a gun, no debate,
no question.
>Even if APKWS was adopted by
>the USAF it would not be an integral weapon. As it stands now we can get
>some kind of CAS support at the 25 meters-from- friendlies- range from every
>fast mover CAS aircraft we have-that is called flexibility.
It's also called "ineffective" on the limited results available.
>> It must be wonderful having that much budget.
> It is. And as we discussed earlier, the gun is a marginal part of the
>total program cost.
Not when you run the numbers. $100 million up front and $8m a year
in-service adds up to some genuine money.
>> But the STOVL version is more, not less, likely to be performing CAS.
>> How then can the gun be optional, if it's so effective and essential.
>
> I did not say it was the most effective weapon-that is you twisting my
>words (again). I said it affords a greater degree of flexibility, especially
>in the very close fight, that you lose without the gun, and I believe that
>flexibility is very important.
So why delete it from the airframe most likely to have a heavy CAS
tasking?
>> Yet again, armament suites are not fixed forever.
>
> Ever try to specify what loadout you want from the air force side?
So you're now trying to solve institutional and doctrinal problems with
procurement?
>> Having the enemy "suppressed" for a pass or two is not a great return on
>> investment either.
> It is if it allows you to disengage, or if it allows you to maneuver
>to a position offering better cover, or if it allows you to conduct an
>assault to dislodge the bad guys.
None of which were true even after multiple gun passes, in the
documented combat example.
>I believe if you asked the average ground
>guy which he'd prefer to have, the ability to achieve short-term
>suppression, or the inability to suppress at all, he'd take the former
Actually, he'd want the Bad Guys made into Dead Guys (or at least Gone
Guys) and I doubt he'd care too much how it was done so long as it
worked.
>> So you don't have the right weapons for the job? (20mm lacks
>> effectiveness, current PGMs too generous in their danger zones)
>>
>> Bear in mind you're making force-wide assertions on the basis of 0.05%
>> of the offensive air sorties here.
>
> Paging Mr. McNamara.
Not sure what this means - you're the one using assertion and opinion to
inform decisions, not me.
> Glad to see you found the article, Paul. Too bad you can't understand
>the basic fact that those ground guys kept asking for strafing attacks
>because they did not want to escalate their own risk until/unless they had
>to.
And at some point you'll notice they switched ordnance because the
strafing runs failed and they needed something better, risks or not.
Luckily, this time the target was static and they had the time for this
progression.
I say that something better is needed. You're insisting that the status
quo is just fine and no improvement is possible. Something of an
impasse.
--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill
Paul J. Adam MainBox<at>jrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk