asymetric warfare

[Howard Berkowitz]

In article >,
(Derek Lyons) wrote:

> Howard Berkowitz > wrote:
>
> >You are missing asymmetry. Archimedes' enemies used low tech, just lots
> >of it. Losing a major C3I node, or the logistics network, is much more
> >of a problem to a high-tech invader.
>
> And it's unlikely as hell that you with your laptop are going to get
> acess to any such.
>

After spending a fair bit of time in advisory groups to the National
Communications System, and the current telecom and advisory groups, I
will point out that if you can defeat the underlying transmission
system, the higher-layer application, often using commercial
transmission facilities, is neutralized.

[Fred J. McCall]

"Ray Drouillard" > wrote:

:
:"pervect" > wrote in message
.. .
:> On Sat, 20 Dec 2003 18:15:56 +0000, (phil
:> hunt) wrote:
:>
:> >On Fri, 19 Dec 2003 13:43:49 -0500, Ray Drouillard
> wrote:
:> >>
:> >>Also, since it's not encrypted, it can be spoofed using a local
:> >>transmitter
:> >
:> >That doesn't logically follow; it's possible to make non-encrypted
:> >data that can't be faked, you just use a digital signature.
:>
:> If you don't go to spread-spectrum, your radio links will probably be
:> jammed. (Solution - go to spread spectrum).
:>
:> Spread spectrum signals will be difficult to separate from noise,
:> except at very close range, where the total power level is noticable
:> above the broadband noise.
:>
:> I'd still rate a radio location system using spread spectrum
:> transmitters as rather vulnerable, because the transmitters have to
:> remain in a fixed location for the system to work, and would be prime
:> targets.
:
:You don't necessarily need stationary transmitters. After all, the GPS
:transmitters aren't stationary.
:
:If the transmitters transmit their locations to the receivers, the
:receivers can do the necessary calculations to get a fix.

Ok, you're now trying to reinvent GPS, but without the satellites.

How do the transmitters know THEIR locations with precision if they
are moving?

--
"Some people get lost in thought because it's such unfamiliar
territory."
--G. Behn

[Derek Lyons]

Howard Berkowitz > wrote:

>In article >,
(Derek Lyons) wrote:
>
>> Howard Berkowitz > wrote:
>>
>> >You are missing asymmetry. Archimedes' enemies used low tech, just lots
>> >of it. Losing a major C3I node, or the logistics network, is much more
>> >of a problem to a high-tech invader.
>>
>> And it's unlikely as hell that you with your laptop are going to get
>> acess to any such.
>
>After spending a fair bit of time in advisory groups to the National
>Communications System, and the current telecom and advisory groups, I
>will point out that if you can defeat the underlying transmission
>system, the higher-layer application, often using commercial
>transmission facilities, is neutralized.

That's fine for disabling DoD systems, important, but non tactical. I
have a hard time believing that a high-tech invader would rely on US
commercial transmission facilities.

D.
--
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Corrections, comments, and additions should be
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[Howard Berkowitz]

In article >,
(Derek Lyons) wrote:

> Howard Berkowitz > wrote:
>
> >In article >,
> (Derek Lyons) wrote:
> >
> >> Howard Berkowitz > wrote:
> >>
> >> >You are missing asymmetry. Archimedes' enemies used low tech, just
> >> >lots
> >> >of it. Losing a major C3I node, or the logistics network, is much
> >> >more
> >> >of a problem to a high-tech invader.
> >>
> >> And it's unlikely as hell that you with your laptop are going to get
> >> acess to any such.
> >
> >After spending a fair bit of time in advisory groups to the National
> >Communications System, and the current telecom and advisory groups, I
> >will point out that if you can defeat the underlying transmission
> >system, the higher-layer application, often using commercial
> >transmission facilities, is neutralized.
>
> That's fine for disabling DoD systems, important, but non tactical. I
> have a hard time believing that a high-tech invader would rely on US
> commercial transmission facilities.
>

I think we've gotten out of synchronization here. I was referring not to
foreign invaders, but to the hypothetical federal tyranny people
frequently go on about deterring.

If it came to a ground invasion of the continental US, unless the
regulars had totally collapsed, it's rather hard to conceive of any
nation that could take and hold a beachhead -- at least within 30-50
years. The PRC is as good a candidate as any, but they have a long way
before they can pose a significant ampbib threat to Taiwan.

[John Schilling]

Howard Berkowitz > writes:

>In article >, (John
>Schilling) wrote:

>> >Exactly. I am _not_ in favor of gun confiscation, but I really can't
>> >accept the idea of the unorganized militia, with sporting weapons,
>> >deterring either regulars or invaders. With a laptop and intimate
>> >knowledge of communications networks, I can be a MUCH nastier deterrent.

>> More likely, you can come to the same end as Archimedes, accomplishing
>> no more in the end than one guy with a hunting rifle.

>You are missing asymmetry. Archimedes' enemies used low tech, just lots
>of it. Losing a major C3I node, or the logistics network, is much more
>of a problem to a high-tech invader.

Even high-tech invaders still use tens or hundreds of thousands of
men with purely mechanical weapons guided by the unaugmented human
eye and brain, who can use all the traditional low-tech methods of
hunting down the fool who thinks his Archimedean brain alone will
triumph over their brain and brawn combined.

Whereupon they can get on with repairing the C3I node and you can
get on with bleeding out on the floor.


>> Now, with a laptop *and* a rifle, you can accomplish a lot more than
>> with either alone. On the defensive side, every detective with a hunch
>> as to where that nuisance with the laptop is, every house-to-house search
>> for same, has to allocate a SWAT team per target instead of just a couple
>> beat cops. Which means the whole process takes them longer for the same
>> available resources and gives you that much more time to make a nuisance
>> of yourself with the laptop.

>Ahem. If one tracks many of the more destructive hacking attempts, the
>computer delivering the attack, the hacker, and the target often are on
>different continents. Those SWAT teams had better have LONG range.

Hacking attempts against the academic and commercial internet, yes.
Military operations, outside of bad technothriller movies and novels,
are not dependant on the global internet. You can hinder the enemy's
R&D and procurement efforts and so delay his acquisition of newer
and better guns, but if you are wholly unarmed the guns he's already
got are more than sufficient.

And the networks that help coordinate his gunmen at the operational
level, the ones which are of immediate concern to you, are not so
broadly distributed. The enemy has no reason to put a node, terminal,
or other access point anywhere he doesn't have at least a minimal
military presence, and those are pretty much by definition places
where his SWAT teams can reach.


For that matter, you'll probably have to deal with armed enemy soldiers
one way or another just to get terminal access in the first place.


--
*John Schilling * "Anything worth doing, *
*Member:AIAA,NRA,ACLU,SAS,LP * is worth doing for money" *
*Chief Scientist & General Partner * -13th Rule of Acquisition *
*White Elephant Research, LLC * "There is no substitute *
* for success" *
*661-951-9107 or 661-275-6795 * -58th Rule of Acquisition *

[Howard Berkowitz]

In article >, (John
Schilling) wrote:

> Howard Berkowitz > writes:
>
> >In article >, (John
> >Schilling) wrote:
>
> >> >Exactly. I am _not_ in favor of gun confiscation, but I really can't
> >> >accept the idea of the unorganized militia, with sporting weapons,
> >> >deterring either regulars or invaders. With a laptop and intimate
> >> >knowledge of communications networks, I can be a MUCH nastier
> >> >deterrent.
>
> >> More likely, you can come to the same end as Archimedes, accomplishing
> >> no more in the end than one guy with a hunting rifle.
>
> >You are missing asymmetry. Archimedes' enemies used low tech, just lots
> >of it. Losing a major C3I node, or the logistics network, is much more
> >of a problem to a high-tech invader.
>
> Even high-tech invaders still use tens or hundreds of thousands of
> men with purely mechanical weapons guided by the unaugmented human
> eye and brain, who can use all the traditional low-tech methods of
> hunting down the fool who thinks his Archimedean brain alone will
> triumph over their brain and brawn combined.
>
> Whereupon they can get on with repairing the C3I node and you can
> get on with bleeding out on the floor.

You seem to be assuming that the information/electronic warfare attacker
is in physical proximity of the guys with the assault rifles, swords,
flamethrowers, clubs, etc. SMART attacks can come from another
continent. Even if the attacker is in the same area, the attacks would
almost certainly be from computers, jammers, etc. that are triggered
remotely. As a specific example, the US buildup in Saudi Arabia in 1991
was quite vulnerable to expendable jammers in the general vicinity of
commercial-grade earth stations.
>

> Hacking attempts against the academic and commercial internet, yes.
> Military operations, outside of bad technothriller movies and novels,
> are not dependant on the global internet. You can hinder the enemy's
> R&D and procurement efforts and so delay his acquisition of newer
> and better guns, but if you are wholly unarmed the guns he's already
> got are more than sufficient.

Again, the military messaging and control is encrypted beyond plausible
attacks by non-national actors, but not so the underlying packet- and
circuit-switched transmission networks, especially the strategic
fixed-location ones. Look at the amount of leased commercial lines over
which things like SIPRNET and JWICS run. There are government-owned
backups, but you significantly degrade capacity by taking out commercial
switching nodes.

Do remember I am not saying use cyberwarfare instead of, but as a
complement. My original argument was not that the white-hat hackers
can't be tracked down -- it was against the argument that the
unorganized militia with sporting weapons was a serious deterrent to any
regular force. Now, you have the apparent regulars hunting the high-tech
resisters, apparently because they ARE a credible annoyance.
>
> And the networks that help coordinate his gunmen at the operational
> level, the ones which are of immediate concern to you, are not so
> broadly distributed. The enemy has no reason to put a node, terminal,
> or other access point anywhere he doesn't have at least a minimal
> military presence, and those are pretty much by definition places
> where his SWAT teams can reach.

I think you are assuming physical presence of the network attacker,
rather than a leave-behind jammer, a remote attack on the routing
software, etc.

>
>
> For that matter, you'll probably have to deal with armed enemy soldiers
> one way or another just to get terminal access in the first place.

You don't need terminal access if you are going after RF links. For
packet and circuit switching, there is still far too much in-band
signaling and back doors that OUGHT to be fixed. The Border Gateway
Protocol, the heart of any IP packet switching network, is not
significantly secure. Good operational procedures are the main
protection.