Re: Hiroshima justified? (wasRe: Enola Gay: Burnt flesh and other magnificent technological achievements)

[Linda Terrell]

On Sun, 21 Dec 2003 16:14:42 UTC, Col. RJ > wrote:

> On 20 Dec 2003 23:32:03 -0800, (cave fish)

>
> First off, **** Japan, they started it, we finished it.
> Second, Arm chair quarter backing the leaders back then is as stupid
> today as saying some running back should have done a run different
> last sunday.
> I believe that the Japs were well served by dropping nukes. They were
> given the chance to surrender and refused. Wanting instead to force
> us to invade, where I will bet hundreds of thousands if not a million
> or more would have died. (People like you would today be whining about
> why we didn't use nukes to save that carnage). After the first nuke
> we again asked the Japs to surrender and they refused. If not for the
> Emperor, they also didn't want to surrender after the second Tojo was
> prepared to obliterate the whole country before giving up.
> AS for the civilian cassualties, the Japs themselves didn't care about
> civilians in other countries. Nor obviously did they care about their
> own since the militerists were prepared to sacrifice them all for
> their pride. Yet now 60 years later you expect us to feel bad and
> all. Not gonna happen from anyone with a smidgen of sanity and an IQ
> over 65.


Indeed, imagine we invaded instead of nuked. Incredible causalties
all round,
guerilla warfare, street by street fighting. Then the American
populace finds out
we had a weapon that could have ended it all in days.

Boom!

LT

[Krztalizer]

>> 3. This all B-17's and B-24's kill more people in Hamburg, Norymberga and
>> others Germany cities
>
>Don't forget the RAF Lancasters and Mosquitoes, which put on the night
>firebombing raids, the which did more damage to German cities.

Cite concerning Mosquitos firebombing, please. Placing the Mosquito among the
four area bombers mentioned (five, counting the Enola Gay herself) is the same
as including a scalpel among a box of cleavers. They didn't bomb cities, they
attacked addresses. I do place a distinction between weapons designed or
employed to "dehouse" or, more bluntly, depopulate an area from the rare
aircraft with the Mosquitos ability to strike the exact spot of the enemy
infection.

v/r
Gordon
<====(A+C====>
USN SAR

Donate your memories - write a note on the back and send those old photos to a
reputable museum, don't take them with you when you're gone.

[Steve Hix]

In article >,
Dave Smith > wrote:
>
> American leadership in WW II? That is where we differ. England and its
> Commonwealth Allies were fighting in Europe

Because they'd been pushed to the wall and couldn't put it off any
longer, once Poland was attacked.

The U.S. was limited, then, to providing logistical support (Lend
Lease), some convoy support (USS Reuben James), and trying desperately
to build up its military forces to something resembling a useful level.
At the beginning of 1940, the U.S. military ranked around 16th, behind
Polands.

> and in SE Asia long before the US finally got involved.

Try again. Japan's attack on the Malay peninsula got the Commonwealth
involved in fighting in SE Asia.

On December 7, 1941, the Japanese Army began arriving at Kota Bharu.
This was just a diversionary force and the main landings in the Malay
peninsula did not take place until the next day, December 8, at Singora
and Patani on the north-east coast.

A diversion one day before Pearl Harbor (the two locales being on
different sides of the IDL), the main initial attack on the same day.

I suppose some might call one day "long before".

It's weak enough to be countered by noting that a U.S.N. gunboat, the
Panay, had already been attacked by Japanese forces in China, in 1937.
Both would be similarly silly claims.

[Steve Hix]

In article >,
(Krztalizer) wrote:

> >> 3. This all B-17's and B-24's kill more people in Hamburg, Norymberga and
> >> others Germany cities
> >
> >Don't forget the RAF Lancasters and Mosquitoes, which put on the night
> >firebombing raids, the which did more damage to German cities.
>
> Cite concerning Mosquitos firebombing, please.

They operated as Pathfinders, which were an integral part of the RAF
night bombing campaign. The bomber streams didn't operate alone.

> Placing the Mosquito among the
> four area bombers mentioned (five, counting the Enola Gay herself) is the same
> as including a scalpel among a box of cleavers. They didn't bomb cities, they
> attacked addresses.

They did that, too, along with a boatload of other jobs.

[Krztalizer]

>From: Charles Gray
>Date: 12/21/2003 9:33 PM Pacific

<post snipped>

Excellent post, sir. Summed up the reality of the days and the mind-set for
when these events occurred. Next, these armchair war critics will start
arguing with Washington's tactics at Yorktown.

Using a bomb like this on a city, or hundreds of thousands of bombs, is wrong
in my opinion. But in the context of a war that I wasn't around to fight, and
the fact that it ended the bloodiest war in history, practically overnight,
suggests that the atomic bombing of these two home island targets was no
different than conventional missions by LeMay's forces, with the exception that
these two missions accomplised an end to the war, which all the other massed
missions and thousands of casualties had not.

Gordon

[Alan Minyard]

On 21 Dec 2003 22:44:55 GMT, (Krztalizer) wrote:

>>> 3. This all B-17's and B-24's kill more people in Hamburg, Norymberga and
>>> others Germany cities
>>
>>Don't forget the RAF Lancasters and Mosquitoes, which put on the night
>>firebombing raids, the which did more damage to German cities.
>
>Cite concerning Mosquitos firebombing, please. Placing the Mosquito among the
>four area bombers mentioned (five, counting the Enola Gay herself) is the same
>as including a scalpel among a box of cleavers. They didn't bomb cities, they
>attacked addresses. I do place a distinction between weapons designed or
>employed to "dehouse" or, more bluntly, depopulate an area from the rare
>aircraft with the Mosquitos ability to strike the exact spot of the enemy
>infection.
>
>v/r
>Gordon
><====(A+C====>
> USN SAR
>
>Donate your memories - write a note on the back and send those old photos to a
>reputable museum, don't take them with you when you're gone.

Without PGMs they were just chucking them out like everyone else. They may have
been assigned different targets, but their "accuracy" was as non-existant as
any other level bomber of the era.

Al Minyard

[Matt Wiser]

(Krztalizer) wrote:
>>From: Charles Gray
>>Date: 12/21/2003 9:33 PM Pacific
>
><post snipped>
>
>Excellent post, sir. Summed up the reality
>of the days and the mind-set for
>when these events occurred. Next, these armchair
>war critics will start
>arguing with Washington's tactics at Yorktown.
>
>Using a bomb like this on a city, or hundreds
>of thousands of bombs, is wrong
>in my opinion. But in the context of a war
>that I wasn't around to fight, and
>the fact that it ended the bloodiest war in
>history, practically overnight,
>suggests that the atomic bombing of these two
>home island targets was no
>different than conventional missions by LeMay's
>forces, with the exception that
>these two missions accomplised an end to the
>war, which all the other massed
>missions and thousands of casualties had not.
>
>Gordon
The bombs were necessary. Alternatives such as a combined blockade and
bombing campaign, or the invasion that was already approved and scheduled
for "on or after 1 November 1945" would succeed, but length of the former
(up to 18 months) and the cost and length of the latter (c.370,000 casualties
and at least a year for the combined invasions of Kyushu and the Kanto Plain)
were considered unacceptable to Truman now that the bomb worked. The weapon
worked, a delivery platform equipped a suitable unit (509th CG), and that
unit had deployed and was ready to go. The domestic political cost of NOT
USING the bomb was also unacceptable, as the US population was war-weary.
Given the info Truman had, and an intransigent Japanese government where
the Army was calling most of the shots (in some cases literally, as assassination
fears infected the civilian members of the govt and the Navy command, who
supported the civilians), he had no choice but to unleash Little Boy and
Fat Man. And more if necessary to accomplish the goal of Japanese Surrender.
Fortunately, only two were needed.

Posted via www.My-Newsgroups.com - web to news gateway for usenet access!

[[email protected]]

(Krztalizer) wrote:

>>From: Charles Gray
>>Date: 12/21/2003 9:33 PM Pacific
>
><post snipped>
>
>Excellent post, sir.

Exactly...I wholeheartedly concur...
--

-Gord.

[Krztalizer]

>
>Without PGMs they were just chucking them out like everyone else. They may
>have
>been assigned different targets, but their "accuracy" was as non-existant as
>any other level bomber of the era.

From 30K perhaps, but down in the weeds, Mosquitos sent their bombs through
doorways and into specifica areas of buildings that they were attacking. No
B-17 or Lanc could ever claim that.

v/r
Gordon
<====(A+C====>
USN SAR

Donate your memories - write a note on the back and send those old photos to a
reputable museum, don't take them with you when you're gone.

[Krztalizer]

>>
> You've never learned about MOUTs or talked to anyone who has.
>Also, the typical reponse of most military units to millions of people
>with bamboo spears is millions of bullets and lots of CAS using napalm
>and HE. You don't save a lot of lives, especially when the second
>tactic in such battles is the following:
> See a village.
> Hmmmmm could there be bad guys in there?
> Call in A-20's and napalm the living hell out of it. (or WP, as
>Napalm was a later innovation).
> Watch screaming human torches run around a lot, thrash, fall down
>and cease moving.
> Move in, grenade all potential hidey holes, etc.
> Move to next village, rinse and repeat.
> you do not play fair, and in truth, if the Japanese had been as
>detirmined as they seemed, my tactic of preference would be mustard or
>other war agents, as people with bamboo spears and no CBW gear don't
>do well when their lungs turn to mush.
>
>
> And as for the pride argument-- you bring up the
>Confederates...well guess what, they never felt they lost, and that's
>a part of the reason for some of our bad history-- they weren't made
>to feel in their bones that they lost.
> That was the difference in WWII. We crushed them utterly. Burned
>their cities, smashed their harbors, left theiir ships on the bottem
>of the ocean, steamed up and down their coast with BB shelling at
>will, and than burned their cities to ash around them.
> There was no pride, we had crushed it out of them. At the end of
>the day, WE permitted the emperor to remain, and every Japanese knew
>it. We could have just as easily killed him, and used some bullets to
>deal with the riots. They were completely helpless, and every bit of
>"we would have won except for a stab in the back" was stomped out of
>them.
> THAT is how you win a war.

AND you get to hear the lamentations of their women.

[Charles Gray]

On 23 Dec 2003 01:40:24 GMT, (Krztalizer) wrote:

>
>> THAT is how you win a war.
>
>AND you get to hear the lamentations of their women.

Pretty much=-= but all the fantasy's of "conditional surrender" miss
the fact that the Japanese leadership was banking on that-- it would
have been their "Divine wind" what would have proven god was still on
their side. The complete unconditional surrender put the pin in that
particular baloon.

[Matt Wiser]

Mary Shafer > wrote:
>On 21 Dec 2003 23:00:36 -0800,
>(cave fish)
>wrote:
>
>> You are right. However, anyone who justifies
>the bombing of Hiroshima
>> and Nagasaki based purely on estimates are
>on shaky ground. They keep
>> saying how it saved lives. But, how do they
>know?
>
>Because the US is still using Purple Hearts
>from those struck for the
>invasion of the Japanese homeland?
>
>And there's no foreseeable end to the supply
>at the rate they're being
>used?
>
>Mary
>
>--
>Mary Shafer Retired aerospace research engineer

The Army ordered at least 370,000 Purple Hearts in June of '45, expecting
to award those to KIA and WIA from the invasion of Japan. Navy ordered at
least 100,000 for Navy and Marine casualties. Still lots in storage.

Posted via www.My-Newsgroups.com - web to news gateway for usenet access!

[Alan Minyard]

On 22 Dec 2003 23:00:35 GMT, (Krztalizer) wrote:

>>
>>Without PGMs they were just chucking them out like everyone else. They may
>>have
>>been assigned different targets, but their "accuracy" was as non-existant as
>>any other level bomber of the era.
>
>From 30K perhaps, but down in the weeds, Mosquitos sent their bombs through
>doorways and into specifica areas of buildings that they were attacking. No
>B-17 or Lanc could ever claim that.
>
>v/r
>Gordon
><====(A+C====>
> USN SAR
>
>Donate your memories - write a note on the back and send those old photos to a
>reputable museum, don't take them with you when you're gone.

All parts of the "Mosquito" myth. The A-20, B-25, B-26, etc all had the same
bombing capabilities. Early in the war, the Mossy was all that the Brits had,
so it was useful for them to portray it as a "super weapon"

Don't get me wrong, the Mossy was a fine a/c, but it was NOT a "precision"
weapon.

Al Minyard

[Keith Willshaw]

"Alan Minyard" > wrote in message
...
> On 22 Dec 2003 23:00:35 GMT, (Krztalizer) wrote:
>

> All parts of the "Mosquito" myth. The A-20, B-25, B-26, etc all had the
same
> bombing capabilities. Early in the war, the Mossy was all that the Brits
had,
> so it was useful for them to portray it as a "super weapon"

There are a couple of slight problems here

1) The Mosquito wasnt available in the early part of the war

2) The RAF operated all of the US types you mention and
replaced many of them with the Mosquito

3) There are very few aircraft of WW2 that were succesful in
as many roles as the Mosquito. Fighter, maritime strike, night fighter,
fighter bomber and night bomber.

4) The RAF never depicted it as a super weapon, the major types
used in the bomber offensive were the Lancaster and Halifax.

>
> Don't get me wrong, the Mossy was a fine a/c, but it was NOT a "precision"
> weapon.

It certainly was on occasion as in the raid on the Gestapo prison
at Amiens and the HQ in Copenhagen. The problem was in such
raids the losses were heavy as at such low altitude German light
flak was deadly.

It was not of course a wonder weapon but the Luftwaffe certainly
came to fear it by night every bit as much as they did the P-51
by day.

Keith

[B2431]

>From: "Keith Willshaw"
>Date: 12/23/2003 3:58 PM Central Standard Time
>Message-id: >
>
>
>"Alan Minyard" > wrote in message
...
>> On 22 Dec 2003 23:00:35 GMT, (Krztalizer) wrote:
>>
>
>> All parts of the "Mosquito" myth. The A-20, B-25, B-26, etc all had the
>same
>> bombing capabilities. Early in the war, the Mossy was all that the Brits
>had,
>> so it was useful for them to portray it as a "super weapon"
>
>There are a couple of slight problems here
>
>1) The Mosquito wasnt available in the early part of the war
>
>2) The RAF operated all of the US types you mention and
>replaced many of them with the Mosquito
>
>3) There are very few aircraft of WW2 that were succesful in
>as many roles as the Mosquito. Fighter, maritime strike, night fighter,
>fighter bomber and night bomber.
>
>4) The RAF never depicted it as a super weapon, the major types
>used in the bomber offensive were the Lancaster and Halifax.
>
>>
>> Don't get me wrong, the Mossy was a fine a/c, but it was NOT a "precision"
>> weapon.
>
>It certainly was on occasion as in the raid on the Gestapo prison
>at Amiens and the HQ in Copenhagen. The problem was in such
>raids the losses were heavy as at such low altitude German light
>flak was deadly.
>
>It was not of course a wonder weapon but the Luftwaffe certainly
>came to fear it by night every bit as much as they did the P-51
>by day.
>
>Keith
>
>
The Nazis even went so far as to make a copy of the Mosquito.

Dan, U. S. Air Force, retired

[Steve Hix]

In article >,
devil > wrote:

> On Thu, 25 Dec 2003 20:46:54 +0000, Charles Gray wrote:
>
> > On Sun, 21 Dec 2003 16:54:04 -0000, "freeda"
> > > wrote:
> >
> >>
> >>Bear in mind America could forcast the impending cold war, so what better
> >>way to scare the Russians ****less.
> >>
> > Um, not as clear as you believe-- because if we could "Forcast" the
> > coming cold war, why was our military allowed to decline so quickly
> > before Korea?
>
> Forecast? The US started it in the first place. And make no mistake,
> Hiroshima and Nagasaki were the first shot.

Even more: then why the drastic drawdown in forces after WW2?

[Steve Hix]

In article >,
Richard Periut > wrote:

> Steve Hix wrote:
> > In article >,
> > Richard Periut > wrote:
> >>Steve Hix wrote:
> >>> Richard Periut > wrote:
> >>>>Linda Terrell wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>>>>So let me get this straight; in order to clear a country of a
> >>>>>>despotism,
> >>>>>>you have to try to annihilate at least two cities full of thousands of
> >>>>>>civilians?
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>I'm really intrigued.
> >>>>>
> >>>>>It ended the war.
> >>>>
> >>>>Yeah, and the cost of human lives and the suffering?
> >>>
> >>>Significantly less than the alternatives of blockade or invasion.
> >
> > Note Periut's dancing as he dodges the issue:
> >
> >>Well if you consider Cuba, it can freely trade with the European Union,
> >>just as any other country blockaded by another country.
> >
> > Not much of a blockade, then, is it?
> >
> > Have someone explain the difference between a blockade and a boycott
> > sometime.
> >
> > Do you spend much time figuring out how to dodge and issue, or is it a
> > natural talent on your part?
>
> Oh, your post speaks volumes of wisdom and knowledge.

Noting, once again, that you dodge the issue.

The boycott of Cuba by the U.S. is *nothing* like the proposed blockage
of Japan that was considered as one of the options of ending the war in
the Pacific.

> Have someone explain to you, that Castro considers it both a blockade
> and a boycott.

A boycott it clearly is; the U.S. officially bars U.S. entities from
doing business with Cuba.

As a blockade, it pretty much misses the mark, since just about anyone
else on earth can do business with Cuba.

And Cuba's economy is *still* in the tank.

> Have you ever attempted to remove the anal probe stuck high up yer rectum?

You're apparently projecting some deeply hidden desire of your own on
someone else. Weird.

You really don't want to face the fact that you *still* haven't
acknowledged that the blockade of Japan would have resulted in more
Japanese deaths than did using the two atomic bombs that drove the
Japanese finally to unconditional surrender.

[B2431]

>From: Steve Hix
>Date: 12/28/2003 10:29 PM Central Standard Time
>Message-id:
>
>
>In article >,
> Richard Periut > wrote:
>
>> Steve Hix wrote:
>> > In article >,
>> > Richard Periut > wrote:
>> >>Steve Hix wrote:
>> >>> Richard Periut > wrote:
>> >>>>Linda Terrell wrote:
>> >>>>
>> >>>>>>So let me get this straight; in order to clear a country of a
>> >>>>>>despotism,
>> >>>>>>you have to try to annihilate at least two cities full of thousands
>of
>> >>>>>>civilians?
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>>I'm really intrigued.
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>>It ended the war.
>> >>>>
>> >>>>Yeah, and the cost of human lives and the suffering?
>> >>>
>> >>>Significantly less than the alternatives of blockade or invasion.
>> >
>> > Note Periut's dancing as he dodges the issue:
>> >
>> >>Well if you consider Cuba, it can freely trade with the European Union,
>> >>just as any other country blockaded by another country.
>> >
>> > Not much of a blockade, then, is it?
>> >
>> > Have someone explain the difference between a blockade and a boycott
>> > sometime.
>> >
>> > Do you spend much time figuring out how to dodge and issue, or is it a
>> > natural talent on your part?
>>
>> Oh, your post speaks volumes of wisdom and knowledge.
>
>Noting, once again, that you dodge the issue.
>
>The boycott of Cuba by the U.S. is *nothing* like the proposed blockage
>of Japan that was considered as one of the options of ending the war in
>the Pacific.
>
>> Have someone explain to you, that Castro considers it both a blockade
>> and a boycott.
>
>A boycott it clearly is; the U.S. officially bars U.S. entities from
>doing business with Cuba.
>
>As a blockade, it pretty much misses the mark, since just about anyone
>else on earth can do business with Cuba.
>
>And Cuba's economy is *still* in the tank.
>

A blockade is an act of war. Why do you think JFK called his act a quarantine?"

Dan, U. S. Air Force, retired

[[email protected]]

Richard Periut > wrote:
>>
>> Seems to me to sell off these possessions might, in the short run
>> be helpful but would, in the long run, be detrimental to the
>> well-being of the membership and therefore the world.
>> --
>>
>> -Gord.
>
>You mean, continue to be the opium of the people. Didn't C. Marx say that?
>
>Rich

Pretty impressive argument there Richard...
--

-Gord.

[Steve Hix]

In article >,
(B2431) wrote:

> >From: Steve Hix
> >Date: 12/28/2003 10:29 PM Central Standard Time
> >Message-id:
> >
> >
> >In article >,
> > Richard Periut > wrote:
> >
> >> Steve Hix wrote:
> >> > In article >,
> >> > Richard Periut > wrote:
> >> >>Steve Hix wrote:
> >> >>> Richard Periut > wrote:
> >> >>>>Linda Terrell wrote:
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>>>So let me get this straight; in order to clear a country of a
> >> >>>>>>despotism,
> >> >>>>>>you have to try to annihilate at least two cities full of thousands
> >of
> >> >>>>>>civilians?
> >> >>>>>>
> >> >>>>>>I'm really intrigued.
> >> >>>>>
> >> >>>>>It ended the war.
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>>Yeah, and the cost of human lives and the suffering?
> >> >>>
> >> >>>Significantly less than the alternatives of blockade or invasion.
> >> >
> >> > Note Periut's dancing as he dodges the issue:
> >> >
> >> >>Well if you consider Cuba, it can freely trade with the European Union,
> >> >>just as any other country blockaded by another country.
> >> >
> >> > Not much of a blockade, then, is it?
> >> >
> >> > Have someone explain the difference between a blockade and a boycott
> >> > sometime.
> >> >
> >> > Do you spend much time figuring out how to dodge and issue, or is it a
> >> > natural talent on your part?
> >>
> >> Oh, your post speaks volumes of wisdom and knowledge.
> >
> >Noting, once again, that you dodge the issue.
> >
> >The boycott of Cuba by the U.S. is *nothing* like the proposed blockage
> >of Japan that was considered as one of the options of ending the war in
> >the Pacific.
> >
> >> Have someone explain to you, that Castro considers it both a blockade
> >> and a boycott.
> >
> >A boycott it clearly is; the U.S. officially bars U.S. entities from
> >doing business with Cuba.
> >
> >As a blockade, it pretty much misses the mark, since just about anyone
> >else on earth can do business with Cuba.
> >
> >And Cuba's economy is *still* in the tank.
>
> A blockade is an act of war. Why do you think JFK called his act a
> quarantine?"

Because fuses were short enough, what with Russian freighters inbound,
at the time.

[Mitchell Holman]

"Jeroen Wenting" > wrote in
:

>
> "Linda Terrell" > wrote in message
>
> l3.net...
>>
>> > >
>> > > It ended the war.
>> > >
>> > > lt
>> > >
>>
>> >
>> > Yeah, and the cost of human lives and the suffering?
>> >
>> > R
>> >
>>
>> It was a WAR. Wars cause suffering and take lives.
>> That's why you try to end it as fast aspossible.
>>
>> Our soldiers were humans who were suffering.
>>
>
> To put it in contrast:
> NOT using the nukes to end WW2 would have cost an estimated 500.000 US
> dead and wounded and several million Japanese dead and wounded without
> taking into account the longterm effects from minefields, poisonous
> residues, etc.. The two nukes together cost maybe 300.000 Japanese dead
> and wounded (including longterm effects from radiation), or roughly 10%
> of the expected total count of an invasion and no US victims at all
> (which certainly in time of war is far more important).
>
> Not using the nukes would also have prolonged WW2 by (estimated) 1-1.6
> years and might have given the USSR time to mount a fullscale invasion
> of western Europe, turning all of Europe into a part of the USSR (thus
> effectively undoing what the allies had achieved there).
>



"Japan was already defeated and that dropping the
bomb was completely unnecessary"
Dwight Eisenhower, "Mandate for Change", pg 380


"the Japanese were ready to surrender and it wasn't
necessary to hit them with that awful thing."
Dwight Eisenhower, Newsweek, 11/11/63


"No military justification for the dropping of the bomb".
Douglas MacArthur

[Steve Hix]

In article >,
Mitchell Holman > wrote:

> "Japan was already defeated and that dropping the
> bomb was completely unnecessary"
> Dwight Eisenhower, "Mandate for Change", pg 380

Unless one wanted to reduce total casualties.

> "the Japanese were ready to surrender and it wasn't
> necessary to hit them with that awful thing."
> Dwight Eisenhower, Newsweek, 11/11/63

As above. (And how much Pacific planning was DDE involved with in 1945?)

> "No military justification for the dropping of the bomb".
> Douglas MacArthur

And we know just how infallible McArthur was, don't we?)

[Keith Willshaw]

"Mitchell Holman" > wrote in message
...
> "Jeroen Wenting" > wrote in
> :

>
> "No military justification for the dropping of the bomb".
> Douglas MacArthur
>

And yet McArthur wanted to use nuclear weapons in Korea
and Eisenhower at an NSC meeting 11th feb 1953 said,
"We should consider the tactical use of atomic weapons in the
Kaesong area." (Korea)


Fact is Eisenhower wasnt part of the decision making process
in August 1945 and hadnt seen the briefing material that would
have allowed him to make an informed decision. The Japanese
were NOT ready to surrender as they could easily have done

Even after 2 A-bombs were dropped the militarists wanted to fight
on and only the intervention of the Emperor forced them to
accept surrender.

Keith

[Mike1]

Steve Hix > wrote:

>> "No military justification for the dropping of the bomb".
>> Douglas MacArthur
>
>And we know just how infallible McArthur was, don't we?)


MAC is one of the most over-rated commanders in US military history.
From leaving the Filipino air-force on the ground for hours after
learning of Pearl Harbor, to his insistance on the disasterous "island
hopping" strategy (causing hundreds of thousands of US casualties for
terrain easily bypassed and cordoned-off), he was a terrible strategist.
Then there's North Korea, a defeat snatched from the jaws of victory
because he just couldn't keep his goddamn mouth shut.

--

Reply to sans two @@, or your reply won't reach me.

"An election is nothing more than an advance auction of stolen goods."
-- Ambrose Bierce

[Kevin Brooks]

"Mike1" > wrote in message
...
> Steve Hix > wrote:
>
> >> "No military justification for the dropping of the bomb".
> >> Douglas MacArthur
> >
> >And we know just how infallible McArthur was, don't we?)
>
>
> MAC is one of the most over-rated commanders in US military history.
> From leaving the Filipino air-force on the ground for hours after
> learning of Pearl Harbor, to his insistance on the disasterous "island
> hopping" strategy (causing hundreds of thousands of US casualties for
> terrain easily bypassed and cordoned-off), he was a terrible strategist.
> Then there's North Korea, a defeat snatched from the jaws of victory
> because he just couldn't keep his goddamn mouth shut.

While I am surely no fan of Dougie, I think your justification is a bit off.
IIRC it was Nimitz who was the master of island hopping, bypassing those
bastions he could--island hopping was in fact the strategy of bypassing
those places easily bypassed. Dougie on the other hand was more for the
"take everything" approach, such his advocacy to the bitter end that Rabaul
should have been invaded as opposed to bypassing it and hopping further up.
He was also the architect of the PI disaster--it was his communications to
Marshall that encouraged the change in the defensive strategy for the PI in
early 1941 (this came up during aprevious discussion, and I later found the
official US Army historical data relating to that communication between
Dougie and GCM), and he was the fellow who decided on the ludicrous forward
defense in the subsequent battle (giving up substantial resources and making
the later defense of Bataan and Corregidor a largely "come as you are"
affair), and refused to acknowledge that his Philippine Army was for the
most part smoke, mirrors, and dreams and was in no way ready for any kind of
combat operations in early 1941. Then he compounded that by insisting upon a
costly reconquest of the PI solely to assauge his own precious reputation.
His refusal to heed warnings regarding the intent and capability of the PLA
in Korea was just icing on the cake, and nullifies his one bright spot at
Inchon. Add in his ridiculous personal vanity and insistence upon royal
treatment, and his scandalous behavior regarding his comments concerning the
B-17 he used to evacuate the PI, and all in all he is probably the most
celebrated yet least deserving senior commander of the century.

Brooks

>
> --
>
> Reply to sans two @@, or your reply won't reach me.
>
> "An election is nothing more than an advance auction of stolen goods."
> -- Ambrose Bierce

[Tom Benton]

"Steve Hix" > wrote in message
...
> In article >,
> Mitchell Holman > wrote:
>
> > "Japan was already defeated and that dropping the
> > bomb was completely unnecessary"
> > Dwight Eisenhower, "Mandate for Change", pg 380
>
> Unless one wanted to reduce total casualties.
>
> > "the Japanese were ready to surrender and it wasn't
> > necessary to hit them with that awful thing."
> > Dwight Eisenhower, Newsweek, 11/11/63
>
> As above. (And how much Pacific planning was DDE involved with in 1945?)
>
> > "No military justification for the dropping of the bomb".
> > Douglas MacArthur
>
> And we know just how infallible McArthur was, don't we?)

As I recall, McArthur wanted to use nukes in Korea. However, we all know
how fond Truman and McArthur were of each other.

[Matt Wiser]

"Linda Terrell" > wrote:
>
>> >
>> > It ended the war.
>> >
>> > lt
>> >
>
>>
>> Yeah, and the cost of human lives and the
>suffering?
>>
>> R
>>
>
>It was a WAR. Wars cause suffering and take
>lives.
>That's why you try to end it as fast aspossible.
>
>Our soldiers were humans who were suffering.
>
>LT
>
>
>--
>
Bravo, Linda. Those posting against the drop don't realize that the U.S.
Sixth Army was scheduled for the largest amphib attack in history on or after
1 Nov 45 in OLYPMPIC, the attack on Kyushu. Just look at Saipan, Luzon, Iwo
Jima, and Okinawa to see what would have transpired on the beaches, hills,
valleys, paddies, and urban areas of Kyushu. A bloodbath for the Japanese,
and a heavy cost for the U.S. Army and Marine Corps, and sailors of the USN
and RN offshore.

Posted via www.My-Newsgroups.com - web to news gateway for usenet access!

[Stephen Harding]

Kevin Brooks wrote:

> While I am surely no fan of Dougie, I think your justification is a bit off.
> IIRC it was Nimitz who was the master of island hopping, bypassing those
> bastions he could--island hopping was in fact the strategy of bypassing
> those places easily bypassed. Dougie on the other hand was more for the
> "take everything" approach, such his advocacy to the bitter end that Rabaul
> should have been invaded as opposed to bypassing it and hopping further up.
> He was also the architect of the PI disaster--it was his communications to
> Marshall that encouraged the change in the defensive strategy for the PI in
> early 1941 (this came up during aprevious discussion, and I later found the
> official US Army historical data relating to that communication between
> Dougie and GCM), and he was the fellow who decided on the ludicrous forward
> defense in the subsequent battle (giving up substantial resources and making
> the later defense of Bataan and Corregidor a largely "come as you are"
> affair), and refused to acknowledge that his Philippine Army was for the
> most part smoke, mirrors, and dreams and was in no way ready for any kind of
> combat operations in early 1941. Then he compounded that by insisting upon a
> costly reconquest of the PI solely to assauge his own precious reputation.
> His refusal to heed warnings regarding the intent and capability of the PLA
> in Korea was just icing on the cake, and nullifies his one bright spot at
> Inchon. Add in his ridiculous personal vanity and insistence upon royal
> treatment, and his scandalous behavior regarding his comments concerning the
> B-17 he used to evacuate the PI, and all in all he is probably the most
> celebrated yet least deserving senior commander of the century.

The guy is pretty easy to dislike in hindsight. But he was working
in the PIs with a severe material deficit. He really wasn't getting
much help from politicos in the US.

And of course, MacArthur did a pretty fair job as commander of the
occupation of Japan under whom the democratic rebuild of Japan succeeded.


SMH

[Kevin Brooks]

"Stephen Harding" > wrote in message
...
> Kevin Brooks wrote:
>
> > While I am surely no fan of Dougie, I think your justification is a bit
off.
> > IIRC it was Nimitz who was the master of island hopping, bypassing those
> > bastions he could--island hopping was in fact the strategy of bypassing
> > those places easily bypassed. Dougie on the other hand was more for the
> > "take everything" approach, such his advocacy to the bitter end that
Rabaul
> > should have been invaded as opposed to bypassing it and hopping further
up.
> > He was also the architect of the PI disaster--it was his communications
to
> > Marshall that encouraged the change in the defensive strategy for the PI
in
> > early 1941 (this came up during aprevious discussion, and I later found
the
> > official US Army historical data relating to that communication between
> > Dougie and GCM), and he was the fellow who decided on the ludicrous
forward
> > defense in the subsequent battle (giving up substantial resources and
making
> > the later defense of Bataan and Corregidor a largely "come as you are"
> > affair), and refused to acknowledge that his Philippine Army was for the
> > most part smoke, mirrors, and dreams and was in no way ready for any
kind of
> > combat operations in early 1941. Then he compounded that by insisting
upon a
> > costly reconquest of the PI solely to assauge his own precious
reputation.
> > His refusal to heed warnings regarding the intent and capability of the
PLA
> > in Korea was just icing on the cake, and nullifies his one bright spot
at
> > Inchon. Add in his ridiculous personal vanity and insistence upon royal
> > treatment, and his scandalous behavior regarding his comments concerning
the
> > B-17 he used to evacuate the PI, and all in all he is probably the most
> > celebrated yet least deserving senior commander of the century.
>
> The guy is pretty easy to dislike in hindsight. But he was working
> in the PIs with a severe material deficit. He really wasn't getting
> much help from politicos in the US.

MacArthur took a bad situation in the PI and exacerbated it quite a bit. It
was he who was encouraging Marshall to take the PI off the "written off at
the outset" list and apply additional resources to their defense, and urged
the revision of the pertinent OPLAN. Hap Arnold contributed to the problem
by overly promising what long-range airpower could acheive in terms of
defending the islands and even taking the fight to the Japanese when/if war
broke out, but it was Dougie who was making grandiose plans and claims
regarding the ability of his PI National Army--which largely existed as a
figment of his own imagination. Then he takes what valuable resources he
*does* get and squanders them with his stupid "defend forward" strategy that
resulted in the loss of a great deal of his critical supplies--in doing that
he coopted the previously acceptable OPLAN and committed to his new
operational plan without having the assets to make it doable--that is an
unforgivable error on his part. And it is not as if there were not folks
telling him this was unwise--but in typical Dougie fashion, he merely
ignored what he did not want to hear. Then the SOB had the unmitigated gall,
after all of that, to try and hang a rep on the poor guy (Skinny Wainright)
he left in charge when he unassed the PI (and I don't care who says
otherwise, his oft-recalled "protests" against being "ordered" to evac was a
bunch of crap).

>
> And of course, MacArthur did a pretty fair job as commander of the
> occupation of Japan under whom the democratic rebuild of Japan succeeded.

He played emperor--it well suited his vanity and personality. There is a bit
of muttering these days that he behaved none too admirably during that
period, letting the Emperor's folks play to his vanity to save some pretty
unscrupulous characters from post war prosecution while offering up others
(such as Yama****a, who was already on Dougie's poopie list for having the
temerity of being quite a handful during the 44-45 PI reconquest). Sorry, I
just find darned little to admire in the guy.

Brooks
>
>
> SMH
>

[Mitchell Holman]

"Keith Willshaw" > wrote in news:bt9uq8$nul
:

>
> "Mitchell Holman" > wrote in message
> ...
>> "Jeroen Wenting" > wrote in
>> :
>
>>
>> "No military justification for the dropping of the bomb".
>> Douglas MacArthur
>>
>
> And yet McArthur wanted to use nuclear weapons in Korea


Just so. MacArthur wasn't against nukes;
he just saw that the Japanese situation didn't
require them.



> and Eisenhower at an NSC meeting 11th feb 1953 said,
> "We should consider the tactical use of atomic weapons in the
> Kaesong area." (Korea)
>

Just so. Ike wasn't against nukes; he just
saw that the Japanese situation didn't require them.


>
> Fact is Eisenhower wasnt part of the decision making process
> in August 1945 and hadnt seen the briefing material that would
> have allowed him to make an informed decision. The Japanese
> were NOT ready to surrender as they could easily have done


Yes, they were. The turning point after
Hiroshima and Nagasaki wasn't the bombs but
Russia's entry into the war. THAT was the
key factor showing defeat was certain.


>
> Even after 2 A-bombs were dropped the militarists wanted to fight
> on and only the intervention of the Emperor forced them to
> accept surrender.


The firestorm raids of LeMay were far
more lethal than the A-bombs and the Japanese
endured THOSE without surrendering. But being
surrounded by all sides by warring victorious
powers was more than any island nation can
withstand. Mac and Ike were right.

[Keith Willshaw]

"Mitchell Holman" > wrote in message
...
> "Keith Willshaw" > wrote in
news:bt9uq8$nul
> :
>
> >
> > "Mitchell Holman" > wrote in message
> > ...
> >> "Jeroen Wenting" > wrote in
> >> :
> >
> >>
> >> "No military justification for the dropping of the bomb".
> >> Douglas MacArthur
> >>
> >
> > And yet McArthur wanted to use nuclear weapons in Korea
>
>
> Just so. MacArthur wasn't against nukes;
> he just saw that the Japanese situation didn't
> require them.
>

He was not involved in the planning for the Invasion
of Japan and was not in a position to make an informed
decision

>
>
> > and Eisenhower at an NSC meeting 11th feb 1953 said,
> > "We should consider the tactical use of atomic weapons in the
> > Kaesong area." (Korea)
> >
>
> Just so. Ike wasn't against nukes; he just
> saw that the Japanese situation didn't require them.
>

He was not involved in the planning for the Invasion
of Japan and was not in a position to make an informed
decision



>
> >
> > Fact is Eisenhower wasnt part of the decision making process
> > in August 1945 and hadnt seen the briefing material that would
> > have allowed him to make an informed decision. The Japanese
> > were NOT ready to surrender as they could easily have done
>
>
> Yes, they were. The turning point after
> Hiroshima and Nagasaki wasn't the bombs but
> Russia's entry into the war. THAT was the
> key factor showing defeat was certain.
>

The Japanese cabinet disagreed. The minutes of the meeting at which
surrender was agreed show clearly that the bomb was the decisive
factor

That meeting began the night of the 9-10 August AFTER the
news of the Soviet attack had been received and was once
again deadlocked. It was only when the news of the Nagasaki
attack was received that an audience was sought with the
Emperor who urged them to "bear the unbearable"

>
> >
> > Even after 2 A-bombs were dropped the militarists wanted to fight
> > on and only the intervention of the Emperor forced them to
> > accept surrender.
>
>
> The firestorm raids of LeMay were far
> more lethal than the A-bombs and the Japanese
> endured THOSE without surrendering. But being
> surrounded by all sides by warring victorious
> powers was more than any island nation can
> withstand. Mac and Ike were right.
>

Even if I accept your categotrisation of their views they werent,
the Japanese were all ready cut off from the Asian
continent by the USN and had already lost entire armies in Okinawa,
India and Burma without surrendering

The last word belongs to the Emperor of Japan
who said in his surrender speech

"Moreover, the enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb, the
power of which to do damage is, indeed, incalculable, taking the toll of
many innocent lives. Should we continue to fight, it would not only result
in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but also it
would lead to the total extinction of human civilization."

He seems pretty clear that the bomb was the decisive factor
as do all the Japanese participants. The decision to surrender was
taken before the extent of the defeat of the Kwantung army
was clear.

Keith

[John Keeney]

"Mitchell Holman" > wrote in message
...
> "Keith Willshaw" > wrote in
news:bt9uq8$nul
> > And yet McArthur wanted to use nuclear weapons in Korea
>
> Just so. MacArthur wasn't against nukes;
> he just saw that the Japanese situation didn't
> require them.

Or perhaps he felt cheated out of finishing off Japan.

[Mitchell Holman]

"John Keeney" > wrote in :

>
> "Mitchell Holman" > wrote in message
> ...
>> "Keith Willshaw" > wrote in
> news:bt9uq8$nul
>> > And yet McArthur wanted to use nuclear weapons in Korea
>>
>> Just so. MacArthur wasn't against nukes;
>> he just saw that the Japanese situation didn't
>> require them.
>
> Or perhaps he felt cheated out of finishing off Japan.
>
>
>

No commander hates his troops that much to
see so many killed for the joy of "finishing off"
the enemy.

[Kevin Brooks]

"Mitchell Holman" > wrote in message
...
> "John Keeney" > wrote in
:
>
> >
> > "Mitchell Holman" > wrote in message
> > ...
> >> "Keith Willshaw" > wrote in
> > news:bt9uq8$nul
> >> > And yet McArthur wanted to use nuclear weapons in Korea
> >>
> >> Just so. MacArthur wasn't against nukes;
> >> he just saw that the Japanese situation didn't
> >> require them.
> >
> > Or perhaps he felt cheated out of finishing off Japan.
> >
> >
> >
>
> No commander hates his troops that much to
> see so many killed for the joy of "finishing off"
> the enemy.

Yeah, instead ol' Dougie just sacrifiiced thousands at the altar of his own
vanity when he insisted on reconquering the PI, and he damned near did the
same thing when he tried his best to invade Rabaul rather than bypass it.
Dougie had about as much concern for his troops as a tomcat has for his
kittens.

Brooks
>
>

[Matt Wiser]

Steve Hix > wrote:
>In article >,
> Mitchell Holman >
>wrote:
>
>> "Japan was already defeated and that dropping
>the
>> bomb was completely unnecessary"
>> Dwight Eisenhower, "Mandate for Change", pg
>380
>
>Unless one wanted to reduce total casualties.
>
>
>> "the Japanese were ready to surrender and
>it wasn't
>> necessary to hit them with that awful thing."
>
>> Dwight Eisenhower, Newsweek, 11/11/63
>
>As above. (And how much Pacific planning was
>DDE involved with in 1945?)
>
>> "No military justification for the dropping
>of the bomb".
>> Douglas MacArthur
>
>And we know just how infallible McArthur was,
>don't we?)
Anyone consider the possiblity that Big Mac was ****ed at not being able
to launch the biggest amphib assaults in history in Kyushu and the Kanto?


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[Matt Wiser]

Mitchell Holman > wrote:
>"Keith Willshaw" >
>wrote in news:bt9uq8$nul
:
>
>>
>> "Mitchell Holman" >
>wrote in message
>> ...
>>> "Jeroen Wenting" >
>wrote in
>>> :
>>
>>>
>>> "No military justification for the dropping
>of the bomb".
>>> Douglas MacArthur
>>>
>>
>> And yet McArthur wanted to use nuclear weapons
>in Korea
>
>
> Just so. MacArthur wasn't against nukes;
>he just saw that the Japanese situation didn't
>
>require them.
>
>
>
>> and Eisenhower at an NSC meeting 11th feb
>1953 said,
>> "We should consider the tactical use of atomic
>weapons in the
>> Kaesong area." (Korea)
>>
>
> Just so. Ike wasn't against nukes; he just
>
>saw that the Japanese situation didn't require
>them.
>
>
>>
>> Fact is Eisenhower wasnt part of the decision
>making process
>> in August 1945 and hadnt seen the briefing
>material that would
>> have allowed him to make an informed decision.
>The Japanese
>> were NOT ready to surrender as they could
>easily have done
>
>
> Yes, they were. The turning point after
>
>Hiroshima and Nagasaki wasn't the bombs but
>Russia's entry into the war. THAT was the
>key factor showing defeat was certain.
>
>
>>
>> Even after 2 A-bombs were dropped the militarists
>wanted to fight
>> on and only the intervention of the Emperor
> forced them to
>> accept surrender.
>
>
> The firestorm raids of LeMay were far
>more lethal than the A-bombs and the Japanese
>endured THOSE without surrendering. But being
>
>surrounded by all sides by warring victorious
>
>powers was more than any island nation can
>withstand. Mac and Ike were right.
>
>
>
>
It took the bombs and the Soviet attack to give the Peace faction what
they needed to get the Emperor to stick his neck out and request that the
Government accept Potsdam. You are also forgetting the attempted putsch on
the night of 14/15 Aug to put in a military govt to continue the war. Loyal
troops put things down without much trouble, and the plotters committed hari-kiri.
The Emperor was advised and said that if necessary, he would issue a command
to surrender.

Posted via www.My-Newsgroups.com - web to news gateway for usenet access!

[Paul J. Adam]

In message >, Stephen Harding
> writes
>Kevin Brooks wrote:
>> He was also the architect of the PI disaster--it was his communications to
>> Marshall that encouraged the change in the defensive strategy for the PI in
>> early 1941 (this came up during aprevious discussion, and I later found the
>> official US Army historical data relating to that communication between
>> Dougie and GCM), and he was the fellow who decided on the ludicrous forward
>> defense in the subsequent battle (giving up substantial resources and making
>> the later defense of Bataan and Corregidor a largely "come as you are"
>> affair), and refused to acknowledge that his Philippine Army was for the
>> most part smoke, mirrors, and dreams and was in no way ready for any kind of
>> combat operations in early 1941.

>The guy is pretty easy to dislike in hindsight. But he was working
>in the PIs with a severe material deficit. He really wasn't getting
>much help from politicos in the US.

Claiming the Philippine Army was an effective combat-ready force wasn't
going to help pry reinforcements out of DC, though.


--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBox<at>jrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

[Matt Wiser]

"Paul J. Adam" > wrote:
>In message >,
>Stephen Harding
> writes
>>Kevin Brooks wrote:
>>> He was also the architect of the PI disaster--it
>was his communications to
>>> Marshall that encouraged the change in the
>defensive strategy for the PI in
>>> early 1941 (this came up during aprevious
>discussion, and I later found the
>>> official US Army historical data relating
>to that communication between
>>> Dougie and GCM), and he was the fellow who
>decided on the ludicrous forward
>>> defense in the subsequent battle (giving
>up substantial resources and making
>>> the later defense of Bataan and Corregidor
>a largely "come as you are"
>>> affair), and refused to acknowledge that
>his Philippine Army was for the
>>> most part smoke, mirrors, and dreams and
>was in no way ready for any kind of
>>> combat operations in early 1941.
>
>>The guy is pretty easy to dislike in hindsight.
> But he was working
>>in the PIs with a severe material deficit.
> He really wasn't getting
>>much help from politicos in the US.
>
>Claiming the Philippine Army was an effective
>combat-ready force wasn't
>going to help pry reinforcements out of DC,
>though.
>
>
>--
>When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing
>to be polite.
>
> W S Churchill
>
>Paul J. Adam MainBox<at>jrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk
Marshall actually offered MacArthur the ORNG's 41st ID in August of 1941.
Big Mac declined the offer, which spared the Oregon Guardsmen the Death March
and everything else that followed.

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