Area bombing is not a dirty word.

[ArtKramr]

60 years of hindsight with some revisionism thrown in have obscured the
original intent of attacking an enemy from the air. I only flew one (of 50)
mission
over cloud cover using GEE. We didn't call it area bombing. We didn't call it
blind bombing. Those are words are now used to stake out an agenda against
bombing in general. We flew the mission because it had to be flown and GEE was
the only way to get it done. And there was a war on. A very nasty unpleasant
war.
The name of the game was to go for the enemies throat. Hit him night and day
in good weather and bad with no let up and no relief. We flew the missions,
came back, buried our dead and went out again.We always hit a specific target
that had to be hit. .The idea of having the enemy hit us without our hitting
back any way we could was unthinkable. It shows weakness and gives the
inititive to the enemy, and once you have lost the initiative, you have lost
the war.


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[Chris Mark]

>The idea of having the enemy hit us without our hitting
>back any way we could was unthinkable. It shows weakness and gives the
>inititive to the enemy, and once you have lost the initiative, you have lost
>the war.

Is that a quote from George W. Bush?


Chris Mark

[ArtKramr]

>ubject: Re: Area bombing is not a dirty word.
>From: (Chris Mark)
>Date: 12/31/03 12:24 PM Pacific Standard Time
>Message-id: >
>
>>The idea of having the enemy hit us without our hitting
>>back any way we could was unthinkable. It shows weakness and gives the
>>inititive to the enemy, and once you have lost the initiative, you have lost
>>the war.
>
>Is that a quote from George W. Bush?
>
>
>Chris Mark


Nope. It is a paraphrase from a Military Tactics instructor at Cadet school.


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[Ed Rasimus]

On 31 Dec 2003 20:24:11 GMT, (Chris Mark) wrote:

>>The idea of having the enemy hit us without our hitting
>>back any way we could was unthinkable. It shows weakness and gives the
>>inititive to the enemy, and once you have lost the initiative, you have lost
>>the war.
>
>Is that a quote from George W. Bush?
>
>Chris Mark

No, but this could be:

"War is an ugly thing, but it is not the ugliest of things; the
decayed and degraded state of moral and patriotic feeling which thinks
that nothing is worth war is much worse. A man who has nothing for
which he is willing to fight, nothing he cares about more than his own
personal safety, is a miserable creature who has no chance of being
free, unless made and kept so by better men than himself."

Actually it was written more than 150 years ago by John Stuart Mill. I
have no problem finding myself in one of Mill's groupings. Do you find
pride in identifying with the other?


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

[Bill Phillips]

"ArtKramr" > wrote in message
...
> 60 years of hindsight with some revisionism thrown in have obscured the
> original intent of attacking an enemy from the air. I only flew one (of
50)
> mission
> over cloud cover using GEE. We didn't call it area bombing. We didn't call
it
> blind bombing. Those are words are now used to stake out an agenda against
> bombing in general. We flew the mission because it had to be flown and GEE
was
> the only way to get it done. And there was a war on. A very nasty
unpleasant
> war.
> The name of the game was to go for the enemies throat.

The problem is: were you going for the enemy's throat?

Beating the enemy's fist with your face is not a good way to win.

> Hit him night and day
> in good weather and bad with no let up and no relief. We flew the
missions,
> came back, buried our dead and went out again.We always hit a specific
target
> that had to be hit. .The idea of having the enemy hit us without our
hitting
> back any way we could was unthinkable. It shows weakness and gives the
> inititive to the enemy, and once you have lost the initiative, you have
lost
> the war.

Quite agree, however, your return blows have to be effective.

Also doing the same thing again and again is not gaining the initiative, it
is surrendering it.

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: Area bombing is not a dirty word.
>From: "Bill Phillips"
>Date: 12/31/03 3:00 PM Pacific Standard Time
>Message-id: >
>
>
>"ArtKramr" > wrote in message
...
>> 60 years of hindsight with some revisionism thrown in have obscured the
>> original intent of attacking an enemy from the air. I only flew one (of
>50)
>> mission
>> over cloud cover using GEE. We didn't call it area bombing. We didn't call
>it
>> blind bombing. Those are words are now used to stake out an agenda against
>> bombing in general. We flew the mission because it had to be flown and GEE
>was
>> the only way to get it done. And there was a war on. A very nasty
>unpleasant
>> war.
>> The name of the game was to go for the enemies throat.
>
>The problem is: were you going for the enemy's throat?
>
>Beating the enemy's fist with your face is not a good way to win.
>
>> Hit him night and day
>> in good weather and bad with no let up and no relief. We flew the
>missions,
>> came back, buried our dead and went out again.We always hit a specific
>target
>> that had to be hit. .The idea of having the enemy hit us without our
>hitting
>> back any way we could was unthinkable. It shows weakness and gives the
>> inititive to the enemy, and once you have lost the initiative, you have
>lost
>> the war.
>
>Quite agree, however, your return blows have to be effective.
>
>Also doing the same thing again and again is not gaining the initiative, it
>is surrendering it.
>
>

Not when experience shows you that he is crumbling under your repeated blows.
And as we delivered these blows we could see him crumbling under our very eyes.



Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[Chris Mark]

>From: Ed Rasimus

>Do you find
>pride in identifying with the other?

Why do you believe I do?


Chris Mark

[Chris Mark]

>From: (ArtKramr)

>Nope. It is a paraphrase from a Military Tactics instructor at Cadet school.

And here's a paraphrase from a mission briefing:

"Remember, if things get screwed up, get rid of those bombs. Find something,
anything, another target--trains, trucks, camps, emplacements, guns, troops,
anything is fair game--and drop on it. I don't care what it is. Better to
drop those bombs than bring them back here. We're not trying to save money,
it's all expendable, and we have a lot more bombs where these come from.
I want those people shook, so shook they never come out of their holes again.
If you kill them today they can't kill you tomorrow. We're not playing fair.
We're playing to win. We win by killing them. Killing them until they've had
enough and quit. They can quit any time, but until they do we are going to
kill them anywhere and anyway we can."

Q: We're dropping to rooftop height three minutes from the target and you said
to fire on "targets of opportunity" during that time. What is a "target of
opportunity"?

A: "Just strafe anything in your line of fire. Fire on anything that moves."

Q: Donkeys move, farmers move, women washing clothes move....

A: "You've got the idea. We've got to hit them where they live until they drop
their ****ing guns and quit. Do you understand?"

Complete silence in the tent.

"DO YOU UNDERSTAND?"

Yes, sir!






Chris Mark

[Mike Beede]

In article >, Chris Mark > wrote:

> And here's a paraphrase from a mission briefing:

Not a paraphrase of anything I can find on the net. Where is
it from?

Mike Beede

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: Area bombing is not a dirty word.
>From: (Chris Mark)
>Date: 12/31/03 4:12 PM Pacific Standard Time
>Message-id: >
>
>>From: (ArtKramr)
>
>>Nope. It is a paraphrase from a Military Tactics instructor at Cadet
>school.
>
>And here's a paraphrase from a mission briefing:
>
>"Remember, if things get screwed up, get rid of those bombs. Find something,
>anything, another target--trains, trucks, camps, emplacements, guns, troops,
>anything is fair game--and drop on it. I don't care what it is. Better to
>drop those bombs than bring them back here. We're not trying to save money,
>it's all expendable, and we have a lot more bombs where these come from.
>I want those people shook, so shook they never come out of their holes again.
>
>If you kill them today they can't kill you tomorrow. We're not playing fair.
>
>We're playing to win. We win by killing them. Killing them until they've
>had
>enough and quit. They can quit any time, but until they do we are going to
>kill them anywhere and anyway we can."
>
>Q: We're dropping to rooftop height three minutes from the target and you
>said
>to fire on "targets of opportunity" during that time. What is a "target of
>opportunity"?
>
>A: "Just strafe anything in your line of fire. Fire on anything that moves."
>
>Q: Donkeys move, farmers move, women washing clothes move....
>
>A: "You've got the idea. We've got to hit them where they live until they
>drop
>their ****ing guns and quit. Do you understand?"
>
>Complete silence in the tent.
>
>"DO YOU UNDERSTAND?"
>
>Yes, sir!
>
>
>
>
>
>
>Chris Mark


You live in a fantasy world of unreality.


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: Area bombing is not a dirty word.
>From: Mike Beede
>Date: 12/31/03 4:48 PM Pacific Standard Time
>Message-id: >
>
>In article >, Chris Mark
> wrote:
>
>> And here's a paraphrase from a mission briefing:
>
>Not a paraphrase of anything I can find on the net. Where is
>it from?
>
> Mike Beede


It's just a lot of crap he made up.


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[Chris Mark]

>From: Mike Beede

>> And here's a paraphrase from a mission briefing:

> Where is
>it from?

Approximate words of Maj. Frank Pilliard briefing for attack on Porto Torres,
Sardinia.


Chris Mark

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: Area bombing is not a dirty word.
>From: (Chris Mark)
>Date: 12/31/03 7:00 PM Pacific Standard Time
>Message-id: >
>
>>From: Mike Beede
>
>>> And here's a paraphrase from a mission briefing:
>
>> Where is
>>it from?
>
>Approximate words of Maj. Frank Pilliard briefing for attack on Porto Torres,
>Sardinia.
>
>
>Chris Mark

And I guess you weren't there to hear it. Right?


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[B2431]

>From: (Chris Mark)
>Date: 12/31/2003 6:12 PM Central Standard Time
>Message-id: >
>
>>From: (ArtKramr)
>
>>Nope. It is a paraphrase from a Military Tactics instructor at Cadet
>school.
>
>And here's a paraphrase from a mission briefing:
>
>"Remember, if things get screwed up, get rid of those bombs. Find something,
>anything, another target--trains, trucks, camps, emplacements, guns, troops,
>anything is fair game--and drop on it. I don't care what it is. Better to
>drop those bombs than bring them back here. We're not trying to save money,
>it's all expendable, and we have a lot more bombs where these come from.
>I want those people shook, so shook they never come out of their holes again.
>
>If you kill them today they can't kill you tomorrow. We're not playing fair.
>
>We're playing to win. We win by killing them. Killing them until they've
>had
>enough and quit. They can quit any time, but until they do we are going to
>kill them anywhere and anyway we can."
>
>Q: We're dropping to rooftop height three minutes from the target and you
>said
>to fire on "targets of opportunity" during that time. What is a "target of
>opportunity"?
>
>A: "Just strafe anything in your line of fire. Fire on anything that moves."
>
>Q: Donkeys move, farmers move, women washing clothes move....
>
>A: "You've got the idea. We've got to hit them where they live until they
>drop
>their ****ing guns and quit. Do you understand?"
>
>Complete silence in the tent.
>
>"DO YOU UNDERSTAND?"
>
>Yes, sir!
>
>
>
>
>
>
>Chris Mark
>
I just can't see anyone in command position that blatantly advocating war
crimes. I can imagine it being hinted at, but never openly stated with that
many witnesses. They have plenty of room in Leavenworth for anyone that stupid.

Dan, U. S. Air Force, retired

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: Area bombing is not a dirty word.
>From: (B2431)
>Date: 12/31/03 8:24 PM Pacific Standard Time
>Message-id: >
>
>>From: (Chris Mark)
>>Date: 12/31/2003 6:12 PM Central Standard Time
>>Message-id: >
>>
>>>From: (ArtKramr)
>>
>>>Nope. It is a paraphrase from a Military Tactics instructor at Cadet
>>school.
>>
>>And here's a paraphrase from a mission briefing:
>>
>>"Remember, if things get screwed up, get rid of those bombs. Find something,
>>anything, another target--trains, trucks, camps, emplacements, guns, troops,
>>anything is fair game--and drop on it. I don't care what it is. Better to
>>drop those bombs than bring them back here. We're not trying to save money,
>>it's all expendable, and we have a lot more bombs where these come from.
>>I want those people shook, so shook they never come out of their holes
>again.
>>
>>If you kill them today they can't kill you tomorrow. We're not playing
>fair.
>>
>>We're playing to win. We win by killing them. Killing them until they've
>>had
>>enough and quit. They can quit any time, but until they do we are going to
>>kill them anywhere and anyway we can."
>>
>>Q: We're dropping to rooftop height three minutes from the target and you
>>said
>>to fire on "targets of opportunity" during that time. What is a "target of
>>opportunity"?
>>
>>A: "Just strafe anything in your line of fire. Fire on anything that moves."
>>
>>Q: Donkeys move, farmers move, women washing clothes move....
>>
>>A: "You've got the idea. We've got to hit them where they live until they
>>drop
>>their ****ing guns and quit. Do you understand?"
>>
>>Complete silence in the tent.
>>
>>"DO YOU UNDERSTAND?"
>>
>>Yes, sir!
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>Chris Mark
>>
>I just can't see anyone in command position that blatantly advocating war
>crimes. I can imagine it being hinted at, but never openly stated with that
>many witnesses. They have plenty of room in Leavenworth for anyone that
>stupid.
>
>Dan, U. S. Air Force, retired


I have been through 50 combat briefings and never heard any such line of crap
in my life.



Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[Bill Phillips]

"ArtKramr" > wrote in message
...
> >Subject: Re: Area bombing is not a dirty word.
> >From: "Bill Phillips"
> >Date: 12/31/03 3:00 PM Pacific Standard Time
> >Message-id: >
> >
> >
> >"ArtKramr" > wrote in message
> ...
> >> 60 years of hindsight with some revisionism thrown in have obscured the
> >> original intent of attacking an enemy from the air. I only flew one (of
> >50)
> >> mission
> >> over cloud cover using GEE. We didn't call it area bombing. We didn't
call
> >it
> >> blind bombing. Those are words are now used to stake out an agenda
against
> >> bombing in general. We flew the mission because it had to be flown and
GEE
> >was
> >> the only way to get it done. And there was a war on. A very nasty
> >unpleasant
> >> war.
> >> The name of the game was to go for the enemies throat.
> >
> >The problem is: were you going for the enemy's throat?
> >
> >Beating the enemy's fist with your face is not a good way to win.
> >
> >> Hit him night and day
> >> in good weather and bad with no let up and no relief. We flew the
> >missions,
> >> came back, buried our dead and went out again.We always hit a specific
> >target
> >> that had to be hit. .The idea of having the enemy hit us without our
> >hitting
> >> back any way we could was unthinkable. It shows weakness and gives the
> >> inititive to the enemy, and once you have lost the initiative, you have
> >lost
> >> the war.
> >
> >Quite agree, however, your return blows have to be effective.
> >
> >Also doing the same thing again and again is not gaining the initiative,
it
> >is surrendering it.
> >
> >
>
> Not when experience shows you that he is crumbling under your repeated
blows.
> And as we delivered these blows we could see him crumbling under our very
eyes.
>

I did a quick search on Germany+war+production.

This is the first hit I got:

http://www.usaaf.net/surveys/eto/ebs4.htm

It indicates that German Industry has so much slack in it that bombing had
little effect.

Psychologically bombing may have been counter productive, it made us appear
inhuman and therefore caused the Germans to fight longer and harder.

True Germany was crumbling at the end but that was as a result of many
effects.

IMHO the only useful thing bombers did was draw the Luftwaffe out so that
the P51s could shoot them down.

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: Area bombing is not a dirty word.
>From: "Bill Phillips"
>Date: 1/1/04 11:36 AM Pacific Standard Time
>Message-id: >
>
>
>"ArtKramr" > wrote in message
...
>> >Subject: Re: Area bombing is not a dirty word.
>> >From: "Bill Phillips"
>> >Date: 12/31/03 3:00 PM Pacific Standard Time
>> >Message-id: >
>> >
>> >
>> >"ArtKramr" > wrote in message
>> ...
>> >> 60 years of hindsight with some revisionism thrown in have obscured the
>> >> original intent of attacking an enemy from the air. I only flew one (of
>> >50)
>> >> mission
>> >> over cloud cover using GEE. We didn't call it area bombing. We didn't
>call
>> >it
>> >> blind bombing. Those are words are now used to stake out an agenda
>against
>> >> bombing in general. We flew the mission because it had to be flown and
>GEE
>> >was
>> >> the only way to get it done. And there was a war on. A very nasty
>> >unpleasant
>> >> war.
>> >> The name of the game was to go for the enemies throat.
>> >
>> >The problem is: were you going for the enemy's throat?
>> >
>> >Beating the enemy's fist with your face is not a good way to win.
>> >
>> >> Hit him night and day
>> >> in good weather and bad with no let up and no relief. We flew the
>> >missions,
>> >> came back, buried our dead and went out again.We always hit a specific
>> >target
>> >> that had to be hit. .The idea of having the enemy hit us without our
>> >hitting
>> >> back any way we could was unthinkable. It shows weakness and gives the
>> >> inititive to the enemy, and once you have lost the initiative, you have
>> >lost
>> >> the war.
>> >
>> >Quite agree, however, your return blows have to be effective.
>> >
>> >Also doing the same thing again and again is not gaining the initiative,
>it
>> >is surrendering it.
>> >
>> >
>>
>> Not when experience shows you that he is crumbling under your repeated
>blows.
>> And as we delivered these blows we could see him crumbling under our very
>eyes.
>>
>
>I did a quick search on Germany+war+production.
>
>This is the first hit I got:
>
>http://www.usaaf.net/surveys/eto/ebs4.htm
>
>It indicates that German Industry has so much slack in it that bombing had
>little effect.
>
>Psychologically bombing may have been counter productive, it made us appear
>inhuman and therefore caused the Germans to fight longer and harder.
>
>True Germany was crumbling at the end but that was as a result of many
>effects.
>
>IMHO the only useful thing bombers did was draw the Luftwaffe out so that
>the P51s could shoot them down.
>
>

Well, that's on opinion.


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[Dave Holford]

Chris Mark wrote:
>
>
> Approximate words of Maj. Frank Pilliard briefing for attack on Porto Torres,
> Sardinia.
>
> Chris Mark




Approximate??????

Sounds more like something YOU think someone might have said at some
time if he was completely stupid - especially in front of multiple
witnesses.

Or did you dig it up from a video game?

Dave

[BUFDRVR]

>IMHO the only useful thing bombers did was draw the Luftwaffe out so that
>the P51s could shoot them down.

The impact the combined bomber offensive had against POL cannot be disputed.
POL was a "Top 3" target prior to the war, but when Intelligence officials were
replaced by American industrial "speacialists", it was dropped to #13 (IIRC).
The first Ploesti raid was undertaken not so much for the direct physical
effect, but to force Germany to defend themselves from the Baltic to the Med.
When a serious effort was undertaken to hit German POL (and sythetic POL) in
early 1944, the results were relatively quick and devestating. The reason your
P-51s did so well was because the FW-190 and Me-109 pilots they were flying
against had less than half the pre-war training time. The reduction in training
hours was due to the loss of both lubricant and fuel. The impact the CBO had
prior to 1944 was to draw manpower to defend Germany from the front. Every guy
manning a AAA piece or fueling a fighter would have been carrying a Mauser-98
on either the eastern or western front if it wasn't for the CBO.


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

[B2431]

>From: "Bill Phillips"


>
>I did a quick search on Germany+war+production.
>
>This is the first hit I got:
>
>http://www.usaaf.net/surveys/eto/ebs4.htm
>
>It indicates that German Industry has so much slack in it that bombing had
>little effect.
>
>Psychologically bombing may have been counter productive, it made us appear
>inhuman and therefore caused the Germans to fight longer and harder.
>
>True Germany was crumbling at the end but that was as a result of many
>effects.
>
>IMHO the only useful thing bombers did was draw the Luftwaffe out so that
>the P51s could shoot them down.
>

In my opinion a great many strategic bombing missions were a waste of men and
aircraft.

1) The bombing of London had already proved the population would NOT be
demoralized yet the Allies seemed to think the Germans would cave.

2) Formating missions could take as long as 2 hours during which time the
Germans would be alerted by radar. I have always wondered if 1 or 2 Forts or
Lancs could sneak in at night and hit the target at dawn. Both bombers had good
accuracy at 5 kilofeet giving a good chance of taking out the target.

3) Targets kept changing prorities. If the bombing missions were planned to
knock out a system or production of a specific item such as ball bearings or
oil and continued until that system or product was brought to a stop they could
then go on to the next priority. Speer said a follow up to the Schweinfurt raid
would have seriously hurt ball bearing production to the point of affecting the
war effort. However the next bombing missions were elsewhere.

You can see where I am going with this. I wonder how many airmen would have
lived if the Allies changed their methods. I wonder how much shorther the war
would have been if oil production and distribution alone were the sole primary
targets early in the war. Secondary targets would be airfields and flack.

Dan, U. S. Air Force, retired

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: Area bombing is not a dirty word.
>From: (B2431)
>Date: 1/1/04 1:42 PM Pacific Standard Time
>Message-id: >
>
>>From: "Bill Phillips"
>
>
>>
>>I did a quick search on Germany+war+production.
>>
>>This is the first hit I got:
>>
>>http://www.usaaf.net/surveys/eto/ebs4.htm
>>
>>It indicates that German Industry has so much slack in it that bombing had
>>little effect.
>>
>>Psychologically bombing may have been counter productive, it made us appear
>>inhuman and therefore caused the Germans to fight longer and harder.
>>
>>True Germany was crumbling at the end but that was as a result of many
>>effects.
>>
>>IMHO the only useful thing bombers did was draw the Luftwaffe out so that
>>the P51s could shoot them down.
>>
>
>In my opinion a great many strategic bombing missions were a waste of men and
>aircraft.
>
>1) The bombing of London had already proved the population would NOT be
>demoralized yet the Allies seemed to think the Germans would cave.
>
>2) Formating missions could take as long as 2 hours during which time the
>Germans would be alerted by radar. I have always wondered if 1 or 2 Forts or
>Lancs could sneak in at night and hit the target at dawn. Both bombers had
>good
>accuracy at 5 kilofeet giving a good chance of taking out the target.
>
>3) Targets kept changing prorities. If the bombing missions were planned to
>knock out a system or production of a specific item such as ball bearings or
>oil and continued until that system or product was brought to a stop they
>could
>then go on to the next priority. Speer said a follow up to the Schweinfurt
>raid
>would have seriously hurt ball bearing production to the point of affecting
>the
>war effort. However the next bombing missions were elsewhere.
>
>You can see where I am going with this. I wonder how many airmen would have
>lived if the Allies changed their methods. I wonder how much shorther the war
>would have been if oil production and distribution alone were the sole
>primary
>targets early in the war. Secondary targets would be airfields and flack.
>
>Dan, U. S. Air Force, retired
>

Hindsight is always 20-20. The bottom line is we beat the *******s and left
Germany a smoking, smoldering, burning ruin. Not bad for a bunch of 19 year old
kids vs the supermen. Before talking about all we did wrong, just consider all
that we did right. And we did a lot more right than we did wrong.


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[B2431]

>From: (ArtKramr)
>
>
>Hindsight is always 20-20. The bottom line is we beat the *******s and left
>Germany a smoking, smoldering, burning ruin. Not bad for a bunch of 19 year
>old
>kids vs the supermen. Before talking about all we did wrong, just consider
>all
>that we did right. And we did a lot more right than we did wrong.
>
>
>Arthur Kramer
>344th BG 494th BS
> England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
>Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
>http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer
>

Agreed.

Dan, U. S. Air Force, retired

[Charles Gray]

On 01 Jan 2004 22:09:46 GMT, (B2431) wrote:

>>From: (ArtKramr)
>>
>>
>>Hindsight is always 20-20. The bottom line is we beat the *******s and left
>>Germany a smoking, smoldering, burning ruin. Not bad for a bunch of 19 year
>>old
>>kids vs the supermen. Before talking about all we did wrong, just consider
>>all
>>that we did right. And we did a lot more right than we did wrong.
>>
>>
>>Arthur Kramer
>>344th BG 494th BS
>> England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
>>Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
>>http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer
>>
>
>Agreed.
>
>Dan, U. S. Air Force, retired

On the one hand, it *is* dirty.
Area Bombing is a dirty word-- it represents the death of many
people on both sides, many horribly.
I agree with that. But for those who think it is the MOST dirty
word, let me give a few others.
Genocide. Dachau, The Eastern Front, Nanking.

If we had been fighting an enemy that avoided attacking civilians,
that abided by the laws of war, that refrained from imposing
dictatorship at home and abroad, mass bombing raids would be an
atrocity-- they wouldn't have been needed. (For that matter, there
wouldn't have been a war). But we were fighting governments that had
proven that literally NO atrocity was beyond them. Any, literally any
means to defeat them was not simply allowed, but required of any moral
natiuon.

And to those who say that it was "too horrible", I would point out
the beneficiaries of these battles that few think of today-- every
Japanese and German citizen who grows up, protests and votes in a
state where such actions are not fraught with danger.

[Kevin Brooks]

"B2431" > wrote in message
...

<snip>

> You can see where I am going with this. I wonder how many airmen would
have
> lived if the Allies changed their methods. I wonder how much shorther the
war
> would have been if oil production and distribution alone were the sole
primary
> targets early in the war. Secondary targets would be airfields and flack.

I think you'd have to toss transportation into the mix right after the
petroleum industry. IMO the biggest positive effects of the combined bombing
offensive were in the end (1) tying up German manpower and resources in the
defense effort, (2) drastic reduction in German petroleum production
(belated effort, but still effective in the end), and (3) making
transportation even less effective (given the impact of #2) through
disruption of their rail and (less so) road nets, and severely disrupting
transport capability during the critical period leading to and immediately
after D-Day. As to airfields--I doubt there was as much value for the
heavies in that arena, as any flat cow pasture could serve as a fighter
strip in those days (and often did), making the finding of them a bit
difficult. Flak is a non-starter, at least for the level bombers, as the
bombing accuracy of the day just could not ensure taking out individual flak
positions--when your CEP is approaching a mile or more, SEAD just is not a
realistic mission, especilayy when viewed against other targets that could
be effectively engaged (industrial).

Brooks

>
> Dan, U. S. Air Force, retired
>

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: Area bombing is not a dirty word.
>From: Charles Gray
>Date: 1/1/04 2:59 PM Pacific Standard Time
>Message-id: >
>
>On 01 Jan 2004 22:09:46 GMT, (B2431) wrote:
>
>>>From: (ArtKramr)
>>>
>>>
>>>Hindsight is always 20-20. The bottom line is we beat the *******s and left
>>>Germany a smoking, smoldering, burning ruin. Not bad for a bunch of 19 year
>>>old
>>>kids vs the supermen. Before talking about all we did wrong, just consider
>>>all
>>>that we did right. And we did a lot more right than we did wrong.
>>>
>>>
>>>Arthur Kramer
>>>344th BG 494th BS
>>> England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
>>>Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
>>>http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer
>>>
>>
>>Agreed.
>>
>>Dan, U. S. Air Force, retired
>
>On the one hand, it *is* dirty.
> Area Bombing is a dirty word-- it represents the death of many
>people on both sides, many horribly.
> I agree with that. But for those who think it is the MOST dirty
>word, let me give a few others.
> Genocide. Dachau, The Eastern Front, Nanking.
>
> If we had been fighting an enemy that avoided attacking civilians,
>that abided by the laws of war, that refrained from imposing
>dictatorship at home and abroad, mass bombing raids would be an
>atrocity-- they wouldn't have been needed. (For that matter, there
>wouldn't have been a war). But we were fighting governments that had
>proven that literally NO atrocity was beyond them. Any, literally any
>means to defeat them was not simply allowed, but required of any moral
>natiuon.
>
> And to those who say that it was "too horrible", I would point out
>the beneficiaries of these battles that few think of today-- every
>Japanese and German citizen who grows up, protests and votes in a
>state where such actions are not fraught with danger.
>


Well said.

Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Bill Phillips wrote in message ...

>I did a quick search on Germany+war+production.
>
>This is the first hit I got:
>
>http://www.usaaf.net/surveys/eto/ebs4.htm
>
>It indicates that German Industry has so much slack in it that bombing had
>little effect.

This is correct to mid 1944, the bombers could not compete with
Speer undoing the inefficiencies in the German economy. It was
also a fact the effect of the bombers helped Speer push through
the changes. The main effect of the bombing was military, the
cost of the air raid warning and protection system, the deployment
of so many fighters and flak guns in Germany, the losses to the day
fighters in particular in early 1944.

The Air Forces are left with "production would have gone up further"
rather than "production went down" until mid 1944, not very convincing.


One reason the average Luftwaffe day fighter had no performance
improvement between early 1942 and mid 1944 was the need
for numbers. The day fighters went from being generally superior
to generally inferior to the allied day fighters.

>Psychologically bombing may have been counter productive, it made us appear
>inhuman and therefore caused the Germans to fight longer and harder.

The "morale" issue is complicated, yes at times it made people more
productive, in others less, similar for "fighting attitude".

>True Germany was crumbling at the end but that was as a result of many
>effects.

The combination of loss of resources and the bombing. It took around
9 months for iron ore to end up as steel in a weapon, similar for other
raw materials, so much of the production loss in late 1944 seems to
be mainly bombing. However this bombing includes the effects of the
medium, light and fighter bombers on the German transport system,
not just the heavies.

The other thing to note is the halfway point for the 8th Air Force bombs
dropped on Germany is around mid November 1944, (less than 1/3 had
been dropped by the end of August 1944), Bomber Command mid point
was around early October 1944 it was very end loaded campaign.

The amount of tonnage and the speed of delivery meant the final months
of the war the bombing was more effective, overloading the air raid repair
abilities.

>IMHO the only useful thing bombers did was draw the Luftwaffe out so that
>the P51s could shoot them down.


The loss of oil products helped, the lack of nitrogen and methanol
meant the Germans had to use more and more inert fillings in
shells. The need to defend Germany left less and less to control the
airspace over the armies or run bombing operations in the allied rear.

No one had ever tried this type of bombing before, and the Germans
did not volunteer raid reports, so it took a long time to learn what
worked.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

[Charles Gray]

One thing that is often levied agaionst the bombing campaigns is the
fact that German production increased as the war came to an end (at
least until the last few days when industry was being overrun).
But, the reality is not so clear. WE need to realize that Germany
did not go to a full wartime production footing until 1943-44, and as
such, there wsa a great deal of "fat" in the industry that could be
cut-- in other words, while bombing did not stop the increase of
production, that was also due to the fact that the germans were only
beginning to introduce the wartime production measures that had been
par for the course in the U.S. and England from 1939 (england) and
1941 (US) on.
The German industrial expansion was dramatically slowed by the
bombing campaign, as many, many books I have on German air projects
contian notes like " The project was abandoned after the
prototype/engines/airframe/fill in the blank was destroyed by U.s.
bombing.

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: Area bombing is not a dirty word.
>From: Charles Gray
>

>One thing that is often levied agaionst the bombing campaigns is the
>fact that German production increased as the war came to an end (at
>least until the last few days when industry was being overrun).

The reason German production increased is because we stopped bombing production
facilites and switched to oil knowing that they could make all they wanted
to,but without oil could never use any of it. So let them waste their labor and
facilites on turning out equipment that could never be used.


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: Area bombing is not a dirty word.
>From: "Geoffrey Sinclair"
>Date: 1/1/04 8:27 PM Pacific Standard Time
>Message-id: >

>lso a fact the effect of the bombers helped Speer push through
>the changes. The main effect of the bombing was military, the
>cost of the air raid warning and protection system, the deployment
>of so many fighters and flak guns in Germany, the losses to the day
>fighters in particular in early 1944.

Don't forget the bridges, marshalling yards, rail facilities, ammo dumps, fuel
dumps. food supplies, dams, canals.road junctions that we detroyed.


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[The Enlightenment]

"ArtKramr" > wrote in message
...
> 60 years of hindsight with some revisionism thrown in have obscured
the
> original intent of attacking an enemy from the air.

Revision comes form the latin and it means "to look at again". It is
not about spining the truth. It is about ascertaining it more
accruately. In its true form it has nothing to do with 'obscuring'
anything. Admitedly both history and historical revisionsim can
become part of ideological warfare.

Looking at history 50 year later is actualy now regarded as a good way
to look at it becuase you can be free of some of the passions and
propaganda that prevent it being looked at evenly and critically

> I only flew one (of 50)
> mission
> over cloud cover using GEE.

What is "GEE" is it radar ground mapping or a system of beacons?


> We didn't call it area bombing. We didn't call it
> blind bombing. Those are words are now used to stake out an agenda
against
> bombing in general. We flew the mission because it had to be flown
and GEE was
> the only way to get it done. And there was a war on. A very nasty
unpleasant
> war.

At the begining of the war the Luftwaffe and RAAF would only attack
military targets: RAF airfields for instance. There was a moral and
ethical code withing the aircrew, armed forces and populations
themselves that prevented this. I mean on both sides. Gradualy
accidents happened these were hyped or exaggerated to justify
reprisals and pretty soon the principles of avoiding civilian targets
was evaded.

Pretty soon methods of bombing which by their nature involved large
civilian casualties.

Finaly it seems that military targets were often only token and most
casualties were civilian.

It was surely a a matter of expediency: relatively accurate low
altitude bombing (as done by B26s or a Stuka) was not acceptable
because aircraft like B17s and Lancasters would suffer unacceptable
losses for one reason or another so cities ended up being flatened and
mainly women and children were burnt or blown to bits. In once case
the RAF bombed the homes of technical workers at penemunde.

In the case of Tokyo and Hamburg about 130,000 in a night civilians
died.

In the case of Nagasaki the atomic bomb landed smack in the middle of
the Catholic area and wiped out 50,000 Japanese Catholics. While the
japanese catholics fought with the Japanese militray (apparently
covents and religious house were always respected for this reason)
they were also a group that suffered some discrimination and were
reluctant to fight.


> The name of the game was to go for the enemies throat. Hit him
night and day
> in good weather and bad with no let up and no relief. We flew the
missions,
> came back, buried our dead and went out again.We always hit a
specific target
> that had to be hit. .The idea of having the enemy hit us without our
hitting
> back any way we could was unthinkable. It shows weakness and gives
the
> inititive to the enemy, and once you have lost the initiative, you
have lost
> the war.
>


Part of war is to discredit the enemy moraly while moraly sancifying
ones own side. The truth is that the enemy is often much closser
morally to us than we are ready to admit.

A mistake or ommision by a German is an atricity or war crime but if
in the case of WW2 and allie is responsble then it is something else.


Here is an Islamic justification of "Collateral Damage"
************************************************
Sa'ab bin Jathamah (may Allah be pleased with him) reported from that
the Prophet was asked about the people in the homes of Mushrikun
(Polytheist) when they are attacked at night and their women and
children are affected, he said: "they are part of them". So, this
Hadith shows that women, children and all those the killing of whom is
forbidden, when they are separate, it is permissible to kill them when
they are mixed up with the fighters and it is not possible to
separate. This is because they had asked the Prophet about the case
which is "attacking at night", in which case it is not possible to
differentiate, and he permitted them because "things may be allowed
when they occur along the way but be forbidden when separate".

Also, Muslim commanders have always used Catapult when fighting the
Kuffar (a kind of weapon that was used in the past when trying to
break into an enemy camp which is fully fortressed - it destroys
whatever it meets by its weight, i.e. something like a catapult -
translator), and it is obvious that a Catapult when applied in a war
does not differentiate between a fighter and others, hence it may
afflict some those so-called 'innocent souls', but that not
withstanding this is an established practice among Muslims in their
wars. Ibn Qudamah may Allah have mercy on him, said: "And it is
permissible to use Catapult because the Prophet may the Salaat and
Salaam be with him used Catapult on the people of Ta'if; and Amr bin
al-As did the same to the people of Alexandria" (Al-Mughniy, vol. 10,
p503). And Ibn al-Qasim said it is permissible to use Catapult against
Kuffar even if children, women and old men and monks are killed
inadvertently, because 'Nikayah' (doing what will weaken the enemy) is
allowed according to the consensus of Ulama. Ibn Rushd said:
"'Nikayah' is permissible according to Ijama' and on any type of
polytheists" (Al-Hashiyah ala' Ar-Raudh, vol. 4, p 271).
*****************************


However I think that "collateral damage" is a term that is not
accurate in some WW2 raids where the civilians were the target instead
of armies.






















>
> Arthur Kramer
> 344th BG 494th BS
> England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
> Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
> http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer
>

[Johnny Bravo]

On 01 Jan 2004 20:33:57 GMT, (BUFDRVR) wrote:

>The impact the combined bomber offensive had against POL cannot be disputed.
>POL was a "Top 3" target prior to the war, but when Intelligence officials were
>replaced by American industrial "speacialists", it was dropped to #13 (IIRC).
>The first Ploesti raid was undertaken not so much for the direct physical
>effect, but to force Germany to defend themselves from the Baltic to the Med.
>When a serious effort was undertaken to hit German POL (and sythetic POL) in
>early 1944, the results were relatively quick and devestating.

<History Channel Mode On>

Between 12 May 1944 and 8 May 1945 the Allied air forces dropped
185,841 tons of high-explosive bombs on 87 German oil producing
targets (16 hydrogenation plants, 9 Fischer-Tropsch plants, 40
refineries, and 22 benzol plants), flying 61,712 sorties. At first,
production losses were extremely sharp, because the plants had not
been hit before and production loss resulted no matter what sections
were hit. In later attacks bombs which hit sections of the plant
already knocked out obviously could not contribute to further
production loss. As the intensity of the attacks increased, production
continued to fall until September, despite the frantic efforts of a
350,000-man emergency repair organization. Production increased
slightly in October and still more in November, mostly because weather
conditions interfered with bombing accuracy (10.1 percent of the bombs
dropped on synthetic plants in these months were by visual sighting,
as compared with 41.5 percent during the previous four months).

The Germans proved extremely adept at reparing these facilities.
A typical example of the recovery capacity of a plant is provided by
the records of the Ammoniakwerk Merseburg Coal to Oil Conversion
Plant, at Leuna. Because of this plant's great importance to the
German war economy, it is safe to assume that repair work was not held
up by lack of material or labor.

The first attack, 12 May 1944, knocked production from 100 percent
down to zero. On 28 May, when the plant was showing signs of
recovering, a second raid again knocked it flat but only for six days.
At this point the management drew up a plan that would have plant to
75 percent production in 27 days. The recovery followed the plan
closely, reaching 75 percent in 29 days. Four days later, a third
attack sent production back to zero. The recovery capacity was still
strong, however, and was back to 51 percent in 11 days on a plan which
called for 80 percent recovery in 13 days. At this point Attack 4 hit
the plant knocking it out of production for three days. After this it
restarted production and achieved 35 percent of normal in five days,
when Attacks 5 and 6 on 28 and 29 July stopped production for the
fifth time. This time the plant's recovery was slower and five
additional attacks on the now inactive plant kept production down
until 15 October. A recovery schedule drawn up at this time provided
for 50 percent production by the end of December. Despite two light
attacks, this plan was maintained, and production had 29 percent by 21
November when Attack 14 knocked it down to zero again. Five additional
attacks kept it down until 29 December when production was resumed on
a schedule that called for 30 percent recovery in one month and 45
percent in two. Recovery had reached 15 percent when Attacks 20 and 21
on 14 January put the plant again out of action for 38 days. Recovery
started again on 21 February, following a plan that foresaw 20 percent
production in one month and 30 percent in two. This schedule was
followed fairly closely, and production had reached 20 percent on 4
April when Attack 22 shut down the plant for the ninth and final time.
Allied occupation prevented any further recovery.

The Leuna versus Allied air forces bout resembled in some ways a prize
fight. The plant was knocked down nine times but never out, and
recovered rapidly at first but more slowly as the accumulating
punishment began to tell. Its recovery capacity also slackened as
indicated by the decreasing percentages of the recovery plans. It
might be said that the plant was finally defeated on points. To have
achieved a complete knockout the Allied air forces would have had to
destroy its recovery capacity, and they did not deliver a sufficiently
strong punch to accomplish this. However the production of the plant
dropped to a trickle after the bombing started, For nearly 11 months
of operation total output was equal to 12% or so of full production
and the ability to repair the plant was dropping fast.

</History Channel Mode Off>
--
"The most merciful thing in the world, I think, is the inability
of the human mind to correlate all its contents." - H.P. Lovecraft

[Johnny Bravo]

On 01 Jan 2004 21:42:41 GMT, (B2431) wrote:

>3) Targets kept changing prorities. If the bombing missions were planned to
>knock out a system or production of a specific item such as ball bearings or
>oil and continued until that system or product was brought to a stop they could
>then go on to the next priority. Speer said a follow up to the Schweinfurt raid
>would have seriously hurt ball bearing production to the point of affecting the
>war effort. However the next bombing missions were elsewhere.

This was a necessity as the repair capacity of the Germans was
rather high. Two raids on a German Coal to Oil conversion plant
dropped production to zero; 29 days later it was back up to 75% of
normal capacity. After being hit again they were back up to 51% of
capacity in 11 days and expecting to be at 80% two days later. Hit
again and it was at 35% of capacity in 5 days; the Germans were just
too good at fixing the capacity to hope it would be out for good
without just hititng it constantly and ignoring other plants at 100%
capacity.

>You can see where I am going with this. I wonder how many airmen would have
>lived if the Allies changed their methods. I wonder how much shorther the war
>would have been if oil production and distribution alone were the sole primary
>targets early in the war. Secondary targets would be airfields and flack.

The problem with this is that we couldn't hit all their oil
production and distribution early in the war. Few if any, escorts
would have been available for nearly all the targets that we could
hit. We would keep hitting the same half of the production capacity
that was already at zero production.

--
"The most merciful thing in the world, I think, is the inability
of the human mind to correlate all its contents." - H.P. Lovecraft

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: Area bombing is not a dirty word.
>From: Johnny Bravo
>Date: 1/2/04 6:05 AM Pacific Standard Time
>Message-id: >
>
>On 01 Jan 2004 20:33:57 GMT, (BUFDRVR) wrote:
>
>>The impact the combined bomber offensive had against POL cannot be disputed.
>>POL was a "Top 3" target prior to the war, but when Intelligence officials
>were
>>replaced by American industrial "speacialists", it was dropped to #13
>(IIRC).
>>The first Ploesti raid was undertaken not so much for the direct physical
>>effect, but to force Germany to defend themselves from the Baltic to the
>Med.
>>When a serious effort was undertaken to hit German POL (and sythetic POL) in
>>early 1944, the results were relatively quick and devestating.
>
><History Channel Mode On>
>
> Between 12 May 1944 and 8 May 1945 the Allied air forces dropped
>185,841 tons of high-explosive bombs on 87 German oil producing
>targets (16 hydrogenation plants, 9 Fischer-Tropsch plants, 40
>refineries, and 22 benzol plants), flying 61,712 sorties. At first,
>production losses were extremely sharp, because the plants had not
>been hit before and production loss resulted no matter what sections
>were hit. In later attacks bombs which hit sections of the plant
>already knocked out obviously could not contribute to further
>production loss. As the intensity of the attacks increased, production
>continued to fall until September, despite the frantic efforts of a
>350,000-man emergency repair organization. Production increased
>slightly in October and still more in November, mostly because weather
>conditions interfered with bombing accuracy (10.1 percent of the bombs
>dropped on synthetic plants in these months were by visual sighting,
>as compared with 41.5 percent during the previous four months).
>
> The Germans proved extremely adept at reparing these facilities.
>A typical example of the recovery capacity of a plant is provided by
>the records of the Ammoniakwerk Merseburg Coal to Oil Conversion
>Plant, at Leuna. Because of this plant's great importance to the
>German war economy, it is safe to assume that repair work was not held
>up by lack of material or labor.
>
> The first attack, 12 May 1944, knocked production from 100 percent
>down to zero. On 28 May, when the plant was showing signs of
>recovering, a second raid again knocked it flat but only for six days.
>At this point the management drew up a plan that would have plant to
>75 percent production in 27 days. The recovery followed the plan
>closely, reaching 75 percent in 29 days. Four days later, a third
>attack sent production back to zero. The recovery capacity was still
>strong, however, and was back to 51 percent in 11 days on a plan which
>called for 80 percent recovery in 13 days. At this point Attack 4 hit
>the plant knocking it out of production for three days. After this it
>restarted production and achieved 35 percent of normal in five days,
>when Attacks 5 and 6 on 28 and 29 July stopped production for the
>fifth time. This time the plant's recovery was slower and five
>additional attacks on the now inactive plant kept production down
>until 15 October. A recovery schedule drawn up at this time provided
>for 50 percent production by the end of December. Despite two light
>attacks, this plan was maintained, and production had 29 percent by 21
>November when Attack 14 knocked it down to zero again. Five additional
>attacks kept it down until 29 December when production was resumed on
>a schedule that called for 30 percent recovery in one month and 45
>percent in two. Recovery had reached 15 percent when Attacks 20 and 21
>on 14 January put the plant again out of action for 38 days. Recovery
>started again on 21 February, following a plan that foresaw 20 percent
>production in one month and 30 percent in two. This schedule was
>followed fairly closely, and production had reached 20 percent on 4
>April when Attack 22 shut down the plant for the ninth and final time.
>Allied occupation prevented any further recovery.
>
>The Leuna versus Allied air forces bout resembled in some ways a prize
>fight. The plant was knocked down nine times but never out, and
>recovered rapidly at first but more slowly as the accumulating
>punishment began to tell. Its recovery capacity also slackened as
>indicated by the decreasing percentages of the recovery plans. It
>might be said that the plant was finally defeated on points. To have
>achieved a complete knockout the Allied air forces would have had to
>destroy its recovery capacity, and they did not deliver a sufficiently
>strong punch to accomplish this. However the production of the plant
>dropped to a trickle after the bombing started, For nearly 11 months
>of operation total output was equal to 12% or so of full production
>and the ability to repair the plant was dropping fast.
>

Of course the important point you are making is the fact that no matter how
many times we bombed and they repaired, we would always be back. In the end we
prevailed. I have sort of lost track of how many missions we flew against the
marshalling yards at Cologne. See "Death of a Marshalling Yard" on my
website.




Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: Area bombing is not a dirty word.
>From: Johnny Bravo
>Date: 1/2/04 6:15 AM Pacific Standard Time
>Message-id: >
>
>On 01 Jan 2004 21:42:41 GMT, (B2431) wrote:
>
>>3) Targets kept changing prorities. If the bombing missions were planned to
>>knock out a system or production of a specific item such as ball bearings or
>>oil and continued until that system or product was brought to a stop they
>could
>>then go on to the next priority. Speer said a follow up to the Schweinfurt
>raid
>>would have seriously hurt ball bearing production to the point of affecting
>the
>>war effort. However the next bombing missions were elsewhere.
>
> This was a necessity as the repair capacity of the Germans was
>rather high. Two raids on a German Coal to Oil conversion plant
>dropped production to zero; 29 days later it was back up to 75% of
>normal capacity. After being hit again they were back up to 51% of
>capacity in 11 days and expecting to be at 80% two days later. Hit
>again and it was at 35% of capacity in 5 days; the Germans were just
>too good at fixing the capacity to hope it would be out for good
>without just hititng it constantly and ignoring other plants at 100%
>capacity.
>
>>You can see where I am going with this. I wonder how many airmen would have
>>lived if the Allies changed their methods. I wonder how much shorther the
>war
>>would have been if oil production and distribution alone were the sole
>primary
>>targets early in the war. Secondary targets would be airfields and flack.
>
> The problem with this is that we couldn't hit all their oil
>production and distribution early in the war. Few if any, escorts
>would have been available for nearly all the targets that we could
>hit. We would keep hitting the same half of the production capacity
>that was already at zero production.


When you get an enemy operation down to zero production, the point is to keep
it there at all costs.

..
Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[BUFDRVR]

>Before talking about all we did wrong, just consider all
>that we did right.

However, it is useful today to study what you did wrong to ensure we do it
right the next time. Unlike infantry and artilliary tactics that are thousands
of years old, aerial warfare is a mere infant at less than a hundred and the
historical examples to study are much fewer. Don't take it personal Art, we are
in the process of sifting through what we did wrong over Iraq less than a year
ago. Sometimes it seems us air minded people are pretty self deprecating.


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

[BUFDRVR]

>The reason German production increased is because we stopped bombing
>production
>facilites and switched to oil knowing that they could make all they wanted
>to,but without oil could never use any of it.

Well...kind of. Ike wanted to drastically reduce German mobility once Allied
ground forces were on the continent, so he urged the elevation in priority of
POL targets in late 1943. It obviously turned out to have a greater strategic
value, but many historians believe that had Ike not asked Hap Arnold to elevate
the priority of POL, it may not have been done. Ike was thinking tactically,
but the results were on the strategic level.


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

[BUFDRVR]

>the Germans were just
>too good at fixing the capacity to hope it would be out for good
>without just hititng it constantly and ignoring other plants at 100%
>capacity.

However, don't underestimate the overall impact of reducing a fuel production
facility to 0% for even one day.


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: Area bombing is not a dirty word.
>From: (BUFDRVR)
>Date: 1/2/04 2:51 PM Pacific Standard Time
>Message-id: >
>
>>Before talking about all we did wrong, just consider all
>>that we did right.
>
>However, it is useful today to study what you did wrong to ensure we do it
>right the next time. Unlike infantry and artilliary tactics that are
>thousands
>of years old, aerial warfare is a mere infant at less than a hundred and the
>historical examples to study are much fewer. Don't take it personal Art, we
>are
>in the process of sifting through what we did wrong over Iraq less than a
>year
>ago. Sometimes it seems us air minded people are pretty self deprecating.
>
>
>BUFDRVR
>
>"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it
>harelips
>everyone on Bear Creek"


I think it is a question of who's ox is gored. We should always study the past
to correct errors. But it is a case of who is doing the studying. When those
who never flew a mission or even served in the military start telling us
everything we did wrong, I resent the hubris. When skilled experienced military
airman do the studying, I perk up and listen. I think it is a matter of
perspective. But from where I sat in WW II, it sure looked as though we did a
lot more right than wrong. And we left a burning defeated Germany as proof.



Regards,

Arthur

Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[Johnny Bravo]

On 02 Jan 2004 14:21:00 GMT, (ArtKramr) wrote:

>Of course the important point you are making is the fact that no matter how
>many times we bombed and they repaired, we would always be back. In the end we
>prevailed. I have sort of lost track of how many missions we flew against the
>marshalling yards at Cologne. See "Death of a Marshalling Yard" on my
>website.

It is also important to note that we had to go back. It just wasn't
possible to knock it out one time so we could ignore it from then on
and go on to the next target. The Germans were pretty good at the
repair business, even for the Coal-Oil conversion plants which
required some specialized components to function (mainly high pressure
domes).

--
"The most merciful thing in the world, I think, is the inability
of the human mind to correlate all its contents." - H.P. Lovecraft

[Johnny Bravo]

On 02 Jan 2004 22:57:45 GMT, (BUFDRVR) wrote:

>>the Germans were just
>>too good at fixing the capacity to hope it would be out for good
>>without just hititng it constantly and ignoring other plants at 100%
>>capacity.
>
>However, don't underestimate the overall impact of reducing a fuel production
>facility to 0% for even one day.

"If the bombing missions were planned to knock out a system or
production of a specific item such as ball bearings or oil and
continued until that system or product was brought to a stop they
could then go on to the next priority. "

I'm not saying there wasn't an impact from cutting it to 0% even for
a short time, just that we couldn't hit it once and forget it for the
rest of the war.

--
"The most merciful thing in the world, I think, is the inability
of the human mind to correlate all its contents." - H.P. Lovecraft

[Peter Stickney]

In article >,
"Kevin Brooks" > writes:
>
> "B2431" > wrote in message
> ...
>
> <snip>
>
>> You can see where I am going with this. I wonder how many airmen would
> have
>> lived if the Allies changed their methods. I wonder how much shorther the
> war
>> would have been if oil production and distribution alone were the sole
> primary
>> targets early in the war. Secondary targets would be airfields and flack.
>
> I think you'd have to toss transportation into the mix right after the
> petroleum industry.

Let's not forget training, either. Yes, there was a tremendous spurt
in production numbers in 1944, but what use was it when there were no
pilots to fly the airplanes, or crew the submarines or tanks?
What new pilots, or sub crews, or soldiers that could be trained, went
to their units with no operational training whatsoever. Survival at
that point was a matter of luck - they never got the chance to develop
skill.
The German Armed Forces going into 1945 were like an M&M. (Smartie,
for you Brits) A thin, hard shell of veterans surrounding a soft
innter layer.

--
Pete Stickney
A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many
bad measures. -- Daniel Webster

[Kevin Brooks]

"Peter Stickney" > wrote in message
...
> In article >,
> "Kevin Brooks" > writes:
> >
> > "B2431" > wrote in message
> > ...
> >
> > <snip>
> >
> >> You can see where I am going with this. I wonder how many airmen would
> > have
> >> lived if the Allies changed their methods. I wonder how much shorther
the
> > war
> >> would have been if oil production and distribution alone were the sole
> > primary
> >> targets early in the war. Secondary targets would be airfields and
flack.
> >
> > I think you'd have to toss transportation into the mix right after the
> > petroleum industry.
>
> Let's not forget training, either. Yes, there was a tremendous spurt
> in production numbers in 1944, but what use was it when there were no
> pilots to fly the airplanes, or crew the submarines or tanks?
> What new pilots, or sub crews, or soldiers that could be trained, went
> to their units with no operational training whatsoever. Survival at
> that point was a matter of luck - they never got the chance to develop
> skill.
> The German Armed Forces going into 1945 were like an M&M. (Smartie,
> for you Brits) A thin, hard shell of veterans surrounding a soft
> innter layer.

True, but the bombing campaign did not target "training", per se. Its effect
on the petroleum situation adversely impacted training, and the attrition of
Luftwaffe pilots defending against the campaign applied additional stress to
the training pipeline. But it would have been very hard to set forth a
bombing campaign during WWII with an objective of degrading the Germans'
ability to train.

Brooks

>
> --
> Pete Stickney
> A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many
> bad measures. -- Daniel Webster

[Bill Phillips]

"BUFDRVR" > wrote in message
...
> >IMHO the only useful thing bombers did was draw the Luftwaffe out so that
> >the P51s could shoot them down.
>
> The impact the combined bomber offensive had against POL cannot be
disputed.
> POL was a "Top 3" target prior to the war, but when Intelligence officials
were
> replaced by American industrial "speacialists", it was dropped to #13
(IIRC).
> The first Ploesti raid was undertaken not so much for the direct physical
> effect, but to force Germany to defend themselves from the Baltic to the
Med.
> When a serious effort was undertaken to hit German POL (and sythetic POL)
in
> early 1944, the results were relatively quick and devestating. The reason
your
> P-51s did so well was because the FW-190 and Me-109 pilots they were
flying
> against had less than half the pre-war training time. The reduction in
training
> hours was due to the loss of both lubricant and fuel.

I am inclined to think there were several factors behind the poorer
training:

The most important being the shortage of pilots, despite the bombing the
Germans had more (fuelled) combat aircraft than they had experienced pilots
to fly them.

The second was the lack of safe training areas, any flight over Germany in
44/45 was a combat mission even if it was in a trainer. Hence it made sense
to get the students into armed aircraft and with experienced combat pilots
ASAP.

In my view fuel as a poor third reason.

> The impact the CBO had
> prior to 1944 was to draw manpower to defend Germany from the front. Every
guy
> manning a AAA piece or fueling a fighter would have been carrying a
Mauser-98
> on either the eastern or western front if it wasn't for the CBO.
>
Just like all the effort being put into bombing as not available to help the
allied armies. Also the flack units could and did turn their guns on ground
targets in the later stages of the war.

How long would a Kar-98 carrying soldier last if the allies put all that
effort into the battlefield?

[Bill Phillips]

"ArtKramr" > wrote in message
...
> >Subject: Re: Area bombing is not a dirty word.
> >From: Charles Gray
> >
>
> >One thing that is often levied agaionst the bombing campaigns is the
> >fact that German production increased as the war came to an end (at
> >least until the last few days when industry was being overrun).
>
> The reason German production increased is because we stopped bombing
production
> facilites and switched to oil knowing that they could make all they
wanted
> to,but without oil could never use any of it. So let them waste their
labor and
> facilites on turning out equipment that could never be used.
>
So you are saying that ALL the bombs dropped during that period were dropped
on oil targets! I would love to here your source for that.

Granted the Germans were short of POL at the end, however, they were short
of everything else as well. I can find few instances of missions being
cancelled solely due to lack of POL, and the few examples that do exist seem
to be local problems getting the fuel to the correct place rather than
because the fuel did not exist.

[Bill Phillips]

"Kevin Brooks" > wrote in message
t...
>
> "Peter Stickney" > wrote in message
> ...
> > In article >,
> > "Kevin Brooks" > writes:
> > >
> > > "B2431" > wrote in message
> > > ...
> > >
> > > <snip>
> > >
> > >> You can see where I am going with this. I wonder how many airmen
would
> > > have
> > >> lived if the Allies changed their methods. I wonder how much shorther
> the
> > > war
> > >> would have been if oil production and distribution alone were the
sole
> > > primary
> > >> targets early in the war. Secondary targets would be airfields and
> flack.
> > >
> > > I think you'd have to toss transportation into the mix right after the
> > > petroleum industry.
> >
> > Let's not forget training, either. Yes, there was a tremendous spurt
> > in production numbers in 1944, but what use was it when there were no
> > pilots to fly the airplanes, or crew the submarines or tanks?
> > What new pilots, or sub crews, or soldiers that could be trained, went
> > to their units with no operational training whatsoever. Survival at
> > that point was a matter of luck - they never got the chance to develop
> > skill.
> > The German Armed Forces going into 1945 were like an M&M. (Smartie,
> > for you Brits) A thin, hard shell of veterans surrounding a soft
> > innter layer.
>
> True, but the bombing campaign did not target "training", per se. Its
effect
> on the petroleum situation adversely impacted training, and the attrition
of
> Luftwaffe pilots defending against the campaign applied additional stress
to
> the training pipeline. But it would have been very hard to set forth a
> bombing campaign during WWII with an objective of degrading the Germans'
> ability to train.
>
This is rather the basis of my objection to bombing.

Several others have commented on the need to identify the weakest link in
the German military and then concentrate on it.

Well, the weakest link was trained combatants, anything that does not target
them:
(a) wastes valuable resources.
(b) causes unnecessary suffering.
(c) increases the amount of aid needed to rebuild Germany afterwards.

I have already given the USAAF bombers credit for being bait for the German
combat pilots, which is more than I give the RAF.

[ArtKramr]

>ubject: Re: Area bombing is not a dirty word.
>From: "Bill Phillips"
>Date: 1/5/04 11:44 AM Pacific Standard Time

>o you are saying that ALL the bombs dropped during that period were dropped
>on oil targets! I would love to here your source for that.

I never said that, You said that.

> can find few instances of missions being
>cancelled solely due to lack of POL, and the

You didn't look hard enough.


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[Bill Phillips]

"ArtKramr" > wrote in message
...
> >Subject: Re: Area bombing is not a dirty word.
> >From: (BUFDRVR)
> >Date: 1/2/04 2:51 PM Pacific Standard Time
> >Message-id: >
> >
> >>Before talking about all we did wrong, just consider all
> >>that we did right.
> >
> >However, it is useful today to study what you did wrong to ensure we do
it
> >right the next time. Unlike infantry and artilliary tactics that are
> >thousands
> >of years old, aerial warfare is a mere infant at less than a hundred and
the
> >historical examples to study are much fewer. Don't take it personal Art,
we
> >are
> >in the process of sifting through what we did wrong over Iraq less than a
> >year
> >ago. Sometimes it seems us air minded people are pretty self deprecating.
> >
> >
> >BUFDRVR
> >
> >"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it
> >harelips
> >everyone on Bear Creek"
>
>
> I think it is a question of who's ox is gored. We should always study the
past
> to correct errors. But it is a case of who is doing the studying. When
those
> who never flew a mission or even served in the military start telling us
> everything we did wrong, I resent the hubris. When skilled experienced
military
> airman do the studying, I perk up and listen. I think it is a matter of
> perspective. But from where I sat in WW II, it sure looked as though we
did a
> lot more right than wrong. And we left a burning defeated Germany as
proof.
>
Unfortunately airman are a prone to spinning findings as anyone else.
Airman lied about the effectiveness of WW1 bombing to justify building up
airpower between the wars. They lied about the effectiveness of German
bombing at the start of WW2, to justify a counter offensive. Throughout WW2
they lied about the effectiveness of their bombing to justify throwing good
resources after bad.

I say it is better to ask someone who does not have an ox in the ring.

[Kevin Brooks]

"Bill Phillips" > wrote in message
...
>
> "BUFDRVR" > wrote in message
> ...
> > >IMHO the only useful thing bombers did was draw the Luftwaffe out so
that
> > >the P51s could shoot them down.
> >
> > The impact the combined bomber offensive had against POL cannot be
> disputed.
> > POL was a "Top 3" target prior to the war, but when Intelligence
officials
> were
> > replaced by American industrial "speacialists", it was dropped to #13
> (IIRC).
> > The first Ploesti raid was undertaken not so much for the direct
physical
> > effect, but to force Germany to defend themselves from the Baltic to the
> Med.
> > When a serious effort was undertaken to hit German POL (and sythetic
POL)
> in
> > early 1944, the results were relatively quick and devestating. The
reason
> your
> > P-51s did so well was because the FW-190 and Me-109 pilots they were
> flying
> > against had less than half the pre-war training time. The reduction in
> training
> > hours was due to the loss of both lubricant and fuel.
>
> I am inclined to think there were several factors behind the poorer
> training:
>
> The most important being the shortage of pilots, despite the bombing the
> Germans had more (fuelled) combat aircraft than they had experienced
pilots
> to fly them.
>
> The second was the lack of safe training areas, any flight over Germany in
> 44/45 was a combat mission even if it was in a trainer. Hence it made
sense
> to get the students into armed aircraft and with experienced combat pilots
> ASAP.
>
> In my view fuel as a poor third reason.
>
> > The impact the CBO had
> > prior to 1944 was to draw manpower to defend Germany from the front.
Every
> guy
> > manning a AAA piece or fueling a fighter would have been carrying a
> Mauser-98
> > on either the eastern or western front if it wasn't for the CBO.
> >
> Just like all the effort being put into bombing as not available to help
the
> allied armies.

Nor could it have been, at least not effectively (see below). At least they
kept the Luftwaffe largely in check while also makiong the POL and
transportation situations within Germany a nightmare (all three of which
were very good things for the "allied armies").

Also the flack units could and did turn their guns on ground
> targets in the later stages of the war.

Great. Imagine how much MORE succesful they would have been had they not had
to concentrate all of those resources on defending the homeland and instead
had been putting them on more mobile armored platforms.

>
> How long would a Kar-98 carrying soldier last if the allies put all that
> effort into the battlefield?'

And pray tell just HOW would you put all of that effort "onto the
battlefield"? We know that level bombing was of mixed, at best, tactical
value when applied "to the battlefield" (witness COBRA). The allied ground
forces in France in late 1944 were about as big as you could manage given
logistics constraints (and no, having all of the bombers play transport
would not have appreciably changed that picture), so you would not have been
reorienting the bombing resources into the ground fight very easily. Sounds
like your plan is not very workable. OTOH, having the CBO ongoing prevented
what was left of the Luftwaffe in late 44 from being able to effectively
focus on supporting their own ground forces opposing the oncoming allied
ground juggernaut. It did indeed make the POL situation a critical one for
German forces, including those on the ground facing Ike's troops. I just
can't see how we could have substantially improved upon the situation by
reorienting the resources applied to the CBO--as Buffdrvr points out, we
could have better *focused* them to be more effective, given the benefit of
hindsight, but in the end the combined weight of *all* of the resources
brought to bear, from the CBO to the ground soldiers and TACAIR, working
simultaneously to apply pressure to the Germans from all directions and
forcing them to try to defend *everywhere* versus concentrating solely upon
the ground equation, was the optimal solution to be had.

Brooks
>
>

[Bill Phillips]

"ArtKramr" > wrote in message
...
> >ubject: Re: Area bombing is not a dirty word.
> >From: "Bill Phillips"
> >Date: 1/5/04 11:44 AM Pacific Standard Time
>
> >o you are saying that ALL the bombs dropped during that period were
dropped
> >on oil targets! I would love to here your source for that.
>
> I never said that, You said that.
>
You said "we stopped bombing production facilites and switched to oil"

> > can find few instances of missions being
> >cancelled solely due to lack of POL, and the
>
> You didn't look hard enough.
>
Then please find some for me.

[BUFDRVR]

>In my view fuel as a poor third reason.
>

According to interviews with Albert Kesselring, fuel shortages severely limited
training and was, according to him, the leading cause of eventually losing air
superiority over their own country.


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

[Keith Willshaw]

"Bill Phillips" > wrote in message
...
>
> "ArtKramr" > wrote in message
> ...
> > >ubject: Re: Area bombing is not a dirty word.
> > >From: "Bill Phillips"
> > >Date: 1/5/04 11:44 AM Pacific Standard Time
> >
> > >o you are saying that ALL the bombs dropped during that period were
> dropped
> > >on oil targets! I would love to here your source for that.
> >
> > I never said that, You said that.
> >
> You said "we stopped bombing production facilites and switched to oil"
>

Which is a LONG way from saying ALL the bombs dropped
during the period were dropped on oil targets.

Keith

[BUFDRVR]

>They lied about the effectiveness of German
>bombing at the start of WW2, to justify a counter offensive.

Wrong. The USAAF part of the CBO was born out of AWPD-1, first drafted in
1938. The only thing the USAAF can be accused of was too easily dismissing the
German failure in the Battle of Britain when they revised AWPD-1 in late 1940.
According to most air power experts of that time period, Germany failed because
their bombers were ill equipped to the task. They were correct in that regard,
but they let that explain away everything and literally learned no lessons from
the Battle of Britain.

>Throughout WW2
>they lied about the effectiveness of their bombing to justify throwing good
>resources after bad.

Wrong again. They had a real time intelligence problem with attempting to
analyze exactly the results of their bombing. They had excellent photo recon
and excellent SIGINT due to Ultra, but a hard time correlating the 2. 60 years
later, we are still struggling with this, albeit not nearly as bad.


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

[Bill Phillips]

> > > The impact the CBO had
> > > prior to 1944 was to draw manpower to defend Germany from the front.
> Every
> > guy
> > > manning a AAA piece or fueling a fighter would have been carrying a
> > Mauser-98
> > > on either the eastern or western front if it wasn't for the CBO.
> > >
> > Just like all the effort being put into bombing as not available to help
> the
> > allied armies.
>
> Nor could it have been, at least not effectively (see below). At least
they
> kept the Luftwaffe largely in check while also makiong the POL and
> transportation situations within Germany a nightmare (all three of which
> were very good things for the "allied armies").
>
> Also the flack units could and did turn their guns on ground
> > targets in the later stages of the war.
>
> Great. Imagine how much MORE succesful they would have been had they not
had
> to concentrate all of those resources on defending the homeland and
instead
> had been putting them on more mobile armored platforms.
>
> >
> > How long would a Kar-98 carrying soldier last if the allies put all that
> > effort into the battlefield?'
>
> And pray tell just HOW would you put all of that effort "onto the
> battlefield"? We know that level bombing was of mixed, at best, tactical
> value when applied "to the battlefield" (witness COBRA). The allied ground
> forces in France in late 1944 were about as big as you could manage given
> logistics constraints (and no, having all of the bombers play transport
> would not have appreciably changed that picture), so you would not have
been
> reorienting the bombing resources into the ground fight very easily.
Sounds
> like your plan is not very workable. OTOH, having the CBO ongoing
prevented
> what was left of the Luftwaffe in late 44 from being able to effectively
> focus on supporting their own ground forces opposing the oncoming allied
> ground juggernaut. It did indeed make the POL situation a critical one for
> German forces, including those on the ground facing Ike's troops. I just
> can't see how we could have substantially improved upon the situation by
> reorienting the resources applied to the CBO--as Buffdrvr points out, we
> could have better *focused* them to be more effective, given the benefit
of
> hindsight, but in the end the combined weight of *all* of the resources
> brought to bear, from the CBO to the ground soldiers and TACAIR, working
> simultaneously to apply pressure to the Germans from all directions and
> forcing them to try to defend *everywhere* versus concentrating solely
upon
> the ground equation, was the optimal solution to be had.
>
It depends on when you divert the resources.

Once you have built bombers you are restricted in what you can do with them.

However change early enough and you can build almost anything instead, such
as a tank that could take on Tigers and Panthers 1 to 1. Note: resources are
a quality issue as well as a quantity one, better equipment could have
actually reduced the logistic burden by achieving a given effect with less
equipment.

Even if it was put into air power then it could have won the battle of the
Atlantic earlier and some more CAS and air transport would have been useful
for the advance across Europe. For example a little more air power would
have turned Operation Market Garden into a victory.

Much the same is true of the German efforts.

[Bill Phillips]

"Keith Willshaw" > wrote in message
...
>
> "Bill Phillips" > wrote in message
> ...
> >
> > "ArtKramr" > wrote in message
> > ...
> > > >ubject: Re: Area bombing is not a dirty word.
> > > >From: "Bill Phillips"
> > > >Date: 1/5/04 11:44 AM Pacific Standard Time
> > >
> > > >o you are saying that ALL the bombs dropped during that period were
> > dropped
> > > >on oil targets! I would love to here your source for that.
> > >
> > > I never said that, You said that.
> > >
> > You said "we stopped bombing production facilites and switched to oil"
> >
>
> Which is a LONG way from saying ALL the bombs dropped
> during the period were dropped on oil targets.
>
OK there is scope for dropping bombs on things that are neither production
or oil.

However, STOPPED means that NO bombs were dropped on production facilities,
which does not fit what I have heard.

[Kevin Brooks]

"Bill Phillips" > wrote in message
...
> > > > The impact the CBO had
> > > > prior to 1944 was to draw manpower to defend Germany from the front.
> > Every
> > > guy
> > > > manning a AAA piece or fueling a fighter would have been carrying a
> > > Mauser-98
> > > > on either the eastern or western front if it wasn't for the CBO.
> > > >
> > > Just like all the effort being put into bombing as not available to
help
> > the
> > > allied armies.
> >
> > Nor could it have been, at least not effectively (see below). At least
> they
> > kept the Luftwaffe largely in check while also makiong the POL and
> > transportation situations within Germany a nightmare (all three of which
> > were very good things for the "allied armies").
> >
> > Also the flack units could and did turn their guns on ground
> > > targets in the later stages of the war.
> >
> > Great. Imagine how much MORE succesful they would have been had they not
> had
> > to concentrate all of those resources on defending the homeland and
> instead
> > had been putting them on more mobile armored platforms.
> >
> > >
> > > How long would a Kar-98 carrying soldier last if the allies put all
that
> > > effort into the battlefield?'
> >
> > And pray tell just HOW would you put all of that effort "onto the
> > battlefield"? We know that level bombing was of mixed, at best, tactical
> > value when applied "to the battlefield" (witness COBRA). The allied
ground
> > forces in France in late 1944 were about as big as you could manage
given
> > logistics constraints (and no, having all of the bombers play transport
> > would not have appreciably changed that picture), so you would not have
> been
> > reorienting the bombing resources into the ground fight very easily.
> Sounds
> > like your plan is not very workable. OTOH, having the CBO ongoing
> prevented
> > what was left of the Luftwaffe in late 44 from being able to effectively
> > focus on supporting their own ground forces opposing the oncoming allied
> > ground juggernaut. It did indeed make the POL situation a critical one
for
> > German forces, including those on the ground facing Ike's troops. I just
> > can't see how we could have substantially improved upon the situation by
> > reorienting the resources applied to the CBO--as Buffdrvr points out, we
> > could have better *focused* them to be more effective, given the benefit
> of
> > hindsight, but in the end the combined weight of *all* of the resources
> > brought to bear, from the CBO to the ground soldiers and TACAIR, working
> > simultaneously to apply pressure to the Germans from all directions and
> > forcing them to try to defend *everywhere* versus concentrating solely
> upon
> > the ground equation, was the optimal solution to be had.
> >
> It depends on when you divert the resources.
>
> Once you have built bombers you are restricted in what you can do with
them.
>
> However change early enough and you can build almost anything instead,
such
> as a tank that could take on Tigers and Panthers 1 to 1. Note: resources
are
> a quality issue as well as a quantity one, better equipment could have
> actually reduced the logistic burden by achieving a given effect with less
> equipment.

Then you would have had to scrap the entire US military production strategy,
which was based upon getting a LOT of "good enough" stuff produced as
opposed to the German approach of building a few really good items--we know
which side lost, so I would side with the winning strategy.

>
> Even if it was put into air power then it could have won the battle of the
> Atlantic earlier

That is not assured. merely tossing a few hundred more aircraft over the
ocean was not going to stop the German subs; it took a combination of
aircraft and emerging technology (i.e., small radars capable of seeing the
surfaced little buggers). Then you would have had to factor in that the
germans, not being subjected to any kind of CBO, would have produced even *m
ore* boats ata faster pace, and trained them more effectively since there
was not the additional effect on their POL supplies, not to mention the fact
that all of those flak crews and resources would have been reprogrammed to
face your other threats, and their Luftwaffe would have been better able to
support operations on *both* fronts, etc, ad nauseum.

and some more CAS and air transport would have been useful
> for the advance across Europe. For example a little more air power would
> have turned Operation Market Garden into a victory.

No freakin' way. The weather shut out air support almost altogether during a
critical window of that operation, and a few more C-47's would NOT have
affected the outcome at Arnhem.

Brooks

>
> Much the same is true of the German efforts.
>
>

[Keith Willshaw]

"Bill Phillips" > wrote in message
...
>

> OK there is scope for dropping bombs on things that are neither production
> or oil.
>
> However, STOPPED means that NO bombs were dropped on production
facilities,
> which does not fit what I have heard.
>
>

In fact there was a switch of emphasis in strategic bombing
from industrial towns to oil targets in 1944. The first bomber command
raid was that on the synthetic-oil plant at Gelsenkirchen on the
night of June 12/13 1944.

Indeed the major raids from this point on were directed at
military targets (Kiel, Le Havre etc), communications targets,
V1/V2 sites and oil targets. It was only in October that raids
were once more made on general production targets when raids
were made on Dortmund and Duisburg.

Keith

[Drazen Kramaric]

On 01 Jan 2004 20:33:57 GMT, (BUFDRVR) wrote:


>Every guy manning a AAA piece or fueling a fighter would have been carrying a Mauser-98
>on either the eastern or western front if it wasn't for the CBO.

As the war progressed, the AA personnel was largely comprised of
people unfit for the front: high school teenagers, girls, WW1
veterans, Soviet POWs etc.

Against this bottom of the barrel opponents, Allies used the flower of
their manhood.

The only reason CBO could have been sustained is that Soviet Union
provided the Red Army to take the main burden of the war.


Drax
remove NOSPAM for reply

[Drazen Kramaric]

On 05 Jan 2004 22:59:12 GMT, (BUFDRVR) wrote:


>According to interviews with Albert Kesselring, fuel shortages severely limited
>training and was, according to him, the leading cause of eventually losing air
>superiority over their own country.

Even if Germany had all the oil it ever needed there was no way for
Germany to deploy enough pilots to take on the combined air forces of
US, UK and USSR.


Drax
remove NOSPAM for reply

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: Area bombing is not a dirty word.
>From: (Drazen Kramaric)
>Date: 1/9/04 4:08 AM Pacific

>As the war progressed, the AA personnel was largely comprised of
>people unfit for the front: high school teenagers, girls, WW1
>veterans, Soviet POWs etc.

They were called the FLAK KINDER and were mostly young men of high school age.


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[Bill Phillips]

> > >
> > It depends on when you divert the resources.
> >
> > Once you have built bombers you are restricted in what you can do with
> them.
> >
> > However change early enough and you can build almost anything instead,
> such
> > as a tank that could take on Tigers and Panthers 1 to 1. Note: resources
> are
> > a quality issue as well as a quantity one, better equipment could have
> > actually reduced the logistic burden by achieving a given effect with
less
> > equipment.
>
> Then you would have had to scrap the entire US military production
strategy,
> which was based upon getting a LOT of "good enough" stuff produced as
> opposed to the German approach of building a few really good items--we
know
> which side lost, so I would side with the winning strategy.
>
I can't find any evidence that the USAAF were pursuing this strategy; on
average its aircraft were as good or better than the enemy's.

Much the same can be said of rifles, artillery, ships, etc.

So it appears that this "entire" strategy was only applied to tanks.

> >
> > Even if it was put into air power then it could have won the battle of
the
> > Atlantic earlier
>
> That is not assured. merely tossing a few hundred more aircraft over the
> ocean was not going to stop the German subs; it took a combination of
> aircraft and emerging technology (i.e., small radars capable of seeing the
> surfaced little buggers).

I am well aware of the need for technology, I am also aware that the first
airborne radars went to the bombers, so that they could bomb through cloud.

> Then you would have had to factor in that the
> germans, not being subjected to any kind of CBO, would have produced even
*m
> ore* boats ata faster pace, and trained them more effectively since there
> was not the additional effect on their POL supplies, not to mention the
fact
> that all of those flak crews and resources would have been reprogrammed to
> face your other threats, and their Luftwaffe would have been better able
to
> support operations on *both* fronts, etc, ad nauseum.
>
Given that German war production went up under bombing, I doubt that the
extra effort going to the front line would be anything like as large as the
effort freed from our bombing offensive.

> and some more CAS and air transport would have been useful
> > for the advance across Europe. For example a little more air power
would
> > have turned Operation Market Garden into a victory.
>
> No freakin' way. The weather shut out air support almost altogether during
a
> critical window of that operation, and a few more C-47's would NOT have
> affected the outcome at Arnhem.

The biggest single problem at Arnhem was that the RAF took 3 lifts to drop
the British airborne div and the Polish Bde.

If they had all been dropped on the first lift then they would have quickly
seized the bridges, and established a strong defensive position around them.
Add a supply drop on D+1 and some CAS to weaken the Germans and they could
have easily held during the bad weather, and weeks after.

[Bill Phillips]

"BUFDRVR" > wrote in message
...
> >In my view fuel as a poor third reason.
> >
>
> According to interviews with Albert Kesselring, fuel shortages severely
limited
> training and was, according to him, the leading cause of eventually losing
air
> superiority over their own country.
>
>
One thing that the German high command is excellent at is finding excuses
for their failures.

One of the reasons WW2 happened was that they successfully convinced the
German people that they had been on the verge of winning WW1 when the
politicians "stabbed then in the back."

So what do you expect him to say:

A) Our failure to train enough pilots early in the war meant that we got
into a vicious circle of: pilot shortage leading to, shorter training
leading to, higher casualties leading to, pilot shortage.

B) We were winning when we ran out of fuel, due to circumstances beyond my
control.

[Bill Phillips]

"BUFDRVR" > wrote in message
...
> >They lied about the effectiveness of German
> >bombing at the start of WW2, to justify a counter offensive.
>
> Wrong. The USAAF part of the CBO was born out of AWPD-1, first drafted in
> 1938. The only thing the USAAF can be accused of was too easily dismissing
the
> German failure in the Battle of Britain when they revised AWPD-1 in late
1940.
> According to most air power experts of that time period, Germany failed
because
> their bombers were ill equipped to the task. They were correct in that
regard,
> but they let that explain away everything and literally learned no lessons
from
> the Battle of Britain.
>
I was think of the RAF, however, the main lesson of the BoB was that bombing
was not as effective as had been expected. As far as I can tell the USAAF
did not learn this lesson.

> >Throughout WW2
> >they lied about the effectiveness of their bombing to justify throwing
good
> >resources after bad.
>
> Wrong again. They had a real time intelligence problem with attempting to
> analyze exactly the results of their bombing. They had excellent photo
recon
> and excellent SIGINT due to Ultra, but a hard time correlating the 2. 60
years
> later, we are still struggling with this, albeit not nearly as bad.
>
Again I was thinking of the RAF, bomb damage assessment in the early days of
night bombing were mostly wishful thinking and was subsequently proved to be
wildly optimistic. BDA did improve as the war progressed, but by then
people were committed to the bombing offensive and so there was less need to
lie.

[Bill Phillips]

"Keith Willshaw" > wrote in message
...
>
> "Bill Phillips" > wrote in message
> ...
> >
>
> > OK there is scope for dropping bombs on things that are neither
production
> > or oil.
> >
> > However, STOPPED means that NO bombs were dropped on production
> facilities,
> > which does not fit what I have heard.
> >
> >
>
> In fact there was a switch of emphasis in strategic bombing
> from industrial towns to oil targets in 1944. The first bomber command
> raid was that on the synthetic-oil plant at Gelsenkirchen on the
> night of June 12/13 1944.
>
> Indeed the major raids from this point on were directed at
> military targets (Kiel, Le Havre etc), communications targets,
> V1/V2 sites and oil targets. It was only in October that raids
> were once more made on general production targets when raids
> were made on Dortmund and Duisburg.

The handful of high profile raids you mention is a small part of the total
picture, and even your list includes some bombing of war production targets,
i.e. it hadn't stopped.

More important you need to explain why war production went up. I have
already explained that my assessment is that the bombing angered the
population and caused them to give up their luxuries and free time and
worked hard to produce more weapons. In short production went up because of
the bombing.

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: Area bombing is not a dirty word.
>From: "Bill Phillips"
>Date: 1/16/04 12:12 PM Pacific Standard Time
>Message-id: >
>
>
>"BUFDRVR" > wrote in message
...
>> >In my view fuel as a poor third reason.
>> >
>>
>> According to interviews with Albert Kesselring, fuel shortages severely
>limited
>> training and was, according to him, the leading cause of eventually losing
>air
>> superiority over their own country.
>>
>>
>One thing that the German high command is excellent at is finding excuses
>for their failures.
>
>One of the reasons WW2 happened was that they successfully convinced the
>German people that they had been on the verge of winning WW1 when the
>politicians "stabbed then in the back."
>
>So what do you expect him to say:
>
>A) Our failure to train enough pilots early in the war meant that we got
>into a vicious circle of: pilot shortage leading to, shorter training
>leading to, higher casualties leading to, pilot shortage.
>
>B) We were winning when we ran out of fuel, due to circumstances beyond my
>control.
>
>

When France surrendered and collaborated it sure looked that way. Children in
France today are taught in schools that France defeated Germany with the "help"
of the allies. How French.


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[Kevin Brooks]

"Bill Phillips" > wrote in message
...
> > > >
> > > It depends on when you divert the resources.
> > >
> > > Once you have built bombers you are restricted in what you can do with
> > them.
> > >
> > > However change early enough and you can build almost anything instead,
> > such
> > > as a tank that could take on Tigers and Panthers 1 to 1. Note:
resources
> > are
> > > a quality issue as well as a quantity one, better equipment could have
> > > actually reduced the logistic burden by achieving a given effect with
> less
> > > equipment.
> >
> > Then you would have had to scrap the entire US military production
> strategy,
> > which was based upon getting a LOT of "good enough" stuff produced as
> > opposed to the German approach of building a few really good items--we
> know
> > which side lost, so I would side with the winning strategy.
> >
> I can't find any evidence that the USAAF were pursuing this strategy; on
> average its aircraft were as good or better than the enemy's.

Your own example was in regards to *tanks* for gosh sakes! If you want USAAF
examples, ask yourself why, despite the availability of better aircraft,
projects like the P-40 continued in production as long as they did? Why did
the B-25 continue in production when the B-26, and later the A-26, were
already entering service in great numbers? Because the US valued mass,
that's why.

>
> Much the same can be said of rifles, artillery, ships, etc.

OK. You think the M3 Grease Gun was the best possible quality SMG we could
produce? Of course not--but it provided the *numbers* that we could not
acheive with the Thompson production. In regards to tanks, the Sherman was
adequate in many ways, good in a few ways, and barely adequate in others
(such as firepower)--but we were still rolling the original 75mm version off
the lines when the war ended. Were Liberty and Victory ships the highest
quality merchent vessels going? No again--but by golly we could turn them
out like pretzels. Artillery? We did fairly well in that area--but more due
to better tactics and C-2 than any inherent advantage of the guns--and
again, turning out zillions of guns also helped.

>
> So it appears that this "entire" strategy was only applied to tanks.

See above.

>
> > >
> > > Even if it was put into air power then it could have won the battle of
> the
> > > Atlantic earlier
> >
> > That is not assured. merely tossing a few hundred more aircraft over the
> > ocean was not going to stop the German subs; it took a combination of
> > aircraft and emerging technology (i.e., small radars capable of seeing
the
> > surfaced little buggers).
>
> I am well aware of the need for technology, I am also aware that the first
> airborne radars went to the bombers, so that they could bomb through
cloud.

That would be because those first radars would have been LOUSY U-Boat
detectors.

>
> > Then you would have had to factor in that the
> > germans, not being subjected to any kind of CBO, would have produced
even
> *m
> > ore* boats ata faster pace, and trained them more effectively since
there
> > was not the additional effect on their POL supplies, not to mention the
> fact
> > that all of those flak crews and resources would have been reprogrammed
to
> > face your other threats, and their Luftwaffe would have been better able
> to
> > support operations on *both* fronts, etc, ad nauseum.
> >
> Given that German war production went up under bombing, I doubt that the
> extra effort going to the front line would be anything like as large as
the
> effort freed from our bombing offensive.

Logic failure. Get back to the subject at hand--the sheer number of
personnel dedicated to the flak forces, the number of guns that went to
support that defense effort that were NOT available to directly support the
Wehrmacht, the critical resources that went into producing those guns and
ammo that instead could have flowed also to the Wehrmacht efforts, the lack
of Luftwaffe support over the battlefield because of the need to resist the
CBO, etc.

>
> > and some more CAS and air transport would have been useful
> > > for the advance across Europe. For example a little more air power
> would
> > > have turned Operation Market Garden into a victory.
> >
> > No freakin' way. The weather shut out air support almost altogether
during
> a
> > critical window of that operation, and a few more C-47's would NOT have
> > affected the outcome at Arnhem.
>
> The biggest single problem at Arnhem was that the RAF took 3 lifts to drop
> the British airborne div and the Polish Bde.

No, the biggest "single problem" was that they went to Arnhem in the first
place, amidst reforming German Panzer units that light airborne troopies
were ill equipped to fight, while depending upon an unrealistic advance rate
from the XXX Corps ground elements along a single axis of advance. Had they
been able to drop the Polich Brigade on day one that would have just allowed
the German's to roll them up with the majority of the British division,
instead of having it available to support the withdrawl of what British
elements were able to finally accomplish that move.

>
> If they had all been dropped on the first lift then they would have
quickly
> seized the bridges, and established a strong defensive position around
them.
> Add a supply drop on D+1 and some CAS to weaken the Germans and they could
> have easily held during the bad weather, and weeks after.

I sincerely doubt that. It would not have changed the fact that they were
dropped too far from their objective, nor would it have changed the fact
that they were facing a lot of German troops and tanks that they had not
planned on encountering. In all likelihood, you would have just given the
Nazis a larger bag of POW's to handle when it was all over.

Brooks
>
>

[Keith Willshaw]

"Bill Phillips" > wrote in message
...
> > > >

>
> If they had all been dropped on the first lift then they would have
quickly
> seized the bridges, and established a strong defensive position around
them.
> Add a supply drop on D+1 and some CAS to weaken the Germans and they could
> have easily held during the bad weather, and weeks after.
>
>

Given that only a single battallion was dropped close enough
on the first drop this seems unlikely. Quite simply there
were no suitable drop zones close to the bridge large
enough to put the whole force into in one go.

When you consider that paratroops are by definition lightly
armed and that the Germans had a Panzer division in the
area it becomes an impossibility.

The fundamental flaw with the operation was that XXX Corps
had to advance along a single road along the top of a dyke
with flooded fields on either side. A single 88 could hold an
armoured column up until the infantry pushed along the field
margins up to their chest in mud and cold water while under
fire.

This made a rapid advance kinda difficult. As for CAS this hit
the same problem that grounded the Poles, FOG, which
isnt exactly rare in NW Europe in the fall.

Keith

[BUFDRVR]

>I was think of the RAF, however, the main lesson of the BoB was that bombing
>was not as effective as had been expected. As far as I can tell the USAAF
>did not learn this lesson.

This is an over simplified lesson. The biggest lesson the USAAF ignored was the
psychological effect of bombing on civilians. If nothing else, residents of
London and surrounding areas disproved some of Douhet's theorys by maintaining
some sense of order during and after the bombings and by showing up for work
the next morning. The USAAF still believed you could cause the collapse of a
nations morale, and thus the collapse of their war effort by bombing civilians.
Now, much to their credit, very few 8th AF missions were designed as "civilian
morale destruction" missions, but the nature of high altitude bombing in the
1940's meant there was going to be collateral civilian casulties and many in
the USAAF believed this was not a bad thing, but a key to winning the war.


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

[BUFDRVR]

>In short production went up because of
>the bombing.

Not true. Production went up *in relation to earlier yearly production* because
most military hardware factories were operating in the neighborhood of 40%-50%
of their capability. By 1942, German armament factories had nearly doubled
their output capacity. In the "United States Strategic Bombing Surveys",
undertaken after the war, this *undetected* excess production capability was a
major intelligence failure by both the UK and the US.


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

[Keith Willshaw]

"Bill Phillips" > wrote in message
...
>
> "Keith Willshaw" > wrote in message
> ...
> >
> > "Bill Phillips" > wrote in message
> > ...
> > >
> >
> > > OK there is scope for dropping bombs on things that are neither
> production
> > > or oil.
> > >
> > > However, STOPPED means that NO bombs were dropped on production
> > facilities,
> > > which does not fit what I have heard.
> > >
> > >
> >
> > In fact there was a switch of emphasis in strategic bombing
> > from industrial towns to oil targets in 1944. The first bomber command
> > raid was that on the synthetic-oil plant at Gelsenkirchen on the
> > night of June 12/13 1944.
> >
> > Indeed the major raids from this point on were directed at
> > military targets (Kiel, Le Havre etc), communications targets,
> > V1/V2 sites and oil targets. It was only in October that raids
> > were once more made on general production targets when raids
> > were made on Dortmund and Duisburg.
>
> The handful of high profile raids you mention is a small part of the total
> picture, and even your list includes some bombing of war production
targets,
> i.e. it hadn't stopped.
>

In fact in 1944 it was a LARGE part of the picture and its quite
true that war production targets were still bombed, stopping
a Tiger tank being delivered is preferable to trying to kill
it with a Sherman tank

> More important you need to explain why war production went up.

Thats simple. Germany didnt put its industries on a full war
footing until 1943. They had no way to go but up. Add to this
Harris switching the focus of the attacks to Berlin from
the Ruhr and the subsequent concentration on tactical and
infrastructure targets that D-Day necessitated and improvement
in German production is inevitable.



> I have
> already explained that my assessment is that the bombing angered the
> population and caused them to give up their luxuries and free time and
> worked hard to produce more weapons. In short production went up because
of
> the bombing.
>

You are in error. The people of Germany had no choice in the matter.
Production priorities were decided by the Reichsminister for war
production. Until 1942 that was Fritz Todt. When he died in an air
crash in 1942 he was replaced by Albert Speer. Speer was shocked by
the inefficiencies and corruption he found in German war production.

If you care to review the data you'll find that Britain was outproducing
Germany in all important areas of production from 1941 onwards
even though Germany had the entire resources of Western Europe
to call on.

Consider aircraft production as an example

In 1942 Germany produced a total of 16,000 aircraft including
2200 FW-190's and 2700 Me-109's

In 1942 Britain produced 28,000 combat aircraft and the USA
turned out 48,000


When we consider tanks we find the following figures
Germany 9,300
Britain 8,600
USA 23,800

I suggest you get hold of a copy of Speer's memoirs
and read them. They are somewhat self serving but
do bear witness to the inefficient mess he found.

Speer also had no doubt about the damage done to Germany's
economy by the bombing of its industrial centres. He said
of the early 1943 raids.

"I was surprised during the war years that the Americans
and the British did not follow up on the destruction of our industry.
If they had done that, the war would have been over a year earlier."

Field Marshall Erhard Milch said after the war

"In conclusion I would like to state that the Allies would have been able to
end the war sooner had they started their attacks against the German
petroleum refineries earlier; in fact they would have shortened the war by
the exact number of months (or weeks) it would have taken (and took) to
carry out these attacks effectively."

Of course this neglects the practicalities of such an attack, until
late 1943 bomber command didnt have the accuracy to hit these
targets and the 8th AF couldnt fly the deep penetration raids
until the escort fighters became available in the same time frame.

Still while I believe the attacks on Hamburg, the Ruhr and Cologne
were succesfull the Berling campaign was an error and
we would have done better to go after the oil targets
at that time while maintaining attacks on promary production
centres in the Ruhr


Keith

[Pete]

"ArtKramr" > wrote

> When France surrendered and collaborated it sure looked that way. Children
in
> France today are taught in schools that France defeated Germany with the
"help"
> of the allies. How French.

The Zaragoza base library had a high school level history book, with
British, French, Russian, and American sections. All relating to WWII.

All 4 sections said basically the same thing. "We won, everyone else helped"

Pete

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: Area bombing is not a dirty word.
>From: "Pete"
>Date: 1/16/04 2:47 PM Pacific Standard Time
>Message-id: >
>
>
>"ArtKramr" > wrote
>
>> When France surrendered and collaborated it sure looked that way. Children
>in
>> France today are taught in schools that France defeated Germany with the
>"help"
>> of the allies. How French.
>
>The Zaragoza base library had a high school level history book, with
>British, French, Russian, and American sections. All relating to WWII.
>
>All 4 sections said basically the same thing. "We won, everyone else helped"
>
>Pete
>
>

Then they add that all those who helped were only after the money. (sheesh)
Think they will ever say thank you to those who " helped"?




Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Bill Phillips wrote in message ...
>More important you need to explain why war production went up. I have
>already explained that my assessment is that the bombing angered the
>population and caused them to give up their luxuries and free time and
>worked hard to produce more weapons. In short production went up because of
>the bombing.

I would recommend the works of Richard Overy, War and Economy in
the Third Reich for example. He advances the point of view the German
economy was much more mobilised early than the post war surveys
had thought and it was inefficiency that was a major cause of low
production, and armament worker efficiency went down in the early war
period. It seems the German statistics used post war, the Wagenfuehr
indexes, did not accurately record when a firm switched to war production.

As an example of the improvements,

The BMW801 aero engine in 1940 took 5,145 kg of raw materials and
2,400 hours of labour, in 1944 it was 2,790 kg of raw materials and
1,250 hours of labour. Henschel made a 64% saving when building
engines between 1939 and 1943, in 1942 Junkers improved Ju88
production efficiency by 30%. In May 1943 each ton of munitions
used less than half the iron and steel, a sixth of the aluminium and
half the copper compared with 1941. Early raw material allocations
were set on an industry wide basis, not product, controls were slack
enough that the Messerschmitt organisation made aluminium step
ladders for example, there were also lightweight shelters made
intended for the troops in the desert.

Pre war there were incentives to employ people, which continued into
the war, minimal rationalisation of supply, the same component could
cost twice as much from different suppliers, the continual interference
of the military demanding small changes, the deliberate cut backs in
1941, which makes the late 1942 increases look better than they should.
The fact in things like aircraft the switch to smaller, lighter aircraft
means the numbers look better but not if you go by airframe weight.
Early in the war if someone reported a better way of doing things they
simply found their quota raised, the state took all the benefit.

Speer helped remove the inefficiencies, aided by the obvious
necessity for more production. The economy's resilience was
helped by having more factory space and machine tools than
were needed, indeed Germany exported many machine tools
during the war. In any case there were the tools looted from
France etc., these mainly helped the allies, since when the
Germans tried to transfer production to the factories in occupied
areas many of the key tools were in storage in Germany.

There were examples of workers becoming more dedicated but it
appears the general result of the situation in Germany in 1943 and
beyond was an increase in general apathy and absenteeism, Ford
factories in the Rhur 4% in 1940 and 25% in 1944, foreign workers
could be held to 3% absenteeism but they were 50 to 80% as
productive as Germans. No revolt, just a get through the day attitude.
The general war situation enabled the Nazis to squeeze the civilians
harder. According to Overy the output per head for the arms industry
looked like, 1939 100, 1940 87.6, 1941 75.9 (provisional figure),
1942 99.6, 1943 131.6, 1944 160.0 (minimum).


Simply before mid 1944 the allies were not in a position to affect
a section of the German economy, the allies lacked the numbers,
the experience and the defences were too strong, and then there
was the need to support the Normandy invasion. In late 1944 the
allies could go after the German economy by destroying the transport
links, and the production decline set in, and there was almost no need
for strikes outside Germany anymore, the assault could be concentrated.
Even Bomber Command took until September 1944 to hit the half way
mark for total bombs on Germany for the war, for the 8th Air Force it was
around two months later.

The trouble is the allied advances in 1944 also cut off important
sources of German raw materials, on the other hand it appears
it took around 9 months for iron ore to become steel in some
weapon or machine. Also there was the extra mobilisation of
skilled workers into the military. Even so most of the economic
decline in 1944 and early 1945 is bomber induced, given the
rapid drop off in railway and canal traffic.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: Area bombing is not a dirty word.
>From: "Geoffrey Sinclair" .

>illed workers into the military. Even so most of the economic
>decline in 1944 and early 1945 is bomber induced, given t

It was my pleasure to contribute what little I could to the crushing of the
Nazi swine.


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[Bill Phillips]

"Kevin Brooks" > wrote in message
...
>
> "Bill Phillips" > wrote in message
> ...
> > > > >
> > > > It depends on when you divert the resources.
> > > >
> > > > Once you have built bombers you are restricted in what you can do
with
> > > them.
> > > >
> > > > However change early enough and you can build almost anything
instead,
> > > such
> > > > as a tank that could take on Tigers and Panthers 1 to 1. Note:
> resources
> > > are
> > > > a quality issue as well as a quantity one, better equipment could
have
> > > > actually reduced the logistic burden by achieving a given effect
with
> > less
> > > > equipment.
> > >
> > > Then you would have had to scrap the entire US military production
> > strategy,
> > > which was based upon getting a LOT of "good enough" stuff produced as
> > > opposed to the German approach of building a few really good items--we
> > know
> > > which side lost, so I would side with the winning strategy.
> > >
> > I can't find any evidence that the USAAF were pursuing this strategy; on
> > average its aircraft were as good or better than the enemy's.
>
> Your own example was in regards to *tanks* for gosh sakes!

Your reply was in regards to "the entire US military production"

> If you want USAAF
> examples, ask yourself why, despite the availability of better aircraft,
> projects like the P-40 continued in production as long as they did? Why
did
> the B-25 continue in production when the B-26, and later the A-26, were
> already entering service in great numbers? Because the US valued mass,
> that's why.
>
That's why I said "on average" both sides kept some poor aircraft in
production, and both produced some first class aircraft.
> >
> > Much the same can be said of rifles, artillery, ships, etc.
>
> OK. You think the M3 Grease Gun was the best possible quality SMG we could
> produce? Of course not--but it provided the *numbers* that we could not
> acheive with the Thompson production.

The M3's main fault was the single feed magazine, copied from the MP38/40.

> In regards to tanks, the Sherman was
> adequate in many ways, good in a few ways, and barely adequate in others
> (such as firepower)--but we were still rolling the original 75mm version
off
> the lines when the war ended.

They were worse that the average German tank.

> Were Liberty and Victory ships the highest
> quality merchent vessels going? No again--but by golly we could turn them
> out like pretzels.

No German competition, so no comparison possible.

> Artillery? We did fairly well in that area--but more due
> to better tactics and C-2 than any inherent advantage of the guns--and
> again, turning out zillions of guns also helped.

Those numbers were combined with quality comparable to the German weapons.
>
> >
> > So it appears that this "entire" strategy was only applied to tanks.
>
> See above.
>
> >
> > > >
> > > > Even if it was put into air power then it could have won the battle
of
> > the
> > > > Atlantic earlier
> > >
> > > That is not assured. merely tossing a few hundred more aircraft over
the
> > > ocean was not going to stop the German subs; it took a combination of
> > > aircraft and emerging technology (i.e., small radars capable of seeing
> the
> > > surfaced little buggers).
> >
> > I am well aware of the need for technology, I am also aware that the
first
> > airborne radars went to the bombers, so that they could bomb through
> cloud.
>
> That would be because those first radars would have been LOUSY U-Boat
> detectors.

Then why were slightly modified versions subsequently used to hunt U-Boats?
>
> >
> > > Then you would have had to factor in that the
> > > germans, not being subjected to any kind of CBO, would have produced
> even
> > *m
> > > ore* boats ata faster pace, and trained them more effectively since
> there
> > > was not the additional effect on their POL supplies, not to mention
the
> > fact
> > > that all of those flak crews and resources would have been
reprogrammed
> to
> > > face your other threats, and their Luftwaffe would have been better
able
> > to
> > > support operations on *both* fronts, etc, ad nauseum.
> > >
> > Given that German war production went up under bombing, I doubt that the
> > extra effort going to the front line would be anything like as large as
> the
> > effort freed from our bombing offensive.
>
> Logic failure. Get back to the subject at hand--the sheer number of
> personnel dedicated to the flak forces, the number of guns that went to
> support that defense effort that were NOT available to directly support
the
> Wehrmacht, the critical resources that went into producing those guns and
> ammo that instead could have flowed also to the Wehrmacht efforts, the
lack
> of Luftwaffe support over the battlefield because of the need to resist
the
> CBO, etc.
>
My point has never been that no resources would have been freed for the
German front line, just that they would be less that the resources freed for
the allied front line.

The secondary point is that without bombing to enrage the population the
Germans would have produced less war material, so there would have been less
to share around.
> >
> > > and some more CAS and air transport would have been useful
> > > > for the advance across Europe. For example a little more air power
> > would
> > > > have turned Operation Market Garden into a victory.
> > >
> > > No freakin' way. The weather shut out air support almost altogether
> during
> > a
> > > critical window of that operation, and a few more C-47's would NOT
have
> > > affected the outcome at Arnhem.
> >
> > The biggest single problem at Arnhem was that the RAF took 3 lifts to
drop
> > the British airborne div and the Polish Bde.
>
> No, the biggest "single problem" was that they went to Arnhem in the first
> place, amidst reforming German Panzer units that light airborne troopies
> were ill equipped to fight, while depending upon an unrealistic advance
rate
> from the XXX Corps ground elements along a single axis of advance. Had
they
> been able to drop the Polich Brigade on day one that would have just
allowed
> the German's to roll them up with the majority of the British division,
> instead of having it available to support the withdrawl of what British
> elements were able to finally accomplish that move.
>
The airborne did have some quite effective anti-tank weapons, fighting a
defensive battle in Arnhem they could have held the very under strength
Panzer Divs for a long time.
> >
> > If they had all been dropped on the first lift then they would have
> quickly
> > seized the bridges, and established a strong defensive position around
> them.
> > Add a supply drop on D+1 and some CAS to weaken the Germans and they
could
> > have easily held during the bad weather, and weeks after.
>
> I sincerely doubt that. It would not have changed the fact that they were
> dropped too far from their objective, nor would it have changed the fact
> that they were facing a lot of German troops and tanks that they had not
> planned on encountering. In all likelihood, you would have just given the
> Nazis a larger bag of POW's to handle when it was all over.
>
They hung on for quite a long time despite all the problems.

[Bill Phillips]

"Keith Willshaw" > wrote in message
...
>
> "Bill Phillips" > wrote in message
> ...
> > > > >
>
> >
> > If they had all been dropped on the first lift then they would have
> quickly
> > seized the bridges, and established a strong defensive position around
> them.
> > Add a supply drop on D+1 and some CAS to weaken the Germans and they
could
> > have easily held during the bad weather, and weeks after.
> >
> >
>
> Given that only a single battallion was dropped close enough
> on the first drop this seems unlikely. Quite simply there
> were no suitable drop zones close to the bridge large
> enough to put the whole force into in one go.
>
Actually the first 2 Bde's were dropped about the same distance from the
bridges. Also although glider LZ's could only be used once, paras only need
minutes to clear a DZ for a second drop.

One Bde stayed to guard the DZ's, a mistake IMHO, and the other advanced on
the bridges on 3 Bn axis. Only one of the Bn's made it to the road bridge,
which is probably where you got your single Bn.

With 5 times the force driving for the bridges the handful of Germans in the
way would not have stood a chance.

> When you consider that paratroops are by definition lightly
> armed and that the Germans had a Panzer division in the
> area it becomes an impossibility.
>
The Panzer Div's were not positioned to stop the initial attack and the
airborne had adequate anti-tank weapons to defend a town against their
counter attack.

> The fundamental flaw with the operation was that XXX Corps
> had to advance along a single road along the top of a dyke
> with flooded fields on either side. A single 88 could hold an
> armoured column up until the infantry pushed along the field
> margins up to their chest in mud and cold water while under
> fire.
>
That is why the plan called for an airborne carpet to clear the way. The
delay was more due to the failure to capture the bridge at Nijmegen before
the Germans had reacted.

> This made a rapid advance kinda difficult. As for CAS this hit
> the same problem that grounded the Poles, FOG, which
> isnt exactly rare in NW Europe in the fall.
>
I was referring to the clear weather days only, principally D and D+1, sorry
if that was not clear.

[Bill Phillips]

"BUFDRVR" > wrote in message
...
> >I was think of the RAF, however, the main lesson of the BoB was that
bombing
> >was not as effective as had been expected. As far as I can tell the
USAAF
> >did not learn this lesson.
>
> This is an over simplified lesson. The biggest lesson the USAAF ignored
was the
> psychological effect of bombing on civilians. If nothing else, residents
of
> London and surrounding areas disproved some of Douhet's theorys by
maintaining
> some sense of order during and after the bombings and by showing up for
work
> the next morning. The USAAF still believed you could cause the collapse of
a
> nations morale, and thus the collapse of their war effort by bombing
civilians.
> Now, much to their credit, very few 8th AF missions were designed as
"civilian
> morale destruction" missions, but the nature of high altitude bombing in
the
> 1940's meant there was going to be collateral civilian casulties and many
in
> the USAAF believed this was not a bad thing, but a key to winning the war.
>
>
Agreed.

[Bill Phillips]

Thanks for the information, I will look into it further. However I am
inclined to think that the inefficiencies were largely an attitude problem,
which was corrected by bombing.

[Keith Willshaw]

"Bill Phillips" > wrote in message
...
>
> "Keith Willshaw" > wrote in message
> ...
> >
> > "Bill Phillips" > wrote in message
> > ...
> > > > > >
> >
> > >
> > > If they had all been dropped on the first lift then they would have
> > quickly
> > > seized the bridges, and established a strong defensive position around
> > them.
> > > Add a supply drop on D+1 and some CAS to weaken the Germans and they
> could
> > > have easily held during the bad weather, and weeks after.
> > >
> > >
> >
> > Given that only a single battallion was dropped close enough
> > on the first drop this seems unlikely. Quite simply there
> > were no suitable drop zones close to the bridge large
> > enough to put the whole force into in one go.
> >
> Actually the first 2 Bde's were dropped about the same distance from the
> bridges. Also although glider LZ's could only be used once, paras only
need
> minutes to clear a DZ for a second drop.
>
> One Bde stayed to guard the DZ's, a mistake IMHO, and the other advanced
on
> the bridges on 3 Bn axis. Only one of the Bn's made it to the road bridge,
> which is probably where you got your single Bn.
>

Quite so , note that guarding you supply line is standard military doctrine

> With 5 times the force driving for the bridges the handful of Germans in
the
> way would not have stood a chance.
>

Which is irrelevant, seizing the bridge was achieved, holding it
was the problem.

> > When you consider that paratroops are by definition lightly
> > armed and that the Germans had a Panzer division in the
> > area it becomes an impossibility.
> >
> The Panzer Div's were not positioned to stop the initial attack and the
> airborne had adequate anti-tank weapons to defend a town against their
> counter attack.
>

Hardly, they had a handful of PIAT'S and no counter to
German artillery. As Major Tony Hibbert said the German
tanks were now devastatingly effective.

'We really had nothing we could do to them, and they drove up
and down the street, firing high explosive into the side of the
building, to create the gap, and then firing smoke shells through that.
The phosphorus from the smoke shells burned us out. By about 8 o'clock,
on Wednesday evening, the fires got out of control and of course
we had by this time about 300 wounded in the cellars.'

> > The fundamental flaw with the operation was that XXX Corps
> > had to advance along a single road along the top of a dyke
> > with flooded fields on either side. A single 88 could hold an
> > armoured column up until the infantry pushed along the field
> > margins up to their chest in mud and cold water while under
> > fire.
> >
> That is why the plan called for an airborne carpet to clear the way. The
> delay was more due to the failure to capture the bridge at Nijmegen before
> the Germans had reacted.
>

The bridge at Nijmegen was ONE of the problems

> > This made a rapid advance kinda difficult. As for CAS this hit
> > the same problem that grounded the Poles, FOG, which
> > isnt exactly rare in NW Europe in the fall.
> >
> I was referring to the clear weather days only, principally D and D+1,
sorry
> if that was not clear.
>

Trouble is that leaves the para's at Arnhem vulnerable to German
counter attack with no CAS and no artillery

Keith

[Kevin Brooks]

"Bill Phillips" > wrote in message
...
>
> "Kevin Brooks" > wrote in message
> ...
> >
> > "Bill Phillips" > wrote in message
> > ...
> > > > > >
<snip>

> > > > Then you would have had to scrap the entire US military production
> > > strategy,
> > > > which was based upon getting a LOT of "good enough" stuff produced
as
> > > > opposed to the German approach of building a few really good
items--we
> > > know
> > > > which side lost, so I would side with the winning strategy.
> > > >
> > > I can't find any evidence that the USAAF were pursuing this strategy;
on
> > > average its aircraft were as good or better than the enemy's.
> >
> > Your own example was in regards to *tanks* for gosh sakes!
>
> Your reply was in regards to "the entire US military production"

And I have detailed how that applied to land, air, and sea systems.

>
> > If you want USAAF
> > examples, ask yourself why, despite the availability of better aircraft,
> > projects like the P-40 continued in production as long as they did? Why
> did
> > the B-25 continue in production when the B-26, and later the A-26, were
> > already entering service in great numbers? Because the US valued mass,
> > that's why.
> >
> That's why I said "on average" both sides kept some poor aircraft in
> production, and both produced some first class aircraft.

Who cares what the Germans did? The issue here was the US philosophy of
producing a lot of stuff that was "good enough" versus a few things that
were demonstrably superior.

> > >
> > > Much the same can be said of rifles, artillery, ships, etc.
> >
> > OK. You think the M3 Grease Gun was the best possible quality SMG we
could
> > produce? Of course not--but it provided the *numbers* that we could not
> > acheive with the Thompson production.
>
> The M3's main fault was the single feed magazine, copied from the MP38/40.

The M3 was a stamped out, mass produced clunker in comparison to the
Thompson. It had a strange rate of fire (it tended to increase its rate as
you held the trigger down, sort of a bam...bam...bam..bam..bam.bam.bam.bam
situation--we still had them as standard weapons for tank, CEV, and AVLB
crewmen in the late eighties, not becuse they were *good*, but because we
had nothing to replace them until the M4 came along), was heavy as hell, and
was never considered to be very accurate weapon. Your single feed magazine,
whatever that means, was the least of its problems.

>
> > In regards to tanks, the Sherman was
> > adequate in many ways, good in a few ways, and barely adequate in others
> > (such as firepower)--but we were still rolling the original 75mm version
> off
> > the lines when the war ended.
>
> They were worse that the average German tank.

Yep, they were in terms of firepower. They were pretty good from a
mechanical reliability standpoint (probably significantly better than their
German counterparts), and relatively fast and agile for the period. They
also did not tax the supporting infrastructure as much as heavier products
like the Tiger would have had it been in allied hands (things like standard
tactical bridging systems, and even shipping--unlike the Germans, we had to
transport all of the Shermans overseas before they could even get into the
fight). The later higher velocity 76 mm gun was better than the 75mm, but it
never really matched German firepower (until the Israelis upgunned them
later in life to the Super Sherman standard).

>
> > Were Liberty and Victory ships the highest
> > quality merchent vessels going? No again--but by golly we could turn
them
> > out like pretzels.
>
> No German competition, so no comparison possible.

You don't need a comparison--it just goes to show that we were turning out
stuff to acheive mass, with acceptable performance versus lower production
with optimal performance.

>
> > Artillery? We did fairly well in that area--but more due
> > to better tactics and C-2 than any inherent advantage of the guns--and
> > again, turning out zillions of guns also helped.
>
> Those numbers were combined with quality comparable to the German weapons.

Yes and no. We did not do nearly as well as the Germans in terms of
versatility, where their 88mm was king. And IIRC the Germans had better SP
guns than we did (the old M7 105mm Priest being about the best we managed),
with products like the Sdkfz 165 Hummel and its 150mm gun. Our comparable
M12 and M40 did not become available until later in the war. The M7 remained
the standard divisional SP gun in the armored divisions throughout the war.

<snip>

> > > I am well aware of the need for technology, I am also aware that the
> first
> > > airborne radars went to the bombers, so that they could bomb through
> > cloud.
> >
> > That would be because those first radars would have been LOUSY U-Boat
> > detectors.
>
> Then why were slightly modified versions subsequently used to hunt
U-Boats?

I don't believe they were "slightly modified". IIRC, and someone around here
who specializes in the field can correct me if I am wrong, it took a shorter
wavelength radar to acheive the ability of detecting a surfaced U-Boat than
waht was available on the bomber radars that were used for gross mapping
(which was about the best they could manage).

<snip for bevity's sake>

> >
> > Logic failure. Get back to the subject at hand--the sheer number of
> > personnel dedicated to the flak forces, the number of guns that went to
> > support that defense effort that were NOT available to directly support
> the
> > Wehrmacht, the critical resources that went into producing those guns
and
> > ammo that instead could have flowed also to the Wehrmacht efforts, the
> lack
> > of Luftwaffe support over the battlefield because of the need to resist
> the
> > CBO, etc.
> >
> My point has never been that no resources would have been freed for the
> German front line, just that they would be less that the resources freed
for
> the allied front line.

First, I seriously doubt that. "In January of 1944 there were 20,625 FLAK
guns (7,941 heavy guns and 12,684 light/medium guns) with 6,880 searchlights
defending Germany. Stationed on other fronts were another 9,569
anti-aircraft guns and 960 searchlights, these totals do not include Army
and Navy FLAK units." (www.ww2guide.com/flak.shtml ). That is a lot of
resources right there. How many men were required to keep each gun and
searchlight in service? How many men and how much other resources were
required to provide the early warning needed, supply the guns, etc.? How
many fighter squadrons were tied up in the defense of the Reich in 1943-44?

If we use a SWAG of eight men per heavy gun and four per lighter gun, and
maybe four per searchlight, that gives you some 125,000 personnel *just in
the weapons crews themselves*. Even if you assume that the Flak units
required less service support committment than frontline combat units (where
the teeth-to-tail ratio was probably in the five or six-to-one range at
best) and assumed a one-to-one ratio, you are talking another 125K personnel
right there. That is already 250K personnel tied up in the defense effort
without even starting to consider the Luftwaffe flying assets. I'd be very
surprised if the total number of German personnel tied to the defense effort
against the CBO was not well in excess of 500K personnel...at a time when
Wehrmacht units were furiously disbanding some units in a vain effort to
keep others in a fill-status that *remotely* resembled their TO&E
requirements.

Which brings us to the second point--the allies could *afford* to dedicate
personnel and resources to the CBO because we had an over-abundance of
manpower and equipment resources. We were challenged to support the scope of
the force that we DID have fighting on the continent--tossing more manpower
into the equation would just exacerbate the support constraints. OTOH, the
Germans were already short manpower and equipment almost across the
board--keeping tank strength in their panzer units up to minimal levels was
a nightmare, and they were lacking infantry and artillerymen as well. Their
tactical air support efforts were seriously hampered by the need to continue
the defense effort back home. So in the end the CBO, if it accomplished
nothing else, applied additional pressure to the German manning and
equipment shortfalls affecting their frontline units that would not have
been present had the CBO not occured.

>
> The secondary point is that without bombing to enrage the population the
> Germans would have produced less war material, so there would have been
less
> to share around.

That argument has never been adequately supported. The reason German
production was still climbing was more due to the effect of their belated
shift to a wartime effort, and the improved efficiencies resulting from the
efforts of Speer and his folks, than due to "rage" on the part of the german
workforce. As another poster has noted, that workforce exhibited an
increasing absence rate as the war progressed--hardly an indicator of a
motivated workforce.

<snip>

> >
> > No, the biggest "single problem" was that they went to Arnhem in the
first
> > place, amidst reforming German Panzer units that light airborne troopies
> > were ill equipped to fight, while depending upon an unrealistic advance
> rate
> > from the XXX Corps ground elements along a single axis of advance. Had
> they
> > been able to drop the Polich Brigade on day one that would have just
> allowed
> > the German's to roll them up with the majority of the British division,
> > instead of having it available to support the withdrawl of what British
> > elements were able to finally accomplish that move.
> >
> The airborne did have some quite effective anti-tank weapons, fighting a
> defensive battle in Arnhem they could have held the very under strength
> Panzer Divs for a long time.

They did? And what were they? The PIAT? You are dreaming here--they faced
those panzers, and they did NOT hold out "for a long time". Their AT
capabilities were ABYSMAL. And you have again ignored the REAL problems with
Market Garden--the poor and limited capacity axis of advnace given to XXX
Corps, the lack of decent DZ's around Arnhem close enough to the targets,
and that great unknown--the weather.

> > >
> > > If they had all been dropped on the first lift then they would have
> > quickly
> > > seized the bridges, and established a strong defensive position around
> > them.
> > > Add a supply drop on D+1 and some CAS to weaken the Germans and they
> could
> > > have easily held during the bad weather, and weeks after.
> >
> > I sincerely doubt that. It would not have changed the fact that they
were
> > dropped too far from their objective, nor would it have changed the fact
> > that they were facing a lot of German troops and tanks that they had not
> > planned on encountering. In all likelihood, you would have just given
the
> > Nazis a larger bag of POW's to handle when it was all over.
> >
> They hung on for quite a long time despite all the problems.

And they ended up withdrawing what they could. Had the entire division
dropped in on day one it would not have sped up XXX Corps advance one iota,
and you'd have been left with the germans having more POW's in hand than
they actually got in the end.

Brooks

>
>

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Bill Phillips wrote in message ...
>Thanks for the information, I will look into it further. However I am
>inclined to think that the inefficiencies were largely an attitude problem,
>which was corrected by bombing.

The German WWII economic inefficiencies were built in by the
Nazi's general divide and rule ideas and the methods used
pre war to create employment. Plus the military's ideas of how
a war economy should be run. Then add the overlay that the
early victories "proved" the system was basically working and
the 1941 cut backs.

The general war situation meant the system had to become more
efficient if Germany was to stand any chance of winning. The
general war situation, including the bombing but also things like
the defeats in the east and south all played there part in any
attitude change. The worse things became the less any vested
interests were able to hold out.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email

[Drazen Kramaric]

On Sun, 18 Jan 2004 02:01:50 GMT, "Kevin Brooks"
> wrote:



>If we use a SWAG of eight men per heavy gun and four per lighter gun, and
>maybe four per searchlight, that gives you some 125,000 personnel *just in
>the weapons crews themselves*. Even if you assume that the Flak units
>required less service support committment than frontline combat units (where
>the teeth-to-tail ratio was probably in the five or six-to-one range at
>best) and assumed a one-to-one ratio, you are talking another 125K personnel
>right there. That is already 250K personnel tied up in the defense effort
>without even starting to consider the Luftwaffe flying assets. I'd be very
>surprised if the total number of German personnel tied to the defense effort
>against the CBO was not well in excess of 500K personnel...at a time when
>Wehrmacht units were furiously disbanding some units in a vain effort to
>keep others in a fill-status that *remotely* resembled their TO&E
>requirements.

The real question is where would the personelly otherwise tied up in
the AA defense be more useful to the German war effort. Most of the
crews were not fit to serve in the front line units either because
they were in the wrong age or sex group. Some of them weren't even
Germans.

Against one eight man gun crew you'd have one ten man B-17 crew. Which
crew costs its parent country more to sustain in the combat?


>Which brings us to the second point--the allies could *afford* to dedicate
>personnel and resources to the CBO because we had an over-abundance of
>manpower and equipment resources. We were challenged to support the scope of
>the force that we DID have fighting on the continent--tossing more manpower
>into the equation would just exacerbate the support constraints. OTOH, the
>Germans were already short manpower and equipment almost across the
>board--keeping tank strength in their panzer units up to minimal levels was
>a nightmare, and they were lacking infantry and artillerymen as well. Their
>tactical air support efforts were seriously hampered by the need to continue
>the defense effort back home. So in the end the CBO, if it accomplished
>nothing else, applied additional pressure to the German manning and
>equipment shortfalls affecting their frontline units that would not have
>been present had the CBO not occured.

This point is valid, with some limits. Indeed, Allies could afford to
send their best human material into strategic bombing. The question is
whether this human material who flew and supported strategic bombing
offensive could have been used more efficiently.

It shouldn't be forgotten that half of the bombs dropped by CBO on
German controlled territory was dropped after September 1944 when
German army and air force were thoroughly defeated and were unlikely
to survive 1945 campaign season even if CBO completely stopped then.

CBO was a consequence of Germany being fully engaged in Soviet Union
with Allies reluctant to risk their ground troops until they became
sure in the victory. If it weren't for collapse of France in 1940, I
doubt British would choose to build Bomber Command on the expense of
increased BEF.


>They did? And what were they? The PIAT?

They had antitank guns too. Not too many, but on the other hand, II SS
Panzer corps didn't have that many tanks either.

>You are dreaming here--they faced those panzers, and they did NOT
>hold out "for a long time".

They were expected to hold for 48 hours. They held out for nine days
and their opponents weren't limited to II SS panzerkorps.

>Their AT capabilities were ABYSMAL. And you have again ignored the REAL problems with
>Market Garden--the poor and limited capacity axis of advnace given to XXX
>Corps, the lack of decent DZ's around Arnhem close enough to the targets,
>and that great unknown--the weather.

Allies had a capability to make two drops on the first day. They chose
not to exercise it. It was a mistake. If there were more troops at
Arnhem, Urquhart would have had enough troops to attack towards the
bridge and hold the DZs. With only one drop, he deemed capture of the
bridge more important and sent troops there hoping that XXX corps
would establish the land supply line.


Drax
remove NOSPAM for reply

[Kevin Brooks]

"Drazen Kramaric" > wrote in message
...
> On Sun, 18 Jan 2004 02:01:50 GMT, "Kevin Brooks"
> > wrote:
>
>
>
> >If we use a SWAG of eight men per heavy gun and four per lighter gun, and
> >maybe four per searchlight, that gives you some 125,000 personnel *just
in
> >the weapons crews themselves*. Even if you assume that the Flak units
> >required less service support committment than frontline combat units
(where
> >the teeth-to-tail ratio was probably in the five or six-to-one range at
> >best) and assumed a one-to-one ratio, you are talking another 125K
personnel
> >right there. That is already 250K personnel tied up in the defense effort
> >without even starting to consider the Luftwaffe flying assets. I'd be
very
> >surprised if the total number of German personnel tied to the defense
effort
> >against the CBO was not well in excess of 500K personnel...at a time when
> >Wehrmacht units were furiously disbanding some units in a vain effort to
> >keep others in a fill-status that *remotely* resembled their TO&E
> >requirements.
>
> The real question is where would the personelly otherwise tied up in
> the AA defense be more useful to the German war effort. Most of the
> crews were not fit to serve in the front line units either because
> they were in the wrong age or sex group. Some of them weren't even
> Germans.

Heck, a significant number of the "front line" Wehrmacht troops in 1944 were
either not Germans or over/underage. The simple fact is that those manpower
resources *were* tied up in the defense effort at a time when their services
were needed over a wide range of areas; the germans were not only lacking
combat infantry troops at this point. They actually had *reduced* the AA
protection afforded their front line units to beef up the AA force in the
Reich--if nothing else (and I strongly suspect this is the most minor of
contributions those folks could have made elsewhere) they could have brought
the forward AA assets back to a point where allied tactical airpower would
have been harder to employ.

>
> Against one eight man gun crew you'd have one ten man B-17 crew. Which
> crew costs its parent country more to sustain in the combat?

Not the issue. As you note below, the allies had the resources to risk some
waste--the Germans did not.

>
>
> >Which brings us to the second point--the allies could *afford* to
dedicate
> >personnel and resources to the CBO because we had an over-abundance of
> >manpower and equipment resources. We were challenged to support the scope
of
> >the force that we DID have fighting on the continent--tossing more
manpower
> >into the equation would just exacerbate the support constraints. OTOH,
the
> >Germans were already short manpower and equipment almost across the
> >board--keeping tank strength in their panzer units up to minimal levels
was
> >a nightmare, and they were lacking infantry and artillerymen as well.
Their
> >tactical air support efforts were seriously hampered by the need to
continue
> >the defense effort back home. So in the end the CBO, if it accomplished
> >nothing else, applied additional pressure to the German manning and
> >equipment shortfalls affecting their frontline units that would not have
> >been present had the CBO not occured.
>
> This point is valid, with some limits. Indeed, Allies could afford to
> send their best human material into strategic bombing. The question is
> whether this human material who flew and supported strategic bombing
> offensive could have been used more efficiently.

I fail to see how, given that the allied forces on the ground in France were
already straining a rather tenuous logistics chain. We had plenty of mediums
to handle the steikes at transportation nets, etc., closer to the FLOT, and
the limiting factor on CAS was more often the weather than it was any lack
of airframes for that mission. The heavies contributions to tying down, and
later eliminating for the most part, the Luftwaffe such that they were never
able to effectively support their own front line forces, and their
contribution to both the deeper transportation disruptions and the vital
petroleum resources available to those forward German forces, outweigh any
likely value to be obtained from "rerolling" them to another task.

>
> It shouldn't be forgotten that half of the bombs dropped by CBO on
> German controlled territory was dropped after September 1944 when
> German army and air force were thoroughly defeated and were unlikely
> to survive 1945 campaign season even if CBO completely stopped then.

It should also be remembered that had the CBO not been underway, the
Luftwaffe would have had a few thousand more aircraft and pilots available
to oppose the allied ground efforts on *both* fronts, meaning that by Sep
1944 the Luftwaffe would *not* have been "thoroughly defeated" (or lacking
seriously in petroleum products), and the ground picture might very well
have been somewhat different as well.

>
> CBO was a consequence of Germany being fully engaged in Soviet Union
> with Allies reluctant to risk their ground troops until they became
> sure in the victory.

Tell that to the million or more allied troops slogging their way up through
Italy from 1943 onwards. Yes, the CBO did provide a method of striking
Germany while the allies built up their capability to go ashore in France.
IMO, that is a *good* thing, as otherwise the Germans would have had free
reign to reorient their less-plentiful resources away from defending the
Reich to other more dangerous (to the allies) pursuits. Ever wonder what the
impact would have been had the Wehrmacht *just* gained a couple of thousand
more 88mm dual-use guns on each front, guns that instead were dedicated to
that defense against the CBO? How much more effective German defensive
efforts on the ground would have been had they not been short of fuel? What
the effect of a a couple of thousand more German aircraft flying in support
of those German troops would have been?

If it weren't for collapse of France in 1940, I
> doubt British would choose to build Bomber Command on the expense of
> increased BEF.

The UK had already committed themselves to build a Bomber Command before the
fall of France. In fact, BC had existed before the war even began (founded
in 1937), and the specs for the first modern RAF four-engined bomber were
released in 1936, resulting in the Stirling. I find it hard to believe you
never heard of the pre-war slogan, "The bomber will always get through."

>
>
> >They did? And what were they? The PIAT?
>
> They had antitank guns too. Not too many, but on the other hand, II SS
> Panzer corps didn't have that many tanks either.

They had a few 6-pounders. But not enough. Nor was their ammo supply that
good. The plain fact of the matter is that airborne troops are not intended
to face significant armored threats (and that has not changed much since
then).

>
> >You are dreaming here--they faced those panzers, and they did NOT
> >hold out "for a long time".
>
> They were expected to hold for 48 hours. They held out for nine days
> and their opponents weren't limited to II SS panzerkorps.

They did not, and indeed could not (not in any way due to any lack of
courage or ingenuity on the part of those poor guys stuck in Arnhem, either)
hold out long enough. Montgomery's plan was fatally flawed from the
outset--it was too ambitious, it did not properly take into account the
effect of the terrain, and it failed to accurately template the enemy force
(despite concrete indications of the presense of that armored corps). It was
born more out of Montgomery's desire to regain the spotlight and acheive a
higher priority for his own force compared to the US elements to his south
than out of solid military planning; exacerbated by the significant pressure
towards using the First Allied Airborne Army in a major way (even George C.
Marshall was apparently urging their use in *some* kind of offensive
thrust). Eliminating the CBO would not have changed any of those facts.

>
> >Their AT capabilities were ABYSMAL. And you have again ignored the REAL
problems with
> >Market Garden--the poor and limited capacity axis of advnace given to XXX
> >Corps, the lack of decent DZ's around Arnhem close enough to the targets,
> >and that great unknown--the weather.
>
> Allies had a capability to make two drops on the first day. They chose
> not to exercise it. It was a mistake. If there were more troops at
> Arnhem, Urquhart would have had enough troops to attack towards the
> bridge and hold the DZs. With only one drop, he deemed capture of the
> bridge more important and sent troops there hoping that XXX corps
> would establish the land supply line.

If the allies already had this capability, why would the elimination of the
CBO have changed the situation? And I differ with you as to holding the
DZ's; they were located in tank country and would have been rolled up rather
quickly, IMO (definitely more quickly than the effort to root out the paras
in the city proper).


Brooks
>
>
> Drax
> remove NOSPAM for reply

[Drazen Kramaric]

On Wed, 21 Jan 2004 16:01:50 GMT, "Kevin Brooks"
> wrote:


>Heck, a significant number of the "front line" Wehrmacht troops in 1944 were
>either not Germans or over/underage.

There were no 16 year olds in Wehrmach in 1944, but they did serve in
the AA units. Girls too were not considered for the front line duties.

>The simple fact is that those manpower resources *were* tied up in the defense
>effort at a time when their services were needed over a wide range of areas

There is nothing simple in this "fact". High school students who
otherwise would do their homeworks or sleep served in the AA units.
Girls who otherwise would stay at home served in German version of
WAAC. The increasing mass of forced and slave labour replaced German
workforce which in turn went to the front.

>the germans were not only lacking combat infantry troops at this point. They actually
>had *reduced* the AA protection afforded their front line units to beef up the AA force in the
>Reich

How many divisions lost their organic AA to supplement the air defense
of the Reich?


>Not the issue. As you note below, the allies had the resources to risk some
>waste--the Germans did not.

I am pointing it out that Germans used many resources in AAA that
otherwise wouldn't have been used in the war effort.


>I fail to see how, given that the allied forces on the ground in France were
>already straining a rather tenuous logistics chain. We had plenty of mediums
>to handle the steikes at transportation nets, etc., closer to the FLOT, and
>the limiting factor on CAS was more often the weather than it was any lack
>of airframes for that mission.

The size of the Allied tactical air forces was getting bigger as the
war went on. So, if instead of heavies, Allies concentrated on light
and medium bombers they could have had more tactical aircraft
available for the given logistical capabilities in UK and
Mediterranean.

>The heavies contributions to tying down, and
>later eliminating for the most part, the Luftwaffe such that they were never
>able to effectively support their own front line forces, and their
>contribution to both the deeper transportation disruptions and the vital
>petroleum resources available to those forward German forces, outweigh any
>likely value to be obtained from "rerolling" them to another task.

What is the difference between shooting down Luftwaffe near the front
and above Germany? If the whole point of the war is to park your tanks
on the enemy airfield (the ultimate air defense), isn't it logical to
concentrate on the support for the army? Unlike Russia, there was no
large strategic depth for Wehrmach to use in the defense of Ruhr. Once
Allies were in France, Wehrmacht (inluding Luftwaffe) had to fight and
win to prevent the invasion of Germany, i.e. Luftwaffe has to come up
and fight.


>It should also be remembered that had the CBO not been underway, the
>Luftwaffe would have had a few thousand more aircraft and pilots available
>to oppose the allied ground efforts on *both* fronts, meaning that by Sep
>1944 the Luftwaffe would *not* have been "thoroughly defeated" (or lacking
>seriously in petroleum products), and the ground picture might very well
>have been somewhat different as well.

The history of air war in the Mediterraean gives a clear picture of
the capabilities of Luftwaffe to interfere with Allied operations
performed under the fighter umbrella. Whereever Luftwaffe rose to
fight it was defeated with heavy losses. Without significant CBO,
German planes were going to be shot down by Allied and Soviet fighters
just as well.


>Tell that to the million or more allied troops slogging their way up through
>Italy from 1943 onwards.

The number of Allied and German troops deployed against each other in
1943 was miniscule in comparison to Eastern front.

>Yes, the CBO did provide a method of striking Germany while the allies built up
>their capability to go ashore in France.
>IMO, that is a *good* thing, as otherwise the Germans would have had free
>reign to reorient their less-plentiful resources away from defending the
>Reich to other more dangerous (to the allies) pursuits. Ever wonder what the
>impact would have been had the Wehrmacht *just* gained a couple of thousand
>more 88mm dual-use guns on each front, guns that instead were dedicated to
>that defense against the CBO?

First, they would have to train real soldiers to man them, second,
they would have to create a logistical base to support them, third,
they were going to face the increased number of tactical air that was
built instead of heavies.

>How much more effective German defensive efforts on the ground would have been
>had they not been short of fuel?

As long as Germans held Ploesti there was little air forces were going
to do about it. Only when Soviets overran the place, Germans felt the
real shortages. Anyway, Allies invasion of Normandy did not succeed
because of any shortage of oil and once Allies established themselves
in France, Germany was incapable of manning two fronts.

> What the effect of a a couple of thousand more German aircraft flying in support
>of those German troops would have been?

None. They would have been shot down by the proportionally stronger
Allied air forces.


>The UK had already committed themselves to build a Bomber Command before the
>fall of France. In fact, BC had existed before the war even began (founded
>in 1937), and the specs for the first modern RAF four-engined bomber were
>released in 1936, resulting in the Stirling. I find it hard to believe you
>never heard of the pre-war slogan, "The bomber will always get through."

I heard it. Fortunately, there was a man in RAF who didn't believe it,
Hugh Dowding.

Anyway, in 1940 RAF did not posses the means for the substantial
strategic bombing campaign against Germany. So, the force that
eventually burnt Hamburg to the ground did not exist prior to the fall
of France.

In the case of fortunate event of France holding against German
onslaught, I'd expect for British to expand the BEF and its tactical
component, rather than leave the ground fighting to French alone and
proceed with the building a historical sized Bomber Command. In 1940,
there was no Eastern front and France itself was incapable of waging
an offensive ground war against Germany. No ammount of 1940 bombers
was going to compensate for the disadvantage at the front.

It was the lack of ground front that left British with no valid
alternative than pursuing strategic bombing on the large scale.



>They did not, and indeed could not (not in any way due to any lack of
>courage or ingenuity on the part of those poor guys stuck in Arnhem, either)
>hold out long enough. Montgomery's plan was fatally flawed from the
>outset--it was too ambitious, it did not properly take into account the
>effect of the terrain, and it failed to accurately template the enemy force
>(despite concrete indications of the presense of that armored corps). It was
>born more out of Montgomery's desire to regain the spotlight and acheive a
>higher priority for his own force compared to the US elements to his south
>than out of solid military planning; exacerbated by the significant pressure
>towards using the First Allied Airborne Army in a major way (even George C.
>Marshall was apparently urging their use in *some* kind of offensive
>thrust). Eliminating the CBO would not have changed any of those facts.

Montgomery was hardly the only one to blame for the failure of
Market-Garden. His plan was approved by Eisenhower and the alternative
plans offered no substantial advantage over the Market Garden.

The presence of _remnants_ of II SS Panzerkorps was not the fatal drop
that killed the Market Garden. The bulk of troops that slowed down
British 2nd army (don't forget that M-G wasn't a XXX corps operation
only) came from German 15th and 1st Parachute armies, not from the SS.

The "division" that fought British at Arnhem was division in name
only, its strength was closer to the regimental "kampfgruppe"
commanded by highest ranking officer in the division, Lt. Colonel.
Harzer. King Tigers that eventually reached the battlefield came from
Germany.



>If the allies already had this capability, why would the elimination of the
>CBO have changed the situation? And I differ with you as to holding the
>DZ's; they were located in tank country and would have been rolled up rather
>quickly, IMO (definitely more quickly than the effort to root out the paras
>in the city proper).

I don't even know who originally tied M-G with CBO, but it wasn't my.
I only replied to specific issues tied to the M-G.

As far as I know, the original plan included the capture of nearby
airfield to enable British 51st airlanding division to take part in
the combat. The dual task presented to the 1st Airborne division
(taking the bridge and securing the DZ) made Urquhart replacement
dividing the forces which in turn were too weak to accomplish any of
the missions.


Drax
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