How 'bout a thread on the F-22 with no mud slinging, no axe grinding, no emotional diatribes, and just some clear, objective discussion? [Archive]

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Scott Ferrin

January 6th 04, 12:00 AM

The things I'd be most interested in are:

1. Was the YF-22/YF-23 a fair flyoff or was it a case of Northop
designing what the air force asked for and Lockheed giving them what
they really wanted? How much of the decision was based on the
capabilities of the aircraft and how much on the track record of the
companies involved?

2. Is there anything unheard of popping up in the F-22's flight
testing that hasn't happened in other programs? IIRC the F-15
experienced delamination on the horizontal stabilizers. They also
clipped the wingtips and added the dogtooth to the horizontal stab.
The F-18 had to have those small strakes added to the top of the LERX.
The F-100 experienced roll reversal. The F-102 wouldn't go fast
enough without a substantial redesign. So is there anything
extraodinarily unusual about the kinks they're working out on the F-22
or is a mountain being made of a mole hill?

3. Was it really necessairy to add that "A" in? Has it really fooled
any politicians?

4. Is there any rational reason for the air force to push forward
with the F-22 if it *is* having significant problems?

5. Is there a way to cram two AIM-9Xs in the space taken by one -9M?

That's about all I can think of at the moment. Any takers?

Ed Rasimus

January 6th 04, 12:47 AM

On Tue, 06 Jan 2004 00:00:52 GMT, Scott Ferrin >
wrote:

>The things I'd be most interested in are:
>
>1. Was the YF-22/YF-23 a fair flyoff or was it a case of Northop
>designing what the air force asked for and Lockheed giving them what
>they really wanted? How much of the decision was based on the
>capabilities of the aircraft and how much on the track record of the
>companies involved?

There's been a lot of air down the intakes since I was closely
involved, but from my seat I would say the flyoff was fair. The two
companies took different approaches to the RFP. Lockheed's was
arguably less risky. They chose to breadboard the avionics while
Northrop opted to fly prototypes. Northrop was stealthier while
Lockheed was more agile. Lockheed had "stealth fighter" production
experience with F-117 while Northrop was doing a wide range of "cats
and dogs" including Tacit Rainbow, Peacekeeper gyros, B-747 fuselage
sections, and smarting from failures with A-9, F-20 etc.

Conversely, Northrop was partnered with MacAir who had a good
management record and production reputation for F-4, F-15 and F-18.
Lockheed was linked with Boeing and GD.

Northrop opted for difficult to manufacture curving surfaces while
Lockheed went more for the polygon shape of the F-117 (they've
smoothed the shape considerably over time).
>
>2. Is there anything unheard of popping up in the F-22's flight
>testing that hasn't happened in other programs?

When you push technology you always get "new" things happening. There
will probably be more glitches in software, man-machine interface and
weapons suite than airframe flying problems.

>The F-100 experienced roll reversal.

Actually it was adverse yaw and departure from controlled flight.
"Roll reversal" is too benign a term. It really wasn't a redesign
solution so much as a training to fly that particular airplane that
made the problem go away.

> The F-102 wouldn't go fast
>enough without a substantial redesign.

Not enough engine on the 102 and not yet understanding "area rule",
hence the F-106 that took care of both issues.

> So is there anything
>extraodinarily unusual about the kinks they're working out on the F-22
>or is a mountain being made of a mole hill?

Say PAH-LAH-TICKZ. There are those that support and those that oppose.
Most of the mountains of one side are molehills for the other.
>
>3. Was it really necessairy to add that "A" in? Has it really fooled
>any politicians?

It has become customary to somehow nod to the attack function. Not
necessary. Someone is made happy by the nomenclature. Who cares?
>
>4. Is there any rational reason for the air force to push forward
>with the F-22 if it *is* having significant problems?

Yes, there is the rational reason that you've already got fifteen
years development expended, you've got an obsolescent Eagle flight and
no replacement on the horizon, and there is no problem of such
significance that would justify scrapping the program.

You may have noted that in Iraqi Freedom we lost one fixed aircraft
for 16,000 sorties. In Desert Storm we lost one fixed wing for every
3500 sorties. In SEA, we lost one F-105 every 65 sorties. I kind of
favor the investment in technology over spending the blood and
gristle.

>5. Is there a way to cram two AIM-9Xs in the space taken by one -9M?

Probably. Or maybe something else.

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

Tarver Engineering

January 6th 04, 01:40 AM

"Ed Rasimus" > wrote in message
...

> Conversely, Northrop was partnered with MacAir who had a good
> management record and production reputation for F-4, F-15 and F-18.
> Lockheed was linked with Boeing and GD.

Northrop's B-2 managment had shot themselves in the foot comming back from
lunch drunk. That caused a bias against Northrop's managment by the
government.

There was also a critical issue with the pilots liking the displays, as Lt
Col Couch had rejected the B-2's display system on first flight. The pilots
liked the YF-22 displays best.

Additionally, the YF-23 program resisted the DARPA subsidy for using Ada in
critical systems, while Lockheed pledged compliance. Lockmart had also been
more co-operative in delivering a prototype of what the contract asked for,
while Northrop tried to deliver what the government wanted now.

So, in the three politically sensitive issues for the selection, the YF-22
held the best hand.

Scott Ferrin

January 6th 04, 03:07 AM

EB Jet

January 6th 04, 05:45 AM

Actually Scott,the nacelles on the production F-23 would have been a bit
*smaller* and rounded at the top versus squared off like the prototypes,which
as you pointed out,still had the extra space for the defunct reversers.They
also would have been a bit closer together.The intakes would have been
different as well.No decision had been made AFAIK regarding the second weapons
bay,but I do know there was a plan to put the AIM-9's on rails on the inside of
the bay doors(it was a pretty wide bay) and using a rotary launcher for the
AIM-120's..The two bay arrangement used a trapeze style launch rack..Despite
your plea for no axe grinding,I predict that it will manifest itself,and I'll
keep my own biased opinions to myself :-) I'd say Ed's reply sums it up pretty
well though(as usual).Happy New Year..

Scott Ferrin

January 6th 04, 07:39 AM

On 06 Jan 2004 05:45:05 GMT, (EB Jet) wrote:

>Actually Scott,the nacelles on the production F-23 would have been a bit
>*smaller*

That's what I said :-)

>and rounded at the top versus squared off like the prototypes,which
>as you pointed out,still had the extra space for the defunct reversers.They
>also would have been a bit closer together.The intakes would have been
>different as well.No decision had been made AFAIK regarding the second weapons
>bay,but I do know there was a plan to put the AIM-9's on rails on the inside of
>the bay doors(it was a pretty wide bay) and using a rotary launcher for the
>AIM-120's..The two bay arrangement used a trapeze style launch rack..Despite
>your plea for no axe grinding,I predict that it will manifest itself,and I'll
>keep my own biased opinions to myself :-) I'd say Ed's reply sums it up pretty
>well though(as usual).Happy New Year..

Ed Rasimus

January 6th 04, 03:29 PM

On Mon, 5 Jan 2004 17:40:37 -0800, "Tarver Engineering"
> wrote:

>
>"Ed Rasimus" > wrote in message
...
>
>> Conversely, Northrop was partnered with MacAir who had a good
>> management record and production reputation for F-4, F-15 and F-18.
>> Lockheed was linked with Boeing and GD.
>
>Northrop's B-2 managment had shot themselves in the foot comming back from
>lunch drunk. That caused a bias against Northrop's managment by the
>government.

B-2 was released into production in 1988. It was built, designed, and
managed at Pico Rivera in what was logically named the "B-2 Division".
The ATF/YF-23 program was run from the Aircraft Division in Hawthorne.
Two distinctly different places. ATF fly-off decision came in 1990, so
it doesn't track that several thousand people at Pico Rivera would
have been caught drunk several years before program decision on a
different aircraft built at a different plant by a different division
of the company. We might also note that the B-2 co-production company
was the F-22 partner of Lockheed.

I will agree, however, that Northrop management was not the most
competent. During Spring of '88, the chairman of MacAir came to
Hawthorne and held a "come to Jesus" meeting in which he expressed his
displeasure at Northrop senior management. At that time, the decision
was made to move avionics development to St. Louis.
>
>There was also a critical issue with the pilots liking the displays, as Lt
>Col Couch had rejected the B-2's display system on first flight. The pilots
>liked the YF-22 displays best.

Fusion of data and presentation was a critical design issue. It
wouldn't surprise me in the slightest if there were customer issues
with the two company proposals. But, that would have been primarily
software driven at the time of contract award.
>
>Additionally, the YF-23 program resisted the DARPA subsidy for using Ada in
>critical systems, while Lockheed pledged compliance. Lockmart had also been
>more co-operative in delivering a prototype of what the contract asked for,
>while Northrop tried to deliver what the government wanted now.

Can't agree with that. In late '80s/early '90s the mandate was Ada.
Northrop had no choice and was certainly compliant. The RFP set
requirements and each competitor interpreted how best to meet them.
>
>So, in the three politically sensitive issues for the selection, the YF-22
>held the best hand.

You've mentioned program management, cockpit displays and language for
software. I don't think any of those could be called "politically
sensitive" issues. The major political sensitivity would be production
location and at the time of contract award, which was pre-merger for
both contenders, the apparent production would take place in the LA
area.

Cost overruns by Northrop on B-2 as well as some scandal on parts
ordering on missile guidance systems for the Electronics Division
certainly muddied the political waters and may have cost Northrop some
points.

>

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

Smartace11

January 6th 04, 06:04 PM

>B-2 was released into production in 1988. It was built, designed, and
>managed at Pico Rivera in what was logically named the "B-2 Division".

Very minor point. The B-2 was managed at Pico but manufactured at Palmdale in
the high desert save for some component parts. Eventually the entire B-2
program moved to USAF Plant 42 at Palmdale.

>The ATF/YF-23 program was run from the Aircraft Division in Hawthorne.
>Two distinctly different places. ATF fly-off decision came in 1990, so
>it doesn't track that several thousand people at Pico Rivera would
>have been caught drunk several years before program decision on a
>different aircraft built at a different plant by a different division
>of the company.

I am sounding like a "Me too" here but the B-2 program had a lot of issues
dealing with both the El Segundo and Hawthorne operations. They almost
operated like several different companies in total competition with one
another.

We might also note that the B-2 co-production company
>was the F-22 partner of Lockheed.

Help me here. Boeing was a majo rmanufacturing partner of the B-2. I don't
remember muchif any involvement from Lockheed in the B-2 program even though
they were across the runway from Northrop at Palmdale.

>
>You've mentioned program management, cockpit displays and language for
>software. I don't think any of those could be called "politically
>sensitive" issues. The major political sensitivity would be production
>location and at the time of contract award, which was pre-merger for
>both contenders, the apparent production would take place in the LA
>area.
>

Full use of Ada was a source selection criteria at one time.

Final selection when the findings of the source selection board reach the
decison makers often gets influenced by political imperative and past
peformance.

>Cost overruns by Northrop on B-2 as well as some scandal on parts
>ordering on missile guidance systems for the Electronics Division
>certainly muddied the political waters and may have cost Northrop some
>points.
>
>
>>
>
>Ed Rasimus
>Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
>"When Thunder Rolled"
>Smithsonian Institution Press
>ISBN #1-58834-103-8
>

Steve

Ed Rasimus

January 6th 04, 06:37 PM

On 06 Jan 2004 18:04:10 GMT, (Smartace11) wrote:

>
>>The ATF/YF-23 program was run from the Aircraft Division in Hawthorne.
>>Two distinctly different places. ATF fly-off decision came in 1990, so
>>it doesn't track that several thousand people at Pico Rivera would
>>have been caught drunk several years before program decision on a
>>different aircraft built at a different plant by a different division
>>of the company.
>
>I am sounding like a "Me too" here but the B-2 program had a lot of issues
>dealing with both the El Segundo and Hawthorne operations. They almost
>operated like several different companies in total competition with one
>another.

Absolutely. I remember when trying to write initial concepts for how
to train ops and maintenance for a stealthy aircraft, I suggested that
since we couldn't very well ask Lockheed how they kept the lid on
their F-117 program training we might go cross-town and get a program
shell from Pico. The stunned looks that I might even consider the
division as part of the same company really set me back. Big walls
exist(ed) between divisions and there was no cross-talk or
cooperation.
>
>
>We might also note that the B-2 co-production company
>>was the F-22 partner of Lockheed.
>
>Help me here. Boeing was a majo rmanufacturing partner of the B-2. I don't
>remember muchif any involvement from Lockheed in the B-2 program even though
>they were across the runway from Northrop at Palmdale.

That's what I said. Boeing was a co- on B-2 and a partner with
Lockheed on F-22. Gosh, you think maybe some secrets leak across
programs?....nah, never happen. I wasn't implying that Lockheed was a
partner in B-2.

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

Scott Ferrin

January 6th 04, 07:21 PM

>Cost overruns by Northrop on B-2 as well as some scandal on parts
>ordering on missile guidance systems for the Electronics Division
>certainly muddied the political waters and may have cost Northrop some
>points.

Would that be on the Peasekeeper's guidance system? ISTR hearing
about that back then.

>
>
>>
>
>Ed Rasimus
>Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
>"When Thunder Rolled"
>Smithsonian Institution Press
>ISBN #1-58834-103-8

Smartace11

January 6th 04, 09:05 PM

>
>That's what I said. Boeing was a co- on B-2 and a partner with
>Lockheed on F-22. Gosh, you think maybe some secrets leak across
>programs?....nah, never happen. I wasn't implying that Lockheed was a
>partner in B-2.

Sorry Ed. I misread and your statement went right past me.

Gee, if you had come to me first I could have picked up the phone and called my
buddies next door in the F-117 program at Wright-Patt :>).

Speaking of sharing stealth data, DoD has has a $3 Billon lawsuit against it
for 6 years or so from GD/McAir, cum Boeing, over the cancellation of the Navy
A-12 program by Cheney,the then SecDef. Their claim is that the program was
terminated at the convenience of the government and that the reason for the
cost/schedule overruns was that the government chose not to share stealth
secrets across F-117 and B-2 programs with A-12 developers contrary to
contractural arrangements. Also that the program was cancelled by Cheney who
was not a warranted contracting officer. The government's position was that it
was cancelled for cause, ie, GD/McAir were concealing the delays and not
performing.

The incident was triggered by a phoney show and tell to Cheney at GD. He had
told the USN program director that he wanted to see proof of program progress
after warning the contractor and USN several times to get their act together .
So they set up a hangar with some A-12 looking parts from their scrap pile and
had some people look like they were fabricating and assembling them to "show"
Cheney.. Cheney learned of the scam and cancelled the program.

The USN program manager retired and fled to England to avoid prosecution.

At least from the AF side there was no issue we were aware of preventing us
from sharing stealth information with the A-12. The decision and subsequent
appeals have gone on for years and at this point Boeing is the loser but as
usual it is on appeal. The case required that the F-117 and B-2 programs
catalog and store over a million pages of classified information. I guess the
makers of the suit hoped to prove there was information that the A-12 program
needed but to my knowledge, none has ever been discovered. Instead, the
complaint and appeals are now based more on "alleged" procedural errors than
anything else.

Wonder how much this plays in Washington in theBoeing KC-767 miniseries drama
still unfolding.

Ed Rasimus

January 6th 04, 11:28 PM

On Tue, 06 Jan 2004 19:21:38 GMT, Scott Ferrin >
wrote:

>
>>Cost overruns by Northrop on B-2 as well as some scandal on parts
>>ordering on missile guidance systems for the Electronics Division
>>certainly muddied the political waters and may have cost Northrop some
>>points.
>
>Would that be on the Peasekeeper's guidance system? ISTR hearing
>about that back then.

Yep. The supply system was incredibly convoluted. For example, I had
one of two Mac II computers in the training section. I wanted some
off-the-shelf software (arcane stuff like MS Word). It took a purchase
order that required NINE signatures and more than six weeks.

Over in Electronics Div. they were up against production deadlines.
Some creative problem solver garnered petty cash and went open market
to buy the necessary materials. Production deliveries on time. When
the supply system deliveries came six weeks later, the excess material
got back-doored to the dumpster. Result was an investigation for
misuse of government....blah...blah...blah.

Had to swear to always use the most inefficient methods under penalty
of law for all future deliveries.

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

F-117A Webmaster

January 7th 04, 12:24 AM

As I understand it, the Lockheed proposal that won couldn't fly!
So yeah... I guess they did need a "redesign".

Kevin
F-117A: The Black Jet Website
www.f-117a.com

Scott Ferrin > wrote in message >...
> Also Lockeed did an extensive redesign
> between selection and prototype flight whereas Northrop didn't take
> advantage of the opportunity.

Thomas Schoene

January 7th 04, 12:30 AM

F-117A Webmaster wrote:
> As I understand it, the Lockheed proposal that won couldn't fly!
> So yeah... I guess they did need a "redesign".

The two YF-22 prototypes made over 110 test flights (more than 70 before
contract award). I have no idea how you could square that with the claim
that the design "couldn't fly."

--
Tom Schoene Replace "invalid" with "net" to e-mail
"If brave men and women never died, there would be nothing
special about bravery." -- Andy Rooney (attributed)

Chad Irby

January 7th 04, 01:01 AM

Ed Rasimus > wrote:

> Over in Electronics Div. they were up against production deadlines.
> Some creative problem solver garnered petty cash and went open market
> to buy the necessary materials. Production deliveries on time. When
> the supply system deliveries came six weeks later, the excess material
> got back-doored to the dumpster. Result was an investigation for
> misuse of government....blah...blah...blah.
>
> Had to swear to always use the most inefficient methods under penalty
> of law for all future deliveries.

Ah, government supply chain...

Back in the early 1980s, I was working the flight line on F-4Es. We had
a nice little supply room, with all of the little hardware you'd
normally need. One of the pieces was a small rivet. Little bitty
aluminum rivets, less than 1/4" wide and maybe 3/8" long. I needed a
few one day, and got the chance to open a new bag (they were about 1000
per bag).

Those little rivets were about a buck each, according to the price
listed on the inventory sheet on the bag. Just under $1000 per bag of
1000 rivets, delivered to the base through the USAF supply chain.

That seemed like, well, a *lot*, so I checked up on it. In town, in a
hardware store, you could buy the same rivets (same manufacturer, same
serial number on the bag, same everything) for about $10 per bag of 1000.

I called the manufacturer. The difference, I was told, was because the
company had several full time employees who did nothing at all but
monitor their military sales (they were a sole-source supplier for that
bit, and didn't sell much else to the government). They were very
unhappy about it, too, since they would rather have just sold the things
for a decent price.

Some months later, I noticed the price on the bags in the bin had gone
down to only $50 or so per bag... I wonder who got the bonus for "cost
cutting" on that one?

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

Tarver Engineering

January 7th 04, 02:37 AM

"Ed Rasimus" > wrote in message
...
> On Mon, 5 Jan 2004 17:40:37 -0800, "Tarver Engineering"
> > wrote:
>
> >
> >"Ed Rasimus" > wrote in message
> ...
> >
> >> Conversely, Northrop was partnered with MacAir who had a good
> >> management record and production reputation for F-4, F-15 and F-18.
> >> Lockheed was linked with Boeing and GD.
> >
> >Northrop's B-2 managment had shot themselves in the foot comming back
from
> >lunch drunk. That caused a bias against Northrop's managment by the
> >government.
>
> B-2 was released into production in 1988. It was built, designed, and
> managed at Pico Rivera in what was logically named the "B-2 Division".
> The ATF/YF-23 program was run from the Aircraft Division in Hawthorne.
> Two distinctly different places. ATF fly-off decision came in 1990, so
> it doesn't track that several thousand people at Pico Rivera would
> have been caught drunk several years before program decision on a
> different aircraft built at a different plant by a different division
> of the company. We might also note that the B-2 co-production company
> was the F-22 partner of Lockheed.

I am writng about Palmdale, but I suppose you can make up a different story,
if it makes you feel better, Ed.

> I will agree, however, that Northrop management was not the most
> competent. During Spring of '88, the chairman of MacAir came to
> Hawthorne and held a "come to Jesus" meeting in which he expressed his
> displeasure at Northrop senior management. At that time, the decision
> was made to move avionics development to St. Louis.

Yes, Lt Col Couch was very unimpressed with the five tube airliner EFIS
Northrop had bought from Hughes. After first flight he hald a debrief for
reserve officers and discussed the issue with me afterwatrds. Basicly, if
you list one operator, the mission was over.

> >There was also a critical issue with the pilots liking the displays, as
Lt
> >Col Couch had rejected the B-2's display system on first flight. The
pilots
> >liked the YF-22 displays best.
>
> Fusion of data and presentation was a critical design issue. It
> wouldn't surprise me in the slightest if there were customer issues
> with the two company proposals. But, that would have been primarily
> software driven at the time of contract award.

The issue was one of emotion and what pilots "liked" not the quality of the
fusion, as what Lockheed demonstrated was a fused navigation system, tabbed
to commercial aircraft. (FMS) So far, there has been no successful
demonstration of a working fused weapon's sensor system, that I know of.

> >Additionally, the YF-23 program resisted the DARPA subsidy for using Ada
in
> >critical systems, while Lockheed pledged compliance. Lockmart had also
been
> >more co-operative in delivering a prototype of what the contract asked
for,
> >while Northrop tried to deliver what the government wanted now.
>
> Can't agree with that. In late '80s/early '90s the mandate was Ada.
> Northrop had no choice and was certainly compliant. The RFP set
> requirements and each competitor interpreted how best to meet them.

Lockheed followed the letter of the RFP and Northrop ignored it. Nearly
identical to the YF-17, where Northrop delivered a conventional aircraft, in
place of the FBW required.

> >So, in the three politically sensitive issues for the selection, the
YF-22
> >held the best hand.
>
> You've mentioned program management, cockpit displays and language for
> software. I don't think any of those could be called "politically
> sensitive" issues. The major political sensitivity would be production
> location and at the time of contract award, which was pre-merger for
> both contenders, the apparent production would take place in the LA
> area.

Sure. :)

And Newt was never Speaker ...

> Cost overruns by Northrop on B-2 as well as some scandal on parts
> ordering on missile guidance systems for the Electronics Division
> certainly muddied the political waters and may have cost Northrop some
> points.

The missile guidence systems issues had to do with falsified enviromental
test data. A case of Northrop being caught lying. We had an individual at
Dryden who falsified flight test results from the X-29 and he spent the last
15 years of his career blackballed by the system, so I have seen how
displeased the USAF can be with a cheat.

EB Jet

January 7th 04, 03:01 AM

<That's what I said :-)>

OOPS...Sorry.I guess if I read your post CAREFULLY I'd not have thought you
meant it the other way around!

Tarver Engineering

January 7th 04, 03:58 AM

"Chad Irby" > wrote in message
. com...
> Ed Rasimus > wrote:
>
> > Over in Electronics Div. they were up against production deadlines.
> > Some creative problem solver garnered petty cash and went open market
> > to buy the necessary materials. Production deliveries on time. When
> > the supply system deliveries came six weeks later, the excess material
> > got back-doored to the dumpster. Result was an investigation for
> > misuse of government....blah...blah...blah.
> >
> > Had to swear to always use the most inefficient methods under penalty
> > of law for all future deliveries.
>
> Ah, government supply chain...

Nope, Northrop got caught delivering non-compliant guidance systems with
falsified records.

Scott Ferrin

January 7th 04, 06:27 AM

On Wed, 07 Jan 2004 00:30:46 GMT, "Thomas Schoene"
> wrote:

>F-117A Webmaster wrote:
>> As I understand it, the Lockheed proposal that won couldn't fly!
>> So yeah... I guess they did need a "redesign".
>
>The two YF-22 prototypes made over 110 test flights (more than 70 before
>contract award). I have no idea how you could square that with the claim
>that the design "couldn't fly."

When the manufacturers submitted their designs for the ATF the order
chosen was:

1. Lockheed
2. Northrop
3. General Dynamics
4. Boeing
5. McDonnell Douglas
(Grumman and Rockewell were the next two but I don't know which
order.)

Anyway of those seven designs they chose 1 and 2 to build prototypes,
which would become the YF-22 and YF-23. The design *as presented* by
Lockheed at that time was the one that couldn't fly. After they
teamed with General Dynamics GD told them essentially "look, your
design won't even be able to fly". Needless to say THAT went over
real well with Lockheed but GD was right. If you look and the
original LM & GD designs and compare them with the YF-22, the YF-22
resembles the GD proposal almost as much as it does LM's. The
production F-22 is even more so.

John Keeney

January 7th 04, 09:17 AM

"Scott Ferrin" > wrote in message
...
> Anyway of those seven designs they chose 1 and 2 to build prototypes,
> which would become the YF-22 and YF-23. The design *as presented* by
> Lockheed at that time was the one that couldn't fly. After they
> teamed with General Dynamics GD told them essentially "look, your
> design won't even be able to fly". Needless to say THAT went over
> real well with Lockheed but GD was right. If you look and the
> original LM & GD designs and compare them with the YF-22, the YF-22
> resembles the GD proposal almost as much as it does LM's. The
> production F-22 is even more so.

Can you point me to sketches of the Lockheed proposal?
And what was General Dynamic's objection to its air-
worthiness?

Scott Ferrin

January 7th 04, 10:07 AM

On Wed, 7 Jan 2004 04:17:23 -0500, "John Keeney" >
wrote:

>
>"Scott Ferrin" > wrote in message
...
>> Anyway of those seven designs they chose 1 and 2 to build prototypes,
>> which would become the YF-22 and YF-23. The design *as presented* by
>> Lockheed at that time was the one that couldn't fly. After they
>> teamed with General Dynamics GD told them essentially "look, your
>> design won't even be able to fly". Needless to say THAT went over
>> real well with Lockheed but GD was right. If you look and the
>> original LM & GD designs and compare them with the YF-22, the YF-22
>> resembles the GD proposal almost as much as it does LM's. The
>> production F-22 is even more so.
>
>Can you point me to sketches of the Lockheed proposal?
>And what was General Dynamic's objection to its air-
>worthiness?
>

Right here

http://www.codeonemagazine.com/archives/1998/articles/apr_98/apra_98.html

Go down to the "Lockheed Design"

Then go down to the GD design. If you ignore the vertical tail, the
GD proposal and the final F/A-22 are remarkably similar.

GD's reasoning on the original Lockheed design was that it had so much
area on the LERXs that in order for it to be anywhere near stable it
would have to have an impractically large horizontal stab.

http://www.codeonemagazine.com/archives/1998/articles/oct_98/oct2a_98.html

"The transformation of 090P into Configuration 1132, what is better
known as the F-22 prototype or YF-22, involved some of the most
concentrated work in the history of aircraft design. The
transformation got off to a strained start as the team members sized
up their relative strengths and weaknesses and argued for and against
a variety of design features. "The period was intense," says Paul
Martin, Lockheed’s deputy chief engineer for technology and design
during the period. "We spent a lot of time convincing each other what
great he-men engineers we all were."

The posturing was fed by the sheer amount of material available to
scrutinize as all three companies placed their work on the table.
Every one of the designs proposed by the three teaming companies had
its share of problems and advantages. As the official starting point,
however, Lockheed’s design was open to the most scrutiny and
criticism.

"After studying the design of Configuration 090P," recalls Murff, "we
soon realized that the airplane would not fly. Its huge forward glove
made the design uncontrollable in the pitch axis. The internal
arrangement would not go together. The large rotary weapon bay pushed
engines and inlets outward, which produced an excessive amount of wave
drag. And the rear-retracting landing gear design was not suited for a
fighter."

"After the General Dynamics team had been out in Burbank for about two
weeks, they sent home a set of drawings of the winning design,"
remembers Kevin Renshaw, the configuration design lead for General
Dynamics. "The first task for the engineers in Fort Worth was to put
the aircraft drawings into the computer to provide a base for
analysis. The immature status of the Lockheed design became
immediately apparent. The plan view, profile view, and sections on the
drawings had only a rough relationship to each other. After analyzing
the design, it became obvious that the aerodynamic and weights data in
the proposal had been ‘goal’ levels with little actual relationship to
the drawings. The design turned out to be a series of unconnected
sections drawn around individual portions of the aircraft’s
subsystems. Lockheed had a concept for an aircraft, not a point
design. However, that approach won the competition.""

Smartace11

January 7th 04, 02:32 PM

>Back in the early 1980s, I was working the flight line on F-4Es. We had
>a nice little supply room, with all of the little hardware you'd
>normally need. One of the pieces was a small rivet. Little bitty
>aluminum rivets, less than 1/4" wide and maybe 3/8" long. I needed a
>few one day, and got the chance to open a new bag (they were about 1000
>per bag).
>
>Those little rivets were about a buck each, according to the price
>listed on the inventory sheet on the bag. Just under $1000 per bag of
>1000 rivets, delivered to the base through the USAF supply chain.
>
>That seemed like, well, a *lot*, so I checked up on it. In town, in a
>hardware store, you could buy the same rivets (same manufacturer, same
>serial number on the bag, same everything) for about $10 per bag of 1000.
>
>I called the manufacturer. The difference, I was told, was because the
>company had several full time employees who did nothing at all but
>monitor their military sales (they were a sole-source supplier for that
>bit, and didn't sell much else to the government). They were very
>unhappy about it, too, since they would rather have just sold the things
>for a decent price.
>
>Some months later, I noticed the price on the bags in the bin had gone
>down to only $50 or so per bag... I wonder who got the bonus for "cost
>cutting" on that one?
>

Look at it as a form of a full employment program. Jobs = happy people = votes
= happy politicians. Pay for a hokey job for someone or pay for their welfare
checks.

Actually, consider that fact the the "system"still supports a fleet of planes
worldwide and has done so for years relatively effectively, so it can't be all
bad.

Usually it is the exceptions and special orders that seem to get screwed up the
most.

Thomas Schoene

January 7th 04, 11:25 PM

Scott Ferrin wrote:
> On Wed, 07 Jan 2004 00:30:46 GMT, "Thomas Schoene"
> > wrote:
>
>> F-117A Webmaster wrote:
>>> As I understand it, the Lockheed proposal that won couldn't fly!
>>> So yeah... I guess they did need a "redesign".
>>
>> The two YF-22 prototypes made over 110 test flights (more than 70
>> before contract award). I have no idea how you could square that
>> with the claim that the design "couldn't fly."

[snip]

> Anyway of those seven designs they chose 1 and 2 to build prototypes,
> which would become the YF-22 and YF-23. The design
> *as presented* by Lockheed at that time was the one that couldn't fly.

OK, that makes more sense. It's certainly not the same as saying that the
plane that won the overall ATF competition could not fly, which is how the
orignal coment read to me.

(I am skeptical that the LM design literally woud not be able to fly. I'd
bet the phrase was first used in the idiomatic sense of "that won't be
acceptable.")
--
Tom Schoene Replace "invalid" with "net" to e-mail
"If brave men and women never died, there would be nothing
special about bravery." -- Andy Rooney (attributed)

Scott Ferrin

January 8th 04, 12:39 AM

On Wed, 07 Jan 2004 23:25:42 GMT, "Thomas Schoene"
> wrote:

>Scott Ferrin wrote:
>> On Wed, 07 Jan 2004 00:30:46 GMT, "Thomas Schoene"
>> > wrote:
>>
>>> F-117A Webmaster wrote:
>>>> As I understand it, the Lockheed proposal that won couldn't fly!
>>>> So yeah... I guess they did need a "redesign".
>>>
>>> The two YF-22 prototypes made over 110 test flights (more than 70
>>> before contract award). I have no idea how you could square that
>>> with the claim that the design "couldn't fly."
>
>[snip]
>
>> Anyway of those seven designs they chose 1 and 2 to build prototypes,
>> which would become the YF-22 and YF-23. The design
>> *as presented* by Lockheed at that time was the one that couldn't fly.
>
>OK, that makes more sense. It's certainly not the same as saying that the
>plane that won the overall ATF competition could not fly, which is how the
>orignal coment read to me.
>
>(I am skeptical that the LM design literally woud not be able to fly. I'd
>bet the phrase was first used in the idiomatic sense of "that won't be
>acceptable.")

Nah, it was literally "it won't fly". In another post I gave links to
the pertinent information.