AC-130 Replacement Contemplated

[sid]

After having been excoriated for saying that civil designs such as
those envisioned for the MC2A and ACS have no business over the
battlefield, this article gives me a bit of gratification:

USAF Plans Serious Look At Replacing Special Ops Aircraft
By Marc Selinger
February 6, 2004

The U.S. Air Force plans to start taking a serious look at potential
replacements for several C-130 variants used by its special operations
forces, a service representative said Feb. 5.

Maj. Gen. John Dorris said the Bush Administration's fiscal 2005
budget request, submitted to Congress Feb. 2, contains "seed money" to
develop concepts for an "MX" aircraft, which would replace the
MC-130E/H airdrop/transport aircraft, and an "AX" which would replace
the AC-130 gunship. The analysis could take about two years.

With surface-to-air threats becoming increasingly sophisticated, the
Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) believes it will need to
begin fielding the new aircraft in about 2015 as a replacement for its
aging Lockheed Martin C-130 variants, Dorris said. He spoke to
reporters after speaking at a special operations conference sponsored
by the National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA).

"After 2015, the ability of the C-130 as it's currently configured,
even with enhancements, is not going to be able to go into a lot of
the airspace that it needs to go into," he said.

The MX is envisioned as a long-range aircraft that is "able to do the
mission in one period of darkness," Dorris said. The latest thinking
for the AX is that it would be a "mothership that sends out sensors."
The sensors would then report back to the mothership, which would send
out "lethal and/or non-lethal projectiles," possibly small, guided
missiles.

A new aerial refueling capability will also be needed by AFSOC but
probably later than 2015, Dorris said.

To address AFSOC's tanker shortfall in the interim, about 27 MC-130H
Combat Talon IIs are being modified to be capable of refueling. That
work will be completed by about 2007. AFSOC's MC-130E Combat Talon Is
already can perform the tanker mission.

[Kevin Brooks]

"sid" > wrote in message
m...
> After having been excoriated for saying that civil designs such as
> those envisioned for the MC2A and ACS have no business over the
> battlefield, this article gives me a bit of gratification:

There is quite a gulf between the kind of "battlefield" (or more
specifically "battle environment") that the special operations aircraft have
to operate in and that which the E-10 will be expected to survive. So I am
not really sure what your point here is...?

Brooks

>
> USAF Plans Serious Look At Replacing Special Ops Aircraft
> By Marc Selinger
> February 6, 2004
>
<snip>

[Les Matheson]

Even though they say the C-130 isn't going to be capable, all the plans I've
seen for the AX and MX aircraft are based on a four engine turboprop design
that sure looks like a C-130J.
--
Les
F-4C(WW),D,E,G(WW)/AC-130A/MC-130E EWO (ret)

[Ragnar]

"sid" > wrote in message
m...
> USAF Plans Serious Look At Replacing Special Ops Aircraft

Yes! Finally, the AC-5 will get its day!

[Thomas Schoene]

Les Matheson wrote:
> Even though they say the C-130 isn't going to be capable, all the
> plans I've seen for the AX and MX aircraft are based on a four engine
> turboprop design that sure looks like a C-130J.



Boeing has mentioned a tilt-wing design they call the Advanced Theater
Transport (aka Super Frog) that sure sounds like it fits the MX mission
description. Doesn't look all that much like a C-130J.

http://www.boeing.com/phantom/att.html

I wasn't able to find anything on Lockheed's ideas (MX is a hard term to
search on, even with modifiers)
--
Tom Schoene Replace "invalid" with "net" to e-mail
"If brave men and women never died, there would be nothing
special about bravery." -- Andy Rooney (attributed)

[Bill McClain]

Boeing has mentioned a tilt-wing design they call the Advanced Theater
> Transport (aka Super Frog) that sure sounds like it fits the MX mission
> description. Doesn't look all that much like a C-130J.
>
> http://www.boeing.com/phantom/att.html

Hmm...no vert stab and rudder. Maybe the Navy will want some to
replace the C-2 Greyhound? If the wingspan isn't too great, they
might be able to put this on an aircraft carrier's deck elevator if
they have to strike it below; I think that was one of the issues with
using a C-130 for COD.

[John]

Bill McClain wrote:

> Boeing has mentioned a tilt-wing design they call the Advanced Theater
> > Transport (aka Super Frog) that sure sounds like it fits the MX mission
> > description. Doesn't look all that much like a C-130J.
> >
> > http://www.boeing.com/phantom/att.html
>
> Hmm...no vert stab and rudder.

is it just me, or does the ATT bear a strong resemblance to the
German Me 323 Gigant ?

[Andreas Parsch]

John wrote:
> is it just me, or does the ATT bear a strong resemblance to the
> German Me 323 Gigant ?

Well ... it's just you ;-). Other than both being large transport aircraft,
I fail to see any commonality.

But it's possible that other individuals on r.a.m. will come forward and
explain that _every_ modern airlifter owes _a lot_ to German wartime
designs ;-)!

SCNR
Andreas

[Zamboni]

"John" > wrote in message
...
> Bill McClain wrote:
>
> > Boeing has mentioned a tilt-wing design they call the Advanced Theater
> > > Transport (aka Super Frog) that sure sounds like it fits the MX
mission
> > > description. Doesn't look all that much like a C-130J.
> > >
> > > http://www.boeing.com/phantom/att.html
> >
> > Hmm...no vert stab and rudder.
>
> is it just me, or does the ATT bear a strong resemblance to the
> German Me 323 Gigant ?
>
The Gigant also came in a gunship configuration, so that would cover the AX
mission as well.

[John]

Andreas Parsch wrote:

> John wrote:
> > is it just me, or does the ATT bear a strong resemblance to the
> > German Me 323 Gigant ?
>
> Well ... it's just you ;-). Other than both being large transport aircraft,
> I fail to see any commonality.
>
> But it's possible that other individuals on r.a.m. will come forward and
> explain that _every_ modern airlifter owes _a lot_ to German wartime
> designs ;-)!
>
> SCNR
> Andreas

I was referring to the sketches at the bottom on the Boeing webpage.
the multiwheel layout, the blunt bulbous shape .

http://www.boeing.com/phantom/att.html

FWIW: I spent many hours inside several variants of trash haulers
so I find them to be a fine aircraft, enough so, that I have
left
lot of them in mid-flight.. Airborne ;-) Herc's are
beautiful !

[sid]

"Kevin Brooks" > wrote in message >...
> "sid" > wrote in message
> m...
> > After having been excoriated for saying that civil designs such as
> > those envisioned for the MC2A and ACS have no business over the
> > battlefield, this article gives me a bit of gratification:
>
> There is quite a gulf between the kind of "battlefield" (or more
> specifically "battle environment") that the special operations aircraft have
> to operate in and that which the E-10 will be expected to survive. So I am
> not really sure what your point here is...?
>
> Brooks
>

Not nearly as big a gulf as you characterize. ISR assets are now
enmeshed in tactical operations. The days of these aircraft standing
off in benign airspace a la Cold War style are over:
http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/defense/111803ISR.pdf
• Without early air dominance, many ISR systems could not
have been used to optimal effect.
– Vulnerable manned aircraft like JSTARS & EP-3 operated deep
in Iraqi airspace
– Aerial refueling tankers penetrated to support ISR
– Unmanned vehicles nearly defenseless if attacked

To illustrate further, here are some comments on the expected use the
of the ACS:
http://www.defensenews.com/conferences/isr1103/2409450.html
....As one of the first systems to the fight, ACS will provide early
intelligence that could help shape the first stages of battle,[LtCol]
Hinsdale said Nov. 18 during a Defense News Media Group conference,
ISR Integration 2003: The Net-Centric Vision, in Arlington, Va.
For instance, it could warn forces if their port of entry has been
compromised "before we put our sons and daughters in harm's way." ...

Since the ACS will be "one of the first systems to the fight" its
axiomatic that air dominance may not be assured when the ACS "arrives
to the fight".

As I mentioned in previous posts, the aircraft in question make fine
civil transports, but shoot at them and you have death traps. They are
designed to withstand component failure;not damage.
Their electrical, avionics, and fuel systems in particular are
exceptionally vulnerable to even slight damage. In order to hold down
costs, these vulenrabilities are not being addressed as they get
shoehorned into military applications. These ain't your granddaddy's
C-135.
Later attempts to back engineer vulnerability improvements into former
transports have proven less than sucessful and expensive. The P-3
comes to mind.

So development of ths AX or whatever may prove a good thing. Also
Boeing and the other civil transport manufacturers now have a viable
commercial reason to harden their aircraft due to the MANPADS threat.

[Kevin Brooks]

"sid" > wrote in message
om...
> "Kevin Brooks" > wrote in message
>...
> > "sid" > wrote in message
> > m...
> > > After having been excoriated for saying that civil designs such as
> > > those envisioned for the MC2A and ACS have no business over the
> > > battlefield, this article gives me a bit of gratification:
> >
> > There is quite a gulf between the kind of "battlefield" (or more
> > specifically "battle environment") that the special operations aircraft
have
> > to operate in and that which the E-10 will be expected to survive. So I
am
> > not really sure what your point here is...?
> >
> > Brooks
> >
>
> Not nearly as big a gulf as you characterize. ISR assets are now
> enmeshed in tactical operations.

Yes, but again, their exposure is an order of magnitude less than that
experienced by MC-130's and AC-130's.

The days of these aircraft standing
> off in benign airspace a la Cold War style are over:
> http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/defense/111803ISR.pdf

SOF platforms like the Combat Talon and Spectre operate in airspace that is
much more dangerous than that experienced by the E-8 or ARL-M's.

> . Without early air dominance, many ISR systems could not
> have been used to optimal effect.

Combat Talons operate in an environment that does not require "air
dominance". The AC-130's have to operate down within the MANPADS envelope to
be very effective (which is why they operate almost exclusively at
night--the last one to try daylight operations got picked off by a SAM
during ODS). When was the last time you heard of an ARL-M or E-8 doing
either?

> - Vulnerable manned aircraft like JSTARS & EP-3 operated deep
> in Iraqi airspace

AFAIK, the E-8 remained outside the SAM threat envelope. Not sure what the
operating altitude was for the Aries, but I'd be surprised if they ever
ventured down into the MANPADS range or within the engagement circle of
larger Iraqi SAM's.

> - Aerial refueling tankers penetrated to support ISR

I know of one report of a KC-135 going *towards* Baghdad at one point, but
did it enter within range of the surviving Iraqi AD assets? Doubt it.

> - Unmanned vehicles nearly defenseless if attacked
>
> To illustrate further, here are some comments on the expected use the
> of the ACS:
> http://www.defensenews.com/conferences/isr1103/2409450.html
> ...As one of the first systems to the fight, ACS will provide early
> intelligence that could help shape the first stages of battle,[LtCol]
> Hinsdale said Nov. 18 during a Defense News Media Group conference,
> ISR Integration 2003: The Net-Centric Vision, in Arlington, Va.
> For instance, it could warn forces if their port of entry has been
> compromised "before we put our sons and daughters in harm's way." ...

Obviously to be done using oblique imaging or UAV's reporting to the
aircraft--you don't think they intend to conduct overflights of an enemy
possessing an decent IADS, do you?

>
> Since the ACS will be "one of the first systems to the fight" its
> axiomatic that air dominance may not be assured when the ACS "arrives
> to the fight".

In which case it had either be very stealthy or use long range
sensors/UAV's; otherwise it will be meat for an IADS.

>
> As I mentioned in previous posts, the aircraft in question make fine
> civil transports, but shoot at them and you have death traps.

No, you have to *hit* them in order to make them a "deathtrap". How many
KC-135's, KC-10's, E-8's, EP-3's, or ARL-M's have been hit during combat
operations to date? None. How many have even been shot *at*? Again, AFAIK,
none.

They are
> designed to withstand component failure;not damage.
> Their electrical, avionics, and fuel systems in particular are
> exceptionally vulnerable to even slight damage. In order to hold down
> costs, these vulenrabilities are not being addressed as they get
> shoehorned into military applications. These ain't your granddaddy's
> C-135.

Since they are not going into the hot part of the bad guy's threat envelope,
why do they need to be survivable in terms of enemy weapons effects?

> Later attempts to back engineer vulnerability improvements into former
> transports have proven less than sucessful and expensive. The P-3
> comes to mind.

None of which have been lost due to combat operations, IIRC.

>
> So development of ths AX or whatever may prove a good thing.

Since the SOF platforms operate in an entirely different threat environment,
I fail to see the connection to programs like ACS. Remember that the ACS
platform will be one of the current flock of business jets (Gulfstream and
Bombadier being major competititors for that role right now). The E-10 is
going to use a 767 platform. Now why do you think you know something about
the unsuitability of these systems that the combined brain power of the
USAF, USN, and US Army don't?

Brooks

Also
> Boeing and the other civil transport manufacturers now have a viable
> commercial reason to harden their aircraft due to the MANPADS threat.

[John Keeney]

"John" > wrote in message
...
> Bill McClain wrote:
>
> > Boeing has mentioned a tilt-wing design they call the Advanced Theater
> > > Transport (aka Super Frog) that sure sounds like it fits the MX
mission
> > > description. Doesn't look all that much like a C-130J.
> > >
> > > http://www.boeing.com/phantom/att.html
> >
> > Hmm...no vert stab and rudder.
>
> is it just me, or does the ATT bear a strong resemblance to the
> German Me 323 Gigant ?

I'ld have to come down on the "just you" side.

[sid]

"Kevin Brooks" > wrote in message > >
> > Not nearly as big a gulf as you characterize. ISR assets are now
> > enmeshed in tactical operations.
>
> Yes, but again, their exposure is an order of magnitude less than that
> experienced by MC-130's and AC-130's.
>

Sure. In the last few conflicts as the Lexington institue piece made
clear, but what about a few years down the road?

> SOF platforms like the Combat Talon and Spectre operate in airspace that is
> much more dangerous than that experienced by the E-8 or ARL-M's.
>

With long range SAM and AAW systems readily available for export its
not something that can be counted on. You may have missed this little
article in a December issue of AW&ST:
"Russian guided-weapons builder Novator is continuing to work, albeit
slowly, on an ultralong-range air-to-air missile, with a version on
offer for export to a select customer set.
Designated article 172, the weapon was included on a model of the
Su-35 derivative of the Sukhoi Su-27 Flanker, on display during the
Dubai air show. The export version, known as the 172S1, has a 300-km.
(186-mi.) range, compared with 400 km. for the original version
specified by the Russian air force. The missile, which is also
referred to (perhaps erroneously) as the KS-172, is intended to engage
specific high-value targets such as airborne warning and control
aircraft, air-to-ground surveillance and tanker platforms."

> > - Aerial refueling tankers penetrated to support ISR
>
> I know of one report of a KC-135 going *towards* Baghdad at one point, but
> did it enter within range of the surviving Iraqi AD assets? Doubt it.
>
There were public reports of tanker assets going "downtown". The
commanding general flew one mission purportedly to allay tanker crews'
fears.

> >
> > To illustrate further, here are some comments on the expected use the
> > of the ACS:
> > http://www.defensenews.com/conferences/isr1103/2409450.html
> > ...As one of the first systems to the fight, ACS will provide early
> > intelligence that could help shape the first stages of battle,[LtCol]
> > Hinsdale said Nov. 18 during a Defense News Media Group conference,
> > ISR Integration 2003: The Net-Centric Vision, in Arlington, Va.
> > For instance, it could warn forces if their port of entry has been
> > compromised "before we put our sons and daughters in harm's way." ...
>
> Obviously to be done using oblique imaging or UAV's reporting to the
> aircraft--you don't think they intend to conduct overflights of an enemy
> possessing an decent IADS, do you?
>

And against an S-300(or equivalent) capapble opponent? They may have
to be risked to get the job done.
"UAV Wrangling" from aircraft is still in the early stages. Given
budget realities its likely going to be a capapbility somewhere up the
"spiral". Until then the standoff ranges will be measured for the
aircraft.

> > As I mentioned in previous posts, the aircraft in question make fine
> > civil transports, but shoot at them and you have death traps.
>
> No, you have to *hit* them in order to make them a "deathtrap". How many
> KC-135's, KC-10's, E-8's, EP-3's, or ARL-M's have been hit during combat
> operations to date? None. How many have even been shot *at*? Again, AFAIK,
> none.
>
As improtant as these aircraft are bcoming to our operational
doctrine, and as few of them as there are or will be, these vulnerable
aircraft will offer a rich target for an opponent with a big payback
no matter the cost to neutralize them. Looks like Novator for one is
already moving in on the business.
>
> Since they are not going into the hot part of the bad guy's threat envelope,
> why do they need to be survivable in terms of enemy weapons effects?
>
Because it appears the threats will be reaching out to them.

> > Later attempts to back engineer vulnerability improvements into former
> > transports have proven less than sucessful and expensive. The P-3
> > comes to mind.

> None of which have been lost due to combat operations, IIRC.
>
Two P-3s were lost in 1968 to ground fire actually. Likely because of
vulenrability to hydrodynamic ram after a small caliber round hit
them. Same vulnerabilty that turned the DHL 'bus into a roman candle
after a small shrapnel hit. Same vulnerability that all civil
transports share.

> Since the SOF platforms operate in an entirely different threat environment,
> I fail to see the connection to programs like ACS. Remember that the ACS
> platform will be one of the current flock of business jets (Gulfstream and
> Bombadier being major competititors for that role right now). The E-10 is
> going to use a 767 platform. Now why do you think you know something about
> the unsuitability of these systems that the combined brain power of the
> USAF, USN, and US Army don't?
>
Read through this selection of links and you will see that
vulnerabilty is a perennial back burner issue...Until losses bring it
front an center.
http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/aircraft/
This one in particular discusses historical lapses in this regard:
http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/aircraft/8.pdf

[Kevin Brooks]

"sid" > wrote in message
m...
> "Kevin Brooks" > wrote in message > >
> > > Not nearly as big a gulf as you characterize. ISR assets are now
> > > enmeshed in tactical operations.
> >
> > Yes, but again, their exposure is an order of magnitude less than that
> > experienced by MC-130's and AC-130's.
> >
>
> Sure. In the last few conflicts as the Lexington institue piece made
> clear, but what about a few years down the road?

At least two of your Lexington Institute "pieces" have endorsed the ACS and
E-10, with their commercial aircraft platforms--what does this say about
your theory that using commercial derivitive platforms is unacceptable?

http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/defense/031218.asp

http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/defense/031211.asp

>
> > SOF platforms like the Combat Talon and Spectre operate in airspace that
is
> > much more dangerous than that experienced by the E-8 or ARL-M's.
> >
>
> With long range SAM and AAW systems readily available for export its
> not something that can be counted on. You may have missed this little
> article in a December issue of AW&ST:
> "Russian guided-weapons builder Novator is continuing to work, albeit
> slowly, on an ultralong-range air-to-air missile, with a version on
> offer for export to a select customer set.
> Designated article 172, the weapon was included on a model of the
> Su-35 derivative of the Sukhoi Su-27 Flanker, on display during the
> Dubai air show. The export version, known as the 172S1, has a 300-km.
> (186-mi.) range, compared with 400 km. for the original version
> specified by the Russian air force. The missile, which is also
> referred to (perhaps erroneously) as the KS-172, is intended to engage
> specific high-value targets such as airborne warning and control
> aircraft, air-to-ground surveillance and tanker platforms."

What was there to miss? The acknowlegement that the pace of development on
this rather strange weapon is "slow"? How would it be targeted? 300 to 400
km is an awful long way for a fighter radar to "see", much less target.

>
> > > - Aerial refueling tankers penetrated to support ISR
> >
> > I know of one report of a KC-135 going *towards* Baghdad at one point,
but
> > did it enter within range of the surviving Iraqi AD assets? Doubt it.
> >
> There were public reports of tanker assets going "downtown". The
> commanding general flew one mission purportedly to allay tanker crews'
> fears.

Sure--going "downtown" after the IADS, or what was left of it pre-war, was
further destroyed. We lost *one* aircraft over Baghdad--an A-10 to an
SA-7/SA-18, IIRC. How much of a threat do you think that SA-18 was to any
KC-135's orbiting at 25K or so feet?

>
> > >
> > > To illustrate further, here are some comments on the expected use the
> > > of the ACS:
> > > http://www.defensenews.com/conferences/isr1103/2409450.html
> > > ...As one of the first systems to the fight, ACS will provide early
> > > intelligence that could help shape the first stages of battle,[LtCol]
> > > Hinsdale said Nov. 18 during a Defense News Media Group conference,
> > > ISR Integration 2003: The Net-Centric Vision, in Arlington, Va.
> > > For instance, it could warn forces if their port of entry has been
> > > compromised "before we put our sons and daughters in harm's way." ...
> >
> > Obviously to be done using oblique imaging or UAV's reporting to the
> > aircraft--you don't think they intend to conduct overflights of an enemy
> > possessing an decent IADS, do you?
> >
>
> And against an S-300(or equivalent) capapble opponent?

Then you use your UAV's--that is what they are for, to go where manned
platforms shouldn't/can't.

They may have
> to be risked to get the job done.

I don't see the USAF placing its RC-135's at great immediate risk, nor do I
see the EP-3's doing that. As to ACS, remember that it is intended to
replace ARL-M (and the remaining RC-12's)--that "L" means low, as in "low
intensity". Nobody is going to be sortying them into an IADS environment.
Period.

> "UAV Wrangling" from aircraft is still in the early stages. Given
> budget realities its likely going to be a capapbility somewhere up the
> "spiral". Until then the standoff ranges will be measured for the
> aircraft.

Let's get this straight--you see a strong potential of AAM's that can engage
our E-10's at 300-400 km, but you think managing an existing UAV from an
airborne operator's station is too tough to handle? I find that a bit hard
to digest.

>
> > > As I mentioned in previous posts, the aircraft in question make fine
> > > civil transports, but shoot at them and you have death traps.
> >
> > No, you have to *hit* them in order to make them a "deathtrap". How many
> > KC-135's, KC-10's, E-8's, EP-3's, or ARL-M's have been hit during combat
> > operations to date? None. How many have even been shot *at*? Again,
AFAIK,
> > none.
> >
> As improtant as these aircraft are bcoming to our operational
> doctrine, and as few of them as there are or will be, these vulnerable
> aircraft will offer a rich target for an opponent with a big payback
> no matter the cost to neutralize them. Looks like Novator for one is
> already moving in on the business.

I would not be buying too much stock in that enterprise just yet.

> >
> > Since they are not going into the hot part of the bad guy's threat
envelope,
> > why do they need to be survivable in terms of enemy weapons effects?
> >
> Because it appears the threats will be reaching out to them.

Your argument that this is the case is less than convincing so far.

>
> > > Later attempts to back engineer vulnerability improvements into former
> > > transports have proven less than sucessful and expensive. The P-3
> > > comes to mind.
>
> > None of which have been lost due to combat operations, IIRC.
> >
> Two P-3s were lost in 1968 to ground fire actually. Likely because of
> vulenrability to hydrodynamic ram after a small caliber round hit
> them. Same vulnerabilty that turned the DHL 'bus into a roman candle
> after a small shrapnel hit. Same vulnerability that all civil
> transports share.

Checking around, there was one confirmed shoot-down of a P-3 in SEA (both
following incidents VP-26 Orions). One was an "unknown" (may have very well
gone down due to accident), the other took a burst of .50 cal while doing a
*low level* pass over a suspect LCM, which set set no. 4 engine on fire. The
crew apparently tried to put as much distance between them and the bad guys
as possible before attempting to ditch, and the wing snapped in the vicinity
of the aforementioned fire. Note that these guys were doing visual recon
from low level--they did not have the super synthetic aperture radars we
have today. The EP-3 does not conduct low level missions, nor do the
ARL-M/RC-12. So what is the applicability of the loss of one P-3 that got
hammered by .50 cal (which can be tough on any airframe, even those designed
to military specs--my brother lost a UH-1 Dustoff bird during Lam Son 719 to
a .50 cal, and more than a couple of A-1's, etc., were allegedly brought
down by 12.7mm and *below* calibers) to current programs like the E-10 and
ACS?


>
> > Since the SOF platforms operate in an entirely different threat
environment,
> > I fail to see the connection to programs like ACS. Remember that the ACS
> > platform will be one of the current flock of business jets (Gulfstream
and
> > Bombadier being major competititors for that role right now). The E-10
is
> > going to use a 767 platform. Now why do you think you know something
about
> > the unsuitability of these systems that the combined brain power of the
> > USAF, USN, and US Army don't?
> >
> Read through this selection of links and you will see that
> vulnerabilty is a perennial back burner issue...Until losses bring it
> front an center.

Great--for aircraft going into the thick of the combat. E-10 and ACS won't
be.

Brooks

> http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/aircraft/
> This one in particular discusses historical lapses in this regard:
> http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/aircraft/8.pdf

[Alfred Loo]

Other than additing bomb carrying capability, I don't see any use in
improving it.
"sid" > wrote in message
m...
> After having been excoriated for saying that civil designs such as
> those envisioned for the MC2A and ACS have no business over the
> battlefield, this article gives me a bit of gratification:
>
> USAF Plans Serious Look At Replacing Special Ops Aircraft
> By Marc Selinger
> February 6, 2004
>
> The U.S. Air Force plans to start taking a serious look at potential
> replacements for several C-130 variants used by its special operations
> forces, a service representative said Feb. 5.
>
> Maj. Gen. John Dorris said the Bush Administration's fiscal 2005
> budget request, submitted to Congress Feb. 2, contains "seed money" to
> develop concepts for an "MX" aircraft, which would replace the
> MC-130E/H airdrop/transport aircraft, and an "AX" which would replace
> the AC-130 gunship. The analysis could take about two years.
>
> With surface-to-air threats becoming increasingly sophisticated, the
> Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) believes it will need to
> begin fielding the new aircraft in about 2015 as a replacement for its
> aging Lockheed Martin C-130 variants, Dorris said. He spoke to
> reporters after speaking at a special operations conference sponsored
> by the National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA).
>
> "After 2015, the ability of the C-130 as it's currently configured,
> even with enhancements, is not going to be able to go into a lot of
> the airspace that it needs to go into," he said.
>
> The MX is envisioned as a long-range aircraft that is "able to do the
> mission in one period of darkness," Dorris said. The latest thinking
> for the AX is that it would be a "mothership that sends out sensors."
> The sensors would then report back to the mothership, which would send
> out "lethal and/or non-lethal projectiles," possibly small, guided
> missiles.
>
> A new aerial refueling capability will also be needed by AFSOC but
> probably later than 2015, Dorris said.
>
> To address AFSOC's tanker shortfall in the interim, about 27 MC-130H
> Combat Talon IIs are being modified to be capable of refueling. That
> work will be completed by about 2007. AFSOC's MC-130E Combat Talon Is
> already can perform the tanker mission.

[[email protected]]

Hmm, maybe it's just you. To me it bears a strong resemblence to a
C-130.

[John]

John Keeney wrote:

> >
> > is it just me, or does the ATT bear a strong resemblance to the
> > German Me 323 Gigant ?
>
> I'ld have to come down on the "just you" side.

Oh Well, thats why I asked.

and JK isn't it nice to hear the C-130's again ? some but not all
of the local KYANG is back from deployment, and they are flying
over the homestead often, love to hear that hummmmmm. of the
turboprops when they fly in trail...

[sid]

"Kevin Brooks" > wrote in message >...
> "sid" > wrote in message
> m...
> > "Kevin Brooks" > wrote in message > >
> > > > Not nearly as big a gulf as you characterize. ISR assets are now
> > > > enmeshed in tactical operations.
>
> At least two of your Lexington Institute "pieces" have endorsed the ACS and
> E-10, with their commercial aircraft platforms--what does this say about
> your theory that using commercial derivitive platforms is unacceptable?
>
> http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/defense/031218.asp
>
> http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/defense/031211.asp
>
One "piece" does advocate the E-10. The other is a bit of an oblique
endorsement of the G-450 over the EMB-145. It doesn't advocate civil
airframes for the mission per se.
Neither bears any real relationshop to the ISR lessons learned
presentation.
> > "Russian guided-weapons builder Novator is continuing to work, albeit
> > slowly, on an ultralong-range air-to-air missile, with a version on
> > offer for export to a select customer set.
> > referred to (perhaps erroneously) as the KS-172, is intended to engage
> > specific high-value targets such as airborne warning and control
> > aircraft, air-to-ground surveillance and tanker platforms."
>
> What was there to miss? The acknowlegement that the pace of development on
> this rather strange weapon is "slow"? How would it be targeted? 300 to 400
> km is an awful long way for a fighter radar to "see", much less target.
>
The fact that there is a market for the capability to counter our ISR
assets and someone that is working on providing that capability is not
something to be missed.
> Sure--going "downtown" after the IADS, or what was left of it pre-war, was
> further destroyed. We lost *one* aircraft over Baghdad--an A-10 to an
> SA-7/SA-18, IIRC. How much of a threat do you think that SA-18 was to any
> KC-135's orbiting at 25K or so feet?
>
This is one of the accounts:
"In a risky bid to extend strike missions by making it easier for
planes to refuel, he ordered tanker aircraft -- which are relatively
vulnerable, because they lack their own warning radar and armaments --
to venture into Iraqi airspace, even though Iraq's dense air defense
network had not been eliminated."

Apparently this was early, before dominance was assured. I'll see if I
can find the AW$ST issue that reported the story. Do you think that
mag is a somewhat credible source?

> > > > To illustrate further, here are some comments on the expected use the
> > > > of the ACS:
> > > > http://www.defensenews.com/conferences/isr1103/2409450.html
> > > > ...As one of the first systems to the fight, ACS will provide early
> > > > intelligence that could help shape the first stages of battle,[LtCol]
> > > > Hinsdale said Nov. 18 during a Defense News Media Group conference,
> > > > ISR Integration 2003: The Net-Centric Vision, in Arlington, Va.
> > > > For instance, it could warn forces if their port of entry has been
> > > > compromised "before we put our sons and daughters in harm's way." ...
> > >
> > > Obviously to be done using oblique imaging or UAV's reporting to the
> > > aircraft--you don't think they intend to conduct overflights of an enemy
> > > possessing an decent IADS, do you?
Well, if it has to be done...The OP-2E story is a bit of a cuationary
tale.
It appears that there are (or at least were when this was written)real
issues with just such analysis abot the survivability of these
programs:
http://www.fas.org/irp/program/collect/SIGINTWP.pdf

> Let's get this straight--you see a strong potential of AAM's that can engage
> our E-10's at 300-400 km, but you think managing an existing UAV from an
> airborne operator's station is too tough to handle? I find that a bit hard
> to digest.
>
I don't think its too hard to handle; our flawed budget process may
not get the capability to the warfighters in a timely fashion.
Regardless of when we field an operationally workable airborne
controlled UAV force the GMTI 767-400 and the ACS configured EMB-145
or G-450 are expected to use onboard sensors. for decades to come. In
the years ahead their vulnerabilities could well be exploited.
> > > No, you have to *hit* them in order to make them a "deathtrap". How many
> > > KC-135's, KC-10's, E-8's, EP-3's, or ARL-M's have been hit during combat
> > > operations to date? None. How many have even been shot *at*? Again,
> > > AFAIK, none.
So? That proves we have been up against inept opponents in recent
scraps thats all. As an FYI the Navy is moving the P-3s away from the
overland tactical support role.

> > >
> > Two P-3s were lost in 1968 to ground fire actually. Likely because of
> > vulenrability to hydrodynamic ram after a small caliber round hit
> > them. Same vulnerabilty that turned the DHL 'bus into a roman candle
> > after a small shrapnel hit. Same vulnerability that all civil
> > transports share.
>
> Checking around, there was one confirmed shoot-down of a P-3 in SEA (both
> following incidents VP-26 Orions). One was an "unknown" (may have very well
> gone down due to accident), the other took a burst of .50 cal while doing a
> *low level* pass over a suspect LCM, which set set no. 4 engine on fire. The
> crew apparently tried to put as much distance between them and the bad guys
> as possible before attempting to ditch, and the wing snapped in the vicinity
> of the aforementioned fire. Note that these guys were doing visual recon
> from low level--they did not have the super synthetic aperture radars we
> have today. The EP-3 does not conduct low level missions, nor do the
> ARL-M/RC-12. So what is the applicability of the loss of one P-3 that got
> hammered by .50 cal (which can be tough on any airframe, even those designed
> to military specs--my brother lost a UH-1 Dustoff bird during Lam Son 719 to
> a .50 cal, and more than a couple of A-1's, etc., were allegedly brought
> down by 12.7mm and *below* calibers) to current programs like the E-10 and
> ACS?
>
The unknown was almost certainly shot down. Also, if you read the
account of the second carefully you will see it wasn't an engine fire
but an uncontrollable fuel tank fire. They weren't trying to ditch,
but instead make a small field on an island which they had a visual
on. The wing burned through as they were about to land.
Hydrodynamic ram killed that airplane and its crew. The navy tried an
abortive program to mitigate the effects with foam in the tanks but it
was a mess and they took the foam back out. The 767 EMB-145 and G-450
have no protection whatsoever against hydrodynamic ram fires. Not that
it imposssible to engineer in though:
http://jas.jcs.mil/news/newsletter_2000_spring.htm
Did you read this BTW:
http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/aircraft/8.pdf
In it you will see where a lack of recognition to vulnerability issues
caused the loss of many aircraft in Vietnam.


>
> Great--for aircraft going into the thick of the combat. E-10 and ACS won't
> be.
>
They threat will be reaching out to them in the next few years.

[Kevin Brooks]

"sid" > wrote in message
om...
> "Kevin Brooks" > wrote in message
>...
> > "sid" > wrote in message
> > m...
> > > "Kevin Brooks" > wrote in message > >
> > > > > Not nearly as big a gulf as you characterize. ISR assets are now
> > > > > enmeshed in tactical operations.
> >
> > At least two of your Lexington Institute "pieces" have endorsed the ACS
and
> > E-10, with their commercial aircraft platforms--what does this say about
> > your theory that using commercial derivitive platforms is unacceptable?
> >
> > http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/defense/031218.asp
> >
> > http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/defense/031211.asp
> >
> One "piece" does advocate the E-10. The other is a bit of an oblique
> endorsement of the G-450 over the EMB-145. It doesn't advocate civil
> airframes for the mission per se.

They sure do seem to advocate the use of those commercial airframes in both
cases.

> Neither bears any real relationshop to the ISR lessons learned
> presentation.
> > > "Russian guided-weapons builder Novator is continuing to work, albeit
> > > slowly, on an ultralong-range air-to-air missile, with a version on
> > > offer for export to a select customer set.
> > > referred to (perhaps erroneously) as the KS-172, is intended to engage
> > > specific high-value targets such as airborne warning and control
> > > aircraft, air-to-ground surveillance and tanker platforms."
> >
> > What was there to miss? The acknowlegement that the pace of development
on
> > this rather strange weapon is "slow"? How would it be targeted? 300 to
400
> > km is an awful long way for a fighter radar to "see", much less target.
> >
> The fact that there is a market for the capability to counter our ISR
> assets and someone that is working on providing that capability is not
> something to be missed.

The fact that the USAF,USN, USA, etc., are not going to place those assets
in a situation of undue risk is patently obvious. The fact that your Russian
"super AAM" is nothing more than a concept at present does not change that.

> > Sure--going "downtown" after the IADS, or what was left of it pre-war,
was
> > further destroyed. We lost *one* aircraft over Baghdad--an A-10 to an
> > SA-7/SA-18, IIRC. How much of a threat do you think that SA-18 was to
any
> > KC-135's orbiting at 25K or so feet?
> >
> This is one of the accounts:
> "In a risky bid to extend strike missions by making it easier for
> planes to refuel, he ordered tanker aircraft -- which are relatively
> vulnerable, because they lack their own warning radar and armaments --
> to venture into Iraqi airspace, even though Iraq's dense air defense
> network had not been eliminated."
>
> Apparently this was early, before dominance was assured. I'll see if I
> can find the AW$ST issue that reported the story. Do you think that
> mag is a somewhat credible source?

Credible, yes. But what does he mean by "eliminated"? We know that they
continued to pop off MANPADS even as the troops and marines entered into the
city--but again, those MANPADS were no threat to the tankers.

>
> > > > > To illustrate further, here are some comments on the expected use
the
> > > > > of the ACS:
> > > > > http://www.defensenews.com/conferences/isr1103/2409450.html
> > > > > ...As one of the first systems to the fight, ACS will provide
early
> > > > > intelligence that could help shape the first stages of
battle,[LtCol]
> > > > > Hinsdale said Nov. 18 during a Defense News Media Group
conference,
> > > > > ISR Integration 2003: The Net-Centric Vision, in Arlington, Va.
> > > > > For instance, it could warn forces if their port of entry has been
> > > > > compromised "before we put our sons and daughters in harm's way."
....
> > > >
> > > > Obviously to be done using oblique imaging or UAV's reporting to the
> > > > aircraft--you don't think they intend to conduct overflights of an
enemy
> > > > possessing an decent IADS, do you?
> Well, if it has to be done...The OP-2E story is a bit of a cuationary
> tale.

"The OP-2E story"??

> It appears that there are (or at least were when this was written)real
> issues with just such analysis abot the survivability of these
> programs:
> http://www.fas.org/irp/program/collect/SIGINTWP.pdf
>
> > Let's get this straight--you see a strong potential of AAM's that can
engage
> > our E-10's at 300-400 km, but you think managing an existing UAV from an
> > airborne operator's station is too tough to handle? I find that a bit
hard
> > to digest.
> >
> I don't think its too hard to handle; our flawed budget process may
> not get the capability to the warfighters in a timely fashion.

That would be the same "flawed process" that has enabled us to leap ahead of
every other nation in the world in terms of these capabilities?

> Regardless of when we field an operationally workable airborne
> controlled UAV force the GMTI 767-400 and the ACS configured EMB-145
> or G-450 are expected to use onboard sensors. for decades to come. In
> the years ahead their vulnerabilities could well be exploited.

What vulnerabilities? The supposed vulnerability to a missile that has yet
been built, guided by a system not yet developed, while engaging in
overflights through an IADS that just won't happen? Not much of a
"vulnerability" you have illustrated there.

> > > > No, you have to *hit* them in order to make them a "deathtrap". How
many
> > > > KC-135's, KC-10's, E-8's, EP-3's, or ARL-M's have been hit during
combat
> > > > operations to date? None. How many have even been shot *at*? Again,
> > > > AFAIK, none.

> So? That proves we have been up against inept opponents in recent
> scraps thats all.

Ummm...no, that could also be proof that we don't place these assets into a
position where they are readily engaged.

As an FYI the Navy is moving the P-3s away from the
> overland tactical support role.

What?

>
> > > >
> > > Two P-3s were lost in 1968 to ground fire actually. Likely because of
> > > vulenrability to hydrodynamic ram after a small caliber round hit
> > > them. Same vulnerabilty that turned the DHL 'bus into a roman candle
> > > after a small shrapnel hit. Same vulnerability that all civil
> > > transports share.
> >
> > Checking around, there was one confirmed shoot-down of a P-3 in SEA
(both
> > following incidents VP-26 Orions). One was an "unknown" (may have very
well
> > gone down due to accident), the other took a burst of .50 cal while
doing a
> > *low level* pass over a suspect LCM, which set set no. 4 engine on fire.
The
> > crew apparently tried to put as much distance between them and the bad
guys
> > as possible before attempting to ditch, and the wing snapped in the
vicinity
> > of the aforementioned fire. Note that these guys were doing visual recon
> > from low level--they did not have the super synthetic aperture radars we
> > have today. The EP-3 does not conduct low level missions, nor do the
> > ARL-M/RC-12. So what is the applicability of the loss of one P-3 that
got
> > hammered by .50 cal (which can be tough on any airframe, even those
designed
> > to military specs--my brother lost a UH-1 Dustoff bird during Lam Son
719 to
> > a .50 cal, and more than a couple of A-1's, etc., were allegedly brought
> > down by 12.7mm and *below* calibers) to current programs like the E-10
and
> > ACS?
> >
> The unknown was almost certainly shot down.

Got some proof of that? And again--we no longer plan to use *any* of these
platforms in a direct visual recon role like they were used for in Market
Time. So how does this apply to supporting your assertions?

Also, if you read the
> account of the second carefully you will see it wasn't an engine fire
> but an uncontrollable fuel tank fire. They weren't trying to ditch,
> but instead make a small field on an island which they had a visual
> on.

Gee, the VP-26 vet who wrote up the description I read must have had all of
his facts wrong. He indicated that the engine was lost, and the fire was in
that vicinity--whether or not it also involved the fuel tankage is a moot
point.

The wing burned through as they were about to land.
> Hydrodynamic ram killed that airplane and its crew.

FYI, *any* airplane with an uncontrolled fire in its engine/wing is
susceptable to subsequent structural failure. And you ignored the fact that
aircraft designed exclusively for military use have also been lost to .50
cal and below hits--so where is this much greater vulnerability of the P-3
in view of that fact?

The navy tried an
> abortive program to mitigate the effects with foam in the tanks but it
> was a mess and they took the foam back out. The 767 EMB-145 and G-450
> have no protection whatsoever against hydrodynamic ram fires. Not that
> it imposssible to engineer in though:
> http://jas.jcs.mil/news/newsletter_2000_spring.htm
> Did you read this BTW:
> http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/aircraft/8.pdf
> In it you will see where a lack of recognition to vulnerability issues
> caused the loss of many aircraft in Vietnam.

I also note that in the first few sentences the authors identify the
difference between "susceptability" and "vulnerability"--the latter does not
come into play if the former is controlled such that hits don't occur--which
will be the predominant environment that the ACS and E-10 will operate in.

>
>
> >
> > Great--for aircraft going into the thick of the combat. E-10 and ACS
won't
> > be.
> >
> They threat will be reaching out to them in the next few years.

So you say. Now go back and tell us what *you* think the "L" in ARL-M means.

Brooks

[John Keeney]

"John" > wrote in message
...
>
>
> John Keeney wrote:
>
> > >
> > > is it just me, or does the ATT bear a strong resemblance to the
> > > German Me 323 Gigant ?
> >
> > I'ld have to come down on the "just you" side.
>
> Oh Well, thats why I asked.
>
> and JK isn't it nice to hear the C-130's again ? some but not all
> of the local KYANG is back from deployment, and they are flying
> over the homestead often, love to hear that hummmmmm. of the
> turboprops when they fly in trail...

Yea, you see them flying three a-line every now and then again.
Saw a couple of them down to Knox shooting approaches there
a couple of weeks back.

Oh, send me your email address, there something you might
be interested in that can't go out over group.

[Bjørnar Bolsøy]

wrote in news:2239-4025F6B3-65@storefull-
3171.bay.webtv.net:

> Hmm, maybe it's just you. To me it bears a strong resemblence to a
> C-130.

I'll add my two cents: looks like a prolapsed C-17.


Regards...

[sid]

"Kevin Brooks" > wrote in message
> The fact that the USAF,USN, USA, etc., are not going to place those assets
> in a situation of undue risk is patently obvious. The fact that your Russian
> "super AAM" is nothing more than a concept at present does not change that.
>
Gee, I thought that the ISR assets were expected to assist in the
conduct of a war. Recent experiences aside, wars are slam full of
"undue risk".
Thats whole issue here, while SOF aircraft are thought of, and built
as, warplanes, the Boeings, Embraers, and Gulfstreams contemplated for
these roles have no such engineering.
Fact is they are very vulnerable platforms that are being considered
for vital missions and that potential adversaries are building weapons
to field against.
Yet these aircraft will be expected to take part in warfare. As few
platforms that the ISR force has or will have, and as important as
they are to the conduct of contemporary and contemplated US military
ops, a capable opponent will find them juicy targets and he can buy
the equipment to do something about it.
A commander may well be forced to put these aircraft into areas of
"undue risk" to get the job done (as was done with the OP-2Es), or
risk not getting the job done at all.

That some AF units seem to be exempt from the possibility of taking
enemy fire has been a long term inherent cultural issue apparently.
I'm not the only one to say it either:
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1983/may-jun/cahoon.htm
C-17 drivers just recently went through combat certification for the
first time. The question begs, why weren't they treated as warfighters
all along?

Sure, its not a real problem today, it won't be next year either, but
then again the ACS and E-10 won't be fielded until how many years down
the road? By the time they are operational, and S-400 s-300 equipped
opponent could well render them impotent.
This is not being planned for. Apparently you missed this part of this
"piece"?:
http://www.fas.org/irp/program/collect/SIGINTWP.pdf
"ADA Susceptibility: GR/CS and ARL susceptibility to SA 10 and SA 12
threats was
the cornerstone of the argument to eliminate them from the system.
While it is true that they are susceptible to the threats, they are no
less so than many of the retained systems. Rivet Joint,EP3, ES3, all
retained by the study, fly at altitudes similar to Army systems. Their
survivability will require stand-off as well. GR/CS normally flies in
the same vicinity as JSTARS and AWACS, two targets an enemy would
likely pursue with more vigor than an RC12. Discussions
made it clear that the entire air campaign was not considered in the
analysis. In fact, constraints of the ADA threat were not uniformly
applied. Had it been so, many other platforms would have to become
HAPs as well (JSTARS, AWACS)."
As an FYI those SAM systems have advertised standoff ranges greater
than that of JSTARS and ACS.
I'm not the only one thinking of this either:
http://www.aiaa.org/aerospace/Article.cfm?issuetocid=168&ArchiveIssueID=22

"For example, the standoff range for defending against SAMs
[surface-to-air missiles] is changing, and you will have to go to
space. Then you may want to move JSTARS [Joint Surveillance and Target
Attack Radar System] and AWACS [Airborne Warning and Control System]
capabilities into space. So past elements that have given situational
awareness in the theater may involve trade-ups."

> > "In a risky bid to extend strike missions by making it easier for
> > planes to refuel, he ordered tanker aircraft -- which are relatively
> > vulnerable, because they lack their own warning radar and armaments --
> > to venture into Iraqi airspace, even though Iraq's dense air defense
> > network had not been eliminated."
> Credible, yes. But what does he mean by "eliminated"? We know that they
> continued to pop off MANPADS even as the troops and marines entered into the
> city--but again, those MANPADS were no threat to the tankers.
>
So why were they concerned. Obviously the longer range threat had not
been rendered below the "undue threat" threshold.
>
> What vulnerabilities? The supposed vulnerability to a missile that has yet
> been built, guided by a system not yet developed, while engaging in
> overflights through an IADS that just won't happen? Not much of a
> "vulnerability" you have illustrated there.
>

You are wrong about this. Besides, you mean susceptability here??? My
beef is vulnerability issues, there is a difference.
But to the point, the S-300 and S-400 are entirely capapble of
countering our ISR assets. Thats a fact.:
http://www.house.gov/pitts/initiatives/ew/010629ew-brief-9.htm
(the google cached version works)
"The Russians sold the SA-10 (Russian designation S-300, NATO:Grumble)
to China, and recently agreed to sell them to Iran. The Russians are
aggressively marketing these systems and China may also build versions
for export, just as they did with the single digit SAMs. Several more
countries may acquire and field these systems within the next 10
years. The major factor preventing proliferation is the high price
tag of these systems. However, the Russians are also developing and
selling improvement kits to the single digit SAMs to provide near
double-digit SAMs performance at a fraction of the cost.'
'In short, the battlefield 10 years from now may be a far more
dangerous place than today, and it will take a toll on our pilots if
we do not act to mitigate the increased threat."

> As an FYI the Navy is moving the P-3s away from the
> > overland tactical support role.
> What?

Yes. P-3s(Not talking about EP-3s) and MMA will not be used in the
overland role due to vulenrability issues.
Did you miss this as well?
http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/defense/111803ISR.pdf
"However, Navy leadership removing P-3 from overland missions in
hostile airspace due to survivability concerns."
>
> Gee, the VP-26 vet who wrote up the description I read must have had all of
> his facts wrong. He indicated that the engine was lost, and the fire was in
> that vicinity--whether or not it also involved the fuel tankage is a moot
> point.
>
Here's what it says. Note the "unclear" part:
"Several rounds ripped into the outer portion of their starboard wing,
knocking out #4 engine and starting a fire. They pulled the emergency
handle and succeeded in feathering the prop, but could not extinguish
the flames. It was unclear whether the fire originated from the engine
nacelle or from within the wing itself."
I will standby this statement.
> The wing burned through as they were about to land.
> > Hydrodynamic ram killed that airplane and its crew.
>
> FYI, *any* airplane with an uncontrolled fire in its engine/wing is
> susceptable to subsequent structural failure. And you ignored the fact that
> aircraft designed exclusively for military use have also been lost to .50
> cal and below hits--so where is this much greater vulnerability of the P-3
> in view of that fact?
>
Any civil transport, such as this one was (before being modified), is
terribly vulnerable:
http://www.concordesst.com/accident/pictures/flames1.jpg
But much can be done to mitigate the effects. And is being done on
"War"planes:
http://jas.jcs.mil/news/pdf/2003_fall.pdf
"When it comes to providing aircraft fuel system ballis-tic tolerance
capability, it is necessary to understand that protecting from a
catastrophic explosion in a fuel tank ullage cannot be accomplished
solely with self-sealing fuel cells. To provide the desired level of
ballistic tolerance requires a hand-in-hand compli-mentary approach
which incorpo-rates both self-sealing fuel cells and OBIGGS.
Ultimately, it is necessary to incorporate the appropriate fuel system
requirements verbiage requir-ing a self-sealing capability and that
damage from certain high explosive incendiary and/or armor piercing
incendiary rounds must not cause catastrophic explosion. This will
drive a solution, which provides the proper level of survivability
protec-tion for both permanently mounted and auxiliary internal fuel
cells."

> I also note that in the first few sentences the authors identify the
> difference between "susceptability" and "vulnerability"--the latter does not
> come into play if the former is controlled such that hits don't occur--which
> will be the predominant environment that the ACS and E-10 will operate in.
>
Glad you found out the difference between the two. I think you fit
firmly in the camp described below. Its a very wrong and hubris filled
view, but I'll let some much more credible sources speak make the
case:
http://jas.jcs.mil/news/pdf/2003_fall.pdf

If you took a poll of operators in the fleet and asked them what they
wanted most on their aircraft, they would say—
1)advanced sensors,
2)range and speed,
3)long range and very accurate weapons,
4)low observable technology, and
50)vulnerability reduction.
Yes that was number 50, not number 5. There are two reasons for this.
First, vulnerability reduction technology is not very sexy. A cool new
radar that can identify a target at 500 miles is always preferable to
a fuel tank liner. And second, most operators just assume that basic
vulnerability reduction features such as fire protection and
redundancy are a given in aircraft design. If you asked an operator if
he would prefer target ID at only 400 miles while guaranteeing he
would not burn up in flight because of a fuel leak, you might get a
different answer.

http://jas.jcs.mil/news/pdf/2001_summer.pdf

"Vietnam and the experience of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war clearly
rattled the confidence of those who felt that high-performance
military aircraft were relatively invulnerable to enemy defenses
simply on the basis of high
transonic or supersonic dash speed, or because of perceived pilot
excellence. Both of these translated into technological and cultural
hubris and numerous aircrew paid the price for such delusions."
....But that fact hints at the survivability battles yet to come. The
history of military aviation has witnessed a seesaw battle between the
offensive
power of the airplane and the defensive snap of its victims.
In an era—
• When the size of deployed coalition air power
forces is likely to shrink,
• When future aircraft production runs may be measured
in dozens rather than several hundred or several
thousand,
• When potential opponents will have little difficulty
in acquiring advanced Flanker-equivalent threat aircraft
and the weapons systems for those aircraft to
hold air and surface targets hostage,
• When the SA-10 equivalent weapon will undoubtedly
become the common currency of air defense in
much the same fashion that the SA-2 was in the
'60's and the SA-6 in the '70's and onwards, and
The challenge for those having responsibility to
ensure the survivability of our joint service aerospace
forces is, if anything, even more demanding than it has
been in the past.

[Kevin Brooks]

"sid" > wrote in message
om...
> "Kevin Brooks" > wrote in message
> > The fact that the USAF,USN, USA, etc., are not going to place those
assets
> > in a situation of undue risk is patently obvious. The fact that your
Russian
> > "super AAM" is nothing more than a concept at present does not change
that.
> >
> Gee, I thought that the ISR assets were expected to assist in the
> conduct of a war.

On our terms.

Recent experiences aside, wars are slam full of
> "undue risk".

Undue risk is what you avoid. Which is why they won't be sending ACS and the
E-10 into IADS environments.

> Thats whole issue here, while SOF aircraft are thought of, and built
> as, warplanes, the Boeings, Embraers, and Gulfstreams contemplated for
> these roles have no such engineering.

Please point to the "special engineering" that sets an AFSOC CN 235/295
apart from one of those Gulfstreams.

> Fact is they are very vulnerable platforms that are being considered
> for vital missions and that potential adversaries are building weapons
> to field against.

Big jump from that Russian firm "slowly" pursuing a very long range AAM
program to "are building".


> Yet these aircraft will be expected to take part in warfare. As few
> platforms that the ISR force has or will have, and as important as
> they are to the conduct of contemporary and contemplated US military
> ops, a capable opponent will find them juicy targets and he can buy
> the equipment to do something about it.

Look, we are NOT sending them into contested airspace, OK? Period. Now, tell
me which foe these systems will be used against that we will not acheive air
superiority/dominance over in very short order?

> A commander may well be forced to put these aircraft into areas of
> "undue risk" to get the job done (as was done with the OP-2Es), or
> risk not getting the job done at all.

There is that strange "OP-2E's" you keep ranting about... And again, we are
not going to send these assets in against "undue risk".

>
> That some AF units seem to be exempt from the possibility of taking
> enemy fire has been a long term inherent cultural issue apparently.
> I'm not the only one to say it either:
>
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1983/may-jun/cahoon.htm
> C-17 drivers just recently went through combat certification for the
> first time. The question begs, why weren't they treated as warfighters
> all along?

Meaningless. ACS and E-10 are not airlifters. Airlifters may indeed have to
drop down into a MANPADS/AAA threat environment to perform their
mission--ACS and the E-10 do not.

>
> Sure, its not a real problem today, it won't be next year either, but
> then again the ACS and E-10 won't be fielded until how many years down
> the road? By the time they are operational, and S-400 s-300 equipped
> opponent could well render them impotent.

Quick! Call the Pentagon and tell them you have discovered the flaw in the
plans that so many professionals have been developing for decades now!

> This is not being planned for. Apparently you missed this part of this
> "piece"?:
> http://www.fas.org/irp/program/collect/SIGINTWP.pdf
> "ADA Susceptibility: GR/CS and ARL susceptibility to SA 10 and SA 12
> threats was
> the cornerstone of the argument to eliminate them from the system.
> While it is true that they are susceptible to the threats, they are no
> less so than many of the retained systems. Rivet Joint,EP3, ES3, all
> retained by the study, fly at altitudes similar to Army systems. Their
> survivability will require stand-off as well. GR/CS normally flies in
> the same vicinity as JSTARS and AWACS, two targets an enemy would
> likely pursue with more vigor than an RC12. Discussions
> made it clear that the entire air campaign was not considered in the
> analysis. In fact, constraints of the ADA threat were not uniformly
> applied. Had it been so, many other platforms would have to become
> HAPs as well (JSTARS, AWACS)."
> As an FYI those SAM systems have advertised standoff ranges greater
> than that of JSTARS and ACS.
> I'm not the only one thinking of this either:
> http://www.aiaa.org/aerospace/Article.cfm?issuetocid=168&ArchiveIssueID=22
>
> "For example, the standoff range for defending against SAMs
> [surface-to-air missiles] is changing, and you will have to go to
> space. Then you may want to move JSTARS [Joint Surveillance and Target
> Attack Radar System] and AWACS [Airborne Warning and Control System]
> capabilities into space. So past elements that have given situational
> awareness in the theater may involve trade-ups."

I don't know where you get these ideas, but the E-8 JSTARS surveillance
range reportedly reaches out to around 250 km--SA-10/12 manage what, maybe
90 km?

>
> > > "In a risky bid to extend strike missions by making it easier for
> > > planes to refuel, he ordered tanker aircraft -- which are relatively
> > > vulnerable, because they lack their own warning radar and armaments --
> > > to venture into Iraqi airspace, even though Iraq's dense air defense
> > > network had not been eliminated."
> > Credible, yes. But what does he mean by "eliminated"? We know that they
> > continued to pop off MANPADS even as the troops and marines entered into
the
> > city--but again, those MANPADS were no threat to the tankers.
> >
> So why were they concerned. Obviously the longer range threat had not
> been rendered below the "undue threat" threshold.

That is not what the evidence indicates. In fact, were any longer range
systems used to engage the KC's? Nope--the threat was ameliorated.

> >
> > What vulnerabilities? The supposed vulnerability to a missile that has
yet
> > been built, guided by a system not yet developed, while engaging in
> > overflights through an IADS that just won't happen? Not much of a
> > "vulnerability" you have illustrated there.
> >
>
> You are wrong about this. Besides, you mean susceptability here??? My
> beef is vulnerability issues, there is a difference.

Hint--vulnerability is not an issue if susceptability is controlled.

> But to the point, the S-300 and S-400 are entirely capapble of
> countering our ISR assets. Thats a fact.:
> http://www.house.gov/pitts/initiatives/ew/010629ew-brief-9.htm
> (the google cached version works)
> "The Russians sold the SA-10 (Russian designation S-300, NATO:Grumble)
> to China, and recently agreed to sell them to Iran. The Russians are
> aggressively marketing these systems and China may also build versions
> for export, just as they did with the single digit SAMs. Several more
> countries may acquire and field these systems within the next 10
> years. The major factor preventing proliferation is the high price
> tag of these systems. However, the Russians are also developing and
> selling improvement kits to the single digit SAMs to provide near
> double-digit SAMs performance at a fraction of the cost.'
> 'In short, the battlefield 10 years from now may be a far more
> dangerous place than today, and it will take a toll on our pilots if
> we do not act to mitigate the increased threat."

Sorry, not a "fact". Fact--SA-10 has a reported max range around 90 km, and
the E-8 can stand off well beyond that and map the terrain well beyond that
out-of-range S-300.

>
> > As an FYI the Navy is moving the P-3s away from the
> > > overland tactical support role.
> > What?
>
> Yes. P-3s(Not talking about EP-3s) and MMA will not be used in the
> overland role due to vulenrability issues.
> Did you miss this as well?
> http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/defense/111803ISR.pdf
> "However, Navy leadership removing P-3 from overland missions in
> hostile airspace due to survivability concerns."

Note the "in hostile airspace" bit. And BTW, we are not discussing P-3's or
MMA--we are discussing ACS and E-10, along with the K-767, right?

> >
> > Gee, the VP-26 vet who wrote up the description I read must have had all
of
> > his facts wrong. He indicated that the engine was lost, and the fire was
in
> > that vicinity--whether or not it also involved the fuel tankage is a
moot
> > point.
> >
> Here's what it says. Note the "unclear" part:
> "Several rounds ripped into the outer portion of their starboard wing,
> knocking out #4 engine and starting a fire. They pulled the emergency
> handle and succeeded in feathering the prop, but could not extinguish
> the flames. It was unclear whether the fire originated from the engine
> nacelle or from within the wing itself."
> I will standby this statement.

Who cares what you are standing by? The guy who reported the incident did
not even know what the root cause (engine or wing/fuel tank fire) was, but
you do, huh?

> > The wing burned through as they were about to land.
> > > Hydrodynamic ram killed that airplane and its crew.
> >
> > FYI, *any* airplane with an uncontrolled fire in its engine/wing is
> > susceptable to subsequent structural failure. And you ignored the fact
that
> > aircraft designed exclusively for military use have also been lost to
..50
> > cal and below hits--so where is this much greater vulnerability of the
P-3
> > in view of that fact?
> >
> Any civil transport, such as this one was (before being modified), is
> terribly vulnerable:
> http://www.concordesst.com/accident/pictures/flames1.jpg
> But much can be done to mitigate the effects. And is being done on
> "War"planes:
> http://jas.jcs.mil/news/pdf/2003_fall.pdf
> "When it comes to providing aircraft fuel system ballis-tic tolerance
> capability, it is necessary to understand that protecting from a
> catastrophic explosion in a fuel tank ullage cannot be accomplished
> solely with self-sealing fuel cells. To provide the desired level of
> ballistic tolerance requires a hand-in-hand compli-mentary approach
> which incorpo-rates both self-sealing fuel cells and OBIGGS.
> Ultimately, it is necessary to incorporate the appropriate fuel system
> requirements verbiage requir-ing a self-sealing capability and that
> damage from certain high explosive incendiary and/or armor piercing
> incendiary rounds must not cause catastrophic explosion. This will
> drive a solution, which provides the proper level of survivability
> protec-tion for both permanently mounted and auxiliary internal fuel
> cells."

Control the susceptability. I.e, the "L" in ARL-M...

>
> > I also note that in the first few sentences the authors identify the
> > difference between "susceptability" and "vulnerability"--the latter does
not
> > come into play if the former is controlled such that hits don't
occur--which
> > will be the predominant environment that the ACS and E-10 will operate
in.
> >
> Glad you found out the difference between the two. I think you fit
> firmly in the camp described below. Its a very wrong and hubris filled
> view, but I'll let some much more credible sources speak make the
> case:
> http://jas.jcs.mil/news/pdf/2003_fall.pdf
>
FYI, I stopped going to your sources shortly after determining that you were
twisting the position of the Lexington Institute in regards to the viability
of using commercial airframes in roles such as ACS and E-10.

<snip>

How can you be so verbose and still fail to answer the question regarding
what you think that "L" in ARL means?

Brooks

[[email protected]]

Yeah, after I looked at it on my PC at work, it definitely looks like a
C-17. In fact, I'd bet there's a good reason it does, 'cause it is!

[sid]

"Kevin Brooks" > wrote in message >...
> FYI, I stopped going to your sources shortly after determining that you were
> twisting the position of the Lexington Institute in regards to the viability
> of using commercial airframes in roles such as ACS and E-10.

Never, not once, have you cited any references, at least I've offered
up SOMETHING to supoort my case. You say I twisted what Lexington
Institute has to say. You are completely wrong.
In the ISR lessons learned, Dr. Thompson was addressing ISR as it
stood this summer in light of recent experiences. You've ignored the
"lessons unlearned" part quite well.
In the ACS paper, of the two platforms, he very much sided against the
EMB(and I couldn't agree with him more), but he figures cost will be
the driver in the program which means the EMB may well end up the
choice. He never stated an opinion one way or the other about using
civil airframes.
Ditto for the paper on the E-10. As a matter of fact, he is stressing
the importance of fielding the radar and not really even broaching
what airframe(more on theat later) it will be on. Those two papers had
a very narrow focus. You are putting more into them than they offer.
At least I've cited references, most of which are .mil. When are you
going to back up your "facts" with anything other than your derisive
retorts?

> Please point to the "special engineering" that sets an AFSOC CN 235/295
> apart from one of those Gulfstreams.
>
As one whose day job involves aviation safety and aircraft
engineering, I can say a whole lot about this....but I won't bore you.
In a nutshell, what the CN-235 has going for it is its very
simplicity. Also its relatively clandestine use-its not emitting, nor
loitering for long periods on station like the ACS and E-10
will-certainly helps in reducing its suceptability as well.
I knew some SOF types when I lived near Hurlburt some years ago, and
they hated that airplane by the way. In their words, "What a piece of
crap". IIRC there is talk of replacing them...but I won't twist
anything for you.
Not much is written about the AX yet, but I'll wager a bet that it
certainly will benefit from survivability analysis and engineering.
Wanna put some cash on it?

> > Fact is they are very vulnerable platforms that are being considered
> > for vital missions and that potential adversaries are building weapons
> > to field against.
>
> Big jump from that Russian firm "slowly" pursuing a very long range AAM
> program to "are building".
>
The Novator AAM is in slow development. The S-300 S-400 are no joke
systems. Its explicitly stated they are intended to be employed
against AWACS. No twisting from me here Kevin. Read it for yourself...
http://www.aeronautics.ru/s400triumph.htm
"While the Triumph[S-400] SAM system is capable of firing older 48N6E
missiles, it will use a brand new missile currently in final stages of
development. This new missile would feature a combination of
semi-active/active homing, an effective range of up to 400km and it
will be capable of hitting new-generation air-to-surface missiles and
AWACS aircraft."

> Look, we are NOT sending them into contested airspace, OK? Period.
> There is that strange "OP-2E's" you keep ranting about... And again, we are
> not going to send these assets in against "undue risk".
>
Some guys whose remains finally made it home to Arlington recently
were certainly ordered into contested airspace in their ISR
assets...Even in the face of "undue risk". The job had to get done.
Thats what war-real war-is about Kevin.

You seem to be suffering from a fairly bad bout of "Victory Disease"
Kevin, this may help you get over it:
http://www.army.mil/prof_writing/volumes/volume1/september_2003/9_03_5.html

> > That some AF units seem to be exempt from the possibility of taking
> > enemy fire has been a long term inherent cultural issue apparently.
> > I'm not the only one to say it either:
> >
> http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1983/may-jun/cahoon.htm

You didn't bother to read this I presume...Go ahead. Learn something
new Kevin. Its an old paper, but pertinent to the debate.

> > C-17 drivers just recently went through combat certification for the
> > first time. The question begs, why weren't they treated as warfighters
> > all along?
>
> Meaningless. ACS and E-10 are not airlifters. Airlifters may indeed have to
> drop down into a MANPADS/AAA threat environment to perform their
> mission--ACS and the E-10 do not.
>
Whats not meaningless is the fact...yes Fact...the AF was caught off
guard about the need to consider the C-17 a warplane and its operators
warfighters. From AvWeek Jan.5'04:
"The C-130 community has had a weapons instructor course (WIC) for
many years. But no one expected the C-17 force to [come] under fire
very often...."

Judging from what was written in 1983 all the way to what was written
in 2004, the AF has a relatively poor track record at figuring out
which of their assets may be getting shot at down the road.

> Quick! Call the Pentagon and tell them you have discovered the flaw in the
> plans that so many professionals have been developing for decades now!
>
From whats written below its a topic of offical debate, but mostly
classified apparently...As it should be. My guess is that the
Budgeteering and Powerpointing Prowess is most important in
acquisitions right now. Suriviablity analysis is not getting the
attention it needs.
> > http://www.fas.org/irp/program/collect/SIGINTWP.pdf
> > "ADA Susceptibility: GR/CS and ARL susceptibility to SA 10 and SA 12
> > threats was
> > the cornerstone of the argument to eliminate them from the system.
> > While it is true that they are susceptible to the threats, they are no
> > less so than many of the retained systems. Rivet Joint,EP3, ES3, all
> > retained by the study, fly at altitudes similar to Army systems. Their
> > survivability will require stand-off as well. GR/CS normally flies in
> > the same vicinity as JSTARS and AWACS, two targets an enemy would
> > likely pursue with more vigor than an RC12. Discussions
> > made it clear that the entire air campaign was not considered in the
> > analysis. In fact, constraints of the ADA threat were not uniformly
> > applied. Had it been so, many other platforms would have to become
> > HAPs as well (JSTARS, AWACS)."

> I don't know where you get these ideas, but the E-8 JSTARS surveillance
> range reportedly reaches out to around 250 km--SA-10/12 manage what, maybe
> 90 km?
>
Since I'm sure you didn't open up the link on the S-400 , here is what
it says:
http://www.aeronautics.ru/s300site.htm
KEY CHARACTERISTICS
S-300PMU1 S-300MU2 S-400
Range, km (max) 150 200 400
Altitude, km (max) 25-27 25+ 25+
Altitude, km (min) 10 10 <<10

> > So why were they concerned. Obviously the longer range threat had not
> > been rendered below the "undue threat" threshold.
>
> That is not what the evidence indicates. In fact, were any longer range
> systems used to engage the KC's? Nope--the threat was ameliorated.
>
We know that after the fact. With tankers going "forward". , maybe its
time they need some WICs as well. And why stop there include the ISR
folks as well.

As an FYI the whole point about the E-10 could well be moot:
http://www.aviationnow.com/avnow/news/channel_awst_story.jsp?id=news/02094wna.xml

My beef is that these airframes represent easy kills and the COTS
culture is ignoring the problem. The threat to them while airborne
isn't there today, but some guys who mean us ill will are working hard
on that problem. Easy kills on the tarmac are another issue as well
and certainly possible today. A few bits of shrapnel and its Buh-Bye
shiny new 767-400. An airframe that can be expected to take a measured
amount of battle damage is a necessity for ALL military aircraft. The
problem is, in order to save costs, this analysis is not getting done.
It'll cost lives down the road too, just like past times when
vulnerability issues were ignored.
What the DOD and the manufacturers should do is subject these
airframes to some rigourous survivability analysis. To digress a bit,
the MMA is expected to retain the low level recce and sub attack
mission, so the MMA really needs the benefit of such analysis as well.
Modify FAR PART 125 and MIL-STD-1530A damage tolerance standards to
include the spectre of the MANPADS threat, and spread the total costs
over civil and military production alike.

I'm off the soapbox.

And, oh yes, I DO know what the "L" in ARL means...

sid

[Kevin Brooks]

"sid" > wrote in message
om...
> "Kevin Brooks" > wrote in message
>...

<rant snipped>

>
> > Look, we are NOT sending them into contested airspace, OK? Period.
> > There is that strange "OP-2E's" you keep ranting about... And again, we
are
> > not going to send these assets in against "undue risk".
> >
> Some guys whose remains finally made it home to Arlington recently
> were certainly ordered into contested airspace in their ISR
> assets...Even in the face of "undue risk". The job had to get done.
> Thats what war-real war-is about Kevin.

Are you talking about the DASH-7 ARL that punched into a freakin'
mountainside? Geeze, just what kind of damage tolerance are you demanding?

<snip>

>
> > I don't know where you get these ideas, but the E-8 JSTARS surveillance
> > range reportedly reaches out to around 250 km--SA-10/12 manage what,
maybe
> > 90 km?
> >
> Since I'm sure you didn't open up the link on the S-400 , here is what
> it says:
> http://www.aeronautics.ru/s300site.htm
> KEY CHARACTERISTICS
> S-300PMU1 S-300MU2 S-400
> Range, km (max) 150 200 400
> Altitude, km (max) 25-27 25+ 25+
> Altitude, km (min) 10 10 <<10

Uhmmm...isn't S-400 the ABM derivitive? Which explains it longer
range--against targets waaay upstairs in their radar horizon at that range?
As to the others....250 km is greater than either of them. Now, how often
are you going to see those systems up near the FLOT? That's right--pretty
much never. Talk about being an ATACMS magnet...

<snip>

> My beef is that these airframes represent easy kills and the COTS
> culture is ignoring the problem. The threat to them while airborne
> isn't there today, but some guys who mean us ill will are working hard
> on that problem. Easy kills on the tarmac are another issue as well
> and certainly possible today. A few bits of shrapnel and its Buh-Bye
> shiny new 767-400. An airframe that can be expected to take a measured
> amount of battle damage is a necessity for ALL military aircraft.

Oh, gee whiz, what about those C-40's? And those aircraft specified to go
into low threat areas? I guess you would discount the future use of CRAF
assets as well, right? What with all of those nasty super long range
AAM's...oops, that's right, they are just ghostware.

<snip>

>
> And, oh yes, I DO know what the "L" in ARL means...

I don't think you do, from the angle of your rants. It does NOT mean "low
altitude", nor does it mean "low chance of surviving its mission".

Brooks

>
> sid

[sid]

> "Kevin Brooks" > wrote in message
>...


> > > Look, we are NOT sending them into contested airspace, OK? Period.
> > > There is that strange "OP-2E's" you keep ranting about... And again, we
> > > are not going to send these assets in against "undue risk".

> > Some guys whose remains finally made it home to Arlington recently
> > were certainly ordered into contested airspace in their ISR
> > assets...Even in the face of "undue risk". The job had to get done.
> > Thats what war-real war-is about Kevin.

> Are you talking about the DASH-7 ARL that punched into a freakin'
> mountainside? Geeze, just what kind of damage tolerance are you demanding?

Hate to disappoint you but...No, I'm not talking about what happened
in Colombia at all. Laos actually. Since you are spouting all these
"facts", I thought you'd know all about it.

>Uhmmm...isn't S-400 the ABM derivitive? Which explains it longer
>range--against targets waaay upstairs in their radar horizon at that
range?
>As to the others....250 km is greater than either of them. Now, how
often
>are you going to see those systems up near the FLOT? That's
right--pretty
>much never. Talk about being an ATACMS magnet...

On your last point, its a matter of active concern. The radars and
targeting systems for these systems are bit tougher to counter.
Be honest, did you ever think the Serbs were capable of shooting down
that F-117 before it happend Kevin? Paycheck says no.
Of course I don't expect you to open this:
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj03/spr03/pietrucha.html
Everyone seems to understand the S-400's threat against
aircraft...except you.

Oh yeah, have you checked out anything on "Three Attacks Three
Defenses?"

> Oh, gee whiz, what about those C-40's? And those aircraft specified to go
> into low threat areas? I guess you would discount the future use of CRAF
> assets as well, right? What with all of those nasty super long range
> AAM's...oops, that's right, they are just ghostware.

C-17s were expected to be in low threat areas...until recently. I
should have phrased my statement (which I'm sure you will misconstrue
as a rant) to say ALL aircraft involved in the active conduct of a
battle...even the ones that traditionally have operated on the
periphery.
For C-40s et all, thats where the changes to Part-25 (typo'd as 125
earlier)and MIL-STD-1530A come in. MANPADS is now a threat to ALL
transport category aircraft.
Speaking of CRAF(which isn't instituted right now BTW)... Even though
it wasn't a flight under DOD auspicies, DHL-and eventually LLoyds of
London-have paid dearly for operating in a hot war zone. By the Grace
of God only that crew and aircraft didn't end up in a smoking hole,
and Thank God too that it was empty and not carrying 300 or so of our
finest. Yes I know it was freight dog, so don't get all ****y about
that little "fact".
Did you see the size of the shrapnel hole where the fragment entered
the bottom of the wing and started that hydrodynamic ram created fire?
Its really small so look carefully.
http://gallery.colofinder.net/dhl-airbus/article12042003a010
I wonder what a S-400 warhead would do to a similarly engineered
EMB-145?
Novator's product is a bit more than ghostware, but I don't want to
disturb any of your "facts".

> > And, oh yes, I DO know what the "L" in ARL means...

> I don't think you do, from the angle of your rants. It does NOT mean "low
> altitude", nor does it mean "low chance of surviving its mission".

LOL!! I worked for the operator that had the DASH-7s before the Army
got them(I've moved on since).
Regardless, the ACS won't have an "L" attached. Its expected to be"one
of the first to the fight".

[Kevin Brooks]

"sid" > wrote in message
om...
> > "Kevin Brooks" > wrote in message
> >...
>
>
> > > > Look, we are NOT sending them into contested airspace, OK? Period.
> > > > There is that strange "OP-2E's" you keep ranting about... And again,
we
> > > > are not going to send these assets in against "undue risk".
>
> > > Some guys whose remains finally made it home to Arlington recently
> > > were certainly ordered into contested airspace in their ISR
> > > assets...Even in the face of "undue risk". The job had to get done.
> > > Thats what war-real war-is about Kevin.
>
> > Are you talking about the DASH-7 ARL that punched into a freakin'
> > mountainside? Geeze, just what kind of damage tolerance are you
demanding?
>
> Hate to disappoint you but...No, I'm not talking about what happened
> in Colombia at all. Laos actually. Since you are spouting all these
> "facts", I thought you'd know all about it.

We have not lost an ARL in Laos.

>
> >Uhmmm...isn't S-400 the ABM derivitive? Which explains it longer
> >range--against targets waaay upstairs in their radar horizon at that
> range?
> >As to the others....250 km is greater than either of them. Now, how
> often
> >are you going to see those systems up near the FLOT? That's
> right--pretty
> >much never. Talk about being an ATACMS magnet...
>
> On your last point, its a matter of active concern. The radars and
> targeting systems for these systems are bit tougher to counter.
> Be honest, did you ever think the Serbs were capable of shooting down
> that F-117 before it happend Kevin? Paycheck says no.

Hand it over. Anybody with have a brain knows that stealth is not completely
infallible, and that golden BB's do exist. The F-117 is a tough enough
target to acquire and hit--but it is not *impossible*.

> Of course I don't expect you to open this:
>
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj03/spr03/pietrucha.html
> Everyone seems to understand the S-400's threat against
> aircraft...except you.

Uhmmm...note that scenario has them facing F-15E's, not E-10's or ARL's?
Gee, wonder why... As to the realism of that particular threat...a single
ATACMS battery sitting in that same UAE territory can drill your S-400 site
each time the radar gets flipped on. Joint operations is a wonderful thing,
isn't it?

<snip>

>
> > Oh, gee whiz, what about those C-40's? And those aircraft specified to
go
> > into low threat areas? I guess you would discount the future use of CRAF
> > assets as well, right? What with all of those nasty super long range
> > AAM's...oops, that's right, they are just ghostware.
>
> C-17s were expected to be in low threat areas...until recently. I
> should have phrased my statement (which I'm sure you will misconstrue
> as a rant) to say ALL aircraft involved in the active conduct of a
> battle...even the ones that traditionally have operated on the
> periphery.
> For C-40s et all, thats where the changes to Part-25 (typo'd as 125
> earlier)and MIL-STD-1530A come in. MANPADS is now a threat to ALL
> transport category aircraft.

Oh, no! We have to scrap all of our airliners NOW! Build new ones that meet
your lofty criteria for survivability, right?

> Speaking of CRAF(which isn't instituted right now BTW)... Even though
> it wasn't a flight under DOD auspicies, DHL-and eventually LLoyds of
> London-have paid dearly for operating in a hot war zone. By the Grace
> of God only that crew and aircraft didn't end up in a smoking hole,
> and Thank God too that it was empty and not carrying 300 or so of our
> finest. Yes I know it was freight dog, so don't get all ****y about
> that little "fact".

No, the "fact" you conveniently ignore is that it WAS a civil aircraft, it
WAS hit by a MANPADS, and...it did not fall apart! It actually *survived*.
Not a good example to support your "commercial airframes can't handle
modern combat requirements" sermon, now is it?

<snip>

> I wonder what a S-400 warhead would do to a similarly engineered
> EMB-145?

Probably the same thing it would do if it hit any *military* aircraft--blow
it to hell and back. You are trying to compare the effects of a MANPADS
strike (which we now know is survivable on the part of a commercial
aircraft, thanks again for the example) to that of a big honking warhead
like what is carried on the S-300/400 class weapons?!

> Novator's product is a bit more than ghostware, but I don't want to
> disturb any of your "facts".

Then tell us where it is--when is the first testflight? What kind of
guidance system will it use? Come on now--give us the specifics on this new
uber-weapon.

>
> > > And, oh yes, I DO know what the "L" in ARL means...
>
> > I don't think you do, from the angle of your rants. It does NOT mean
"low
> > altitude", nor does it mean "low chance of surviving its mission".
>
> LOL!! I worked for the operator that had the DASH-7s before the Army
> got them(I've moved on since).
> Regardless, the ACS won't have an "L" attached. Its expected to be"one
> of the first to the fight".

I hate to tell you this, but the ARL also serves in that role--or did you
think we deployed them to Korea for grins and giggles? The key is *where* it
conducts its "fight"...yep, somewhere well to the rear of the FLOT, with due
regard to any potential threat systems that *could* cause it problems if it
moved into their envelope.

This has been loads of fun, but in the end it sounds a bit like that
fellow's one-man crusade against those eee-vil oil companies who stole his
kool-aid/gas formula that gives him 100 miles to the gallon, and can't
understand *why* the mainstream tech world just can't seem to grasp the
importance of his discovery... So adios, and have a nice day--we can revisit
this the day we start trying to penetrate the bad guys' IADS with those
ERJ's....

Brooks

[sid]

> > "Kevin Brooks" > wrote in message
> >...
> > Hate to disappoint you but...No, I'm not talking about what happened
> > in Colombia at all. Laos actually. Since you are spouting all these
> > "facts", I thought you'd know all about it.

> We have not lost an ARL in Laos.

Yeah. I know that. Apparently you are unaware of the ISR assets we DID
lose in Laos.


> Hand it over. Anybody with have a brain knows that stealth is not completely
> infallible, and that golden BB's do exist. The F-117 is a tough enough
> target to acquire and hit--but it is not *impossible*.

I only have your word for it and so far your words have not been
substantiated or proven particularly reliable.
Do you think we are the only ones pursuing innovative networked
targeting systems? You are showing more signs of that "Voctory
Disease".


> Of course I don't expect you to open this:
>
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj03/spr03/pietrucha.html
> Everyone seems to understand the S-400's threat against
> aircraft...except you.

> Uhmmm...note that scenario has them facing F-15E's, not E-10's or ARL's?
> Gee, wonder why... As to the realism of that particular threat...a single
> ATACMS battery sitting in that same UAE territory can drill your S-400 site
> each time the radar gets flipped on. Joint operations is a wonderful thing,
> isn't it?

Excellent!! You did open a link. I urge you to open the others as
well...especially those dealing with surviviability. Whatever you
think of my points here, there is wealth of good stuff there. I'm
heartened that you now know the difference between "vulnerability" and
"susceptability"
Networked systems, that certainly wont be fielded by 2006, is what it
takes to defeat that kind of threat. What is expected to serve as the
nexus for the networked systems? Why our airborne ISR assets of
course. Neutralize them and we have a big problem.
Our potential adversaries are aware of this and have stated they want
to counter those assets in a big way.
Once you get done doing the research on ISR asset losses in Laos, read
up on Three Attacks Three Defenses


> > For C-40s et all, thats where the changes to Part-25 (typo'd as 125
> > earlier)and MIL-STD-1530A come in. MANPADS is now a threat to ALL
> > transport category aircraft.

> Oh, no! We have to scrap all of our airliners NOW! Build new ones that meet
> your lofty criteria for survivability, right?

Thats silly Kevin. What CAN be done is to harden those civil airframes
destined for military use to a measured level. Then leverage at least
some of those enhancements (whatever analysis shows to be the best)
into new construction aircraft.
On the civil side, all thats being proposed are pork riddled expensive
countermeasure sets. IF you were to read up on survivability, you
would see a balance between susceptability and vulnerability is what
it takes for sucess.
The big problem is the analysis is not getting done for aircraft that
will sorely need the protection one day.


> No, the "fact" you conveniently ignore is that it WAS a civil aircraft, it
> WAS hit by a MANPADS, and...it did not fall apart! It actually *survived*.
> Not a good example to support your "commercial airframes can't handle
> modern combat requirements" sermon, now is it?

Didn't ignore it one bit. It was a very small piece of shrapnel that
caused that winfg to burn almost all the way off. Because this
aircraft landed means little. It had no hydraulics (and no manual
reversion), and the left after spar was burned 85 to 90 pct through.
The fact that airplane landed really doesn't say much except that it
was a calm day, the aircraft was empty and light, and the captain had
just recently been reviewing the United DC-10 no hydraulics landing.
If it had been windy, or if the airplane had been heavier, or if the
captain had not thought about how to maneuver with engines only, the
story would have been different. They were really, really lucky.
An aircraft that had been built to take at least some damage which is
what these people are all about making sure happens:
http://jas.jcs.mil/main.htm
would have had a whole lot better chance at making it back alive.


> I hate to tell you this, but the ARL also serves in that role--or did you
> think we deployed them to Korea for grins and giggles? The key is *where* it
> conducts its "fight"...yep, somewhere well to the rear of the FLOT, with due
> regard to any potential threat systems that *could* cause it problems if it
> moved into their envelope.

Essentially a cold war type deployment prior to the initiation of
hostilities. You are exhibiting more symptoms of the Victory Disease.
http://www.army.mil/prof_writing/volumes/volume1/september_2003/9_03_5.html
With a projected SAR/MTI range of 120 km (in flat terrain) ACS would
be well within range of S-300 S-400 threats.

On a parting note. Did you see where the E-10 isn't likely to be built
anytime soon anyway?