Re: Why not use the F-22 to replace the F/A-18 and F-14?

[Pooh Bear]

"Scott M. Kozel" wrote:

> You allege I "resort to schoolgirl hysterical abuse", and then you post
> strings of personal abuse.

You started the name calling. Now let's stop it - ok ?

>
> Hypocrite!

Quite !

Graham

[Pooh Bear]

JL Grasso wrote:

> On Mon, 01 Mar 2004 06:44:12 +0000, Pooh Bear
> > wrote:
>
> >"Scott M. Kozel" wrote:
> >
> >> Pooh Bear > wrote:
> >> >
> >> > "Scott M. Kozel" wrote:
> >> >
> >> > > Not surprising for Puke Bear.
> >> >
> >> > Who the h**l rattled *your* cage Kozel ?
> >> >
> >> > I once thought you were an intelligent person.
> >> >
> >> > Your resort to schoolgirl hysterical abuse shows otherwise. Caught a
> >> > case of Berteimania ?
> >>
> >> YOU sound hysterical.
> >
> >Please calm down and take the pills. There's a good lad.
> >
> >So ? You're prepared to resort to the verbal abuse school of debate ?
> >
> >I suppose you'll be suggesting I stick rodents up my bottom next ?
> >
> >You do yourself a disservice by lowering yourself to the troll-level
> >currently shown by most a.d.a contributors.
> >
> >I have no problem with debating an arguable case. To resort to verbal
> >abuse ( as Scott did - and you are close to ) to make your point pretty
> >much voids you of any credibility.
>
> I assume you may have been addressing me here in your reply to Scott.

In part.

> I
> apologize for any slight(s) that you may deem personally insulting.

Thank you kindly.

>
> Understand that it's a bit tedious and somewhat frustrating to debate with
> someone who ignores points that should be understood of certain
> technologies which are called into question.
>
> I will grant you that your technical knowledge is likely greater than that
> of the average planespotter, and I'll try and keep the debate on an
> accordingly professional level.

Much appreciated.

Your comments have been very interesting actually.

Regds, Graham

[Pooh Bear]

JL Grasso wrote:

> On Mon, 01 Mar 2004 17:58:20 +0000, Pooh Bear
> > wrote:
>
> >You would dismiss photographic evidence ? I can see I'll have to ferret out that tape if it still
> >exists.
>
> All that I've seen is the photographs (stills) on the airdisaster.com
> site, and I don't feel that there is any signicance whatsoever in what is
> shown there. Still, I'm open to whatever arises, and will gladly admit
> that I'm wrong should I be shown compelling evidence which supports your
> assertion.
>
> I'd also be more than interested in viewing the documentary(s) that you
> reference. If you know how / where I could purchase one, please let me
> know.

I found a link that gave a number to order a copy of the Channel 4 Equinox programme - need to
backtrack and find again. Actually, I have a feeling they did more than one programme on this - but no
matter.

It's likely to be UK PAL though - can you view that ?

> We need to get this resolved before you start trying to tell me that a 757
> did not hit the Pentagon!

LOL, Graham

[Woody Beal]

On 2/29/04 8:58, in article , "Kevin
Brooks" > wrote:

>
> "Doug "Woody" and Erin Beal" > wrote in message
> ...
>
> Not at all; your argument was so lacking in logic that I saw little reason
> to bother. But if you are so interested in improving yourself, here goes:

Quite the condescending gentleman aren't you?

> "CAS is available immediately because it is capping nearby--not because it
<SNIP>
>
> What you ignore is that the "capping" (by which you actually menat
> "stacking", I presume) is utterly dependent upon a number of external
> factors that don't necessarily impact the operations of a STOVL aircraft.

'Round and 'round. First of all, stack is not a verb. It's a noun. If I'm
in the CAS stack, I'm capping.

> You have to have tankers to support the CAS stack--tankers are a commodity
<SNIP>
> the ground commander's needs. He wants some CBU-105's in the mix? <SNIP>

You make a correct argument. The nearer an airfield/CV is to the battle,
the more sorties you can generate. Afghanistan is a good example of a place
that was hard to get to by both CV and the USAF.

I'm saying it's not worth the risk/extra cost, and I disagree with your
assessment of how many scenarios make the concept worth the cost. The
decision has been made. I disagree with it.

<SNIP>
>> It was actually YOU that suggested that the USAF was trying to make nice
>> with the USMC.
>
> No, it was not. I was being quite facetious with that query. That you found
> it palusible is rather telling of your grasp of this situation.
>

I've got a darned good grasp of it. Perhaps you have a problem
communicating your point. Leave the sarcasm out, and we can conduct an
intelligent discussion.

> Firstly, if the STOVL version were axed, the USMC would most
<SNIP>
>They are already onboard. They just seem to grasp the importance of being
> more versatile a bit better than you do.

I grasp what's useful and what's not.

>>
>>>
>>> Any evidence that STOVL kills more pilots than other fast jets? Or any
<SNIP>
>> that last one shouldn't count... Not unique to the STOVL discussion. I
>> was on a roll.)
>
> Meaningless. Compare the accident rates per hours flown and get back to me.
> Then tell us how that applies to the F-35B, a different aircraft with a
> different lift system.
>

You asked. I answered. The data for more experienced pilots stacks up the
same. I included the 500 hrs or less data because it's what I had at my
fingertips. Most military pilots will tell you that the AV-8B's mishap
rates are above other military aircraft--and it's a maintenance hog.

>>
>> According to a brief by the Navy's Aviation Safety School given a few
<SNIP>
>
> So flying the AV-8B is more demanding of new pilots. Hardly an indictment of
> the STOVL concept itself.
>

That is simply burying your head in the sand. A more complex airplane will
fail more often than a less complex airplane. Historically, the AV-8B has
meted this out.


<SNIP>
>
> Unless you can't support the operation adequately with the CTOL aircraft.
>
> Brooks
>

Which you can.

--Woody

>>
>> Now ask me if I think it's a good idea that the F-35 is a single engine
>> aircraft or whether I think it's a good idea that the Navy guys have
>> decided not to put an internal gun on their version.
>>
>> --Woody
>>
>
>

[running with scissors]

Pooh Bear > wrote in message >...
> JL Grasso wrote:
>
> > On Sun, 29 Feb 2004 21:40:20 +0000, Pooh Bear
> > > wrote:
> >
> > >So the radio altimeter was accurate ? I think not. And that was known to be one of the weak
> > >spots in the A320's systems at that time IIRC.
> > >
> > >I'm guessing that Capt Asseline realised that the radar altimeter was malfunctioning and
> > >reverted to baro readings.
> > >
> > >
> > >Regds, Graham
> >
> > You need to know that at 12:45:11, the aircraft was still well off the
> > airport area by several thousand yards. They were over a hilly,
> > partially-forested area (Hardt Forest) to the right of the approach end of
> > runway 02 (which was the actual runway they were supposed to parallel
> > during the flyover).
>
> Ahh - the problem with the briefing !
>
> > You should also know that radar altimeters report the
> > distance between the transceiver antennas and any objects below.
>
> Yes indeed - I do.
>
> > So, if
> > the topography of the area below varies, or the altitude varies, the
> > readings change nearly immediately.
>
> Agreed.
>
> So let's check the topography then ? The flight path etc. From my own experience, that general area
> is pretty flat but I'm interested in seeing any info.
>
> > Changes in the attitude of the
> > aircraft can sometimes have effects on the readings also.
>
> I can see that too - indeed you could possibly call it a deficiency of rad alts.
>
> > This is
> > something that an experienced Captain would know, and something a
> > planespotter would not.
>
> Can't resist being Bertei's pal ? If only I had the time to go spot planes ! Last time I had a
> look-around I saw some nice kit at Panshanger. I'd rather spend my time 'spotting' attractive women
> - and getting to know them actually.
>
> > If you would actually read something comprehensive concerning this accident, you could see that
> > the RadAlt was consistent while over the relatively level terrain of the airfield - just as one
> > would expect.
>
> Indeed it is.
>
>
> > I also assume that if the radar altimeter was broken, it would have been
> > deferred MMEL and cited as such in the investigation.
>
> I never asserted it was broken. Simply that the implementation at that time in the A320 had given
> rise to concerns about its accuracy.
>
> Actually - you succeeded in diverting my attention from what I consider to be one of the more
> intruiging aspects of this crash - notably a suggested compressor stall.
>
>
> Graham

nope no comressor stall.

according to tarver, airbus's crash at the end of the runway because
its unknown and unmapped.

[Kevin Brooks]

"Woody Beal" > wrote in message
...
> On 2/29/04 8:58, in article , "Kevin
> Brooks" > wrote:
>
> >
> > "Doug "Woody" and Erin Beal" > wrote in message
> > ...
> >
> > Not at all; your argument was so lacking in logic that I saw little
reason
> > to bother. But if you are so interested in improving yourself, here
goes:
>
> Quite the condescending gentleman aren't you?

Not really. I was willing to let that particular passage go unanswered, but
you are so all fired up to debate it that you wanted to make a big point of
it, so you got your answer.

>
> > "CAS is available immediately because it is capping nearby--not because
it
> <SNIP>
> >
> > What you ignore is that the "capping" (by which you actually menat
> > "stacking", I presume) is utterly dependent upon a number of external
> > factors that don't necessarily impact the operations of a STOVL
aircraft.
>
> 'Round and 'round. First of all, stack is not a verb. It's a noun.

Better check the ol' dictionary again. It is indeed also a verb; my
handy-dandy Webster's defines it as "to pile up in a stack".

If I'm
> in the CAS stack, I'm capping.

Whatever you say, pal. I had assumed you were referring to some
verb-transformed version of CAP, as in "combat air patrol". If so you might
want to clue DoD in on your change to the definition of CAP, which is, "An
aircraft patrol provided over an objective area, the force protected, the
critical area of a combat zone, or in an air defense area, for the purpose
of intercepting and destroying hostile aircraft before they reach their
targets. Also called CAP. See also airborne alert; barrier combat air
patrol; patrol; rescue combat air patrol." Don't see any reference to CAS
usage there. ( http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/c/01033.html )
Of course, to be completely honest, there is no reference to the term CAS
stack in that publication, either. So why don't we just both claim victory
regarding this particularly weighty matter and be done with it? :)

>
> > You have to have tankers to support the CAS stack--tankers are a
commodity
> <SNIP>
> > the ground commander's needs. He wants some CBU-105's in the mix? <SNIP>
>
> You make a correct argument. The nearer an airfield/CV is to the battle,
> the more sorties you can generate. Afghanistan is a good example of a
place
> that was hard to get to by both CV and the USAF.

And it was also one where the inability to provide specific weapons loadout
requests in a timely manner was problematic, as witnessed by the Anaconda
fight, where the aircraft were not always optimally loaded out to handle the
requirments of the ground force at that given moment--this is another
advantage of the STOVL platform, which can hit a FARP to load out the
required munitions.

>
> I'm saying it's not worth the risk/extra cost, and I disagree with your
> assessment of how many scenarios make the concept worth the cost. The
> decision has been made. I disagree with it.

Fine. Disagreement within our military is, IMO, what makes it great. As
Patton once said, "If everybody is in agreement, then somebody is not
thinking" (or something similarly worded--been a few years since I read that
quote). I'll take the opposite stance, in that I view increasing our
versatility as a key requirement for our future military needs, especially
in view of the environment that we find ourselves in and facing for the
foreseeable future, where a lack of specific threat characterization until
that threat is immediately immenent is the norm.

>
> <SNIP>
> >> It was actually YOU that suggested that the USAF was trying to make
nice
> >> with the USMC.
> >
> > No, it was not. I was being quite facetious with that query. That you
found
> > it palusible is rather telling of your grasp of this situation.
> >
>
> I've got a darned good grasp of it. Perhaps you have a problem
> communicating your point. Leave the sarcasm out, and we can conduct an
> intelligent discussion.

Apologies if you were offended. The sarcasm introduced in my original
comment regarding whether you thought the USAF was merely making nice to the
USMC was IMO rather mild--hang around Usenet long enough and you will
experience much worse, I promise you. Suffice it to say that the USAF is not
pursuing the purchase of the STVL version of the F-35 as a minor portion of
their overall F-35 buy due to any desire to make things easy for the USMC,
OK?

>
> > Firstly, if the STOVL version were axed, the USMC would most
> <SNIP>
> >They are already onboard. They just seem to grasp the importance of being
> > more versatile a bit better than you do.
>
> I grasp what's useful and what's not.

If you can't grasp the "usefulness" of versatility in the modern and future
military picture, then I beleive you need to reconsider. Had I told you in
August of 2001 that we needed to be able and ready to go into Afghanistan
with a combination of airpower and landpower, you'd have laughed at me. The
plain fact of the matter is that we don't *know* where, when, how, or what
the next threat will be or its nature. That requires versatility on the part
of the military forces. The USAF has probably been one of the more energetic
proponents of improving the versatility of its units and platforms; the USMC
another. The Army and Navy have been IMO relative late bloomers in this
regard, but now we are seeing some real movement in their camps as well. The
flip-side of this versatility card is that those forces that *don't* become
versatile, or can't become more versatile, become prime fodder for
elimination by being labled as "non-transformational" (the Army, for
example, is *finally* moving towards the concept of the brigade combat team
being its primary unit of action, as opposed to the Cold War
mentality-inspired division; this helps a bit in making their heavy
formations a bit more versatile in terms of how we will use them). A USAF
tactical fighter force that includes some STOVL F-35B's along with the CTOL
F-35A's is by definition going to be a more versatile force than one which
is solely A model equipped.

>
> >>
> >>>
> >>> Any evidence that STOVL kills more pilots than other fast jets? Or any
> <SNIP>
> >> that last one shouldn't count... Not unique to the STOVL discussion. I
> >> was on a roll.)
> >
> > Meaningless. Compare the accident rates per hours flown and get back to
me.
> > Then tell us how that applies to the F-35B, a different aircraft with a
> > different lift system.
> >
>
> You asked. I answered. The data for more experienced pilots stacks up
the
> same. I included the 500 hrs or less data because it's what I had at my
> fingertips. Most military pilots will tell you that the AV-8B's mishap
> rates are above other military aircraft--and it's a maintenance hog.

OK, here are a couple of numbers I ran over: AV-8 accident rate per 100K
hours was 12 (admittedly an "ouch!", but I am not sure they were not lumping
together *all* AV-8 records, to include the early AV-8A)...and the accident
rate for the old CTOL F-8 Crusader through its lifetime? 16. That does not
equate to a definite case of being able to claim that STOVL is inherently
more risky than CTOL.

>
> >>
> >> According to a brief by the Navy's Aviation Safety School given a few
> <SNIP>
> >
> > So flying the AV-8B is more demanding of new pilots. Hardly an
indictment of
> > the STOVL concept itself.
> >
>
> That is simply burying your head in the sand. A more complex airplane
will
> fail more often than a less complex airplane. Historically, the AV-8B has
> meted this out.

And the F-8 Crusader? The F-104, which peaked at an astounding 139 per 100K
hours back in the 1960's? The Century Series fighters generally all had
accident rates that exceeded those for the AV-8. If increased complexity
resulted in a direct and irreversable increase in the accident rate, then
why are today's more complex aircraft exhibiting a much lower accident rate
than their earlier ancestors?

Finally, how does the AV-8 accident rate imply a direct connection with that
which can be expected for the F-35B, which will use a radically different
lift system (partly because of the past problems with the AV-8?)?

>
>
> <SNIP>
> >
> > Unless you can't support the operation adequately with the CTOL
aircraft.
> >
> > Brooks
> >
>
> Which you can.

You can't guarantee that. Imagine a scenario where the fight in Afghanistan
had not been able to rely as heavily as it did upon the Northern Alliance in
the ground combat role. When US lives are on the line in that ground
environment, the demand for CAS will inevitably increase. The demand for
tanker support to keep the C-17's flowing into the intermediate staging
base, or even directly into the area of operations' aerial port of
debarkation (APOD), will increase, meaning less available to support the use
of CTOL fighters in the loooong range CAS effort. Or, imagine a scenario
where we are forced to (gasp!) take on two different simulataneous combat
operations in different theaters, one being a more major conflict that
consumes the lions share of the available tanking and bomber (read as
"really long range and high capacity CAS platform, in addition to its BAI
and "strategic" roles") assets. You don't have the option of just saying,
"Sorry, no CAS for you guys in theater B due to the range restrictions."
Versatility rules.

Brooks

>
> --Woody
>
> >>
> >> Now ask me if I think it's a good idea that the F-35 is a single engine
> >> aircraft or whether I think it's a good idea that the Navy guys have
> >> decided not to put an internal gun on their version.
> >>
> >> --Woody
> >>
> >
> >
>

[Woody Beal]

On 3/1/04 21:44, in article , "Kevin
Brooks" > wrote:

>
> "Woody Beal" > wrote in message
> ...
<SNIP>
> Not really. I was willing to let that particular passage go unanswered, but
> you are so all fired up to debate it that you wanted to make a big point of
> it, so you got your answer.
>

Fair enough. I'll put it to bed.

>>
>>> "CAS is available immediately because it is capping nearby--not because
<SNIP>
> stack in that publication, either. So why don't we just both claim victory
> regarding this particularly weighty matter and be done with it? :)
>

I'm done with this point too.

>>
>>> You have to have tankers to support the CAS stack--tankers are a
<SNIP>
>>
>> I've got a darned good grasp of it. Perhaps you have a problem
>> communicating your point. Leave the sarcasm out, and we can conduct an
>> intelligent discussion.
>
> Apologies if you were offended. The sarcasm introduced in my original
> comment regarding whether you thought the USAF was merely making nice to the
> USMC was IMO rather mild--hang around Usenet long enough and you will
> experience much worse, I promise you. Suffice it to say that the USAF is not
> pursuing the purchase of the STVL version of the F-35 as a minor portion of
> their overall F-35 buy due to any desire to make things easy for the USMC,
> OK?
>

OK. Now we're ebbing and flowing. Any offense taken on my part was
certainly minor. I hope that I haven't given you the impression that I'm
the thin-skinned type. I've been dealing with critique and criticism for
years (not just since I started conversing on RAMN in about 1995 either).
Frankly, the more I learn about aviation and tactics, the more I realize I
don't know.

Honestly, any speculation on my part about why the USAF is buying STOVL
F-35's is just that.

<SNIP>
> formations a bit more versatile in terms of how we will use them). A USAF
> tactical fighter force that includes some STOVL F-35B's along with the CTOL
> F-35A's is by definition going to be a more versatile force than one which
> is solely A model equipped.

Yes it is. It also provides them a shot at expansion and secures a foothold
in what they probably consider to be a growth area in tactical aviation.
The blue-suited brethren are fairly savvy folk.

>>>>> Any evidence that STOVL kills more pilots than other fast jets? Or any
>> <SNIP>
>
> OK, here are a couple of numbers I ran over: AV-8 accident rate per 100K
> hours was 12 (admittedly an "ouch!", but I am not sure they were not lumping
> together *all* AV-8 records, to include the early AV-8A)...and the accident
> rate for the old CTOL F-8 Crusader through its lifetime? 16. That does not
> equate to a definite case of being able to claim that STOVL is inherently
> more risky than CTOL.
>

F-8 and AV-8B are apples and oranges (old apples, young oranges?) due to
their operating in mostly different eras. During a portion of the F-8's
life span, many of the safety programs that were input in later years (e.g.
the NATOPS program IIRC) were not in effect. Compare the F/A-18 or F-14
rates with the AV-8B.

The microcosm I mentioned at China Lake (while certainly anecdotal), speaks
to the larger issue. On the way to dinner tonight, I polled a couple of
(Hornet) pilots as to how they thought the AV-8B stacked up to the F/A-18
from a safety standpoint. Death trap was the general consensus. Granted,
they think neanderthal, like me.

>>
>>>>
>>>> According to a brief by the Navy's Aviation Safety School given a few
>> <SNIP>
>>>
>>> So flying the AV-8B is more demanding of new pilots. Hardly an
> indictment of
>>> the STOVL concept itself.
>>>
>>
>> That is simply burying your head in the sand. A more complex airplane
> will
>> fail more often than a less complex airplane. Historically, the AV-8B has
>> meted this out.
>
> And the F-8 Crusader? The F-104, which peaked at an astounding 139 per 100K
> hours back in the 1960's? The Century Series fighters generally all had
> accident rates that exceeded those for the AV-8. If increased complexity
> resulted in a direct and irreversable increase in the accident rate, then
> why are today's more complex aircraft exhibiting a much lower accident rate
> than their earlier ancestors?
>

Time period is important in this discussion as alluded to above because of
safety programs (currency requirements, NATOPS, annual check rides, etc.
that were put into effect).

> Finally, how does the AV-8 accident rate imply a direct connection with that
> which can be expected for the F-35B, which will use a radically different
> lift system (partly because of the past problems with the AV-8?)?
>

Honestly, no one knows for sure. Most likely better because we've learned
some important lessons from the AV-8A/B and are applying a different
solution to the problem of STOVL. My guess is that because it still relies
on more moving parts than it's CTOL counterparts in a critical phase of
flight, it'll have a higher mishap rate.

Again, unofficial dinner poll: Opinion of the STOVL F-35? Not worth it.

<SNIP>
> "Sorry, no CAS for you guys in theater B due to the range restrictions."
> Versatility rules.
>
> Brooks
>

Ironically, I also find myself arguing from the same perspective when I talk
to USAF dudes who say that CV's are washed up and not cost effective, so
believe me when I say, I see your points.

--Woody

[Kevin Brooks]

"Woody Beal" > wrote in message
...
> On 3/1/04 21:44, in article , "Kevin
> Brooks" > wrote:
>
> >
> > "Woody Beal" > wrote in message
> > ...

<snip>

>
> OK. Now we're ebbing and flowing. Any offense taken on my part was
> certainly minor. I hope that I haven't given you the impression that I'm
> the thin-skinned type. I've been dealing with critique and criticism for
> years (not just since I started conversing on RAMN in about 1995 either).
> Frankly, the more I learn about aviation and tactics, the more I realize I
> don't know.

Shoot, I don't know diddly about actual air tactics beyond what I have read,
so you are light years ahead of me. I have had some experience with the CAS
planning cycle from the groundpounder's perspective, and one of the biggest
gripes we had was the lack of responsiveness and that 72-48-24 hour
timeline. To give the USAF credit where it is due, it sounds like that
situation has improved mightily over the past couple of years.

>
> Honestly, any speculation on my part about why the USAF is buying STOVL
> F-35's is just that.
>
> <SNIP>
> > formations a bit more versatile in terms of how we will use them). A
USAF
> > tactical fighter force that includes some STOVL F-35B's along with the
CTOL
> > F-35A's is by definition going to be a more versatile force than one
which
> > is solely A model equipped.
>
> Yes it is. It also provides them a shot at expansion and secures a
foothold
> in what they probably consider to be a growth area in tactical aviation.
> The blue-suited brethren are fairly savvy folk.

That is true too. Though my take is that the term "joint" now has a
significantly more concrete meaning in all of the services than it did even
five or six years ago.

>
> >>>>> Any evidence that STOVL kills more pilots than other fast jets? Or
any
> >> <SNIP>
> >
> > OK, here are a couple of numbers I ran over: AV-8 accident rate per 100K
> > hours was 12 (admittedly an "ouch!", but I am not sure they were not
lumping
> > together *all* AV-8 records, to include the early AV-8A)...and the
accident
> > rate for the old CTOL F-8 Crusader through its lifetime? 16. That does
not
> > equate to a definite case of being able to claim that STOVL is
inherently
> > more risky than CTOL.
> >
>
> F-8 and AV-8B are apples and oranges (old apples, young oranges?) due to
> their operating in mostly different eras. During a portion of the F-8's
> life span, many of the safety programs that were input in later years
(e.g.
> the NATOPS program IIRC) were not in effect. Compare the F/A-18 or F-14
> rates with the AV-8B.

Twin engined aircraft with single engine aircraft? I don't think so. Take
the F-16, which does indeed have a significantly lower accident rate (a bit
under three per 100K hours IIRC). I can see your point, and acknowledge that
the AV-8 is indeed more accident prone than its contemporaries--but that
does noy IMO yield a concrete conclusion versus the F-35B.

>
> The microcosm I mentioned at China Lake (while certainly anecdotal),
speaks
> to the larger issue. On the way to dinner tonight, I polled a couple of
> (Hornet) pilots as to how they thought the AV-8B stacked up to the F/A-18
> from a safety standpoint. Death trap was the general consensus. Granted,
> they think neanderthal, like me.

Yeah, I once attended a joint course with a polyglot of participants,
including both an F-18 pilot and a P-3 bus driver. The Hornet driver was
ceaseless in his hammering of the Orion guy--I think he was mainly ****ed
because to him "deployment" meant six months on a CVN halfway around the
world, while the VP folks were pulling up to 179-day (in order to keep it
under that TDY pay maximum) rotations to Iceland, where the fishing is
outstanding (I don't recall him decrying the VP folks also having to do
those tours during the winter months...). Definitely neanderthal... :-)

>
> >>
> >>>>
> >>>> According to a brief by the Navy's Aviation Safety School given a few
> >> <SNIP>
> >>>
> >>> So flying the AV-8B is more demanding of new pilots. Hardly an
> > indictment of
> >>> the STOVL concept itself.
> >>>
> >>
> >> That is simply burying your head in the sand. A more complex airplane
> > will
> >> fail more often than a less complex airplane. Historically, the AV-8B
has
> >> meted this out.
> >
> > And the F-8 Crusader? The F-104, which peaked at an astounding 139 per
100K
> > hours back in the 1960's? The Century Series fighters generally all had
> > accident rates that exceeded those for the AV-8. If increased complexity
> > resulted in a direct and irreversable increase in the accident rate,
then
> > why are today's more complex aircraft exhibiting a much lower accident
rate
> > than their earlier ancestors?
> >
>
> Time period is important in this discussion as alluded to above because of
> safety programs (currency requirements, NATOPS, annual check rides, etc.
> that were put into effect).

I have no doubt that those factors are important. But when all is said and
done, the fact is that as aircraft complexity has increased, the accident
rate has generally decreased. This is true even *since* such safety programs
were initiated--witness the low rate for the F-16, which has within its own
career grown increasingly complex (compare a F-16A Block 10 to the F-16C
Block 52). I do believe that its accident rate is abit lower than that of
the F-4, which had that whole extra engine included... :)

>
> > Finally, how does the AV-8 accident rate imply a direct connection with
that
> > which can be expected for the F-35B, which will use a radically
different
> > lift system (partly because of the past problems with the AV-8?)?
> >
>
> Honestly, no one knows for sure. Most likely better because we've learned
> some important lessons from the AV-8A/B and are applying a different
> solution to the problem of STOVL. My guess is that because it still
relies
> on more moving parts than it's CTOL counterparts in a critical phase of
> flight, it'll have a higher mishap rate.

Maybe. But then again, maybe not. For all we know the typically "increased
risk" associated with operatins from a CVN may lead to the C model having a
worse accident record. I don't think there is enough information that
*could* be available at this point to postively conclude either way.

>
> Again, unofficial dinner poll: Opinion of the STOVL F-35? Not worth it.

OK. But go back to those folks and ask them to earnestly try to put
themselves in the boots of the brigade commander on the ground who has
troops in contact, is outnumbered (as we can expect to be in many cases),
and needs to shift his air support quickly from one target set to a whole
new class of targets, while also needing/desperately wanting an increase of
maybe 30% in the CAS sortie count--and oh, by the way, the nearest CTOL
fighter airstrip is 1000 miles away, since they have yet to reconstruct the
airfield in his AO that is supporting him via C-130 shuttle. Do you think
that *he* might value having a squadron (USAF type, with 24 birds) of SOVL
assets capable of hitting a FARP ten or twelve klicks to the rear of his CP?

Or alternatively, when the CVN's are all clustered in (choose body of water)
handling the major contingency going down with (choose potential foe), and
your USMC BLT is forced to devite from its transit to that area while
enroute and FRAGO'd to execute operations independently elsewhere, would you
want the services of some F-35B's operating as part of your parent amphib
strike group?

>
> <SNIP>
> > "Sorry, no CAS for you guys in theater B due to the range restrictions."
> > Versatility rules.
> >
> > Brooks
> >
>
> Ironically, I also find myself arguing from the same perspective when I
talk
> to USAF dudes who say that CV's are washed up and not cost effective, so
> believe me when I say, I see your points.

OK. I personally find the CVN to be of immense import--in specific
circumstances and conditions. Much like the F-35B--it ain't the best
all-around strike/CAS platform available, but it does have its niches.
Neither is necessarily the best tool for *all* potentialities.

Are you still at China Lake? Wonderful place (note my sarcasm)...right next
to that other gardenspot I used to frequent on occasion, FT Irwin (even more
sarcasm). Last time I went through that area I spent the night in that
little town near the main entrance to China Lake, enroute to Lone Pine for a
few days fishing in the higher elevations.

Brooks

>
> --Woody
>

[Woody Beal]

On 3/2/04 0:18, in article , "Kevin
Brooks" > wrote:

>
> "Woody Beal" > wrote in message
<SNIP>
>
> Shoot, I don't know diddly about actual air tactics beyond what I have read,
> so you are light years ahead of me. I have had some experience with the CAS
> planning cycle from the groundpounder's perspective, and one of the biggest
> gripes we had was the lack of responsiveness and that 72-48-24 hour
> timeline. To give the USAF credit where it is due, it sounds like that
> situation has improved mightily over the past couple of years.
>

I know a bit--all from the perspective of Naval Aviation. I know what we
bring to the table.

<SNIP>
>
> Twin engined aircraft with single engine aircraft? I don't think so. Take
> the F-16, which does indeed have a significantly lower accident rate (a bit
> under three per 100K hours IIRC). I can see your point, and acknowledge that
> the AV-8 is indeed more accident prone than its contemporaries--but that
> does noy IMO yield a concrete conclusion versus the F-35B.
>

Concur that it does not yield a concrete conclusion, but it does yield a
tendency based on several possible single point failures. If lift fan doors
don't open, if lift rotor fails to engage properly, if engine fails during
transition to STOVL life gets tough at a very critical and low altitude
moment. These problems (though not identical) are similar to those
experienced in the AV-8B.

Mechanical failures in the STOVL regime are unforgiving because of their low
altitude locale.

>>
>> The microcosm I mentioned at China Lake (while certainly anecdotal),
<SNIP>
> those tours during the winter months...). Definitely neanderthal... :-)
>

Beating up on P-3 guys is a standard Hornet pilot sport. I choose not to
participate--kind of like clubbing baby seals--no sport in it.

<SNIP>
>> Time period is important in this discussion as alluded to above because of
>> safety programs (currency requirements, NATOPS, annual check rides, etc.
>> that were put into effect).
>
> I have no doubt that those factors are important. But when all is said and
> done, the fact is that as aircraft complexity has increased, the accident
> rate has generally decreased. This is true even *since* such safety programs
> were initiated--witness the low rate for the F-16, which has within its own
> career grown increasingly complex (compare a F-16A Block 10 to the F-16C
> Block 52). I do believe that its accident rate is abit lower than that of
> the F-4, which had that whole extra engine included... :)
>

Complexity is not the sole issue as you point out. Sometimes it goes toward
mission accomplishment, sometimes survivability, and some of that complexity
goes toward increasing flight safety. In the case of the F-16 or the
F/A-18, the mechanical complexity associated with the flight controls
actually keeps those aircraft in the air. In the case of the F-14, the DFCS
makes the jet more stable. The complexity of the F-35B when compared to the
C or the A only gives it an additional option for landing--a complexity with
several possible single point failures in a critical flight regime.

>>
>>> Finally, how does the AV-8 accident rate imply a direct connection with
> that
>>> which can be expected for the F-35B, which will use a radically
> different
>>> lift system (partly because of the past problems with the AV-8?)?
>>>
>>
>> Honestly, no one knows for sure. Most likely better because we've learned
>> some important lessons from the AV-8A/B and are applying a different
>> solution to the problem of STOVL. My guess is that because it still
> relies
>> on more moving parts than it's CTOL counterparts in a critical phase of
>> flight, it'll have a higher mishap rate.
>
> Maybe. But then again, maybe not. For all we know the typically "increased
> risk" associated with operatins from a CVN may lead to the C model having a
> worse accident record. I don't think there is enough information that
> *could* be available at this point to postively conclude either way.
>

My experience tells me that the STOVL will crash more than the CV which will
crash more than the CTOL.

>>
>> Again, unofficial dinner poll: Opinion of the STOVL F-35? Not worth it.
>
> OK. But go back to those folks and ask them to earnestly try to put
> themselves in the boots of the brigade commander on the ground who has
> troops in contact, is outnumbered (as we can expect to be in many cases),
> and needs to shift his air support quickly from one target set to a whole
> new class of targets, while also needing/desperately wanting an increase of
> maybe 30% in the CAS sortie count--and oh, by the way, the nearest CTOL
> fighter airstrip is 1000 miles away, since they have yet to reconstruct the
> airfield in his AO that is supporting him via C-130 shuttle. Do you think
> that *he* might value having a squadron (USAF type, with 24 birds) of SOVL
> assets capable of hitting a FARP ten or twelve klicks to the rear of his CP?
>

Absolutely. There aren't many scenarios like this in the world, though.
China maybe? Even in OIF, aircraft from ship's in the north (much further
than in the south) transited only about 350NM ro so to get into theater.

> Or alternatively, when the CVN's are all clustered in (choose body of water)
> handling the major contingency going down with (choose potential foe), and
> your USMC BLT is forced to devite from its transit to that area while
> enroute and FRAGO'd to execute operations independently elsewhere, would you
> want the services of some F-35B's operating as part of your parent amphib
> strike group?
>

Again, a luxury. "All the CVN's" tells me that you could easily spit one to
support the strike group--up to the elephants to fight out.

<SNIP>
> OK. I personally find the CVN to be of immense import--in specific
> circumstances and conditions. Much like the F-35B--it ain't the best
> all-around strike/CAS platform available, but it does have its niches.
> Neither is necessarily the best tool for *all* potentialities.
>

And I would like the U.S. Military to buy every weapons system out there...
Including F-35B's (which they will). I'd like them to have the money to
continue to recapitalize filling Carrier decks, and ARG's and MAG's with
aircraft. I'd like them to buy SATCOM for all of my Army buddies on the
ground--you get the picture.

I disagree with the way we've decided to spend our limited funds (F-35B, CV
version with no gun, F-22, etc).

> Are you still at China Lake? Wonderful place (note my sarcasm)...right next
> to that other gardenspot I used to frequent on occasion, FT Irwin (even more
> sarcasm). Last time I went through that area I spent the night in that
> little town near the main entrance to China Lake, enroute to Lone Pine for a
> few days fishing in the higher elevations.
>
> Brooks

Nope. Left there for the fleet in 1996. Loved living there though. Best
flying I've ever done. Worked for a great boss. Learned a LOT about RDT&E,
BRAC, civil servants, and the ins and outs of large organizations.

--Woody

[Pete Schaefer]

"Woody Beal" > wrote in message
...
> Concur that it does not yield a concrete conclusion, but it does yield a
> tendency based on several possible single point failures. If lift fan
doors
> don't open, if lift rotor fails to engage properly, if engine fails during
> transition to STOVL life gets tough at a very critical and low altitude
> moment. These problems (though not identical) are similar to those
> experienced in the AV-8B.

Actually, conversion is done at an altitude and speed that, if it fails,
you're still wing-borne. The airplane fails back to a regular engine. Just
pop the TVL forward and continue to fly conventional. THe diciest moment
for the lift-fan system is during clutch engagement, but you don't perform
that in a high-exposure kind of situation. Doors and all that aren't really
a problem, cuz you'll know there's a problem before you expose yourself.

> Mechanical failures in the STOVL regime are unforgiving because of their
low
> altitude locale.

Yup. But a lot of stuff in the engine/lift-fan system is monitored. Health
checking on the B model propulsion system is way beyond anything that has
been put into service to-date. THe problem here is that health monitoring
tech is really only good for known failure modes. It's the "gee we never
considered that" kind of problems that can get scary. Infant mortality. WIth
the lift-fan system, you'll typically know if you have a mechanical problem
before you go jet-borne. Once transitioning to jet-borne, you just gotta
watch all the critical temps (turbine inlet, exhaust gas....yadda yadda).

Also, much of the unforgiving nature of jet-borne flight has been addressed
through the inceptor mapping. Switching from rates to attitude commands
makes overcontrol type slip-ups much less likely. The F-35B will be much
more forgiving to exhausted pilots.

> makes the jet more stable. The complexity of the F-35B when compared to
the
> C or the A only gives it an additional option for landing--a complexity
with
> several possible single point failures in a critical flight regime.

Keep in mind that the operational environment envisioned for the F-35B is
much more varied than what has been done with the Harrier. So, exposure to
hazards (thinking mainly weather) will be much greater.


Pete
(worked on the X-35B for a couple of years designing the yaw-axis control
laws).

[Frijoles]

Which airfield? Sorry, I don't have the reference here at home. Its the
same place where the Army POWs were transferred to the KC-130 on TV.

"Guy Alcala" > wrote in message
.. .
> Frijoles wrote:
>
> <snip>
>
> > On the warfighting side, if fighting an air war was simply a matter of
> > stacking jets somewhere, we could cover the entire battlespace with B-1s
or
> > B-2s. (A trivia question -- how many CV sorties does it take to cover
the
> > same number of DMPIs that ONE B-1 with a full load of SDBs can cover?)
And
> > if tanking isn't an "issue," what's up with all the bragging about what
a
> > great tanking capability the Navy's brand new STRIKE aircraft
provides...?
>
> Especially since they had to send four more F-18Es to the theater during
the
> war, to boost the navy's own tanker assets (and of course, taking away
airbridge
> tanker assets from other jobs, to get them there).
>
> > 45% of Marine CAS sorties during OIF were flown by Harriers -- that's
hardly
> > a trivial number, particularly if you're on the ground getting shot at,
or
> > facing the prospect of having to deal with massed armor and indirect
fires.
> > IIRC, about 1500 strike sorties were flown off L-class ships,
principally
> > Bataan and BHR which each operated 20-25 jets. A couple hundred were
flown
> > from a "recovered" airfield within 10 minutes of Baghdad.
>
> <snip>
>
> Would you happen to know which airfield? I've found one source that says
it was
> "60nm south" of Baghdad, but no other details. Looking at a map,
>
>
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/iraq_planning_print_2003.jpg
>
> Shayka Mazhar and Al Iskandariyah New appear to be too close to the city,
Salman
> Pak East is too close and too far east (although the Marines did go by
there
> IIRR). An Najaf New is due south of Baghdad and about the right distance,
but
> AFAIK the marines weren't near there in any strength, having crossed the
> Euphrates at Nasiriya before heading up between the rivers towards
Baghdad. The
> Shaykh Hantush Highway Strip seems to be the closest match for distance
and
> direction, but the marines also went through al Kut, which puts An
Numaniyah (I
> know they took that) or Al Jarrah in the picture (although they're more SE
than
> S), and possibly the fields south and/or east of Al Kut, altough they're a
bit
> far and definitely southeast.
>
> Guy
>

[Guy Alcala]

Frijoles wrote:

> Which airfield? Sorry, I don't have the reference here at home. Its the
> same place where the Army POWs were transferred to the KC-130 on TV.

Thanks. I think that was Tallil down near Nasiriyah, which seems a bit far from
Baghdad (a lot more than 60 nm), but I know there was a big hospital set up there,
as well as a FOB for A-10s.

Guy

[running with scissors]

Pooh Bear > wrote in message >...
> running with scissors wrote:
>
> > Pooh Bear > wrote in message >...
> >
> > > Actually - you succeeded in diverting my attention from what I consider to be one of the more
> > > intruiging aspects of this crash - notably a suggested compressor stall.
> > >
> > >
> > > Graham
> >
> > nope no comressor stall.
> >
> > according to tarver, airbus's crash at the end of the runway because
> > its unknown and unmapped.
>
> Scary concept ! Is it in the annals ?
>
>
> Graham

its utter ********. like any of tarvers theories.

[Frijoles]

You're correct that the A-10 FOB was "near Nasiryah" -- but that was well
south of the location that the Marine Corps used. The Marine Corps wanted
something further north to support possible operations to the north (and
well north) of Baghdad.

"Guy Alcala" > wrote in message
.. .
> Frijoles wrote:
>
> > Which airfield? Sorry, I don't have the reference here at home. Its
the
> > same place where the Army POWs were transferred to the KC-130 on TV.
>
> Thanks. I think that was Tallil down near Nasiriyah, which seems a bit
far from
> Baghdad (a lot more than 60 nm), but I know there was a big hospital set
up there,
> as well as a FOB for A-10s.
>
> Guy
>
>
>

[Guy Alcala]

Frijoles wrote:

> You're correct that the A-10 FOB was "near Nasiryah" -- but that was well
> south of the location that the Marine Corps used.

That's what I thought. I finally found a news story that ID'ed the airfield
they were flown to by CH-46 as Numaniyah.

> The Marine Corps wanted
> something further north to support possible operations to the north (and
> well north) of Baghdad.

Just found a news story that confirmed use of Numaniyah as a Harrier FARP:

http://www.usmc.mil/marinelink/mcn2000.nsf/0/7895F00735DE2CB485256D66007B63BF?opendocument

Guy

[Vivek Thomas]

>The 747 had its cockpit placed above the main cabin so they could open
>the nose for loading in the cargo variant, i.e., it was designed from
>the beginning to carry cargo.
>

That feature is where the 747 shows it's origins. The design the 747 was
derived from was the losing contender in the C-X (correct me if that
designation is incorrect) competition. That competition was won by the
Lockheed design --- the C-5 Galaxy. Boeing took their C-X design and reworked
it as a civilian passenger aircraft. Who knows, maybe if Boeing had won the
competition, we'd see the Lockheed L-1012 Galaxy as the king of civilian
widebodys?

--------------------------------------------------------------------------
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In thrust we trust!