US Army Cancels Comanche Helo

[robert arndt]

http://aolsvc.news.aol.com/news/article.adp?id=20031124101509990006&_mpc=news%2e6

Too bad, only wish it would have been the V-22 or F-22 programs.

Rob

[Tarver Engineering]

"robert arndt" > wrote in message
m...
>
http://aolsvc.news.aol.com/news/article.adp?id=20031124101509990006&_mpc=news%2e6
>
> Too bad, only wish it would have been the V-22 or F-22 programs.

There is still time.

Rummy is performance oriented and the 2001 procurement production break
changes everything.

[Paul F Austin]

"robert arndt" wrote
>
> Too bad, only wish it would have been the V-22 or F-22 programs.

This is the first big lessons learned to come out of Iraq War-2. Between the
Apaches getting put out of action by massed gunfire and the demonstrated
advantages of UAVs, the Army decided that Comanche was last-war's weapon.

[MLenoch]

>> Too bad, only wish it would have been the V-22 or F-22 programs.
>
>

V-22 can still be axed.
But, isn't the F-22 already 'deployed', at least at Tyndall?
VL

[Tarver Engineering]

"MLenoch" > wrote in message
...
> >> Too bad, only wish it would have been the V-22 or F-22 programs.
> >
> >
>
> V-22 can still be axed.
> But, isn't the F-22 already 'deployed', at least at Tyndall?

Cut them up.

[Scott Ferrin]

On Mon, 23 Feb 2004 16:12:46 -0800, "Tarver Engineering"
> wrote:

>
>"MLenoch" > wrote in message
...
>> >> Too bad, only wish it would have been the V-22 or F-22 programs.
>> >
>> >
>>
>> V-22 can still be axed.
>> But, isn't the F-22 already 'deployed', at least at Tyndall?
>
>Cut them up.
>


Yeah that would be a real smart move.

[Tarver Engineering]

"Scott Ferrin" > wrote in message
...
> On Mon, 23 Feb 2004 16:12:46 -0800, "Tarver Engineering"
> > wrote:
>
> >
> >"MLenoch" > wrote in message
> ...
> >> >> Too bad, only wish it would have been the V-22 or F-22 programs.
> >> >
> >> >
> >>
> >> V-22 can still be axed.
> >> But, isn't the F-22 already 'deployed', at least at Tyndall?
> >
> >Cut them up.

> Yeah that would be a real smart move.

Not as smart as shutting down the F-22 in '98.

[Kevin Brooks]

"Paul F Austin" > wrote in message
. ..
>
> "robert arndt" wrote
> >
> > Too bad, only wish it would have been the V-22 or F-22 programs.
>
> This is the first big lessons learned to come out of Iraq War-2. Between
the
> Apaches getting put out of action by massed gunfire and the demonstrated
> advantages of UAVs, the Army decided that Comanche was last-war's weapon.

Eh? I think you are reading a bit more into it than is reasonable. First,
why were those Apaches expereincing such difficulty during that one deep
mission? Bad terrain contributed to the problem (realatively flat and good
visibility), as did the decision *not* to fire the normal SEAD support
effort from the tubes and MLRS/ATACMS due to concern over potential civilian
casualties. Being a bit too aggressive also probably counted against them
that night (anybody who has ever participated in any DIV or Corps level
exercise where Apaches were included in the play knows how strenuously the
aviators tried to keep the Apaches in the deep fight and tried to eschew the
over-the-shoulder missions). Second, we have no UAV as yet, or in the near
term, that can do what an aircraft like the AH-64D can do; none can match
its weapons load, nor its ability to carry a mix of weapons, nor carry
*both* a target acquisition and tracking radar *and* a good FLIR/thermal
sight, and current UAV's can't hit a FARP and be back into the fight in
short order when required.

Will the UAV's eventually be able to match those kind of capabilities? To
some extent (though the weapons load/mix will be tough unless you make one
big honking UAV), especially when the rotary UCAV becomes available...some
day. Look to see the Apache remain a viable part of the force mix for many
more years. The RAH-66 was cut because it had become a "black hole" for RD&A
funding, with continuing problems and an ever changing in-service date; it
was also too darned expensive on a per unit basis and the number last being
bandied about for procurement was too low to fill the original projected
need by far. If the attack helo concept was as dead as you portray it as
being, why is the USMC, which is usuallly the last service to waste precious
resources on outdated concepts, still moving at full speed with the AH-1Z
program?

Brooks

>
>
>

[Thomas Schoene]

Kevin Brooks wrote:
> "Paul F Austin" > wrote in message
> . ..
>>
>> "robert arndt" wrote
>>>
>>> Too bad, only wish it would have been the V-22 or F-22 programs.
>>
>> This is the first big lessons learned to come out of Iraq War-2.
>> Between the Apaches getting put out of action by massed gunfire and
>> the demonstrated advantages of UAVs, the Army decided that Comanche
>> was last-war's weapon.
>
> Eh? I think you are reading a bit more into it than is reasonable.

I'd put a different read on the same events, but with basically the same
conclusion.

What probably did in Comanche (IMO) was not the fact that the Apaches were
getting hit, but the realization that they were getting hit by weapons that
didn't care at all about radar signature (i.e. optically pointed guns and IR
MANPADS). If those non-radar-guided systems are really the major threats
to helos -- as the last couple of years of fighting in various places
certianly suggests they they are -- it makes no sense at all to spend large
sums on a helicopter whose main claim to fame (and major cost driver) is
radar signature reduction.

If this logic is true, Comanche died not because it's a helicopter, but
because it's *the wrong kind* of helicopter.

> we have no UAV as yet, or in the
> near term, that can do what an aircraft like the AH-64D can do;

Absolutely true. However, we may soon have UAVs that can do what the RAH-66
could do, except for actual weapon delivery, which the Apache can handle
just fine. (Why the Comanche was bombed up to rival the Apache, I'll never
understand.)




--
Tom Schoene Replace "invalid" with "net" to e-mail
"If brave men and women never died, there would be nothing
special about bravery." -- Andy Rooney (attributed)

[MLenoch]

>Not as smart as shutting down the F-22 in '98.

We're certainly past that point. Today, the F-15s are literally falling apart
in the air and something is needed to replaced the old F-15C and soon-to-be
F-15E airframes. (Friends in the squadrons often tell tales of shedding tail
feathers, etc.) New production F-15s? Maybe? Or new production F-22s?
Whatever?
VL

[ROTORFRANK]

All good points. Bad tactics in one engagement do not mean attack helicopters
are useless. And for all their hype, UAVs are nowhere near a true replacement.


The Army screwed up Comanche development by under-funding the effort and
dragging it out over 20 years. The aircraft itself performed, but the program
failed. This decision still leaves the Army without a replacement for the
OH-58D.

Frank

[Tarver Engineering]

"MLenoch" > wrote in message
...
> >Not as smart as shutting down the F-22 in '98.
>
> We're certainly past that point. Today, the F-15s are literally falling
apart
> in the air and something is needed to replaced the old F-15C and
soon-to-be
> F-15E airframes. (Friends in the squadrons often tell tales of shedding
tail
> feathers, etc.) New production F-15s? Maybe? Or new production F-22s?

Gephard is retiring, so the super eagle is probably no longer viable.

The F-35 is going to have to pull part of the F-15's duty even if Lockheed
pulls of a miracale, as the 160 F-22 aircraft are not enough to replace the
F-15.

[Paul F Austin]

"Thomas Schoene" wrote
> Kevin Brooks wrote:
> > "Paul F Austin" wrote > >>
> >> "robert arndt" wrote
> >>>
> >>> Too bad, only wish it would have been the V-22 or F-22 programs.
> >>
> >> This is the first big lessons learned to come out of Iraq War-2.
> >> Between the Apaches getting put out of action by massed gunfire and
> >> the demonstrated advantages of UAVs, the Army decided that Comanche
> >> was last-war's weapon.
> >
> > Eh? I think you are reading a bit more into it than is reasonable.
>
> I'd put a different read on the same events, but with basically the same
> conclusion.
>
> What probably did in Comanche (IMO) was not the fact that the Apaches were
> getting hit, but the realization that they were getting hit by weapons
that
> didn't care at all about radar signature (i.e. optically pointed guns and
IR
> MANPADS). If those non-radar-guided systems are really the major threats
> to helos -- as the last couple of years of fighting in various places
> certianly suggests they they are -- it makes no sense at all to spend
large
> sums on a helicopter whose main claim to fame (and major cost driver) is
> radar signature reduction.
>
> If this logic is true, Comanche died not because it's a helicopter, but
> because it's *the wrong kind* of helicopter.

Yep. A suprising outcome, that LO isn't really worth much when operating at
low altitude. The Iraqis adopted the levee en masse tactics that the
Vietnamese used, with every available tube firing upward as soon as the
alarm is given. And that's at_night_. During daylight hours things get even
worse. Slow-movers operating at low altitudes will suffer unacceptable
attrition if they're manned. The Army should develop a low-cost unmanned
weapons platform, one that can use fused data from off-board sources to cue
a low-cost on-board targeting sensor. Being a helo isn't important, carrying
heavy ordnance loads may or may not be the way to go but being able to
persist in the interdiction area_is_.

[Kevin Brooks]

"Thomas Schoene" > wrote in message
ink.net...
> Kevin Brooks wrote:
> > "Paul F Austin" > wrote in message
> > . ..
> >>
> >> "robert arndt" wrote
> >>>
> >>> Too bad, only wish it would have been the V-22 or F-22 programs.
> >>
> >> This is the first big lessons learned to come out of Iraq War-2.
> >> Between the Apaches getting put out of action by massed gunfire and
> >> the demonstrated advantages of UAVs, the Army decided that Comanche
> >> was last-war's weapon.
> >
> > Eh? I think you are reading a bit more into it than is reasonable.
>
> I'd put a different read on the same events, but with basically the same
> conclusion.
>
> What probably did in Comanche (IMO) was not the fact that the Apaches were
> getting hit, but the realization that they were getting hit by weapons
that
> didn't care at all about radar signature (i.e. optically pointed guns and
IR
> MANPADS). If those non-radar-guided systems are really the major threats
> to helos -- as the last couple of years of fighting in various places
> certianly suggests they they are -- it makes no sense at all to spend
large
> sums on a helicopter whose main claim to fame (and major cost driver) is
> radar signature reduction.

I always thought the emphasis on radar stealth was off the mark. But be
careful drawing any hard and fast conclusions in regards to helo
survivability vis a vis the 11th AVN deep attack during OIF. About the best
you can do in that realm is to say that "Deep attack helo missions over open
terrain with good visibility afforded to the bad guys, and without the
benefit of the normal SEAD support from your own arty assets is extremely
risky." Not much beyond that.

>
> If this logic is true, Comanche died not because it's a helicopter, but
> because it's *the wrong kind* of helicopter.

I could generally agree with that, with the caveat that part of what was
wrong was a skyrocketing program and unit cost.

>
> > we have no UAV as yet, or in the
> > near term, that can do what an aircraft like the AH-64D can do;
>
> Absolutely true. However, we may soon have UAVs that can do what the
RAH-66
> could do, except for actual weapon delivery, which the Apache can handle
> just fine. (Why the Comanche was bombed up to rival the Apache, I'll
never
> understand.)

You have to understand the changes in the Army aviation missions over the
past few years. Dedicated attack helos were pulled from a number of units
(i.e., a portion of the divisional aviation battalions in airborne/air
assault divisions, cavalry units) some years back in favor of the AH-58D,
which was nothing more than the OH-58D with armament added. I did not like
Commanche, but I *can* see the wisdom of including a strike capability in
your cavalry scout birds--increased versatility for when things don't go as
planned, the ability to engage time sensitive targets of opportunity during
the scout mission, and ensuring that your *cavalry* units can perform their
cavalry roles, to include both guard and (even) covering force battle
operations.

That said, I am quite happy to see the demise of this program, and only wish
it had happened earlier when the resultant savings could have been applied
to other critical needs.

Brooks

>
>
>
>
> --
> Tom Schoene Replace "invalid" with "net" to e-mail
> "If brave men and women never died, there would be nothing
> special about bravery." -- Andy Rooney (attributed)
>
>
>
>

[Kevin Brooks]

"Paul F Austin" > wrote in message
. ..
>
> "Thomas Schoene" wrote
> > Kevin Brooks wrote:
> > > "Paul F Austin" wrote > >>
> > >> "robert arndt" wrote
> > >>>
> > >>> Too bad, only wish it would have been the V-22 or F-22 programs.
> > >>
> > >> This is the first big lessons learned to come out of Iraq War-2.
> > >> Between the Apaches getting put out of action by massed gunfire and
> > >> the demonstrated advantages of UAVs, the Army decided that Comanche
> > >> was last-war's weapon.
> > >
> > > Eh? I think you are reading a bit more into it than is reasonable.
> >
> > I'd put a different read on the same events, but with basically the same
> > conclusion.
> >
> > What probably did in Comanche (IMO) was not the fact that the Apaches
were
> > getting hit, but the realization that they were getting hit by weapons
> that
> > didn't care at all about radar signature (i.e. optically pointed guns
and
> IR
> > MANPADS). If those non-radar-guided systems are really the major
threats
> > to helos -- as the last couple of years of fighting in various places
> > certianly suggests they they are -- it makes no sense at all to spend
> large
> > sums on a helicopter whose main claim to fame (and major cost driver) is
> > radar signature reduction.
> >
> > If this logic is true, Comanche died not because it's a helicopter, but
> > because it's *the wrong kind* of helicopter.
>
> Yep. A suprising outcome, that LO isn't really worth much when operating
at
> low altitude. The Iraqis adopted the levee en masse tactics that the
> Vietnamese used, with every available tube firing upward as soon as the
> alarm is given. And that's at_night_. During daylight hours things get
even
> worse. Slow-movers operating at low altitudes will suffer unacceptable
> attrition if they're manned. The Army should develop a low-cost unmanned
> weapons platform, one that can use fused data from off-board sources to
cue
> a low-cost on-board targeting sensor. Being a helo isn't important,
carrying
> heavy ordnance loads may or may not be the way to go but being able to
> persist in the interdiction area_is_.

Why? Maybe the lesson should instead be to refrain from using attack helos
in the deep fight (what you call the "interdiction area", I presume) when
(a) the terrain is unsuitable, and/or (b) the normal SEAD support package is
not provided. Ever been in the woods when helos were operating around you?
Or in rugged terrain? During those situations it is hard to find the helo
during daylight hours; at night you are hopelessly confused. In those kind
of environments the deep attack option becomes more tenable. Even in the
situation that the 11th AVN encountered during their dissapointing OIF deep
attack mission might have had a very different outcome had the SEAD arty
support been included (it was not executed due to collateral damage
concerns). Again, you are reading a bit too much into the results of a
single mission which was conducted under rather unique circumstances, and
very likely with some serious planning flaws included in the mix.

Your UCAV concept is not new--the Army has already initiated a rotary UCAV
R&D program. In fact, the early idea was to have such UCAV's support the
Commanches, and even be controlled from the Commanches in some cases.

Brooks

>
>

[Dav1936531]

>From: (MLenoch)
> >

>>> Too bad, only wish it would have been the V-22 or F-22 programs.

>V-22 can still be axed.
>But, isn't the F-22 already 'deployed', at least at Tyndall?
>VL

Yes it is. I was down is Destin, FLA (just down the road from Tyndall) a couple
of weeks ago (vacation to get out of the cold) and saw a couple of F-22's
flying around over the Gulf of Mexico. Those babies "howl" when they fly.

Also saw a Tyndall AF pilot being interviewed on the local Destin news
concerning their brand spanking new F-22's.......can't remember his exact
words, but he was grinning ear to ear and said something to the effect that he
was flying the greatest fighter in existence.

Also visited the AF armament museum there. Ed R. might like to see the F-104
they have there. The thing looks like it just came off the assembly line.
Dave

[Paul F Austin]

"Kevin Brooks" wrote
>
> "Paul F Austin" wrote in message
> >
> > Yep. A suprising outcome, that LO isn't really worth much when operating
> at
> > low altitude. The Iraqis adopted the levee en masse tactics that the
> > Vietnamese used, with every available tube firing upward as soon as the
> > alarm is given. And that's at_night_. During daylight hours things get
> even
> > worse. Slow-movers operating at low altitudes will suffer unacceptable
> > attrition if they're manned. The Army should develop a low-cost unmanned
> > weapons platform, one that can use fused data from off-board sources to
> cue
> > a low-cost on-board targeting sensor. Being a helo isn't important,
> carrying
> > heavy ordnance loads may or may not be the way to go but being able to
> > persist in the interdiction area_is_.
>
> Why? Maybe the lesson should instead be to refrain from using attack helos
> in the deep fight (what you call the "interdiction area", I presume) when
> (a) the terrain is unsuitable, and/or (b) the normal SEAD support package
is
> not provided. Ever been in the woods when helos were operating around you?
> Or in rugged terrain? During those situations it is hard to find the helo
> during daylight hours; at night you are hopelessly confused. In those kind
> of environments the deep attack option becomes more tenable. Even in the
> situation that the 11th AVN encountered during their dissapointing OIF
deep
> attack mission might have had a very different outcome had the SEAD arty
> support been included (it was not executed due to collateral damage
> concerns). Again, you are reading a bit too much into the results of a
> single mission which was conducted under rather unique circumstances, and
> very likely with some serious planning flaws included in the mix.

You kinda miss the point. Comanche's reason for existence was to incorporate
LO into an Army platform. Otherwise, continued development of OH-58s would
have delivered the needed functions sooner and cheaper. As an ancillary
issue, the Army dragged out the development 'way too long. My company's part
of Comanche was designed twice because of parts obsolescence. If Comanche
were in the middle of production, then likely, the lessons from Iraq-2 would
have been incorporated into operations. As it is, the program gets canned.

As for the lack of SEAD, my impression (and that's all it is) was that the
Iraqis had everyone with a weapon that could elevate far enough fire into
the night once the alarm was given, much the way the Vietnamese did. If you
can suppress_that_then you don't need to AHs in the first place.

>
> Your UCAV concept is not new--the Army has already initiated a rotary UCAV
> R&D program. In fact, the early idea was to have such UCAV's support the
> Commanches, and even be controlled from the Commanches in some cases.

Of course it's not. It's not even "my idea". I'm under no illusion that I or
anyone on this forum will "think up" a new paradigm that those blockheads at
the Pentagon, yadayada... Real analysis doesn't happen on Usenet. Although
why the Army restricts its thinking to rotorcraft is a good question.

The last two years have clearly illustrated some major advantages for UAVs.
They can't do everything by any means but the "natural advantage" of an
unmanned platform lies in great persistence, being able to stay on station
for very long times so that the platform is there exactly when needed. The
ISR community has found that there are step-change improvements in coverage
over satellites and manned aircraft that derive from keeping a platform
overhead all day long. Likewise, hitting fleeting, moving targets benefits
from having a launcher available_right now_, not five minutes off and that's
hard to do with manned platforms and_may_be easier with UCAVs. It's
a_may_because the analysis is in progress but apparently OSD decided that in
light of bad management, bad programmatic news and repeated program replans,
to cut its losses.

There's something systematically wrong with the way we develop aircraft.
Neither Comanche nor F-22 development should have taken as long as it has.
One of the trolls was asking for delays in F-22 production until a "complete
and independent evaluation" can be done, whatever that is. For a variety of
reasons, we can't seem to get a combat aircraft into the hands of troops in
anything like a reasonable time. During the fifties and sixties we developed
aircraft, got the -A LRIP model into the hands of troops, incorporated the
fixes for problems identified by the users in the -C model and then went
into volume production. Now, no one is willing to stick their weenie out and
the "development" stretches endlessly.

[Kevin Brooks]

"Paul F Austin" > wrote in message
...
>
> "Kevin Brooks" wrote
> >
> > "Paul F Austin" wrote in message
> > >
> > > Yep. A suprising outcome, that LO isn't really worth much when
operating
> > at
> > > low altitude. The Iraqis adopted the levee en masse tactics that the
> > > Vietnamese used, with every available tube firing upward as soon as
the
> > > alarm is given. And that's at_night_. During daylight hours things get
> > even
> > > worse. Slow-movers operating at low altitudes will suffer unacceptable
> > > attrition if they're manned. The Army should develop a low-cost
unmanned
> > > weapons platform, one that can use fused data from off-board sources
to
> > cue
> > > a low-cost on-board targeting sensor. Being a helo isn't important,
> > carrying
> > > heavy ordnance loads may or may not be the way to go but being able to
> > > persist in the interdiction area_is_.
> >
> > Why? Maybe the lesson should instead be to refrain from using attack
helos
> > in the deep fight (what you call the "interdiction area", I presume)
when
> > (a) the terrain is unsuitable, and/or (b) the normal SEAD support
package
> is
> > not provided. Ever been in the woods when helos were operating around
you?
> > Or in rugged terrain? During those situations it is hard to find the
helo
> > during daylight hours; at night you are hopelessly confused. In those
kind
> > of environments the deep attack option becomes more tenable. Even in the
> > situation that the 11th AVN encountered during their dissapointing OIF
> deep
> > attack mission might have had a very different outcome had the SEAD arty
> > support been included (it was not executed due to collateral damage
> > concerns). Again, you are reading a bit too much into the results of a
> > single mission which was conducted under rather unique circumstances,
and
> > very likely with some serious planning flaws included in the mix.
>
> You kinda miss the point. Comanche's reason for existence was to
incorporate
> LO into an Army platform.

No, its reason for existance was to provide a state of the art
reconnaissance and light attack capability that incorporated low
observability (not in just the radar spectrum, either) features. There is a
difference--the goal was not to get LO into an Army system so much as it was
to get a system that incorporated the LO.

Otherwise, continued development of OH-58s would
> have delivered the needed functions sooner and cheaper.

But without the capabilities of the Commanche. The 58 series is not capable
of continual upgrade; hell, the D model is already grossly different from
the original A model, and probably about maxed out in terms of economical
upgrade. You can only cram so much poop in a bag that size and of that
particular configuration.

As an ancillary
> issue, the Army dragged out the development 'way too long. My company's
part
> of Comanche was designed twice because of parts obsolescence. If Comanche
> were in the middle of production, then likely, the lessons from Iraq-2
would
> have been incorporated into operations. As it is, the program gets canned.

Hey, I *like* the decision to can it, and it was drug out too long, was a
bit too ambitious, its radar LO design was of questionable value in view of
its trade-offs, and it was too darned expensive. But NONE of that bears upon
your claim that the manned attack helo is allegedly a thing of the past, now
does it?

>
> As for the lack of SEAD, my impression (and that's all it is) was that the
> Iraqis had everyone with a weapon that could elevate far enough fire into
> the night once the alarm was given, much the way the Vietnamese did. If
you
> can suppress_that_then you don't need to AHs in the first place.

I don't think you fully understand the SEAD effort, and the resources that
it can include, that normally supports such an operation. Likely areas where
ground fire or weapons systems would be encountered during the ingress and
egress can be suppressed (actually saturated) by a combination of tube arty
fires, MLRS (which is probably the best single SEAD asset out to around 70
klicks), and even ATACMS (which can go to around 300 klicks) if the
mission/threat requires them. Any idea what the effect of those submunitions
going off around your "everybody shoot up" crowd would be? How many of those
that just *witness* that kind of firestorm are subsequently willing to
expose themselves if they *do* get a shot? Would it have been highly
effective if it had been included in this attack? Maybe--we'll never know.
But the idea that the results of a single mission flown under one set of
circumstances and without SEAD support should be the decisive factor in
determining the feasibility of attack helo operations is not a very
supportable postion IMO.

>
> >
> > Your UCAV concept is not new--the Army has already initiated a rotary
UCAV
> > R&D program. In fact, the early idea was to have such UCAV's support the
> > Commanches, and even be controlled from the Commanches in some cases.
>
> Of course it's not. It's not even "my idea". I'm under no illusion that I
or
> anyone on this forum will "think up" a new paradigm that those blockheads
at
> the Pentagon, yadayada... Real analysis doesn't happen on Usenet. Although
> why the Army restricts its thinking to rotorcraft is a good question.

Kind of hard to have a CTOL airframe use a FARP, isn't it? Or use terrain
masking effectively while it loiters and peeks, or loiters and shoots?

>
> The last two years have clearly illustrated some major advantages for
UAVs.
> They can't do everything by any means but the "natural advantage" of an
> unmanned platform lies in great persistence, being able to stay on station
> for very long times so that the platform is there exactly when needed. The
> ISR community has found that there are step-change improvements in
coverage
> over satellites and manned aircraft that derive from keeping a platform
> overhead all day long. Likewise, hitting fleeting, moving targets benefits
> from having a launcher available_right now_, not five minutes off and
that's
> hard to do with manned platforms and_may_be easier with UCAVs. It's
> a_may_because the analysis is in progress but apparently OSD decided that
in
> light of bad management, bad programmatic news and repeated program
replans,
> to cut its losses.

You are mixing your systems up a bit. Long duration ISR missions are
normally flown at altitude; but the Army needs a system that can also get in
closer (lower) for finite detail. When you switch to the UCAV role, all of
those current long duration UAV's have a pretty miserly weapons load
capability--they are of little value rotating overhead if they don't still
have munitions capable of doing the various jobs required. Fixed wing UAV's
can't hit a FARP and be back into the fight quickly after rearming and
refueling--they have to mosey on back to the rear, land, get turned around,
take back off and mosey on back up to the battle area, dispense their
munitions (which from what I have seen so far is a load of maybe two
Hellfires, or four BAT's), after which they have to do it all over again.
Which tells me that the larger attack helos still have a role in the fight,
and if you are planning to go the UCAV route, a VTOL system that can use
your FARP's is an advantage.

>
> There's something systematically wrong with the way we develop aircraft.
> Neither Comanche nor F-22 development should have taken as long as it has.

I'd agree with that.

> One of the trolls was asking for delays in F-22 production until a
"complete
> and independent evaluation" can be done, whatever that is. For a variety
of
> reasons, we can't seem to get a combat aircraft into the hands of troops
in
> anything like a reasonable time. During the fifties and sixties we
developed
> aircraft, got the -A LRIP model into the hands of troops, incorporated the
> fixes for problems identified by the users in the -C model and then went
> into volume production. Now, no one is willing to stick their weenie out
and
> the "development" stretches endlessly.

Which is why spiral development is all the rage these days. But when they do
use that approach, they have some congressional weenie sitting on the Hill
start whining about the lack of complete testing, and risk, etc.

Brooks

>
>
>
>

[Felger Carbon]

"Paul F Austin" > wrote in message
...
>
> The last two years have clearly illustrated some major advantages
for UAVs.
> They can't do everything by any means but the "natural advantage" of
an
> unmanned platform lies in great persistence, being able to stay on
station
> for very long times so that the platform is there exactly when
needed. The
> ISR community has found that there are step-change improvements in
coverage
> over satellites and manned aircraft that derive from keeping a
platform
> overhead all day long. Likewise, hitting fleeting, moving targets
benefits
> from having a launcher available_right now_, not five minutes off
and that's
> hard to do with manned platforms and_may_be easier with UCAVs. It's
> a_may_because the analysis is in progress but apparently OSD decided
that in
> light of bad management, bad programmatic news and repeated program
replans,
> to cut its losses.

I've read the above three times, and I still can't see where UAVs get
credit for saving our side's human lives. Heli pilots fully
expendable??

[Paul F Austin]

"Kevin Brooks" > wrote
>
> "Paul F Austin" > wrote
> >

> >
> > As for the lack of SEAD, my impression (and that's all it is) was that
the
> > Iraqis had everyone with a weapon that could elevate far enough fire
into
> > the night once the alarm was given, much the way the Vietnamese did. If
> you
> > can suppress_that_then you don't need to AHs in the first place.
>
> I don't think you fully understand the SEAD effort, and the resources that
> it can include, that normally supports such an operation. Likely areas
where
> ground fire or weapons systems would be encountered during the ingress and
> egress can be suppressed (actually saturated) by a combination of tube
arty
> fires, MLRS (which is probably the best single SEAD asset out to around 70
> klicks), and even ATACMS (which can go to around 300 klicks) if the
> mission/threat requires them. Any idea what the effect of those
submunitions
> going off around your "everybody shoot up" crowd would be? How many of
those
> that just *witness* that kind of firestorm are subsequently willing to
> expose themselves if they *do* get a shot? Would it have been highly
> effective if it had been included in this attack? Maybe--we'll never know.
> But the idea that the results of a single mission flown under one set of
> circumstances and without SEAD support should be the decisive factor in
> determining the feasibility of attack helo operations is not a very
> supportable postion IMO.
>

Kevin, why fly the AH strike in the first place if you're going to use this
much support for ingress and egress? You're taking it as a given that AHs
are more efficient at delivering ordnance to some class of targets than any
other alternative. That may be true against armor in a maneuver battle but
in Iraq-2, that wasn't the target set.

If we were arming for the Fulda Gap, then AHs make a lot of sense. It's not
clear to me that it's true for the battles we fight these days.

> >
> > >
> > > Your UCAV concept is not new--the Army has already initiated a rotary
> UCAV
> > > R&D program. In fact, the early idea was to have such UCAV's support
the
> > > Commanches, and even be controlled from the Commanches in some cases.
> >
> > Of course it's not. It's not even "my idea". I'm under no illusion that
I
> or
> > anyone on this forum will "think up" a new paradigm that those
blockheads
> at
> > the Pentagon, yadayada... Real analysis doesn't happen on Usenet.
Although
> > why the Army restricts its thinking to rotorcraft is a good question.
>
> Kind of hard to have a CTOL airframe use a FARP, isn't it? Or use terrain
> masking effectively while it loiters and peeks, or loiters and shoots?

The object is warheads on foreheads. The FARP/short flight time ordnance
taxi is one model for doing that. A cloud of UCAVs in another. A Giant
Bombtruck In the Sky is still another. Because the Army has been wedded to
short range, low endurance platforms is no reason not to open up the
analysis space to consider other alternatives.

>
> >
> > The last two years have clearly illustrated some major advantages for
> UAVs.
> > They can't do everything by any means but the "natural advantage" of an
> > unmanned platform lies in great persistence, being able to stay on
station
> > for very long times so that the platform is there exactly when needed.
The
> > ISR community has found that there are step-change improvements in
> coverage
> > over satellites and manned aircraft that derive from keeping a platform
> > overhead all day long. Likewise, hitting fleeting, moving targets
benefits
> > from having a launcher available_right now_, not five minutes off and
> that's
> > hard to do with manned platforms and_may_be easier with UCAVs. It's
> > a_may_because the analysis is in progress but apparently OSD decided
that
> in
> > light of bad management, bad programmatic news and repeated program
> replans,
> > to cut its losses.
>
> You are mixing your systems up a bit. Long duration ISR missions are
> normally flown at altitude; but the Army needs a system that can also get
in
> closer (lower) for finite detail. When you switch to the UCAV role, all of
> those current long duration UAV's have a pretty miserly weapons load
> capability--they are of little value rotating overhead if they don't still
> have munitions capable of doing the various jobs required. Fixed wing
UAV's
> can't hit a FARP and be back into the fight quickly after rearming and
> refueling--they have to mosey on back to the rear, land, get turned
around,
> take back off and mosey on back up to the battle area, dispense their
> munitions (which from what I have seen so far is a load of maybe two
> Hellfires, or four BAT's), after which they have to do it all over again.
> Which tells me that the larger attack helos still have a role in the
fight,
> and if you are planning to go the UCAV route, a VTOL system that can use
> your FARP's is an advantage.

AHs may have their place. The Israelis certainly get a lot of use from them
(and so do the Iranians from what I've read). In the current environment,
the target set that needs servicing is the "30 second" target, between
detection and identification and either a warhead on a forehead or *oops* he
disappeared. That kind of target requires ubiquitous platforms rather than a
heavy loadout on a few platforms.

Snooping and pooping is a traditional role that OHs have filled. There's a
real question whether they're the best way to do it. A platform that flies
in the Predator envelope (about 10Kfeet) misses nothing from a sensor
standpoint that could be gained by flying at a hundred feet. In any case,
you're ignoring the value of fused sensor data from multiple platforms. No
single scout is_ever_going to operate outside the data network in the
future. To do so would be stupid.

There are two missions here.

The first is an ISR mission that's going to be served by a network of
sensors and platforms. Some of the platforms will be under control of
brigade and lower, some will be controlled by higher echelons but_all_the
take will be available to all the forces.

The second mission is ordnance delivery. AHs can do that although they
compete with fixed wing assets as well as the artillery crowd. An AH
integrates sensors and ordnance and it's not clear to me, given that data
network, where the right place in the number of platforms/loadout per
platform/sensors per platform/endurance per platform space is the right
place to be. If you're dealing with a Sea O' Tanks heading your way, that's
one thing. If you're looking to pot a target speeding from one hide to
another, that's another thing. If you're looking for a rascal on a
motorcycle that just launched an RPG at the local headquarters, that's still
another.

One abiding fault of armies is the desire to equip yourself to fight the war
you_want_to fight. That's a cardinal error.

[Raymond Chuang]

"Paul F Austin" > wrote in message
. ..

> This is the first big lessons learned to come out of Iraq War-2. Between
the
> Apaches getting put out of action by massed gunfire and the demonstrated
> advantages of UAVs, the Army decided that Comanche was last-war's weapon.

There's also another factor: the development of GPS-guided munitions and the
arrival of the JSTARS command platform with its powerful side-scanning radar
that could track targets hundreds of miles away. During Operation Iraqi
Freedom, JSTARS planes frequently guided attack planes carrying JDAM and
JSOW weapons to attack targets with great accuracy where the launch plane
was well away from MANPAD rockets and low-altitude AA guns. At the rate
things are going, we may see after 2010 stealthy fast-flying UAV's dropping
GPS-guided bombs and launching TV/laser-guided missiles.

In short, the days of low-flying attacks by manned aircraft are coming to an
end.

--
Raymond Chuang
Sacramento, CA USA

[Kevin Brooks]

"Paul F Austin" > wrote in message
...
>
> "Kevin Brooks" > wrote
> >
> > "Paul F Austin" > wrote
> > >
>
> > >
> > > As for the lack of SEAD, my impression (and that's all it is) was that
> the
> > > Iraqis had everyone with a weapon that could elevate far enough fire
> into
> > > the night once the alarm was given, much the way the Vietnamese did.
If
> > you
> > > can suppress_that_then you don't need to AHs in the first place.
> >
> > I don't think you fully understand the SEAD effort, and the resources
that
> > it can include, that normally supports such an operation. Likely areas
> where
> > ground fire or weapons systems would be encountered during the ingress
and
> > egress can be suppressed (actually saturated) by a combination of tube
> arty
> > fires, MLRS (which is probably the best single SEAD asset out to around
70
> > klicks), and even ATACMS (which can go to around 300 klicks) if the
> > mission/threat requires them. Any idea what the effect of those
> submunitions
> > going off around your "everybody shoot up" crowd would be? How many of
> those
> > that just *witness* that kind of firestorm are subsequently willing to
> > expose themselves if they *do* get a shot? Would it have been highly
> > effective if it had been included in this attack? Maybe--we'll never
know.
> > But the idea that the results of a single mission flown under one set of
> > circumstances and without SEAD support should be the decisive factor in
> > determining the feasibility of attack helo operations is not a very
> > supportable postion IMO.
> >
>
> Kevin, why fly the AH strike in the first place if you're going to use
this
> much support for ingress and egress?

You really have no idea as to the difference in terminal effects and
capabilities between indirect dire systems and direct fire systems?

You're taking it as a given that AHs
> are more efficient at delivering ordnance to some class of targets than
any
> other alternative. That may be true against armor in a maneuver battle but
> in Iraq-2, that wasn't the target set.

Actually, it sometimes was (they did not always remain dug in and waiting).
I did not say anything about "any other alternative", now did I?

>
> If we were arming for the Fulda Gap, then AHs make a lot of sense. It's
not
> clear to me that it's true for the battles we fight these days.

They guys fighting in Anaconda like their support. As did the USMC units
supported by their AH-1W's (interesting account in last month's AFM on their
use in OIF). Note that the USMC is also still pursuing their AH-1Z program
as fast as they can. So where do you get this strange idea that OIF
condemned the attack helo concept to the trashpile?

>
> > >
> > > >
> > > > Your UCAV concept is not new--the Army has already initiated a
rotary
> > UCAV
> > > > R&D program. In fact, the early idea was to have such UCAV's support
> the
> > > > Commanches, and even be controlled from the Commanches in some
cases.
> > >
> > > Of course it's not. It's not even "my idea". I'm under no illusion
that
> I
> > or
> > > anyone on this forum will "think up" a new paradigm that those
> blockheads
> > at
> > > the Pentagon, yadayada... Real analysis doesn't happen on Usenet.
> Although
> > > why the Army restricts its thinking to rotorcraft is a good question.
> >
> > Kind of hard to have a CTOL airframe use a FARP, isn't it? Or use
terrain
> > masking effectively while it loiters and peeks, or loiters and shoots?
>
> The object is warheads on foreheads. The FARP/short flight time ordnance
> taxi is one model for doing that. A cloud of UCAVs in another. A Giant
> Bombtruck In the Sky is still another. Because the Army has been wedded to
> short range, low endurance platforms is no reason not to open up the
> analysis space to consider other alternatives.

Hint--long endurance usually meand long transit time, and long preparation.
The immediate CAS/AI situation may not allow for that. Which is why they
like that whole FARP concept--need more 2.75 inch FFAR's and 30mm to
continue that suppression mission that just moved to the top of the target
heap? The FARP has them close by--that UAV orbiting with its BAT's is not
going to do you a lot of good in that scenario. Just a simple example. Ever
wonder why the USMC also values the attack helo, and for that matter its
AV-8B's? There is a lot to be said for quick response to a changing
situation's requirements.

>
> >
> > >
> > > The last two years have clearly illustrated some major advantages for
> > UAVs.
> > > They can't do everything by any means but the "natural advantage" of
an
> > > unmanned platform lies in great persistence, being able to stay on
> station
> > > for very long times so that the platform is there exactly when needed.
> The
> > > ISR community has found that there are step-change improvements in
> > coverage
> > > over satellites and manned aircraft that derive from keeping a
platform
> > > overhead all day long. Likewise, hitting fleeting, moving targets
> benefits
> > > from having a launcher available_right now_, not five minutes off and
> > that's
> > > hard to do with manned platforms and_may_be easier with UCAVs. It's
> > > a_may_because the analysis is in progress but apparently OSD decided
> that
> > in
> > > light of bad management, bad programmatic news and repeated program
> > replans,
> > > to cut its losses.
> >
> > You are mixing your systems up a bit. Long duration ISR missions are
> > normally flown at altitude; but the Army needs a system that can also
get
> in
> > closer (lower) for finite detail. When you switch to the UCAV role, all
of
> > those current long duration UAV's have a pretty miserly weapons load
> > capability--they are of little value rotating overhead if they don't
still
> > have munitions capable of doing the various jobs required. Fixed wing
> UAV's
> > can't hit a FARP and be back into the fight quickly after rearming and
> > refueling--they have to mosey on back to the rear, land, get turned
> around,
> > take back off and mosey on back up to the battle area, dispense their
> > munitions (which from what I have seen so far is a load of maybe two
> > Hellfires, or four BAT's), after which they have to do it all over
again.
> > Which tells me that the larger attack helos still have a role in the
> fight,
> > and if you are planning to go the UCAV route, a VTOL system that can use
> > your FARP's is an advantage.
>
> AHs may have their place. The Israelis certainly get a lot of use from
them
> (and so do the Iranians from what I've read). In the current environment,
> the target set that needs servicing is the "30 second" target, between
> detection and identification and either a warhead on a forehead or *oops*
he
> disappeared. That kind of target requires ubiquitous platforms rather than
a
> heavy loadout on a few platforms.

No, that is just ONE of the target types that need we have to address. You
also need to be able to address that immediate CAS request from the poor
groundpounder who is sitting there with his SINCGARS and incapable of
talking to the UAV operator sitting a hundred klicks back--so you still need
those manned CAS assets, to include the attack helos. Do the UCAV's have a
role? Of course they do, and in all likelihood it will continue to grow in
the future. But taking the single example of the 11th AVN deep mission
during OIF and extrapolating a result of "no role or mission for the attack
helo in the modern fight" in favor of the UCAV (which does not yet exist in
terms of the capabilites you are requiring of them) is not a logical
conclusion.

>
> Snooping and pooping is a traditional role that OHs have filled. There's a
> real question whether they're the best way to do it.

In all circumstances? No they would not be. Are you ready to replace their
capabilities with UAV's *right now*? No (a glance at the Army's UAV programs
and history will prove that). Will we be ready to completely do so in five
years? I seriously doubt it. Ten years? I still doubt that we will be ready
to fully hand off the scouting role to unmanned platforms at that point,
unless we really experienced a change in luck in terms of tactical UAV
success. So what do use during that time period until your "uber UAV's" are
ready and fully fielded?

A platform that flies
> in the Predator envelope (about 10Kfeet) misses nothing from a sensor
> standpoint that could be gained by flying at a hundred feet.

Really? You can ensure that the same detail is acheived? I doubt that.

In any case,
> you're ignoring the value of fused sensor data from multiple platforms.

Which you think we have already conquered--but we have not. We are working
towards it, and guess what--one of those contributing platforms is, and will
be, the manned scout helo.

No
> single scout is_ever_going to operate outside the data network in the
> future. To do so would be stupid.

Who ssaid it would?

>
> There are two missions here.
>
> The first is an ISR mission that's going to be served by a network of
> sensors and platforms. Some of the platforms will be under control of
> brigade and lower, some will be controlled by higher echelons but_all_the
> take will be available to all the forces.

You are dreaming here. We currently have the ASIC reside at *division*
level. Will we improve the picture at the BCT and even BN TF levels? No
doubt we will. But do we want some poor company team commander, or platoon
leader, or for that matter the BN TF staff, to have to wade through the
plethora of data that does NOT impact their mission needs? Nope. Do you want
to crap out the bandwidth with the transfer of data that is not needed by
lower echelon units? Nope again. And how does any of this imply that the
manned helo does not have a role today, or for that matter during the
foreseeable future? It doesn't.

>
> The second mission is ordnance delivery. AHs can do that although they
> compete with fixed wing assets as well as the artillery crowd.

Used properly they *complement* those systems, just as those systems
complement its use; "compete" is the wrong term of use.

An AH
> integrates sensors and ordnance and it's not clear to me, given that data
> network, where the right place in the number of platforms/loadout per
> platform/sensors per platform/endurance per platform space is the right
> place to be. If you're dealing with a Sea O' Tanks heading your way,
that's
> one thing. If you're looking to pot a target speeding from one hide to
> another, that's another thing. If you're looking for a rascal on a
> motorcycle that just launched an RPG at the local headquarters, that's
still
> another.
>
> One abiding fault of armies is the desire to equip yourself to fight the
war
> you_want_to fight. That's a cardinal error.

Another cardinal error is trying to take the results of the last conflict
(in this case of the 11th AVN deep attack a singular battle at that) and
apply them with undue rigor to all future conflicts.

Brooks

>
>

[Paul F Austin]

"Felger Carbon" > wrote in message
nk.net...
> "Paul F Austin" > wrote in message
> ...
> >
> > The last two years have clearly illustrated some major advantages
> for UAVs.
> > They can't do everything by any means but the "natural advantage" of
> an
> > unmanned platform lies in great persistence, being able to stay on
> station
> > for very long times so that the platform is there exactly when
> needed. The
> > ISR community has found that there are step-change improvements in
> coverage
> > over satellites and manned aircraft that derive from keeping a
> platform
> > overhead all day long. Likewise, hitting fleeting, moving targets
> benefits
> > from having a launcher available_right now_, not five minutes off
> and that's
> > hard to do with manned platforms and_may_be easier with UCAVs. It's
> > a_may_because the analysis is in progress but apparently OSD decided
> that in
> > light of bad management, bad programmatic news and repeated program
> replans,
> > to cut its losses.
>
> I've read the above three times, and I still can't see where UAVs get
> credit for saving our side's human lives. Heli pilots fully
> expendable??

I don't think I said that. UAVs have an advantage over manned platforms for
extremely hazardous missions like SEAD because of the reduced risk to crews
but another advantage is the option of extremely long mission times because
the "crew" can change without bringing the aircraft back to base. Manned
aircraft do put aircrew at risk but you have the advantage of a human being
on the spot. One hump UCAVs will have to get over is the reluctance that
"higher" has in turning an autonomous weapon loose with reduced human
supervision. Certainly at first, the "trigger" will remain firmly in human
hands. Probably the_last_"trigger" to be turned over to robotic killers will
be air-to-air weapons, since the pilots' union will be extremely reluctant
to share the sky with them.

[Paul F Austin]

"Raymond Chuang" wrote
> "Paul F Austin" wrote
>
> > This is the first big lessons learned to come out of Iraq War-2. Between
> the
> > Apaches getting put out of action by massed gunfire and the demonstrated
> > advantages of UAVs, the Army decided that Comanche was last-war's
weapon.
>
> There's also another factor: the development of GPS-guided munitions and
the
> arrival of the JSTARS command platform with its powerful side-scanning
radar
> that could track targets hundreds of miles away. During Operation Iraqi
> Freedom, JSTARS planes frequently guided attack planes carrying JDAM and
> JSOW weapons to attack targets with great accuracy where the launch plane
> was well away from MANPAD rockets and low-altitude AA guns. At the rate
> things are going, we may see after 2010 stealthy fast-flying UAV's
dropping
> GPS-guided bombs and launching TV/laser-guided missiles.

No single sensor sees all and knows all. For example, JSTARS is extremely
limited in mountainous terrain (because of limited sight lines). Likewise,
very high fliers like U-2 and G-Hawk have trouble with some sensors and some
angles. It takes (and we're deploying) a wide range of sensorcraft that
complement each other. Some of the key ones (U-2, G-Hawk, Rivet Joint and
JSTARs) are extremely over-committed right now.

>
> In short, the days of low-flying attacks by manned aircraft are coming to
an
> end.

That may be true in the future, which isn't here yet.

[Paul F Austin]

"Kevin Brooks" wrote
>
> "Paul F Austin" wrote
> >
> > "Kevin Brooks" wrote
> > >
> > > "Paul F Austin" wrote
> > > >
> >
> > > >
> > > > As for the lack of SEAD, my impression (and that's all it is) was
that
> > the
> > > > Iraqis had everyone with a weapon that could elevate far enough fire
> > into
> > > > the night once the alarm was given, much the way the Vietnamese did.
> If
> > > you
> > > > can suppress_that_then you don't need to AHs in the first place.
> > >
> > > I don't think you fully understand the SEAD effort, and the resources
> that
> > > it can include, that normally supports such an operation. Likely areas
> > where
> > > ground fire or weapons systems would be encountered during the ingress
> and
> > > egress can be suppressed (actually saturated) by a combination of tube
> > arty
> > > fires, MLRS (which is probably the best single SEAD asset out to
around
> 70
> > > klicks), and even ATACMS (which can go to around 300 klicks) if the
> > > mission/threat requires them. Any idea what the effect of those
> > submunitions
> > > going off around your "everybody shoot up" crowd would be? How many of
> > those
> > > that just *witness* that kind of firestorm are subsequently willing to
> > > expose themselves if they *do* get a shot? Would it have been highly
> > > effective if it had been included in this attack? Maybe--we'll never
> know.
> > > But the idea that the results of a single mission flown under one set
of
> > > circumstances and without SEAD support should be the decisive factor
in
> > > determining the feasibility of attack helo operations is not a very
> > > supportable postion IMO.
> > >
> >
> > Kevin, why fly the AH strike in the first place if you're going to use
> this
> > much support for ingress and egress?
>
> You really have no idea as to the difference in terminal effects and
> capabilities between indirect dire systems and direct fire systems?

You're right about that. I'm a swivel chair hussar with no practical
knowledge of which weapons are appropriate for which particular mission. And
if it makes you feel better, I don't think all the AHs should be thrown on
the junk heap. I'm a conservative after all.

>
> You're taking it as a given that AHs
> > are more efficient at delivering ordnance to some class of targets than
> any
> > other alternative. That may be true against armor in a maneuver battle
but
> > in Iraq-2, that wasn't the target set.
>
> Actually, it sometimes was (they did not always remain dug in and
waiting).
> I did not say anything about "any other alternative", now did I?
>
> >
> > If we were arming for the Fulda Gap, then AHs make a lot of sense. It's
> not
> > clear to me that it's true for the battles we fight these days.
>
> They guys fighting in Anaconda like their support. As did the USMC units
> supported by their AH-1W's (interesting account in last month's AFM on
their
> use in OIF). Note that the USMC is also still pursuing their AH-1Z program
> as fast as they can. So where do you get this strange idea that OIF
> condemned the attack helo concept to the trashpile?

I don't and I didn't focus particularly on the 11th's engagement. What I
paid more attention to was the air campaign over Afghanistan with
the_extremely_long mission times required. Yep, the guys on the ground in
the Anaconda op needed a great deal of CAS. I just want to open the box a
bit on how to deliver those fires, considering what would have happened if
the SF teams had needed urgent support before the Marines opened up shop at
Camp Rhino.

> >
> > The object is warheads on foreheads. The FARP/short flight time ordnance
> > taxi is one model for doing that. A cloud of UCAVs in another. A Giant
> > Bombtruck In the Sky is still another. Because the Army has been wedded
to
> > short range, low endurance platforms is no reason not to open up the
> > analysis space to consider other alternatives.
>
> Hint--long endurance usually meand long transit time, and long
preparation.

Neither one is necessarily true. Because e.g. G-Hawk-can-fly
intercontinental missions, the temptation on the part of mission planners is
to use the endurance that way. The same endurance can result in multi-day
time on station using a regional base.

> The immediate CAS/AI situation may not allow for that. Which is why they
> like that whole FARP concept--need more 2.75 inch FFAR's and 30mm to
> continue that suppression mission that just moved to the top of the target
> heap? The FARP has them close by--that UAV orbiting with its BAT's is not
> going to do you a lot of good in that scenario. Just a simple example.
Ever
> wonder why the USMC also values the attack helo, and for that matter its
> AV-8B's? There is a lot to be said for quick response to a changing
> situation's requirements.

The Marines love their organic air because of institutional memory that goes
back to Guadalcanal, when the Navy sailed away, leaving the Marines holding
the bag (and I'm an ex-sailor). I understand the virtues of organic assets.
But. The Army's institutional experience with CAS systems is strongly
colored by the Key West Agreement and the limitations that put on the kinds
of aircraft the Army was allowed to operate. Helos were allowed so the Army
got expert in helicopters. I have a submariners's prejudices that helos are
unnatural contrivances.

Yes, quick response is the key and since Comanche is dead (and we both agree
that was the right decision), now is the time to determine the best way to
generate responsive CAS. My prejudices say that the CAS assets should be
organic to the Army but that's Unjoint.

> > > >
> > > > The last two years have clearly illustrated some major advantages
for
> > > UAVs.
> > > > They can't do everything by any means but the "natural advantage" of
> an
> > > > unmanned platform lies in great persistence, being able to stay on
> > station
> > > > for very long times so that the platform is there exactly when
needed.
> > The
> > > > ISR community has found that there are step-change improvements in
> > > coverage
> > > > over satellites and manned aircraft that derive from keeping a
> platform
> > > > overhead all day long. Likewise, hitting fleeting, moving targets
> > benefits
> > > > from having a launcher available_right now_, not five minutes off
and
> > > that's
> > > > hard to do with manned platforms and_may_be easier with UCAVs. It's
> > > > a_may_because the analysis is in progress but apparently OSD decided
> > that
> > > in
> > > > light of bad management, bad programmatic news and repeated program
> > > replans,
> > > > to cut its losses.
> > >
> > > You are mixing your systems up a bit. Long duration ISR missions are
> > > normally flown at altitude; but the Army needs a system that can also
> get
> > in
> > > closer (lower) for finite detail. When you switch to the UCAV role,
all
> of
> > > those current long duration UAV's have a pretty miserly weapons load
> > > capability--they are of little value rotating overhead if they don't
> still
> > > have munitions capable of doing the various jobs required. Fixed wing
> > UAV's
> > > can't hit a FARP and be back into the fight quickly after rearming and
> > > refueling--they have to mosey on back to the rear, land, get turned
> > around,
> > > take back off and mosey on back up to the battle area, dispense their
> > > munitions (which from what I have seen so far is a load of maybe two
> > > Hellfires, or four BAT's), after which they have to do it all over
> again.
> > > Which tells me that the larger attack helos still have a role in the
> > fight,
> > > and if you are planning to go the UCAV route, a VTOL system that can
use
> > > your FARP's is an advantage.
> >
> > AHs may have their place. The Israelis certainly get a lot of use from
> them
> > (and so do the Iranians from what I've read). In the current
environment,
> > the target set that needs servicing is the "30 second" target, between
> > detection and identification and either a warhead on a forehead or
*oops*
> he
> > disappeared. That kind of target requires ubiquitous platforms rather
than
> a
> > heavy loadout on a few platforms.
>
> No, that is just ONE of the target types that need we have to address. You
> also need to be able to address that immediate CAS request from the poor
> groundpounder who is sitting there with his SINCGARS and incapable of
> talking to the UAV operator sitting a hundred klicks back--so you still
need
> those manned CAS assets, to include the attack helos. Do the UCAV's have a
> role? Of course they do, and in all likelihood it will continue to grow in
> the future. But taking the single example of the 11th AVN deep mission
> during OIF and extrapolating a result of "no role or mission for the
attack
> helo in the modern fight" in favor of the UCAV (which does not yet exist
in
> terms of the capabilites you are requiring of them) is not a logical
> conclusion.

If the PBI can't talk to the UAV operator a hundred klicks back, he likely
can't talk to the orbiting CAS either. You miss a key point. We do CAS very
well now. We-don't- do the 30 second sensor to shooter against a moving
target well at all and that's a hole in our capabilities. The reality is
that we do most things very well indeed, so that we're filling in the
corners that were missed the first time around.

>
> >
> > Snooping and pooping is a traditional role that OHs have filled. There's
a
> > real question whether they're the best way to do it.
>
> In all circumstances? No they would not be. Are you ready to replace their
> capabilities with UAV's *right now*? No (a glance at the Army's UAV
programs
> and history will prove that). Will we be ready to completely do so in five
> years? I seriously doubt it. Ten years? I still doubt that we will be
ready
> to fully hand off the scouting role to unmanned platforms at that point,
> unless we really experienced a change in luck in terms of tactical UAV
> success. So what do use during that time period until your "uber UAV's"
are
> ready and fully fielded?

Use AHs. It may come as some surprise that I don't think UAVs are the
Swiss-Army-Knife of airborne systems. The Army has a long and crappy history
of UAV development (I worked on the tail-end of Aquilla). The various Unions
seem to be getting their **** together now, in light of real combat
experience but it will take years to field the right systems in the right
numbers.
>
> A platform that flies
> > in the Predator envelope (about 10Kfeet) misses nothing from a sensor
> > standpoint that could be gained by flying at a hundred feet.
>
> Really? You can ensure that the same detail is acheived? I doubt that.

I don't. I can go into no detail. There are specific terrains where medium
altititude sensors are at a disadvantage because of geometric issues but in
terms of militarily useable sensor resolution, there's nothing much to
choose.

>
> In any case,
> > you're ignoring the value of fused sensor data from multiple platforms.
>
> Which you think we have already conquered--but we have not. We are working
> towards it, and guess what--one of those contributing platforms is, and
will
> be, the manned scout helo.
>
> No
> > single scout is_ever_going to operate outside the data network in the
> > future. To do so would be stupid.
>
> Who ssaid it would?

You're right, that's a bit of a strawman. And the sensor net is nothing like
complete yet. But it is the future. And once the future is here, it's not
clear what role manned scout helos will play.
>
> >
> > There are two missions here.
> >
> > The first is an ISR mission that's going to be served by a network of
> > sensors and platforms. Some of the platforms will be under control of
> > brigade and lower, some will be controlled by higher echelons
but_all_the
> > take will be available to all the forces.
>
> You are dreaming here. We currently have the ASIC reside at *division*
> level. Will we improve the picture at the BCT and even BN TF levels? No
> doubt we will. But do we want some poor company team commander, or platoon
> leader, or for that matter the BN TF staff, to have to wade through the
> plethora of data that does NOT impact their mission needs? Nope. Do you
want
> to crap out the bandwidth with the transfer of data that is not needed by
> lower echelon units? Nope again. And how does any of this imply that the
> manned helo does not have a role today, or for that matter during the
> foreseeable future? It doesn't.

As I said, I may be premature on the data dissimination issue. You
tell_me_what a manned helo brings to the party as a sensor platform.

>
> >
> > The second mission is ordnance delivery. AHs can do that although they
> > compete with fixed wing assets as well as the artillery crowd.
>
> Used properly they *complement* those systems, just as those systems
> complement its use; "compete" is the wrong term of use.

No, they don't. The reality is that helos are what the Army is allowed, not
that helos have specific mission properties that are unique. They are
maintenance intensive, expensive and based on the Kosovo experience, not
very mobile strategically. To earn their place, they have to deliver better
than the alternatives.

>
> An AH
> > integrates sensors and ordnance and it's not clear to me, given that
data
> > network, where the right place in the number of platforms/loadout per
> > platform/sensors per platform/endurance per platform space is the right
> > place to be. If you're dealing with a Sea O' Tanks heading your way,
> that's
> > one thing. If you're looking to pot a target speeding from one hide to
> > another, that's another thing. If you're looking for a rascal on a
> > motorcycle that just launched an RPG at the local headquarters, that's
> still
> > another.
> >
> > One abiding fault of armies is the desire to equip yourself to fight the
> war
> > you_want_to fight. That's a cardinal error.
>
> Another cardinal error is trying to take the results of the last conflict
> (in this case of the 11th AVN deep attack a singular battle at that) and
> apply them with undue rigor to all future conflicts.

Didn't do that. As I said. You're the one that obsesses on that engagement.

And you still don't address the fleeting target.

[phil hunt]

On Mon, 23 Feb 2004 17:26:04 -0500, Paul F Austin > wrote:
>
>"robert arndt" wrote
>>
>> Too bad, only wish it would have been the V-22 or F-22 programs.
>
>This is the first big lessons learned to come out of Iraq War-2. Between the
>Apaches getting put out of action by massed gunfire and the demonstrated
>advantages of UAVs, the Army decided that Comanche was last-war's weapon.

That's my take on it too.

--
"It's easier to find people online who openly support the KKK than
people who openly support the RIAA" -- comment on Wikipedia
(Email: zen19725 at zen dot co dot uk)

[phil hunt]

On Mon, 23 Feb 2004 19:35:35 -0800, Hobo > wrote:
>In article >,
> (robert arndt) wrote:
>
>> Too bad, only wish it would have been the V-22 or F-22 programs.
>>
>> Rob
>
>Of course, it was the Germans who invented the uncompleted program.

At least they had a good excuse, like losing the war.

There would have been some interesting designs if WW2 had gone
into 1946 or 47.

--
"It's easier to find people online who openly support the KKK than
people who openly support the RIAA" -- comment on Wikipedia
(Email: zen19725 at zen dot co dot uk)

[Kevin Brooks]

"Paul F Austin" > wrote in message
. ..
>
> "Kevin Brooks" wrote
> >
> > "Paul F Austin" wrote
> > >
> > > "Kevin Brooks" wrote
> > > >
> > > > "Paul F Austin" wrote
> > > > >
> > >
> > > > >
> > > > > As for the lack of SEAD, my impression (and that's all it is) was
> that
> > > the
> > > > > Iraqis had everyone with a weapon that could elevate far enough
fire
> > > into
> > > > > the night once the alarm was given, much the way the Vietnamese
did.
> > If
> > > > you
> > > > > can suppress_that_then you don't need to AHs in the first place.
> > > >
> > > > I don't think you fully understand the SEAD effort, and the
resources
> > that
> > > > it can include, that normally supports such an operation. Likely
areas
> > > where
> > > > ground fire or weapons systems would be encountered during the
ingress
> > and
> > > > egress can be suppressed (actually saturated) by a combination of
tube
> > > arty
> > > > fires, MLRS (which is probably the best single SEAD asset out to
> around
> > 70
> > > > klicks), and even ATACMS (which can go to around 300 klicks) if the
> > > > mission/threat requires them. Any idea what the effect of those
> > > submunitions
> > > > going off around your "everybody shoot up" crowd would be? How many
of
> > > those
> > > > that just *witness* that kind of firestorm are subsequently willing
to
> > > > expose themselves if they *do* get a shot? Would it have been highly
> > > > effective if it had been included in this attack? Maybe--we'll never
> > know.
> > > > But the idea that the results of a single mission flown under one
set
> of
> > > > circumstances and without SEAD support should be the decisive factor
> in
> > > > determining the feasibility of attack helo operations is not a very
> > > > supportable postion IMO.
> > > >
> > >
> > > Kevin, why fly the AH strike in the first place if you're going to use
> > this
> > > much support for ingress and egress?
> >
> > You really have no idea as to the difference in terminal effects and
> > capabilities between indirect dire systems and direct fire systems?
>
> You're right about that. I'm a swivel chair hussar with no practical
> knowledge of which weapons are appropriate for which particular mission.
And
> if it makes you feel better, I don't think all the AHs should be thrown on
> the junk heap. I'm a conservative after all.

The plain fact of the matter is that the indirect fire systems can't acheive
the same results that the Apaches can in the EA. For example, the standard
DPICM bomblet, while it can be lethal against troops in the open, thin
skinned vehicles, and even light armor, is not likely to kill an MBT *if* it
hits it. The Apache can kill that MBT quite easily, as we have seen in the
past. Artillery is becoming more capable of killing point targets, but we
are not yet at the stage where we can hand-off all of the killing to such
indirect fire systems. But indirect fire systems can (right now) provide
excellent suppression against the kind of threats that the Apache has to
concern itself with while it ingresses and egresses. Nor are they limited to
providing that kind of support to rotary assets; ATACMS has been used in the
SEAD role in support of fast mover efforts (the SEAD role being one of
ATACMS primary reasons for existing).

>
> >
> > You're taking it as a given that AHs
> > > are more efficient at delivering ordnance to some class of targets
than
> > any
> > > other alternative. That may be true against armor in a maneuver battle
> but
> > > in Iraq-2, that wasn't the target set.
> >
> > Actually, it sometimes was (they did not always remain dug in and
> waiting).
> > I did not say anything about "any other alternative", now did I?
> >
> > >
> > > If we were arming for the Fulda Gap, then AHs make a lot of sense.
It's
> > not
> > > clear to me that it's true for the battles we fight these days.
> >
> > They guys fighting in Anaconda like their support. As did the USMC units
> > supported by their AH-1W's (interesting account in last month's AFM on
> their
> > use in OIF). Note that the USMC is also still pursuing their AH-1Z
program
> > as fast as they can. So where do you get this strange idea that OIF
> > condemned the attack helo concept to the trashpile?
>
> I don't and I didn't focus particularly on the 11th's engagement. What I
> paid more attention to was the air campaign over Afghanistan with
> the_extremely_long mission times required.

No, your original statement that I took exception to said nothing of the
sort, and was evidently directly related to that single deep attack mission
by the 11th AVN: "This is the first big lessons learned to come out of Iraq
War-2. Between the Apaches getting put out of action by massed gunfire..."
Now where do we see any reference to Afghani operations in that statement?
And who in heck has claimed that the Apache should be the *primary* CAS/BAI
platform, especially in long range engagements like those that typified the
early stages of OEF?

Yep, the guys on the ground in
> the Anaconda op needed a great deal of CAS. I just want to open the box a
> bit on how to deliver those fires, considering what would have happened if
> the SF teams had needed urgent support before the Marines opened up shop
at
> Camp Rhino.

You are delving into METT-T concerns, not indicting the continuing valid
roles of attack helos. No single system can perform all roles across the
spectrum of combat, and throughout the depth of the battlespace. That the
Apache can't do that either means nothing.

>
> > >
> > > The object is warheads on foreheads. The FARP/short flight time
ordnance
> > > taxi is one model for doing that. A cloud of UCAVs in another. A Giant
> > > Bombtruck In the Sky is still another. Because the Army has been
wedded
> to
> > > short range, low endurance platforms is no reason not to open up the
> > > analysis space to consider other alternatives.
> >
> > Hint--long endurance usually meand long transit time, and long
> preparation.
>
> Neither one is necessarily true. Because e.g. G-Hawk-can-fly
> intercontinental missions, the temptation on the part of mission planners
is
> to use the endurance that way. The same endurance can result in multi-day
> time on station using a regional base.

OK, first off, nobody is talking about using Global Hawk in the CAS/BAI role
that I am aware of. And yes, it does take a while to get fixed wing UAV's
regenerated and back into the fight, and yes, their basing requirements will
normally put them some distance from the FLOT. The ground commander needs a
whole plethora of different platforms to support him, including UAV's, and
ideally also including manned helos. The VTOL aircraft, and its ability to
use a FARP and conduct quick turnarounds with task-driven weapons loadout,
contributes to his versatility much more than any of the current (or soon to
be available) crop of armed UAV's can.

>
> > The immediate CAS/AI situation may not allow for that. Which is why they
> > like that whole FARP concept--need more 2.75 inch FFAR's and 30mm to
> > continue that suppression mission that just moved to the top of the
target
> > heap? The FARP has them close by--that UAV orbiting with its BAT's is
not
> > going to do you a lot of good in that scenario. Just a simple example.
> Ever
> > wonder why the USMC also values the attack helo, and for that matter its
> > AV-8B's? There is a lot to be said for quick response to a changing
> > situation's requirements.
>
> The Marines love their organic air because of institutional memory that
goes
> back to Guadalcanal, when the Navy sailed away, leaving the Marines
holding
> the bag (and I'm an ex-sailor).

Who cares about "organic"? The USMC loved the support it got from its
AH-1W's during OIF. Period. Granted that giving the ground force commander
his own dedicated and owned source of CAS/BAI can also be valuable, but the
key fact from the above is that the attack helo was deemed to still be an
important asset by the USMC.

I understand the virtues of organic assets.
> But. The Army's institutional experience with CAS systems is strongly
> colored by the Key West Agreement and the limitations that put on the
kinds
> of aircraft the Army was allowed to operate. Helos were allowed so the
Army
> got expert in helicopters. I have a submariners's prejudices that helos
are
> unnatural contrivances.
>
> Yes, quick response is the key and since Comanche is dead (and we both
agree
> that was the right decision), now is the time to determine the best way to
> generate responsive CAS. My prejudices say that the CAS assets should be
> organic to the Army but that's Unjoint.

I don't in the end care *who* owns the assets, my concern is that we need to
ensure the commander has *all* of the tools that he can get which contribute
to his versatility and agility on the battlefield. Right now, and for the
foreseeable future, that includes the manned helo; yes, it faces threats
from groundfire (but so does the UAV), but it can perform in environments
that might be difficult for the UAV (ie., effective enemy ECM).

>
> > > > >
> > > > > The last two years have clearly illustrated some major advantages
> for
> > > > UAVs.
> > > > > They can't do everything by any means but the "natural advantage"
of
> > an
> > > > > unmanned platform lies in great persistence, being able to stay on
> > > station
> > > > > for very long times so that the platform is there exactly when
> needed.
> > > The
> > > > > ISR community has found that there are step-change improvements in
> > > > coverage
> > > > > over satellites and manned aircraft that derive from keeping a
> > platform
> > > > > overhead all day long. Likewise, hitting fleeting, moving targets
> > > benefits
> > > > > from having a launcher available_right now_, not five minutes off
> and
> > > > that's
> > > > > hard to do with manned platforms and_may_be easier with UCAVs.
It's
> > > > > a_may_because the analysis is in progress but apparently OSD
decided
> > > that
> > > > in
> > > > > light of bad management, bad programmatic news and repeated
program
> > > > replans,
> > > > > to cut its losses.
> > > >
> > > > You are mixing your systems up a bit. Long duration ISR missions are
> > > > normally flown at altitude; but the Army needs a system that can
also
> > get
> > > in
> > > > closer (lower) for finite detail. When you switch to the UCAV role,
> all
> > of
> > > > those current long duration UAV's have a pretty miserly weapons load
> > > > capability--they are of little value rotating overhead if they don't
> > still
> > > > have munitions capable of doing the various jobs required. Fixed
wing
> > > UAV's
> > > > can't hit a FARP and be back into the fight quickly after rearming
and
> > > > refueling--they have to mosey on back to the rear, land, get turned
> > > around,
> > > > take back off and mosey on back up to the battle area, dispense
their
> > > > munitions (which from what I have seen so far is a load of maybe two
> > > > Hellfires, or four BAT's), after which they have to do it all over
> > again.
> > > > Which tells me that the larger attack helos still have a role in the
> > > fight,
> > > > and if you are planning to go the UCAV route, a VTOL system that can
> use
> > > > your FARP's is an advantage.
> > >
> > > AHs may have their place. The Israelis certainly get a lot of use from
> > them
> > > (and so do the Iranians from what I've read). In the current
> environment,
> > > the target set that needs servicing is the "30 second" target, between
> > > detection and identification and either a warhead on a forehead or
> *oops*
> > he
> > > disappeared. That kind of target requires ubiquitous platforms rather
> than
> > a
> > > heavy loadout on a few platforms.
> >
> > No, that is just ONE of the target types that need we have to address.
You
> > also need to be able to address that immediate CAS request from the poor
> > groundpounder who is sitting there with his SINCGARS and incapable of
> > talking to the UAV operator sitting a hundred klicks back--so you still
> need
> > those manned CAS assets, to include the attack helos. Do the UCAV's have
a
> > role? Of course they do, and in all likelihood it will continue to grow
in
> > the future. But taking the single example of the 11th AVN deep mission
> > during OIF and extrapolating a result of "no role or mission for the
> attack
> > helo in the modern fight" in favor of the UCAV (which does not yet exist
> in
> > terms of the capabilites you are requiring of them) is not a logical
> > conclusion.
>
> If the PBI can't talk to the UAV operator a hundred klicks back, he likely
> can't talk to the orbiting CAS either.

Bullpoopie. His basic FM *can* let him talk to line-of-sight targets, but he
is not going to be able to hit that UAV site without a retrans chain (and
then only problematically).

You miss a key point. We do CAS very
> well now. We-don't- do the 30 second sensor to shooter against a moving
> target well at all and that's a hole in our capabilities. The reality is
> that we do most things very well indeed, so that we're filling in the
> corners that were missed the first time around.

But that does not imply in any way that the attack helo is a product of a
bygone era.

>
> >
> > >
> > > Snooping and pooping is a traditional role that OHs have filled.
There's
> a
> > > real question whether they're the best way to do it.
> >
> > In all circumstances? No they would not be. Are you ready to replace
their
> > capabilities with UAV's *right now*? No (a glance at the Army's UAV
> programs
> > and history will prove that). Will we be ready to completely do so in
five
> > years? I seriously doubt it. Ten years? I still doubt that we will be
> ready
> > to fully hand off the scouting role to unmanned platforms at that point,
> > unless we really experienced a change in luck in terms of tactical UAV
> > success. So what do use during that time period until your "uber UAV's"
> are
> > ready and fully fielded?
>
> Use AHs. It may come as some surprise that I don't think UAVs are the
> Swiss-Army-Knife of airborne systems. The Army has a long and crappy
history
> of UAV development (I worked on the tail-end of Aquilla). The various
Unions
> seem to be getting their **** together now, in light of real combat
> experience but it will take years to field the right systems in the right
> numbers.
> >
> > A platform that flies
> > > in the Predator envelope (about 10Kfeet) misses nothing from a sensor
> > > standpoint that could be gained by flying at a hundred feet.
> >
> > Really? You can ensure that the same detail is acheived? I doubt that.
>
> I don't. I can go into no detail. There are specific terrains where medium
> altititude sensors are at a disadvantage because of geometric issues but
in
> terms of militarily useable sensor resolution, there's nothing much to
> choose.

Unless things have changed dramatically since OAF, then I can't buy that.
One of the lessons learned there was that the UAV's could not find the
targets with the desired reliability. Terrain and vegetative cover, enemy
camouflage efforts (including multi-spectral systems)--they all can degrade
sensor performance, especially from increased range.

>
> >
> > In any case,
> > > you're ignoring the value of fused sensor data from multiple
platforms.
> >
> > Which you think we have already conquered--but we have not. We are
working
> > towards it, and guess what--one of those contributing platforms is, and
> will
> > be, the manned scout helo.
> >
> > No
> > > single scout is_ever_going to operate outside the data network in the
> > > future. To do so would be stupid.
> >
> > Who ssaid it would?
>
> You're right, that's a bit of a strawman. And the sensor net is nothing
like
> complete yet. But it is the future. And once the future is here, it's not
> clear what role manned scout helos will play.
> >
> > >
> > > There are two missions here.
> > >
> > > The first is an ISR mission that's going to be served by a network of
> > > sensors and platforms. Some of the platforms will be under control of
> > > brigade and lower, some will be controlled by higher echelons
> but_all_the
> > > take will be available to all the forces.
> >
> > You are dreaming here. We currently have the ASIC reside at *division*
> > level. Will we improve the picture at the BCT and even BN TF levels? No
> > doubt we will. But do we want some poor company team commander, or
platoon
> > leader, or for that matter the BN TF staff, to have to wade through the
> > plethora of data that does NOT impact their mission needs? Nope. Do you
> want
> > to crap out the bandwidth with the transfer of data that is not needed
by
> > lower echelon units? Nope again. And how does any of this imply that the
> > manned helo does not have a role today, or for that matter during the
> > foreseeable future? It doesn't.
>
> As I said, I may be premature on the data dissimination issue. You
> tell_me_what a manned helo brings to the party as a sensor platform.

Ability to operate in a rigorous ECM environment for one. Better fieild of
view provided by the mark-one eyeballs of a couple of crewmembers.
Observation in 3-D versus the more sanitary 2-D of UAV optical sensors. And
most importantly, the ability to reason while absorbing sensory input. Add
in the fact that we can data link their onboard sensors just as we do that
of the UAV's (demonstrated similarly by USMC AV-8B's during OIF providing
datalinked images from their targeting pods to ground commanders).

>
> >
> > >
> > > The second mission is ordnance delivery. AHs can do that although they
> > > compete with fixed wing assets as well as the artillery crowd.
> >
> > Used properly they *complement* those systems, just as those systems
> > complement its use; "compete" is the wrong term of use.
>
> No, they don't. The reality is that helos are what the Army is allowed,
not
> that helos have specific mission properties that are unique.

Huh? They don't? Ever try to turn around an A-10 at a FARP cut into the
brush immediately to the rear of the FLOT? How long was it before we had
operational fighter strips up and running in Afghanistan? We had Cobras
operating there in quick fashion (and could have had them even more quickly
if we had so desired). Ever have your A-10 direct your arty? Armed scout
helos do that routinely.

They are
> maintenance intensive, expensive and based on the Kosovo experience, not
> very mobile strategically. To earn their place, they have to deliver
better
> than the alternatives.

No they don't. They have to complement the other systems, as i said earlier.
You really need to look up the concept of "combined arms warfare". Each
system uses its strengths to help overcome the weaknesses of the other
systems. Sort of like the JAAT (joint air attack tactics) missions that the
A-10's and Apaches/Cobras used to sometimes train on.

>
> >
> > An AH
> > > integrates sensors and ordnance and it's not clear to me, given that
> data
> > > network, where the right place in the number of platforms/loadout per
> > > platform/sensors per platform/endurance per platform space is the
right
> > > place to be. If you're dealing with a Sea O' Tanks heading your way,
> > that's
> > > one thing. If you're looking to pot a target speeding from one hide to
> > > another, that's another thing. If you're looking for a rascal on a
> > > motorcycle that just launched an RPG at the local headquarters, that's
> > still
> > > another.
> > >
> > > One abiding fault of armies is the desire to equip yourself to fight
the
> > war
> > > you_want_to fight. That's a cardinal error.
> >
> > Another cardinal error is trying to take the results of the last
conflict
> > (in this case of the 11th AVN deep attack a singular battle at that)
and
> > apply them with undue rigor to all future conflicts.
>
> Didn't do that. As I said. You're the one that obsesses on that
engagement.

"This is the first big lessons learned to come out of Iraq War-2. Between
the Apaches getting put out of action by massed gunfire..." Your words, not
mine.

>
> And you still don't address the fleeting target.

Neither does the 81mm mortar--are you going to want to can them, too?

Brooks

>
>

[Bogospace]

"Paul F Austin" > wrote in message
...
> No single sensor sees all and knows all.

I think that's the point. The total awareness concept called for 5000
Comanches in service. Pfft.. 5000 UAVs is doable.

[Thomas Schoene]

Kevin Brooks wrote:

> I always thought the emphasis on radar stealth was off the mark. But
> be careful drawing any hard and fast conclusions in regards to helo
> survivability vis a vis the 11th AVN deep attack during OIF.

I'm not looking only at that attack. There are a bunch of incidents, from
Operation ANACONDA on, that suggest that attack helos are going to get hit
fairly often, and that those hits will come from optical or IR weapons.

> I did not like Commanche, but I *can* see the wisdom
> of including a strike capability in your cavalry scout
> birds--increased versatility for when things don't go as planned, the

Sure, but I question the scale of the armament actually selected. With the
stub wings (which I think were deferred from the most recent production
plan), a Comanche could carry 14 Hellfires, almost 90% of the armament of an
Apache. That's a lot of targets of opportunity. And the requirement for
internal carriage for part of that load added both cost and complexity.

Personally, I think they should have started building a much less complex
scout sometime in the early 1990s, starting with AH-58 capabilities but
built in into a more combat-worthy airframe. It would look strikingly like
an early AH-1 or the Japanese OH-X in general outline. Sensors consist of
Londbow above the mast and Comanche optics above the cockpit but below the
rotor (the second-best spot,a fter the mast it taken by radar). Armament of
perhaps 4 Hellfire (or two rocket pods) and 4 Stinger (for UAV killing as
much as for self-defense) on stub wings plus maybe a GAU-19 .50-caliber
gatling in a chin mount for small arms suppression. Don't worry about radar
LO; concentrate on IR, front-aspect visual, and maybe acoustics.

With luck and planning, the same dynamic system can be adapted for that long
overdue Light Utility Helo requirement (shades of UH-1/AH-1 in reverse?).
--
Tom Schoene Replace "invalid" with "net" to e-mail
"If brave men and women never died, there would be nothing
special about bravery." -- Andy Rooney (attributed)

[Charles Gray]

On Tue, 24 Feb 2004 23:34:46 +0000, (phil
hunt) wrote:

>On Mon, 23 Feb 2004 17:26:04 -0500, Paul F Austin > wrote:
>>
>>"robert arndt" wrote
>>>
>>> Too bad, only wish it would have been the V-22 or F-22 programs.
>>
>>This is the first big lessons learned to come out of Iraq War-2. Between the
>>Apaches getting put out of action by massed gunfire and the demonstrated
>>advantages of UAVs, the Army decided that Comanche was last-war's weapon.
>
>That's my take on it too.


And they wasted a ton of money on it. I don't mind that the program
was canceled-- if they had a good reason to.

But consider this-- the LHX program first got started back in 1983--
before I was out of high school! Total up all the starts and stops,
half done systems, etc, and you probably have enough wasted money to
put helicopter engines on the New Jersey and get a REAL big CAS
platform.
Seriously, I think we long ago passed th epoint where delays in
getting actual hardware in service for hands on looks cost more than
the money to be saved by endless rounds of redesign.

[Howard Berkowitz]

In article >, "Paul F
Austin" > wrote:

> "Kevin Brooks" wrote
> >
> > "Paul F Austin" wrote in message
> > >
>
>
> Of course it's not. It's not even "my idea". I'm under no illusion that I
> or
> anyone on this forum will "think up" a new paradigm that those blockheads
> at
> the Pentagon, yadayada... Real analysis doesn't happen on Usenet.
> Although
> why the Army restricts its thinking to rotorcraft is a good question.

Can we say "Key West Agreement"?

[Paul F Austin]

"Howard Berkowitz" > wrote in message
...
> In article >, "Paul F
> Austin" > wrote:
>
> > "Kevin Brooks" wrote
> > >
> > > "Paul F Austin" wrote in message
> > > >
> >
> >
> > Of course it's not. It's not even "my idea". I'm under no illusion that
I
> > or
> > anyone on this forum will "think up" a new paradigm that those
blockheads
> > at
> > the Pentagon, yadayada... Real analysis doesn't happen on Usenet.
> > Although
> > why the Army restricts its thinking to rotorcraft is a good question.
>
> Can we say "Key West Agreement"?

No ****? It's time to ****can the Key West Agreement. This business of
half-fast CAS for the Army and fast CAS for the Air Force is absurd. It's
past time to look at the mission requirements, decide who does the scope and
provide the right platform. The idea that the Air Force has the franchise on
fixed wing combat aircraft was an artifact of yesteryear. Right now, the Air
Force is doing it's patented "we'll do the CAS mission with very fast movers
that can also <be used for other missions>" by planning on replacing the
A-10 with the F-35.

[Howard Berkowitz]

In article >, "Paul F
Austin" > wrote:

> "Howard Berkowitz" > wrote in message
> ...
> > In article >, "Paul F
> > Austin" > wrote:
> >
> > > "Kevin Brooks" wrote
> > > >
> > > > "Paul F Austin" wrote in message
> > > > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Of course it's not. It's not even "my idea". I'm under no illusion
> > > that
> I
> > > or
> > > anyone on this forum will "think up" a new paradigm that those
> blockheads
> > > at
> > > the Pentagon, yadayada... Real analysis doesn't happen on Usenet.
> > > Although
> > > why the Army restricts its thinking to rotorcraft is a good question.
> >
> > Can we say "Key West Agreement"?
>
> No ****? It's time to ****can the Key West Agreement. This business of
> half-fast CAS for the Army and fast CAS for the Air Force is absurd. It's
> past time to look at the mission requirements, decide who does the scope
> and
> provide the right platform. The idea that the Air Force has the franchise
> on
> fixed wing combat aircraft was an artifact of yesteryear. Right now, the
> Air
> Force is doing it's patented "we'll do the CAS mission with very fast
> movers
> that can also <be used for other missions>" by planning on replacing the
> A-10 with the F-35.
>
>

Please don't assume I'm defending the thing! But it probably is the
reason for the rotorcraft emphasis.

If we look at roles and missions, there are cases where operational and
routine control could very reasonably differ. For example, long-range
air defense assets like Patriot and SM-2 could go, operationally, to the
service component with the best battlespace management capability. Might
be Air Force, might be Navy.

But logistic and maintenance support for the Patriot vehicles, given
commonality with other platforms, belongs in the Army.

[Kevin Brooks]

"Paul F Austin" > wrote in message
. ..
>
> "Howard Berkowitz" > wrote in message
> ...
> > In article >, "Paul F
> > Austin" > wrote:
> >
> > > "Kevin Brooks" wrote
> > > >
> > > > "Paul F Austin" wrote in message
> > > > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Of course it's not. It's not even "my idea". I'm under no illusion
that
> I
> > > or
> > > anyone on this forum will "think up" a new paradigm that those
> blockheads
> > > at
> > > the Pentagon, yadayada... Real analysis doesn't happen on Usenet.
> > > Although
> > > why the Army restricts its thinking to rotorcraft is a good question.
> >
> > Can we say "Key West Agreement"?
>
> No ****? It's time to ****can the Key West Agreement. This business of
> half-fast CAS for the Army and fast CAS for the Air Force is absurd. It's
> past time to look at the mission requirements, decide who does the scope
and
> provide the right platform. The idea that the Air Force has the franchise
on
> fixed wing combat aircraft was an artifact of yesteryear. Right now, the
Air
> Force is doing it's patented "we'll do the CAS mission with very fast
movers
> that can also <be used for other missions>" by planning on replacing the
> A-10 with the F-35.

I once thought similarly to you on this issue, but not anymore. The concept
of jointness is much more palapable today than it was even five years ago,
for one thing. Second, the advent of economical and reliable PGM's means
that those fast movers (or for that matter the heavy movers like the Buff),
given decent info from the ground, can acheive darned good effects in the
CAS role. The Army does not need to compete for, or takeover from, the USAF
the CAS mission. What it *can* do is complement the USAF capabilities such
that the ground commander has the widest range of options available to him
to handle any contingencies he may face--which is why including the attack
helo in the mix for the foreseeable future is a wise move. Apparently the
Army agrees with that sentiment--they have no designs on taking over the
A-10 mission (which those nasty USAF types have the *audacity* to announce
now that they are enhancing by upgrading the A-10's which will remain in the
force until the F-35's can replace them, sometime in the next ten to fifteen
years), and have announced that they will indeed incorporate some of the
Commanche sensor and UAV control capabilites into the Block III Longbow
program. face it, paul--those attack helos are gonna be around for a
while..along with the new scout aircraft they are also going to buy.

Brooks

>
>

[Paul F Austin]

"Kevin Brooks" > wrote in message
...
>
> "Paul F Austin" > wrote in message
> . ..
> >
> > "Howard Berkowitz" > wrote in message
> > ...
> > > In article >, "Paul F
> > > Austin" > wrote:
> > >
> > > > "Kevin Brooks" wrote
> > > > >
> > > > > "Paul F Austin" wrote in message
> > > > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > Of course it's not. It's not even "my idea". I'm under no illusion
> that
> > I
> > > > or
> > > > anyone on this forum will "think up" a new paradigm that those
> > blockheads
> > > > at
> > > > the Pentagon, yadayada... Real analysis doesn't happen on Usenet.
> > > > Although
> > > > why the Army restricts its thinking to rotorcraft is a good
question.
> > >
> > > Can we say "Key West Agreement"?
> >
> > No ****? It's time to ****can the Key West Agreement. This business of
> > half-fast CAS for the Army and fast CAS for the Air Force is absurd.
It's
> > past time to look at the mission requirements, decide who does the scope
> and
> > provide the right platform. The idea that the Air Force has the
franchise
> on
> > fixed wing combat aircraft was an artifact of yesteryear. Right now, the
> Air
> > Force is doing it's patented "we'll do the CAS mission with very fast
> movers
> > that can also <be used for other missions>" by planning on replacing
the
> > A-10 with the F-35.
>
> I once thought similarly to you on this issue, but not anymore. The
concept
> of jointness is much more palapable today than it was even five years ago,
> for one thing. Second, the advent of economical and reliable PGM's means
> that those fast movers (or for that matter the heavy movers like the
Buff),
> given decent info from the ground, can acheive darned good effects in the
> CAS role. The Army does not need to compete for, or takeover from, the
USAF
> the CAS mission. What it *can* do is complement the USAF capabilities such
> that the ground commander has the widest range of options available to him
> to handle any contingencies he may face--which is why including the attack
> helo in the mix for the foreseeable future is a wise move. Apparently the
> Army agrees with that sentiment--they have no designs on taking over the
> A-10 mission (which those nasty USAF types have the *audacity* to announce
> now that they are enhancing by upgrading the A-10's which will remain in
the
> force until the F-35's can replace them, sometime in the next ten to
fifteen
> years), and have announced that they will indeed incorporate some of the
> Commanche sensor and UAV control capabilites into the Block III Longbow
> program. face it, paul--those attack helos are gonna be around for a
> while..along with the new scout aircraft they are also going to buy.

I don't know why, but I get suspicious when the AF says that their CAS
platform is going to be a supercruiser. Maybe it's just me... I hope AHs
remain survivable.

I don think it's interesting that (according to AvWeek) the Iraqi insurgents
are reserving the SA-16 and up for helos because they figure the Pk of any
MANPADS against a large transport is low.

[Tank Fixer]

In article >,
on Tue, 24 Feb 2004 23:44:54 +0000,
phil hunt attempted to say .....

> On Mon, 23 Feb 2004 19:35:35 -0800, Hobo > wrote:
> >In article >,
> > (robert arndt) wrote:
> >
> >> Too bad, only wish it would have been the V-22 or F-22 programs.
> >>
> >> Rob
> >
> >Of course, it was the Germans who invented the uncompleted program.
>
> At least they had a good excuse, like losing the war.
>
> There would have been some interesting designs if WW2 had gone
> into 1946 or 47.

They would have looked really cool sitting at the ends of the runways with
dry fuel tanks.



--
When dealing with propaganda terminology one sometimes always speaks in
variable absolutes. This is not to be mistaken for an unbiased slant.

[Kevin Brooks]

"Tank Fixer" > wrote in message
k.net...
> In article >,
> on Tue, 24 Feb 2004 23:44:54 +0000,
> phil hunt attempted to say .....
>
> > On Mon, 23 Feb 2004 19:35:35 -0800, Hobo > wrote:
> > >In article >,
> > > (robert arndt) wrote:
> > >
> > >> Too bad, only wish it would have been the V-22 or F-22 programs.
> > >>
> > >> Rob
> > >
> > >Of course, it was the Germans who invented the uncompleted program.
> >
> > At least they had a good excuse, like losing the war.
> >
> > There would have been some interesting designs if WW2 had gone
> > into 1946 or 47.
>
> They would have looked really cool sitting at the ends of the runways with
> dry fuel tanks.

LOL! Good point!

Brooks

[Tarver Engineering]

"Paul F Austin" > wrote in message
.. .

> I don't know why, but I get suspicious when the AF says that their CAS
> platform is going to be a supercruiser. Maybe it's just me... I hope AHs
> remain survivable.

The B-one has been doing CAS, Austin.

The nature of the technology has changed.

[M]

Kevin Brooks >
> I always thought the emphasis on radar stealth was off the mark.

Consider missions like the one at the start of Desert Storm, where
(iirc) Apaches sneaked in low at night and destroyed Iraqi early
warning radars. Obviously, radar stealth seems useful for such
missions.

So, a few stupid(?) questions: Am I wrong about radar
stealth being quite useful in addition to terrain masking?
Is using helos for such missions outdated? Are such deep
missions a marginal issue nowadays, or was it so already
back then? Or is it that the US is focusing its capability
on tackling third rate opponents with minimal own-losses,
rendering the issue of radar-based airdefences largely irrelevant?

> without the benefit of the normal SEAD support from your own
> arty assets is extremely risky."

More naive questions: Is artillery SEAD really seen as a
requirement for attack helo missions within the envelope
of enemy short-range airdefences? If so, what about operating
out of arty range? Or without having arty on theatre in the
first place (eg much of Afghanistan, esp early on)? And, finally,
if artillery is that effective for SEAD, wouldn't it also be
effective against the targets of the attack helos? Couldn't
smart AT-MP submunitions, or whatever, then do all the job
of the AH's, and more safely?

Moreover, while MLRS can saturate fairly large areas with
submunitions, and will probably ruin the day of any
manpad operator in the target area, one can't possibly
use arty to saturate all the potential locations of
air-defences. At least not with low-level ingress/eggress.
A guy with a manpad can hide easily - in the worst
case he'll be lurking just next to your base, like has
been the case in some Russian helo losses in Chechenya.

And what if the enemy has useful counter battery capability
that limits arty SEAD support? Use AH's to take it out, but...
<g>

[John Hairell]

On Wed, 25 Feb 2004 15:36:51 -0500, Howard Berkowitz
> wrote:

>In article >, "Paul F
>Austin" > wrote:
>
>> "Kevin Brooks" wrote
>> >
>> > "Paul F Austin" wrote in message
>> > >
>>
>>
>> Of course it's not. It's not even "my idea". I'm under no illusion that I
>> or
>> anyone on this forum will "think up" a new paradigm that those blockheads
>> at
>> the Pentagon, yadayada... Real analysis doesn't happen on Usenet.
>> Although
>> why the Army restricts its thinking to rotorcraft is a good question.
>
>Can we say "Key West Agreement"?


Which one? The US Army-USAF relationship is actually derived from
multiple agreements, the earliest dating to the '40s. The latest
agreement didn't fully override all of the previous ones.

John Hairell )

[Kevin Brooks]

"M" <*@*.*> wrote in message ...
> Kevin Brooks >
> > I always thought the emphasis on radar stealth was off the mark.
>
> Consider missions like the one at the start of Desert Storm, where
> (iirc) Apaches sneaked in low at night and destroyed Iraqi early
> warning radars. Obviously, radar stealth seems useful for such
> missions.

Actually, from what little I understand, that scenario is one where LO tech
would be of the least usefulness. Early warning radars work on the longer
end of the wavelength, and LO is least effective against EW systems; ISTR
reading that stealthy platforms can rather often pop up on such systems. But
the LO is better oriented towards the shorter wavelength acquisition and
tracking systems. If I have that all wrong, sombody else can feel free to
correct that view.

>
> So, a few stupid(?) questions: Am I wrong about radar
> stealth being quite useful in addition to terrain masking?
> Is using helos for such missions outdated? Are such deep
> missions a marginal issue nowadays, or was it so already
> back then? Or is it that the US is focusing its capability
> on tackling third rate opponents with minimal own-losses,
> rendering the issue of radar-based airdefences largely irrelevant?

I don't think LO in the radar spectrum is nearly as important for a helo
that is able to use terrain masking as would be reducing the IR and sound
signatures. As to going deep, the aviators were quite enamored with that
philosophy ever since the Apache arrived on the scene; when we played mixed
force simulations, where our division had both Cobras and Apaches in hand,
we invariably dedicated the Apaches to going deep (where they often took
heavier losses) while we retained the Cobras for over-the-shoulder shooting
and as our last-ditch AT reserve. The experience during OIF with the 11th
AVN BDE deep attack does point out the dangers inherent in trying to use
rotary assets in that role, but beware drawing to great a conclusion, as
that mission may have had some planning problems, and it was executed
knowingly at greater risk without SEAD support.

>
> > without the benefit of the normal SEAD support from your own
> > arty assets is extremely risky."
>
> More naive questions: Is artillery SEAD really seen as a
> requirement for attack helo missions within the envelope
> of enemy short-range airdefences?

In my expereince at the DIV level, and watching the corps planning cycle
up-close, yes it usually is included in the deep strike plan.

If so, what about operating
> out of arty range?

Unlikely--MLRS is now reaching out to a bit over 70 klicks, and when firing
ATACMS it can go as deep as some 300 klicks. During exercises V Corps
usually kept a significant part of the ATACMS supply under its thumb for use
in both SEAD and against OPFOR deep attack (i.e., rocket) systems.

Or without having arty on theatre in the
> first place (eg much of Afghanistan, esp early on)?

Which is why we are now fielding HIMARS, the HEMTT truck based "light MLRS",
with a six pack in the rack versus the two six packs available in the
tracked version. You can also do the JAAT routine, where the attack helos
work with fixed wing CAS.

And, finally,
> if artillery is that effective for SEAD, wouldn't it also be
> effective against the targets of the attack helos?

Nope. You are using the arty deep in the SEAD role against area targets. The
attack helos are going there because they can pick out and kill the specific
systems you are going after. If they are MBT's, then the current crop of
arty systems (other than Copperhead, which needs a designator and rather
good battlefield conditions) can't reliably kill them.

Couldn't
> smart AT-MP submunitions, or whatever, then do all the job
> of the AH's, and more safely?

How many smart AT packages have we fielded for the arty systems? None, other
than Copperhead, which has a mixed record. We have tested some, and gotten
to the almost-ready-to-field stage, but not actually fielded them. That
*may* change with the new GMLRS (guided MLRS)...there was some talk about
fielding a smart submunition package for it and for ATACMS.

>
> Moreover, while MLRS can saturate fairly large areas with
> submunitions, and will probably ruin the day of any
> manpad operator in the target area, one can't possibly
> use arty to saturate all the potential locations of
> air-defences. At least not with low-level ingress/eggress.
> A guy with a manpad can hide easily - in the worst
> case he'll be lurking just next to your base, like has
> been the case in some Russian helo losses in Chechenya.

So you do a good mission analysis using the currently available planning
software. Plot the ingress and egress in and check it against line-of-sight
and AD weapons ranges; a good GIS can then shde in the areas where your path
intersects the LOS from what terrain. You then either adjust your route, or
plan for SEAD fires on that terrain.

>
> And what if the enemy has useful counter battery capability
> that limits arty SEAD support? Use AH's to take it out, but...

I don't see us facing any bad guys who can overmatch our counterbattery, and
the ever important firefinder radars, capabilities.

Brooks

> <g>

[Howard Berkowitz]

In article >, John Hairell
> wrote:

> On Wed, 25 Feb 2004 15:36:51 -0500, Howard Berkowitz
> > wrote:
>
> >In article >, "Paul F
> >Austin" > wrote:
> >
> >> "Kevin Brooks" wrote
> >> >
> >> > "Paul F Austin" wrote in message
> >> > >
> >>
> >>
> >> Of course it's not. It's not even "my idea". I'm under no illusion
> >> that I
> >> or
> >> anyone on this forum will "think up" a new paradigm that those
> >> blockheads
> >> at
> >> the Pentagon, yadayada... Real analysis doesn't happen on Usenet.
> >> Although
> >> why the Army restricts its thinking to rotorcraft is a good question.
> >
> >Can we say "Key West Agreement"?
>
>
> Which one? The US Army-USAF relationship is actually derived from
> multiple agreements, the earliest dating to the '40s. The latest
> agreement didn't fully override all of the previous ones.

I want to say 1947, but it would probably have to been a little after
that (or maybe late in the year) since the Air Force was represented as
a full service.

[Felger Carbon]

"Howard Berkowitz" > wrote in message
...
>
> > >Can we say "Key West Agreement"?
> >
> > Which one? The US Army-USAF relationship is actually derived from
> > multiple agreements, the earliest dating to the '40s. The latest
> > agreement didn't fully override all of the previous ones.
>
> I want to say 1947, but it would probably have to been a little
after
> that (or maybe late in the year) since the Air Force was represented
as
> a full service.

If you google on "Key West Agreement", you will be overwhelmed with
information. It wuz 1948. ;-)

[Howard Berkowitz]

In article . net>,
"Felger Carbon" > wrote:

> "Howard Berkowitz" > wrote in message
> ...
> >
> > > >Can we say "Key West Agreement"?
> > >
> > > Which one? The US Army-USAF relationship is actually derived from
> > > multiple agreements, the earliest dating to the '40s. The latest
> > > agreement didn't fully override all of the previous ones.
> >
> > I want to say 1947, but it would probably have to been a little
> after
> > that (or maybe late in the year) since the Air Force was represented
> as
> > a full service.
>
> If you google on "Key West Agreement", you will be overwhelmed with
> information. It wuz 1948. ;-)
>
>

Hey, I was busy being a fetus most of that year! Talk about information
overload when you get born!

Thanks.

[M]

Kevin Brooks >
> How many smart AT packages have we fielded for the arty systems? None, other
> than Copperhead, which has a mixed record. We have tested some, and gotten
> to the almost-ready-to-field stage, but not actually fielded them. That
> *may* change with the new GMLRS (guided MLRS)...there was some talk about
> fielding a smart submunition package for it and for ATACMS.

But there are non-US systems, like the Swedish Strix, which
is a 120mm mortar fired guided AT round. At least on paper,
it seems very formidable with autonomous guidance, target
search and prioritization, and a decent-sized top-attack
warhead. The Brittish 80mm Merlin was rather similar, although
mm-wave radar rather than IR, but I recall that it was cancelled.

I find it surprizing that the US hasn't adopted any smart
artillery rounds, except the Copperhead, which really isn't
all that smart (non-autonomous). Especially considering the
hype that was there already in the 80's about cargo rockets
with autonomous AT-munitions that would render massed MBT usage
obsolete (again :)... Eg plans of Lance carrying dozens of
such munitions.

Perhaps the fact that none was fielded has something to do
with the end of the cold war. Speculatively, if it was seen
that the AH's (etc) that they already had were sufficient to
deal with any armour threat out there? Otoh, it's interesting
that Sweden would come up with such a round. Do they perhaps
see it the other way around, as a substitute for the attack
helos they don't have?

> I don't see us facing any bad guys who can overmatch our
> counterbattery, and the ever important firefinder radars,
> capabilities.

Unlikely yes, but I could think of rapidly deployed
light 'speed-bump' infantry getting into trouble lacking
sufficient arty. Mogadishu perhaps illustrates in a
small scale that even US troops can find themselves on the
ground without sufficient support.

[M]

The matter of using MLRS for SEAD for AH's brings up
the question of whether it's sufficient for saturating
the defences. While anti-personnel bomblets, like
those used in MLRS, cluster bombs and such, typically
are very effective, there are situations where this
isn't the case. Soft terrain, like snow covered ground,
or boggy ground, greatly reduces the effect of any impact
fuzed arty, and small muntions in particular.

Firstly, the submunitions may fail to detonate, as the
decelearition when hitting the soft terrain may be
insufficient to trigger them. Secondly, the effect of
those that do detonate, is greatly reduced by the snow
or bog absorbing the blast and sharpnel. And finally,
there'll be no bouncing, which otherwise could give
bomblets a kind of low-level airburst capability.

Airburst by proximity fuzing is the obvious solution, but
I think it'd be prohibitavely expensive with bomblets. In
forested terrain, 'trigger-hair' impact fuzing may give
canopy-level airbursts, but I guess that wouldn't be practical
with bomblets either.

Are there bomblets (anti-personnel submunitions) that
actually work well in soft terrain? And if so, how
do they accomplish it?

[Thomas Schoene]

Kevin Brooks wrote:
> "M" <*@*.*> wrote in message
> ...
>> Kevin Brooks >
>>> I always thought the emphasis on radar stealth was off the mark.
>>
>> Consider missions like the one at the start of Desert Storm, where
>> (iirc) Apaches sneaked in low at night and destroyed Iraqi early
>> warning radars. Obviously, radar stealth seems useful for such
>> missions.
>
> Actually, from what little I understand, that scenario is one where
> LO tech would be of the least usefulness. Early warning radars work
> on the longer end of the wavelength, and LO is least effective
> against EW systems; ISTR reading that stealthy platforms can rather
> often pop up on such systems. But the LO is better oriented towards
> the shorter wavelength acquisition and tracking systems. If I have
> that all wrong, sombody else can feel free to correct that view.
>
>>
>> So, a few stupid(?) questions: Am I wrong about radar
>> stealth being quite useful in addition to terrain masking?
>> Is using helos for such missions outdated? Are such deep
>> missions a marginal issue nowadays, or was it so already
>> back then? Or is it that the US is focusing its capability
>> on tackling third rate opponents with minimal own-losses,
>> rendering the issue of radar-based airdefences largely irrelevant?
>
> I don't think LO in the radar spectrum is nearly as important for a
> helo that is able to use terrain masking as would be reducing the IR
> and sound signatures. As to going deep, the aviators were quite
> enamored with that philosophy ever since the Apache arrived on the
> scene; when we played mixed force simulations, where our division had
> both Cobras and Apaches in hand, we invariably dedicated the Apaches
> to going deep (where they often took heavier losses) while we
> retained the Cobras for over-the-shoulder shooting and as our
> last-ditch AT reserve. The experience during OIF with the 11th AVN
> BDE deep attack does point out the dangers inherent in trying to use
> rotary assets in that role, but beware drawing to great a conclusion,
> as that mission may have had some planning problems, and it was
> executed knowingly at greater risk without SEAD support.
>
>>
>>> without the benefit of the normal SEAD support from your own
>>> arty assets is extremely risky."
>>
>> More naive questions: Is artillery SEAD really seen as a
>> requirement for attack helo missions within the envelope
>> of enemy short-range airdefences?
>
> In my expereince at the DIV level, and watching the corps planning
> cycle up-close, yes it usually is included in the deep strike plan.
>
> If so, what about operating
>> out of arty range?
>
> Unlikely--MLRS is now reaching out to a bit over 70 klicks, and when
> firing ATACMS it can go as deep as some 300 klicks. During exercises
> V Corps usually kept a significant part of the ATACMS supply under
> its thumb for use in both SEAD and against OPFOR deep attack (i.e.,
> rocket) systems.
>
> Or without having arty on theatre in the
>> first place (eg much of Afghanistan, esp early on)?
>
> Which is why we are now fielding HIMARS, the HEMTT truck based "light
> MLRS", with a six pack in the rack versus the two six packs available
> in the tracked version. You can also do the JAAT routine, where the
> attack helos work with fixed wing CAS.
>
> And, finally,
>> if artillery is that effective for SEAD, wouldn't it also be
>> effective against the targets of the attack helos?
>
> Nope. You are using the arty deep in the SEAD role against area
> targets. The attack helos are going there because they can pick out
> and kill the specific systems you are going after. If they are MBT's,
> then the current crop of arty systems (other than Copperhead, which
> needs a designator and rather good battlefield conditions) can't
> reliably kill them.
>
> Couldn't
>> smart AT-MP submunitions, or whatever, then do all the job
>> of the AH's, and more safely?
>
> How many smart AT packages have we fielded for the arty systems?
> None, other than Copperhead, which has a mixed record. We have tested
> some, and gotten to the almost-ready-to-field stage, but not actually
> fielded them.

Not true. The Army fielded and used the SADARM artillery-fired AT
submunitions in Iraq last year. The 3ID(M) After Action report says they
fired over 120 rounds with 48 targets killed.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2003/3id-aar-jul03.pdf

(You'll have to search in the report)

That
> *may* change with the new GMLRS (guided MLRS)...there was some talk
> about fielding a smart submunition package for it and for ATACMS.

I think GMLRS is headed toward a unitary round more than smart subs. ATACSM
BAT may still show up, though.

The Army has also just issued a contract (now under protest) for manufacture
of a 120mm Precision-Guided Mortar Projectile, and is soliciting for an
off-the-shelf round to complement the depleted SADARM stocks.

--
Tom Schoene Replace "invalid" with "net" to e-mail
"If brave men and women never died, there would be nothing
special about bravery." -- Andy Rooney (attributed)

[Kevin Brooks]

"M" <*@*.*> wrote in message ...
> Kevin Brooks >
> > How many smart AT packages have we fielded for the arty systems? None,
other
> > than Copperhead, which has a mixed record. We have tested some, and
gotten
> > to the almost-ready-to-field stage, but not actually fielded them. That
> > *may* change with the new GMLRS (guided MLRS)...there was some talk
about
> > fielding a smart submunition package for it and for ATACMS.
>
> But there are non-US systems, like the Swedish Strix, which
> is a 120mm mortar fired guided AT round. At least on paper,
> it seems very formidable with autonomous guidance, target
> search and prioritization, and a decent-sized top-attack
> warhead. The Brittish 80mm Merlin was rather similar, although
> mm-wave radar rather than IR, but I recall that it was cancelled.

If Strix were such a great system it would have been picked up by more
nations than just Sweden and Switzerland (not sure that having two of the
biggest neutrals buy it is much of an endorsement!). Despite claims
otherwise, it will be subject to decoying with properly set up IR emitters.
And it only has a 7 klick range, which is not going to do much in the
interdiction role. If you try to fire it while your forces are in the close
fight, there is a significant fratricide risk.

>
> I find it surprizing that the US hasn't adopted any smart
> artillery rounds, except the Copperhead, which really isn't
> all that smart (non-autonomous). Especially considering the
> hype that was there already in the 80's about cargo rockets
> with autonomous AT-munitions that would render massed MBT usage
> obsolete (again :)... Eg plans of Lance carrying dozens of
> such munitions.

That was "Assault Breaker", father of ATACMS. The plans to develop smart
submunitions dispensers for the MLRS family, along with FASCAM versions,
died when the threat of a major conflict with the USSR winked out.

>
> Perhaps the fact that none was fielded has something to do
> with the end of the cold war.

Yep. But have no fear--the Excalibur GPS guided 155mm projectile is about
ready to enter service, IIRC. We also have GMLRS, with guided accuracy out
to around 74 km, according to released test results. And remember that
ATACMS is guided, out to 300 km.

Speculatively, if it was seen
> that the AH's (etc) that they already had were sufficient to
> deal with any armour threat out there? Otoh, it's interesting
> that Sweden would come up with such a round. Do they perhaps
> see it the other way around, as a substitute for the attack
> helos they don't have?

Given its short range, I doubt it.

>
> > I don't see us facing any bad guys who can overmatch our
> > counterbattery, and the ever important firefinder radars,
> > capabilities.
>
> Unlikely yes, but I could think of rapidly deployed
> light 'speed-bump' infantry getting into trouble lacking
> sufficient arty. Mogadishu perhaps illustrates in a
> small scale that even US troops can find themselves on the
> ground without sufficient support.

One of the lessons (re)learned from Anaconda was *always* have your arty
assets available. We are fielding the M777 light 155mm gun now, and HIMARS
is also pending fielding. We already have the M119 light 105mm guns. There
is no need for *any* significant US troop deployment to go in without arty
accompanying it.

Brooks

[Kevin Brooks]

"Thomas Schoene" > wrote in message
link.net...
> Kevin Brooks wrote:
<snip>

> >
> > How many smart AT packages have we fielded for the arty systems?
> > None, other than Copperhead, which has a mixed record. We have tested
> > some, and gotten to the almost-ready-to-field stage, but not actually
> > fielded them.
>
> Not true. The Army fielded and used the SADARM artillery-fired AT
> submunitions in Iraq last year. The 3ID(M) After Action report says they
> fired over 120 rounds with 48 targets killed.

Thanks; I had thought that program was axed a couple of years back.

>
>
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2003/3id-aar-jul03.pdf
>
> (You'll have to search in the report)
>
> That
> > *may* change with the new GMLRS (guided MLRS)...there was some talk
> > about fielding a smart submunition package for it and for ATACMS.
>
> I think GMLRS is headed toward a unitary round more than smart subs.
ATACSM
> BAT may still show up, though.

I believe you are correct, but I am not sure that the use of a a smart
submunition warhead is dead yet. The interest in being able to engage
transient targets and reduce the sensor-to-shooter cycle time would seem to
point to a place for such a system.

>
> The Army has also just issued a contract (now under protest) for
manufacture
> of a 120mm Precision-Guided Mortar Projectile, and is soliciting for an
> off-the-shelf round to complement the depleted SADARM stocks.

The 120mm projectile is not going to be of much use in the deep attack--not
enough leg on it. In the close battle, the danger close range would have to
be a concern; lobbing autonomous IR or MMWR guided munitions over the FLOT
whre your own Brads and Abrams are operating could be problematic. Is the
new system going to use autonomous targeting, or laser designation?

Brooks

>
> --
> Tom Schoene

[Magnus Redin]

Hi!

"Kevin Brooks" > writes:
> If Strix were such a great system it would have been picked up by more
> nations than just Sweden and Switzerland (not sure that having two of the
> biggest neutrals buy it is much of an endorsement!). Despite claims
> otherwise, it will be subject to decoying with properly set up IR emitters.
> And it only has a 7 klick range, which is not going to do much in the
> interdiction role. If you try to fire it while your forces are in the close
> fight, there is a significant fratricide risk.

I do not know how good Strix is compared with other equivalent systems
but that it has too short range for interdiction is as irrelevant that
noticing that a vehicle mounted TOW has to short range for
interdiction.

It seems obvious that the Strix at least will fit everywhere you have
mortar fire support. It enables the grunts calling for mortar fire
support to call for tank kills instead of mortar rounds that merely
scratches armour paint. The extra training needed ought to be trivial,
no new communications systems needed and no new logistics needed.

The fratricide risk ought to be of the same kind as for ordinary
mortar fire, dont call down fire on your friends. It seems reasonable
that it is a weapon that is good for supporting infantry defending
against armour, supporting wehicles finding armour at a reasonable
distance and that it is bad to call on during short range vehicle to
vehicle combat. (It would of course be very nifty with a IFF system
that can handle that but such a system could easily be more expensive
then the weapon proper. )

The IR detector and decoy arms race has probably no true winners, a
system used for decades must surely be upgraded several times? I have
absolutelly no idea if strix needs such an upgrade but it ought to
be easier to upgrade the detector or CPU or software of a
functioning system then starting from scratch.

Best regards,

--
Titta gärna på http://www.lysator.liu.se/~redin och kommentera min
politiska sida.
Magnus Redin, Klockaregården 6, 586 44 LINKöPING, SWEDEN
Phone: Sweden (0)70 5160046

[Kevin Brooks]

"Magnus Redin" > wrote in message
...
> Hi!
>
> "Kevin Brooks" > writes:
> > If Strix were such a great system it would have been picked up by more
> > nations than just Sweden and Switzerland (not sure that having two of
the
> > biggest neutrals buy it is much of an endorsement!). Despite claims
> > otherwise, it will be subject to decoying with properly set up IR
emitters.
> > And it only has a 7 klick range, which is not going to do much in the
> > interdiction role. If you try to fire it while your forces are in the
close
> > fight, there is a significant fratricide risk.
>
> I do not know how good Strix is compared with other equivalent systems
> but that it has too short range for interdiction is as irrelevant that
> noticing that a vehicle mounted TOW has to short range for
> interdiction.

Not in this argument it is not. The poster was claiming that we should be
able to forego attack helo operations in favor of systems like Strix for the
deep attack role--and Strix is NOT a deep attack asset, by any definition.
Don't take this as an outright condemnation of Strix, just its inability to
*replace* the attack helo.

>
> It seems obvious that the Strix at least will fit everywhere you have
> mortar fire support. It enables the grunts calling for mortar fire
> support to call for tank kills instead of mortar rounds that merely
> scratches armour paint. The extra training needed ought to be trivial,
> no new communications systems needed and no new logistics needed.

OK, belay the "outright condemnation bit" for a second--if it is so good,
and has been around since 1994, why have only Sweden and Switzerland ordered
it?

>
> The fratricide risk ought to be of the same kind as for ordinary
> mortar fire, dont call down fire on your friends. It seems reasonable
> that it is a weapon that is good for supporting infantry defending
> against armour, supporting wehicles finding armour at a reasonable
> distance and that it is bad to call on during short range vehicle to
> vehicle combat. (It would of course be very nifty with a IFF system
> that can handle that but such a system could easily be more expensive
> then the weapon proper. )

True enough. But it appears the Brits cancelled their similar Merlin effort
years ago, and the US has yet to actively seek a mortar fired anti-tank
killer capability, having other systems that can do the job (and if it has
to be done by arty, then a FIST or COLT with assigned laser designator can
do the job with Copperhead).

Brooks

>
> The IR detector and decoy arms race has probably no true winners, a
> system used for decades must surely be upgraded several times? I have
> absolutelly no idea if strix needs such an upgrade but it ought to
> be easier to upgrade the detector or CPU or software of a
> functioning system then starting from scratch.
>
> Best regards,
>
> --
> Titta gärna på http://www.lysator.liu.se/~redin och kommentera min
> politiska sida.
> Magnus Redin, Klockaregården 6, 586 44 LINKöPING, SWEDEN
> Phone: Sweden (0)70 5160046

[Peter Kemp]

On Fri, 27 Feb 2004 10:10:14 -0500, "Kevin Brooks"
> wrote:

>
>"Thomas Schoene" > wrote in message
link.net...
>> Kevin Brooks wrote:
><snip>
>
>> >
>> > How many smart AT packages have we fielded for the arty systems?
>> > None, other than Copperhead, which has a mixed record. We have tested
>> > some, and gotten to the almost-ready-to-field stage, but not actually
>> > fielded them.
>>
>> Not true. The Army fielded and used the SADARM artillery-fired AT
>> submunitions in Iraq last year. The 3ID(M) After Action report says they
>> fired over 120 rounds with 48 targets killed.
>
>Thanks; I had thought that program was axed a couple of years back.

It was, but there was still a quantity of LRIP rounds in stock, so
they were sent out to see how they fared.

---
Peter Kemp

Life is short - drink faster

[Magnus Redin]

Hi!

"Kevin Brooks" > writes:
> Not in this argument it is not. The poster was claiming that we should be
> able to forego attack helo operations in favor of systems like Strix for the
> deep attack role--and Strix is NOT a deep attack asset, by any definition.
> Don't take this as an outright condemnation of Strix, just its inability to
> *replace* the attack helo.

Oh, I obviously dident read enough of the thread. Replacing attack
helicopters with mortar rounds is of course an impossible idea even if
they are 100% accurate.

> OK, belay the "outright condemnation bit" for a second--if it is so
> good, and has been around since 1994, why have only Sweden and
> Switzerland ordered it?

The cold war ended and everybody but USA has lowered their military
spending significantly? And the USA dont like to buy foreign high-tech
weapons if it can be avoided. Nobody bought our exelent self propelled
"Bandkanon" howitzer either and it could fire 14 155mm rounds in 45
seconds in 1966. Perhaps its like that howitzer, too expensive and
somewhat before its time? But I do not know what the strix rounds
cost.

> True enough. But it appears the Brits cancelled their similar Merlin
> effort years ago, and the US has yet to actively seek a mortar fired
> anti-tank killer capability, having other systems that can do the
> job (and if it has to be done by arty, then a FIST or COLT with
> assigned laser designator can do the job with Copperhead).

I do not know why the Merlin project was cancelled, it was a
significantly smaller round, perhaps it was not possible to get it
all to fit in such a small package?
Good for you that you have plenty of other systems for killing armour.

Best regards,
--
Titta gärna på http://www.lysator.liu.se/~redin och kommentera min
politiska sida.
Magnus Redin, Klockaregården 6, 586 44 LINKöPING, SWEDEN
Phone: Sweden (0)70 5160046

[Paul F Austin]

"M" <*@*.*> wrote in message ...
> Kevin Brooks >
> > How many smart AT packages have we fielded for the arty systems? None,
other
> > than Copperhead, which has a mixed record. We have tested some, and
gotten
> > to the almost-ready-to-field stage, but not actually fielded them. That
> > *may* change with the new GMLRS (guided MLRS)...there was some talk
about
> > fielding a smart submunition package for it and for ATACMS.
>
> But there are non-US systems, like the Swedish Strix, which
> is a 120mm mortar fired guided AT round. At least on paper,
> it seems very formidable with autonomous guidance, target
> search and prioritization, and a decent-sized top-attack
> warhead. The Brittish 80mm Merlin was rather similar, although
> mm-wave radar rather than IR, but I recall that it was cancelled.
>
> I find it surprizing that the US hasn't adopted any smart
> artillery rounds, except the Copperhead, which really isn't
> all that smart (non-autonomous). Especially considering the
> hype that was there already in the 80's about cargo rockets
> with autonomous AT-munitions that would render massed MBT usage
> obsolete (again :)... Eg plans of Lance carrying dozens of
> such munitions.
>
> Perhaps the fact that none was fielded has something to do
> with the end of the cold war. Speculatively, if it was seen
> that the AH's (etc) that they already had were sufficient to
> deal with any armour threat out there? Otoh, it's interesting
> that Sweden would come up with such a round. Do they perhaps
> see it the other way around, as a substitute for the attack
> helos they don't have?

From all reports the SADARM rounds performed_very_well in the Iraq-2 war.
Unfortunately, almost all of them have been expended and evidently there are
no plans to reopen production. The Army is soliciting non-development
proposals for rounds to restock.

There's a fair amount of activity in course-correcting artillery rounds. The
cheapest is so-called "1D", range-only correction. A smart fuze deploys an
airbrake after so many revolutions of the round. For some of them, the
number of revolutions is uplinked to the round after it leaves the muzzle,
based on muzzle velocity measurements. The 1-D fuzes reduce the range part
of the error ellipse which is the largest part of total error. There are
also "1.5D" and "2D" correcting shells in development that can correct
cross-range errors as well.

All of these are "non-smart" in that there is no terminal target sensing but
like GMLRS, the decrease in CEP will increase lethality against hard
targets. Based on the standard equations for SSKP against hard targets using
blast overpressure as the kill mechanism, lethality goes up as CEP^2. I'm
not sure how applicable that model is since blast normally won't kill armor
but it's an indicator.

[Paul F Austin]

"Kevin Brooks" wrote

>
> True enough. But it appears the Brits cancelled their similar Merlin
effort
> years ago, and the US has yet to actively seek a mortar fired anti-tank
> killer capability, having other systems that can do the job (and if it has
> to be done by arty, then a FIST or COLT with assigned laser designator can
> do the job with Copperhead).

Do you have any idea how many Copperheads are still in inventory? Martin
built about 4-5000 rounds before production was cancelled and I understood
that substantial numbers were expended in Iraq-1.

[Kevin Brooks]

"Magnus Redin" > wrote in message
...
> Hi!
>
> "Kevin Brooks" > writes:
> > Not in this argument it is not. The poster was claiming that we should
be
> > able to forego attack helo operations in favor of systems like Strix for
the
> > deep attack role--and Strix is NOT a deep attack asset, by any
definition.
> > Don't take this as an outright condemnation of Strix, just its inability
to
> > *replace* the attack helo.
>
> Oh, I obviously dident read enough of the thread. Replacing attack
> helicopters with mortar rounds is of course an impossible idea even if
> they are 100% accurate.
>
> > OK, belay the "outright condemnation bit" for a second--if it is so
> > good, and has been around since 1994, why have only Sweden and
> > Switzerland ordered it?
>
> The cold war ended and everybody but USA has lowered their military
> spending significantly? And the USA dont like to buy foreign high-tech
> weapons if it can be avoided. Nobody bought our exelent self propelled
> "Bandkanon" howitzer either and it could fire 14 155mm rounds in 45
> seconds in 1966. Perhaps its like that howitzer, too expensive and
> somewhat before its time? But I do not know what the strix rounds
> cost.

I'd say it was because in this case Sweden exhibited that trait that we
ourselves have had to avoid (sometimes not so successfully ourselves, I'd
admit) and bought a nifty weapon designed to help counter the anticipated
hordes of Soviet armored vehicles you might have faced if the balloon had
ever actually gone up--but they did it after the threat was largely
dissipated. Apparently the old "Cold War Mindset" when it came to weapons
procurement after the demise of the Warsaw Pact threat is not a purely
American disease... :-) The US had a number of deep strike artillery
anti-armor weapons in the development pipeline--most were subsequently
cancelled.

Brooks

>
> > True enough. But it appears the Brits cancelled their similar Merlin
> > effort years ago, and the US has yet to actively seek a mortar fired
> > anti-tank killer capability, having other systems that can do the
> > job (and if it has to be done by arty, then a FIST or COLT with
> > assigned laser designator can do the job with Copperhead).
>
> I do not know why the Merlin project was cancelled, it was a
> significantly smaller round, perhaps it was not possible to get it
> all to fit in such a small package?
> Good for you that you have plenty of other systems for killing armour.
>
> Best regards,
> --
> Titta gärna på http://www.lysator.liu.se/~redin och kommentera min
> politiska sida.
> Magnus Redin, Klockaregården 6, 586 44 LINKöPING, SWEDEN
> Phone: Sweden (0)70 5160046

[Kevin Brooks]

"Paul F Austin" > wrote in message
...
>
> "Kevin Brooks" wrote
>
> >
> > True enough. But it appears the Brits cancelled their similar Merlin
> effort
> > years ago, and the US has yet to actively seek a mortar fired anti-tank
> > killer capability, having other systems that can do the job (and if it
has
> > to be done by arty, then a FIST or COLT with assigned laser designator
can
> > do the job with Copperhead).
>
> Do you have any idea how many Copperheads are still in inventory?

Plenty. How many 1000 to 2000 tank armies are you planning on fighting? And
as Tom has pointed out, we apparently have at least some SADARM rounds as
well.

Martin
> built about 4-5000 rounds before production was cancelled and I understood
> that substantial numbers were expended in Iraq-1.

As I recall it, the number used during ODS was less than 400. Please correct
me if I am wrong--I read the actual number a year or so ago but can't recall
where. I did see where the 1st CAV fired a grand total of 30.

Brooks
>
>

[Kevin Brooks]

"Paul F Austin" > wrote in message
...
<snip>

>
> There's a fair amount of activity in course-correcting artillery rounds.
The
> cheapest is so-called "1D", range-only correction. A smart fuze deploys an
> airbrake after so many revolutions of the round. For some of them, the
> number of revolutions is uplinked to the round after it leaves the muzzle,
> based on muzzle velocity measurements. The 1-D fuzes reduce the range part
> of the error ellipse which is the largest part of total error. There are
> also "1.5D" and "2D" correcting shells in development that can correct
> cross-range errors as well.
>
> All of these are "non-smart" in that there is no terminal target sensing
but
> like GMLRS, the decrease in CEP will increase lethality against hard
> targets. Based on the standard equations for SSKP against hard targets
using
> blast overpressure as the kill mechanism, lethality goes up as CEP^2. I'm
> not sure how applicable that model is since blast normally won't kill
armor
> but it's an indicator.

They are worthless against armor unless you acheive a direct hit; even a
direct strike by a DPICM round against a MBT is unlikely to give you a kill.
You have to have either a terminally guided round such as Copperhead or a
terminally guided submunition like SADARM to kill tanks. Even Excalibur,
except in its SADARM version, which is now moot, is not a tank killer with
its reported 10 meter CEP (against a stationary MBT, that would require
what, a minimum of maybe eight to twelve rounds to give you a reasonable
assurance of hitting it?). Then there is the sensor-to-shooter time lag to
overcome against a moving target, which necessitates the use of a terminally
guided munition.

Brooks

>
>

[Kevin Brooks]

"Peter Kemp" > wrote in message
...
> On Fri, 27 Feb 2004 10:10:14 -0500, "Kevin Brooks"
> > wrote:
>
> >
> >"Thomas Schoene" > wrote in message
> link.net...
> >> Kevin Brooks wrote:
> ><snip>
> >
> >> >
> >> > How many smart AT packages have we fielded for the arty systems?
> >> > None, other than Copperhead, which has a mixed record. We have tested
> >> > some, and gotten to the almost-ready-to-field stage, but not actually
> >> > fielded them.
> >>
> >> Not true. The Army fielded and used the SADARM artillery-fired AT
> >> submunitions in Iraq last year. The 3ID(M) After Action report says
they
> >> fired over 120 rounds with 48 targets killed.
> >
> >Thanks; I had thought that program was axed a couple of years back.
>
> It was, but there was still a quantity of LRIP rounds in stock, so
> they were sent out to see how they fared.

Yeah, that agrees with what I have found on the web thus far. Thanks for the
update.

Brooks

>
> ---
> Peter Kemp
>
> Life is short - drink faster

[Paul J. Adam]

In message >, Kevin Brooks
> writes
>True enough. But it appears the Brits cancelled their similar Merlin effort
>years ago,

This was not a technical failure, but the realisation that an 81mm bomb
didn't have the lethality needed, while scaling up to 120mm was a major
retooling and a large logistic overhead.

--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBox<at>jrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

[Paul F Austin]

"Kevin Brooks" > wrote in message
...
>
> "Paul F Austin" > wrote in message
> ...
> <snip>
>
> >
> > There's a fair amount of activity in course-correcting artillery rounds.
> The
> > cheapest is so-called "1D", range-only correction. A smart fuze deploys
an
> > airbrake after so many revolutions of the round. For some of them, the
> > number of revolutions is uplinked to the round after it leaves the
muzzle,
> > based on muzzle velocity measurements. The 1-D fuzes reduce the range
part
> > of the error ellipse which is the largest part of total error. There are
> > also "1.5D" and "2D" correcting shells in development that can correct
> > cross-range errors as well.
> >
> > All of these are "non-smart" in that there is no terminal target sensing
> but
> > like GMLRS, the decrease in CEP will increase lethality against hard
> > targets. Based on the standard equations for SSKP against hard targets
> using
> > blast overpressure as the kill mechanism, lethality goes up as CEP^2.
I'm
> > not sure how applicable that model is since blast normally won't kill
> armor
> > but it's an indicator.
>
> They are worthless against armor unless you acheive a direct hit; even a
> direct strike by a DPICM round against a MBT is unlikely to give you a
kill.
> You have to have either a terminally guided round such as Copperhead or a
> terminally guided submunition like SADARM to kill tanks. Even Excalibur,
> except in its SADARM version, which is now moot, is not a tank killer with
> its reported 10 meter CEP (against a stationary MBT, that would require
> what, a minimum of maybe eight to twelve rounds to give you a reasonable
> assurance of hitting it?). Then there is the sensor-to-shooter time lag to
> overcome against a moving target, which necessitates the use of a
terminally
> guided munition.

The SSKP model I was refering to was for nuclear weapons against missile
silos, rather a different case. If what you say is true, why GMLRS and CC
artillery rounds?

[Kevin Brooks]

"Paul J. Adam" > wrote in message
...
> In message >, Kevin Brooks
> > writes
> >True enough. But it appears the Brits cancelled their similar Merlin
effort
> >years ago,
>
> This was not a technical failure, but the realisation that an 81mm bomb
> didn't have the lethality needed, while scaling up to 120mm was a major
> retooling and a large logistic overhead.

I suspect a revised view of the nature of the threat likely has something to
do with that decision.

Brooks

>
> --
> When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
> W S Churchill
>
> Paul J. Adam MainBox<at>jrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

[Kevin Brooks]

"Paul F Austin" > wrote in message
. ..
>
> "Kevin Brooks" > wrote in message
> ...
> >
> > "Paul F Austin" > wrote in message
> > ...
> > <snip>
> >
> > >
> > > There's a fair amount of activity in course-correcting artillery
rounds.
> > The
> > > cheapest is so-called "1D", range-only correction. A smart fuze
deploys
> an
> > > airbrake after so many revolutions of the round. For some of them, the
> > > number of revolutions is uplinked to the round after it leaves the
> muzzle,
> > > based on muzzle velocity measurements. The 1-D fuzes reduce the range
> part
> > > of the error ellipse which is the largest part of total error. There
are
> > > also "1.5D" and "2D" correcting shells in development that can correct
> > > cross-range errors as well.
> > >
> > > All of these are "non-smart" in that there is no terminal target
sensing
> > but
> > > like GMLRS, the decrease in CEP will increase lethality against hard
> > > targets. Based on the standard equations for SSKP against hard targets
> > using
> > > blast overpressure as the kill mechanism, lethality goes up as CEP^2.
> I'm
> > > not sure how applicable that model is since blast normally won't kill
> > armor
> > > but it's an indicator.
> >
> > They are worthless against armor unless you acheive a direct hit; even a
> > direct strike by a DPICM round against a MBT is unlikely to give you a
> kill.
> > You have to have either a terminally guided round such as Copperhead or
a
> > terminally guided submunition like SADARM to kill tanks. Even Excalibur,
> > except in its SADARM version, which is now moot, is not a tank killer
with
> > its reported 10 meter CEP (against a stationary MBT, that would require
> > what, a minimum of maybe eight to twelve rounds to give you a reasonable
> > assurance of hitting it?). Then there is the sensor-to-shooter time lag
to
> > overcome against a moving target, which necessitates the use of a
> terminally
> > guided munition.
>
> The SSKP model I was refering to was for nuclear weapons against missile
> silos, rather a different case. If what you say is true, why GMLRS and CC
> artillery rounds?

Not to make them effective armor killers, that's for sure (at least in the
absence of having something like SADARM attached to them). They do reduce
the number of rounds required to acheive a suppression or destruction effect
on other targets.

Brooks
>
>

[Paul J. Adam]

In message >, Kevin Brooks
> writes
>"Paul J. Adam" > wrote in message
...
>> This was not a technical failure, but the realisation that an 81mm bomb
>> didn't have the lethality needed, while scaling up to 120mm was a major
>> retooling and a large logistic overhead.
>
>I suspect a revised view of the nature of the threat likely has something to
>do with that decision.

An infantry battalion is never going to complain about more anti-tank
(or anti-other AFV) assets. You've not got _that_ many MILAN (posts nor
missiles) and LAW is short-ranged and demanding of the firer (an oppo
shot off four LIFEX LAW90: he went in thinking 'this should be fun!' and
came out looking and feeling ill for days) so more assets and more range
in the battalion anti-armour plan would be nice. T-55s aren't scary to a
treadhead, but well-handled they can worry infantry quite a bit.

But, Merlin firstly lacked the lethality, and secondly distracted the
mortar platoon from their main job of firing HE, smoke and illum
missions. It was followed post-Options for Change, so the changed threat
wasn't the main axe (though I would hesitate to deny that added to the
stroke)

--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBox<at>jrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

[Thomas Schoene]

Kevin Brooks wrote:
> "Thomas Schoene" > wrote

>> I think GMLRS is headed toward a unitary round more than smart subs.
>> ATACSM BAT may still show up, though.
>
> I believe you are correct, but I am not sure that the use of a a smart
> submunition warhead is dead yet. The interest in being able to engage
> transient targets and reduce the sensor-to-shooter cycle time would
> seem to point to a place for such a system.

OH, I agree that there will be such weapons in inventory,. But I'm not sure
there is funding to give every system this option.

It seems to me that the planned off-the-shelf 155mm smart submunition round,
a possible Excaliber extended-range smart submunition round, and ATACMS-BAT
will probably be sufficiently complementary that they don't also need an
MLRS smart submunition round.

>
>>
>> The Army has also just issued a contract (now under protest) for
>> manufacture of a 120mm Precision-Guided Mortar Projectile, and is
>> soliciting for an off-the-shelf round to complement the depleted
>> SADARM stocks.
>
> The 120mm projectile is not going to be of much use in the deep
> attack--not enough leg on it. In the close battle, the danger close
> range would have to be a concern; lobbing autonomous IR or MMWR
> guided munitions over the FLOT whre your own Brads and Abrams are
> operating could be problematic. Is the new system going to use
> autonomous targeting, or laser designation?

Laser, undoubtedly for the reason you suggest. Even live gunners have a
hard enough time telling an LAV and a BTR (for example).

I think the main purpose here is to give the Striker battalions a bit more
antitank and point hard-target firepower within their own zone of influence.


--
Tom Schoene Replace "invalid" with "net" to e-mail
"If brave men and women never died, there would be nothing
special about bravery." -- Andy Rooney (attributed)

[Kevin Brooks]

"Thomas Schoene" > wrote in message
hlink.net...
> Kevin Brooks wrote:
> > "Thomas Schoene" > wrote
>
> >> I think GMLRS is headed toward a unitary round more than smart subs.
> >> ATACSM BAT may still show up, though.
> >
> > I believe you are correct, but I am not sure that the use of a a smart
> > submunition warhead is dead yet. The interest in being able to engage
> > transient targets and reduce the sensor-to-shooter cycle time would
> > seem to point to a place for such a system.
>
> OH, I agree that there will be such weapons in inventory,. But I'm not
sure
> there is funding to give every system this option.
>
> It seems to me that the planned off-the-shelf 155mm smart submunition
round,
> a possible Excaliber extended-range smart submunition round, and
ATACMS-BAT
> will probably be sufficiently complementary that they don't also need an
> MLRS smart submunition round.

True, but then the smartest option would probably be to skip the 155mm
rounds and just use the GMLRS and ATACMS. GMLRS' longer range when compared
to the current 155mm capability means you won't have to waste an ATACMS when
the target is in that range that exceeds the capability of the 155mm's (say
35-40 km) but also falls within the GMLRS max of around 75 km. Lay that
template down on a fluid mechanized battlefield and the area that results,
as measured from the FLOT, is going to put a band of about 30 km depth
beginning some 25 km the other side of the FLOT where your 155's can't
strike, and your ATACMS is being shot-short. With HIMARS ready to enter into
service (ISTR they were doing the troop trials a year or more ago) you are
guaranteed GMLRS availability across the spectrum, so the 155mm has no
advantage there either.

>
> >
> >>
> >> The Army has also just issued a contract (now under protest) for
> >> manufacture of a 120mm Precision-Guided Mortar Projectile, and is
> >> soliciting for an off-the-shelf round to complement the depleted
> >> SADARM stocks.
> >
> > The 120mm projectile is not going to be of much use in the deep
> > attack--not enough leg on it. In the close battle, the danger close
> > range would have to be a concern; lobbing autonomous IR or MMWR
> > guided munitions over the FLOT whre your own Brads and Abrams are
> > operating could be problematic. Is the new system going to use
> > autonomous targeting, or laser designation?
>
> Laser, undoubtedly for the reason you suggest. Even live gunners have a
> hard enough time telling an LAV and a BTR (for example).
>
> I think the main purpose here is to give the Striker battalions a bit more
> antitank and point hard-target firepower within their own zone of
influence.

OK, that would make sense (too bad the Army has yet to pick up the turret
mounted, breech loading 120mm mortar offered by one manufacturer (can't
recall which) that is already in service with the Saudi NG on their own
wheeled armored vehicles). I don't see it being of tremendous value to the
heavy units (given that your mortars will generally be a couple klicks or
more rearward of their supported elements, and the max range of the AT
systems available on both the Brad and Abrams, most of what the 120mm could
engage would already be in range of your primary AT systems in short order).

Brooks

>
>
> --
> Tom Schoene

[Ron]

>True, but then the smartest option would probably be to skip the 155mm
>rounds and just use the GMLRS and ATACMS. GMLRS' longer range when compared
>to the current 155mm capability means you won't have to waste an ATACMS when
>the target is in that range that exceeds the capability of the 155mm's (say
>35-40 km) but also falls within the GMLRS max of around 75 km. Lay that
>template down on a fluid mechanized battlefield and the area that results,
>as measured from the FLOT, is going to put a band of about 30 km depth
>beginning some 25 km the other side of the FLOT where your 155's can't
>strike, and your ATACMS is being shot-short. With HIMARS ready to enter into
>service (ISTR they were doing the troop trials a year or more ago) you are
>guaranteed GMLRS availability across the spectrum, so the 155mm has no
>advantage there either.
>
>>

Be careful Kevin, dont want to have to call you Kurt Plummer :)


Ron
Tanker 65, C-54E (DC-4)

[Kevin Brooks]

"Ron" > wrote in message
...
> >True, but then the smartest option would probably be to skip the 155mm
> >rounds and just use the GMLRS and ATACMS. GMLRS' longer range when
compared
> >to the current 155mm capability means you won't have to waste an ATACMS
when
> >the target is in that range that exceeds the capability of the 155mm's
(say
> >35-40 km) but also falls within the GMLRS max of around 75 km. Lay that
> >template down on a fluid mechanized battlefield and the area that
results,
> >as measured from the FLOT, is going to put a band of about 30 km depth
> >beginning some 25 km the other side of the FLOT where your 155's can't
> >strike, and your ATACMS is being shot-short. With HIMARS ready to enter
into
> >service (ISTR they were doing the troop trials a year or more ago) you
are
> >guaranteed GMLRS availability across the spectrum, so the 155mm has no
> >advantage there either.
> >
> >>
>
> Be careful Kevin, dont want to have to call you Kurt Plummer :)

OK, I give...what/who is a Kurt Plummer? It's late here, and I am scratching
my head...

Brooks

>
>
> Ron
> Tanker 65, C-54E (DC-4)
>

[Guy Alcala]

Ron wrote:

> >True, but then the smartest option would probably be to skip the 155mm
> >rounds and just use the GMLRS and ATACMS. GMLRS' longer range when compared
> >to the current 155mm capability means you won't have to waste an ATACMS when
> >the target is in that range that exceeds the capability of the 155mm's (say
> >35-40 km) but also falls within the GMLRS max of around 75 km. Lay that
> >template down on a fluid mechanized battlefield and the area that results,
> >as measured from the FLOT, is going to put a band of about 30 km depth
> >beginning some 25 km the other side of the FLOT where your 155's can't
> >strike, and your ATACMS is being shot-short. With HIMARS ready to enter into
> >service (ISTR they were doing the troop trials a year or more ago) you are
> >guaranteed GMLRS availability across the spectrum, so the 155mm has no
> >advantage there either.
> >
> >>
>
> Be careful Kevin, dont want to have to call you Kurt Plummer :)

Kevin's in no danger of that as yet. He'd have to string a bunch of obscure
acronyms together without any breaks and then throw in a few even more obscure
(to all but him) pithy phrases that he'd made up, in a sentence that's a very
long paragraph in length. Oh, and the syntax is too conventional, he needs to
rearrange the order and make a few verbs into nouns (or vice versa). The above
is entirely too readable to qualify as Plummer-speak -- not only is Kevin's
thesis identified in the first sentence, but when you get to the end of the
paragraph you can still remember what the whole thing was about ;-)

Guy

[Ron]

>> Be careful Kevin, dont want to have to call you Kurt Plummer :)
>
>OK, I give...what/who is a Kurt Plummer? It's late here, and I am scratching
>my head...
>
>Brooks

Its kind of a joke now that he does not seem to post here anymore, but his
postings seemed to be composed almost entirely of acronyms.

Those who have been here for a while will know who i am talking about.

Your post wasnt near as bad as his, I just saw an lot of acronyms and thought
of him.




Ron
Tanker 65, C-54E (DC-4)

[Guy Alcala]

Kevin Brooks wrote:

> "Ron" > wrote in message

<snip>

> > Be careful Kevin, dont want to have to call you Kurt Plummer :)
>
> OK, I give...what/who is a Kurt Plummer? It's late here, and I am scratching
> my head...

Tust me, you don't want to go there ;-) But if you just have to know, google on
r.a.m., r.a.m.n., or s.m.n., with author "Kurt Plummer".

Guy

[[email protected]]

(Ron) wrote:

>>True, but then the smartest option would probably be to skip the 155mm
>>rounds and just use the GMLRS and ATACMS. GMLRS' longer range when compared
>>to the current 155mm capability means you won't have to waste an ATACMS when
>>the target is in that range that exceeds the capability of the 155mm's (say
>>35-40 km) but also falls within the GMLRS max of around 75 km. Lay that
>>template down on a fluid mechanized battlefield and the area that results,
>>as measured from the FLOT, is going to put a band of about 30 km depth
>>beginning some 25 km the other side of the FLOT where your 155's can't
>>strike, and your ATACMS is being shot-short. With HIMARS ready to enter into
>>service (ISTR they were doing the troop trials a year or more ago) you are
>>guaranteed GMLRS availability across the spectrum, so the 155mm has no
>>advantage there either.
>>
>>>
>
>Be careful Kevin, dont want to have to call you Kurt Plummer :)
>
>
>Ron
>Tanker 65, C-54E (DC-4)

Yes! wasn't that fun?...I'd find whole paragraphs in which I'd
find absolutely nothing that was comprehensible to me...once
found a whole post (decent sized) in which I couldn't get a
glimmer...gee...saved it somewhere...
--

-Gord.

[[email protected]]

Guy Alcala > wrote:

>Ron wrote:
>
>> >True, but then the smartest option would probably be to skip the 155mm
>> >rounds and just use the GMLRS and ATACMS. GMLRS' longer range when compared
>> >to the current 155mm capability means you won't have to waste an ATACMS when
>> >the target is in that range that exceeds the capability of the 155mm's (say
>> >35-40 km) but also falls within the GMLRS max of around 75 km. Lay that
>> >template down on a fluid mechanized battlefield and the area that results,
>> >as measured from the FLOT, is going to put a band of about 30 km depth
>> >beginning some 25 km the other side of the FLOT where your 155's can't
>> >strike, and your ATACMS is being shot-short. With HIMARS ready to enter into
>> >service (ISTR they were doing the troop trials a year or more ago) you are
>> >guaranteed GMLRS availability across the spectrum, so the 155mm has no
>> >advantage there either.
>> >
>> >>
>>
>> Be careful Kevin, dont want to have to call you Kurt Plummer :)
>
>Kevin's in no danger of that as yet. He'd have to string a bunch of obscure
>acronyms together without any breaks and then throw in a few even more obscure
>(to all but him) pithy phrases that he'd made up, in a sentence that's a very
>long paragraph in length. Oh, and the syntax is too conventional, he needs to
>rearrange the order and make a few verbs into nouns (or vice versa). The above
>is entirely too readable to qualify as Plummer-speak -- not only is Kevin's
>thesis identified in the first sentence, but when you get to the end of the
>paragraph you can still remember what the whole thing was about ;-)
>
>Guy

Exactly exactly...I always thought it was fun...a few seemed to
understand him so some of it must have made sense I guess...not
much did to me...it was what, a couple of years ago?...three
maybe?...
--

-Gord.

[John Keeney]

"Ron" > wrote in message
...
>
> Be careful Kevin, dont want to have to call you Kurt Plummer :)

I about went blind towards the end of last summer: during one
of the training missions one of the fake IDs I ran across was
for one "Kurt Plummer".
I have yet to confront the person who supplied those IDs about
the sources for those names...

[John Keeney]

"Gord Beaman" > wrote in message
...
>
> Exactly exactly...I always thought it was fun...a few seemed to
> understand him so some of it must have made sense I guess...not

Oh, I could understand and follow him (just had to spend the
effort deciphering the acronyms from context). Just that most
of his proposals lacked robustness and all his presentations
were deficient in clarity.
For me it simply got to the point my time was worth more to
me than the return.

> much did to me...it was what, a couple of years ago?...three
> maybe?...

I would think longer than that...

A quick search out of google shows his last posting as Aug 27, 2001
which was barely over a dozen lines and had but three acronyms and
they were all common.

[Guy Alcala]

John Keeney wrote:

> "Gord Beaman" > wrote in message
> ...
> >
> > Exactly exactly...I always thought it was fun...a few seemed to
> > understand him so some of it must have made sense I guess...not
>
> Oh, I could understand and follow him (just had to spend the
> effort deciphering the acronyms from context). Just that most
> of his proposals lacked robustness and all his presentations
> were deficient in clarity.
> For me it simply got to the point my time was worth more to
> me than the return.

As Paul J. Adam put it in a classic post (Sub: "Plummer-English
dictionary"):

In article >, Maury
Markowitz > writes
> Which is what, that he doesn't know what he's talking about? Because
he
>writes with lots of acronyms? I assume you don't do science for a
living.

No, I do weapon system development for a living and Kurt throws
acronyms
around that neither I, nor my colleagues, nor printed guides, nor major

Internet search engines, can decipher.

I'd say he lacks clarity in his EOR and fails to apply necessary FFPC
to
his proposals.


Or I could say that he fails to do a proper SNA which poisons the
entire
CADMID cycle, and that he fails to break out his KURs and KSRs.

I could also say that his blatant refusal to do even the most basic TOS

against his KURs makes it impossible to evaluate his claims in any
dispassionate way. He's obviously never had to work within an IPT with
DSTL input using DTUPC/DFS methods to minimise LCC against uncertain
ACs
with a loose URD and no defined SRD from which to derive the design. Of

course you can't get around DEFSTAN 00-56 and its allocation of SILs
which have a massive impact on SCS development costs.

> Can you provide any evidence for your postion? Anything off topic?
Obvious
>name dropping? Made up FLAs? No?

None of the above abbreviations are made up. Is it easy to read, is it
readily comprehensible? Nope. But it makes perfect sense... if you
speak
the same jargonese as the author.

It's _easy_ to strew incomprehensible jargon into your writing. It's
harder to write readable English. If you believe what you write, make
it
comprehensible. If you're peddling snake oil, bury as much as you can
in
technobabble.

[Kevin Brooks]

"Ron" > wrote in message
...
> >> Be careful Kevin, dont want to have to call you Kurt Plummer :)
> >
> >OK, I give...what/who is a Kurt Plummer? It's late here, and I am
scratching
> >my head...
> >
> >Brooks
>
> Its kind of a joke now that he does not seem to post here anymore, but his
> postings seemed to be composed almost entirely of acronyms.
>
> Those who have been here for a while will know who i am talking about.
>
> Your post wasnt near as bad as his, I just saw an lot of acronyms and
thought
> of him.

Gee, thanks Ron, you really know how to stroke a guy's ego... :-) Messeur
Plummer apparently abdicated about the time I started participating in the
group (nad no, damnit, that should *not* infer that I am him, or he is
me...).

I *usually* try to include the full nomenclature for any acronyms that might
be unintelligible to the general, but militarily knowledgable, reader. I
think most folks here know what GMLRS and ATACMS are. That said, I reread
that passage after I wrote it--it was not the acronyms that bothered me so
much as the rather tortuous logic chain I was trying to contstruct. Not one
of my better efforts, I'd agree. Mea culpa.

Brooks

>
>
>
>
> Ron
> Tanker 65, C-54E (DC-4)
>

[Guy Alcala]

Kevin Brooks wrote:

> "Ron" > wrote in message
> ...
> > >> Be careful Kevin, dont want to have to call you Kurt Plummer :)
> > >
> > >OK, I give...what/who is a Kurt Plummer? It's late here, and I am
> scratching
> > >my head...
> > >
> > >Brooks
> >
> > Its kind of a joke now that he does not seem to post here anymore, but his
> > postings seemed to be composed almost entirely of acronyms.
> >
> > Those who have been here for a while will know who i am talking about.
> >
> > Your post wasnt near as bad as his, I just saw an lot of acronyms and
> thought
> > of him.
>
> Gee, thanks Ron, you really know how to stroke a guy's ego... :-) Messeur
> Plummer apparently abdicated about the time I started participating in the
> group (nad no, damnit, that should *not* infer that I am him, or he is
> me...).
>
> I *usually* try to include the full nomenclature for any acronyms that might
> be unintelligible to the general, but militarily knowledgable, reader. I
> think most folks here know what GMLRS and ATACMS are. That said, I reread
> that passage after I wrote it--it was not the acronyms that bothered me so
> much as the rather tortuous logic chain I was trying to contstruct. Not one
> of my better efforts, I'd agree. Mea culpa.

Kevin, it wasn't a problem, and the logic chain and acronynm use was fine. Lots
of acronyms was just part of what made KP's posts so special. Here's a tutorial
I once wrote, explaining how to read Kurt's posts:

http://groups.google.com/groups?hl=en&lr=&ie=UTF-8&selm=3B69E441.8414A898%40postoffice.pacbell.net&prev=/groups%3Fsafe%3Dimages%26ie%3DISO-8859-1%26as_ugroup%3Drec.aviation.military%26as_usubjec t%3DPlummer-English%2520dictionary%26as_drrb%3Db%26as_mind%3D1 2%26as_minm%3D5%26as_miny%3D2001%26as_maxd%3D29%26 as_maxm%3D2%26as_maxy%3D2004%26lr%3D%26num%3D100%2 6hl%3Den



Guy

[Kevin Brooks]

"Guy Alcala" > wrote in message
. ..
> Kevin Brooks wrote:
>
> > "Ron" > wrote in message
> > ...
> > > >> Be careful Kevin, dont want to have to call you Kurt Plummer :)
> > > >
> > > >OK, I give...what/who is a Kurt Plummer? It's late here, and I am
> > scratching
> > > >my head...
> > > >
> > > >Brooks
> > >
> > > Its kind of a joke now that he does not seem to post here anymore, but
his
> > > postings seemed to be composed almost entirely of acronyms.
> > >
> > > Those who have been here for a while will know who i am talking about.
> > >
> > > Your post wasnt near as bad as his, I just saw an lot of acronyms and
> > thought
> > > of him.
> >
> > Gee, thanks Ron, you really know how to stroke a guy's ego... :-)
Messeur
> > Plummer apparently abdicated about the time I started participating in
the
> > group (nad no, damnit, that should *not* infer that I am him, or he is
> > me...).
> >
> > I *usually* try to include the full nomenclature for any acronyms that
might
> > be unintelligible to the general, but militarily knowledgable, reader. I
> > think most folks here know what GMLRS and ATACMS are. That said, I
reread
> > that passage after I wrote it--it was not the acronyms that bothered me
so
> > much as the rather tortuous logic chain I was trying to contstruct. Not
one
> > of my better efforts, I'd agree. Mea culpa.
>
> Kevin, it wasn't a problem, and the logic chain and acronynm use was fine.
Lots
> of acronyms was just part of what made KP's posts so special. Here's a
tutorial
> I once wrote, explaining how to read Kurt's posts:

LOL! Nice job. When are you going to come up with the complimentary "How to
Explain Simple Concepts to Henry Cobb"?

Brooks

>
>
http://groups.google.com/groups?hl=en&lr=&ie=UTF-8&selm=3B69E441.8414A898%40postoffice.pacbell.net&prev=/groups%3Fsafe%3Dimages%26ie%3DISO-8859-1%26as_u
group%3Drec.aviation.military%26as_usubject%3DPlum mer-English%2520dictionary
%26as_drrb%3Db%26as_mind%3D12%26as_minm%3D5%26as_m iny%3D2001%26as_maxd%3D29%
26as_maxm%3D2%26as_maxy%3D2004%26lr%3D%26num%3D100 %26hl%3Den
>
>
>
> Guy
>

[Guy Alcala]

Kevin Brooks wrote:

> "Guy Alcala" > wrote in message

<snip>

> > Kevin, it wasn't a problem, and the logic chain and acronynm use was fine.
> Lots
> > of acronyms was just part of what made KP's posts so special. Here's a
> tutorial
> > I once wrote, explaining how to read Kurt's posts:
>
> LOL! Nice job. When are you going to come up with the complimentary "How to
> Explain Simple Concepts to Henry Cobb"?

I haven't the energy to waste on that. To put the concept as simply as possible,"Yew cain't teach someone what don't want to larn."

Guy

[M]

Kevin Brooks >
> Not in this argument it is not. The poster was claiming that we should be
> able to forego attack helo operations in favor of systems like Strix for the
> deep attack role--and Strix is NOT a deep attack asset, by any definition.

Oh no I didn't <g>, and, besides, I was explicitely speculating...

While I agree that Strix certainly isn't a deep strike AT asset
like AH's, I'd think that it can do some of the AT job of AH's
in CAS. A small country not being able to afford everything, may
have to do difficult choises between dissimilar systems. My
speculation was that if Strix is seen to improve the AT capability
of the Royal Army significantly, it may be one reason why they
haven't gotten (expensive) attack helos.

Besides, putting Strix and AH's in the same category is rather
modest compared to that some Finnish top brass - quite seriously -
drew a parallel between anti-personnel mines and AH's a few years
ago. (The logic being that if the AP mines have to be abandonded due
to international agreements, AT minefields will be too easy to clear,
and thus AH's are necessary to maintain the AT capability).

[Joe Osman]

"Guy Alcala" > wrote in message
. ..
> Kevin Brooks wrote:
>
> > "Ron" > wrote in message
> > ...
> > > >> Be careful Kevin, dont want to have to call you Kurt Plummer :)
> > > >
> > > >OK, I give...what/who is a Kurt Plummer? It's late here, and I am
> > scratching
> > > >my head...
> > > >
> > > >Brooks
> > >
> > > Its kind of a joke now that he does not seem to post here anymore, but
his
> > > postings seemed to be composed almost entirely of acronyms.
> > >
> > > Those who have been here for a while will know who i am talking about.
> > >
> > > Your post wasnt near as bad as his, I just saw an lot of acronyms and
> > thought
> > > of him.
> >
> > Gee, thanks Ron, you really know how to stroke a guy's ego... :-)
Messeur
> > Plummer apparently abdicated about the time I started participating in
the
> > group (nad no, damnit, that should *not* infer that I am him, or he is
> > me...).
> >
> > I *usually* try to include the full nomenclature for any acronyms that
might
> > be unintelligible to the general, but militarily knowledgable, reader. I
> > think most folks here know what GMLRS and ATACMS are. That said, I
reread
> > that passage after I wrote it--it was not the acronyms that bothered me
so
> > much as the rather tortuous logic chain I was trying to contstruct. Not
one
> > of my better efforts, I'd agree. Mea culpa.
>
> Kevin, it wasn't a problem, and the logic chain and acronynm use was fine.
Lots
> of acronyms was just part of what made KP's posts so special. Here's a
tutorial
> I once wrote, explaining how to read Kurt's posts:
>
>
http://groups.google.com/groups?hl=en&lr=&ie=UTF-8&selm=3B69E441.8414A898%40
postoffice.pacbell.net&prev=/groups%3Fsafe%3Dimages%26ie%3DISO-8859-1%26as_u
group%3Drec.aviation.military%26as_usubject%3DPlum mer-English%2520dictionary
%26as_drrb%3Db%26as_mind%3D12%26as_minm%3D5%26as_m iny%3D2001%26as_maxd%3D29%
26as_maxm%3D2%26as_maxy%3D2004%26lr%3D%26num%3D100 %26hl%3Den
>
>
>
> Guy
>
I think you could also be the winner of the longest URL ever posted award.
It's certainly the longest I've ever seen. But unlike most of the others,
clicking on it did work.

Joe




-----= Posted via Newsfeeds.Com, Uncensored Usenet News =-----
http://www.newsfeeds.com - The #1 Newsgroup Service in the World!
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[Guy Alcala]

Joe Osman wrote:

<snip>

> I think you could also be the winner of the longest URL ever posted award.
> It's certainly the longest I've ever seen. But unlike most of the others,
> clicking on it did work.

Ye gods! I had no idea it went on like that.

Guy

[Peter Twydell]

In article >, Guy Alcala
> writes
>Kevin Brooks wrote:
>
>> "Ron" > wrote in message
>> ...
>> > >> Be careful Kevin, dont want to have to call you Kurt Plummer :)
>> > >
>> > >OK, I give...what/who is a Kurt Plummer? It's late here, and I am
>> scratching
>> > >my head...
>> > >
>> > >Brooks
>> >
>> > Its kind of a joke now that he does not seem to post here anymore, but his
>> > postings seemed to be composed almost entirely of acronyms.
>> >
>> > Those who have been here for a while will know who i am talking about.
>> >
>> > Your post wasnt near as bad as his, I just saw an lot of acronyms and
>> thought
>> > of him.
>>
>> Gee, thanks Ron, you really know how to stroke a guy's ego... :-) Messeur
>> Plummer apparently abdicated about the time I started participating in the
>> group (nad no, damnit, that should *not* infer that I am him, or he is
>> me...).
>>
>> I *usually* try to include the full nomenclature for any acronyms that might
>> be unintelligible to the general, but militarily knowledgable, reader. I
>> think most folks here know what GMLRS and ATACMS are. That said, I reread
>> that passage after I wrote it--it was not the acronyms that bothered me so
>> much as the rather tortuous logic chain I was trying to contstruct. Not one
>> of my better efforts, I'd agree. Mea culpa.
>
>Kevin, it wasn't a problem, and the logic chain and acronynm use was fine. Lots
>of acronyms was just part of what made KP's posts so special. Here's a tutorial
>I once wrote, explaining how to read Kurt's posts:
>
>http://groups.google.com/groups?hl=en&lr=&ie=UTF-8&selm=3B69E441.8414A898%40post
>office.pacbell.net&prev=/groups%3Fsafe%3Dimages%26ie%3DISO-8859-1%26as_ugroup%3D
>rec.aviation.military%26as_usubject%3DPlummer-English%2520dictionary%26as_drrb%3
>Db%26as_mind%3D12%26as_minm%3D5%26as_miny%3D2001%2 6as_maxd%3D29%26as_maxm%3D2%26
>as_maxy%3D2004%26lr%3D%26num%3D100%26hl%3Den
>
>
>
>Guy
>

When I first encountered KP, I thought the reason I couldn't understand
him was my own ignorance. My eventual conclusion for 99% of what he
posted was BS/WTF.
--
Peter

Ying tong iddle-i po!