Officers..The Bridge at Remagen

[ArtKramr]

When the troops of the 9th armored division reached the bridge at Remaagen on
March 7th they stopped undecided what to do. General William Hoge saw the
bridge standing aand ordered it to be taken with the East end of the bridge
secured. Lt. Karl Timmermann led the charge takig the bridge and setting up a
perimeter line of skernishers on the Eastern side.

When ordered to take the bridge troops obeyed the commands of their officers
instantly and obediently. No debates. No second opinions. Just immediate
action. It is how wars are won.


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[Kevin Brooks]

"ArtKramr" > wrote in message
...
> When the troops of the 9th armored division reached the bridge at Remaagen
on
> March 7th they stopped undecided what to do. General William Hoge saw the
> bridge standing aand ordered it to be taken with the East end of the
bridge
> secured. Lt. Karl Timmermann led the charge takig the bridge and setting
up a
> perimeter line of skernishers on the Eastern side.
>
> When ordered to take the bridge troops obeyed the commands of their
officers
> instantly and obediently. No debates. No second opinions. Just immediate
> action. It is how wars are won.

And no higher orders from those above Hoge to carry out the maneuver--he
acted in accordance with his higher commander's intent. You just don't get
it, do you?

Brooks

>
>
> Arthur Kramer

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: Officers..The Bridge at Remagen
>From: "Emmanuel Gustin"
>Date: 2/26/04 11:50 AM Pacific Standard Time
>Message-id:

>Apparently there *was* a debate -- at Bradley's HQ. Some staff
>officer had the temerity to suggest that the 9th should not have
>taken the bridge because it was not according to plan!
>

But that was after the fact. No debates on the spot.


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[Ed Majden]

"ArtKramr" >
> When ordered to take the bridge troops obeyed the commands of their
officers
> instantly and obediently. No debates. No second opinions. Just immediate
> action. It is how wars are won.

Art:
I have been following this discussion for sometime and think I should
jump in. Blind obedience of a direct command by an officer is sometimes NOT
the wisest choice! I site the event of March 16, 1968, the Mylai massacre!
Officers can be dead wrong at times! At the German War Crimes trials the
defence of saying, "I was ordered to do this", did not work.
Ed

[Dave Holford]

ArtKramr wrote:
>
>
> But that was after the fact. No debates on the spot.
>


You speak with authority - you were there?

Dave

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: Officers..The Bridge at Remagen
>From: "Ed Majden"
>Date: 2/26/04 12:19 PM Pacific Standard Time
>Message-id: <Zws%b.605494$JQ1.62940@pd7tw1no>
>
>
>"ArtKramr" >
>> When ordered to take the bridge troops obeyed the commands of their
>officers
>> instantly and obediently. No debates. No second opinions. Just immediate
>> action. It is how wars are won.
>
>Art:
> I have been following this discussion for sometime and think I should
>jump in. Blind obedience of a direct command by an officer is sometimes NOT
>the wisest choice! I site the event of March 16, 1968, the Mylai massacre!
>Officers can be dead wrong at times! At the German War Crimes trials the
>defence of saying, "I was ordered to do this", did not work.
>Ed
>
>

We can always give isolated examples that prove the exception. But in an army
when the exception is the rule, we end up with a mob where everyone is in
business for themselves. Not a good way to go to war.


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[Ed Majden]

----- Original Message -----
From: "ArtKramr"
>
> We can always give isolated examples that prove the exception. But in an
army
> when the exception is the rule, we end up with a mob where everyone is in
> business for themselves. Not a good way to go to war.
>
Unfortunately there are many examples! If an officer has the confidence
of his men and he has respect for the troops he commands in most cases his
orders will be followed without question. Just because a guy has bars on
his shoulders does not necessarily mean he is a good leader or for that
matter a knowledgeable one. In the British forces rank often came from
class distinction not whether you deserved the position. Remember Dieppe or
Hong Kong!

With respect:
Ed

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: Officers..The Bridge at Remagen
>From: "Ed Majden"
>Date: 2/26/04 12:53 PM Pacific Standard Time
>Message-id: <W0t%b.621339$X%5.404706@pd7tw2no>
>
>
>----- Original Message -----
>From: "ArtKramr"
>>
>> We can always give isolated examples that prove the exception. But in an
>army
>> when the exception is the rule, we end up with a mob where everyone is in
>> business for themselves. Not a good way to go to war.
>>
> Unfortunately there are many examples! If an officer has the confidence
>of his men and he has respect for the troops he commands in most cases his
>orders will be followed without question. Just because a guy has bars on
>his shoulders does not necessarily mean he is a good leader or for that
>matter a knowledgeable one. In the British forces rank often came from
>class distinction not whether you deserved the position. Remember Dieppe or
>Hong Kong!
>
>With respect:
>Ed
>
>

What you say is true. But an undiciplined army will always come out the loser.
And it is not reasonable to take the position that most officers don't know
their job. Or most sargeants for that matter. Is it?


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[Ron]

>When the troops of the 9th armored division reached the bridge at Remaagen on
>March 7th they stopped undecided what to do. General William Hoge saw the
>bridge standing aand ordered it to be taken with the East end of the bridge
>secured. Lt. Karl Timmermann led the charge takig the bridge and setting up a
>perimeter line of skernishers on the Eastern side.
>
>When ordered to take the bridge troops obeyed the commands of their officers
>instantly and obediently. No debates. No second opinions. Just immediate
>action. It is how wars are won.

But I will have to chime in on this, with some agreements and disagreements.

Warfare has evolved past the stage, at least with Western countries, where it
was all about just generating maximum numbers of planes, people, etc to a
target and that meant the difference. In much of the history of warfare,
whether it was the Roman conquest of Europe, or B-26s over a bridge, it was
about putting maximum numbers of your side on or over a target for the best
chance of success. The tactics were not usually too specialized typically, nor
were the weapons. One person who questioned or disagreed could mean one less
warrior, or one less plane over the target whose bombs could have made the
difference.

However, warfare today is less numbers oriented, and more about having the
right plan and the right tactics when you go in, because often now we do
undertake operations in which our force, while being at a numerical
disadvantage, will have a huge techological advantage over the enemy, and the
right plans and tactics are going to make maximum use of that.

One B-52, equipped with JDAMs, utilizing highly training soldiers for targeting
and directing, and with the right tactics, can achieve things undreamed not
long ago.

And a special forces team, be it SFOD-D, SEAL, PJs, etc, doesnt just get a
command from the team leader and the rest just go do it without any thinking.
They are going to work out the plan beforehand, and probably each contributing
or adding to it. When fighter and bomber aircraft are doing CAS work, or
interdiction, the technology is best utilized when you properly employ the
weapons, instead of just generating large numerical sorties and hoping for the
best.
Special forces might have been a novelty during WW2, but now they and their
tactics are an integral part of modern warfighting.

But ironically, it is 3rd world armies that still rely on "just do as your
told", "no questions asked", and still fight with massed numbers, not much
technology, and do not coordinate or train solders much, lest they become a
domestic threat, especially Arab and Middle Eastern Armies. Against an
educated well trained army, who uses proper planning and tactics, those 3rd
world armies come up quite short.









Ron
Tanker 65, C-54E (DC-4)

[Jim Doyle]

"Ed Majden" > wrote in message
news:W0t%b.621339$X%5.404706@pd7tw2no...
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "ArtKramr"
> >
> > We can always give isolated examples that prove the exception. But in an
> army
> > when the exception is the rule, we end up with a mob where everyone is
in
> > business for themselves. Not a good way to go to war.
> >
> Unfortunately there are many examples! If an officer has the
confidence
> of his men and he has respect for the troops he commands in most cases his
> orders will be followed without question. Just because a guy has bars on
> his shoulders does not necessarily mean he is a good leader or for that
> matter a knowledgeable one. In the British forces rank often came from
> class distinction not whether you deserved the position. Remember Dieppe
or
> Hong Kong!
>
Hang on Ed, surly you can't pin Dieppe on British ineptitude - being an
Allied venture, it needed Allied ratification. If anything it was a Canadian
effort (something like 5,000 Canadian troops), the only British employed
were a number of commandos, IIRC about the same number of US Rangers were
also used. Plus what on earth did the Brits do to Hong Kong except turn it
into the prosperous place of commerce and business it is now?!
Can't argue with your stating that often British officers were born to it.
John E Johnson (sp?), the wartime spitfire ace, had his initial pre-war
pilot application turned down since he stumbled in the interview having been
ask for which hunt he rode! I can guarantee this is not the case any longer.

> With respect:

Genuinely likewise,

Jim D

> Ed
>
>

[Ed Majden]

"Jim Doyle"
> Hang on Ed, surly you can't pin Dieppe on British ineptitude - being an
> Allied venture, it needed Allied ratification. If anything it was a
Canadian
> effort (something like 5,000 Canadian troops), the only British employed
> were a number of commandos, IIRC about the same number of US Rangers were
> also used. Plus what on earth did the Brits do to Hong Kong except turn it
> into the prosperous place of commerce and business it is now?!
> Can't argue with your stating that often British officers were born to

I'm not necessarily blaming the Brits for Dieppe except for Montbatten's
involvement. Canadian officers were just itching to get into action. The
whole plan was just stupid. Promised support did not materialize and the
numbers were not near enough for an effective assault. That's why Ike
didn't listen to the Russian's demand for a second front until the allies
were ready. As for Hong Kong, I'm talking about the stupid Canadian
decision to send a poorly equipped and poorly trained battalion into a place
they had no chance of winning. I don't think they even delayed the Japanese
victory at Hong Kong. It was a lost cause from the start. This was probably
much a political decision but the Generals must have agreed to it. People
killed and maimed for nothing with no hope of success. Just a plain stupid
loss of life. This was a decision by politicians and high ranking officers
not the grunts who suffered and died!
Ed

[Keith Willshaw]

"Ed Majden" > wrote in message
news:qOw%b.625931$ts4.78485@pd7tw3no...
>
> "Jim Doyle"
> > Hang on Ed, surly you can't pin Dieppe on British ineptitude - being an
> > Allied venture, it needed Allied ratification. If anything it was a
> Canadian
> > effort (something like 5,000 Canadian troops), the only British employed
> > were a number of commandos, IIRC about the same number of US Rangers
were
> > also used. Plus what on earth did the Brits do to Hong Kong except turn
it
> > into the prosperous place of commerce and business it is now?!
> > Can't argue with your stating that often British officers were born to
>
> I'm not necessarily blaming the Brits for Dieppe except for
Montbatten's
> involvement. Canadian officers were just itching to get into action. The
> whole plan was just stupid. Promised support did not materialize and the
> numbers were not near enough for an effective assault. That's why Ike
> didn't listen to the Russian's demand for a second front until the allies
> were ready. As for Hong Kong, I'm talking about the stupid Canadian
> decision to send a poorly equipped and poorly trained battalion into a
place
> they had no chance of winning. I don't think they even delayed the
Japanese
> victory at Hong Kong. It was a lost cause from the start.

Rather like the Phillipines, Guam or Wake in fact

Keith

[Cub Driver]

> Plus what on earth did the Brits do to Hong Kong except turn it
>into the prosperous place of commerce and business it is now?

I suspect the poster was referring to its loss to the Japanese about
Christmas 1941.

Deep down, however, I suspect he was actually thinking of the loss of
Singapore in February 1942. Unlike the situation in indefensible Hong
Kong, the early surrender of Singapore was a rather shameful moment in
British arms.

all the best -- Dan Ford
email: (requires authentication)

see the Warbird's Forum at www.warbirdforum.com
and the Piper Cub Forum at www.pipercubforum.com

[Keith Willshaw]

"Cub Driver" > wrote in message
...
>
> > Plus what on earth did the Brits do to Hong Kong except turn it
> >into the prosperous place of commerce and business it is now?
>
> I suspect the poster was referring to its loss to the Japanese about
> Christmas 1941.
>
> Deep down, however, I suspect he was actually thinking of the loss of
> Singapore in February 1942. Unlike the situation in indefensible Hong
> Kong, the early surrender of Singapore was a rather shameful moment in
> British arms.
>

The surrender occurred only after the Japanese captured the reservoirs
and cut off water to the city. 2 million people without water dont survive
for very long in a tropical climate. Without air cover Singapore was
simply not defensible but as with the Phillipines it wasnt politically
possible to abandon it.

Keith

[Presidente Alcazar]

On Fri, 27 Feb 2004 09:32:08 -0000, "Keith Willshaw"
> wrote:


>> Deep down, however, I suspect he was actually thinking of the loss of
>> Singapore in February 1942. Unlike the situation in indefensible Hong
>> Kong, the early surrender of Singapore was a rather shameful moment in
>> British arms.
>
>The surrender occurred only after the Japanese captured the reservoirs
>and cut off water to the city. 2 million people without water dont survive
>for very long in a tropical climate. Without air cover Singapore was
>simply not defensible but as with the Phillipines it wasnt politically
>possible to abandon it.

Nevertheless, while I'm usually the first to point out that the fall
of Singapore was fundamentally due to external factors (chiefly the
war cabinet decision to prioritise everything else, including supply
to Russia, above providing the recognised minimum in the way of
resources to defend the place effectively), the fact remains that the
forces which were there did not operate effectively enough even when
the external constraints were taken into consideration. Having said
that, at least Percival had the strength of character to surrender at
the end of practicable resistance rather than make grandiose postures
at the expense of the lives of everybody else - the sort of thing that
a lot of Wehrmacht commanders failed to manage.

Gavin Bailey

[Kevin Brooks]

"Keith Willshaw" > wrote in message
...
>
> "Cub Driver" > wrote in message
> ...
> >
> > > Plus what on earth did the Brits do to Hong Kong except turn it
> > >into the prosperous place of commerce and business it is now?
> >
> > I suspect the poster was referring to its loss to the Japanese about
> > Christmas 1941.
> >
> > Deep down, however, I suspect he was actually thinking of the loss of
> > Singapore in February 1942. Unlike the situation in indefensible Hong
> > Kong, the early surrender of Singapore was a rather shameful moment in
> > British arms.
> >
>
> The surrender occurred only after the Japanese captured the reservoirs
> and cut off water to the city. 2 million people without water dont survive
> for very long in a tropical climate. Without air cover Singapore was
> simply not defensible but as with the Phillipines it wasnt politically
> possible to abandon it.

Come on Keith, Singapore *was* an embarrassment for your side. It happens;
our first committed units to Korea, before things tightened up around Pusan,
did not acquit themselves very well either, for a number of reasons. The
leadership in Singapore screwed the pooch in how they laid out their
defenses--just as MacArthur screwed the pooch with his ridiculous "defend
forward" strategy in the PI. What separates the two is that the US and PI
troops fought on to the bitter end, suffering and starving *before* the
survivors went into captivity, while Singapore fell with relatively little
bloodshed (and no delay of the Japanese timetable).

Brooks

>
> Keith
>
>

[Keith Willshaw]

"Kevin Brooks" > wrote in message
...
>
> "Keith Willshaw" > wrote in message
> ...
> >
> > "Cub Driver" > wrote in message
> > ...
> > >
> > > > Plus what on earth did the Brits do to Hong Kong except turn it
> > > >into the prosperous place of commerce and business it is now?
> > >
> > > I suspect the poster was referring to its loss to the Japanese about
> > > Christmas 1941.
> > >
> > > Deep down, however, I suspect he was actually thinking of the loss of
> > > Singapore in February 1942. Unlike the situation in indefensible Hong
> > > Kong, the early surrender of Singapore was a rather shameful moment in
> > > British arms.
> > >
> >
> > The surrender occurred only after the Japanese captured the reservoirs
> > and cut off water to the city. 2 million people without water dont
survive
> > for very long in a tropical climate. Without air cover Singapore was
> > simply not defensible but as with the Phillipines it wasnt politically
> > possible to abandon it.
>
> Come on Keith, Singapore *was* an embarrassment for your side. It happens;

Of course it was.

> our first committed units to Korea, before things tightened up around
Pusan,
> did not acquit themselves very well either, for a number of reasons. The
> leadership in Singapore screwed the pooch in how they laid out their
> defenses--just as MacArthur screwed the pooch with his ridiculous "defend
> forward" strategy in the PI. What separates the two is that the US and PI
> troops fought on to the bitter end, suffering and starving *before* the
> survivors went into captivity, while Singapore fell with relatively little
> bloodshed (and no delay of the Japanese timetable).
>

Thats not entirely true, the fighting for Sarimbun beach was bitter
but the result was inevitable as only 2 Aussie battallions were in position
and the Japanese attacked with 2 divisions. The problem for Percival
was that with the Japanese having total air superiority he couldnt move
troops forward to counterattack.

During the The Battle of Pasir Panjang 2 battallions of the Malay
Regiment fought to the last man and at Bukit Timah local
Chinese militia fought hand to hand with the Japanese in
a very bloody and brutal action but once the Japanese seized
the reservoirs the result was inevitable as the people of Singapore
city had no drinking water. In a crowded city in the tropics
this was no joke.

Singapore is a LOT smaller than the Phillipines and contained
2 million civilians who couldnt be supplied with water let alone
be protected from artillery and bombing. Had Percival attempted
to make a last stand in the city the result would have been
another Nanking

Keith

[Drazen Kramaric]

On 26 Feb 2004 19:26:25 GMT, (ArtKramr) wrote:

>When the troops of the 9th armored division reached the bridge at Remaagen on
>March 7th they stopped undecided what to do. General William Hoge saw the
>bridge standing aand ordered it to be taken with the East end of the bridge
>secured. Lt. Karl Timmermann led the charge takig the bridge and setting up a
>perimeter line of skernishers on the Eastern side.
>
>When ordered to take the bridge troops obeyed the commands of their officers
>instantly and obediently. No debates. No second opinions. Just immediate
>action. It is how wars are won.

Actually, according to William Breuer's "Storming Hitler's Rhine",
Timmerman's men hesitated, when Major Deveers tried to cheer them up,
he was cursed back about what he could have done with his damned
bridge. It took some prodding until men finally rose and followed
their lieutnant over the bridge.


Drax

[Drazen Kramaric]

On Fri, 27 Feb 2004 09:32:08 -0000, "Keith Willshaw"
> wrote:


>The surrender occurred only after the Japanese captured the reservoirs
>and cut off water to the city. 2 million people without water dont survive
>for very long in a tropical climate. Without air cover Singapore was
>simply not defensible but as with the Phillipines it wasnt politically
>possible to abandon it.

Japanese should never reach Johore in the first place with only three
divisions if British defense was even remotely competant. Throughout
Pacific war, Japanese managed to fight far more stubbornly without air
cover.

In addition, note how British managed to slip entire division into the
port only to surrender it without even used it in combat.

No matter how do you twist it, Singapore was the greatest British
military blunder in WW2.


Drax

[Keith Willshaw]

"Drazen Kramaric" > wrote in message
...
> On Fri, 27 Feb 2004 09:32:08 -0000, "Keith Willshaw"
> > wrote:
>
>
> >The surrender occurred only after the Japanese captured the reservoirs
> >and cut off water to the city. 2 million people without water dont
survive
> >for very long in a tropical climate. Without air cover Singapore was
> >simply not defensible but as with the Phillipines it wasnt politically
> >possible to abandon it.
>
> Japanese should never reach Johore in the first place with only three
> divisions if British defense was even remotely competant.

I quite agree


> Throughout
> Pacific war, Japanese managed to fight far more stubbornly without air
> cover.
>

Stubbornly yes, intelligently no. By 1944 the weaknesses of the
Japanese fighting methods was well understood and they took
horrible casualties to little effect.

> In addition, note how British managed to slip entire division into the
> port only to surrender it without even used it in combat.
>
> No matter how do you twist it, Singapore was the greatest British
> military blunder in WW2.
>

Indeed it was.

Keith

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: Officers..The Bridge at Remagen
>From: (Drazen Kramaric)
>Date: 3/31/04 11:12 AM Pacific Standard Time
>Message-id: >
>
>On 26 Feb 2004 19:26:25 GMT, (ArtKramr) wrote:
>
>>When the troops of the 9th armored division reached the bridge at Remaagen
>on
>>March 7th they stopped undecided what to do. General William Hoge saw the
>>bridge standing aand ordered it to be taken with the East end of the bridge
>>secured. Lt. Karl Timmermann led the charge takig the bridge and setting up
>a
>>perimeter line of skernishers on the Eastern side.
>>
>>When ordered to take the bridge troops obeyed the commands of their officers
>>instantly and obediently. No debates. No second opinions. Just immediate
>>action. It is how wars are won.
>
>Actually, according to William Breuer's "Storming Hitler's Rhine",
>Timmerman's men hesitated, when Major Deveers tried to cheer them up,
>he was cursed back about what he could have done with his damned
>bridge. It took some prodding until men finally rose and followed
>their lieutnant over the bridge.
>
>
>Drax


I know men who were there and they tell the story as I have told it. Also there
were cameramen there who recorded the assault as I have told it. Brauer wasn't
there and knows nothing about it.



Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[Kevin Brooks]

"ArtKramr" > wrote in message
...
> >Subject: Re: Officers..The Bridge at Remagen
> >From: (Drazen Kramaric)
> >Date: 3/31/04 11:12 AM Pacific Standard Time
> >Message-id: >
> >
> >On 26 Feb 2004 19:26:25 GMT, (ArtKramr) wrote:
> >
> >>When the troops of the 9th armored division reached the bridge at
Remaagen
> >on
> >>March 7th they stopped undecided what to do. General William Hoge saw
the
> >>bridge standing aand ordered it to be taken with the East end of the
bridge
> >>secured. Lt. Karl Timmermann led the charge takig the bridge and setting
up
> >a
> >>perimeter line of skernishers on the Eastern side.
> >>
> >>When ordered to take the bridge troops obeyed the commands of their
officers
> >>instantly and obediently. No debates. No second opinions. Just immediate
> >>action. It is how wars are won.
> >
> >Actually, according to William Breuer's "Storming Hitler's Rhine",
> >Timmerman's men hesitated, when Major Deveers tried to cheer them up,
> >he was cursed back about what he could have done with his damned
> >bridge. It took some prodding until men finally rose and followed
> >their lieutnant over the bridge.
> >
> >
> >Drax
>
>
> I know men who were there and they tell the story as I have told it. Also
there
> were cameramen there who recorded the assault as I have told it. Brauer
wasn't
> there and knows nothing about it.

Once again Art comes up short when his story is examined against available
hisorical accounts:

"Timmermann saw that the bridge was damaged (see the picture at right) but
passable. He called the platoon leaders together and gave the plan for
crossing the bridge. The men hesitated - they were tired and it looked like
certain death." www2.gasou.edu/facstaff/etmcmull/REMAGEN.htm (Account from
a US Army officer who participated in the Remagen operation, with the first
AAA battalion to arive to defend the bridghead)

Sounds like the account Breuer related is a lot closer to the truth than the
one Art recalss--but heck, given that Art can't even remember the fact that
National Guard units were in the thick of the combat throughout the ETO,
this comes as little surprise.

Brooks




>
>
>
> Arthur Kramer

[Gernot Hassenpflug]

"Keith Willshaw" > writes:

> > Throughout
>> Pacific war, Japanese managed to fight far more stubbornly without air
>> cover.
>>
>
> Stubbornly yes, intelligently no. By 1944 the weaknesses of the
> Japanese fighting methods was well understood and they took
> horrible casualties to little effect.

It does boggle the mind rather, doesn't it. I believe it was only in
late 1944, at Palau (do I have that right? The unnecessary invasion?)
that the Japanese commander managed to persuade GHQ to allow him to
fight a guerilla battle rather than suicide charges - in order to
prolong resistance for as long as possible. This became the accepted
way to fight after that, despite suicide charges carried out at times
after that. All in all though, a great waste of life on mostly the
Japanese side.

--
G Hassenpflug * IJN & JMSDF equipment/history fan