How did the Brits do it?

[ArtKramr]

I think back to the war and the RAF heavies on their night missions. Missions
flown in the winter usually were in atrocioius weather where there was no view
of the gound and the sky above was overcast. There was no way to shoot at star
fix or take a dirft reading from the ground. Working dead reckoning from
England deep into Germany and any change in wind dorection or velocity that
went undetected made dead reckoning navigation a hit and miss proposition.
Often it was not just miss, it was gross miss. Knowing all this how could the
RAF ever hope to pull off these winter night missions successfully? What was
the logic that made them keep flying under these hopeless navigation
conditions? Anyone know?


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[Keith Willshaw]

"ArtKramr" > wrote in message
...
> I think back to the war and the RAF heavies on their night missions.
Missions
> flown in the winter usually were in atrocioius weather where there was no
view
> of the gound and the sky above was overcast. There was no way to shoot at
star
> fix or take a dirft reading from the ground. Working dead reckoning from
> England deep into Germany and any change in wind dorection or velocity
that
> went undetected made dead reckoning navigation a hit and miss
proposition.
> Often it was not just miss, it was gross miss. Knowing all this how could
the
> RAF ever hope to pull off these winter night missions successfully? What
was
> the logic that made them keep flying under these hopeless navigation
> conditions? Anyone know?
>

This is a complex subject and a matter of some controversy
but unusually these days is on topic so I'll give it a go.

The RAF began the war in 1939 with a plan that envisaged
daylight precision bombing of military targets only. Unfortunately
catastrophic losses on early raids, 50% and higher, proved this
to be impossible. It was quite impossible politically and from
a morale point of view to simply stop bombing the Germans
This was especially true after the Blitz.

An attempt was made to use the techniques you describe
to bomb at night and the results as you would expect were
very mixed. In 1940 raids were mainly aimed at the invasion
barges in French and Belgian Ports and these being relatively
easy to locate at night results were acceptable.

However as targets deep in Germany were attacked it was evident
that the expected results were not being delivered.

An official report commissioned by the war office from the
economist David Miles Bensusan-Butt revealed that bombing
was shockingly inaccurate. Churchill recognised the importance
of the report - "this is a very serious paper and seems to
require urgent attention" and temporarily suspended bombing while
a solution was sought. This was to consist of four parts

1) The adoption of better navigational aids
2) Better crew training
3) Larger better equipped 4 engined bombers
4) A switch of tactics

Essentially the RAF decided that if they couldnt hit precision targets
then they would switch to targetting things they couldnt miss,
this was area bombing. The idea being that if you couldnt
hit the arms factory in the city you'd settle for flattening the
entire metropolis.

As the war progressed navigational aids like Gee and Oboe along
with Radar aids like H2S and the use of Pathfinders did improve
accuracy a great deal so that by 1944 the RAF were able to
atatck and obliterate targets varying from troop concentrations
in Normandy to entire cities.

Keith

[Jim Doyle]

"ArtKramr" > wrote in message
...
> I think back to the war and the RAF heavies on their night missions.
Missions
> flown in the winter usually were in atrocioius weather where there was no
view
> of the gound and the sky above was overcast. There was no way to shoot at
star
> fix or take a dirft reading from the ground. Working dead reckoning from
> England deep into Germany and any change in wind dorection or velocity
that
> went undetected made dead reckoning navigation a hit and miss
proposition.
> Often it was not just miss, it was gross miss. Knowing all this how could
the
> RAF ever hope to pull off these winter night missions successfully? What
was
> the logic that made them keep flying under these hopeless navigation
> conditions? Anyone know?

As I understand it Art, you and your fellow Americans bombed by day, the RAF
by night. This was to concentrate efforts of the two doctrines, precision
and area bombing. The British began unintentional area bombing when they
switched to night attacks, mitigating the heavy losses associated with deep
attacks into Europe with ill defended bombers in airspace without air
supremacy. I guess this was somewhat justifiable to the British Public given
the Blitz on Britain's cities in '40-'41. Yet the USA - which had not been
on the receiving end of a bombing campaign on it's own soil, directed at
it's own civilians - opted for precision daylight attacks.

The biggest advocate of Area Bombing was Lord Cherwell. He devised a very
rudimentary calculation to justify the area bombing principal based on the
anticipated bomber production, average tonnage of HE dropped by a bomber
before being shot down, average number of homes destroyed per ton of HE etc.
Essentially, if 200,000 tons of HE fell on German cities (half of that
expected to be dropped over Germany) 30 million households should be
destroyed. You remove the industrial workforce, you remove the capacity to
produce war materiel. Simple....

.... if only it worked! British tactics against Germany were optimised to the
conditions of the day, with the subsequent development of nav aids, dead
reckoning was superseded and bombing became much more accurate and
aggressive.

In the latter stages of the war, in my opinion, Area Bombing became
unjustifiable before it ceased. Dresden is a prime example, though there are
many who believe this to be a show of strength to the Russians, it just
simply didn't deserve the tremendous volume of bombs metered out.

Something in the region of 55,000 RAF aircrew of Bomber Command were killed
in action in the war. I can't even begin to comprehend that loss, as many
died in six years of Bomber Command as there are currently in the RAF. Sadly
it's both terrible and tragic.

Jim Doyle

> Arthur Kramer
> 344th BG 494th BS
> England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
> Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
> http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer
>

[Mike Marron]

(ArtKramr) wrote:

>I think back to the war and the RAF heavies on their night missions. Missions
>flown in the winter usually were in atrocioius weather where there was no view
>of the gound and the sky above was overcast. There was no way to shoot at star
>fix or take a dirft reading from the ground. Working dead reckoning from
>England deep into Germany and any change in wind dorection or velocity that
>went undetected made dead reckoning navigation a hit and miss proposition.
>Often it was not just miss, it was gross miss. Knowing all this how could the
>RAF ever hope to pull off these winter night missions successfully? What was
>the logic that made them keep flying under these hopeless navigation
>conditions? Anyone know?

Welcome to the brass balls world of the intrepid freight dog,
barnstormer, firefighter, bush pilot, cropduster, etc.

Nothing mysterious here -- the Brits did it the same way the Yanks,
Canucks, Jerries and everyone else did it in crappy weather all over
the world (not just in Europe).

Latest weather report from the ol' teletype machine in hand, you
would launch into the nighttime "can't-see-****" conditions and fly on
instruments while staying on course via a variety of (potentially
deadly!) methods. Such methods included, but were not limited to:

1) Radioing other airplanes in the sky so they can take bearings on
your position or extend a trailing wire antenna and crank the Gibson
Girl (emergency transmitters originally developed by the Luftwaffe)
and navigate via direction-finding equipment and your not-so-trusty
mag compass, and...

2) When push came to shove, descend below the clouds to treetop
level (this, now THIS took "mas grande cajones!") and wander
back and forth across a course you "assume" to be correct while
taking fixes as quickly as possible while hedgehopping to indicate of
any deviations off-course while simultaneously scanning for possible
marker flares or fires from your comrades on the ground before
climbing back up into the soup and continuing on to your target.

[M. J. Powell]

In message >, Jim Doyle
> writes

snip
>
>... if only it worked! British tactics against Germany were optimised to the
>conditions of the day, with the subsequent development of nav aids, dead
>reckoning was superseded and bombing became much more accurate and
>aggressive.
>
>In the latter stages of the war, in my opinion, Area Bombing became
>unjustifiable before it ceased. Dresden is a prime example, though there are
>many who believe this to be a show of strength to the Russians, it just
>simply didn't deserve the tremendous volume of bombs metered out.

>Letter to the Sunday Telegraph. I forgot to note the date.
>
>As a correspondent pointed out, Dresden was bombed because it was a
>military target. (Letters Feb 20). The city's destiny was sealed at the
>Yalta conference (on Feb 4 1945) and, as Winston Churchill's
>interpreter, I heard and watched Stalin with his deputy Chief of Staff,
>General Antonov, urgently ask us to bomb roads and railways to stop
>Hitler transferring divisions from the West. Antonov stressed the
>importance of Dresden as a vital rail junction, saying there was a
"uzel
>svyazi" - literally, "communications knot".
>
>Churchill and Roosevelt had to agree as they were indebted to Stalin
for
>relieving pressure on our front during the German Ardennes winter
>counter-offensive.
>

Mike
--
M.J.Powell

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: How did the Brits do it?
>From: "Keith Willshaw"
>Date: 3/10/04 6:44 AM Pacific Standard Time
>Message-id: >
>
>
>"ArtKramr" > wrote in message
...
>> I think back to the war and the RAF heavies on their night missions.
>Missions
>> flown in the winter usually were in atrocioius weather where there was no
>view
>> of the gound and the sky above was overcast. There was no way to shoot at
>star
>> fix or take a dirft reading from the ground. Working dead reckoning from
>> England deep into Germany and any change in wind dorection or velocity
>that
>> went undetected made dead reckoning navigation a hit and miss
>proposition.
>> Often it was not just miss, it was gross miss. Knowing all this how could
>the
>> RAF ever hope to pull off these winter night missions successfully? What
>was
>> the logic that made them keep flying under these hopeless navigation
>> conditions? Anyone know?
>>
>
>This is a complex subject and a matter of some controversy
>but unusually these days is on topic so I'll give it a go.
>
>The RAF began the war in 1939 with a plan that envisaged
>daylight precision bombing of military targets only. Unfortunately
>catastrophic losses on early raids, 50% and higher, proved this
>to be impossible. It was quite impossible politically and from
>a morale point of view to simply stop bombing the Germans
>This was especially true after the Blitz.
>
>An attempt was made to use the techniques you describe
>to bomb at night and the results as you would expect were
>very mixed. In 1940 raids were mainly aimed at the invasion
>barges in French and Belgian Ports and these being relatively
>easy to locate at night results were acceptable.
>
>However as targets deep in Germany were attacked it was evident
>that the expected results were not being delivered.
>
>An official report commissioned by the war office from the
>economist David Miles Bensusan-Butt revealed that bombing
>was shockingly inaccurate. Churchill recognised the importance
>of the report - "this is a very serious paper and seems to
>require urgent attention" and temporarily suspended bombing while
>a solution was sought. This was to consist of four parts
>
>1) The adoption of better navigational aids
>2) Better crew training
>3) Larger better equipped 4 engined bombers
>4) A switch of tactics
>
>Essentially the RAF decided that if they couldnt hit precision targets
>then they would switch to targetting things they couldnt miss,
>this was area bombing. The idea being that if you couldnt
>hit the arms factory in the city you'd settle for flattening the
>entire metropolis.
>
>As the war progressed navigational aids like Gee and Oboe along
>with Radar aids like H2S and the use of Pathfinders did improve
>accuracy a great deal so that by 1944 the RAF were able to
>atatck and obliterate targets varying from troop concentrations
>in Normandy to entire cities.
>
>Keith
>
>
Of course Gee Box and Oboe came very late in the war. I flew a number of Gee
missions as the war drew to a close. But how anyone can do long range dead
reckoning when wind drift and velocity cannot be reliably determined, with no
view of the stars or gound, makes things a bit hopeless. But I would say that
90% or more of those missions were flown without any electronic or radar aids
at all. . Every time I think of those guys up there I am in awe of their
incredible courage and determination under near impossible conditions. BTW, did
they even carry driftmeters?




Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: How did the Brits do it?
>From: "Jim Doyle"
>Date: 3/10/04 7:41 AM Pacific Standard Time
>Message-id:

>Something in the region of 55,000 RAF aircrew of Bomber Command were killed
>in action in the war. I can't even begin to comprehend that loss, as many
>died in six years of Bomber Command as there are currently in the RAF. Sadly
>it's both terrible and tragic.
>
>Jim Doyle


Their heroism is beyond comprehension. and rarely equalled in the annals of
war. To take off on a mission knowing how small the odds were that you would
ever return takes the ultimate in courage..


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[Keith Willshaw]

"ArtKramr" > wrote in message
...
> >Subject: Re: How did the Brits do it?
> >From: "Keith Willshaw"
> >Date: 3/10/04 6:44 AM Pacific Standard Time
> >Message-id: >
> >
> >
> >"ArtKramr" > wrote in message
> ...
> >> I think back to the war and the RAF heavies on their night missions.
> >Missions
> >> flown in the winter usually were in atrocioius weather where there was
no
> >view
> >> of the gound and the sky above was overcast. There was no way to shoot
at
> >star
> >> fix or take a dirft reading from the ground. Working dead reckoning
from
> >> England deep into Germany and any change in wind dorection or velocity
> >that
> >> went undetected made dead reckoning navigation a hit and miss
> >proposition.
> >> Often it was not just miss, it was gross miss. Knowing all this how
could
> >the
> >> RAF ever hope to pull off these winter night missions successfully?
What
> >was
> >> the logic that made them keep flying under these hopeless navigation
> >> conditions? Anyone know?
> >>
> >
> >This is a complex subject and a matter of some controversy
> >but unusually these days is on topic so I'll give it a go.
> >
> >The RAF began the war in 1939 with a plan that envisaged
> >daylight precision bombing of military targets only. Unfortunately
> >catastrophic losses on early raids, 50% and higher, proved this
> >to be impossible. It was quite impossible politically and from
> >a morale point of view to simply stop bombing the Germans
> >This was especially true after the Blitz.
> >
> >An attempt was made to use the techniques you describe
> >to bomb at night and the results as you would expect were
> >very mixed. In 1940 raids were mainly aimed at the invasion
> >barges in French and Belgian Ports and these being relatively
> >easy to locate at night results were acceptable.
> >
> >However as targets deep in Germany were attacked it was evident
> >that the expected results were not being delivered.
> >
> >An official report commissioned by the war office from the
> >economist David Miles Bensusan-Butt revealed that bombing
> >was shockingly inaccurate. Churchill recognised the importance
> >of the report - "this is a very serious paper and seems to
> >require urgent attention" and temporarily suspended bombing while
> >a solution was sought. This was to consist of four parts
> >
> >1) The adoption of better navigational aids
> >2) Better crew training
> >3) Larger better equipped 4 engined bombers
> >4) A switch of tactics
> >
> >Essentially the RAF decided that if they couldnt hit precision targets
> >then they would switch to targetting things they couldnt miss,
> >this was area bombing. The idea being that if you couldnt
> >hit the arms factory in the city you'd settle for flattening the
> >entire metropolis.
> >
> >As the war progressed navigational aids like Gee and Oboe along
> >with Radar aids like H2S and the use of Pathfinders did improve
> >accuracy a great deal so that by 1944 the RAF were able to
> >atatck and obliterate targets varying from troop concentrations
> >in Normandy to entire cities.
> >
> >Keith
> >
> >
> Of course Gee Box and Oboe came very late in the war. I flew a number of
Gee
> missions as the war drew to a close. But how anyone can do long range
dead
> reckoning when wind drift and velocity cannot be reliably determined, with
no
> view of the stars or gound, makes things a bit hopeless. But I would say
that
> 90% or more of those missions were flown without any electronic or radar
aids
> at all.

Not really Art

Bomber command flew its first mission using Gee in late 1941.

On March 3 1942 the first major raid that utilised gee equipped
aircraft dropping flares for the main force was made against the
Renault works at Billancourt in France. 223 of 235 aircraft
found their target). Losses were very light (one Wellington was lost)
, and damage was evaluated as 'heavy'

By mid summer 1942 almost all BC aircraft had Gee. H2S began
arriving in service in 1943.

> Every time I think of those guys up there I am in awe of their
> incredible courage and determination under near impossible conditions.
BTW, did
> they even carry driftmeters?
>

Sure but how useful they were on a dark and cloudy night
is another matter.

Keith

[OXMORON1]

Kieth noted in response to Art's question about driftmeters on Bomber Command
A/C:
>Sure but how useful they were on a dark and cloudy night
>is another matter.

As long as it was overcast not clouds below, it is/was amazing how much info
you could get from one of those suckers.
One light on the ground or the reflection off of one body of water (pond, lake,
stream) provided something to work with as opposed to nothing.
Gee and H2S were a great improvement to accuracy.
It is one pain in the rear to shoot celestial in an a/c bouncing and bucking
around in Northern European skys.

Rick Clark

[Jim Doyle]

"M. J. Powell" > wrote in message
...
> In message >, Jim Doyle
> > writes
>
> snip
> >
> >... if only it worked! British tactics against Germany were optimised to
the
> >conditions of the day, with the subsequent development of nav aids, dead
> >reckoning was superseded and bombing became much more accurate and
> >aggressive.
> >
> >In the latter stages of the war, in my opinion, Area Bombing became
> >unjustifiable before it ceased. Dresden is a prime example, though there
are
> >many who believe this to be a show of strength to the Russians, it just
> >simply didn't deserve the tremendous volume of bombs metered out.
>
> Letter to the Sunday Telegraph. I forgot to note the date.
>
> As a correspondent pointed out, Dresden was bombed because it was a
> military target. (Letters Feb 20). The city's destiny was sealed at the
> Yalta conference (on Feb 4 1945) and, as Winston Churchill's
> interpreter, I heard and watched Stalin with his deputy Chief of Staff,
> General Antonov, urgently ask us to bomb roads and railways to stop
> Hitler transferring divisions from the West. Antonov stressed the
> importance of Dresden as a vital rail junction, saying there was a
> "uzel svyazi" - literally, "communications knot".
>
> Churchill and Roosevelt had to agree as they were indebted to Stalin
> for relieving pressure on our front during the German Ardennes winter
counter-offensive.

Dresden posed a military threat, granted.

The horrific firestorm created by the incendiaries and napalm killed 100,000
civilians - 1 in 6 of the inhabitants (given there were a large number of
refugees fleeing the advancing Red Army). The message was clear to Stalin,
even if the assault was at his request.

>
> Mike
> --
> M.J.Powell

[ArtKramr]

>>As the war progressed navigational aids like Gee and Oboe along
>> >with Radar aids like H2S and the use of Pathfinders did improve
>> >accuracy a great deal so that by 1944 the RAF were able to
>> >atatck and obliterate targets varying from troop concentrations
>> >in Normandy to entire cities.
>> >
>> >Keith
>> >
>> >
>> Of course Gee Box and Oboe came very late in the war. I flew a number of
>Gee
>> missions as the war drew to a close. But how anyone can do long range
>dead
>> reckoning when wind drift and velocity cannot be reliably determined, with
>no
>> view of the stars or gound, makes things a bit hopeless. But I would say
>that
>> 90% or more of those missions were flown without any electronic or radar
>aids
>> at all.
>
>Not really Art
>
>Bomber command flew its first mission using Gee in late 1941.
>
>On March 3 1942 the first major raid that utilised gee equipped
>aircraft dropping flares for the main force was made against the
>Renault works at Billancourt in France. 223 of 235 aircraft
>found their target). Losses were very light (one Wellington was lost)
>, and damage was evaluated as 'heavy'
>
>By mid summer 1942 almost all BC aircraft had Gee. H2S began
>arriving in service in 1943.
>


We didn't get Gee until late in 1944 when we flew our first Gee mission..Hated
it because we couldn't see the damage we had (or had not) done. I remember the
briefing before the first Gee mission. we were ttoldf the Germans knew nothing
about Gee. On our first mission we got German jamming grass over our scopes.
Not too efficient because we could still see the blips and complete the mission
ok.


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: How did the Brits do it?
>From: (OXMORON1)
>Date: 3/10/04 12:15 PM Pacific Standard Time
>Message-id: >
>
>Kieth noted in response to Art's question about driftmeters on Bomber Command
>A/C:
>>Sure but how useful they were on a dark and cloudy night
>>is another matter.
>
>As long as it was overcast not clouds below, it is/was amazing how much info
>you could get from one of those suckers.
>One light on the ground or the reflection off of one body of water (pond,
>lake,
>stream) provided something to work with as opposed to nothing.
>Gee and H2S were a great improvement to accuracy.
>It is one pain in the rear to shoot celestial in an a/c bouncing and bucking
>around in Northern European skys.
>
>Rick Clark
>
Exactly, If you could see a glimmer of anything on the ground you could grab
off a drift reading. Of course the best driftmeter was the Norden bombsight.But
you had to be in the nose to use it. If you were in the nav compartment there
was no way you could get a drift reading You were blind. I always wondered why
they didn't put a driftmeter in the nav compartment. Nothing fancy any simple
driftmeter was better than none. Flying along with no idea of where the wind
was blowing you was not a good feeling.




Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[Keith Willshaw]

"ArtKramr" > wrote in message
...

>
> We didn't get Gee until late in 1944 when we flew our first Gee
mission..Hated
> it because we couldn't see the damage we had (or had not) done. I remember
the
> briefing before the first Gee mission. we were ttoldf the Germans knew
nothing
> about Gee. On our first mission we got German jamming grass over our
scopes.
> Not too efficient because we could still see the blips and complete the
mission
> ok.
>

It would be a matter of priorities, the night bombers got Gee first
because they needed it more and the Pathfinder Squadrons had
priority within Bomber Command

Keith

[David Windhorst]

How did nighttime losses compare to daylight? I've googled a couple
strings looking for both RAF and 8th AF etc. stats, but so far all I've
found are some general statements that, as German nightfighter weapons
and tactics improved, the percentages became roughtly comparable.

[ArtKramr]

>ubject: Re: How did the Brits do it?
>From: "Emmanuel Gustin"
>Date: 3/10/04 2:51 PM Pacific Standard Time
>Message-id: >
>
>"ArtKramr" > wrote in message
...
>
>> We didn't get Gee until late in 1944 when we flew our first Gee
>mission..Hated
>> it because we couldn't see the damage we had (or had not) done. I remember
>the
>> briefing before the first Gee mission. we were ttoldf the Germans knew
>nothing
>> about Gee. On our first mission we got German jamming grass over our
>scopes.
>
>It is even worse: The Germans were using GEE well before
>you were. For 'Steinbock', the German bombing offensive
>against Britain in the first four months of 1944, German
>bombers were equipped with GEE receivers, either salvaged
>from British bombers ('Hyperbel') or German-made ('Truhe').
>That close to the transmitters, GEE signals were of course
>hardly affected by German jamming. The British were unaware
>of it until they discovered oddly familiar-looking equipment
>in a shot-down German bomber...
>
>'Steinbock' was a failure nevertheless, the RAF's nightfighter
>defenses were too strong.
>
>--
>Emmanuel Gustin
>Emmanuel.Gustin -rem@ve- skynet dot be
>Flying Guns Page: http://users.skynet.be/Emmanuel.Gustin/
>
>

Interesting. Do you know where the German Gee transmitters were located? Were
there also three of them?


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[M. J. Powell]

In message >, Jim Doyle
> writes
>
>"M. J. Powell" > wrote in message
...
>> In message >, Jim Doyle
>> > writes
>>
>> snip
>> >
>> >... if only it worked! British tactics against Germany were optimised to
>the
>> >conditions of the day, with the subsequent development of nav aids, dead
>> >reckoning was superseded and bombing became much more accurate and
>> >aggressive.
>> >
>> >In the latter stages of the war, in my opinion, Area Bombing became
>> >unjustifiable before it ceased. Dresden is a prime example, though there
>are
>> >many who believe this to be a show of strength to the Russians, it just
>> >simply didn't deserve the tremendous volume of bombs metered out.
>>
>> Letter to the Sunday Telegraph. I forgot to note the date.
>>
>> As a correspondent pointed out, Dresden was bombed because it was a
>> military target. (Letters Feb 20). The city's destiny was sealed at the
>> Yalta conference (on Feb 4 1945) and, as Winston Churchill's
>> interpreter, I heard and watched Stalin with his deputy Chief of Staff,
>> General Antonov, urgently ask us to bomb roads and railways to stop
>> Hitler transferring divisions from the West. Antonov stressed the
>> importance of Dresden as a vital rail junction, saying there was a
>> "uzel svyazi" - literally, "communications knot".
>>
>> Churchill and Roosevelt had to agree as they were indebted to Stalin
>> for relieving pressure on our front during the German Ardennes winter
>counter-offensive.
>
>Dresden posed a military threat, granted.
>
>The horrific firestorm created by the incendiaries and napalm killed 100,000
>civilians - 1 in 6 of the inhabitants (given there were a large number of
>refugees fleeing the advancing Red Army). The message was clear to Stalin,
>even if the assault was at his request.

I think he got the message much earlier, after Hamburg et al.

Mike
--
M.J.Powell

[M. J. Powell]

In message >, Keith Willshaw
> writes
>
>"ArtKramr" > wrote in message
...

Snip

>> Every time I think of those guys up there I am in awe of their
>> incredible courage and determination under near impossible conditions.
>BTW, did
>> they even carry driftmeters?
>>
>
>Sure but how useful they were on a dark and cloudy night
>is another matter.

The Dambusters dropped flare floats into the North Sea and got a drift
angle from the rear gunner.

After that they map read...

Mike
--
M.J.Powell

[M. J. Powell]

In message >, ArtKramr
> writes
>>> >
>
snip
>
>We didn't get Gee until late in 1944 when we flew our first Gee mission..Hated
>it because we couldn't see the damage we had (or had not) done. I remember the
>briefing before the first Gee mission. we were ttoldf the Germans knew nothing
>about Gee. On our first mission we got German jamming grass over our scopes.
>Not too efficient because we could still see the blips and complete the mission
>ok.

I used Gee III once, in a Javelin. Trouble was by the time I'd lined up
the pips and plotted onto a chart we were 60 miles further on...

450 knots does that.

Mike
--
M.J.Powell

[Keith Willshaw]

"David Windhorst" > wrote in message
...
> How did nighttime losses compare to daylight? I've googled a couple
> strings looking for both RAF and 8th AF etc. stats, but so far all I've
> found are some general statements that, as German nightfighter weapons
> and tactics improved, the percentages became roughtly comparable.
>

The only possible answer is that it varied depending on
when and where. The Berlin raids in late 1943 were
much more dangerous than raids on the Ruhr.

Over the course of the war I recall that loss rates for the
RAF and USAAF were approx the same. By late 44
and into 45 the RAF were making a lot of daylight raids too.

Keith

[ArtKramr]

>ubject: Re: How did the Brits do it?
>From: "M. J. Powell"
>Date: 3/10/04 3:14 PM Pacific Standard Time
>Message-id: >
>
>In message >, Keith Willshaw
> writes
>>
>>"ArtKramr" > wrote in message
...
>
>Snip
>
>>> Every time I think of those guys up there I am in awe of their
>>> incredible courage and determination under near impossible conditions.
>>BTW, did
>>> they even carry driftmeters?
>>>
>>
>>Sure but how useful they were on a dark and cloudy night
>>is another matter.
>
>The Dambusters dropped flare floats into the North Sea and got a drift
>angle from the rear gunner.
>
>After that they map read...
>
>Mike
>--
>M.J.Powell


Never saw a driftmeter I didn't love.


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: How did the Brits do it?
>From: "M. J. Powell"
>Date: 3/10/04 3:14 PM Pacific Standard Time
>Message-id: >
>
>In message >, ArtKramr
> writes
>>>> >
>>
>snip
>>
>>We didn't get Gee until late in 1944 when we flew our first Gee
>mission..Hated
>>it because we couldn't see the damage we had (or had not) done. I remember
>the
>>briefing before the first Gee mission. we were ttoldf the Germans knew
>nothing
>>about Gee. On our first mission we got German jamming grass over our scopes.
>>Not too efficient because we could still see the blips and complete the
>mission
>>ok.
>
>I used Gee III once, in a Javelin. Trouble was by the time I'd lined up
>the pips and plotted onto a chart we were 60 miles further on...
>
>450 knots does that.
>
>Mike
>--
>M.J.Powell


We didn't do it that way. when the pips came together it was bombs away and
g'bye Fritz.

..



Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: How did the Brits do it?
>From: "Emmanuel Gustin"
>Date: 3/10/04 4:15 PM Pacific Standard Time
>Message-id: >
>
>"ArtKramr" > wrote in message
...
>
>> Interesting. Do you know where the German Gee transmitters were located?
>Were
>> there also three of them?
>
>AFAIK they simply tuned their equipment to the British GEE
>transmitters! The basic Gee (unlike Gee-H) was not a transponder
>system, so they only needed the receiver to measure the phase
>shifts, and then Gee worked for the Luftwaffe as well as the RAF.
>
>The Allies did something similar with a German (naval) navigation
>system, which turned out to be so efficient that it survived the war
>a long time. Unlike Gee -- Wattson-Watt made an effort to have
>Gee adopted by airlines, but the American airlines were having
>none of it; it was too expensive and complicated to operate.
>
>--
>Emmanuel Gustin
>Emmanuel.Gustin -rem@ve- skynet dot be
>Flying Guns Page: http://users.skynet.be/Emmanuel.Gustin/
>
>


We didn't fly Gee until well after D-Day. I remember that we used three
transmitters. As I remember it there was one in southern France, another in
Denmark, Don't remember where the third one was. Do you know?


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[Krztalizer]

>We didn't get Gee until late in 1944 when we flew our first Gee
>mission..Hated
>it because we couldn't see the damage we had (or had not) done. I remember
>the
>briefing before the first Gee mission. we were ttoldf the Germans knew
>nothing
>about Gee.

Art that Intel Weinie was playing with you - the Germans knew enough about GEE
that by 1944, they had already lost more than one Luftwaffe aircraft that was
confirmed to carry a GEE reciever! One of the few times in WWII that both
sides were using a piece of the same electronic gear, for the same purpose.
They built "Rotterdam" / H2S duplicates as well.

v/r
Gordon

[Krztalizer]

>
>We didn't fly Gee until well after D-Day. I remember that we used three
>transmitters. As I remember it there was one in southern France, another
>in
>Denmark, Don't remember where the third one was. Do you know?

There were at least two in the UK and right on the heels of the invasion, if I
remember rightly, the Allies brought one ashore.

v/r
Gordon
<====(A+C====>
USN SAR

Donate your memories - write a note on the back and send your old photos to a
reputable museum, don't take them with you when you're gone.

[The CO]

"Emmanuel Gustin" > wrote in message
...

<snip>

> The Allies did something similar with a German (naval) navigation
> system, which turned out to be so efficient that it survived the war
> a long time.

First ever LORAN station.

It covered the Bay of Biscay and was heavily utilised by
RAF Coastal Command. They kept that site running for something like
30 years after the war. It was doubtless of more use to the Brits than
the Germans. IIRC, it was *intended* for use by U-Boats but it probably
contributed to the loss of more than it helped.

The Germans had functional radio nav aids that covered the British Isles
from the outset. Knickebein and (later) X-Gerat and Y-Gerat had to be
discovered and jamming methods worked out.
All the above is covered in great detail in "Most Secret War" by R.V.
Jones, WW2
head of scientific intelligence in Britain..

The CO

[Ragnar]

"ArtKramr" > wrote in message
...
> I think back to the war and the RAF heavies on their night missions.
Missions
> flown in the winter usually were in atrocioius weather where there was no
view
> of the gound and the sky above was overcast. There was no way to shoot at
star
> fix or take a dirft reading from the ground. Working dead reckoning from
> England deep into Germany and any change in wind dorection or velocity
that
> went undetected made dead reckoning navigation a hit and miss
proposition.
> Often it was not just miss, it was gross miss. Knowing all this how could
the
> RAF ever hope to pull off these winter night missions successfully? What
was
> the logic that made them keep flying under these hopeless navigation
> conditions? Anyone know?

The "logic" was simple. The Brits strategy was to drop bombs at night
regardless of whether or not the intended target was in sight Some targets
were missed entirely, but the bombs could cause terror instead, which was in
itself an objective.

[ArtKramr]

>Subject: Re: How did the Brits do it?
>From: (Krztalizer)
>Date: 3/10/04 4:41 PM Pacific Standard Time
>Message-id: >
>
>>We didn't get Gee until late in 1944 when we flew our first Gee
>>mission..Hated
>>it because we couldn't see the damage we had (or had not) done. I remember
>>the
>>briefing before the first Gee mission. we were ttoldf the Germans knew
>>nothing
>>about Gee.
>
>Art that Intel Weinie was playing with you - the Germans knew enough about
>GEE
>that by 1944, they had already lost more than one Luftwaffe aircraft that was
>confirmed to carry a GEE reciever! One of the few times in WWII that both
>sides were using a piece of the same electronic gear, for the same purpose.
>They built "Rotterdam" / H2S duplicates as well.
>
>v/r
>Gordon


The moment I saw all that grass jamming my screen I figured as much.
(grin)


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[rnf2]

On 10 Mar 2004 14:01:30 GMT, (ArtKramr) wrote:

>I think back to the war and the RAF heavies on their night missions. Missions
>flown in the winter usually were in atrocioius weather where there was no view
>of the gound and the sky above was overcast. There was no way to shoot at star
>fix or take a dirft reading from the ground. Working dead reckoning from
>England deep into Germany and any change in wind dorection or velocity that
>went undetected made dead reckoning navigation a hit and miss proposition.
>Often it was not just miss, it was gross miss. Knowing all this how could the
>RAF ever hope to pull off these winter night missions successfully? What was
>the logic that made them keep flying under these hopeless navigation
>conditions? Anyone know?
>
>
>Arthur Kramer
>344th BG 494th BS
> England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
>Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
>http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

One way used was radio direction finding nad measuing the angles on
the source of german propraganda broadcasts...

Lord Haw Haw was apparantly used a fair bit as he was begining his
nightly braodcasts to reach the british public on dark winter nights
as the bombers were crossing the channel :)

ironic isn't it... the germans providing their own targettign for the
brits :)

[M. J. Powell]

In message >, Glenfiddich
> writes
>On Thu, 11 Mar 2004 01:15:31 +0100, "Emmanuel Gustin"
> wrote:
>
>...
>>AFAIK they simply tuned their equipment to the British GEE
>>transmitters! The basic Gee (unlike Gee-H) was not a transponder
>>system, so they only needed the receiver to measure the phase
>>shifts, and then Gee worked for the Luftwaffe as well as the RAF.
>>
>>The Allies did something similar with a German (naval) navigation
>>system, which turned out to be so efficient that it survived the war
>>a long time. Unlike Gee -- Wattson-Watt made an effort to have
>>Gee adopted by airlines, but the American airlines were having
>>none of it; it was too expensive and complicated to operate.
>
>Are you refering to the Decca Navigator system?
>I thought that was a development of GEE.

He's referring to 'Sonne', a neat system which needed only an ordinary
receiver and a stop-watch. It was a 'counting dots' system. It was later
developed as 'Consol', a neat pun.
The last transmitter was at Stavanger in Norway and went off the air in
about 1955 IIRC.
The system only gave a position line but with about 1 or 2 degrees
accuracy.
>
>It may not have been adopted by US airlines, but was commecially used
>in the UK - and by the RAF.
>And their later moving map display was very simple to fly.
>
>DN was also very popular with fishing vessels,
>as it let them *accurately return to a favourite spot.

A demonstration I saw in a film allowed a fishing boat to return to
harbour and actually pass between the moles without the helmsman seeing
out of the wheelhouse.

Mike
--
M.J.Powell

[M. J. Powell]

In message >, rnf2
> writes

snip

>One way used was radio direction finding nad measuing the angles on
>the source of german propraganda broadcasts...
>
>Lord Haw Haw was apparantly used a fair bit as he was begining his
>nightly braodcasts to reach the british public on dark winter nights
>as the bombers were crossing the channel :)
>
>ironic isn't it... the germans providing their own targettign for the
>brits :)

The Germans shut down their B/C transmitters in groups as the bomber
stream passed over. This allowed the high power transmitter Aspidestra
at Crowborough (800 kW) to butt in on their frequency and play dance
tunes and relay false news programmes. Sefton Delmer 'Black Propaganda'.

Mike
--
M.J.Powell

[David Lesher]

(Krztalizer) writes:

>They built "Rotterdam" / H2S duplicates as well.

H2S was forbidden over land for quite a while. It was vital to the
Uboat campaign and the boffins figured that if used over Germany,
one *would* be captured and the secret blown. [There was no way to
destroy the magnatron w/o taking out the aircraft as well....]

They were right.
--
A host is a host from coast to
& no one will talk to a host that's close........[v].(301) 56-LINUX
Unless the host (that isn't close).........................pob 1433
is busy, hung or dead....................................20915-1433

[David Lesher]

rnf2 > writes:


>One way used was radio direction finding nad measuing the angles on
>the source of german propraganda broadcasts...

DF on known emitters is an old ploy. You can tell where YOU are, or
where IT is. That was why Eisenhower's SHAEF transmitter was in the
area of Patton's First US Army Group.

There was also one German navaid that was not jammed but spoofed; a
receiver at one end of England listened to the modulated German
transmitter. The audio went across Britain to where a transmitter
on the same frequency rebroadcast it. Since the UK transmitter
was closer to the bomber.......

--
A host is a host from coast to
& no one will talk to a host that's close........[v].(301) 56-LINUX
Unless the host (that isn't close).........................pob 1433
is busy, hung or dead....................................20915-1433

[Guy Alcala]

David Lesher wrote:

> (Krztalizer) writes:
>
> >They built "Rotterdam" / H2S duplicates as well.
>
> H2S was forbidden over land for quite a while. It was vital to the
> Uboat campaign and the boffins figured that if used over Germany,
> one *would* be captured and the secret blown. [There was no way to
> destroy the magnatron w/o taking out the aircraft as well....]

That argument was made by the RN/Coastal Command, but Bomber Command
won the decision (by Churchill), and H2S went into service over land
right away. And a more or less intact magnetron was captured on one of
the very first missions, from a Stirling shot down near/over Rotterdam
(whence its German code name, Rotterdam Gerate) on 2 February 1943.

Guy

[The CO]

"David Lesher" > wrote in message
...
> rnf2 > writes:

> There was also one German navaid that was not jammed but spoofed; a
> receiver at one end of England listened to the modulated German
> transmitter. The audio went across Britain to where a transmitter
> on the same frequency rebroadcast it. Since the UK transmitter
> was closer to the bomber.......

Operation "Domino"
This was Y-Gerat (Y-Device) or Wotan II. The transmitter used was the
old 1930's Baird TV
transmitter at Alexandra Palace. It was a very effective
countermeasure. Wotan was the Norse god
with only one eye (one beam). It was also known as 'Benito'.
Basically the Y-Gerat worked by transmitting a single beam with Lorenz
characteristics, morse dots
received if you were on one side of the beam, dashes on the other and an
equisignal of continuous tone
if you were in the centre of the beam and on course. The bomb release
point was done by means of a
kind of remote Distance Measuring Equipment, in that a signal was sent
to a transponder in the aircraft and
a response returned, by measuring the delay between transmission of the
interrogation pulse and reception
of the response it was possible to calculate the distance fairly
accurately. A signal was sent to the aircraft to
release the bombs at the correct point allowing for altitude, speed and
distance to target etc.
The countermeasure involved intercepting the aircraft transponder signal
and retransmitting it through the
TV transmitter, which caused a false distance reading.

The earlier Knickebein (crooked leg) 2 beam system and the multi beam
X-gerat (X-device) had already
been countered. The loss of these was actually quite a blow, as the
later Y-Gerat was only capable
of handling one aircraft at a time, whereas Knickebein was in every
bomber. The Germans created a "Pathfinder"
force of their own, KG100, to use it.
Knickebein worked on the normal Lorenz frequencies around 30mhz and the
first jammers (code name 'Aspirin'
to counter the beams which were code named 'Headache') were actually
medical diathermy units which produced
powerful broadband noise.


The CO

[Ganton Pretz]

David Lesher > wrote in message >...

> (Krztalizer) writes:
>
> >They built "Rotterdam" / H2S duplicates as well.
>
> H2S was forbidden over land for quite a while. It was vital to the
> Uboat campaign and the boffins figured that if used over Germany,
> one *would* be captured and the secret blown. [There was no way to
> destroy the magnatron w/o taking out the aircraft as well....]
>
> They were right.


If it was that vital they would not have used it. The people who
'defined' vital were trying to bomb Germany. Oddly enough it was
Bomber Harris who appreciated that bombing U-Boat yards and basses was
a complete waste of effort.

The Germans were scammed into thinking their Metox boxes were leaking
radiation which were being used to track them. It was a technical
possibility and so they bought into it. That delayed the development
of a H2S detector (Naxos).

[Andrew Chaplin]

Ganton Pretz wrote:
>
> If it was that vital they would not have used it. The people who
> 'defined' vital were trying to bomb Germany. Oddly enough it was
> Bomber Harris who appreciated that bombing U-Boat yards and basses was
> a complete waste of effort.
>
> The Germans were scammed into thinking their Metox boxes were leaking
> radiation which were being used to track them. It was a technical
> possibility and so they bought into it. That delayed the development
> of a H2S detector (Naxos).

What did "H2S" stand for, anyway. (Sounds like dihydrogen sulphide to
me.) Sorry if it has already been posted, I missed that part of the
thread.
--
Andrew Chaplin
SIT MIHI GLADIUS SICUT SANCTO MARTINO
(If you're going to e-mail me, you'll have to get "yourfinger." out.)

[Keith Willshaw]

"Andrew Chaplin" > wrote in message
...
> Ganton Pretz wrote:
> >
> > If it was that vital they would not have used it. The people who
> > 'defined' vital were trying to bomb Germany. Oddly enough it was
> > Bomber Harris who appreciated that bombing U-Boat yards and basses was
> > a complete waste of effort.
> >
> > The Germans were scammed into thinking their Metox boxes were leaking
> > radiation which were being used to track them. It was a technical
> > possibility and so they bought into it. That delayed the development
> > of a H2S detector (Naxos).
>
> What did "H2S" stand for, anyway. (Sounds like dihydrogen sulphide to
> me.) Sorry if it has already been posted, I missed that part of the
> thread.

There are at least versions of the story about the naming of the radar

1) Its original name was "Home Sweet Home" which was shortened
to H2S

2) Its original name was TF (for Town Finder) but a different
code name was required and an RAF type suggested
'H2S because it stinks'


Keith

[Ganton Pretz]

"Keith Willshaw" > wrote in message >...
> "ArtKramr" > wrote in message
> ...
> > >Subject: Re: How did the Brits do it?
> > >From: "Keith Willshaw"
> > >Date: 3/10/04 6:44 AM Pacific Standard Time
> > >Message-id: >
> > >
> > >
> > >"ArtKramr" > wrote in message
> > ...
> > >> I think back to the war and the RAF heavies on their night missions.
> Missions
> > >> flown in the winter usually were in atrocioius weather where there was
> no
> view
> > >> of the gound and the sky above was overcast. There was no way to shoot
> at
> star
> > >> fix or take a dirft reading from the ground. Working dead reckoning
> from
> > >> England deep into Germany and any change in wind dorection or velocity
> that
> > >> went undetected made dead reckoning navigation a hit and miss
> proposition.
> > >> Often it was not just miss, it was gross miss. Knowing all this how
> could
> the
> > >> RAF ever hope to pull off these winter night missions successfully?
> What
> was
> > >> the logic that made them keep flying under these hopeless navigation
> > >> conditions? Anyone know?
> > >>
> > >
> > >This is a complex subject and a matter of some controversy
> > >but unusually these days is on topic so I'll give it a go.
> > >
> > >The RAF began the war in 1939 with a plan that envisaged
> > >daylight precision bombing of military targets only. Unfortunately
> > >catastrophic losses on early raids, 50% and higher, proved this
> > >to be impossible. It was quite impossible politically and from
> > >a morale point of view to simply stop bombing the Germans
> > >This was especially true after the Blitz.
> > >
> > >An attempt was made to use the techniques you describe
> > >to bomb at night and the results as you would expect were
> > >very mixed. In 1940 raids were mainly aimed at the invasion
> > >barges in French and Belgian Ports and these being relatively
> > >easy to locate at night results were acceptable.
> > >
> > >However as targets deep in Germany were attacked it was evident
> > >that the expected results were not being delivered.
> > >
> > >An official report commissioned by the war office from the
> > >economist David Miles Bensusan-Butt revealed that bombing
> > >was shockingly inaccurate. Churchill recognised the importance
> > >of the report - "this is a very serious paper and seems to
> > >require urgent attention" and temporarily suspended bombing while
> > >a solution was sought. This was to consist of four parts
> > >
> > >1) The adoption of better navigational aids
> > >2) Better crew training
> > >3) Larger better equipped 4 engined bombers
> > >4) A switch of tactics
> > >
> > >Essentially the RAF decided that if they couldnt hit precision targets
> > >then they would switch to targetting things they couldnt miss,
> > >this was area bombing. The idea being that if you couldnt
> > >hit the arms factory in the city you'd settle for flattening the
> > >entire metropolis.
> > >
> > >As the war progressed navigational aids like Gee and Oboe along
> > >with Radar aids like H2S and the use of Pathfinders did improve
> > >accuracy a great deal so that by 1944 the RAF were able to
> > >atatck and obliterate targets varying from troop concentrations
> > >in Normandy to entire cities.
> > >
> > >Keith
> > >
> > >
> > Of course Gee Box and Oboe came very late in the war. I flew a number of
> Gee
> > missions as the war drew to a close. But how anyone can do long range
> dead
> > reckoning when wind drift and velocity cannot be reliably determined, with
> no
> > view of the stars or gound, makes things a bit hopeless. But I would say
> that
> > 90% or more of those missions were flown without any electronic or radar
> aids
> > at all.
>
> Not really Art
>
> Bomber command flew its first mission using Gee in late 1941.
>
> On March 3 1942 the first major raid that utilised gee equipped
> aircraft dropping flares for the main force was made against the
> Renault works at Billancourt in France. 223 of 235 aircraft
> found their target). Losses were very light (one Wellington was lost)
> , and damage was evaluated as 'heavy'


I don't really think they put that factory out of action. As you say
they needed to physically illuminate the target.


>
> By mid summer 1942 almost all BC aircraft had Gee. H2S began
> arriving in service in 1943.


Knowing where one actually is and bombing accurately are related
issues but strictly speaking quite different.

GEE put a bomber in the general place it wanted to bomb and most of
the bombs might just do a bit of damage to something in the same town.