Is there a place for Traditional CAS in the 21st century?

[Charles Gray]

To put it a different way, the model of a A-10 style aircraft,
equipped with cannon and guns, providing close air support and
anti-armor firepower to the troops?
Or have things changed enought (cheap PGM's, UCAV's, etc) to where
that model is more along the line of a Battleship in 1945-- no matter
how effective at its job, there are now things that can do the job
just as well or better, and are more flexible to boot?

[Kevin Brooks]

"Charles Gray" > wrote in message
...
> To put it a different way, the model of a A-10 style aircraft,
> equipped with cannon and guns, providing close air support and
> anti-armor firepower to the troops?
> Or have things changed enought (cheap PGM's, UCAV's, etc) to where
> that model is more along the line of a Battleship in 1945-- no matter
> how effective at its job, there are now things that can do the job
> just as well or better, and are more flexible to boot?

You might take your answer from the USAF. They are planning now to upgrade a
number of A-10's for continued service, since the F-35A/B's won't be
available in operational strength until sometime early in the next decade.
So they definitely see a place for the A-10 in the "CAS toolbox" for the
immediate future.

Yes, the CAS mission has seen significant changes over the past decade or
so, with affordable, versatile PGM's bringing aircraft that were never
really before thought of as major CAS players into the mix. Note the use of
the word "mix"; the major watchword for now and in the foreseeable future is
"versatility", and to ensure they can acheive that the USAF will field a
wide range of assets that can perform CAS missions. Their recent decision to
pursue the STOVL F-35B variant as part of their JSF buy is another example
of seeking greater versatility for the force as a whole. Likewise, many of
these same platforms will also be capable of performing BAI, or RESCAP, etc.
All contributing to greater versatility, both in regards to the individual
components and the entire force.

Brooks

[Cub Driver]

I'm sure the army would like a replacement for the A-10, but it's not
going to get one. Given the difficulties combat helicopters have had
in the past year, both in the Iraq invasion and with the Pentagon,
they're not going to be a substitute. So it looks like the army will
have to get along with a combination of dumbed-down fighter planes,
its own helos, and (most promising of all) UAVs.

On Thu, 11 Mar 2004 20:37:51 GMT, Charles Gray > wrote:

>To put it a different way, the model of a A-10 style aircraft,
>equipped with cannon and guns, providing close air support and
>anti-armor firepower to the troops?
> Or have things changed enought (cheap PGM's, UCAV's, etc) to where
>that model is more along the line of a Battleship in 1945-- no matter
>how effective at its job, there are now things that can do the job
>just as well or better, and are more flexible to boot?

all the best -- Dan Ford
email: (requires authentication)

see the Warbird's Forum at www.warbirdforum.com
and the Piper Cub Forum at www.pipercubforum.com

[Paul J. Adam]

In message >, Charles Gray
> writes
>To put it a different way, the model of a A-10 style aircraft,
>equipped with cannon and guns, providing close air support and
>anti-armor firepower to the troops?

Yes, just as there's a place for the AC-130 and similar aircraft. The
A-10 isn't using the GAU-8A as a primary weapon (and never has in
action) but does find it useful on a number of occasions where mission
requires and threat permits.

Ideally the A-10 would be replaced by something with less gun (maybe a
25mm rotary or 27mm Mauser), less armour (resisting AAA is one thing,
but SAMs do most of the killing), more speed and power, and more
countermeasures. Oddly enough, that's a good pencil sketch of the JSF :)

> Or have things changed enought (cheap PGM's, UCAV's, etc) to where
>that model is more along the line of a Battleship in 1945-- no matter
>how effective at its job, there are now things that can do the job
>just as well or better, and are more flexible to boot?

I wouldn't be that hard on the A-10 (even if I do attack some of the
more enthusiastic claims made for it). It doesn't have the battleship's
"prestige" connotations making losses headline news (no more so than any
other air asset, anyway), nor the peculiarly high costs (IIRC it's
relatively cheap to fly and maintain, always a survival aid :) ).

If you want a warship analogy, it's more like a cruiser than a
battleship in 1945: cheap enough to keep, versatile enough to still be
useful for a while, and handy to have until a replacement comes on line.

The A-10 isn't survivable in a high-threat environment, but there aren't
many of those and the likely ones can be reduced or suppressed enough to
let it be used. Since it's bought and paid for, still has a number of
uses, and still has a fair bit of life left in the airframes, why throw
it away?

--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBox<at>jrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

[Guy Alcala]

"Paul J. Adam" wrote:

> In message >, Charles Gray
> > writes
> >To put it a different way, the model of a A-10 style aircraft,
> >equipped with cannon and guns, providing close air support and
> >anti-armor firepower to the troops?
>
> Yes, just as there's a place for the AC-130 and similar aircraft. The
> A-10 isn't using the GAU-8A as a primary weapon (and never has in
> action) but does find it useful on a number of occasions where mission
> requires and threat permits.

<snip>

I don't think you want to make such a blanket statement about the GAU-8,
Paul. From the April 14th, 2003 AvLeak, article "Beyond Baghdad", by Robert
Wall:

"One of the primary aircraft used over Baghdad has been the Air Force's
A-10, which operates more than 50 of them from a base here [in Kuwait] and a
site in southern Iraq [almost certainly Tallil]. 'The A-10s provide the
surgical weaponry required for successful urban close air support,' said
Col. Cesar Rodriguez, operations officer for the 332 Air Expeditionary
Wing. The aircraft's 30-mm gun is the primary weapon, although
infrared-guided AGM-65G-2 Mavericks are also frequently being employed."

Not a direct quote, but presumably Wall was paraphrasing what Rodriguez or
others had told him. Certainly the gun was widely used in Baghdad.

Guy

[N9NWO]

Paul J. Adam wrote:
> In message >, Charles Gray
> > writes
>
>>To put it a different way, the model of a A-10 style aircraft,
>>equipped with cannon and guns, providing close air support and
>>anti-armor firepower to the troops?
>
>
> Yes, just as there's a place for the AC-130 and similar aircraft. The
> A-10 isn't using the GAU-8A as a primary weapon (and never has in
> action) but does find it useful on a number of occasions where mission
> requires and threat permits.
>
> Ideally the A-10 would be replaced by something with less gun (maybe a
> 25mm rotary or 27mm Mauser), less armour (resisting AAA is one thing,
> but SAMs do most of the killing), more speed and power, and more
> countermeasures. Oddly enough, that's a good pencil sketch of the JSF :)

The F-35 is suppose to now have the GAU-12, 25mm, gun
that was on the AV-8B Harrier. This is the same round
that is used by the Army with M242 Bushmaster on the
Bradley APC and by the Navy with the Mk 38 AMG.

It is thought that other systems are replaced, the 25mm
will become the primary light cannon round. Thus the Navy
CIWS (Phalanx) may migrate towards this round with newer
ships (ie DD-X).


>
>> Or have things changed enought (cheap PGM's, UCAV's, etc) to where
>>that model is more along the line of a Battleship in 1945-- no matter
>>how effective at its job, there are now things that can do the job
>>just as well or better, and are more flexible to boot?
>
>
> I wouldn't be that hard on the A-10 (even if I do attack some of the
> more enthusiastic claims made for it). It doesn't have the battleship's
> "prestige" connotations making losses headline news (no more so than any
> other air asset, anyway), nor the peculiarly high costs (IIRC it's
> relatively cheap to fly and maintain, always a survival aid :) ).
>
> If you want a warship analogy, it's more like a cruiser than a
> battleship in 1945: cheap enough to keep, versatile enough to still be
> useful for a while, and handy to have until a replacement comes on line.
>
> The A-10 isn't survivable in a high-threat environment, but there aren't
> many of those and the likely ones can be reduced or suppressed enough to
> let it be used. Since it's bought and paid for, still has a number of
> uses, and still has a fair bit of life left in the airframes, why throw
> it away?
>

[Thomas Schoene]

N9NWO wrote:
> It is thought that other systems are replaced, the 25mm
> will become the primary light cannon round. Thus the Navy
> CIWS (Phalanx) may migrate towards this round with newer
> ships (ie DD-X).

There have been plenty of proposals for 25mm versions of Phalanx, but not
much interest from the Navy. They figure than if a maginal increase in
capability is needed, the 20mm Enhanced Lethality Cartridge could be
reinstated. It's always been reported as having the same effectiveness as a
conventional 25mm sabot round.

In general, however, the Navy is migrating to no gun-based CIWS at all.
LPD-17 has just RAM and 30mm Mk 46 turrets for small-baot defense. Unless
things change from what was shown at concept design, DD(X) will have 40mm
guns for close-in defnse, but not for anti-missile duties. If they do
change, I think the most likely swap will be to 30mm MK 46 turrets in place
of the 40mm, but still with no missile-defense role. For anti-missile
defense, it will rely on ESSM.

--
Tom Schoene Replace "invalid" with "net" to e-mail
"Our country, right or wrong. When right, to be kept right, when
wrong to be put right." - Senator Carl Schurz, 1872

[Tarver Engineering]

I see UAVs under the direct control of the men on the ground as the
replacement for the A-10. Some sort of game boy type interface to designate
targets would be all the human interface required. In that manner the
tendancy of the A-10 to make blue on blue incursions might be eliminated.

[Ed Rasimus]

On Sun, 14 Mar 2004 10:50:56 -0800, "Tarver Engineering"
> wrote:

>
>
>I see UAVs under the direct control of the men on the ground as the
>replacement for the A-10. Some sort of game boy type interface to designate
>targets would be all the human interface required. In that manner the
>tendancy of the A-10 to make blue on blue incursions might be eliminated.
>

That would take a quantum leap in sensor technology as well as an
incredible level of logistic support. What you suggest would require
some sort of UAV platoon attached to a maneuver element with
pre-packaged UAV rounds, a launch/recovery capability, a cadre of
trained operators, reload munitions, etc. etc. etc. Not a low-tech,
mud-reliable sort of weapon.

Then there is the question of battle-field view. While the guy on the
ground may be able to see the enemy immediately in front of him, he
seldom knows what else is out there and threatening. That takes a
detached, at altitude, observer. Hunkering in a foxhole or a tracked
vehicle buttoned-up, looking at a 12.1 inch LCD display that reports
what the eye in the nose of the UAV happens to be looking at is a
difficult perspective from which to manipulate CAS.

You proposal also doesn't address the complexities of airspace
coordination for employment of a CAS system within the mix of
aviation, indirect fire assets and direct fire from supporting or
flanking units. Letting "game-boy" operators fly armed UAVs to deliver
ordinance at the engagement level is not a trivial problem.

And, the "tendency of the A-10 to make blue on blue incursions" is an
unsupported cheap shot. The A-10 (and any other CAS system) has made
few friendly fire mistakes. They happen, but it isn't epidemic.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

[N9NWO]

Thomas Schoene wrote:
> N9NWO wrote:
>
>>It is thought that other systems are replaced, the 25mm
>>will become the primary light cannon round. Thus the Navy
>>CIWS (Phalanx) may migrate towards this round with newer
>>ships (ie DD-X).
>
>
> There have been plenty of proposals for 25mm versions of Phalanx, but not
> much interest from the Navy. They figure than if a maginal increase in
> capability is needed, the 20mm Enhanced Lethality Cartridge could be
> reinstated. It's always been reported as having the same effectiveness as a
> conventional 25mm sabot round.
>
> In general, however, the Navy is migrating to no gun-based CIWS at all.
> LPD-17 has just RAM and 30mm Mk 46 turrets for small-baot defense. Unless
> things change from what was shown at concept design, DD(X) will have 40mm
> guns for close-in defnse, but not for anti-missile duties. If they do
> change, I think the most likely swap will be to 30mm MK 46 turrets in place
> of the 40mm, but still with no missile-defense role. For anti-missile
> defense, it will rely on ESSM.

Currently it looks more like the Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile will
replace the CIWS:

Block I baseline 2 introduced further reliability upgrades and a muzzle
restraint to decrease dispersion. Installed on multiple non-Aegis and
Aegis ships, neither the original Phalanx Block 0 nor the subsequent
Block 1 baseline 0, 1, or 2 upgrades are integrated with a ship
self-defense system. A January 1992 Chief of Naval Operations decision
requires replacement of Phalanx with the new ESSM system in new
construction DDG ships. Though it initially appeared that DDG-79 would
be the first new construction DDG to receive Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile
in lieu of Phalanx, it now appears that, due to a slippage in the ESSM
development program, DDG-85 will be the first. The Navy plans to install
the Phalanx Block 1 baseline 2 configuration as temporary installations
on DDG-79 through 84 until ESSM is produced.

The RAM is mostly a Sidewinder missile platform.
The MK 46 Mod 1 30mm Machine Guns looks to be an
upgrade for the Mk 38 25mm (M242 Bushmaster). One
page for the LHP-17 showed the Mk 38 and not the Mk 46.

[Tarver Engineering]

"Ed Rasimus" > wrote in message
...
> On Sun, 14 Mar 2004 10:50:56 -0800, "Tarver Engineering"
> > wrote:
>
> >
> >
> >I see UAVs under the direct control of the men on the ground as the
> >replacement for the A-10. Some sort of game boy type interface to
designate
> >targets would be all the human interface required. In that manner the
> >tendancy of the A-10 to make blue on blue incursions might be eliminated.

> That would take a quantum leap in sensor technology as well as an
> incredible level of logistic support. What you suggest would require
> some sort of UAV platoon attached to a maneuver element with
> pre-packaged UAV rounds, a launch/recovery capability, a cadre of
> trained operators, reload munitions, etc. etc. etc. Not a low-tech,
> mud-reliable sort of weapon.

I fail to see how it is any different from an A-10, without the operator and
operator support requirements. UAVs are already flying in US airspace using
existing comercially available sensors. My vehicle in atonomous mode could
come to the battle and then go home when exhasted. Such UAVs are already
envisioned as loiterers, where a battle may occur in the future, or along a
transportation link.

> Then there is the question of battle-field view. While the guy on the
> ground may be able to see the enemy immediately in front of him, he
> seldom knows what else is out there and threatening. That takes a
> detached, at altitude, observer. Hunkering in a foxhole or a tracked
> vehicle buttoned-up, looking at a 12.1 inch LCD display that reports
> what the eye in the nose of the UAV happens to be looking at is a
> difficult perspective from which to manipulate CAS.

CAS is now done with a JDAM from a B-one at thousands of feet. The only
thing that was holding back the technology was the moral issue of having a
flying machine kill without an operator, but that was answered by CIA years
ago.

> You proposal also doesn't address the complexities of airspace
> coordination for employment of a CAS system within the mix of
> aviation, indirect fire assets and direct fire from supporting or
> flanking units. Letting "game-boy" operators fly armed UAVs to deliver
> ordinance at the engagement level is not a trivial problem.

Atonomous UAVs are the future, reguardless of the screeching of the fighter
mafia.

> And, the "tendency of the A-10 to make blue on blue incursions" is an
> unsupported cheap shot. The A-10 (and any other CAS system) has made
> few friendly fire mistakes. They happen, but it isn't epidemic.

The A-10's record vs the rotary wing equivalents for blue on blue incidents
is poor. I would rather blame the machine than the inter-service reality in
this forum.

[Ed Rasimus]

On Sun, 14 Mar 2004 12:32:07 -0800, "Tarver Engineering"
> wrote:

>
>"Ed Rasimus" > wrote in message
...
>> On Sun, 14 Mar 2004 10:50:56 -0800, "Tarver Engineering"
>> > wrote:
>>
>> >
>> >
>> >I see UAVs under the direct control of the men on the ground as the
>> >replacement for the A-10. Some sort of game boy type interface to
>designate
>> >targets would be all the human interface required. In that manner the
>> >tendancy of the A-10 to make blue on blue incursions might be eliminated.
>
>> That would take a quantum leap in sensor technology as well as an
>> incredible level of logistic support. What you suggest would require
>> some sort of UAV platoon attached to a maneuver element with
>> pre-packaged UAV rounds, a launch/recovery capability, a cadre of
>> trained operators, reload munitions, etc. etc. etc. Not a low-tech,
>> mud-reliable sort of weapon.
>
>I fail to see how it is any different from an A-10, without the operator and
>operator support requirements. UAVs are already flying in US airspace using
>existing comercially available sensors. My vehicle in atonomous mode could
>come to the battle and then go home when exhasted. Such UAVs are already
>envisioned as loiterers, where a battle may occur in the future, or along a
>transportation link.

OK, I misunderstood your initial post. When you said "direct control
of the men on the ground" I assumed you were suggesting an organic UAV
capability in the maneuver element. What you explain now, is simply a
full-blown tactical system with everything but the pilot-in-the-loop.
At some future time, data processing may make that practical, but
right now the wetware is still the most size/weight effective
solution.

The loiterer doesn't seem a practical model over an ongoing
engagement. Much too MANPAD intensive to be tolerated. Certainly the
current use of UAVs as recce platforms or even very limited (due to
small payload) interdiction systems is working well. CAS, however is
often very critical in terms of "danger close" criteria, run-in
directions, and other factors.
>
>> Then there is the question of battle-field view. While the guy on the
>> ground may be able to see the enemy immediately in front of him, he
>> seldom knows what else is out there and threatening. That takes a
>> detached, at altitude, observer. Hunkering in a foxhole or a tracked
>> vehicle buttoned-up, looking at a 12.1 inch LCD display that reports
>> what the eye in the nose of the UAV happens to be looking at is a
>> difficult perspective from which to manipulate CAS.
>
>CAS is now done with a JDAM from a B-one at thousands of feet. The only
>thing that was holding back the technology was the moral issue of having a
>flying machine kill without an operator, but that was answered by CIA years
>ago.

Some CAS is done from a heavy type at altitude with JDAM, but I think
the questioner's phrase "Traditional CAS" refers to troops-in-contact
and immediate fire support situations which may require a nose-to-nose
look at the enemy. I'll be the first to agree that modern weapons with
stand-off capability and high accuracy make the definitions of what
CAS really is more debatable.

I don't think there is any moral issue involved with or without an
operator. If the targeting is against a military objective, I'm
comfortable.
>
>> You proposal also doesn't address the complexities of airspace
>> coordination for employment of a CAS system within the mix of
>> aviation, indirect fire assets and direct fire from supporting or
>> flanking units. Letting "game-boy" operators fly armed UAVs to deliver
>> ordinance at the engagement level is not a trivial problem.
>
>Atonomous UAVs are the future, reguardless of the screeching of the fighter
>mafia.

I don't think I was screeching. I agree that there is a bright future
for UAVs with increasing missions. But, I don't go so far as to accept
the sensationalized concept of video game whiz-kids snapped off the
back streets of the inner city to do the job. If you check out the
operators of the current crop of UAVs, you'll find a lot of active and
former fighter types. The hands and the mind still function pretty
well long after the body quits tolerating the high-G environment.
>
>> And, the "tendency of the A-10 to make blue on blue incursions" is an
>> unsupported cheap shot. The A-10 (and any other CAS system) has made
>> few friendly fire mistakes. They happen, but it isn't epidemic.
>
>The A-10's record vs the rotary wing equivalents for blue on blue incidents
>is poor. I would rather blame the machine than the inter-service reality in
>this forum.

Sorry, I won't accept that assertion. The A-10s record is very good
with regard to CAS. And, there is nothing inherent about "the
machine"--it is as vulnerable to fratricide mistakes as any other
system. Taking the pilot out of the loop is the real issue and there's
no evidence to indicate that the potential for fratricide goes down.
I'd contend that taking the man out of the system will increase the
probability of error.



Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

[Tarver Engineering]

"Ed Rasimus" > wrote in message
...
> On Sun, 14 Mar 2004 12:32:07 -0800, "Tarver Engineering"
> > wrote:
>
> >
> >"Ed Rasimus" > wrote in message
> ...
> >> On Sun, 14 Mar 2004 10:50:56 -0800, "Tarver Engineering"
> >> > wrote:
> >>
> >> >
> >> >
> >> >I see UAVs under the direct control of the men on the ground as the
> >> >replacement for the A-10. Some sort of game boy type interface to
designate
> >> >targets would be all the human interface required. In that manner the
> >> >tendancy of the A-10 to make blue on blue incursions might be
eliminated.
> >
> >> That would take a quantum leap in sensor technology as well as an
> >> incredible level of logistic support. What you suggest would require
> >> some sort of UAV platoon attached to a maneuver element with
> >> pre-packaged UAV rounds, a launch/recovery capability, a cadre of
> >> trained operators, reload munitions, etc. etc. etc. Not a low-tech,
> >> mud-reliable sort of weapon.
> >
> >I fail to see how it is any different from an A-10, without the operator
and
> >operator support requirements. UAVs are already flying in US airspace
using
> >existing comercially available sensors. My vehicle in atonomous mode
could
> >come to the battle and then go home when exhasted. Such UAVs are already
> >envisioned as loiterers, where a battle may occur in the future, or along
a
> >transportation link.
>
> OK, I misunderstood your initial post. When you said "direct control
> of the men on the ground" I assumed you were suggesting an organic UAV
> capability in the maneuver element. What you explain now, is simply a
> full-blown tactical system with everything but the pilot-in-the-loop.
> At some future time, data processing may make that practical, but
> right now the wetware is still the most size/weight effective
> solution.

The ground operator would have the capability of designating targets and the
ability to change the level of agression of the autonomous vehicle. I want
to get pilots out of the mud, not send them into harm's way. There is a
similar autonomous vehicle envisioned for the F-35, but it can wait until
the F-22 is either produced, or cancelled.

> The loiterer doesn't seem a practical model over an ongoing
> engagement. Much too MANPAD intensive to be tolerated. Certainly the
> current use of UAVs as recce platforms or even very limited (due to
> small payload) interdiction systems is working well. CAS, however is
> often very critical in terms of "danger close" criteria, run-in
> directions, and other factors.

The loiter vehicle is moving forward first, as it is funded for paper
investigation of the idea. That way it stays out of the obvious reality
check issues for "silver bullet" type assets.

> >> Then there is the question of battle-field view. While the guy on the
> >> ground may be able to see the enemy immediately in front of him, he
> >> seldom knows what else is out there and threatening. That takes a
> >> detached, at altitude, observer. Hunkering in a foxhole or a tracked
> >> vehicle buttoned-up, looking at a 12.1 inch LCD display that reports
> >> what the eye in the nose of the UAV happens to be looking at is a
> >> difficult perspective from which to manipulate CAS.
> >
> >CAS is now done with a JDAM from a B-one at thousands of feet. The only
> >thing that was holding back the technology was the moral issue of having
a
> >flying machine kill without an operator, but that was answered by CIA
years
> >ago.
>
> Some CAS is done from a heavy type at altitude with JDAM, but I think
> the questioner's phrase "Traditional CAS" refers to troops-in-contact
> and immediate fire support situations which may require a nose-to-nose
> look at the enemy. I'll be the first to agree that modern weapons with
> stand-off capability and high accuracy make the definitions of what
> CAS really is more debatable.

A 2000 pound bomb dropped accurate does the same job from 15,000 feet as it
does from 200 feet; perhaps even better, as the man on the ground has better
control of the target's coordinates. That is not always true, as my brother
has a story of his company commander calling a strike on his own company's
position, but that is another issue. The CO got his bronze star and never
went out again. (ie heroin addict)

> I don't think there is any moral issue involved with or without an
> operator. If the targeting is against a military objective, I'm
> comfortable.

How about a wedding? (Afghanistan)

> >> You proposal also doesn't address the complexities of airspace
> >> coordination for employment of a CAS system within the mix of
> >> aviation, indirect fire assets and direct fire from supporting or
> >> flanking units. Letting "game-boy" operators fly armed UAVs to deliver
> >> ordinance at the engagement level is not a trivial problem.
> >
> >Atonomous UAVs are the future, reguardless of the screeching of the
fighter
> >mafia.
>
> I don't think I was screeching. I agree that there is a bright future
> for UAVs with increasing missions. But, I don't go so far as to accept
> the sensationalized concept of video game whiz-kids snapped off the
> back streets of the inner city to do the job. If you check out the
> operators of the current crop of UAVs, you'll find a lot of active and
> former fighter types. The hands and the mind still function pretty
> well long after the body quits tolerating the high-G environment.

Which is why we are discussing autonomous vehicles for filling the role of
"traditional CAS". I have the impression that the Infantry is as pleased to
stay out of that type of situation as a fighter pilot is to have BVR
weapons.

> >> And, the "tendency of the A-10 to make blue on blue incursions" is an
> >> unsupported cheap shot. The A-10 (and any other CAS system) has made
> >> few friendly fire mistakes. They happen, but it isn't epidemic.
> >
> >The A-10's record vs the rotary wing equivalents for blue on blue
incidents
> >is poor. I would rather blame the machine than the inter-service reality
in
> >this forum.
>
> Sorry, I won't accept that assertion. The A-10s record is very good
> with regard to CAS.

Not as good as the Army's own rotary wings.

> And, there is nothing inherent about "the
> machine"--it is as vulnerable to fratricide mistakes as any other
> system.

That depends on how well the operator can see the battle and follow
instructions.

> Taking the pilot out of the loop is the real issue and there's
> no evidence to indicate that the potential for fratricide goes down.

The Army's own assets are statistically less likely to blue on blue.

> I'd contend that taking the man out of the system will increase the
> probability of error.

My man is on the ground, saving his own life.

Do you think Cleland was fragged?

[Ed Rasimus]

On Sun, 14 Mar 2004 13:44:13 -0800, "Tarver Engineering"
> wrote:

>
>Do you think Cleland was fragged?
>
No, Cleland was a victim of his own clumsiness. He dropped the grenade
out of his own hand. That story is pretty well known.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

[Bob McKellar]

Ed Rasimus wrote:

> On Sun, 14 Mar 2004 13:44:13 -0800, "Tarver Engineering"
> > wrote:
>
> >
> >Do you think Cleland was fragged?
> >
> No, Cleland was a victim of his own clumsiness. He dropped the grenade
> out of his own hand. That story is pretty well known.
>
> Ed Rasimus
> Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
> "When Thunder Rolled"
> Smithsonian Institution Press
> ISBN #1-58834-103-8

Actually, recently the story was changed due to another soldier coming
forth and admitting that it was his grenade, and that he had straightened
the pin, having been told that was the warrior like thing to do.

The story was well covered here in Georgia.

I guess I could find a link if you wish.

Bob McKellar, former Cleland constituent

[Peter Kemp]

On Sun, 14 Mar 2004 18:42:08 GMT, "Thomas Schoene"
> wrote:

>In general, however, the Navy is migrating to no gun-based CIWS at all.
>LPD-17 has just RAM and 30mm Mk 46 turrets for small-baot defense. Unless
>things change from what was shown at concept design, DD(X) will have 40mm
>guns for close-in defnse, but not for anti-missile duties. If they do
>change, I think the most likely swap will be to 30mm MK 46 turrets in place
>of the 40mm, but still with no missile-defense role. For anti-missile
>defense, it will rely on ESSM.

What's the 40mm proposed for the DD(X)? I had assumed from the few
concept drawings they'd be using the Mk 46 turrets for commonality to
start with.


---
Peter Kemp

Life is short - drink faster

[Kevin Brooks]

"Ed Rasimus" > wrote in message
...
> On Sun, 14 Mar 2004 12:32:07 -0800, "Tarver Engineering"
> > wrote:
>
> >
> >"Ed Rasimus" > wrote in message
> ...
> >> On Sun, 14 Mar 2004 10:50:56 -0800, "Tarver Engineering"
> >> > wrote:
> >>
> >> >
> >> >
> >> >I see UAVs under the direct control of the men on the ground as the
> >> >replacement for the A-10. Some sort of game boy type interface to
> >designate
> >> >targets would be all the human interface required. In that manner the
> >> >tendancy of the A-10 to make blue on blue incursions might be
eliminated.
> >
> >> That would take a quantum leap in sensor technology as well as an
> >> incredible level of logistic support. What you suggest would require
> >> some sort of UAV platoon attached to a maneuver element with
> >> pre-packaged UAV rounds, a launch/recovery capability, a cadre of
> >> trained operators, reload munitions, etc. etc. etc. Not a low-tech,
> >> mud-reliable sort of weapon.
> >
> >I fail to see how it is any different from an A-10, without the operator
and
> >operator support requirements. UAVs are already flying in US airspace
using
> >existing comercially available sensors. My vehicle in atonomous mode
could
> >come to the battle and then go home when exhasted. Such UAVs are already
> >envisioned as loiterers, where a battle may occur in the future, or along
a
> >transportation link.
>
> OK, I misunderstood your initial post. When you said "direct control
> of the men on the ground" I assumed you were suggesting an organic UAV
> capability in the maneuver element. What you explain now, is simply a
> full-blown tactical system with everything but the pilot-in-the-loop.
> At some future time, data processing may make that practical, but
> right now the wetware is still the most size/weight effective
> solution.

Actually, the ground forces are well on their way to having UAV's as an
organic element, even down to the platoon level. The USMC has already
initiated production of the small Dragoneye, which is essentially about a
two man load--the operator uses a laptop to control the aircraft and observe
the intel feed (and no, it is unlikely to be any kind of weapons carrier).
The Army has established a squadron/battalion sized ISR element to serve in
its new Stryker Brigade Combat Teams, and I believe the plan is to have them
operate their own small UAV's in the not-too-distant future.

<snip>

>
> I don't think I was screeching. I agree that there is a bright future
> for UAVs with increasing missions. But, I don't go so far as to accept
> the sensationalized concept of video game whiz-kids snapped off the
> back streets of the inner city to do the job. If you check out the
> operators of the current crop of UAVs, you'll find a lot of active and
> former fighter types. The hands and the mind still function pretty
> well long after the body quits tolerating the high-G environment.

The objective right now for the ground forces is to get useful UAV's into
operation at the lowest possible echelons. From what I have seen regarding
Dragoneye, it is a pretty simple system to operate. I would imagine the
Army's new focus on rotary UAV's will also emphasize ease of operation (I
doubt the Army wants to commit rated pilots to flying its UAV's as the USAF
has been doing); trying to attach additional qualified pilots to each and
every meneuver brigade/battalion, etc., to operate their organic UAV's would
impinge upon the pool of pilots available to fly the manned aircraft in the
AVN BDE's.

> >
> >> And, the "tendency of the A-10 to make blue on blue incursions" is an
> >> unsupported cheap shot. The A-10 (and any other CAS system) has made
> >> few friendly fire mistakes. They happen, but it isn't epidemic.
> >
> >The A-10's record vs the rotary wing equivalents for blue on blue
incidents
> >is poor. I would rather blame the machine than the inter-service reality
in
> >this forum.
>
> Sorry, I won't accept that assertion.

You are correct there. IIRC there were two A-10 frat incidents during ODS
(one engagement of a British Warrior AFV and one of a USMC LAV); on the
other hand, there was also a rather nasty AH-64 frat incident (hit a Bradley
IIRC). So there is no real preponderance of evidence to support the idea
that the A-10 was "poor" in comparison to the rotary assets in this
regard--one incident versus two incidents is statistically meaningless.

The A-10s record is very good
> with regard to CAS. And, there is nothing inherent about "the
> machine"--it is as vulnerable to fratricide mistakes as any other
> system. Taking the pilot out of the loop is the real issue and there's
> no evidence to indicate that the potential for fratricide goes down.
> I'd contend that taking the man out of the system will increase the
> probability of error.

Yep. It will be quite a while before the crunchies would be comfortable with
the idea of autonomous UCAV's flying the CAS missions, especially those TIC
missions you mentioned earlier.

Brooks

>
>
>
> Ed Rasimus
> Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
> "When Thunder Rolled"
> Smithsonian Institution Press
> ISBN #1-58834-103-8

[Kevin Brooks]

"Ed Rasimus" > wrote in message
...
> On Sun, 14 Mar 2004 13:44:13 -0800, "Tarver Engineering"
> > wrote:
>
> >
> >Do you think Cleland was fragged?
> >
> No, Cleland was a victim of his own clumsiness. He dropped the grenade
> out of his own hand. That story is pretty well known.

Actually, Ed, if you do a Google on it there is some evidence to support
that may not have been the case. Cleland thought that was what must have
happened, but another man who was on the ground with him now claims it was
another individual who dropped the grenade. Nobody can no for sure, and it
really does not matter in the end.

Brooks

>
>
> Ed Rasimus
> Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
> "When Thunder Rolled"
> Smithsonian Institution Press
> ISBN #1-58834-103-8

[Thomas Schoene]

Peter Kemp wrote:
> On Sun, 14 Mar 2004 18:42:08 GMT, "Thomas Schoene"
> > wrote:
>
>> In general, however, the Navy is migrating to no gun-based CIWS at
>> all. LPD-17 has just RAM and 30mm Mk 46 turrets for small-baot
>> defense. Unless things change from what was shown at concept
>> design, DD(X) will have 40mm guns for close-in defnse, but not for
>> anti-missile duties. If they do change, I think the most likely
>> swap will be to 30mm MK 46 turrets in place of the 40mm, but still
>> with no missile-defense role. For anti-missile defense, it will
>> rely on ESSM.
>
> What's the 40mm proposed for the DD(X)? I had assumed from the few
> concept drawings they'd be using the Mk 46 turrets for commonality to
> start with.

Northrop Grumman bid two Bofors 40mm Mk 3. (BIW proposed three 30mm Mk 46)
In the latest pictures they're still there, sitting on top of the helo
hangar in low-RCS enclosures.

http://raytheon.com/businesses/rids/gallery/300_ddx.jpg
(very big picture)

But I will not be at all surprised to see them replaced by 30mm.

--
Tom Schoene Replace "invalid" with "net" to e-mail
"Our country, right or wrong. When right, to be kept right, when
wrong to be put right." - Senator Carl Schurz, 1872

[Peter Kemp]

On Sun, 14 Mar 2004 23:18:29 GMT, "Thomas Schoene"
> wrote:

>Peter Kemp wrote:
>> On Sun, 14 Mar 2004 18:42:08 GMT, "Thomas Schoene"
>> > wrote:
>>
>>> In general, however, the Navy is migrating to no gun-based CIWS at
>>> all. LPD-17 has just RAM and 30mm Mk 46 turrets for small-baot
>>> defense. Unless things change from what was shown at concept
>>> design, DD(X) will have 40mm guns for close-in defnse, but not for
>>> anti-missile duties. If they do change, I think the most likely
>>> swap will be to 30mm MK 46 turrets in place of the 40mm, but still
>>> with no missile-defense role. For anti-missile defense, it will
>>> rely on ESSM.
>>
>> What's the 40mm proposed for the DD(X)? I had assumed from the few
>> concept drawings they'd be using the Mk 46 turrets for commonality to
>> start with.
>
>Northrop Grumman bid two Bofors 40mm Mk 3. (BIW proposed three 30mm Mk 46)
>In the latest pictures they're still there, sitting on top of the helo
>hangar in low-RCS enclosures.

Thanks for the info and the pic Tom, much appreciated.

---
Peter Kemp

Life is short - drink faster

[John R Weiss]

"Tarver Engineering" > wrote...
>
> I see UAVs under the direct control of the men on the ground as the
> replacement for the A-10. Some sort of game boy type interface to designate
> targets would be all the human interface required. In that manner the
> tendancy of the A-10 to make blue on blue incursions might be eliminated.

If anything, remote-controlled CAS platforms will increase blue-on-blue, and
they will likely be MORE vulnerable to defenses.

There is not a sensor available on any UAV that can provide the same real-time
situational awareness as a man in the cockpit. All current sensors are too
narrow in field of view and too slow in scan to give enough feedback to a remote
operator for real-time decision making.

Also, the weapon loadout in a UAV will not likely be as flexible as that on an
A-10, F/A-18, or follow-on manned airplane.

[John R Weiss]

"Tarver Engineering" > wrote...
>
> CAS is now done with a JDAM from a B-one at thousands of feet.

The Bone may have dropped JDAM, but I question whether it was in a "traditional
CAS" role. Can you provide specifics?

[John R Weiss]

"Tarver Engineering" > wrote...

> The ground operator would have the capability of designating targets and the
> ability to change the level of agression of the autonomous vehicle.

Are you talking about the operator of the UAV or someone else?

The narrow field of view of the UAV sensors will make self-designation difficult
unless previously designated or localized by someone else. If accurate Lat/Long
coordinates are available for uplink/downlink, that would work, but the
probability of errors is still the same as in any other such designation. Given
the lack of situational awareness on the part of the UAV ground operator, the
probability of his being able to recognize and correct for a target designation
error is much higher than with a manned airplane.

Also, what comprises a "change the level of aggression of the autonomous
vehicle"?


> A 2000 pound bomb dropped accurate does the same job from 15,000 feet as it
> does from 200 feet; perhaps even better, as the man on the ground has better
> control of the target's coordinates.

Only a guided weapon can be as accurate from 15,000 feet as from 200 feet;
ballistic dispersion is a fact of life for free-fall weapons. In the case of a
guided weapon and a stationary target, CEP from the fixed coordinates will be
the discriminator. However, with a moving target the weapon time of flight is a
significant factor in Pk, unless terminal guidance (e.g., laser, IIR) is
available. For the current JDAM, either a moving-target designation system
(e.g., AMTI -- Airborne Moving Target Indicator -- in the A-6) or a real-time
calculated lead in the designation point will be required to hit a moving target
from high altitude. If such an AMTI system can be automated and incorporated
into the UAV's targeting suite, it might be viable.

In neither case can it be said in general that a man on the ground "has better
control of the target's coordinates." In the case of a stationary target such
as a building, initial designation (e.g., laser spot) by the infantry may be
advantageous, but in traditional CAS a target almost always must be visually
identified before weapon release. Laser spot indicators or slewing of the
airplane's sensor reticle to uplinked Lat/Long coordinates may facilitate target
ID and refinement, but the man on the ground has control over the initial target
coordinates rather than the final coordinates.

In the case of a moving target, the man on the ground has little to no control
over target coordinates.

[i]
>> And, there is nothing inherent about "the
>> machine"--it is as vulnerable to fratricide mistakes as any other
>> system.
>
> That depends on how well the operator can see the battle and follow
> instructions.

EXACTLY!

A ground-based UAV operator, stationed remotely from the battlefield can never
"see the battle" in real time as clearly as someone on the battlefield.

[Henry J Cobb]

John R Weiss wrote:
> If anything, remote-controlled CAS platforms will increase blue-on-blue, and
> they will likely be MORE vulnerable to defenses.

So when will we see a program to train A-10 pilots about the shapes of
armored vehicles operated by the United States military?

http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/10/02/sprj.irq.friendly.fire/

-HJC

[monkey]

Ed Rasimus > wrote in message >...
> On Sun, 14 Mar 2004 13:44:13 -0800, "Tarver Engineering"
> > wrote:
>
> >
> >Do you think Cleland was fragged?
> >
> No, Cleland was a victim of his own clumsiness. He dropped the grenade
> out of his own hand. That story is pretty well known.
>
>
> Ed Rasimus
> Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
> "When Thunder Rolled"
> Smithsonian Institution Press
> ISBN #1-58834-103-8

For what it's worth, we just got a USMC Hornet exchange pilot on our
squadron who was in both Afghanistan. He did a LOT of CAS, and his
experience was that JDAM and LGBs just weren't working for the job.
The solution - "traditional CAS - in his own words they were operating
" as low as they could "- often down @ 100-200 feet. I watched a
zillion of his HUD tapes from Iraq. Believe it or not, his unit used
almost exclusively dumb bombs, unguided rockets, and CBUs.

[Tarver Engineering]

"John R Weiss" > wrote in message
...
> "Tarver Engineering" > wrote...
>
> > The ground operator would have the capability of designating targets and
the
> > ability to change the level of agression of the autonomous vehicle.
>
> Are you talking about the operator of the UAV or someone else?

The UAV is of course atonomous.

> The narrow field of view of the UAV sensors will make self-designation
difficult
> unless previously designated or localized by someone else.

You might want to read the thread before jumping in next time, Weiss.

[Tarver Engineering]

"John R Weiss" > wrote in message
...
> "Tarver Engineering" > wrote...
> >
> > CAS is now done with a JDAM from a B-one at thousands of feet.
>
> The Bone may have dropped JDAM, but I question whether it was in a
"traditional
> CAS" role. Can you provide specifics?

You want me to do a google search for you, Weiss?

Perhaps you have not understood, but I would not **** on you if you were on
fire, John.

[Tarver Engineering]

"John R Weiss" > wrote in message
...
> "Tarver Engineering" > wrote...
> >
> > I see UAVs under the direct control of the men on the ground as the
> > replacement for the A-10. Some sort of game boy type interface to
designate
> > targets would be all the human interface required. In that manner the
> > tendancy of the A-10 to make blue on blue incursions might be
eliminated.
>
> If anything, remote-controlled CAS platforms will increase blue-on-blue,
and
> they will likely be MORE vulnerable to defenses.

Right now a RPG in the flight deck takes out a rotary wing, so effectively
that the commanche is toast. Perhaps you would like to rethink your
supposition.

> There is not a sensor available on any UAV that can provide the same
real-time
> situational awareness as a man in the cockpit. All current sensors are
too
> narrow in field of view and too slow in scan to give enough feedback to a
remote
> operator for real-time decision making.

You mean the guy on the ground running a gameboy? Designating targets and
controlling the agressiveness mode is the extent of the operator's
authority.

> Also, the weapon loadout in a UAV will not likely be as flexible as that
on an
> A-10, F/A-18, or follow-on manned airplane.

That is true. There will need to be more than one model.

[Pat Carpenter]

On Sun, 14 Mar 2004 20:26:27 -0800, Henry J Cobb > wrote:

>John R Weiss wrote:
>> If anything, remote-controlled CAS platforms will increase blue-on-blue, and
>> they will likely be MORE vulnerable to defenses.
>
>So when will we see a program to train A-10 pilots about the shapes of
>armored vehicles operated by the United States military?
>
>http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/10/02/sprj.irq.friendly.fire/
>
>-HJC
Please include UK Warrior vehicles in that training.

Pat Carpenter

[Kevin Brooks]

"Henry J Cobb" > wrote in message
...
> John R Weiss wrote:
> > If anything, remote-controlled CAS platforms will increase blue-on-blue,
and
> > they will likely be MORE vulnerable to defenses.
>
> So when will we see a program to train A-10 pilots about the shapes of
> armored vehicles operated by the United States military?

Henry, just when we think you can't be any more of an idiot than you you
have demonstrated yourself to be, you manage to up the ante and set a whole
new standard for idiocy. **** happens. Ever try flying at low altitude and
picking out and identifying objects the size of an armored vehicle? Not as
easy as you may think. Add in the fact that bullets are flying in both
directions, and the CAS sortie in question was a most rikki-ticky
troops-in-contact situation. **** happens. It happened in the Civil War
(take a gander at which side inflicted the majority of casualties on the
Federal forces during the early battle at Big Bethel), it happened during
WWI, it happened during WWII (on a scale that dwarfs your above referenced
little incident), it happened in Korea and Vietnam, it happened during ODS,
OEF, and yes, it happened during OIF. If you are really concerened about the
ability of the A-10 pilots to identify vehicles on the ground during TIC CAS
missions, I guess you are really having kittens over the issue of US ground
forces engaging *their own* armored vehicles during ODS, or the similar case
during OIF when the Brits hit one of their own tanks?

>
> http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/10/02/sprj.irq.friendly.fire/

Gee, I never would have thought of CNN as wanting to sensationalize issues
which they have little understanding of in the first place...

What's the story, Henry? You all finished with squaring away the Navy (that
other service that as a corporate body you are convinced has less
professional knowledge and wisdom than you do), and are returning to
enlighten the USAF with your cunning and skill?

Brooks

>
> -HJC
>

[Kevin Brooks]

"Pat Carpenter" > wrote in message
...
> On Sun, 14 Mar 2004 20:26:27 -0800, Henry J Cobb > wrote:
>
> >John R Weiss wrote:
> >> If anything, remote-controlled CAS platforms will increase
blue-on-blue, and
> >> they will likely be MORE vulnerable to defenses.
> >
> >So when will we see a program to train A-10 pilots about the shapes of
> >armored vehicles operated by the United States military?
> >
> >http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/10/02/sprj.irq.friendly.fire/
> >
> >-HJC
> Please include UK Warrior vehicles in that training.

Before you get too smug, recall who clanged that Challenger around Basra
during the latest visit to the area...twasn't the Yanks, and twasn't the
Iraqis.

Brooks

>
> Pat Carpenter

[Ed Rasimus]

On 14 Mar 2004 20:44:45 -0800, (monkey) wrote:

>For what it's worth, we just got a USMC Hornet exchange pilot on our
>squadron who was in both Afghanistan. He did a LOT of CAS, and his
>experience was that JDAM and LGBs just weren't working for the job.
>The solution - "traditional CAS - in his own words they were operating
>" as low as they could "- often down @ 100-200 feet. I watched a
>zillion of his HUD tapes from Iraq. Believe it or not, his unit used
>almost exclusively dumb bombs, unguided rockets, and CBUs.

If the weather is good and you aren't a classic "troops-in-contact"
situation there isn't much reason to be dealing with 100-200 feet. Way
too much can go wrong to justify that type of delivery. If the bad
guys are in the wires, then every tactical aviator I've known will do
what is necessary.

That being said, however, I didn't know that "unguided rockets" were
still in the inventory for regular carry. And, I'm unfamiliar with any
type of CBU that can be delivered at 100-200 feet. Last one of those I
believe was the infamous CBU-2 which pushed the bomblets out the back
of a canister that was retained on the airplane.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

[Ed Rasimus]

On Sun, 14 Mar 2004 18:11:30 -0500, "Kevin Brooks"
> wrote:

>
>"Ed Rasimus" > wrote in message
...

>>
>> OK, I misunderstood your initial post. When you said "direct control
>> of the men on the ground" I assumed you were suggesting an organic UAV
>> capability in the maneuver element. What you explain now, is simply a
>> full-blown tactical system with everything but the pilot-in-the-loop.
>> At some future time, data processing may make that practical, but
>> right now the wetware is still the most size/weight effective
>> solution.
>
>Actually, the ground forces are well on their way to having UAV's as an
>organic element, even down to the platoon level. The USMC has already
>initiated production of the small Dragoneye, which is essentially about a
>two man load--the operator uses a laptop to control the aircraft and observe
>the intel feed (and no, it is unlikely to be any kind of weapons carrier).
>The Army has established a squadron/battalion sized ISR element to serve in
>its new Stryker Brigade Combat Teams, and I believe the plan is to have them
>operate their own small UAV's in the not-too-distant future.

No doubt about it. It will be a great immediate intel resource, but it
doesn't fill the bill as a CAS platform--who is going to be
back-packing a meaningful ordinance load for these model airplanes?

>>
>> I don't think I was screeching. I agree that there is a bright future
>> for UAVs with increasing missions. But, I don't go so far as to accept
>> the sensationalized concept of video game whiz-kids snapped off the
>> back streets of the inner city to do the job. If you check out the
>> operators of the current crop of UAVs, you'll find a lot of active and
>> former fighter types. The hands and the mind still function pretty
>> well long after the body quits tolerating the high-G environment.
>
>The objective right now for the ground forces is to get useful UAV's into
>operation at the lowest possible echelons. From what I have seen regarding
>Dragoneye, it is a pretty simple system to operate. I would imagine the
>Army's new focus on rotary UAV's will also emphasize ease of operation (I
>doubt the Army wants to commit rated pilots to flying its UAV's as the USAF
>has been doing); trying to attach additional qualified pilots to each and
>every meneuver brigade/battalion, etc., to operate their organic UAV's would
>impinge upon the pool of pilots available to fly the manned aircraft in the
>AVN BDE's.

Once again, you are correct with regard to the "eye in the sky"
operation--it doesn't take a lot of training (witness the number of
week-end RC model flyers around the country), but we've been talking
about CAS from organic UAVs. That is going to take a bit more skill
and judgement.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

[Kevin Brooks]

"Ed Rasimus" > wrote in message
...
> On Sun, 14 Mar 2004 18:11:30 -0500, "Kevin Brooks"
> > wrote:
>
> >
> >"Ed Rasimus" > wrote in message
> ...
>
> >>
> >> OK, I misunderstood your initial post. When you said "direct control
> >> of the men on the ground" I assumed you were suggesting an organic UAV
> >> capability in the maneuver element. What you explain now, is simply a
> >> full-blown tactical system with everything but the pilot-in-the-loop.
> >> At some future time, data processing may make that practical, but
> >> right now the wetware is still the most size/weight effective
> >> solution.
> >
> >Actually, the ground forces are well on their way to having UAV's as an
> >organic element, even down to the platoon level. The USMC has already
> >initiated production of the small Dragoneye, which is essentially about a
> >two man load--the operator uses a laptop to control the aircraft and
observe
> >the intel feed (and no, it is unlikely to be any kind of weapons
carrier).
> >The Army has established a squadron/battalion sized ISR element to serve
in
> >its new Stryker Brigade Combat Teams, and I believe the plan is to have
them
> >operate their own small UAV's in the not-too-distant future.
>
> No doubt about it. It will be a great immediate intel resource, but it
> doesn't fill the bill as a CAS platform--who is going to be
> back-packing a meaningful ordinance load for these model airplanes?

In the case of Dragoneye, I noted earlier that it will not be lugging any
ordnance. The initial use of UAV's in the Stryker BCT's will undoubtedly be
purely for ISR purposes, but I would not rule out the future development of
some sort of limited strike role (perhaps dropping submunitions in the
Skeet/SADARM category, or firing the precision guided version of the 2.75"
rocket that they have been developing). The SBCT's won't be limited to any
manpackable systems.

>
> >>
> >> I don't think I was screeching. I agree that there is a bright future
> >> for UAVs with increasing missions. But, I don't go so far as to accept
> >> the sensationalized concept of video game whiz-kids snapped off the
> >> back streets of the inner city to do the job. If you check out the
> >> operators of the current crop of UAVs, you'll find a lot of active and
> >> former fighter types. The hands and the mind still function pretty
> >> well long after the body quits tolerating the high-G environment.
> >
> >The objective right now for the ground forces is to get useful UAV's into
> >operation at the lowest possible echelons. From what I have seen
regarding
> >Dragoneye, it is a pretty simple system to operate. I would imagine the
> >Army's new focus on rotary UAV's will also emphasize ease of operation (I
> >doubt the Army wants to commit rated pilots to flying its UAV's as the
USAF
> >has been doing); trying to attach additional qualified pilots to each and
> >every meneuver brigade/battalion, etc., to operate their organic UAV's
would
> >impinge upon the pool of pilots available to fly the manned aircraft in
the
> >AVN BDE's.
>
> Once again, you are correct with regard to the "eye in the sky"
> operation--it doesn't take a lot of training (witness the number of
> week-end RC model flyers around the country), but we've been talking
> about CAS from organic UAVs. That is going to take a bit more skill
> and judgement.

Personally, I don't see UCAV's filling the CAS role for many years to come;
their first employment will undoubtedly be in the deeper BAI role where
fratricide is not as big a concern. But if the Army fields a small UAV in
the SBCT's, it would probably be capable of deploying some form of
submunition or FFAR in the future, and I doubt that they would require any
trained pilots to deploy them. As to the requisite "skill and judgement",
that is a toss-up--we already trust PFC's and Speedy-Four's to operate the
main gun armament of M1A2 tanks, and they can reach out and touch someone in
rather spectacular fashion. Nor do pilot types have a lock on either of
those qualities--I can still remember my brother laughing about the
bulldozer operator he ran into in Danang who said he'd never been up in a
helicopter, so he managed to take the kid up for a flight around the local
area, and even let him get a bit of unauthorized stick time. The kid
insisted he return the favor by allowing Larry to operate his bulldozer
(Larry was not itching to do that, but he did not want to hurt the guy's
feelings); so a few days later he found himself trying mightily to
coordinate the throttle, *decelerator* pedal, control handles, and blade
controls of a D7. He acknowledged that he quite honestly sucked when it came
to doing that job, and when he climbed down afterwards he said the kid just
stood there with a blank look on his face, shaking his head slowly back and
forth, and said, "Sir, I can't believe they let you fly helicopters."

Brooks

>
>
> Ed Rasimus
> Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
> "When Thunder Rolled"
> Smithsonian Institution Press
> ISBN #1-58834-103-8

[Peter Kemp]

On Mon, 15 Mar 2004 14:44:39 -0500, "Kevin Brooks"
> wrote:
>
>In the case of Dragoneye, I noted earlier that it will not be lugging any
>ordnance. The initial use of UAV's in the Stryker BCT's will undoubtedly be
>purely for ISR purposes, but I would not rule out the future development of
>some sort of limited strike role (perhaps dropping submunitions in the
>Skeet/SADARM category, or firing the precision guided version of the 2.75"
>rocket that they have been developing). The SBCT's won't be limited to any
>manpackable systems.

Due to the small load of a Dragoneye, I imagine it's more likely to
carry a very small designator, so the forces it's scouting for can lob
laser guided mortar rounds in (i.e. the XM395 PGMM). That way the UAV
doesn't need to use up any of it's valuable load on ordnance.

>Personally, I don't see UCAV's filling the CAS role for many years to come;
>their first employment will undoubtedly be in the deeper BAI role where
>fratricide is not as big a concern. But if the Army fields a small UAV in
>the SBCT's, it would probably be capable of deploying some form of
>submunition or FFAR in the future, and I doubt that they would require any
>trained pilots to deploy them.

I agree with all this, but would point out that *if* the organic UAVs
such as Dragoneye and Hunter provide a decent pseudo-UCAV capability,
then it's possible traditional CAS is going to be needed less
frequently.
---
Peter Kemp

Life is short - drink faster

[monkey]

Ed Rasimus > wrote in message >...
> On 14 Mar 2004 20:44:45 -0800, (monkey) wrote:
>
> >For what it's worth, we just got a USMC Hornet exchange pilot on our
> >squadron who was in both Afghanistan. He did a LOT of CAS, and his
> >experience was that JDAM and LGBs just weren't working for the job.
> >The solution - "traditional CAS - in his own words they were operating
> >" as low as they could "- often down @ 100-200 feet. I watched a
> >zillion of his HUD tapes from Iraq. Believe it or not, his unit used
> >almost exclusively dumb bombs, unguided rockets, and CBUs.
>
> If the weather is good and you aren't a classic "troops-in-contact"
> situation there isn't much reason to be dealing with 100-200 feet. Way
> too much can go wrong to justify that type of delivery. If the bad
> guys are in the wires, then every tactical aviator I've known will do
> what is necessary.
>
> That being said, however, I didn't know that "unguided rockets" were
> still in the inventory for regular carry. And, I'm unfamiliar with any
> type of CBU that can be delivered at 100-200 feet. Last one of those I
> believe was the infamous CBU-2 which pushed the bomblets out the back
> of a canister that was retained on the airplane.
>
>
> Ed Rasimus
> Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
> "When Thunder Rolled"
> Smithsonian Institution Press
> ISBN #1-58834-103-8

Hey, Ed, I'm just repeating what the guy said. It should be fairly
obviuos to anyone that you can't drop a CBU or bomb from 100 feet - I
was referring to the low stuff as his altitude of choice to negate
threats - I assume that he used SOP MAP for the above mentioned
weapons. I'm not sure which rocket pods they were using but i did view
several hud tapes of them in use.

[John R Weiss]

"Tarver Engineering" > wrote...
>
> The UAV is of course atonomous.

Of course -- in your dreams!

[John R Weiss]

"Tarver Engineering" > wrote...
>
>> The Bone may have dropped JDAM, but I question whether it was in a
>> "traditional CAS" role. Can you provide specifics?
>
> You want me to do a google search for you, Weiss?

I didn't think you could provide specifics...

[John R Weiss]

"Henry J Cobb" > wrote...
> John R Weiss wrote:
>> If anything, remote-controlled CAS platforms will increase blue-on-blue, and
>> they will likely be MORE vulnerable to defenses.
>
> So when will we see a program to train A-10 pilots about the shapes of
> armored vehicles operated by the United States military?

Blue-on-blue has happened in every war to date, and will happen in every war in
the future. The trick is to minimize it.

In the CAS arena, the comparative lack of situational awareness on the part of a
remote UAV operator will most likely increase the probability of friendly
fire -- not reduce it.

[John R Weiss]

"Tarver Engineering" > wrote...
>
>> If anything, remote-controlled CAS platforms will increase blue-on-blue,
>> and they will likely be MORE vulnerable to defenses.
>
> Right now a RPG in the flight deck takes out a rotary wing, so effectively
> that the commanche is toast. Perhaps you would like to rethink your
> supposition.

No need to rethink on that scenario.

An RPG is relatively slow and emits a significant smoke trail. It is also
unguided, so evasion is probable if it is seen soon enough.

There are at least 2 sets of eyeballs in virtually every helo in the battle
field, significantly increasing the probability of early detection of an
incoming RPG. With a UAV, the primary "eyes" are likely focused straight ahead
or on the primary target, with little or no secondary lookout. Also, the
quality of evasive tactics IF the RPG is sighted will be significantly less
without any "seat of the pants" feel for the aircraft.


> You mean the guy on the ground running a gameboy? Designating targets and
> controlling the agressiveness mode is the extent of the operator's
> authority.

Are defensive tactics beyond that operator's "authority"? If so, the value of
the UAV just decreased substantially!

What is an "agressiveness mode" and how is it controlled?

[Thomas Schoene]

Henry J Cobb wrote:
> So when will we see a program to train A-10 pilots about the shapes of
> armored vehicles operated by the United States military?

So Henry, when was the last time you tried to identify armored vehicles in
urban terrain, probably shrouded in smoke, from the cockpit of a fast-moving
jet aircraft?

Same here (never), but I know folks who have, including a Marine OV-10 FAC
pilot who flew in the Gulf War. They tell me it's damned hard to do.

--
Tom Schoene Replace "invalid" with "net" to e-mail
"Our country, right or wrong. When right, to be kept right, when
wrong to be put right." - Senator Carl Schurz, 1872

[Pat Carpenter]

On Mon, 15 Mar 2004 01:11:01 -0500, "Kevin Brooks"
> wrote:

>
>"Pat Carpenter" > wrote in message
...
>> On Sun, 14 Mar 2004 20:26:27 -0800, Henry J Cobb > wrote:
>>
>> >John R Weiss wrote:
>> >> If anything, remote-controlled CAS platforms will increase
>blue-on-blue, and
>> >> they will likely be MORE vulnerable to defenses.
>> >
>> >So when will we see a program to train A-10 pilots about the shapes of
>> >armored vehicles operated by the United States military?
>> >
>> >http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/10/02/sprj.irq.friendly.fire/
>> >
>> >-HJC
>> Please include UK Warrior vehicles in that training.
>
>Before you get too smug, recall who clanged that Challenger around Basra
>during the latest visit to the area...twasn't the Yanks, and twasn't the
>Iraqis.
>
>Brooks
>
>>
>> Pat Carpenter
>
Agreed we did but the A-10's mangaged it in both GFI and GFII.

Pat Carpenter

[Tony Williams]

"John R Weiss" > wrote in message news:<p9u5c.18281$1p.326709@attbi_s54>...
>
> In the CAS arena, the comparative lack of situational awareness on the part of a
> remote UAV operator will most likely increase the probability of friendly
> fire -- not reduce it.

That's an interesting issue. A counter-argument could be that an
operator sitting safely back on the ground will be less stressed and
able to take more considered judgements - and if in doubt to call for
a second opinion from a senior officer looking over his shoulder.

There would also be the opportunity for more realistic training in
that it would be easy to record UAV films showing what different
friendly and enemy vehicles look like in various circumstances.

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
Military gun and ammunition discussion forum:
http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/

[Ed Rasimus]

On 15 Mar 2004 23:54:03 -0800,
(Tony Williams) wrote:

>"John R Weiss" > wrote in message news:<p9u5c.18281$1p.326709@attbi_s54>...
>>
>> In the CAS arena, the comparative lack of situational awareness on the part of a
>> remote UAV operator will most likely increase the probability of friendly
>> fire -- not reduce it.
>
>That's an interesting issue. A counter-argument could be that an
>operator sitting safely back on the ground will be less stressed and
>able to take more considered judgements - and if in doubt to call for
>a second opinion from a senior officer looking over his shoulder.

The issue is field-of-view. How many sensors will the UAV carry? Where
will the look? How rapid can they scan? Now, consider the wetware on
scene--look right, look left, high/low, etc. Faster with much more
information available for accurate decision-making.

Ever tried to fly one of those PC flight sim war games where you
toggle to look in various directions?
>
>There would also be the opportunity for more realistic training in
>that it would be easy to record UAV films showing what different
>friendly and enemy vehicles look like in various circumstances.

You must be aware that aircrews currently train on friend/foe
recognition.



Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

[Henry J Cobb]

Thomas Schoene wrote:
> So Henry, when was the last time you tried to identify armored vehicles in
> urban terrain, probably shrouded in smoke, from the cockpit of a fast-moving
> jet aircraft?
>
> Same here (never), but I know folks who have, including a Marine OV-10 FAC
> pilot who flew in the Gulf War. They tell me it's damned hard to do.

Then you just don't attack the first thing you see.

Did the A-10 pilot have the proper clearance to attack?

If so, who gave it to him? And why wasn't this coordinated with the
troops on the ground?

-HJC

[Ed Rasimus]

On Tue, 16 Mar 2004 06:52:08 -0800, Henry J Cobb > wrote:

>Thomas Schoene wrote:
>> So Henry, when was the last time you tried to identify armored vehicles in
>> urban terrain, probably shrouded in smoke, from the cockpit of a fast-moving
>> jet aircraft?
>>
>> Same here (never), but I know folks who have, including a Marine OV-10 FAC
>> pilot who flew in the Gulf War. They tell me it's damned hard to do.
>
>Then you just don't attack the first thing you see.

Why do you assume that anyone would? When you operate a weapon,
whether a fast mover tactical aircraft or a hunting rifle in the
field, you verify your target.
>
>Did the A-10 pilot have the proper clearance to attack?

That would depend upon the particular circumstances--the ROE. If
working in support of ground forces, he would have to be controlled.
He would be coordinated into the area to deconflict with artillery and
aviation assets. He might be under FAC control. He might be operating
on a 9-line or maybe with an illuminator. He might be in an
interdiction role on a fixed reported target. He might be in a
"kill-box" where he has free-fire discretion.

Are you assuming that fighters commonly operate as some sort of
autonomous cowboy?
>
>If so, who gave it to him? And why wasn't this coordinated with the
>troops on the ground?

See above.
>
>-HJC

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

[Tarver Engineering]

"John R Weiss" > wrote in message
news:L%t5c.18641$_w.370665@attbi_s53...
> "Tarver Engineering" > wrote...
> >
> >> The Bone may have dropped JDAM, but I question whether it was in a
> >> "traditional CAS" role. Can you provide specifics?
> >
> > You want me to do a google search for you, Weiss?
>
> I didn't think you could provide specifics...

Anyone could provide specifics.

[Tarver Engineering]

"John R Weiss" > wrote in message
news:p9u5c.18653$po.222112@attbi_s52...
> "Tarver Engineering" > wrote...
> >
> >> If anything, remote-controlled CAS platforms will increase
blue-on-blue,
> >> and they will likely be MORE vulnerable to defenses.
> >
> > Right now a RPG in the flight deck takes out a rotary wing, so
effectively
> > that the commanche is toast. Perhaps you would like to rethink your
> > supposition.
>
> No need to rethink on that scenario.
>
> An RPG is relatively slow and emits a significant smoke trail. It is also
> unguided, so evasion is probable if it is seen soon enough.

Well you had best get down to the Pentagon and let them know they made a
mistake cancelling the comanche. While you are there, perhaps you can talk
up the F-14. :)

[Tarver Engineering]

"John R Weiss" > wrote in message
news:L%t5c.18245$1p.325253@attbi_s54...
> "Tarver Engineering" > wrote...
> >
> > The UAV is of course atonomous.
>
> Of course -- in your dreams!

Soon enough. The Army has $25 billion to spend.

[Tarver Engineering]

"John R Weiss" > wrote in message
news:p9u5c.18281$1p.326709@attbi_s54...
> "Henry J Cobb" > wrote...
> > John R Weiss wrote:
> >> If anything, remote-controlled CAS platforms will increase
blue-on-blue, and
> >> they will likely be MORE vulnerable to defenses.
> >
> > So when will we see a program to train A-10 pilots about the shapes of
> > armored vehicles operated by the United States military?
>
> Blue-on-blue has happened in every war to date, and will happen in every
war in
> the future. The trick is to minimize it.

Scrapping the A-10 is a step in that direction, but ill advised at this
time.

> In the CAS arena, the comparative lack of situational awareness on the
part of a
> remote UAV operator will most likely increase the probability of friendly
> fire -- not reduce it.

The UAV is of course autonomous.

[Kevin Brooks]

"Pat Carpenter" > wrote in message
...
> On Mon, 15 Mar 2004 01:11:01 -0500, "Kevin Brooks"
> > wrote:
>
> >
> >"Pat Carpenter" > wrote in message
> ...
> >> On Sun, 14 Mar 2004 20:26:27 -0800, Henry J Cobb > wrote:
> >>
> >> >John R Weiss wrote:
> >> >> If anything, remote-controlled CAS platforms will increase
> >blue-on-blue, and
> >> >> they will likely be MORE vulnerable to defenses.
> >> >
> >> >So when will we see a program to train A-10 pilots about the shapes of
> >> >armored vehicles operated by the United States military?
> >> >
> >> >http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/10/02/sprj.irq.friendly.fire/
> >> >
> >> >-HJC
> >> Please include UK Warrior vehicles in that training.
> >
> >Before you get too smug, recall who clanged that Challenger around Basra
> >during the latest visit to the area...twasn't the Yanks, and twasn't the
> >Iraqis.
> >
> >Brooks
> >
> >>
> >> Pat Carpenter
> >
> Agreed we did but the A-10's mangaged it in both GFI and GFII.

Well, heck, when it is your side that is providing the bulk of the toys and
the men to operate them, you can expect that the greater percentage of
untoward incidents will also be in their pocket. Now, can you enlighten us
as to just how a RN *AEW* helo (of all things--one would imagine that such
aircraft are generally better informed about their surrounding traffic
conditions than most) managed to collide with *another* AEW helo (and in the
process killed a USN officer on exchange duty)?

As I said earlier, in war "**** happens". Even in the UK forces...

Brooks
>
> Pat Carpenter

[John R Weiss]

"Tony Williams" > wrote...
>>
>> In the CAS arena, the comparative lack of situational awareness on the part
of a
>> remote UAV operator will most likely increase the probability of friendly
>> fire -- not reduce it.
>
> That's an interesting issue. A counter-argument could be that an
> operator sitting safely back on the ground will be less stressed and
> able to take more considered judgements - and if in doubt to call for
> a second opinion from a senior officer looking over his shoulder.

I would disagree with your argument. The UAV operator will already be
handicapped by his narrow field of view, so any such judgements will be made on
a much smaller information basis.

If the environment is such that a UAV can hang around long enough for second
opinions, it is also possible for a pilot to make an ID pass over the target and
get a verbal confirmation from the FAC. Also, in a multiple-target environment,
targeting by reference to nearby visual cues (e.g., geographical features or
smoke) is relatively straightforward for the pilot, but may be impossible with a
narrow field-of-view UAV sensor.


> There would also be the opportunity for more realistic training in
> that it would be easy to record UAV films showing what different
> friendly and enemy vehicles look like in various circumstances.

I don't see how a remote UAV operator could get more realistic training than a
pilot who has seen the battlefield personally.

In the case of the pilot, training with gun camera tapes and other visual
training aids already supplements his experience in actual target ID. While a
UAV operator could get similar experience while operating the UAV, the
limitations of his sensors will not allow him to have as broad a picture as the
pilot there in person.

[Tony Williams]

Ed Rasimus > wrote in message >...
> On 15 Mar 2004 23:54:03 -0800,
> (Tony Williams) wrote:
> >
> >There would also be the opportunity for more realistic training in
> >that it would be easy to record UAV films showing what different
> >friendly and enemy vehicles look like in various circumstances.
>
> You must be aware that aircrews currently train on friend/foe
> recognition.

Of course, but the opportunities for recognising different vehicles in
different conditions from an aircraft must be limited, and looking at
films isn't quite the same thing. My suggestion is that viewing
training videos from UAVs would look exactly like what the operator
would see on his screen for real. And he could do it again and again.

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
Discussion forum at: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/

[Pat Carpenter]

On Tue, 16 Mar 2004 12:49:55 -0500, "Kevin Brooks"
> wrote:

>
>"Pat Carpenter" > wrote in message
...
>> On Mon, 15 Mar 2004 01:11:01 -0500, "Kevin Brooks"
>> > wrote:
>>
>> >
>> >"Pat Carpenter" > wrote in message
>> ...
>> >> On Sun, 14 Mar 2004 20:26:27 -0800, Henry J Cobb > wrote:
>> >>
>> >> >John R Weiss wrote:
>> >> >> If anything, remote-controlled CAS platforms will increase
>> >blue-on-blue, and
>> >> >> they will likely be MORE vulnerable to defenses.
>> >> >
>> >> >So when will we see a program to train A-10 pilots about the shapes of
>> >> >armored vehicles operated by the United States military?
>> >> >
>> >> >http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/10/02/sprj.irq.friendly.fire/
>> >> >
>> >> >-HJC
>> >> Please include UK Warrior vehicles in that training.
>> >
>> >Before you get too smug, recall who clanged that Challenger around Basra
>> >during the latest visit to the area...twasn't the Yanks, and twasn't the
>> >Iraqis.
>> >
>> >Brooks
>> >
>> >>
>> >> Pat Carpenter
>> >
>> Agreed we did but the A-10's mangaged it in both GFI and GFII.
>
>Well, heck, when it is your side that is providing the bulk of the toys and
>the men to operate them, you can expect that the greater percentage of
>untoward incidents will also be in their pocket. Now, can you enlighten us
>as to just how a RN *AEW* helo (of all things--one would imagine that such
>aircraft are generally better informed about their surrounding traffic
>conditions than most) managed to collide with *another* AEW helo (and in the
>process killed a USN officer on exchange duty)?
>
>As I said earlier, in war "**** happens". Even in the UK forces...
>
>Brooks
>>
>> Pat Carpenter
>
Probably the same way as the Patriot shot down two allied aircraft
before a brave F16 pilot smoked the *******. Trouble is too many
systems are treated like toys and not lethal weapons.
As to the RN choppers, they both had their radomes stowed and were
relying on shipboard radar control.

To quote from a WWII saying :-
"When the Luftwaffe bombed the Allies ducked, when the RAF bombed the
Germans ducked but when the Americans bombed every f**ker ducked"

Pat Carpenter

[John R Weiss]

"Tony Williams" > wrote...

> Of course, but the opportunities for recognising different vehicles in
> different conditions from an aircraft must be limited, and looking at
> films isn't quite the same thing. My suggestion is that viewing
> training videos from UAVs would look exactly like what the operator
> would see on his screen for real. And he could do it again and again.

The training opportunities you describe would be available equally to pilots and
UAV operators. The pilots would still have the advantage of being able to see
or visualize the broader picture available from the cockpit.

Also, repeating the same "canned" scenarios ad nauseum may not provide any
additional training. Without experience, any difference from the already-seen
perspective may be unidentifiable.

[Peter Kemp]

On Tue, 16 Mar 2004 20:55:50 GMT, "John R Weiss"
> wrote:

>"Tony Williams" > wrote...
>
>> Of course, but the opportunities for recognising different vehicles in
>> different conditions from an aircraft must be limited, and looking at
>> films isn't quite the same thing. My suggestion is that viewing
>> training videos from UAVs would look exactly like what the operator
>> would see on his screen for real. And he could do it again and again.
>
>The training opportunities you describe would be available equally to pilots and
>UAV operators. The pilots would still have the advantage of being able to see
>or visualize the broader picture available from the cockpit.
>
>Also, repeating the same "canned" scenarios ad nauseum may not provide any
>additional training. Without experience, any difference from the already-seen
>perspective may be unidentifiable.

But the pilot is unlikely to be able to fit his copy of Janes Armour
and Artillery in the cockpit, and the UAV jockey can have his next to
his terminal.

---
Peter Kemp

Life is short - drink faster

[Tarver Engineering]

"Peter Kemp" > wrote in message
...
> On Tue, 16 Mar 2004 20:55:50 GMT, "John R Weiss"
> > wrote:
>
> >"Tony Williams" > wrote...
> >
> >> Of course, but the opportunities for recognising different vehicles in
> >> different conditions from an aircraft must be limited, and looking at
> >> films isn't quite the same thing. My suggestion is that viewing
> >> training videos from UAVs would look exactly like what the operator
> >> would see on his screen for real. And he could do it again and again.
> >
> >The training opportunities you describe would be available equally to
pilots and
> >UAV operators. The pilots would still have the advantage of being able
to see
> >or visualize the broader picture available from the cockpit.
> >
> >Also, repeating the same "canned" scenarios ad nauseum may not provide
any
> >additional training. Without experience, any difference from the
already-seen
> >perspective may be unidentifiable.
>
> But the pilot is unlikely to be able to fit his copy of Janes Armour
> and Artillery in the cockpit, and the UAV jockey can have his next to
> his terminal.

A simple laser surveying device can target laser or GPS guided weapons as
selected by the terminal operator. Just drop a couple into the tube ... bye
bye.

[Kevin Brooks]

"Pat Carpenter" > wrote in message
...
> On Tue, 16 Mar 2004 12:49:55 -0500, "Kevin Brooks"
> > wrote:
>
> >
> >"Pat Carpenter" > wrote in message
> ...
> >> On Mon, 15 Mar 2004 01:11:01 -0500, "Kevin Brooks"
> >> > wrote:
> >>
> >> >
> >> >"Pat Carpenter" > wrote in message
> >> ...
> >> >> On Sun, 14 Mar 2004 20:26:27 -0800, Henry J Cobb >
wrote:
> >> >>
> >> >> >John R Weiss wrote:
> >> >> >> If anything, remote-controlled CAS platforms will increase
> >> >blue-on-blue, and
> >> >> >> they will likely be MORE vulnerable to defenses.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >So when will we see a program to train A-10 pilots about the shapes
of
> >> >> >armored vehicles operated by the United States military?
> >> >> >
> >> >> >http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/10/02/sprj.irq.friendly.fire/
> >> >> >
> >> >> >-HJC
> >> >> Please include UK Warrior vehicles in that training.
> >> >
> >> >Before you get too smug, recall who clanged that Challenger around
Basra
> >> >during the latest visit to the area...twasn't the Yanks, and twasn't
the
> >> >Iraqis.
> >> >
> >> >Brooks
> >> >
> >> >>
> >> >> Pat Carpenter
> >> >
> >> Agreed we did but the A-10's mangaged it in both GFI and GFII.
> >
> >Well, heck, when it is your side that is providing the bulk of the toys
and
> >the men to operate them, you can expect that the greater percentage of
> >untoward incidents will also be in their pocket. Now, can you enlighten
us
> >as to just how a RN *AEW* helo (of all things--one would imagine that
such
> >aircraft are generally better informed about their surrounding traffic
> >conditions than most) managed to collide with *another* AEW helo (and in
the
> >process killed a USN officer on exchange duty)?
> >
> >As I said earlier, in war "**** happens". Even in the UK forces...
> >
> >Brooks
> >>
> >> Pat Carpenter
> >
> Probably the same way as the Patriot shot down two allied aircraft
> before a brave F16 pilot smoked the *******. Trouble is too many
> systems are treated like toys and not lethal weapons.

From
http://www.newscientist.com/hottopics/tech/article.jsp?id=99993575&sub=Security%20and%20Defence :

""History shows that fratricide is an unavoidable feature of warfare,"
admits the National Audit Office, Britain's public spending watchdog, in a
2002 report on the MoD's attempts to improve combat identification."

Treated like "toys" huh? From that statement one can assume you have little
first-hand experience with a profession at arms.

> As to the RN choppers, they both had their radomes stowed and were
> relying on shipboard radar control.

Gee, and not a single Yank around to take responsibility for the act (unless
you were planning on blaming the one who was killed...?

>
> To quote from a WWII saying :-
> "When the Luftwaffe bombed the Allies ducked, when the RAF bombed the
> Germans ducked but when the Americans bombed every f**ker ducked"

Regarding Operation Tractable (Falaise Gap):

"Bomber Command carried out this operation without American involvement, but
a large number of bombers, many ironically from 6 Group of the Royal
Canadian Air Force, bombed short."

Those short bombs caused casualties. Like I said, **** happens, even when
you Brits are the ones doing the dealing. George Washington noted a
Brit-on-Brit fratricide incident that occured during the French and Indian
War, when the detachment he was commanding came within sight of another
British element and both sides opened fire on each other. Maybe you think
Washington bears the sole burden for that event, too?

Brooks

>
> Pat Carpenter

[Matthew G. Saroff]

Ed Rasimus > wrote:

>On Sun, 14 Mar 2004 13:44:13 -0800, "Tarver Engineering"
> wrote:
>
>>
>>Do you think Cleland was fragged?
>>
>No, Cleland was a victim of his own clumsiness. He dropped the grenade
>out of his own hand. That story is pretty well known.

Ummm....No.

One of his men, who didn't know how th rig his pin
properly, dropped his grenade, and Cleland THOUGHT that it was
one of his.

Since he knew that he rigged his properly, he picked it
up.

All the planning in the world doesn't matter when an
angel pees down the barrel of your rifle.
--
--Matthew Saroff
Rules to live by:
1) To thine own self be true
2) Don't let your mouth write no checks that your butt can't cash
3) Interference in the time stream is forbidden, do not meddle in causality
Check http://www.pobox.com/~msaroff, including The Bad Hair Web Page

[Paul F Austin]

"John R Weiss" wrote
> "Tony Williams" wrote...
> >>
> >> In the CAS arena, the comparative lack of situational awareness on the
part
> of a
> >> remote UAV operator will most likely increase the probability of
friendly
> >> fire -- not reduce it.
> >
> > That's an interesting issue. A counter-argument could be that an
> > operator sitting safely back on the ground will be less stressed and
> > able to take more considered judgements - and if in doubt to call for
> > a second opinion from a senior officer looking over his shoulder.
>
> I would disagree with your argument. The UAV operator will already be
> handicapped by his narrow field of view, so any such judgements will be
made on
> a much smaller information basis.
>
> If the environment is such that a UAV can hang around long enough for
second
> opinions, it is also possible for a pilot to make an ID pass over the
target and
> get a verbal confirmation from the FAC. Also, in a multiple-target
environment,
> targeting by reference to nearby visual cues (e.g., geographical features
or
> smoke) is relatively straightforward for the pilot, but may be impossible
with a
> narrow field-of-view UAV sensor.

You're making the assumption that the FOV will remain "soda-straw". When you
consider the DAS baselined for F-35, an operator of a UAV designed to fly a
CAS mission could have the same situational awareness as a pilot on board
and _better_situational awareness than any aircraft now flying, essentially
a 4pi steradian field of regard The camera systems (from Indigo Systems
http://www.indigosystems.com/company/PR/pr_030318.html) are quite small and
would be feasible for an aircraft able to carry the ordnance in the first
place.

Current generation UAVs are designed as ISR platforms rather than as UCAVs.
Expect the sensor suite to be different for a different mission. In fact,
one of the "UCAV" platforms being bruited about is a pilotless F-35. There
are a lot of issues to be resolved and development to be done before a UCAV
flies a CAS mission but there are no laws of physics that prevent it from
happening.

The real question is whether a remotely piloted CAS aircraft works better
than one with a man aboard. The up side of a UCAV is more fuel and ordnance
for a given airframe, reduction of pilot fatigue and manning issues not to
mention reduction in people at risk. The down side is the vulnerability of
datalinks to jamming, airspace deconfliction and failure tolerance since an
on-board pilot can compensate to a limited extent for equipment failure and
damage..

Once that decision is made, then the correct requirements get levied against
the new system and off you go to the procurement races.

[Peter Stickney]

In article >,
Peter Kemp > writes:
> On Tue, 16 Mar 2004 20:55:50 GMT, "John R Weiss"
> > wrote:
>
>>"Tony Williams" > wrote...
>>
>>> Of course, but the opportunities for recognising different vehicles in
>>> different conditions from an aircraft must be limited, and looking at
>>> films isn't quite the same thing. My suggestion is that viewing
>>> training videos from UAVs would look exactly like what the operator
>>> would see on his screen for real. And he could do it again and again.
>>
>>The training opportunities you describe would be available equally to pilots and
>>UAV operators. The pilots would still have the advantage of being able to see
>>or visualize the broader picture available from the cockpit.
>>
>>Also, repeating the same "canned" scenarios ad nauseum may not provide any
>>additional training. Without experience, any difference from the already-seen
>>perspective may be unidentifiable.
>
> But the pilot is unlikely to be able to fit his copy of Janes Armour
> and Artillery in the cockpit, and the UAV jockey can have his next to
> his terminal.

Which, with the way that the business of who is on who's side is
stacking up these days, won't help a damned bit anyway. For example,
in 1991, during the Second Gulf War, you had among the Coalition
members Syria and re rump Kuwaiti Liberation Force, equipped with
Soviet T-62 and T-72 tanks, BMPs adn BTRs, (Or, in the Kuwaiti case,
the Yugoslav clones of same (M-84?). Fat lot of good recognizing
shapes is going to do you. Paint jobs don't help either, Once an
armored vehicle's been out of the Kaserne for 20 minutes, the only way
to tell what colors it had been painted is to wipe off the dust.

And somebody ele's point of having "Higher Authority" around to settle
policy matters doesn't particularly stack up, either. Consider the
case of teh U.S> Army UH-60 that was nailed by an F-15 in '91 or '92.
The pilots weren't 100% sure, one way or another, about their visual
ID of the aircraft. But they also had Higher Authority, in the form
of an AWACS Controller, screaming for them to shoot it.

--
Pete Stickney
A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many
bad measures. -- Daniel Webster

[Tarver Engineering]

"Paul F Austin" > wrote in message
...
>
> "John R Weiss" wrote
> > "Tony Williams" wrote...
> > >>
> > >> In the CAS arena, the comparative lack of situational awareness on
the
> part
> > of a
> > >> remote UAV operator will most likely increase the probability of
> friendly
> > >> fire -- not reduce it.
> > >
> > > That's an interesting issue. A counter-argument could be that an
> > > operator sitting safely back on the ground will be less stressed and
> > > able to take more considered judgements - and if in doubt to call for
> > > a second opinion from a senior officer looking over his shoulder.
> >
> > I would disagree with your argument. The UAV operator will already be
> > handicapped by his narrow field of view, so any such judgements will be
> made on
> > a much smaller information basis.
> >
> > If the environment is such that a UAV can hang around long enough for
> second
> > opinions, it is also possible for a pilot to make an ID pass over the
> target and
> > get a verbal confirmation from the FAC. Also, in a multiple-target
> environment,
> > targeting by reference to nearby visual cues (e.g., geographical
features
> or
> > smoke) is relatively straightforward for the pilot, but may be
impossible
> with a
> > narrow field-of-view UAV sensor.
>
> You're making the assumption that the FOV will remain "soda-straw". When
you
> consider the DAS baselined for F-35, an operator of a UAV designed to fly
a
> CAS mission could have the same situational awareness as a pilot on board
> and _better_situational awareness than any aircraft now flying,
essentially
> a 4pi steradian field of regard The camera systems (from Indigo Systems
> http://www.indigosystems.com/company/PR/pr_030318.html) are quite small
and
> would be feasible for an aircraft able to carry the ordnance in the first
> place.
>
> Current generation UAVs are designed as ISR platforms rather than as
UCAVs.
> Expect the sensor suite to be different for a different mission. In fact,
> one of the "UCAV" platforms being bruited about is a pilotless F-35. There
> are a lot of issues to be resolved and development to be done before a
UCAV
> flies a CAS mission but there are no laws of physics that prevent it from
> happening.
>
> The real question is whether a remotely piloted CAS aircraft works better
> than one with a man aboard. The up side of a UCAV is more fuel and
ordnance
> for a given airframe, reduction of pilot fatigue and manning issues not to
> mention reduction in people at risk. The down side is the vulnerability of
> datalinks to jamming, airspace deconfliction and failure tolerance since
an
> on-board pilot can compensate to a limited extent for equipment failure
and
> damage..
>
> Once that decision is made, then the correct requirements get levied
against
> the new system and off you go to the procurement races.

Get the price down and noone else can play.

[Pat Carpenter]

On Tue, 16 Mar 2004 20:15:03 -0500, "Kevin Brooks"
> wrote:

>
>"Pat Carpenter" > wrote in message
...
>> On Tue, 16 Mar 2004 12:49:55 -0500, "Kevin Brooks"
>> > wrote:
>>
>> >
>> >"Pat Carpenter" > wrote in message
>> ...
>> >> On Mon, 15 Mar 2004 01:11:01 -0500, "Kevin Brooks"
>> >> > wrote:
>> >>
>> >> >
>> >> >"Pat Carpenter" > wrote in message
>> >> ...
>> >> >> On Sun, 14 Mar 2004 20:26:27 -0800, Henry J Cobb >
>wrote:
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >John R Weiss wrote:
>> >> >> >> If anything, remote-controlled CAS platforms will increase
>> >> >blue-on-blue, and
>> >> >> >> they will likely be MORE vulnerable to defenses.
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >So when will we see a program to train A-10 pilots about the shapes
>of
>> >> >> >armored vehicles operated by the United States military?
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/10/02/sprj.irq.friendly.fire/
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >-HJC
>> >> >> Please include UK Warrior vehicles in that training.
>> >> >
>> >> >Before you get too smug, recall who clanged that Challenger around
>Basra
>> >> >during the latest visit to the area...twasn't the Yanks, and twasn't
>the
>> >> >Iraqis.
>> >> >
>> >> >Brooks
>> >> >
>> >> >>
>> >> >> Pat Carpenter
>> >> >
>> >> Agreed we did but the A-10's mangaged it in both GFI and GFII.
>> >
>> >Well, heck, when it is your side that is providing the bulk of the toys
>and
>> >the men to operate them, you can expect that the greater percentage of
>> >untoward incidents will also be in their pocket. Now, can you enlighten
>us
>> >as to just how a RN *AEW* helo (of all things--one would imagine that
>such
>> >aircraft are generally better informed about their surrounding traffic
>> >conditions than most) managed to collide with *another* AEW helo (and in
>the
>> >process killed a USN officer on exchange duty)?
>> >
>> >As I said earlier, in war "**** happens". Even in the UK forces...
>> >
>> >Brooks
>> >>
>> >> Pat Carpenter
>> >
>> Probably the same way as the Patriot shot down two allied aircraft
>> before a brave F16 pilot smoked the *******. Trouble is too many
>> systems are treated like toys and not lethal weapons.
>
What no excuse for the Patriot then?
>From
>http://www.newscientist.com/hottopics/tech/article.jsp?id=99993575&sub=Security%20and%20Defence :
>
>""History shows that fratricide is an unavoidable feature of warfare,"
>admits the National Audit Office, Britain's public spending watchdog, in a
>2002 report on the MoD's attempts to improve combat identification."
>
>Treated like "toys" huh? From that statement one can assume you have little
>first-hand experience with a profession at arms.

You called them toys, and when you start calling them toys you start
treating them like toys.
>
>> As to the RN choppers, they both had their radomes stowed and were
>> relying on shipboard radar control.
>
>Gee, and not a single Yank around to take responsibility for the act (unless
>you were planning on blaming the one who was killed...?
>
I don't remember blaming any Americans in that case, correct me if I'm
wrong.
>>
>> To quote from a WWII saying :-
>> "When the Luftwaffe bombed the Allies ducked, when the RAF bombed the
>> Germans ducked but when the Americans bombed every f**ker ducked"
>
>Regarding Operation Tractable (Falaise Gap):
>
>"Bomber Command carried out this operation without American involvement, but
>a large number of bombers, many ironically from 6 Group of the Royal
>Canadian Air Force, bombed short."
>

"The American air force bombed the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division as
they were in a staging area ready to attack the enemy"

>"
>Those short bombs caused casualties. Like I said, **** happens, even when
>you Brits are the ones doing the dealing. George Washington noted a
>Brit-on-Brit fratricide incident that occured during the French and Indian
>War, when the detachment he was commanding came within sight of another
>British element and both sides opened fire on each other. Maybe you think
>Washington bears the sole burden for that event, too?
>
>Brooks
>
>>
>> Pat Carpenter
>
Pat Carpenter

[Kevin Brooks]

"Pat Carpenter" > wrote in message
...
> On Tue, 16 Mar 2004 20:15:03 -0500, "Kevin Brooks"
> > wrote:
>
> >
> >"Pat Carpenter" > wrote in message
> ...
> >> On Tue, 16 Mar 2004 12:49:55 -0500, "Kevin Brooks"
> >> > wrote:
> >>
> >> >
> >> >"Pat Carpenter" > wrote in message
> >> ...
> >> >> On Mon, 15 Mar 2004 01:11:01 -0500, "Kevin Brooks"
> >> >> > wrote:
> >> >>
> >> >> >
> >> >> >"Pat Carpenter" > wrote in message
> >> >> ...
> >> >> >> On Sun, 14 Mar 2004 20:26:27 -0800, Henry J Cobb >
> >wrote:
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> >John R Weiss wrote:
> >> >> >> >> If anything, remote-controlled CAS platforms will increase
> >> >> >blue-on-blue, and
> >> >> >> >> they will likely be MORE vulnerable to defenses.
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >So when will we see a program to train A-10 pilots about the
shapes
> >of
> >> >> >> >armored vehicles operated by the United States military?
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/10/02/sprj.irq.friendly.fire/
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >-HJC
> >> >> >> Please include UK Warrior vehicles in that training.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >Before you get too smug, recall who clanged that Challenger around
> >Basra
> >> >> >during the latest visit to the area...twasn't the Yanks, and
twasn't
> >the
> >> >> >Iraqis.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >Brooks
> >> >> >
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> Pat Carpenter
> >> >> >
> >> >> Agreed we did but the A-10's mangaged it in both GFI and GFII.
> >> >
> >> >Well, heck, when it is your side that is providing the bulk of the
toys
> >and
> >> >the men to operate them, you can expect that the greater percentage of
> >> >untoward incidents will also be in their pocket. Now, can you
enlighten
> >us
> >> >as to just how a RN *AEW* helo (of all things--one would imagine that
> >such
> >> >aircraft are generally better informed about their surrounding traffic
> >> >conditions than most) managed to collide with *another* AEW helo (and
in
> >the
> >> >process killed a USN officer on exchange duty)?
> >> >
> >> >As I said earlier, in war "**** happens". Even in the UK forces...
> >> >
> >> >Brooks
> >> >>
> >> >> Pat Carpenter
> >> >
> >> Probably the same way as the Patriot shot down two allied aircraft
> >> before a brave F16 pilot smoked the *******. Trouble is too many
> >> systems are treated like toys and not lethal weapons.
> >
> What no excuse for the Patriot then?

Excuses? We don' need no stinkin' 'scuses... Like I said, **** happens.

> >From
>
>http://www.newscientist.com/hottopics/tech/article.jsp?id=99993575&sub=Secu
rity%20and%20Defence :
> >
> >""History shows that fratricide is an unavoidable feature of warfare,"
> >admits the National Audit Office, Britain's public spending watchdog, in
a
> >2002 report on the MoD's attempts to improve combat identification."
> >
> >Treated like "toys" huh? From that statement one can assume you have
little
> >first-hand experience with a profession at arms.
>
> You called them toys, and when you start calling them toys you start
> treating them like toys.

Not really. You are rather clueless regarding modern weapons, eh?

> >
> >> As to the RN choppers, they both had their radomes stowed and were
> >> relying on shipboard radar control.
> >
> >Gee, and not a single Yank around to take responsibility for the act
(unless
> >you were planning on blaming the one who was killed...?
> >
> I don't remember blaming any Americans in that case, correct me if I'm
> wrong.

Actually, from the beginning you have taken a rather singleminded approach
to pointing out the US related incidents. When it was merely pointed out to
you that fratricide events have been common to both our respective forces,
you wanted to start tossing out more allegations of US responsibility. Hate
to tell you this, but fratricide is a factor of war; we try to control it as
best we can, but it *will* continue to rear its ugly little head...even
within HM forces.

> >>
> >> To quote from a WWII saying :-
> >> "When the Luftwaffe bombed the Allies ducked, when the RAF bombed the
> >> Germans ducked but when the Americans bombed every f**ker ducked"
> >
> >Regarding Operation Tractable (Falaise Gap):
> >
> >"Bomber Command carried out this operation without American involvement,
but
> >a large number of bombers, many ironically from 6 Group of the Royal
> >Canadian Air Force, bombed short."
> >
>
> "The American air force bombed the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division as
> they were in a staging area ready to attack the enemy"

We sure did, a bit earlier; we also hammered our own 30th Inf Division not
once, but twice during the COBRA effort. Malmedy got bombed not once but
twice by both B-24's and B-26's. And as we see from the above, so did you.
See what I mean about "**** happens" being applicable to everyone, not just
we 'mercans?

Brooks

>
> >"
> >Those short bombs caused casualties. Like I said, **** happens, even when
> >you Brits are the ones doing the dealing. George Washington noted a
> >Brit-on-Brit fratricide incident that occured during the French and
Indian
> >War, when the detachment he was commanding came within sight of another
> >British element and both sides opened fire on each other. Maybe you think
> >Washington bears the sole burden for that event, too?
> >
> >Brooks
> >
> >>
> >> Pat Carpenter
> >
> Pat Carpenter

[John Keeney]

"Paul F Austin" > wrote in message
...
>
> You're making the assumption that the FOV will remain "soda-straw". When
you

A reasonable assumption on his part I'm afraid.

> consider the DAS baselined for F-35, an operator of a UAV designed to fly
a
> CAS mission could have the same situational awareness as a pilot on board
> and _better_situational awareness than any aircraft now flying,
essentially
> a 4pi steradian field of regard The camera systems (from Indigo Systems
> http://www.indigosystems.com/company/PR/pr_030318.html) are quite small
and
> would be feasible for an aircraft able to carry the ordnance in the first
> place.

Cameras haven't been the problem for at least the last 30 years, the band
width
to move their product back to the controller is.

> Current generation UAVs are designed as ISR platforms rather than as
UCAVs.
> Expect the sensor suite to be different for a different mission. In fact,
> one of the "UCAV" platforms being bruited about is a pilotless F-35. There
> are a lot of issues to be resolved and development to be done before a
UCAV
> flies a CAS mission but there are no laws of physics that prevent it from
> happening.

Agreed.

> The real question is whether a remotely piloted CAS aircraft works better
> than one with a man aboard. The up side of a UCAV is more fuel and
ordnance
> for a given airframe, reduction of pilot fatigue and manning issues not to
> mention reduction in people at risk. The down side is the vulnerability of
> datalinks to jamming, airspace deconfliction and failure tolerance since
an
> on-board pilot can compensate to a limited extent for equipment failure
and
> damage..

An item of concern is the numbers of UCAV you could have up at any given
time to perform CAS or other missions. With manned planes the limit is
pretty much how many planes you have. With UCAVs, unless they are
autonomous,
there are limits to how many ways you can divide up the available control
band width to use theUCAVs concurrently.
It may be that manned planes will continue to be needed for high intensity
operations long after UCAV become capable of CAS.

[Paul F Austin]

"John Keeney" > wrote in message
...
>
> "Paul F Austin" > wrote in message
> ...
> >
> > You're making the assumption that the FOV will remain "soda-straw". When
> you
>
> A reasonable assumption on his part I'm afraid.
>
> > consider the DAS baselined for F-35, an operator of a UAV designed to
fly
> a
> > CAS mission could have the same situational awareness as a pilot on
board
> > and _better_situational awareness than any aircraft now flying,
> essentially
> > a 4pi steradian field of regard The camera systems (from Indigo Systems
> > http://www.indigosystems.com/company/PR/pr_030318.html) are quite small
> and
> > would be feasible for an aircraft able to carry the ordnance in the
first
> > place.
>
> Cameras haven't been the problem for at least the last 30 years, the band
> width
> to move their product back to the controller is.

In the near term, TCDL will provide sufficient connectivity to (for
instance) provide uplink video from a DAS-like system. The higher rate CDL
services should be available to support UCAVs_if the need drives the
requirement_.

>
> > Current generation UAVs are designed as ISR platforms rather than as
> UCAVs.
> > Expect the sensor suite to be different for a different mission. In
fact,
> > one of the "UCAV" platforms being bruited about is a pilotless F-35.
There
> > are a lot of issues to be resolved and development to be done before a
> UCAV
> > flies a CAS mission but there are no laws of physics that prevent it
from
> > happening.
>
> Agreed.
>
> > The real question is whether a remotely piloted CAS aircraft works
better
> > than one with a man aboard. The up side of a UCAV is more fuel and
> ordnance
> > for a given airframe, reduction of pilot fatigue and manning issues not
to
> > mention reduction in people at risk. The down side is the vulnerability
of
> > datalinks to jamming, airspace deconfliction and failure tolerance since
> an
> > on-board pilot can compensate to a limited extent for equipment failure
> and
> > damage..
>
> An item of concern is the numbers of UCAV you could have up at any given
> time to perform CAS or other missions. With manned planes the limit is
> pretty much how many planes you have. With UCAVs, unless they are
> autonomous,
> there are limits to how many ways you can divide up the available control
> band width to use theUCAVs concurrently.
> It may be that manned planes will continue to be needed for high intensity
> operations long after UCAV become capable of CAS.

That may be the case but I don't think datalink BW will be the limiting
factor. There are several other network and platform requirements that are
driving the satellite up/downlink and inter-aircraft datalink data rates, so
this isn't a UCAV-driven development. As I said, deconfliction is an
issue-because-most of the time, puttative UCAVs will operate autonomously
with operator direct control and sensing being intermittent, depending on
what's going on. Operators may be located remotely and communicate over
satellite links or they may be "in the area" and communicate by TCDL.
There's obviously trades to be done there.

[John R Weiss]

"Paul F Austin" > wrote...
> You're making the assumption that the FOV will remain "soda-straw". When you
> consider the DAS baselined for F-35, an operator of a UAV designed to fly a
> CAS mission could have the same situational awareness as a pilot on board
> and _better_situational awareness than any aircraft now flying, essentially
> a 4pi steradian field of regard The camera systems (from Indigo Systems
> http://www.indigosystems.com/company/PR/pr_030318.html) are quite small and
> would be feasible for an aircraft able to carry the ordnance in the first
> place.

Looks like an interesting concept, but probably not as straightforward as you
imagine...

Assuming the system performs as advertised, I would see the major stumbling
block to be the display to the UAV operator. A "helmet sight" display would be
too narrow for situational awareness, unless it was slaved to his head
movements. However, if you could sit him inside a dome (similar to current
advanced flight simulators) and project the "stitched" images around him, it
could work. Transmitting that much data to a remote operator and processing it
in real time could be a significant problem, though.

Another problem would be to get the operator used to visualizing the world in
IR. All his threat training would have to be based on IR imagery to be useful
with his IR sensor suite. Target ID becomes a significant problem again in
terms of blue-on-blue potential.


> Current generation UAVs are designed as ISR platforms rather than as UCAVs.
> Expect the sensor suite to be different for a different mission. In fact,
> one of the "UCAV" platforms being bruited about is a pilotless F-35. There
> are a lot of issues to be resolved and development to be done before a UCAV
> flies a CAS mission but there are no laws of physics that prevent it from
> happening.

I agree about the laws of physics. I still see significant problems to
overcome, and those will cost significant $$. It's difficult to guess whether
the payback will be good enough to pursue the concept in earnest.


> The real question is whether a remotely piloted CAS aircraft works better
> than one with a man aboard. The up side of a UCAV is more fuel and ordnance
> for a given airframe, reduction of pilot fatigue and manning issues not to
> mention reduction in people at risk. The down side is the vulnerability of
> datalinks to jamming, airspace deconfliction and failure tolerance since an
> on-board pilot can compensate to a limited extent for equipment failure and
> damage..

I see more vulnerability in the UCAV than just data link jamming. In a
permissive threat environment, the vulnerability issue may not be
insurmountable. However, CAS is performed by definition in an environment where
ground troops are closely engaged. With the plethora of mobile, ground-based
anti-air defenses, a UCAV is much more likely to be shot down than a piloted
airplane, simply because the operator will not be able to detect threats as
well. Add the fact that the operator doesn't have his own butt at risk, and he
is less likely to see defensive maneuvering as a dire necessity.


> Once that decision is made, then the correct requirements get levied against
> the new system and off you go to the procurement races.

I certainly see a future for UCAVs in general. However, I believe the CAS
mission is one of the least likely to succeed for them.

[Pat Carpenter]

On Tue, 16 Mar 2004 23:44:33 -0500, "Kevin Brooks"
> wrote:

>
>"Pat Carpenter" > wrote in message
...
>> On Tue, 16 Mar 2004 20:15:03 -0500, "Kevin Brooks"
>> > wrote:
>>
>> >
>> >"Pat Carpenter" > wrote in message
>> ...
>> >> On Tue, 16 Mar 2004 12:49:55 -0500, "Kevin Brooks"
>> >> > wrote:
>> >>
>> >> >
>> >> >"Pat Carpenter" > wrote in message
>> >> ...
>> >> >> On Mon, 15 Mar 2004 01:11:01 -0500, "Kevin Brooks"
>> >> >> > wrote:
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >"Pat Carpenter" > wrote in message
>> >> >> ...
>> >> >> >> On Sun, 14 Mar 2004 20:26:27 -0800, Henry J Cobb >
>> >wrote:
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >> >John R Weiss wrote:
>> >> >> >> >> If anything, remote-controlled CAS platforms will increase
>> >> >> >blue-on-blue, and
>> >> >> >> >> they will likely be MORE vulnerable to defenses.
>> >> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> >So when will we see a program to train A-10 pilots about the
>shapes
>> >of
>> >> >> >> >armored vehicles operated by the United States military?
>> >> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> >http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/10/02/sprj.irq.friendly.fire/
>> >> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> >-HJC
>> >> >> >> Please include UK Warrior vehicles in that training.
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >Before you get too smug, recall who clanged that Challenger around
>> >Basra
>> >> >> >during the latest visit to the area...twasn't the Yanks, and
>twasn't
>> >the
>> >> >> >Iraqis.
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >Brooks
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >> Pat Carpenter
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> Agreed we did but the A-10's mangaged it in both GFI and GFII.
>> >> >
>> >> >Well, heck, when it is your side that is providing the bulk of the
>toys
>> >and
>> >> >the men to operate them, you can expect that the greater percentage of
>> >> >untoward incidents will also be in their pocket. Now, can you
>enlighten
>> >us

So on that logic then you are saying that you were providing the
majority of the allied targets. So why weren't the Brit's, Canadians
etc. killing large numbers of American participants?

>> >> >as to just how a RN *AEW* helo (of all things--one would imagine that
>> >such
>> >> >aircraft are generally better informed about their surrounding traffic
>> >> >conditions than most) managed to collide with *another* AEW helo (and
>in
>> >the
>> >> >process killed a USN officer on exchange duty)?
>> >> >
>> >> >As I said earlier, in war "**** happens". Even in the UK forces...
>> >> >
>> >> >Brooks
>> >> >>
>> >> >> Pat Carpenter
>> >> >
>> >> Probably the same way as the Patriot shot down two allied aircraft
>> >> before a brave F16 pilot smoked the *******. Trouble is too many
>> >> systems are treated like toys and not lethal weapons.
>> >
>> What no excuse for the Patriot then?
>
>Excuses? We don' need no stinkin' 'scuses... Like I said, **** happens.

Sorry but **** doesn't just happen, it is normally caused by a string
of events ( try going on an accident investigation course). One should
never just accept it but try to stop it ever happening again.
>
>> >From
>>
>>http://www.newscientist.com/hottopics/tech/article.jsp?id=99993575&sub=Secu
>rity%20and%20Defence :
>> >
>> >""History shows that fratricide is an unavoidable feature of warfare,"
>> >admits the National Audit Office, Britain's public spending watchdog, in
>a
>> >2002 report on the MoD's attempts to improve combat identification."
>> >
>> >Treated like "toys" huh? From that statement one can assume you have
>little
>> >first-hand experience with a profession at arms.
>>

I have been on the close recieving end of some of your modern "toys"
twice in the last decade and a half, have you?

>> You called them toys, and when you start calling them toys you start
>> treating them like toys.
>
>Not really. You are rather clueless regarding modern weapons, eh?
>
I've targeted them, fired them and nearly been killed by them, hence I
think the reverse may be more the case.

>> >
>> >> As to the RN choppers, they both had their radomes stowed and were
>> >> relying on shipboard radar control.
>> >
>> >Gee, and not a single Yank around to take responsibility for the act
>(unless
>> >you were planning on blaming the one who was killed...?
>> >
>> I don't remember blaming any Americans in that case, correct me if I'm
>> wrong.
>
>Actually, from the beginning you have taken a rather singleminded approach
>to pointing out the US related incidents. When it was merely pointed out to
>you that fratricide events have been common to both our respective forces,
>you wanted to start tossing out more allegations of US responsibility. Hate
>to tell you this, but fratricide is a factor of war; we try to control it as
>best we can, but it *will* continue to rear its ugly little head...even
>within HM forces.
>
Please re-read the start of my contribution and you will see than I
just added to an American's request that A-10's recieve better ID
training.
>> >>
>> >> To quote from a WWII saying :-
>> >> "When the Luftwaffe bombed the Allies ducked, when the RAF bombed the
>> >> Germans ducked but when the Americans bombed every f**ker ducked"
>> >
>> >Regarding Operation Tractable (Falaise Gap):
>> >
>> >"Bomber Command carried out this operation without American involvement,
>but
>> >a large number of bombers, many ironically from 6 Group of the Royal
>> >Canadian Air Force, bombed short."
>> >
>>
>> "The American air force bombed the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division as
>> they were in a staging area ready to attack the enemy"
>
>We sure did, a bit earlier; we also hammered our own 30th Inf Division not
>once, but twice during the COBRA effort. Malmedy got bombed not once but
>twice by both B-24's and B-26's. And as we see from the above, so did you.
>See what I mean about "**** happens" being applicable to everyone, not just
>we 'mercans?
>
>Brooks
>
>>
>> >"
>> >Those short bombs caused casualties. Like I said, **** happens, even when
>> >you Brits are the ones doing the dealing. George Washington noted a
>> >Brit-on-Brit fratricide incident that occured during the French and
>Indian
>> >War, when the detachment he was commanding came within sight of another
>> >British element and both sides opened fire on each other. Maybe you think
>> >Washington bears the sole burden for that event, too?
>> >

I think that maybe that you are still living in those far off days.
"**** happens" won't cut it any more in this day and age, if you
really believe that then please stay away from any thing more lethal
than a pocket knife.

>> >Brooks
>> >
>> >>
>> >> Pat Carpenter
>> >
>> Pat Carpenter
>
Pat Carpenter

[Paul F Austin]

"John R Weiss" > wrote in message
news:t1%5c.30768$_w.528631@attbi_s53...
> "Paul F Austin" > wrote...
> > You're making the assumption that the FOV will remain "soda-straw". When
you
> > consider the DAS baselined for F-35, an operator of a UAV designed to
fly a
> > CAS mission could have the same situational awareness as a pilot on
board
> > and _better_situational awareness than any aircraft now flying,
essentially
> > a 4pi steradian field of regard The camera systems (from Indigo Systems
> > http://www.indigosystems.com/company/PR/pr_030318.html) are quite small
and
> > would be feasible for an aircraft able to carry the ordnance in the
first
> > place.
>
> Looks like an interesting concept, but probably not as straightforward as
you
> imagine...
>
> Assuming the system performs as advertised, I would see the major
stumbling
> block to be the display to the UAV operator. A "helmet sight" display
would be
> too narrow for situational awareness, unless it was slaved to his head
> movements. However, if you could sit him inside a dome (similar to
current
> advanced flight simulators) and project the "stitched" images around him,
it
> could work. Transmitting that much data to a remote operator and
processing it
> in real time could be a significant problem, though.

You should read a bit about F-35. That's precisely how DAS will work. The
HMS will project the DAS camera images depending on where the pilot is
looking. The description in AvWeek said that even if aircraft structure was
"in the way", the pilot would be given the view along the sight line he was
looking at. If a wing is in the way, he'll have "X-ray vision". And since
the DAS cameras are IR there's that extra advantage.

When I first looked at F-35, it seemed a looong step backward in terms of
situational awareness, with virtually no rear-quadrant visibility. DAS
promises to fix that. If it works for F-35 then it should work for UCAVs.

>
> Another problem would be to get the operator used to visualizing the world
in
> IR. All his threat training would have to be based on IR imagery to be
useful
> with his IR sensor suite. Target ID becomes a significant problem again
in
> terms of blue-on-blue potential.

That's true but it's currently true for NVG flight. CAS doesn't stop at
sundown. There's a whole lot of work being done on Blue-Force Tracking which
was used in rudimentary fashion in Iraq-II.

[Peter Kemp]

On Tue, 16 Mar 2004 22:19:11 -0500, (Peter
Stickney) wrote:

>In article >,
> Peter Kemp > writes:
>> But the pilot is unlikely to be able to fit his copy of Janes Armour
>> and Artillery in the cockpit, and the UAV jockey can have his next to
>> his terminal.
>
>Which, with the way that the business of who is on who's side is
>stacking up these days, won't help a damned bit anyway. For example,
>in 1991, during the Second Gulf War, you had among the Coalition
>members Syria and re rump Kuwaiti Liberation Force, equipped with
>Soviet T-62 and T-72 tanks, BMPs adn BTRs, (Or, in the Kuwaiti case,
>the Yugoslav clones of same (M-84?). Fat lot of good recognizing
>shapes is going to do you.

Which is why most of the allies were kept the hell out fo the way to
avoid really bad fratricide issues, just like the Omani (or was it
UAE?) Mirage F-1s were kept doing CAP in the rear areas to avoid
getting splashed forward where the trouble was. IIRC the basic role of
our Arab allies was to look good on paper, and enter Kuwait City
first, while the toughest work was being done in the desert by the US,
UK, and French.

>And somebody ele's point of having "Higher Authority" around to settle
>policy matters doesn't particularly stack up, either. Consider the
>case of teh U.S> Army UH-60 that was nailed by an F-15 in '91 or '92.
>The pilots weren't 100% sure, one way or another, about their visual
>ID of the aircraft. But they also had Higher Authority, in the form
>of an AWACS Controller, screaming for them to shoot it.

True, you're always vulnerable to someone in authority overriding
those with more info.

---
Peter Kemp

Life is short - drink faster

[Kevin Brooks]

"Pat Carpenter" > wrote in message
...
> On Tue, 16 Mar 2004 23:44:33 -0500, "Kevin Brooks"
> > wrote:
>
> >
> >"Pat Carpenter" > wrote in message
> ...
> >> On Tue, 16 Mar 2004 20:15:03 -0500, "Kevin Brooks"
> >> > wrote:
> >>
> >> >
> >> >"Pat Carpenter" > wrote in message
> >> ...
> >> >> On Tue, 16 Mar 2004 12:49:55 -0500, "Kevin Brooks"
> >> >> > wrote:
> >> >>
> >> >> >
> >> >> >"Pat Carpenter" > wrote in message
> >> >> ...
> >> >> >> On Mon, 15 Mar 2004 01:11:01 -0500, "Kevin Brooks"
> >> >> >> > wrote:
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >"Pat Carpenter" > wrote in
message
> >> >> >> ...
> >> >> >> >> On Sun, 14 Mar 2004 20:26:27 -0800, Henry J Cobb
>
> >> >wrote:
> >> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> >> >John R Weiss wrote:
> >> >> >> >> >> If anything, remote-controlled CAS platforms will increase
> >> >> >> >blue-on-blue, and
> >> >> >> >> >> they will likely be MORE vulnerable to defenses.
> >> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >> >So when will we see a program to train A-10 pilots about the
> >shapes
> >> >of
> >> >> >> >> >armored vehicles operated by the United States military?
> >> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >> >http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/10/02/sprj.irq.friendly.fire/
> >> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >> >-HJC
> >> >> >> >> Please include UK Warrior vehicles in that training.
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >Before you get too smug, recall who clanged that Challenger
around
> >> >Basra
> >> >> >> >during the latest visit to the area...twasn't the Yanks, and
> >twasn't
> >> >the
> >> >> >> >Iraqis.
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >Brooks
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> >> Pat Carpenter
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> Agreed we did but the A-10's mangaged it in both GFI and GFII.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >Well, heck, when it is your side that is providing the bulk of the
> >toys
> >> >and
> >> >> >the men to operate them, you can expect that the greater percentage
of
> >> >> >untoward incidents will also be in their pocket. Now, can you
> >enlighten
> >> >us
>
> So on that logic then you are saying that you were providing the
> majority of the allied targets. So why weren't the Brit's, Canadians
> etc. killing large numbers of American participants?

Uhmmm...how many Canadians did you see on the ground (or in the air) during
this last Gulf event? Or for that matter during the first one? How many RAF
sorties were dedicated to CAS during ODS, and how many CAS sorties did they
fly for US forces during this latest fight? YOUR logic appears to be the
flawed item here. Again, why do you on the one hand claim that you have no
beef with the US, yet on the other hand come out with this kind of nonsense
(and a few messages late, too)?

>
> >> >> >as to just how a RN *AEW* helo (of all things--one would imagine
that
> >> >such
> >> >> >aircraft are generally better informed about their surrounding
traffic
> >> >> >conditions than most) managed to collide with *another* AEW helo
(and
> >in
> >> >the
> >> >> >process killed a USN officer on exchange duty)?
> >> >> >
> >> >> >As I said earlier, in war "**** happens". Even in the UK forces...
> >> >> >
> >> >> >Brooks
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> Pat Carpenter
> >> >> >
> >> >> Probably the same way as the Patriot shot down two allied aircraft
> >> >> before a brave F16 pilot smoked the *******. Trouble is too many
> >> >> systems are treated like toys and not lethal weapons.
> >> >
> >> What no excuse for the Patriot then?
> >
> >Excuses? We don' need no stinkin' 'scuses... Like I said, **** happens.
>
> Sorry but **** doesn't just happen, it is normally caused by a string
> of events ( try going on an accident investigation course). One should
> never just accept it but try to stop it ever happening again.

LOL! Now where did I say that we should stop trying to prevent fratricide
incidents? H'mmm? FYI, there is a big difference between realizing that
fratricide incidents will occur during major combat operations (and
sometimes even during training events), and adopting a the-hell-with-it
attitude. Excuses are not worth much; you go back and figure out what went
wrong, and try to prevent it from happening again in the future. That is the
correct approach. Your approach, where you just wring your hands and whine
about US incidents while desperately trying to ignore those incidents
attributed to your own forces is rather meaningless.

> >
> >> >From
> >>
>
>>http://www.newscientist.com/hottopics/tech/article.jsp?id=99993575&sub=Sec
u
> >rity%20and%20Defence :
> >> >
> >> >""History shows that fratricide is an unavoidable feature of warfare,"
> >> >admits the National Audit Office, Britain's public spending watchdog,
in
> >a
> >> >2002 report on the MoD's attempts to improve combat identification."
> >> >
> >> >Treated like "toys" huh? From that statement one can assume you have
> >little
> >> >first-hand experience with a profession at arms.
> >>
>
> I have been on the close recieving end of some of your modern "toys"
> twice in the last decade and a half, have you?

Where and when? In my case was lucky enough to never experience the
intentional efforts of someone trying to kill me--the closest I have come
was having to skidaddle out of a range area when M110 8" guns started
shooting over our head into the nearby impact area, and having to go from
chest-defilade in the commander's hatch of a M113A1 to vision block use
lickity-split when the ignoramus gunner in the M60A3 tooling along on my
right decided it was a good time to enage the pop-up Hind target on my left
during a LFX phase at NTC (the observer controller caught that one and
"killed" the tank with a MILES "God Gun" so he could tear the TC a new
rear-opening). Been around TOW's that did the boost-without-sustainer dance
across the desert floor, and a bit too close for comfort during a couple of
explosives detonations. Was on the training range when another M60A3
sprinkled a CAV Troops M113 with some long range MG fire and was lasing in
preparation for pumping a training APDS round into it when the radio calls
got the TC's attention and a rather nasty situation was narrowly avoided.
Performed range clearance ops with EOD once, but that was not particularly
dangerous as long as you avoided the odd 40mm AGL "silver easter egg" we
came across. saw a lot of friendlies get waxed during corps WFX in
Germany--luckily they were reall just electrons scurrying around in the
simulation database (though the officer responsible, a good friend and at
the time working for me, took it pretty hard, putting "paid" to any idea you
may have that we don't really care about frat incidents).

>
> >> You called them toys, and when you start calling them toys you start
> >> treating them like toys.
> >
> >Not really. You are rather clueless regarding modern weapons, eh?
> >
> I've targeted them, fired them and nearly been killed by them, hence I
> think the reverse may be more the case.

Odd then that you have this one-sided view of fratricide as being a purely
US inspired event.

>
> >> >
> >> >> As to the RN choppers, they both had their radomes stowed and were
> >> >> relying on shipboard radar control.
> >> >
> >> >Gee, and not a single Yank around to take responsibility for the act
> >(unless
> >> >you were planning on blaming the one who was killed...?
> >> >
> >> I don't remember blaming any Americans in that case, correct me if I'm
> >> wrong.
> >
> >Actually, from the beginning you have taken a rather singleminded
approach
> >to pointing out the US related incidents. When it was merely pointed out
to
> >you that fratricide events have been common to both our respective
forces,
> >you wanted to start tossing out more allegations of US responsibility.
Hate
> >to tell you this, but fratricide is a factor of war; we try to control it
as
> >best we can, but it *will* continue to rear its ugly little head...even
> >within HM forces.
> >
> Please re-read the start of my contribution and you will see than I
> just added to an American's request that A-10's recieve better ID
> training.

Ever flown at low altitude and tried to pick out and identify *known*
targets? Having only done so from the comparitively slow platforms like the
UH-1 and CH-47, I can tell you that it is not all that easy to do. That you
apparently think it should be is telling. Now, oddly you find the A-10
community so needful of this additional training that you not only had to
chime in with what you note above, but when it was pointed out that
fratricide events were all too common to your own forces as well (not
instead of) as our own, you had to start lunging out with more "its the US
that does it" crap. Nobody has denied the US forces have indeed accounted
for our share of frat incidents, but if vehicle ID is your beef, then I
suggest that starting with your own freakin' Challenger crews might be a
better place to *start* that additional training, it being a bit easier to
make a good ID from a tank sitting still than it is from an A-10 flying
overhead (even at its less-than-stellar speed).

> >> >>
> >> >> To quote from a WWII saying :-
> >> >> "When the Luftwaffe bombed the Allies ducked, when the RAF bombed
the
> >> >> Germans ducked but when the Americans bombed every f**ker ducked"
> >> >
> >> >Regarding Operation Tractable (Falaise Gap):
> >> >
> >> >"Bomber Command carried out this operation without American
involvement,
> >but
> >> >a large number of bombers, many ironically from 6 Group of the Royal
> >> >Canadian Air Force, bombed short."
> >> >
> >>
> >> "The American air force bombed the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division as
> >> they were in a staging area ready to attack the enemy"
> >
> >We sure did, a bit earlier; we also hammered our own 30th Inf Division
not
> >once, but twice during the COBRA effort. Malmedy got bombed not once but
> >twice by both B-24's and B-26's. And as we see from the above, so did
you.
> >See what I mean about "**** happens" being applicable to everyone, not
just
> >we 'mercans?
> >
> >Brooks
> >
> >>
> >> >"
> >> >Those short bombs caused casualties. Like I said, **** happens, even
when
> >> >you Brits are the ones doing the dealing. George Washington noted a
> >> >Brit-on-Brit fratricide incident that occured during the French and
> >Indian
> >> >War, when the detachment he was commanding came within sight of
another
> >> >British element and both sides opened fire on each other. Maybe you
think
> >> >Washington bears the sole burden for that event, too?
> >> >
>
> I think that maybe that you are still living in those far off days.
> "**** happens" won't cut it any more in this day and age, if you
> really believe that then please stay away from any thing more lethal
> than a pocket knife.

"**** happens" is quite adequate in conveying the fact that fratricide
events ARE a part of combat, despite the shrill whining of you and the
general media. Even your OWN forces recognize that (see that quote from your
own MoD). That does not imply that we do not, or should not, try to minimize
them.

Brooks


>
> >> >Brooks
> >> >
> >> >>
> >> >> Pat Carpenter
> >> >
> >> Pat Carpenter
> >
> Pat Carpenter

[Thomas Schoene]

Paul F Austin wrote:

> When I first looked at F-35, it seemed a looong step backward in
> terms of situational awareness, with virtually no rear-quadrant
> visibility. DAS promises to fix that. If it works for F-35 then it
> should work for UCAVs.

The bandwidth issue is still a real concern. That's a lot of data to
transmit via long-range RF signal, and there's already lots of competition
for the spectrum. What's possible to do by wire or fiber inside the
aircraft may not be practical via radio to a remote operator.

--
Tom Schoene Replace "invalid" with "net" to e-mail
"Our country, right or wrong. When right, to be kept right, when
wrong to be put right." - Senator Carl Schurz, 1872

[John R Weiss]

"Paul F Austin" > wrote...
>
> You should read a bit about F-35. That's precisely how DAS will work. The
> HMS will project the DAS camera images depending on where the pilot is
> looking. The description in AvWeek said that even if aircraft structure was
> "in the way", the pilot would be given the view along the sight line he was
> looking at. If a wing is in the way, he'll have "X-ray vision". And since
> the DAS cameras are IR there's that extra advantage.

I didn't read all that capability (e.g., "X-ray vision") into the stuff I have
read about DAS, but it sounds plausible in concept. However, for a UAV there
will be a cost/weight bogey to overcome, plus the data bandwidth and reliability
to transmit all that video real-time to the operator.


>> Another problem would be to get the operator used to visualizing the world in
>> IR. All his threat training would have to be based on IR imagery to be
useful
>> with his IR sensor suite. Target ID becomes a significant problem again in
>> terms of blue-on-blue potential.
>
> That's true but it's currently true for NVG flight. CAS doesn't stop at
> sundown. There's a whole lot of work being done on Blue-Force Tracking which
> was used in rudimentary fashion in Iraq-II.

Yep... and the time when the expected transponder or other tracking device
isn't working is the time blue-on-blue will be most likely. That is when the
hard decisions have to be made real time, sometimes in a few seconds or less.
Even assuming comparable sensor suites, the pilot over the battlefield will have
a distinct advantage over the remote UAV operator.

I'm not trying to say CAS with UCAVs is impossible; I just cannot accept the
contention that blue-on-blue will somehow be reduced or eliminated because of
their use.

[Pat Carpenter]

On Wed, 17 Mar 2004 20:54:48 -0500, "Kevin Brooks"
> wrote:

>
>"Pat Carpenter" > wrote in message
...
>> On Tue, 16 Mar 2004 23:44:33 -0500, "Kevin Brooks"
>> > wrote:
>>
>> >
>> >"Pat Carpenter" > wrote in message
>> ...
>> >> On Tue, 16 Mar 2004 20:15:03 -0500, "Kevin Brooks"
>> >> > wrote:
>> >>
>> >> >
>> >> >"Pat Carpenter" > wrote in message
>> >> ...
>> >> >> On Tue, 16 Mar 2004 12:49:55 -0500, "Kevin Brooks"
>> >> >> > wrote:
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >"Pat Carpenter" > wrote in message
>> >> >> ...
>> >> >> >> On Mon, 15 Mar 2004 01:11:01 -0500, "Kevin Brooks"
>> >> >> >> > wrote:
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> >"Pat Carpenter" > wrote in
>message
>> >> >> >> ...
>> >> >> >> >> On Sun, 14 Mar 2004 20:26:27 -0800, Henry J Cobb
>
>> >> >wrote:
>> >> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >> >> >John R Weiss wrote:
>> >> >> >> >> >> If anything, remote-controlled CAS platforms will increase
>> >> >> >> >blue-on-blue, and
>> >> >> >> >> >> they will likely be MORE vulnerable to defenses.
>> >> >> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> >> >So when will we see a program to train A-10 pilots about the
>> >shapes
>> >> >of
>> >> >> >> >> >armored vehicles operated by the United States military?
>> >> >> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> >> >http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/10/02/sprj.irq.friendly.fire/
>> >> >> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> >> >-HJC
>> >> >> >> >> Please include UK Warrior vehicles in that training.
>> >> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> >Before you get too smug, recall who clanged that Challenger
>around
>> >> >Basra
>> >> >> >> >during the latest visit to the area...twasn't the Yanks, and
>> >twasn't
>> >> >the
>> >> >> >> >Iraqis.
>> >> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> >Brooks
>> >> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >> >> Pat Carpenter
>> >> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> Agreed we did but the A-10's mangaged it in both GFI and GFII.
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >Well, heck, when it is your side that is providing the bulk of the
>> >toys
>> >> >and
>> >> >> >the men to operate them, you can expect that the greater percentage
>of
>> >> >> >untoward incidents will also be in their pocket. Now, can you
>> >enlighten
>> >> >us
>>
>> So on that logic then you are saying that you were providing the
>> majority of the allied targets. So why weren't the Brit's, Canadians
>> etc. killing large numbers of American participants?
>
>Uhmmm...how many Canadians did you see on the ground (or in the air) during
>this last Gulf event? Or for that matter during the first one? How many RAF
>sorties were dedicated to CAS during ODS, and how many CAS sorties did they
>fly for US forces during this latest fight? YOUR logic appears to be the
>flawed item here. Again, why do you on the one hand claim that you have no
>beef with the US, yet on the other hand come out with this kind of nonsense
>(and a few messages late, too)?
>
You've remembered this topic is about CAS have you? Hence Brit tank on
tank hardy qualifies. By the way you missed the Brit milan hit on a
Brit Marine craft on the waterway which killed one and in juried
others (investigation just published, look it up)
I'm not saying that we don't have our own problems but how many US
troops were killed by their allies in both GWI & II?.
>>
>> >> >> >as to just how a RN *AEW* helo (of all things--one would imagine
>that
>> >> >such
>> >> >> >aircraft are generally better informed about their surrounding
>traffic
>> >> >> >conditions than most) managed to collide with *another* AEW helo
>(and
>> >in
>> >> >the
>> >> >> >process killed a USN officer on exchange duty)?
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >As I said earlier, in war "**** happens". Even in the UK forces...
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >Brooks
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >> Pat Carpenter
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> Probably the same way as the Patriot shot down two allied aircraft
>> >> >> before a brave F16 pilot smoked the *******. Trouble is too many
>> >> >> systems are treated like toys and not lethal weapons.
>> >> >
>> >> What no excuse for the Patriot then?
>> >
>> >Excuses? We don' need no stinkin' 'scuses... Like I said, **** happens.
>>
>> Sorry but **** doesn't just happen, it is normally caused by a string
>> of events ( try going on an accident investigation course). One should
>> never just accept it but try to stop it ever happening again.
>
>LOL! Now where did I say that we should stop trying to prevent fratricide
>incidents? H'mmm? FYI, there is a big difference between realizing that
>fratricide incidents will occur during major combat operations (and
>sometimes even during training events), and adopting a the-hell-with-it
>attitude. Excuses are not worth much; you go back and figure out what went
>wrong, and try to prevent it from happening again in the future. That is the
>correct approach. Your approach, where you just wring your hands and whine
>about US incidents while desperately trying to ignore those incidents
>attributed to your own forces is rather meaningless.
>
I'm not whining just asking that after killing our men in GWI, it
didn't stop the A-10s from doing it again in II. Where's your "Excuses
are not worth much; you go back and figure out what went
wrong, and try to prevent it from happening again in the future".
>> >
>> >> >From
>> >>
>>
>>>http://www.newscientist.com/hottopics/tech/article.jsp?id=99993575&sub=Sec
>u
>> >rity%20and%20Defence :
>> >> >
>> >> >""History shows that fratricide is an unavoidable feature of warfare,"
>> >> >admits the National Audit Office, Britain's public spending watchdog,
>in
>> >a
>> >> >2002 report on the MoD's attempts to improve combat identification."
>> >> >
>> >> >Treated like "toys" huh? From that statement one can assume you have
>> >little
>> >> >first-hand experience with a profession at arms.
>> >>
>>
>> I have been on the close recieving end of some of your modern "toys"
>> twice in the last decade and a half, have you?
>
>Where and when? In my case was lucky enough to never experience the
>intentional efforts of someone trying to kill me--the closest I have come
>was having to skidaddle out of a range area when M110 8" guns started
>shooting over our head into the nearby impact area, and having to go from
>chest-defilade in the commander's hatch of a M113A1 to vision block use
>lickity-split when the ignoramus gunner in the M60A3 tooling along on my
>right decided it was a good time to enage the pop-up Hind target on my left
>during a LFX phase at NTC (the observer controller caught that one and
>"killed" the tank with a MILES "God Gun" so he could tear the TC a new
>rear-opening). Been around TOW's that did the boost-without-sustainer dance
>across the desert floor, and a bit too close for comfort during a couple of
>explosives detonations. Was on the training range when another M60A3
>sprinkled a CAV Troops M113 with some long range MG fire and was lasing in
>preparation for pumping a training APDS round into it when the radio calls
>got the TC's attention and a rather nasty situation was narrowly avoided.
>Performed range clearance ops with EOD once, but that was not particularly
>dangerous as long as you avoided the odd 40mm AGL "silver easter egg" we
>came across. saw a lot of friendlies get waxed during corps WFX in
>Germany--luckily they were reall just electrons scurrying around in the
>simulation database (though the officer responsible, a good friend and at
>the time working for me, took it pretty hard, putting "paid" to any idea you
>may have that we don't really care about frat incidents).
>
Jesus, you never got off the range? And you want to discuss this
seriously?
>>
>> >> You called them toys, and when you start calling them toys you start
>> >> treating them like toys.
>> >
>> >Not really. You are rather clueless regarding modern weapons, eh?
>> >
>> I've targeted them, fired them and nearly been killed by them, hence I
>> think the reverse may be more the case.
>
>Odd then that you have this one-sided view of fratricide as being a purely
>US inspired event.

Never said it was purely an American problem but which country kills
more of it's allies than any other (and of course it's own).
>
>>
>> >> >
>> >> >> As to the RN choppers, they both had their radomes stowed and were
>> >> >> relying on shipboard radar control.
>> >> >
>> >> >Gee, and not a single Yank around to take responsibility for the act
>> >(unless
>> >> >you were planning on blaming the one who was killed...?
>> >> >
>> >> I don't remember blaming any Americans in that case, correct me if I'm
>> >> wrong.
>> >
>> >Actually, from the beginning you have taken a rather singleminded
>approach
>> >to pointing out the US related incidents. When it was merely pointed out
>to
>> >you that fratricide events have been common to both our respective
>forces,
>> >you wanted to start tossing out more allegations of US responsibility.
>Hate
>> >to tell you this, but fratricide is a factor of war; we try to control it
>as
>> >best we can, but it *will* continue to rear its ugly little head...even
>> >within HM forces.
>> >
>> Please re-read the start of my contribution and you will see than I
>> just added to an American's request that A-10's recieve better ID
>> training.
>
>Ever flown at low altitude and tried to pick out and identify *known*
>targets? Having only done so from the comparitively slow platforms like the
>UH-1 and CH-47, I can tell you that it is not all that easy to do. That you
>apparently think it should be is telling. Now, oddly you find the A-10
>community so needful of this additional training that you not only had to
>chime in with what you note above, but when it was pointed out that
>fratricide events were all too common to your own forces as well (not
>instead of) as our own, you had to start lunging out with more "its the US
>that does it" crap. Nobody has denied the US forces have indeed accounted
>for our share of frat incidents, but if vehicle ID is your beef, then I
>suggest that starting with your own freakin' Challenger crews might be a
>better place to *start* that additional training, it being a bit easier to
>make a good ID from a tank sitting still than it is from an A-10 flying
>overhead (even at its less-than-stellar speed).

You've got it wrong, I actually love the Hog and it's saved my ass on
a couple of occasions but if something is broke it needs fixing. I'd
love to see the A-10 up-dated with better communications, better
sensors, better self-defense and more appropriate weaponry (kinda
looks like a FAC with teeth).
We don't need a mach I JSF (F-35A style or even a 35C with a gun) for
CAS but a nice slow bomb truck that can protect its self. Above 5,000
at night the A-10 is almost inaudible and with the right sensors plus
NGs could act like a mini Spooky. During the day above 12,00 it's safe
from nearly everything but SAMs so flying slow with even a simple pair
of binoculars would be better than Mk one eyeball (AWACS, RAW and fit
a couple of AN/ALE-37A to protect his back).
As for UCAV's, when you are trying to get close in support it's a bit
like the difference of talking to the guy behind the counter as
opposed to talking to a guy in a call centre. Or put it another way,
between talking to a Marine pilot as opposed to USAF (no flame
intended but if you've been there you know what I mean).
>
>> >> >>
>> >> >> To quote from a WWII saying :-
>> >> >> "When the Luftwaffe bombed the Allies ducked, when the RAF bombed
>the
>> >> >> Germans ducked but when the Americans bombed every f**ker ducked"
>> >> >
>> >> >Regarding Operation Tractable (Falaise Gap):
>> >> >
>> >> >"Bomber Command carried out this operation without American
>involvement,
>> >but
>> >> >a large number of bombers, many ironically from 6 Group of the Royal
>> >> >Canadian Air Force, bombed short."
>> >> >
>> >>
>> >> "The American air force bombed the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division as
>> >> they were in a staging area ready to attack the enemy"
>> >
>> >We sure did, a bit earlier; we also hammered our own 30th Inf Division
>not
>> >once, but twice during the COBRA effort. Malmedy got bombed not once but
>> >twice by both B-24's and B-26's. And as we see from the above, so did
>you.
>> >See what I mean about "**** happens" being applicable to everyone, not
>just
>> >we 'mercans?
>> >
>> >Brooks
>> >
>> >>
>> >> >"
>> >> >Those short bombs caused casualties. Like I said, **** happens, even
>when
>> >> >you Brits are the ones doing the dealing. George Washington noted a
>> >> >Brit-on-Brit fratricide incident that occured during the French and
>> >Indian
>> >> >War, when the detachment he was commanding came within sight of
>another
>> >> >British element and both sides opened fire on each other. Maybe you
>think
>> >> >Washington bears the sole burden for that event, too?
>> >> >
>>
>> I think that maybe that you are still living in those far off days.
>> "**** happens" won't cut it any more in this day and age, if you
>> really believe that then please stay away from any thing more lethal
>> than a pocket knife.
>
>"**** happens" is quite adequate in conveying the fact that fratricide
>events ARE a part of combat, despite the shrill whining of you and the
>general media. Even your OWN forces recognize that (see that quote from your
>own MoD). That does not imply that we do not, or should not, try to minimize
>them.
>
>Brooks
>
>
> >
>> >> >Brooks
>> >> >
>> >> >>
>> >> >> Pat Carpenter
>> >> >
>> >> Pat Carpenter
>> >
>> Pat Carpenter
>

[Kevin Brooks]

"Pat Carpenter" > wrote in message
...
> On Wed, 17 Mar 2004 20:54:48 -0500, "Kevin Brooks"
> > wrote:
>
> >
> >"Pat Carpenter" > wrote in message
> ...
> >> On Tue, 16 Mar 2004 23:44:33 -0500, "Kevin Brooks"
> >> > wrote:
> >>
> >> >
> >> >"Pat Carpenter" > wrote in message
> >> ...
> >> >> On Tue, 16 Mar 2004 20:15:03 -0500, "Kevin Brooks"
> >> >> > wrote:
> >> >>
> >> >> >
> >> >> >"Pat Carpenter" > wrote in message
> >> >> ...
> >> >> >> On Tue, 16 Mar 2004 12:49:55 -0500, "Kevin Brooks"
> >> >> >> > wrote:
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >"Pat Carpenter" > wrote in
message
> >> >> >> ...
> >> >> >> >> On Mon, 15 Mar 2004 01:11:01 -0500, "Kevin Brooks"
> >> >> >> >> > wrote:
> >> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >> >"Pat Carpenter" > wrote in
> >message
> >> >> >> >> ...
> >> >> >> >> >> On Sun, 14 Mar 2004 20:26:27 -0800, Henry J Cobb
> >
> >> >> >wrote:
> >> >> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> >> >> >John R Weiss wrote:
> >> >> >> >> >> >> If anything, remote-controlled CAS platforms will
increase
> >> >> >> >> >blue-on-blue, and
> >> >> >> >> >> >> they will likely be MORE vulnerable to defenses.
> >> >> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >> >> >So when will we see a program to train A-10 pilots about
the
> >> >shapes
> >> >> >of
> >> >> >> >> >> >armored vehicles operated by the United States military?
> >> >> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >> >> >http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/10/02/sprj.irq.friendly.fire/
> >> >> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >> >> >-HJC
> >> >> >> >> >> Please include UK Warrior vehicles in that training.
> >> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >> >Before you get too smug, recall who clanged that Challenger
> >around
> >> >> >Basra
> >> >> >> >> >during the latest visit to the area...twasn't the Yanks, and
> >> >twasn't
> >> >> >the
> >> >> >> >> >Iraqis.
> >> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >> >Brooks
> >> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> >> >> Pat Carpenter
> >> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >> Agreed we did but the A-10's mangaged it in both GFI and GFII.
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >Well, heck, when it is your side that is providing the bulk of
the
> >> >toys
> >> >> >and
> >> >> >> >the men to operate them, you can expect that the greater
percentage
> >of
> >> >> >> >untoward incidents will also be in their pocket. Now, can you
> >> >enlighten
> >> >> >us
> >>
> >> So on that logic then you are saying that you were providing the
> >> majority of the allied targets. So why weren't the Brit's, Canadians
> >> etc. killing large numbers of American participants?
> >
> >Uhmmm...how many Canadians did you see on the ground (or in the air)
during
> >this last Gulf event? Or for that matter during the first one? How many
RAF
> >sorties were dedicated to CAS during ODS, and how many CAS sorties did
they
> >fly for US forces during this latest fight? YOUR logic appears to be the
> >flawed item here. Again, why do you on the one hand claim that you have
no
> >beef with the US, yet on the other hand come out with this kind of
nonsense
> >(and a few messages late, too)?
> >
> You've remembered this topic is about CAS have you? Hence Brit tank on
> tank hardy qualifies. By the way you missed the Brit milan hit on a
> Brit Marine craft on the waterway which killed one and in juried
> others (investigation just published, look it up)
> I'm not saying that we don't have our own problems but how many US
> troops were killed by their allies in both GWI & II?.

Meaningless for ODS, where I don't recall the RAF flying any CAS for the US
forces. Apparently during the latest operation, based upon what I have read
in your own government's report, the RAF forces were likely providing some
CAS support to US forces, but not sure how much (apparently about 10% of
overall sorties were flown by RAF assets, but the report noted that one of
the real advantages of the RAF assets being "pooled" with US air assets was
that the UK forces gained acces to, among other platforms, the *A-10*). RAF
assets apparently were more heavily involved in the BAI and strategic strike
roles, and had some problems on the CAS end (poor communications with ground
units and targeting pods that were reportedly not optimal for the job of
providing CAS for troops-in-contact). See:
http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200304/cmselect/cmdfence/57/5708.htm

So in the end, the question would be, "How often did RAF (or RAAF for that
matter) assets provide TIC CAS for US forces?"

> >>
> >> >> >> >as to just how a RN *AEW* helo (of all things--one would imagine
> >that
> >> >> >such
> >> >> >> >aircraft are generally better informed about their surrounding
> >traffic
> >> >> >> >conditions than most) managed to collide with *another* AEW helo
> >(and
> >> >in
> >> >> >the
> >> >> >> >process killed a USN officer on exchange duty)?
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >As I said earlier, in war "**** happens". Even in the UK
forces...
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >Brooks
> >> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> >> Pat Carpenter
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> Probably the same way as the Patriot shot down two allied
aircraft
> >> >> >> before a brave F16 pilot smoked the *******. Trouble is too many
> >> >> >> systems are treated like toys and not lethal weapons.
> >> >> >
> >> >> What no excuse for the Patriot then?
> >> >
> >> >Excuses? We don' need no stinkin' 'scuses... Like I said, ****
happens.
> >>
> >> Sorry but **** doesn't just happen, it is normally caused by a string
> >> of events ( try going on an accident investigation course). One should
> >> never just accept it but try to stop it ever happening again.
> >
> >LOL! Now where did I say that we should stop trying to prevent fratricide
> >incidents? H'mmm? FYI, there is a big difference between realizing that
> >fratricide incidents will occur during major combat operations (and
> >sometimes even during training events), and adopting a the-hell-with-it
> >attitude. Excuses are not worth much; you go back and figure out what
went
> >wrong, and try to prevent it from happening again in the future. That is
the
> >correct approach. Your approach, where you just wring your hands and
whine
> >about US incidents while desperately trying to ignore those incidents
> >attributed to your own forces is rather meaningless.
> >
> I'm not whining just asking that after killing our men in GWI, it
> didn't stop the A-10s from doing it again in II. Where's your "Excuses
> are not worth much; you go back and figure out what went
> wrong, and try to prevent it from happening again in the future".

YOUR government's report singled out the A-10 as being one of those systems
that they considered a "gain" in terms of its use in support of UK forces.
And no, excuses are not worth much--it happened. That is a terrible shame to
be sure, but when you are providing TIC CAS that kind of thing will
sometimes occur. The guys do the best they can under extremely difficult
circumstances, and they try to learn from their mistakes. Again, "History
shows that fratricide is an unavoidable feature of warfare," admits the
National Audit Office, Britain's public spending watchdog..."

> >> >
> >> >> >From
> >> >>
> >>
>
>>>http://www.newscientist.com/hottopics/tech/article.jsp?id=99993575&sub=Se
c
> >u
> >> >rity%20and%20Defence :
> >> >> >
> >> >> >""History shows that fratricide is an unavoidable feature of
warfare,"
> >> >> >admits the National Audit Office, Britain's public spending
watchdog,
> >in
> >> >a
> >> >> >2002 report on the MoD's attempts to improve combat identification.
"
> >> >> >
> >> >> >Treated like "toys" huh? From that statement one can assume you
have
> >> >little
> >> >> >first-hand experience with a profession at arms.
> >> >>
> >>
> >> I have been on the close recieving end of some of your modern "toys"
> >> twice in the last decade and a half, have you?
> >
> >Where and when? In my case was lucky enough to never experience the
> >intentional efforts of someone trying to kill me--the closest I have come
> >was having to skidaddle out of a range area when M110 8" guns started
> >shooting over our head into the nearby impact area, and having to go from
> >chest-defilade in the commander's hatch of a M113A1 to vision block use
> >lickity-split when the ignoramus gunner in the M60A3 tooling along on my
> >right decided it was a good time to enage the pop-up Hind target on my
left
> >during a LFX phase at NTC (the observer controller caught that one and
> >"killed" the tank with a MILES "God Gun" so he could tear the TC a new
> >rear-opening). Been around TOW's that did the boost-without-sustainer
dance
> >across the desert floor, and a bit too close for comfort during a couple
of
> >explosives detonations. Was on the training range when another M60A3
> >sprinkled a CAV Troops M113 with some long range MG fire and was lasing
in
> >preparation for pumping a training APDS round into it when the radio
calls
> >got the TC's attention and a rather nasty situation was narrowly avoided.
> >Performed range clearance ops with EOD once, but that was not
particularly
> >dangerous as long as you avoided the odd 40mm AGL "silver easter egg" we
> >came across. saw a lot of friendlies get waxed during corps WFX in
> >Germany--luckily they were reall just electrons scurrying around in the
> >simulation database (though the officer responsible, a good friend and at
> >the time working for me, took it pretty hard, putting "paid" to any idea
you
> >may have that we don't really care about frat incidents).
> >
> Jesus, you never got off the range? And you want to discuss this
> seriously?

Yep. FYI, by the time the first Gulf fracas broke out I was commanding a
bridge company, which while not exactly a high demand item during that romp
through the desert, was indeed on the deployment list, but the whole thing
was over before we even got mobilized. I got out a few months before the
whole 9-11 thing went down, never figuring I'd miss what has transpired
since (though I note my last unit has yet to deploy anywhere). Tell me, does
getting hammered in a M113 by an M60A3 at point-blank range with .50 cal
fire at NTC leave you "less dead" than having it happen somewhere else? I
know of units that lost more folks during NTC rotations than they lost
during ODS (my first active duty unit, the old 19th EN BN (CBT) being one of
them); the average when I was doing my NTC rotations was generally about one
fatality per brigade(-) rotation, and my brigade had the dubious honor of
having the worst AC safety record in FORSCOM at the time (bad convergence of
"**** happens" karma, as the fatalities were generally unrelated in terms of
cause)--we even crippled a visiting UK-type who, despite warnings not to
sleep on the ground around vehicles, did so and had a M113 park on top of
his legs.

> >>
> >> >> You called them toys, and when you start calling them toys you start
> >> >> treating them like toys.
> >> >
> >> >Not really. You are rather clueless regarding modern weapons, eh?
> >> >
> >> I've targeted them, fired them and nearly been killed by them, hence I
> >> think the reverse may be more the case.
> >
> >Odd then that you have this one-sided view of fratricide as being a
purely
> >US inspired event.
>
> Never said it was purely an American problem but which country kills
> more of it's allies than any other (and of course it's own).

Which country was providing 90% of the air effort (and likely even more of
the CAS effort)? based upon that, if all else is even, we should have nine
friendly fire CAS incidents for every one caused by the allied forces in
mix. I don't believe there were nine Blue-on-Blue CAS incidents reported
during this latest effort, so why should we expect to see even one from the
RAF?

> >
> >>
> >> >> >
> >> >> >> As to the RN choppers, they both had their radomes stowed and
were
> >> >> >> relying on shipboard radar control.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >Gee, and not a single Yank around to take responsibility for the
act
> >> >(unless
> >> >> >you were planning on blaming the one who was killed...?
> >> >> >
> >> >> I don't remember blaming any Americans in that case, correct me if
I'm
> >> >> wrong.
> >> >
> >> >Actually, from the beginning you have taken a rather singleminded
> >approach
> >> >to pointing out the US related incidents. When it was merely pointed
out
> >to
> >> >you that fratricide events have been common to both our respective
> >forces,
> >> >you wanted to start tossing out more allegations of US responsibility.
> >Hate
> >> >to tell you this, but fratricide is a factor of war; we try to control
it
> >as
> >> >best we can, but it *will* continue to rear its ugly little
head...even
> >> >within HM forces.
> >> >
> >> Please re-read the start of my contribution and you will see than I
> >> just added to an American's request that A-10's recieve better ID
> >> training.
> >
> >Ever flown at low altitude and tried to pick out and identify *known*
> >targets? Having only done so from the comparitively slow platforms like
the
> >UH-1 and CH-47, I can tell you that it is not all that easy to do. That
you
> >apparently think it should be is telling. Now, oddly you find the A-10
> >community so needful of this additional training that you not only had to
> >chime in with what you note above, but when it was pointed out that
> >fratricide events were all too common to your own forces as well (not
> >instead of) as our own, you had to start lunging out with more "its the
US
> >that does it" crap. Nobody has denied the US forces have indeed accounted
> >for our share of frat incidents, but if vehicle ID is your beef, then I
> >suggest that starting with your own freakin' Challenger crews might be a
> >better place to *start* that additional training, it being a bit easier
to
> >make a good ID from a tank sitting still than it is from an A-10 flying
> >overhead (even at its less-than-stellar speed).
>
> You've got it wrong, I actually love the Hog and it's saved my ass on
> a couple of occasions but if something is broke it needs fixing. I'd
> love to see the A-10 up-dated with better communications, better
> sensors, better self-defense and more appropriate weaponry (kinda
> looks like a FAC with teeth).

You'll be happy to know that the USAF is indeed planning on updating the
A-10's it will retain in service--new engines, new targeting pods, etc.

> We don't need a mach I JSF (F-35A style or even a 35C with a gun) for
> CAS but a nice slow bomb truck that can protect its self. Above 5,000
> at night the A-10 is almost inaudible and with the right sensors plus
> NGs could act like a mini Spooky. During the day above 12,00 it's safe
> from nearly everything but SAMs so flying slow with even a simple pair
> of binoculars would be better than Mk one eyeball (AWACS, RAW and fit
> a couple of AN/ALE-37A to protect his back).

I like the A-10; used to watch them doing gunnery quite often at one of the
posts I worked at. And i still see a need for them in the modern battle
environment. But I also see where that F-35 is becoming a much more capable
CAS platform than I would have ever thought even a couple of years back. The
use of JDAM, especially when it comes available in the small-diameter-bomb
(SDB) form, is changing how CAS can be delivered (note the significant use
of B-52 and B-1B delivered CAS during Afghani operations); but even that is
subject to fratricide, as we saw when the B-52 dropped a 2000 pound JDAM on
the coordinates given to it by the SF team on the ground--unfortunately, the
coords were for his own position and not those of the target he wanted to
hit.

Brooks

> As for UCAV's, when you are trying to get close in support it's a bit
> like the difference of talking to the guy behind the counter as
> opposed to talking to a guy in a call centre. Or put it another way,
> between talking to a Marine pilot as opposed to USAF (no flame
> intended but if you've been there you know what I mean).
> >
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> To quote from a WWII saying :-
> >> >> >> "When the Luftwaffe bombed the Allies ducked, when the RAF bombed
> >the
> >> >> >> Germans ducked but when the Americans bombed every f**ker ducked"
> >> >> >
> >> >> >Regarding Operation Tractable (Falaise Gap):
> >> >> >
> >> >> >"Bomber Command carried out this operation without American
> >involvement,
> >> >but
> >> >> >a large number of bombers, many ironically from 6 Group of the
Royal
> >> >> >Canadian Air Force, bombed short."
> >> >> >
> >> >>
> >> >> "The American air force bombed the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division as
> >> >> they were in a staging area ready to attack the enemy"
> >> >
> >> >We sure did, a bit earlier; we also hammered our own 30th Inf Division
> >not
> >> >once, but twice during the COBRA effort. Malmedy got bombed not once
but
> >> >twice by both B-24's and B-26's. And as we see from the above, so did
> >you.
> >> >See what I mean about "**** happens" being applicable to everyone, not
> >just
> >> >we 'mercans?
> >> >
> >> >Brooks
> >> >
> >> >>
> >> >> >"
> >> >> >Those short bombs caused casualties. Like I said, **** happens,
even
> >when
> >> >> >you Brits are the ones doing the dealing. George Washington noted a
> >> >> >Brit-on-Brit fratricide incident that occured during the French and
> >> >Indian
> >> >> >War, when the detachment he was commanding came within sight of
> >another
> >> >> >British element and both sides opened fire on each other. Maybe you
> >think
> >> >> >Washington bears the sole burden for that event, too?
> >> >> >
> >>
> >> I think that maybe that you are still living in those far off days.
> >> "**** happens" won't cut it any more in this day and age, if you
> >> really believe that then please stay away from any thing more lethal
> >> than a pocket knife.
> >
> >"**** happens" is quite adequate in conveying the fact that fratricide
> >events ARE a part of combat, despite the shrill whining of you and the
> >general media. Even your OWN forces recognize that (see that quote from
your
> >own MoD). That does not imply that we do not, or should not, try to
minimize
> >them.
> >
> >Brooks
> >
> >
> > >
> >> >> >Brooks
> >> >> >
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> Pat Carpenter
> >> >> >
> >> >> Pat Carpenter
> >> >
> >> Pat Carpenter
> >
>

[Paul F Austin]

"Thomas Schoene" wrote
> Paul F Austin wrote:
>
> > When I first looked at F-35, it seemed a looong step backward in
> > terms of situational awareness, with virtually no rear-quadrant
> > visibility. DAS promises to fix that. If it works for F-35 then it
> > should work for UCAVs.
>
> The bandwidth issue is still a real concern. That's a lot of data to
> transmit via long-range RF signal, and there's already lots of competition
> for the spectrum. What's possible to do by wire or fiber inside the
> aircraft may not be practical via radio to a remote operator.

TCDL provides 200Kbps downlink/10Mbps uplink service. That's adequate for
this kind of situatuational awareness. More downlink would allow more raw
data but in this case, the fusion of the six DAS thermal cameras occurs
on-board and only the FOV in the direction the user's HMS is pointed at need
be downlinked. CDL provides uplink services at various rates from T1 up to
256Mbps but that's overkill. CDL also lacks the total system capacity that
would be required. Today. The USAF is busy expanding the satellite comm
network capacity in anticipation of increased traffic.

[Alan Minyard]

On Tue, 16 Mar 2004 19:55:23 +0000 (UTC), Pat Carpenter > wrote:

>>
>Probably the same way as the Patriot shot down two allied aircraft
>before a brave F16 pilot smoked the *******. Trouble is too many
>systems are treated like toys and not lethal weapons.
>As to the RN choppers, they both had their radomes stowed and were
>relying on shipboard radar control.
>
>To quote from a WWII saying :-
>"When the Luftwaffe bombed the Allies ducked, when the RAF bombed the
>Germans ducked but when the Americans bombed every f**ker ducked"
>
>Pat Carpenter

You obviously have no knowledge of military system, tactics, logistics, or any
thing else. You are rude and insufferable.

PLONK

Al Minyard

[Pat Carpenter]

On Thu, 18 Mar 2004 10:43:35 -0600, Alan Minyard
> wrote:

>On Tue, 16 Mar 2004 19:55:23 +0000 (UTC), Pat Carpenter > wrote:
>
>>>
>>Probably the same way as the Patriot shot down two allied aircraft
>>before a brave F16 pilot smoked the *******. Trouble is too many
>>systems are treated like toys and not lethal weapons.
>>As to the RN choppers, they both had their radomes stowed and were
>>relying on shipboard radar control.
>>
>>To quote from a WWII saying :-
>>"When the Luftwaffe bombed the Allies ducked, when the RAF bombed the
>>Germans ducked but when the Americans bombed every f**ker ducked"
>>
>>Pat Carpenter
>
>You obviously have no knowledge of military system, tactics, logistics, or any
>thing else. You are rude and insufferable.

Rude and insufferable, it what way?

As for no knowledge, I get mine in the field on a day to day basis (be
back there soon). You sound like an armchair warrior with lots of
books, a long past life and a life time google pass.

Do your additions to this group ever extend beyond a two line entry
and some red-neck bigoted comment? (hint I just checked and they
don't)

>PLONK
>
>Al Minyard

Plonker (look it up)

Blue Skies
Pat Carpenter

ps nobody in the UK has used "keep your pecker up" in the last 30
years!

[[email protected]]

"John R Weiss" > wrote:

>
>I'm not trying to say CAS with UCAVs is impossible; I just cannot accept the
>contention that blue-on-blue will somehow be reduced or eliminated because of
>their use.

While this is certainly not my field it would seem to me that it
'would' indeed help to mitigate B on B because of the old "OH MY
GOD!, if that 'target' actually _is_ enemy then I've got about 2
seconds to live!...do I shoot or not?!?. Whereas if the operator
is quite safely installed in an airconditioned trailer miles away
then he might be thinking "Jesus!, if that target really is enemy
then our multi-dollar UAV has only 2 seconds to live".

Big difference I'd think (but then, whadda I know?) :)
--

-Gord.

[[email protected]]

Pat Carpenter > wrote:

>
>ps nobody in the UK has used "keep your pecker up" in the last 30
>years!

Must play havoc with your birthrate eh?. :)
--

-Gord.

[John Keeney]

"Paul F Austin" > wrote in message
.. .
>
> "Thomas Schoene" wrote
> > Paul F Austin wrote:
> >
> > > When I first looked at F-35, it seemed a looong step backward in
> > > terms of situational awareness, with virtually no rear-quadrant
> > > visibility. DAS promises to fix that. If it works for F-35 then it
> > > should work for UCAVs.
> >
> > The bandwidth issue is still a real concern. That's a lot of data to
> > transmit via long-range RF signal, and there's already lots of
competition
> > for the spectrum. What's possible to do by wire or fiber inside the
> > aircraft may not be practical via radio to a remote operator.
>
> TCDL provides 200Kbps downlink/10Mbps uplink service. That's adequate for
> this kind of situatuational awareness. More downlink would allow more raw

For how many nodes/UCAVs at once?

> data but in this case, the fusion of the six DAS thermal cameras occurs
> on-board and only the FOV in the direction the user's HMS is pointed at
need
> be downlinked. CDL provides uplink services at various rates from T1 up to
> 256Mbps but that's overkill. CDL also lacks the total system capacity that
> would be required. Today. The USAF is busy expanding the satellite comm
> network capacity in anticipation of increased traffic.

[John R Weiss]

"John Keeney" > wrote...
>
>>> The bandwidth issue is still a real concern. That's a lot of data to
>>> transmit via long-range RF signal, and there's already lots of competition
>>> for the spectrum. What's possible to do by wire or fiber inside the
>>> aircraft may not be practical via radio to a remote operator.
>>
>> TCDL provides 200Kbps downlink/10Mbps uplink service. That's adequate for
>> this kind of situatuational awareness. More downlink would allow more raw
>
> For how many nodes/UCAVs at once?

Another good point! What would the nominal/maximum number of simultaneous UCAV
missions be in a single theater? If there are ongoing UAV recce missions as
well, will there be enough infrastructure support for simultaneous control of
all the UAV/UCAVs?

Traditional CAS was seldom done with a single airplane. More often, flights of
2 airplanes would orbit an IP and alternate attacks under the control of a
single FAC. That provided a larger total ordnance loadout and reduced time
between individual attacks. It also provided backup in case one aircraft broke.

Similarly, CAS with UCAVs would likely require more than a single vehicle per
mission. With the proposed capability (DAS + TCDL, etc), the infrastructure for
UAV operator stations would be expensive as well as space-consuming. That type
of infrastructure would not likely accompany front-line units, but would be held
by separate, dedicated units.

Finally, while semi-autonomous recce UAVs could be controlled via satellite
links, time delays in control links would likely make high-altitude satellites
and/or multiple relays unsuitable for real-time control such as that needed in
CAS. One article I read on TCDL mentioned line-of-sight ranges of 100-160 KM,
which were very dependent on UAV altitude. Some CAS and target ID is very
difficult with high-altitude run-ins...

[Paul F Austin]

"John Keeney" wrote
>
> "Paul F Austin" wrote ...
> >
> > "Thomas Schoene" wrote
> > > Paul F Austin wrote:
> > >
> > > > When I first looked at F-35, it seemed a looong step backward in
> > > > terms of situational awareness, with virtually no rear-quadrant
> > > > visibility. DAS promises to fix that. If it works for F-35 then it
> > > > should work for UCAVs.
> > >
> > > The bandwidth issue is still a real concern. That's a lot of data to
> > > transmit via long-range RF signal, and there's already lots of
> competition
> > > for the spectrum. What's possible to do by wire or fiber inside the
> > > aircraft may not be practical via radio to a remote operator.
> >
> > TCDL provides 200Kbps downlink/10Mbps uplink service. That's adequate
for
> > this kind of situatuational awareness. More downlink would allow more
raw
>
> For how many nodes/UCAVs at once?

One for each TCDL link. What's your point?

>
> > data but in this case, the fusion of the six DAS thermal cameras occurs
> > on-board and only the FOV in the direction the user's HMS is pointed at
> need
> > be downlinked. CDL provides uplink services at various rates from T1 up
to
> > 256Mbps but that's overkill. CDL also lacks the total system capacity
that
> > would be required. Today. The USAF is busy expanding the satellite comm
> > network capacity in anticipation of increased traffic.
>
>

One part of the USAF's data network roadmap is to place switching nodes in
many aircraft, including tankers and MC2A to provide both the aggregate BW
and number of available links. There're complementary programs to increase
COMSAT capacity by using -less than MILSTAR- robust satellites and
transponders.

The data network roadmap is progressing "under the RADAR" because it gets a
lot less publicity than to Things That Go Fast And Explode but is IMO more
important.

[Tarver Engineering]

"John R Weiss" > wrote in message
news:p2G6c.42116$SR1.48965@attbi_s04...
> "John Keeney" > wrote...
> >
> >>> The bandwidth issue is still a real concern. That's a lot of data to
> >>> transmit via long-range RF signal, and there's already lots of
competition
> >>> for the spectrum. What's possible to do by wire or fiber inside the
> >>> aircraft may not be practical via radio to a remote operator.
> >>
> >> TCDL provides 200Kbps downlink/10Mbps uplink service. That's adequate
for
> >> this kind of situatuational awareness. More downlink would allow more
raw
> >
> > For how many nodes/UCAVs at once?
>
> Another good point! What would the nominal/maximum number of simultaneous
UCAV
> missions be in a single theater? If there are ongoing UAV recce missions
as
> well, will there be enough infrastructure support for simultaneous control
of
> all the UAV/UCAVs?

You are on to why atonomuous vehicles are necessary, Weiss.

> Traditional CAS was seldom done with a single airplane. More often,
flights of
> 2 airplanes would orbit an IP and alternate attacks under the control of a
> single FAC. That provided a larger total ordnance loadout and reduced
time
> between individual attacks. It also provided backup in case one aircraft
broke.

The idea today is to develop a robotic wingman, where the wingman becomes a
loiterer, after the lead feeds it the buddy pack.

> Similarly, CAS with UCAVs would likely require more than a single vehicle
per
> mission. With the proposed capability (DAS + TCDL, etc), the
infrastructure for
> UAV operator stations would be expensive as well as space-consuming. That
type
> of infrastructure would not likely accompany front-line units, but would
be held
> by separate, dedicated units.

That does not seem to be the case.

> Finally, while semi-autonomous recce UAVs could be controlled via
satellite
> links, time delays in control links would likely make high-altitude
satellites
> and/or multiple relays unsuitable for real-time control such as that
needed in
> CAS. One article I read on TCDL mentioned line-of-sight ranges of 100-160
KM,
> which were very dependent on UAV altitude. Some CAS and target ID is very
> difficult with high-altitude run-ins...

Better to lose a robot taking a look than a pilot containing vehicle.

[Paul F Austin]

"John R Weiss" > wrote in message
news:p2G6c.42116$SR1.48965@attbi_s04...
> "John Keeney" > wrote...
> >
> >>> The bandwidth issue is still a real concern. That's a lot of data to
> >>> transmit via long-range RF signal, and there's already lots of
competition
> >>> for the spectrum. What's possible to do by wire or fiber inside the
> >>> aircraft may not be practical via radio to a remote operator.
> >>
> >> TCDL provides 200Kbps downlink/10Mbps uplink service. That's adequate
for
> >> this kind of situatuational awareness. More downlink would allow more
raw
> >
> > For how many nodes/UCAVs at once?
>
> Another good point! What would the nominal/maximum number of simultaneous
UCAV
> missions be in a single theater? If there are ongoing UAV recce missions
as
> well, will there be enough infrastructure support for simultaneous control
of
> all the UAV/UCAVs?
>
> Traditional CAS was seldom done with a single airplane. More often,
flights of
> 2 airplanes would orbit an IP and alternate attacks under the control of a
> single FAC. That provided a larger total ordnance loadout and reduced
time
> between individual attacks. It also provided backup in case one aircraft
broke.
>
> Similarly, CAS with UCAVs would likely require more than a single vehicle
per
> mission. With the proposed capability (DAS + TCDL, etc), the
infrastructure for
> UAV operator stations would be expensive as well as space-consuming. That
type
> of infrastructure would not likely accompany front-line units, but would
be held
> by separate, dedicated units.
>
> Finally, while semi-autonomous recce UAVs could be controlled via
satellite
> links, time delays in control links would likely make high-altitude
satellites
> and/or multiple relays unsuitable for real-time control such as that
needed in
> CAS. One article I read on TCDL mentioned line-of-sight ranges of 100-160
KM,
> which were very dependent on UAV altitude. Some CAS and target ID is very

> difficult with high-altitude run-ins...

Actually not all that good a point!

As I said elsewhere, the USAF plans to proliferate switch and relay nodes in
support aircraft like tankers, MC2A and possibly retrofitted AWACS and
JSTARs. HALE UAVs are also being considered for relay platforms. The number
of links and aggregate bandwidth planned for the not too distant future is
much greater than is available today.

That kind of network makes the UAV operators REMFs for sure. There's no more
need for a TCDL terminal in every foxhole (or in every FAC) to control UAVs
than there is now to control manned aircraft. UAVs aren't now and will be
even less in the future directly driven by a ground controller-except when
the mission requires it-. Enroute control is done by autopilot. That's why I
said (several posts ago) that airspace deconfliction is a major obstacle to
using UCAVs in the numbers required to do CAS.

Regarding the cost and ubiquity of terminals, consider Hunter UAVs. Hunter's
current Ground Control Station (GCS) occupies the back of a HMMV while IAI
Malat is developing a Compact GCS significantly smaller for installation in
e.g. C-130s. The Remote Video Terminal to recieve payload data is much
smaller and is intended to be available at the TOC.

During an actual engagement, a single controller should be able to control a
small number of aircraft, taking direct control during target aquistition
and weapon delivery and letting the autopilots handle the "cab rank"
aircraft. This is obviously complex, depending on the details of UCAV
requirements and the doctrines that derive from it. As easily, because
nobody wants a warhead on a blue forehead, all UCAV missions in proximity
with own troops might be required to be under direct control of an operator
at all times.

There's an enthusiasm to hang ordnance on the current generation of UAVs
which is probably a mistake. UAVs are designed to carry sensor payloads and
neither their sensor suite nor the ordnance loads meet the requirements for
CAS/BAI. The services and the manufacturers run the risk of screwing up and
giving UAVs an bad name as ordnance delivery vehicles by not specifying and
building UCAVs with the right characteristics to meet the mission. The first
time some idiot launches a Hellfire from a Predator at a blue target, you'll
see what I mean.

[Thomas Schoene]

Paul F Austin wrote:
> "John Keeney" wrote
>>
>> "Paul F Austin" wrote ...

>>> TCDL provides 200Kbps downlink/10Mbps uplink service. That's
>>> adequate for this kind of situatuational awareness. More downlink
>>> would allow more raw
>>
>> For how many nodes/UCAVs at once?
>
> One for each TCDL link. What's your point?

How many TDCL links can you suport in a single geographic region? The wider
the pipes are, they fewer a given segment of spectrum can support. There
are clever ways to stretch bandwidth, but there is ultimately a finite
limit.

--
Tom Schoene Replace "invalid" with "net" to e-mail
"Our country, right or wrong. When right, to be kept right, when
wrong to be put right." - Senator Carl Schurz, 1872

[Paul F Austin]

"Thomas Schoene" wrote
> Paul F Austin wrote:
> > "John Keeney" wrote
> >>
> >> "Paul F Austin" wrote ...
>
> >>> TCDL provides 200Kbps downlink/10Mbps uplink service. That's
> >>> adequate for this kind of situatuational awareness. More downlink
> >>> would allow more raw
> >>
> >> For how many nodes/UCAVs at once?
> >
> > One for each TCDL link. What's your point?
>
> How many TDCL links can you suport in a single geographic region? The
wider
> the pipes are, they fewer a given segment of spectrum can support. There
> are clever ways to stretch bandwidth, but there is ultimately a finite
> limit.

That's true and it's a serious problem. First the obligatory disclaimer.
This is frankly outside my area, not being a RF comms guy, so if I step on
my crank, I'm sure someone will point it out.

Frequency diversity can carry you only so far. TCDL operates (on the return
link) over a 400MHz band with 5MHz channel spacing. I don't know if adjacent
channels can operate within LOS of each other but that's 80 channels at best
whose antennas can "see" each other. Directional links will carry you a ways
also since the operating band, Ku/K, is highly directional and the apertures
are small. TCDL is intended to work in other bands as well. Ka and Q bands
offers substantial available BW.

Certainly the problems of directional RF comms between maneuvering aircraft
are being solved as part of the IFDL development for F-22 and F-35. The F-22
IFDL antenna, providing hemispherical coverage and 78 switched beams weighs
5.4 pounds and occupies 250 cubic inches. This antenna
http://www.emsstg.com/defense/ant_data_link.asp operates in Q band
(30-50GHz) but gives you an idea of what's possible. An equivalent TCDL
aperture in Ku/K band would be larger because of the lower frequency.

Another answer may be LASER links, much work is going on in this area. When
I worked on a controller for LASER cross-links for (now defunct) Teledesic,
the spot size was about 6 inches in diameter into a receiver about 4X bigger
over GEO kinds of distances but that was for a non-maneuvering satellite
with known ephemeris. It did require a closed-loop tracker because even the
minimal vibrations in an orbiting spacecraft could cause the spot to walk
when working over those distances. The challenges of two maneuvering
aircraft communicating by LASER are substantial but given GPS and a stable
element at both ends, cooperative aiming should be possible.

All of these things are_possible_but they all cost money. If I start from
the position that UCAVs are candidates for future CAS/BAI missions, then the
projected UCAV is burdened with something like the ICNIA suite with things
like IFDL. A CAS UCAV won't be cheap. That's why I mentioned that some have
suggested a pilotless F-35 as a UCAV candidate. There will be_some_cost
advantages in such an aircraft but we're not talking about a $150K model
airplane with a pair of SDBs under the wings and a minigun slung under the
fuscelage.

This is the kind of thing that USENET lends itself least to since serious
trades require serious analysis. The information above came from 5 minutes
with Google and FAS's site. Handwavium is poor substitute for real
engineering. I apologize to John for getting a bit snippy in my answer to
him. I'm certainly not casting myself as an authority in these matters
who's_done_the trades touched on above.

[John Keeney]

"Paul F Austin" > wrote in message
.. .
>
> "John Keeney" wrote
> >
> > "Paul F Austin" wrote ...
> > >
> > > "Thomas Schoene" wrote
> > > > Paul F Austin wrote:
> > > >
> > > > > When I first looked at F-35, it seemed a looong step backward in
> > > > > terms of situational awareness, with virtually no rear-quadrant
> > > > > visibility. DAS promises to fix that. If it works for F-35 then it
> > > > > should work for UCAVs.
> > > >
> > > > The bandwidth issue is still a real concern. That's a lot of data
to
> > > > transmit via long-range RF signal, and there's already lots of
> > competition
> > > > for the spectrum. What's possible to do by wire or fiber inside the
> > > > aircraft may not be practical via radio to a remote operator.
> > >
> > > TCDL provides 200Kbps downlink/10Mbps uplink service. That's adequate
> for
> > > this kind of situatuational awareness. More downlink would allow more
> raw
> >
> > For how many nodes/UCAVs at once?
>
> One for each TCDL link. What's your point?

That if you have 100 UCAVs that need to be engaged that you need your
down & up links to be able to handle 100 UCAVs at once. Granted, most
planes currently are loitering to await their turn at a target. But they can
all engage at once if sufficient targets present themselves. If your UCAV
control link is limited to a half dozen planes concurrently you've opened
yourself up to saturation tactics.