Flt 587-Airbus vs American Airlines

[John Bailey]

http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/21/nyregion/21plane.html is a report of
the maneuvering by both Airbus and American Airlines to get in their 2
cents, pilot training vs inadequate design, in the crash of AA Flt 587
over Queens. Apparently the tail came off because of a violent yaw
type of pilot induced oscillation. The range of rudder control
available to the pilot seems grossly inadequate. AA may have
contributed to the problem by failing to reflect the design flaw in
their training, however their real failure might be not grounding the
planes for suicidal instability. Pilots of the F86D had to accept
working around a low altitude-high speed pilot induced oscillation. In
that case the oscillations were in pitch. I could accept such on a
military fighter plane, but such an accident waiting to happen in a
commercial airliner seems unconscionable.


John Bailey
http://home.rochester.rr.com/jbxroads/mailto.html

[Tarver Engineering]

"John Bailey" > wrote in message
...
> http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/21/nyregion/21plane.html is a report of
> the maneuvering by both Airbus and American Airlines to get in their 2
> cents, pilot training vs inadequate design, in the crash of AA Flt 587
> over Queens. Apparently the tail came off because of a violent yaw
> type of pilot induced oscillation. The range of rudder control
> available to the pilot seems grossly inadequate.

The pilot's excess command authority over the rudder control system is why
the structure delaminated.

> AA may have
> contributed to the problem by failing to reflect the design flaw in
> their training, however their real failure might be not grounding the
> planes for suicidal instability.

I'll leave this the Schmidt to answer. :)

> Pilots of the F86D had to accept
> working around a low altitude-high speed pilot induced oscillation. In
> that case the oscillations were in pitch. I could accept such on a
> military fighter plane, but such an accident waiting to happen in a
> commercial airliner seems unconscionable.

The airplane experianced a rudder stall (rudder reversal) due to turbulent
air flow; which was probably a direct result of ATC loss of seperation.
There is a USAir flight 427 suspected of having crashed for the same reason.
It is quite possible that training pilots to use excessive rudder and
operator panic are the cause of these crashes; excepting the abnormal
operating conditions.

[Paul F Austin]

"John Bailey" wrote
> http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/21/nyregion/21plane.html is a report of
> the maneuvering by both Airbus and American Airlines to get in their 2
> cents, pilot training vs inadequate design, in the crash of AA Flt 587
> over Queens. Apparently the tail came off because of a violent yaw
> type of pilot induced oscillation. The range of rudder control
> available to the pilot seems grossly inadequate. AA may have
> contributed to the problem by failing to reflect the design flaw in
> their training, however their real failure might be not grounding the
> planes for suicidal instability. Pilots of the F86D had to accept
> working around a low altitude-high speed pilot induced oscillation. In
> that case the oscillations were in pitch. I could accept such on a
> military fighter plane, but such an accident waiting to happen in a
> commercial airliner seems unconscionable.

My impression from reading the AvWeek reports is that this problem isn't
unique to A300s nor to Airbus products. The fin can be overloaded in most
transports if opposite rudder is commanded while a significant yaw has
occurred. I'm not a pilot but AvWeek claimed that standard recovery training
for transport pilots could lead to this condition.

[Robey Price]

After an exhausting session with Victoria's Secret Police, "Paul F
Austin" confessed the following:

>My impression from reading the AvWeek reports is that this problem isn't
>unique to A300s nor to Airbus products. The fin can be overloaded in most
>transports if opposite rudder is commanded while a significant yaw has
>occurred. I'm not a pilot but AvWeek claimed that standard recovery training
>for transport pilots could lead to this condition.

You are correct, I fly the 757 and we've recently had some expanded
warning verbiage added to our flight manual about excessive rudder
inputs during an engine failure. Pretty soon after that AA crash we
were cautioned about excessive rudder inputs.

Why is rudder input mandatory during an engine failure vice simply
using ailerons?

Quick example, a United 747-400 lost an engine on takeoff from SFO a
couple years back. The jet was full/heavy, the FO (guy in the right
seat) was making the takeoff. During intial climbout, the FO used full
aileron/yoke to maintain wings level while trying to climb straight
out. The only problem was the drag caused by the deployed spoilers
(for roll) on the side with two good motors. [picture aileron into the
two good engines trying to "lift" the wing with only one motor to turn
into the good side]. This was not the approved solution for
controlling a 747 on takeoff with an engine failure.

As a result the drag severely degraded the climb capability and there
was a ridge line in front of the jet. Two guys sitting in jumpseats
finally had enough of the FO's hamfisted technique and started
insisting he use rudder to control the yaw and not aileron. The FO
listened..."Oh yeah, ****, f*ck me..." and they cleared the rapidly
rising terrain by mere feet.

So that is why rudder input is critical, minimize yaw and drag to
provide climb performance.

And as you alluded to, blind rapid full rudder inputs can simply
over-G the airframe.

The technique we are taught during an engine failure is to climb
straight ahead (airspace and terrain permitting), engine failure
during the takeoff roll are pretty painless if you simply blend in
enough rudder to keep on centerline as you accelerate then shift to
instruments once airborne.

Engine failure during climbout while in a turn can be disorienting
with the greater yawing and rolling tendencies due to higher speeds
and power settings...obviously greater care must be taken by the pilot
flying the jet.

Juvat

[Paul F Austin]

"Robey Price" wrote
> After an exhausting session with Victoria's Secret Police, "Paul F
> Austin" confessed the following:
>
> >My impression from reading the AvWeek reports is that this problem isn't
> >unique to A300s nor to Airbus products. The fin can be overloaded in most
> >transports if opposite rudder is commanded while a significant yaw has
> >occurred. I'm not a pilot but AvWeek claimed that standard recovery
training
> >for transport pilots could lead to this condition.
>
> You are correct, I fly the 757 and we've recently had some expanded
> warning verbiage added to our flight manual about excessive rudder
> inputs during an engine failure. Pretty soon after that AA crash we
> were cautioned about excessive rudder inputs.
>
> Why is rudder input mandatory during an engine failure vice simply
> using ailerons?
>
> Quick example, a United 747-400 lost an engine on takeoff from SFO a
> couple years back. The jet was full/heavy, the FO (guy in the right
> seat) was making the takeoff. During intial climbout, the FO used full
> aileron/yoke to maintain wings level while trying to climb straight
> out. The only problem was the drag caused by the deployed spoilers
> (for roll) on the side with two good motors. [picture aileron into the
> two good engines trying to "lift" the wing with only one motor to turn
> into the good side]. This was not the approved solution for
> controlling a 747 on takeoff with an engine failure.
>
> As a result the drag severely degraded the climb capability and there
> was a ridge line in front of the jet. Two guys sitting in jumpseats
> finally had enough of the FO's hamfisted technique and started
> insisting he use rudder to control the yaw and not aileron. The FO
> listened..."Oh yeah, ****, f*ck me..." and they cleared the rapidly
> rising terrain by mere feet.
>
> So that is why rudder input is critical, minimize yaw and drag to
> provide climb performance.
>
> And as you alluded to, blind rapid full rudder inputs can simply
> over-G the airframe.
>
> The technique we are taught during an engine failure is to climb
> straight ahead (airspace and terrain permitting), engine failure
> during the takeoff roll are pretty painless if you simply blend in
> enough rudder to keep on centerline as you accelerate then shift to
> instruments once airborne.
>
> Engine failure during climbout while in a turn can be disorienting
> with the greater yawing and rolling tendencies due to higher speeds
> and power settings...obviously greater care must be taken by the pilot
> flying the jet.

Thanks for the information. I am somewhat amazed that the FAA doesn't
require load analysis of the fin under yaw/extreme opposite rudder but
(again according to AvWeek), it does not.

[Ron Parsons]

In article >,
"Paul F Austin" > wrote:

>"Robey Price" wrote
>> After an exhausting session with Victoria's Secret Police, "Paul F
>> Austin" confessed the following:
>>
>> >My impression from reading the AvWeek reports is that this problem isn't
>> >unique to A300s nor to Airbus products. The fin can be overloaded in most
>> >transports if opposite rudder is commanded while a significant yaw has
>> >occurred. I'm not a pilot but AvWeek claimed that standard recovery
>training
>> >for transport pilots could lead to this condition.
>>
>> You are correct, I fly the 757 and we've recently had some expanded
>> warning verbiage added to our flight manual about excessive rudder
>> inputs during an engine failure. Pretty soon after that AA crash we
>> were cautioned about excessive rudder inputs.
>>
>> Why is rudder input mandatory during an engine failure vice simply
>> using ailerons?
>>
>> Quick example, a United 747-400 lost an engine on takeoff from SFO a
>> couple years back. The jet was full/heavy, the FO (guy in the right
>> seat) was making the takeoff. During intial climbout, the FO used full
>> aileron/yoke to maintain wings level while trying to climb straight
>> out. The only problem was the drag caused by the deployed spoilers
>> (for roll) on the side with two good motors. [picture aileron into the
>> two good engines trying to "lift" the wing with only one motor to turn
>> into the good side]. This was not the approved solution for
>> controlling a 747 on takeoff with an engine failure.
>>
>> As a result the drag severely degraded the climb capability and there
>> was a ridge line in front of the jet. Two guys sitting in jumpseats
>> finally had enough of the FO's hamfisted technique and started
>> insisting he use rudder to control the yaw and not aileron. The FO
>> listened..."Oh yeah, ****, f*ck me..." and they cleared the rapidly
>> rising terrain by mere feet.
>>
>> So that is why rudder input is critical, minimize yaw and drag to
>> provide climb performance.
>>
>> And as you alluded to, blind rapid full rudder inputs can simply
>> over-G the airframe.
>>
>> The technique we are taught during an engine failure is to climb
>> straight ahead (airspace and terrain permitting), engine failure
>> during the takeoff roll are pretty painless if you simply blend in
>> enough rudder to keep on centerline as you accelerate then shift to
>> instruments once airborne.
>>
>> Engine failure during climbout while in a turn can be disorienting
>> with the greater yawing and rolling tendencies due to higher speeds
>> and power settings...obviously greater care must be taken by the pilot
>> flying the jet.
>
>Thanks for the information. I am somewhat amazed that the FAA doesn't
>require load analysis of the fin under yaw/extreme opposite rudder but
>(again according to AvWeek), it does not.
>
>

Political and un-Diplomatic pressure from the foreign states heavily
invested in the sucess of Airbus.

--
Ron

[John Bailey]

On Sun, 21 Mar 2004 22:36:45 GMT, (John
Bailey) wrote:

>http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/21/nyregion/21plane.html is a report of
>the maneuvering by both Airbus and American Airlines to get in their 2
>cents, pilot training vs inadequate design, in the crash of AA Flt 587
>over Queens.

Remarks in response to the original post assume the actual failure:
the rudder failing catastrophically, was due to the pilot responding
in an excessive way to a situation in which yaw needed to be
controlled. These resonses do not mention the fact that the yaw
needing to be controlled AND the excessive response came from a
characteristic of the plane itself. This inadequacy is described in
the Times article.
Here is the key quote:
(quote)
But the author of the study, Ronald A. Hess of the University of
California, said that the design of the rudder was conducive to such
oscillations. One problem, he found, was that on the A-300, the amount
of force needed to start moving the rudder was relatively high, and
the total range of motion allowed at that speed was only a little over
an inch, making it very difficult to apply any amount of rudder less
than its full extension. In addition, rudder application does not move
the plane instantly, and the delay might encourage a pilot to keep
applying the rudder until the aircraft moved further than the pilot
intended, according to Mr. Hess's analysis. The natural reaction would
then be to apply the rudder in the opposite direction. (end quote)

>I could accept such (lurking instability) on a
>military fighter plane, but such an accident waiting to happen in a
>commercial airliner seems unconscionable.

Pilot induced oscillation is the result of a failure of the controls
design to take into account the inherent lag of the human control
response. In the F86D at high speed, low altitude, the human simply
could not control the pitch of the plane, once it began oscillating.
The recourse was to let the plane fly out of the situation and hope it
was pointed in the right direction when it emerged. Many hot pilots
were red faced after insisting it was the pilots fault and then
finding themselves unable to avoid the maneuver. Apparently the most
notorious case occured when the squadron commander at Selfridge AFB,
lead a flyby formation, reaching levels of oscillation that had his
wingtips generating vortex fog.

John Bailey
http://home.rochester.rr.com/jbxroads/mailto.html

[Robey Price]

After an exhausting session with Victoria's Secret Police, John
Bailey confessed the following:

>Remarks in response to the original post assume the actual failure:
>the rudder failing catastrophically, was due to the pilot responding
>in an excessive way to a situation in which yaw needed to be
>controlled. These resonses do not mention the fact that the yaw
>needing to be controlled AND the excessive response came from a
>characteristic of the plane itself.

Good point.

>In addition, rudder application does not move
>the plane instantly, and the delay might encourage a pilot to keep
>applying the rudder until the aircraft moved further than the pilot
>intended, according to Mr. Hess's analysis. The natural reaction would
>then be to apply the rudder in the opposite direction. (end quote)

I've witnessed yaw PIO during V(one) cuts in the MD-80 and 757
simulator, it can happen with any jet IMO in a high pucker factor
situation...was never a problem in the F-16 8-)

>Pilot induced oscillation is the result of a failure of the controls
>design to take into account the inherent lag of the human control
>response.

Which is addressed in the F-16 with Standby Gains when the gear is
down or the refueling door is open. Would have been nice for the F-4
when refueling at a heavy weight and high altitude (above about
FL270).

> Apparently the most notorious case occured when the
>squadron commander at Selfridge AFB, lead a flyby formation,
> reaching levels of oscillation that had his wingtips generating vortex fog

Ya know you don't have to be doing anything special to generate
visible wingtip vortices. See them all the time in high relative humid
conditions from jets stabilized on final approach...but I get your
point.

The worst case I've heard of was an airshow flyby of RoKAF F-4s.
Number 3 trying to be perfect as Sq CO Lead approaches the sight line
at a very high speed (running late IIRC) gets into vicious PIO and
finally "freezes" the stick aft as his jet zooms out of formation for
an unscheduled missing man demo (much better than a fireball sliding
down the runway).

Juvat

[Tarver Engineering]

"John Bailey" > wrote in message
...

> Here is the key quote:
> (quote)
> But the author of the study, Ronald A. Hess of the University of
> California, said that the design of the rudder was conducive to such
> oscillations. One problem, he found, was that on the A-300, the amount
> of force needed to start moving the rudder was relatively high, and
> the total range of motion allowed at that speed was only a little over
> an inch, making it very difficult to apply any amount of rudder less
> than its full extension. In addition, rudder application does not move
> the plane instantly, and the delay might encourage a pilot to keep
> applying the rudder until the aircraft moved further than the pilot
> intended, according to Mr. Hess's analysis. The natural reaction would
> then be to apply the rudder in the opposite direction. (end quote)

More likely Hess is full of **** and should look further into the
circumstances of the crash.

[Nemo l'ancien]

>Political and un-Diplomatic pressure from the foreign states heavily
>invested in the sucess of Airbus.
>
>
>
The same for Boeing 737 tail problem... resolved for the entire fleet
only in ....2012....

[Tarver Engineering]

"Nemo l'ancien" > wrote in message
...
>
> >Political and un-Diplomatic pressure from the foreign states heavily
> >invested in the sucess of Airbus.
> >
> >
> >
> The same for Boeing 737 tail problem... resolved for the entire fleet
> only in ....2012....

The Boeing tail problem is the same one the A-300 has; the 737 rudder PCU AD
is basicly political bull****. Loss of ATC seperation led to a control
surface stall and the pilot beat the rudder pedals through the floor. The
difference is that the A-300 in question was equiped with a DFDR and we can
know exactly what happened. We know the pilot's inputs to the airplane, the
direction of deflection of the rudder and the aircraft's response to those
control surface deflections. Flight AA587 was classic rudder reversal due
to flow seperation. (stall)

Referernce: Blakey's statement to the USAir 737 and AA A-300.

[Paul F Austin]

"Ron Parsons" > wrote in message
...
> In article >,
> "Paul F Austin" > wrote:
>
> >"Robey Price" wrote
> >> After an exhausting session with Victoria's Secret Police, "Paul F
> >> Austin" confessed the following:
> >>
> >> >My impression from reading the AvWeek reports is that this problem
isn't
> >> >unique to A300s nor to Airbus products. The fin can be overloaded in
most
> >> >transports if opposite rudder is commanded while a significant yaw has
> >> >occurred. I'm not a pilot but AvWeek claimed that standard recovery
> >training
> >> >for transport pilots could lead to this condition.
> >>
> >> You are correct, I fly the 757 and we've recently had some expanded
> >> warning verbiage added to our flight manual about excessive rudder
> >> inputs during an engine failure. Pretty soon after that AA crash we
> >> were cautioned about excessive rudder inputs.
....
> >
> >Thanks for the information. I am somewhat amazed that the FAA doesn't
> >require load analysis of the fin under yaw/extreme opposite rudder but
> >(again according to AvWeek), it does not.
> >
> >
>
> Political and un-Diplomatic pressure from the foreign states heavily
> invested in the sucess of Airbus.

Nonsense. The lack of analysis of that condition is long standing and
applied to Lockheed, Boeing and McAir before Airbus was born.

In case you have trouble keeping up, the failure mode that augered in AA587
probably applies to most jet transports. Because the analysis hasn't been
done, you can't prove that_any_certified for passenger service will survive
a rudder slam while in a sideslip at low altitude.

You can fix the problem if 1. you know the envelope that's survivable and 2.
you prevent excursions outside the envelope. You prevent the excursion (in
increasing order of preferability) by training, by modifications to control
"feel", by changes to control laws and by structural enhancements. The last
may not be possible within acceptable weight and moment constraints.

[Tarver Engineering]

"Paul F Austin" > wrote in message
...
>
> "Ron Parsons" > wrote in message
> ...
> > In article >,
> > "Paul F Austin" > wrote:
> >
> > >"Robey Price" wrote
> > >> After an exhausting session with Victoria's Secret Police, "Paul F
> > >> Austin" confessed the following:
> > >>
> > >> >My impression from reading the AvWeek reports is that this problem
> isn't
> > >> >unique to A300s nor to Airbus products. The fin can be overloaded in
> most
> > >> >transports if opposite rudder is commanded while a significant yaw
has
> > >> >occurred. I'm not a pilot but AvWeek claimed that standard recovery
> > >training
> > >> >for transport pilots could lead to this condition.
> > >>
> > >> You are correct, I fly the 757 and we've recently had some expanded
> > >> warning verbiage added to our flight manual about excessive rudder
> > >> inputs during an engine failure. Pretty soon after that AA crash we
> > >> were cautioned about excessive rudder inputs.
> ...
> > >
> > >Thanks for the information. I am somewhat amazed that the FAA doesn't
> > >require load analysis of the fin under yaw/extreme opposite rudder but
> > >(again according to AvWeek), it does not.
> > >
> > >
> >
> > Political and un-Diplomatic pressure from the foreign states heavily
> > invested in the sucess of Airbus.
>
> Nonsense. The lack of analysis of that condition is long standing and
> applied to Lockheed, Boeing and McAir before Airbus was born.
>
> In case you have trouble keeping up, the failure mode that augered in
AA587
> probably applies to most jet transports. Because the analysis hasn't been
> done, you can't prove that_any_certified for passenger service will
survive
> a rudder slam while in a sideslip at low altitude.
>
> You can fix the problem if 1. you know the envelope that's survivable and
2.
> you prevent excursions outside the envelope. You prevent the excursion (in
> increasing order of preferability) by training, by modifications to
control
> "feel", by changes to control laws and by structural enhancements. The
last
> may not be possible within acceptable weight and moment constraints.

Twin engine out takeoff requirements have driven regulation for these big
rudders, until now. It is a fairly simple matter for AI to reduce the
pilot's command authority by adjusting the control LAWs.

[tw]

"Ron Parsons" > wrote in message
...
> In article >,
> "Paul F Austin" > wrote:
>
> >"Robey Price" wrote
> >> After an exhausting session with Victoria's Secret Police, "Paul F
> >> Austin" confessed the following:
> >>
> >> >My impression from reading the AvWeek reports is that this problem
isn't
> >> >unique to A300s nor to Airbus products. The fin can be overloaded in
most
> >> >transports if opposite rudder is commanded while a significant yaw has
> >> >occurred. I'm not a pilot but AvWeek claimed that standard recovery
> >training
> >> >for transport pilots could lead to this condition.
> >>
> >> You are correct, I fly the 757 and we've recently had some expanded
> >> warning verbiage added to our flight manual about excessive rudder
> >> inputs during an engine failure. Pretty soon after that AA crash we
> >> were cautioned about excessive rudder inputs.

<snip>

> >Thanks for the information. I am somewhat amazed that the FAA doesn't
> >require load analysis of the fin under yaw/extreme opposite rudder but
> >(again according to AvWeek), it does not.
> >
> >
>
> Political and un-Diplomatic pressure from the foreign states heavily
> invested in the sucess of Airbus.

...and Boeing as well presumably, seeing as they potentially have the same
problem. DUH! As I believe the youngsters say.

>
> --
> Ron

[Ron Parsons]

In article >,
"tw" > wrote:

>"Ron Parsons" > wrote in message
...
>> In article >,
>> "Paul F Austin" > wrote:
>>
>> >"Robey Price" wrote
>> >> After an exhausting session with Victoria's Secret Police, "Paul F
>> >> Austin" confessed the following:
>> >>
>> >> >My impression from reading the AvWeek reports is that this problem
>isn't
>> >> >unique to A300s nor to Airbus products. The fin can be overloaded in
>most
>> >> >transports if opposite rudder is commanded while a significant yaw has
>> >> >occurred. I'm not a pilot but AvWeek claimed that standard recovery
>> >training
>> >> >for transport pilots could lead to this condition.
>> >>
>> >> You are correct, I fly the 757 and we've recently had some expanded
>> >> warning verbiage added to our flight manual about excessive rudder
>> >> inputs during an engine failure. Pretty soon after that AA crash we
>> >> were cautioned about excessive rudder inputs.
>
><snip>
>
>> >Thanks for the information. I am somewhat amazed that the FAA doesn't
>> >require load analysis of the fin under yaw/extreme opposite rudder but
>> >(again according to AvWeek), it does not.
>> >
>> >
>>
>> Political and un-Diplomatic pressure from the foreign states heavily
>> invested in the sucess of Airbus.
>
>..and Boeing as well presumably, seeing as they potentially have the same
>problem. DUH! As I believe the youngsters say.

Not exactly. Boeing has had hardover problems in the past, AA21 into
Jamaca Bay back in the late '50s for example and the various 737
incidents.

The Airbus has a totally different problem which only the pilots are
willing to speak about. The fleet, including the AA587 aircraft has a
history of uncommanded rudder fluctuations where the rudder slams back
and forth between the stops so rapidly that the DFR can't record it.

Airbus won't admit it might be a design flaw, AAL won't consider it
might be improper maintainance.

The NWA pilots were screaming their heads off about the wierd stuff that
the FBW baby busses were doing, but the FAA turned a deaf ear.

Airbus has been consistant in finding Pilot Error, in one case in Asia
releasing their findings before the Accdent Investigation Team had even
arrived at the site.

The only reason that AAL has Airbus aircraft in the fleet is that it was
a requirment in order to gain landing rights in Europe.

FAA understands clearly that if they ground any of the busses, that the
EU states involved with Airbus will ground Boeings.

Now don't you feel safer?

--
Ron

[tw]

"Ron Parsons" > wrote in message
...
> In article >,
> "tw" > wrote:
>
> >"Ron Parsons" > wrote in message
> ...
> >> In article >,
> >> "Paul F Austin" > wrote:
> >>
> >> >"Robey Price" wrote
> >> >> After an exhausting session with Victoria's Secret Police, "Paul F
> >> >> Austin" confessed the following:
> >> >>
> >> >> >My impression from reading the AvWeek reports is that this problem
> >isn't
> >> >> >unique to A300s nor to Airbus products. The fin can be overloaded
in
> >most
> >> >> >transports if opposite rudder is commanded while a significant yaw
has
> >> >> >occurred. I'm not a pilot but AvWeek claimed that standard recovery
> >> >training
> >> >> >for transport pilots could lead to this condition.
> >> >>
> >> >> You are correct, I fly the 757 and we've recently had some expanded
> >> >> warning verbiage added to our flight manual about excessive rudder
> >> >> inputs during an engine failure. Pretty soon after that AA crash we
> >> >> were cautioned about excessive rudder inputs.
> >
> ><snip>
> >
> >> >Thanks for the information. I am somewhat amazed that the FAA doesn't
> >> >require load analysis of the fin under yaw/extreme opposite rudder but
> >> >(again according to AvWeek), it does not.
> >> >
> >> >
> >>
> >> Political and un-Diplomatic pressure from the foreign states heavily
> >> invested in the sucess of Airbus.
> >
> >..and Boeing as well presumably, seeing as they potentially have the same
> >problem. DUH! As I believe the youngsters say.
>
> Not exactly. Boeing has had hardover problems in the past, AA21 into
> Jamaca Bay back in the late '50s for example and the various 737
> incidents.

Look up the post to where the 757 pilot says
"You are correct, I fly the 757 and we've recently had some expanded
warning verbiage added to our flight manual about excessive rudder
inputs during an engine failure. Pretty soon after that AA crash we
were cautioned about excessive rudder inputs."

It is a conern for Boeing as well as Airbus - this has nothing to do with
the dodgy hydraulic actuators that have been blamed for the hardover
problem.

> The Airbus has a totally different problem which only the pilots are
> willing to speak about. The fleet, including the AA587 aircraft has a
> history of uncommanded rudder fluctuations where the rudder slams back
> and forth between the stops so rapidly that the DFR can't record it.

Cite? How come this problem isn't showing up with all Airbus users?

> Airbus won't admit it might be a design flaw, AAL won't consider it
> might be improper maintainance.
>
> The NWA pilots were screaming their heads off about the wierd stuff that
> the FBW baby busses were doing, but the FAA turned a deaf ear.

How come no other Airbus users are complaining?

> Airbus has been consistant in finding Pilot Error, in one case in Asia
> releasing their findings before the Accdent Investigation Team had even
> arrived at the site.

Which one was that?

>
> The only reason that AAL has Airbus aircraft in the fleet is that it was
> a requirment in order to gain landing rights in Europe.

I find that extremely hard to believe, do you have a source?

> FAA understands clearly that if they ground any of the busses, that the
> EU states involved with Airbus will ground Boeings.

Again, cite?

>
> Now don't you feel safer?

I certainly don't feel any less safe

[Keith Willshaw]

"Ron Parsons" > wrote in message
...
> In article >,

> Not exactly. Boeing has had hardover problems in the past, AA21 into
> Jamaca Bay back in the late '50s for example and the various 737
> incidents.
>
> The Airbus has a totally different problem which only the pilots are
> willing to speak about. The fleet, including the AA587 aircraft has a
> history of uncommanded rudder fluctuations where the rudder slams back
> and forth between the stops so rapidly that the DFR can't record it.
>

This sounds extremely dubious, the DFR can record events that take less
than a millisecond, the rudder is much to massive to move in that time.


> Airbus won't admit it might be a design flaw, AAL won't consider it
> might be improper maintainance.
>
> The NWA pilots were screaming their heads off about the wierd stuff that
> the FBW baby busses were doing, but the FAA turned a deaf ear.
>

The A-300 isnt a FBW aircraft it uses conventional control systems.

Keith

[Robey Price]

After an exhausting session with Victoria's Secret Police, Ron
Parsons confessed the following:

>The NWA pilots were screaming their heads off about the wierd stuff that
>the FBW baby busses were doing, but the FAA turned a deaf ear.

Got anything specific WRT this claim? Not saying weird stuff doesn't
happen, but the pilot grapevine never reflected anything resembling
NWA pilots "screaming their heads off" and the FAA ignoring them.

I'll be the first to admit that lots of stupid pilot/airplane tricks
never make it thru to the rank and file, but I've not seen any sign of
your claim on the ALPA site or the NWA forums.

Many of us call the A-320, "Fifi" (IOW a french dog or the Poodle in
deference to United guys and O'Hare's ground controllers calling the
737 a Guppy) ergo the A319 is a "minature poodle." This is no more
mean spirited than F-15 guys calling the F-16 the Lawn Dart, Viper
guys calling Eagle guys, "Ego drivers."

Juvat

[Tarver Engineering]

"Robey Price" > wrote in message
...
> After an exhausting session with Victoria's Secret Police, Ron
> Parsons confessed the following:
>
> >The NWA pilots were screaming their heads off about the wierd stuff that
> >the FBW baby busses were doing, but the FAA turned a deaf ear.
>
> Got anything specific WRT this claim? Not saying weird stuff doesn't
> happen, but the pilot grapevine never reflected anything resembling
> NWA pilots "screaming their heads off" and the FAA ignoring them.

The only think I ever heard was that hose early A-320s were noisey and that
is true. They had a little bandwidth starvation problem in the flight
control computer, but it is corrected.

> I'll be the first to admit that lots of stupid pilot/airplane tricks
> never make it thru to the rank and file, but I've not seen any sign of
> your claim on the ALPA site or the NWA forums.
>
> Many of us call the A-320, "Fifi" (IOW a french dog or the Poodle in
> deference to United guys and O'Hare's ground controllers calling the
> 737 a Guppy) ergo the A319 is a "minature poodle." This is no more
> mean spirited than F-15 guys calling the F-16 the Lawn Dart, Viper
> guys calling Eagle guys, "Ego drivers."

A little friendly chatter is a good thing.

[Robey Price]

After an exhausting session with Victoria's Secret Police, "Tarver
Engineering" confessed the following:

>The only think I ever heard was that hose early A-320s were noisey and that
>is true.

In a different vein...I've heard of the "airbus whine," which was used
by a Denver Center controller last month. In a strictly anecdotal
observation, A320/319 crews were complaining about the quality of
their "ride" more often than 737/757 folks, and airbus guys were
requesting frequent altitude changes.

Not to mention the airbus insults you upon touchdown, "Retard...
retard...retard..."

>A little friendly chatter is a good thing.

True.

Juvat

[Tarver Engineering]

"Robey Price" > wrote in message
...
> After an exhausting session with Victoria's Secret Police, "Tarver
> Engineering" confessed the following:
>
> >The only think I ever heard was that hose early A-320s were noisey and
that
> >is true.
>
> In a different vein...I've heard of the "airbus whine," which was used

A DC-9 like audable bandwidth starvation was what I was refering to.
(tailcone) The whine is just normal machine noise caused by the way AI
implements airplane systems.

> by a Denver Center controller last month. In a strictly anecdotal
> observation, A320/319 crews were complaining about the quality of
> their "ride" more often than 737/757 folks, and airbus guys were
> requesting frequent altitude changes.

The A-320 is a better ride to begin with, so the bumps are noticed. It is
my opinion that the last narrow body Boeing built for that Cadillac ride was
the 727. I like the idea that the 7E7 is being designed with the cabin in
mind.

> Not to mention the airbus insults you upon touchdown, "Retard...
> retard...retard..."

Not to mention how the French "demand" instead of request.

[Robey Price]

After an exhausting session with Victoria's Secret Police, "Tarver
Engineering" confessed the following:

>A DC-9 like audable bandwidth starvation was what I was refering to.
>(tailcone) The whine is just normal machine noise caused by the way AI
>implements airplane systems.

JT you got me there, I have no idea what audible bandwith starvation
is. I've been back in the tail cone of a DC-9/MD-80 with the APU
running...

>The A-320 is a better ride to begin with, so the bumps are noticed.

Speaking as a 757 pilot, I can see no basis for your conclusion that
the ride is better on the A-320. With a shorter fuselage there is a
smaller distance from the CG to the nose or tail, so there's less
movement about the CG (thinking teeter-totter) when disturbed. In that
regard the ass end of a 757-300 is pretty darn uncomfortable in lumpy
air while up in the cockpit we think it's not so bad.

But like the DC-9/MD-80, the A319/320 has a lower service ceiling than
the 757, so both often do more deviating for TRWs.

The A319/320 has a wider aisle which Pax and FAs like, but it has
Drift Down issues that 757-200s don't have even with the less powerful
P&W motors vice the Rolls Royce option.

Go-arounds (rejected landings) are much more sporting in the A319/320
in terms of switchology vice the 757. The PNF (pilot not flying) is
just like a one-legged man in an asskicking contest. But as in all
things, pilots can screw the pooch regardless of airplane.

Juvat

[Peter Kemp]

On Thu, 25 Mar 2004 13:51:28 GMT, Ron Parsons > wrote:

>The only reason that AAL has Airbus aircraft in the fleet is that it was
>a requirment in order to gain landing rights in Europe.

Got a cite for this? Considering I can think of at least one airline
that is entirely European (RyanAir only flies 737s IIRC) that doesn't
fly *any* AI aircraft, this sounds like ******** .

Even the National carriers of France and the UK (especially France),
the primary forces behind AI, have dozens of Boeings - why would they
bother if there was some deep conspiracy?

>FAA understands clearly that if they ground any of the busses, that the
>EU states involved with Airbus will ground Boeings.

Don't talk rubbish. What would be the grounds?
---
Peter Kemp

Life is short - drink faster

[Tarver Engineering]

"Robey Price" > wrote in message
...
> After an exhausting session with Victoria's Secret Police, "Tarver
> Engineering" confessed the following:
>
> >A DC-9 like audable bandwidth starvation was what I was refering to.
> >(tailcone) The whine is just normal machine noise caused by the way AI
> >implements airplane systems.
>
> JT you got me there, I have no idea what audible bandwith starvation
> is. I've been back in the tail cone of a DC-9/MD-80 with the APU
> running...

One of the main deficiencies of the corrected in the DC-9 in the -80 amended
type certificate was to fix the tail cone. AI had an undersampling problem
in the feedback control system of the A-320, but it was corrected some time
ago.

> >The A-320 is a better ride to begin with, so the bumps are noticed.
> Speaking as a 757 pilot, I can see no basis for your conclusion that
> the ride is better on the A-320. With a shorter fuselage there is a
> smaller distance from the CG to the nose or tail, so there's less
> movement about the CG (thinking teeter-totter) when disturbed. In that
> regard the ass end of a 757-300 is pretty darn uncomfortable in lumpy
> air while up in the cockpit we think it's not so bad.

There are pitch stability issues related to cabin comfort with either type,
but I find the A-320's wet tail to be the more pleasant solution. The 757
uses feedback compensation to get similar fuel savings, except the
newer -320 design is quiter and more comfortable, IMO.

> But like the DC-9/MD-80, the A319/320 has a lower service ceiling than
> the 757, so both often do more deviating for TRWs.

From a machine standpoint the 757 is probably the superior bird.

> The A319/320 has a wider aisle which Pax and FAs like, but it has
> Drift Down issues that 757-200s don't have even with the less powerful
> P&W motors vice the Rolls Royce option.

The pitch stability issues related to the 757 make my joints hurt.

> Go-arounds (rejected landings) are much more sporting in the A319/320
> in terms of switchology vice the 757. The PNF (pilot not flying) is
> just like a one-legged man in an asskicking contest. But as in all
> things, pilots can screw the pooch regardless of airplane.

As has been demonstrated in both types.

[Tarver Engineering]

"Peter Kemp" > wrote in message
...
> On Thu, 25 Mar 2004 13:51:28 GMT, Ron Parsons > wrote:
>
> >The only reason that AAL has Airbus aircraft in the fleet is that it was
> >a requirment in order to gain landing rights in Europe.
>
> Got a cite for this? Considering I can think of at least one airline
> that is entirely European (RyanAir only flies 737s IIRC) that doesn't
> fly *any* AI aircraft, this sounds like ******** .
>
> Even the National carriers of France and the UK (especially France),
> the primary forces behind AI, have dozens of Boeings - why would they
> bother if there was some deep conspiracy?
>
> >FAA understands clearly that if they ground any of the busses, that the
> >EU states involved with Airbus will ground Boeings.
>
> Don't talk rubbish. What would be the grounds?

It sounds like restraint of trade to me, which is an automatic loser for
regulatory agencies.

[Ron Parsons]

In article >,
Peter Kemp > wrote:

>On Thu, 25 Mar 2004 13:51:28 GMT, Ron Parsons > wrote:
>
>>The only reason that AAL has Airbus aircraft in the fleet is that it was
>>a requirment in order to gain landing rights in Europe.
>
>Got a cite for this? Considering I can think of at least one airline
>that is entirely European (RyanAir only flies 737s IIRC) that doesn't
>fly *any* AI aircraft, this sounds like ******** .

Being there doesn't come with cites. Sorry.

>
>Even the National carriers of France and the UK (especially France),
>the primary forces behind AI, have dozens of Boeings - why would they
>bother if there was some deep conspiracy?
>
>>FAA understands clearly that if they ground any of the busses, that the
>>EU states involved with Airbus will ground Boeings.
>
>Don't talk rubbish. What would be the grounds?

Revenge.

--
Ron

[Ron Parsons]

In article >,
"Keith Willshaw" > wrote:

>"Ron Parsons" > wrote in message
...
>> In article >,
>
>> Not exactly. Boeing has had hardover problems in the past, AA21 into
>> Jamaca Bay back in the late '50s for example and the various 737
>> incidents.
>>
>> The Airbus has a totally different problem which only the pilots are
>> willing to speak about. The fleet, including the AA587 aircraft has a
>> history of uncommanded rudder fluctuations where the rudder slams back
>> and forth between the stops so rapidly that the DFR can't record it.
>>
>
>This sounds extremely dubious, the DFR can record events that take less
>than a millisecond, the rudder is much to massive to move in that time.

Perhaps then my friends who fly them know less than you.

>
>
>> Airbus won't admit it might be a design flaw, AAL won't consider it
>> might be improper maintainance.
>>
>> The NWA pilots were screaming their heads off about the wierd stuff that
>> the FBW baby busses were doing, but the FAA turned a deaf ear.
>>
>
>The A-300 isnt a FBW aircraft it uses conventional control systems.

I was writing of two separate matters where the common thread was the
attitude of AI.

Sorry to have confused you.

--
Ron

[Ron Parsons]

In article >,
"tw" > wrote:

>"Ron Parsons" > wrote in message
...
>> In article >,
>> "tw" > wrote:
>>
>> >"Ron Parsons" > wrote in message
>> ...
>> >> In article >,
>> >> "Paul F Austin" > wrote:
>> >>
>> >> >"Robey Price" wrote
>> >> >> After an exhausting session with Victoria's Secret Police, "Paul F
>> >> >> Austin" confessed the following:
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >My impression from reading the AvWeek reports is that this problem
>> >isn't
>> >> >> >unique to A300s nor to Airbus products. The fin can be overloaded
>in
>> >most
>> >> >> >transports if opposite rudder is commanded while a significant yaw
>has
>> >> >> >occurred. I'm not a pilot but AvWeek claimed that standard recovery
>> >> >training
>> >> >> >for transport pilots could lead to this condition.
>> >> >>
>> >> >> You are correct, I fly the 757 and we've recently had some expanded
>> >> >> warning verbiage added to our flight manual about excessive rudder
>> >> >> inputs during an engine failure. Pretty soon after that AA crash we
>> >> >> were cautioned about excessive rudder inputs.
>> >
>> ><snip>
>> >
>> >> >Thanks for the information. I am somewhat amazed that the FAA doesn't
>> >> >require load analysis of the fin under yaw/extreme opposite rudder but
>> >> >(again according to AvWeek), it does not.
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >>
>> >> Political and un-Diplomatic pressure from the foreign states heavily
>> >> invested in the sucess of Airbus.
>> >
>> >..and Boeing as well presumably, seeing as they potentially have the same
>> >problem. DUH! As I believe the youngsters say.
>>
>> Not exactly. Boeing has had hardover problems in the past, AA21 into
>> Jamaca Bay back in the late '50s for example and the various 737
>> incidents.
>
>Look up the post to where the 757 pilot says
>"You are correct, I fly the 757 and we've recently had some expanded
> warning verbiage added to our flight manual about excessive rudder
>inputs during an engine failure. Pretty soon after that AA crash we
>were cautioned about excessive rudder inputs."
>
>It is a conern for Boeing as well as Airbus - this has nothing to do with
>the dodgy hydraulic actuators that have been blamed for the hardover
>problem.
>
>> The Airbus has a totally different problem which only the pilots are
>> willing to speak about. The fleet, including the AA587 aircraft has a
>> history of uncommanded rudder fluctuations where the rudder slams back
>> and forth between the stops so rapidly that the DFR can't record it.
>
>Cite? How come this problem isn't showing up with all Airbus users?
>
>> Airbus won't admit it might be a design flaw, AAL won't consider it
>> might be improper maintainance.
>>
>> The NWA pilots were screaming their heads off about the wierd stuff that
>> the FBW baby busses were doing, but the FAA turned a deaf ear.
>
>How come no other Airbus users are complaining?
>
>> Airbus has been consistant in finding Pilot Error, in one case in Asia
>> releasing their findings before the Accdent Investigation Team had even
>> arrived at the site.
>
>Which one was that?
>
>>
>> The only reason that AAL has Airbus aircraft in the fleet is that it was
>> a requirment in order to gain landing rights in Europe.
>
>I find that extremely hard to believe, do you have a source?
>
>> FAA understands clearly that if they ground any of the busses, that the
>> EU states involved with Airbus will ground Boeings.
>
>Again, cite?
>
>>
>> Now don't you feel safer?
>
>I certainly don't feel any less safe
>
>

Sorry, the real world doesn't come with cites.

--
Ron

[Keith Willshaw]

"Ron Parsons" > wrote in message
...

> >
> >This sounds extremely dubious, the DFR can record events that take less
> >than a millisecond, the rudder is much to massive to move in that time.
>
> Perhaps then my friends who fly them know less than you.
>

Ah friends who cant manage to post for themselves and who
of course cant be named.

Yeah Right

Keith

[WaltBJ]

"Tarver Engineering" > wrote in message >...
> "John Bailey" > wrote in message
> ...
SNIP:>
One problem, he found, was that on the A-300, the amount
> > of force needed to start moving the rudder was relatively high, and
> > the total range of motion allowed at that speed was only a little over
> > an inch, making it very difficult to apply any amount of rudder less
> > than its full extension.
SNIP:
Is he trying to say that operational reasons limit rudder motion to a
little over an inch, or what? Doesn't sound like enough to handle one
engine out with the other one firewalled to, say, climb out of San
Juan, Costa Rico.
Walt BJ

[Tarver Engineering]

"WaltBJ" > wrote in message
om...
> "Tarver Engineering" > wrote in message
>...
> > "John Bailey" > wrote in message
> > ...
> SNIP:>
> One problem, he found, was that on the A-300, the amount
> > > of force needed to start moving the rudder was relatively high, and
> > > the total range of motion allowed at that speed was only a little over
> > > an inch, making it very difficult to apply any amount of rudder less
> > > than its full extension.
> SNIP:
> Is he trying to say that operational reasons limit rudder motion to a
> little over an inch, or what? Doesn't sound like enough to handle one
> engine out with the other one firewalled to, say, climb out of San
> Juan, Costa Rico.

I'll agree with Walt's observation that the poster may wish to rethink their
contribution to the thread. Get a clue, FAA has two zeros.

[Tom]

Ron Parsons > wrote in message >...
> In article >,
> "tw" > wrote:
>
> >"Ron Parsons" > wrote in message
> ...
> >> In article >,
> >> "tw" > wrote:
> >>
> >> >"Ron Parsons" > wrote in message
> >> ...
> >> >> In article >,
> >> >> "Paul F Austin" > wrote:
> >> >>
> >> >> >"Robey Price" wrote
> >> >> >> After an exhausting session with Victoria's Secret Police, "Paul F
> >> >> >> Austin" confessed the following:
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> >My impression from reading the AvWeek reports is that this problem
> isn't
> >> >> >> >unique to A300s nor to Airbus products. The fin can be overloaded
> in
> most
> >> >> >> >transports if opposite rudder is commanded while a significant yaw
> has
> >> >> >> >occurred. I'm not a pilot but AvWeek claimed that standard recovery
> training
> >> >> >> >for transport pilots could lead to this condition.
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> You are correct, I fly the 757 and we've recently had some expanded
> >> >> >> warning verbiage added to our flight manual about excessive rudder
> >> >> >> inputs during an engine failure. Pretty soon after that AA crash we
> >> >> >> were cautioned about excessive rudder inputs.
> >> >
> >> ><snip>
> >> >
> >> >> >Thanks for the information. I am somewhat amazed that the FAA doesn't
> >> >> >require load analysis of the fin under yaw/extreme opposite rudder but
> >> >> >(again according to AvWeek), it does not.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >>
> >> >> Political and un-Diplomatic pressure from the foreign states heavily
> >> >> invested in the sucess of Airbus.
> >> >
> >> >..and Boeing as well presumably, seeing as they potentially have the same
> >> >problem. DUH! As I believe the youngsters say.
> >>
> >> Not exactly. Boeing has had hardover problems in the past, AA21 into
> >> Jamaca Bay back in the late '50s for example and the various 737
> >> incidents.
> >
> >Look up the post to where the 757 pilot says
> >"You are correct, I fly the 757 and we've recently had some expanded
> > warning verbiage added to our flight manual about excessive rudder
> >inputs during an engine failure. Pretty soon after that AA crash we
> >were cautioned about excessive rudder inputs."
> >
> >It is a conern for Boeing as well as Airbus - this has nothing to do with
> >the dodgy hydraulic actuators that have been blamed for the hardover
> >problem.
> >
> >> The Airbus has a totally different problem which only the pilots are
> >> willing to speak about. The fleet, including the AA587 aircraft has a
> >> history of uncommanded rudder fluctuations where the rudder slams back
> >> and forth between the stops so rapidly that the DFR can't record it.
> >
> >Cite? How come this problem isn't showing up with all Airbus users?
> >
> >> Airbus won't admit it might be a design flaw, AAL won't consider it
> >> might be improper maintainance.
> >>
> >> The NWA pilots were screaming their heads off about the wierd stuff that
> >> the FBW baby busses were doing, but the FAA turned a deaf ear.
> >
> >How come no other Airbus users are complaining?
> >
> >> Airbus has been consistant in finding Pilot Error, in one case in Asia
> >> releasing their findings before the Accdent Investigation Team had even
> >> arrived at the site.
> >
> >Which one was that?
> >
> >>
> >> The only reason that AAL has Airbus aircraft in the fleet is that it was
> >> a requirment in order to gain landing rights in Europe.
> >
> >I find that extremely hard to believe, do you have a source?
> >
> >> FAA understands clearly that if they ground any of the busses, that the
> >> EU states involved with Airbus will ground Boeings.
> >
> >Again, cite?
> >
> >>
> >> Now don't you feel safer?
> >
> >I certainly don't feel any less safe
> >
> >
>
> Sorry, the real world doesn't come with cites.

Hmm.. my bull**** detector just pegged.

[Tarver Engineering]

"Tom" > wrote in message
om...
> Ron Parsons > wrote in message
>...
<snip>
> > >> FAA understands clearly that if they ground any of the busses, that
the
> > >> EU states involved with Airbus will ground Boeings.
> > >
> > >Again, cite?
> > >
> > >>
> > >> Now don't you feel safer?
> > >
> > >I certainly don't feel any less safe

> > Sorry, the real world doesn't come with cites.
>
> Hmm.. my bull**** detector just pegged.

You will get over it. What Ron wrote is why there is a JAA in Europe.

Money and jobs.

[Tom]

"Tarver Engineering" > wrote in message >...
> "Tom" > wrote in message
> om...
> > Ron Parsons > wrote in message
> >...
> <snip>
> > > >> FAA understands clearly that if they ground any of the busses, that
> the
> > > >> EU states involved with Airbus will ground Boeings.
> > > >
> > > >Again, cite?
> > > >
> > > >>
> > > >> Now don't you feel safer?
> > > >
> > > >I certainly don't feel any less safe
>
> > > Sorry, the real world doesn't come with cites.
> >
> > Hmm.. my bull**** detector just pegged.
>
> You will get over it. What Ron wrote is why there is a JAA in Europe.

What?

>
> Money and jobs.

What ARE you on about splaps boy?

[Tarver Engineering]

"Tom" > wrote in message
om...
> "Tarver Engineering" > wrote in message
>...
> > "Tom" > wrote in message
> > om...
> > > Ron Parsons > wrote in message
> > >...
> > <snip>
> > > > >> FAA understands clearly that if they ground any of the busses,
that the
> > > > >> EU states involved with Airbus will ground Boeings.
> > > > >
> > > > >Again, cite?
> > > > >
> > > > >>
> > > > >> Now don't you feel safer?
> > > > >
> > > > >I certainly don't feel any less safe
> >
> > > > Sorry, the real world doesn't come with cites.
> > >
> > > Hmm.. my bull**** detector just pegged.
> >
> > You will get over it. What Ron wrote is why there is a JAA in Europe.
>
> What?

Tit for tat is how it is. Europe had the perception that FAA was screwing
them on certification of new airplanes so they strated JAA.

What don't you get?

[Tom]

"Tarver Engineering" > wrote in message >...
> "Tom" > wrote in message
> om...
> > "Tarver Engineering" > wrote in message
> >...
> > > "Tom" > wrote in message
> > > om...
> > > > Ron Parsons > wrote in message
> > > >...
> > > <snip>
> > > > > >> FAA understands clearly that if they ground any of the busses,
> that the
> > > > > >> EU states involved with Airbus will ground Boeings.
> > > > > >
> > > > > >Again, cite?
> > > > > >
> > > > > >>
> > > > > >> Now don't you feel safer?
> > > > > >
> > > > > >I certainly don't feel any less safe
>
> > > > > Sorry, the real world doesn't come with cites.
> > > >
> > > > Hmm.. my bull**** detector just pegged.
> > >
> > > You will get over it. What Ron wrote is why there is a JAA in Europe.
> >
> > What?
>
> Tit for tat is how it is.

Absolute nonsense - what Beoings have had difficulty with
certification in Europe?

> Europe had the perception that FAA was screwing
> them on certification of new airplanes so they strated JAA.

Your contention is that the JAA was created soley to refuse
certification of Boeing products?!

>
> What don't you get?

THe same hallucinatory side-effects when drinking that you do?