RN's search for an offensive role in nuclear war

[KDR]

While reading Eric Grove's "Vanguard to Trident" again, I found
something which may interest SMNers.

On page 44, Grove wrote:
"The ASW/fighter priority advised against putting too many scarce
resources into strike aircraft but, nevertheless, in mid-1948 studies
began of a new heavy attack aircraft with a range of perhaps two to
three thousand miles. Such a machine would give the Royal Navy the
same kind of nuclear attack capabilities as were being so assiduously
pursed by the United States Navy."

Anyone has any idea what type of aircraft it was?

Page 56
"The carrier was clearly the major surface ship. There was some debate
over the primary duty of these ships, whether they were mainly for
offensive purposes in attacking enemy naval bases or for defensive use
dealing with air and submarine threats to high-value convoys.
....
The emphasis on convoy escort was clear. As Fraser put it to the fifth
sea lord in 1948: "Planning can only proceed on something we know we
must do; escort safely our convoys." This view did not find complete
acceptance among Fraser's colleagues, especially the airmen, who
instinctively demanded a more theoretically "offensive" role."

See OA NHC Burke Papers, Personal File, #51 at
http://www.history.navy.mil/colloquia/cch8c.html

Page 98
"Not only did the Admiralty insist on keeping these two sophisticated
types (Sea Vixen and Scimitar), but it was actively pursuing once
again the concept of a nuclear-capable heavy attack aircraft. Some
kind of navalized variant of the RAF's Canberra bomber was considered,
and this led to a requirement, issued in June 1952, for a new jet
strike aircraft of much more advanced design and performance, the NA39
(Buccaneer)."

Page 105
"In return the Admiralty made the point that the main argument in
favor of the RAF's planned medium-bomber force was the influence it
might give over the general Western bomber offensive. It was as
important to have influence over the main NATO Striking Fleet's AJ-1s
or A3Ds as it was over the United States Air Force's B-47s and B-36s."

[Steven James Forsberg]

B

: Page 56
: "The carrier was clearly the major surface ship. There was some debate
: over the primary duty of these ships, whether they were mainly for
: offensive purposes in attacking enemy naval bases or for defensive use
: dealing with air and submarine threats to high-value convoys.
: ...
: The emphasis on convoy escort was clear. As Fraser put it to the fifth
: sea lord in 1948: "Planning can only proceed on something we know we
: must do; escort safely our convoys." This view did not find complete
: acceptance among Fraser's colleagues, especially the airmen, who
: instinctively demanded a more theoretically "offensive" role."

This was to be a longstanding debate during the cold war. Take for
example the U.S. arguments over proper naval strategy wrt a Soviet invasion
of Germany - the "Let's go bomb Murmansk" crowd versus the "sensible GIUK
gap blockade" group. Many naval aviators were not happy with contingency
plans that had most carrier 'strike' aircraft deploying for use from
NATO airfields while the ASW and interceptors stayed at sea to do blockade
and/or escort duty. They formulated a counter strategy that had the carrier
groups sailing into the Norwegian Sea to launch attacks on Soviet facilities
in the far north.
What would have actually been done if war had broken out? Probably
the Gap blockade/escort mission, even if some folks (Lehman, the aviator
SecNav) had fits. It was certianly an issue that kept staffs busy,
however.

regards,
----------------------------------------------------------------

[KDR]

Steven James Forsberg > wrote in message >...
> B
>
> : Page 56
> : "The carrier was clearly the major surface ship. There was some debate
> : over the primary duty of these ships, whether they were mainly for
> : offensive purposes in attacking enemy naval bases or for defensive use
> : dealing with air and submarine threats to high-value convoys.
> : ...
> : The emphasis on convoy escort was clear. As Fraser put it to the fifth
> : sea lord in 1948: "Planning can only proceed on something we know we
> : must do; escort safely our convoys." This view did not find complete
> : acceptance among Fraser's colleagues, especially the airmen, who
> : instinctively demanded a more theoretically "offensive" role."
>
> This was to be a longstanding debate during the cold war. Take for
> example the U.S. arguments over proper naval strategy wrt a Soviet invasion
> of Germany - the "Let's go bomb Murmansk" crowd versus the "sensible GIUK
> gap blockade" group. Many naval aviators were not happy with contingency
> plans that had most carrier 'strike' aircraft deploying for use from
> NATO airfields while the ASW and interceptors stayed at sea to do blockade
> and/or escort duty. They formulated a counter strategy that had the carrier
> groups sailing into the Norwegian Sea to launch attacks on Soviet facilities
> in the far north.
> What would have actually been done if war had broken out? Probably
> the Gap blockade/escort mission, even if some folks (Lehman, the aviator
> SecNav) had fits. It was certianly an issue that kept staffs busy,
> however.
>
> regards,
> ----------------------------------------------------------------
>

From other books by Eric Grove and Norman Friedman, I've got the
impression that the "hold on to GIUK gap" option was seriously
considered only for a decade from the late 1960's. Falling back to the
GIUK gap is essentially giving up Norway to the Soviets, IMHO.
Exercise 'Main Brace' in 1952 envisaged NATO's Striking Fleet going up
the Norwegian Sea to attack the Soviet Northen Fleet 'at source'. I
believe other exercises up to the late 1960's were more or less
similar, although with some flavour of "flexible response".

Regards,

[rb]

KDR wrote:
> While reading Eric Grove's "Vanguard to Trident" again, I found
> something which may interest SMNers.
>
> On page 44, Grove wrote:
> "The ASW/fighter priority advised against putting too many scarce
> resources into strike aircraft but, nevertheless, in mid-1948 studies
> began of a new heavy attack aircraft with a range of perhaps two to
> three thousand miles. Such a machine would give the Royal Navy the
> same kind of nuclear attack capabilities as were being so assiduously
> pursed by the United States Navy."
>
> Anyone has any idea what type of aircraft it was?
>
>


closest I can find are the Canberra bomber almost fits the timeline ~
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/English_Electric_Canberra
and somewhat later the TSR-2
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BAC_TSR-2

[Keith Willshaw]

"rb" > wrote in message
...
> KDR wrote:
> > While reading Eric Grove's "Vanguard to Trident" again, I found
> > something which may interest SMNers.
> >
> > On page 44, Grove wrote:
> > "The ASW/fighter priority advised against putting too many scarce
> > resources into strike aircraft but, nevertheless, in mid-1948 studies
> > began of a new heavy attack aircraft with a range of perhaps two to
> > three thousand miles. Such a machine would give the Royal Navy the
> > same kind of nuclear attack capabilities as were being so assiduously
> > pursed by the United States Navy."
> >
> > Anyone has any idea what type of aircraft it was?
> >
> >
>
>
> closest I can find are the Canberra bomber almost fits the timeline ~
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/English_Electric_Canberra
> and somewhat later the TSR-2
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BAC_TSR-2
>

The nearest I can imagine is the 1954 Naval Staff Requirement NA.39
which called for a long range carrier aircraft capable of
making a nuclear strike and flying in under enemy radar.

The aircraft that grew from this specn was the Blackburn Buccaneer


Keith

[Alan Lothian]

In article >, Keith Willshaw
> wrote:

> "rb" > wrote in message
> ...
> > KDR wrote:
> > > While reading Eric Grove's "Vanguard to Trident" again, I found
> > > something which may interest SMNers.
> > >
> > > On page 44, Grove wrote:
> > > "The ASW/fighter priority advised against putting too many scarce
> > > resources into strike aircraft but, nevertheless, in mid-1948 studies
> > > began of a new heavy attack aircraft with a range of perhaps two to
> > > three thousand miles. Such a machine would give the Royal Navy the
> > > same kind of nuclear attack capabilities as were being so assiduously
> > > pursed by the United States Navy."
> > >
> > > Anyone has any idea what type of aircraft it was?
> > >
> > >
> >
> >
> > closest I can find are the Canberra bomber almost fits the timeline ~
> > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/English_Electric_Canberra
> > and somewhat later the TSR-2
> > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BAC_TSR-2
> >
>
> The nearest I can imagine is the 1954 Naval Staff Requirement NA.39
> which called for a long range carrier aircraft capable of
> making a nuclear strike and flying in under enemy radar.
>
> The aircraft that grew from this specn was the Blackburn Buccaneer
>
"Not built, carved from solid". Bloody well damn near was, too.

--
"The past resembles the future as water resembles water" Ibn Khaldun

My .mac.com address is a spam sink.
If you wish to email me, try atlothian at blueyonder dot co dot uk

[Eystein Roll Aarseth]

On Fri, 02 Apr 2004 21:59:05 GMT, Alan Lothian > wrote:

> In article >, Keith Willshaw
> > wrote:
>>
>> The nearest I can imagine is the 1954 Naval Staff Requirement NA.39
>> which called for a long range carrier aircraft capable of
>> making a nuclear strike and flying in under enemy radar.
>>
>> The aircraft that grew from this specn was the Blackburn Buccaneer
>>
> "Not built, carved from solid". Bloody well damn near was, too.

Heh. The Banana Jet was awesome. Pity the P150 "supersonic Buccaneer"
project never got past planning stage.

EAa
--
Of course it looks as though it came out of Independence
Day by way of This Island Earth, which is nice, and it's
a magnificently sexy piece of equipment to boot.
-- Mike Andrews about the SR-71 Blackbird.

[KDR]

"Keith Willshaw" > wrote in message >...
> "rb" > wrote in message
> ...
> > KDR wrote:
> > > While reading Eric Grove's "Vanguard to Trident" again, I found
> > > something which may interest SMNers.
> > >
> > > On page 44, Grove wrote:
> > > "The ASW/fighter priority advised against putting too many scarce
> > > resources into strike aircraft but, nevertheless, in mid-1948 studies
> > > began of a new heavy attack aircraft with a range of perhaps two to
> > > three thousand miles. Such a machine would give the Royal Navy the
> > > same kind of nuclear attack capabilities as were being so assiduously
> > > pursed by the United States Navy."
> > >
> > > Anyone has any idea what type of aircraft it was?
> >
> > closest I can find are the Canberra bomber almost fits the timeline ~
> > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/English_Electric_Canberra
> > and somewhat later the TSR-2
> > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BAC_TSR-2
>
> The nearest I can imagine is the 1954 Naval Staff Requirement NA.39
> which called for a long range carrier aircraft capable of
> making a nuclear strike and flying in under enemy radar.
>
> The aircraft that grew from this specn was the Blackburn Buccaneer

In my original post that started this thread, I quoted page 98, which
is as follows.

"Not only did the Admiralty insist on keeping these two sophisticated
types (Sea Vixen and Scimitar), but it was actively pursuing once
again the concept of a nuclear-capable heavy attack aircraft. Some
kind of navalized variant of the RAF's Canberra bomber was considered,
and this led to a requirement, issued in June 1952, for a new jet
strike aircraft of much more advanced design and performance, the NA39
(Buccaneer)."

My understanding is that the nuclear-capable heavy attack aircraft
studied in 1948 was something entirely different, not a navalised
variant of the RAF Canberra, which appears to be considered in the
early 1950's. An Anglicized version of AJ Savage, perhaps?

Regards,