No More New Fighter Aircraft Types?

[W. D. Allen Sr.]

"...The total cost of LOCKHEED MARTIN CORP.'s Joint Strike Fighter
program to develop a new tactical fighter will rise by $45
billion, or 22.6%, to $245 billion, the Pentagon said. In a
regular report to Congress on major weapons programs, the U.S.
Defense Department said the sharp rise in costs for the new
jet, also known as the F-35, was due mainly to revised
contractor labor and overhead costs, design delays, and a
postponement in the start of procurement from 2006 to 2007.
(Reuters 04:58 PM ET 04/05/2004)...."

Are we getting to the point in history where the development of new fighter
plane models is going to cease?

History has seen the demise of the chariot, the battering ram, the military
dirigible, the battleship, and even the hypersonic transport. So are we
pursuing the last fighter plane in the F-35? The unit price of modern
fighters is such that only a very few countries in the world can even afford
a fully effective air force. Also, we now know the key to success in air
combat is pilot training, not having the hottest airplanes. Witness two Navy
F/A-18s on a bombing mission in Desert Storm shooting down two Iraqi
interceptors while enroute to their target.

Today only three entities apparently can afford to develop new fighter plane
types. They are Russia, the European Union, and the good old USA. Other
nations like Communist China, India, or Israel seem to do little more than
develop variations on existing models. Even so, neither Russia or the EU
have been able lately to compete with the USA in new model development.

So is it becoming more and more difficult to justify a new model fighter
today, either in term of performance or cost. Will the F-35 be the last of a
breed?

WDA

end

[Henry J Cobb]

W. D. Allen Sr. wrote:
> Are we getting to the point in history where the development of new fighter
> plane models is going to cease?

Fnord!

I can't find the "United States military will only be able to afford one
airplane" quote.

Can somebody help me out here?

-HJC

[Thomas Schoene]

Henry J Cobb wrote:
> W. D. Allen Sr. wrote:
>> Are we getting to the point in history where the development of new
>> fighter plane models is going to cease?
>
> Fnord!
>
> I can't find the "United States military will only be able to afford
> one airplane" quote.
>
> Can somebody help me out here?

Norman Augustine, from _Augustine's Laws._ (And I think a version before
that in "The Widening Gyre" published in n_International Security_)

"In the year 2054, the entire defense budget will purchase just one
aircraft. This aircraft will have to be shared by the Air Force and Navy
3-1/2 days each per week except for leap year, when it will be made
available to the Marines for the extra day."

Of course, many of these so-called laws were actually intended to point out
the fallaciousness of simple extrapolation of statistical data.

--
Tom Schoene Replace "invalid" with "net" to e-mail
"Our country, right or wrong. When right, to be kept right, when
wrong to be put right." - Senator Carl Schurz, 1872

[Henry J Cobb]

Emmanuel Gustin wrote:
> What is needed, clearly, is a revised approach to aircraft
> development. The USA is now trying to fund two fighters, the
> F"/A"-22 and the F-35, which are both highly ambitious and
> complex. With hindsight, it should have developed a single
> middle-class fighter (designed for carrier use; the USAF can
> use a lightened version) instead of a high/low mix, and the
> approach to design should have been more evolutionary.

Can we call it a Super Hornet so people think it's just an upgrade of an
existing fighter?

-HJC

[Ed Rasimus]

On Mon, 12 Apr 2004 13:55:05 +0200, "Emmanuel Gustin"
> wrote:

>Considering that Sweden (population 8,8 million, GDP US$231
>billion) could still afford to develop JAS39 Gripen, I think that
>the demise of the fighter aircraft for financial reasons does not
>yet need to be feared.

A good example. But, it also is an example of drawing conclusions when
comparing apples to oranges. Certainly Sweden has a history of
developing, producing and operating exceptional aircraft, but the
neutrality of Sweden means that the aircraft are by definition going
to be defensive in purpose and home-based in operation. We won't be
finding much force projection going on for the Swedish military.

The result is a fairly straightforward high agility, interceptor with
limited ground attack capability and a fairly traditional sensor
suite.
>
>What is needed, clearly, is a revised approach to aircraft
>development. The USA is now trying to fund two fighters, the
>F"/A"-22 and the F-35, which are both highly ambitious and
>complex. With hindsight, it should have developed a single
>middle-class fighter (designed for carrier use; the USAF can
>use a lightened version) instead of a high/low mix, and the
>approach to design should have been more evolutionary.

While the stake in McNamara's heart never kill him? Must we also
administer a silver bullet and still wear garlic around our necks?
Your suggest sounds a lot like TFX--the horrendous "one size fits all"
development projection that got the US the F-111. An airplane the Navy
aborted in the third trimester and which the AF could not effectively
operate for twenty years after deployment. The under-powered A, the
vacuum tube unmaintainable D, the unsustainable E and finally the
almost capable F model....ahhh yes, I remember them well. Great
examples such as Mt. Home which housed 84 airplanes disguised as a
three squadron (18 UE per squadron) wing and still could barely
generate 0.5 sorties/aircraft/day figured on their "authorized
equippage of 54 airframes.

No thanks. Air dominance and ground attack seem to work best with
dedicated air frames in a hi/lo mix--the USAF has done quite nicely
with F-15/16 and the Navy seems to have concluded that the "good ol'
days" of F-14/A-6 operations were better on both sides of the mission
than the F/A-18 business.
>
>But I suspect that no small part of the cost getting out of control
>is due to so-called "management", techniques which are now
>also eating their way into military culture. The litigious American
>mind has long had an excessive reverence for the written word
>(whether it is the Constitution or "Do not dry pets in this microwave
>oven!") and appears to be easily seduced by the trappings of
>bureaucracy. Granted, the multi-national Eurofighter bureaucracy
>cannot be any better! There is a risk-averse tendency to break
>down development in phases, phases in stages, and stages in
>substages, ad infinitum, all surrounded by due process and a mass
>of tests. In theory, these serve to eliminate risks and get the best
>possible aircraft; in practice they stretch development time and
>increase costs. The justification is that the complexity of modern
>aircraft requires delegation of the work. In practice, according to
>Conway's law, every dividing line in the organisation adds
>complexity to the final system.

Gotta agree 100% here. Certainly the project management culture
increases costs while attempting to minimize risks. What you don't
address, however, is the over-lay of political decision interference.
While a free-market capitalist business model might be successful with
the phase/stage/substage sequence, when you throw in the political
posturing, competition for budget dollars, mis-information campaigns
and general pacifism of nearly 50% of the American electorate, you
really get a screwed up program.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

[Tarver Engineering]

"Ed Rasimus" > wrote in message
...
> On Mon, 12 Apr 2004 13:55:05 +0200, "Emmanuel Gustin"
> > wrote:

> No thanks. Air dominance and ground attack seem to work best with
> dedicated air frames in a hi/lo mix--the USAF has done quite nicely
> with F-15/16 and the Navy seems to have concluded that the "good ol'
> days" of F-14/A-6 operations were better on both sides of the mission
> than the F/A-18 business.

The F/A-18 is the solution to USN's problems and a fine example of a
procurement that faced the realities of the times.

We can't very well expect to keep F-35 costs down by migrating
electric/electronic systems from the F-22. That alone is reason for the
price of the F-35 to adjust upwards by 1/3. These days I would look to tha
F-35 to migrate technology to the F-22, if the F-22 survives it's current
review.

[phil hunt]

On Mon, 12 Apr 2004 13:55:05 +0200, Emmanuel Gustin > wrote:
>
>What is needed, clearly, is a revised approach to aircraft
>development. The USA is now trying to fund two fighters, the
>F"/A"-22 and the F-35, which are both highly ambitious and
>complex. With hindsight, it should have developed a single
>middle-class fighter (designed for carrier use; the USAF can
>use a lightened version) instead of a high/low mix, and the
>approach to design should have been more evolutionary.

That sounds resonable. And at the same time, a STOVL ground attack
aircraft replacing the A-10 and Harrier.



--
"It's easier to find people online who openly support the KKK than
people who openly support the RIAA" -- comment on Wikipedia
(Email: zen19725 at zen dot co dot uk)

[phil hunt]

On Mon, 12 Apr 2004 08:58:55 -0600, Ed Rasimus > wrote:
>
>No thanks. Air dominance and ground attack seem to work best with
>dedicated air frames in a hi/lo mix

Wny? Why not standardise on one fighter?

--
"It's easier to find people online who openly support the KKK than
people who openly support the RIAA" -- comment on Wikipedia
(Email: zen19725 at zen dot co dot uk)

[Tarver Engineering]

"phil hunt" > wrote in message
. ..
> On Mon, 12 Apr 2004 08:58:55 -0600, Ed Rasimus
> wrote:
> >
> >No thanks. Air dominance and ground attack seem to work best with
> >dedicated air frames in a hi/lo mix
>
> Wny? Why not standardise on one fighter?

The USAF loses power under that scenerio.

I'd say a few USAF super bugs might get the point across. :)

[Ed Rasimus]

On Mon, 12 Apr 2004 17:36:33 +0100, (phil
hunt) wrote:

>On Mon, 12 Apr 2004 08:58:55 -0600, Ed Rasimus > wrote:
>>
>>No thanks. Air dominance and ground attack seem to work best with
>>dedicated air frames in a hi/lo mix
>
>Wny? Why not standardise on one fighter?

A good question. Start by acknowledging that modern tactical aircraft
are not simply airplanes that fight. They are complex weapon systems
that bring together not only the airframe but the sensors, the
weapons, the defenses, etc. All of these components come with their
own baggage of trade-offs, compromises that must be made to get the
job done. For example stealth has become a desireable asset, but
building a stealthy airframe often means loss of manueverability.

An air superiority system needs high thrust/weight ratio, high
manueverability, reasonable range, short response time etc. It also
needs a sensor suite that can find, sort and allocate weapons to the
enemy. Ideally it should have longer reach than the enemy platform and
possess sufficient stealth to allow first-look/first-shot.

The ground attack system needs a different sensor suite and must be
capable of carrying a meaningful payload. It has to feed data into the
complex ground attack weapons. It needs range, but might do without
some of the agility. It might be larger, heavier and less stealthy
than the A/A airplane.

The naval aircraft needs the durability to operate off the boat. The
weight of landing gear, arresting hooks, launch attachments, etc.
aren't necessary for the conventional ground-based system.

Add a bit of advantage to multiple source procurement as well and you
can begin to build a compelling argument for a mixed force. It's going
to be a compromise. Too diverse a force and you get overly
complicated. Too singularly dependent and you incur too much
performance compromise.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

[Tarver Engineering]

"Ed Rasimus" > wrote in message
...
> On Mon, 12 Apr 2004 17:36:33 +0100, (phil
> hunt) wrote:

>
> An air superiority system needs high thrust/weight ratio, high
> manueverability, reasonable range, short response time etc. It also
> needs a sensor suite that can find, sort and allocate weapons to the
> enemy. Ideally it should have longer reach than the enemy platform and
> possess sufficient stealth to allow first-look/first-shot.

The sensor suite for US operations is increasingly space based with Global
capability. A reliable airborn weapons platform with data link capability
is what is needed. The USAF airplane procurement cycle is too slow and
bogged down with politics to produce tech advantages in individual manned
airborn equipments. The expendature of $60 billion for space based sensor
systems as part of the missile defense (ABM) is the required direction for
Pentagon systems and the fighter mafia will only miss the boat again in
ignoring the facts. The F-22 being a prime example of USAF not adjusting to
USAF requirements in acquisition. Military tech no longer exists in a
vacuum.

[Chad Irby]

(phil hunt) wrote:

> >On Mon, 12 Apr 2004 08:58:55 -0600, Ed Rasimus >
> >wrote:
> >>
> >>No thanks. Air dominance and ground attack seem to work best with
> >>dedicated air frames in a hi/lo mix
> >
> >Wny? Why not standardise on one fighter?

A few months back, I was talking to a guy who was asking the "why not
one fighter plane" question (F-22 vs. F-35), until I pointed out that he
had a car *and* a pickup truck in his garage, with a motorcycle for
weekends...

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

[sid]

"Thomas Schoene" > wrote in message et>...
> "In the year 2054, the entire defense budget will purchase just one
> aircraft. This aircraft will have to be shared by the Air Force and Navy
> 3-1/2 days each per week except for leap year, when it will be made
> available to the Marines for the extra day."
>
> Of course, many of these so-called laws were actually intended to point out
> the fallaciousness of simple extrapolation of statistical data.


Unfortunately, operating costs are spiraling so out of control that
there is a sad ring of truth to this hyperbole (AvWeek Apr 5)...
Some potential candidates to be defense secretary in a John Kerry
administration are already waving off the opportunity. "Think of the
the nightmare any secretary is going to have," says a likely
contender. "We are looking at a defense budget this year that is
almost the same as Reagan had in 1985 in real purchasing power. But
look how much less we get. Reagan was buying 700,000 more people in
uniform, 912 combat aircraft compared with 100-150 this year, 900
tanks compared with none, 600 Bradley APCs compared with none, 27
ships compared with 11. It reflects how shockingly large operating
costs have become."

[Kevin Brooks]

"Emmanuel Gustin" > wrote in message
...
> "Ed Rasimus" > wrote in message
> ...
>
> > A good example. But, it also is an example of drawing conclusions when
> > comparing apples to oranges. Certainly Sweden has a history of
> > developing, producing and operating exceptional aircraft, but the
> > neutrality of Sweden means that the aircraft are by definition going
> > to be defensive in purpose and home-based in operation.
>
> Of course a fighter for the US will have to meet more
> requirements than one for Sweden. But assume, for the moment,
> that it has to be five times as complex and expensive -- I think
> that is enough for a whole lot more requirements. That should
> still well within budget for a middle-sized country, and certainly
> affordable for the USA, if managed well.
>
> Somehow I have the feeling that the F/A-22 is also going to
> be defensive in purpose and home-based in operation. With
> a force of probably less than 200 operational aircraft, few
> will be available for operations outside the 'homeland'.

Why would that be? If the preeminent air-breathing threat to the homeland is
missappropriated airliners, homemade cruise-missiles, etc., why do you have
to have the top-of-the-line, fights-outnumbered-and-wins "silver bullet"
aircraft solely committed to homeland defense? I'd think the later block
F-16's that will be flying for many years to come with the ANG (not to
mention the likely trickle-down of F-15C's to replace the current ANG F-15A
MSIPs) would be more than capable of handling that requirement.

>
> The F/A-22 is heading the way of the CF-105 Arrow -- an
> impressive achievement of technology, but too expensive to
> be a justifiable purchase.

Only of course if we plan on turning our other cheek in the event we have to
face a serious air/IADS threat in some currently unforseen contingency (the
ones that usually arise to bite you in the ass) over the next fifteen or so
years. One situation arising that requires us to have a world-beater of the
F/A-22 caliber in our pocket is all it takes to make it a "justifiable
purchase".

The USAF needs a fighter that it
> can afford to buy at least 500 of, ideally 1000; so that the
> development costs can be spread over a sensible production
> run. And so that after 30+ years of service and associated
> attrition, it still will still have a decent force.

That would be nice, but it appears that *nobody* has that kind of cash
around; ISTR that earlier projected Eurofighter Typhoon production estimates
have been reduced over the years, and that is a cheaper (and yes, less
capable) platform than the F/A-22. How do you quantify a "decent force"? I'd
think that a force that allows maybe seven squadrons in a "silver bullet"
role over the next fifteen years, ramping down if necessary to four or five
squadrons after that (due to attrition), would be A-OK, given that by then
we will doubtless have newer means of handling some of the problems (i.e.,
UCAV's, even better ISR systems, more lethal weaponry to mount on the
remaining aircraft, etc.) that the F/A-22 is to handle.

>
> > Your suggest sounds a lot like TFX--the horrendous "one size fits all"
> > development projection that got the US the F-111.
>
> Actually, I wanted to suggest a procument cycle more like the
> F-4... A large shipboard interceptor that proved to be good
> enough, with modifications, for a very wide range of roles.

But then you are missing out completely on what the F/A-22 promises to
deliver as it matures--not a "good enough" platform, but a "much better than
anything it will have to face" platform. Your solution is grounded in the
old mass-is-everything paradigm--OTOH, transformation is all about busting
paradigms and leveraging our strengths against our weaknesses. Smaller, much
more capable forces taking using our "high ground" of information
management, ISR, agile decisionmaking, and precision engagement to overcome
new and evolving threats, rather than trying to reinvent the old "3:1 combat
power ratio means we have to win here" Lanchesterian construct.

>
> I think that a good naval fighter design, not too small but not
> too large either, has enough ruggedness, capability and stretch
> into it to meet most roles that can be reasonable asssigned to
> a fighter. Of course "one size fits all" won't work, so you will
> need other designs as well; but with less demands on them these
> can be much simpler and more optimized for specific tasks.

It can be argued that your approach has yet to be truly successful. The F-4
is not really a great example--it was an adequate aircraft for the USAF, but
it was not what they really wanted (as evidenced by the start of R&D towards
the F-15 while the F-4 was still filling out the active component force and
well before the first Phantoms made it to the ANG/USAFR).

>
> Besides, any fighter needs to be designed to be adaptable to
> other roles, and given the lengthy lifecycle for the next generation
> of fighters, the designer always will have to make sure that the
> basic design can be modified and updated a few times.

True, which is why spiral development seems to make sense--get the basic
system into service, then refine its capabilities as it serves.

>
> > While a free-market capitalist business model might be successful with
> > the phase/stage/substage sequence, when you throw in the political
> > posturing, competition for budget dollars, mis-information campaigns
> > and general pacifism of nearly 50% of the American electorate, you
> > really get a screwed up program.
>
> I am slightly skeptical about the ability of the 'free-market capitalist
> business model' to develop good combat aircraft on its own. It really
> needs a good requirement and support team on the service side, to
> support development and bring in a dose of realism. Without it, the
> companies are often excessively conservative.

Disagree. Look at the X-32/X-35 competition and you can see where both were
willing to be quite daring (and obtaining mixed results) in their
approaches, in very different ways.

>
> Politics and blatant 'pork' distibution can really mess up a program.
> But I doubt that the lack of knowledge or the unfavourable attitude
> of the general public have much of an impact. Anyway, the US public
> is largely in favour of a very high defence budget.

Where were you in the nineties? The public's acceptance (and therefore that
of its elected officials) of a "very high defense budget" is susceptable to
almost whimsical change--go through a period where you are stretching out
each and every procurement program due to lack of funds, while at the same
time finding you are incapable of even sending your personnel to their
required service schools due to lack of funds, and you will become a
believer in that fact-of-life.

Brooks

>
>
> --
> Emmanuel Gustin
> Emmanuel dot Gustin @t skynet dot be
> Flying Guns Books and Site: http://users.skynet.be/Emmanuel.Gustin/
>
>
>

[John Cook]

>That would be nice, but it appears that *nobody* has that kind of cash
>around; ISTR that earlier projected Eurofighter Typhoon production estimates
>have been reduced over the years,

The Eurofighters order number (620) have been stable since about
1996, so far that is!!! Tranche 2 negotiations may yet hold some
surprises, but all governments have restated their commitment to the
full numbers.

Export numbers are anywhere between 18 and 78 extras...

If you reduce the Typhoons orders by the same percentages as the
F-22 then RAF could expect to receive less than 73 aircraft, rather
than the 232 their planning on.




Cheers
John Cook

Any spelling mistakes/grammatic errors are there purely to annoy. All
opinions are mine, not TAFE's however much they beg me for them.

Email Address :-
Spam trap - please remove (trousers) to email me
Eurofighter Website :- http://www.eurofighter-typhoon.co.uk

[Dweezil Dwarftosser]

Tarver Engineering wrote:
>
> "Ed Rasimus" > wrote in message
> ...
> > On Mon, 12 Apr 2004 17:36:33 +0100, (phil
> > hunt) wrote:
>
> >
> > An air superiority system needs high thrust/weight ratio, high
> > manueverability, reasonable range, short response time etc. It also
> > needs a sensor suite that can find, sort and allocate weapons to the
> > enemy. Ideally it should have longer reach than the enemy platform and
> > possess sufficient stealth to allow first-look/first-shot.
>
> The sensor suite for US operations is increasingly space based with Global
> capability.

Only as long as the birdies above don't sustain interference
or attack. What then? You still need the traditional means
of reliably delivering the weapons to the target. Hotshot
fighter jocks could probably still succeed with a grease pencil
mark on the sight glass, and memorizing a set of direct bomb
tables... but must we resort to WW I tactics every time Ivan,
Mustafa, or Won Hung Lo geek out a way to scramble the RF?

> A reliable airborn weapons platform with data link capability
> is what is needed.

Sure. As long as you never transmit the good stuff in the clear
until you REALLY need it in a war. Wipe out the other guy within
the first ten days or so, and you're home free; after that, he'll
be turning your displays into masses of grass...

> The USAF airplane procurement cycle is too slow and bogged down
> with politics to produce tech advantages in individual manned
> airborn equipments.

Not to mention the scads of college boys writing code
to do things they don't understand - and feel (erroneously)
that the GIs - from E-1s to generals - can never understand.
Libraries, libraries, libraries; if it doesn't work as spec'd
with existing, just add others to bog it down some more.
God help everyone if a condition exists which they haven't
planned to accomodate. (An absolute certainty!)
If you spend enough money, you'll either fix it or hide the
errors so well that the things will be sitting in DM before
anyone figures it out.

> The expendature of $60 billion for space based sensor
> systems as part of the missile defense (ABM) is the required
> direction for Pentagon systems and the fighter mafia will only
> miss the boat again in ignoring the facts. The F-22 being a
> prime example of USAF not adjusting to USAF requirements in
> acquisition. Military tech no longer exists in a
> vacuum.

Once upon a time, John, there was a method where Airman Dukes
(who just tripped over the answer to a problem) could tell the
designers/programmers WHAT they did wrong, WHY it doesn't work,
and HOW he fixed it. (Been there, done that.) No longer.
That avenue is closed; the geeks don't dare admit error; and to
fix the problem would be a very costly admission indeed.
Military tech used to be walled off from the just curious by
classification alone; today, that SOB is hermetically sealed
deep underground, surrounded by tripwires, moats, mines, and
dead ends - all to designed to protect the core from infiltration
by those who know enough to make a difference - and simplify
the process. It's the vacuum of space...

John T., former WCS MSgt

[Dweezil Dwarftosser]

Chad Irby wrote:
>
> (phil hunt) wrote:
>
> > >On Mon, 12 Apr 2004 08:58:55 -0600, Ed Rasimus >
> > >wrote:
> > >>
> > >>No thanks. Air dominance and ground attack seem to work best with
> > >>dedicated air frames in a hi/lo mix
> > >
> > >Wny? Why not standardise on one fighter?
>
> A few months back, I was talking to a guy who was asking the "why not
> one fighter plane" question (F-22 vs. F-35), until I pointed out that he
> had a car *and* a pickup truck in his garage, with a motorcycle for
> weekends...

Precisely. The Ferrari goes like hell, but makes a lousy
gravel-toter. Sometimes, you need LOTS of gravel.

[Dweezil Dwarftosser]

Emmanuel Gustin wrote:
>

> Somehow I have the feeling that the F/A-22 is also going to
> be defensive in purpose and home-based in operation. With
> a force of probably less than 200 operational aircraft, few
> will be available for operations outside the 'homeland'.

Nope. If you do it right, you'd need only one squadron at
home, used for training. The rest could be used to bring
the nastiness to the bad guys - FAR from "the homeland".

[Tarver Engineering]

"Dweezil Dwarftosser" > wrote in message
...
> Tarver Engineering wrote:
> >
> > "Ed Rasimus" > wrote in message
> > ...
> > > On Mon, 12 Apr 2004 17:36:33 +0100, (phil
> > > hunt) wrote:
> >
> > >
> > > An air superiority system needs high thrust/weight ratio, high
> > > manueverability, reasonable range, short response time etc. It also
> > > needs a sensor suite that can find, sort and allocate weapons to the
> > > enemy. Ideally it should have longer reach than the enemy platform and
> > > possess sufficient stealth to allow first-look/first-shot.
> >
> > The sensor suite for US operations is increasingly space based with
Global
> > capability.
>
> Only as long as the birdies above don't sustain interference
> or attack. What then? You still need the traditional means
> of reliably delivering the weapons to the target. Hotshot
> fighter jocks could probably still succeed with a grease pencil
> mark on the sight glass, and memorizing a set of direct bomb
> tables... but must we resort to WW I tactics every time Ivan,
> Mustafa, or Won Hung Lo geek out a way to scramble the RF?

If they start jamming communications it won't matter if the information is
space based, or comming from an AWACS. In order to make any kind of
comparison you would ahve to compare to what is done today.

> > A reliable airborn weapons platform with data link capability
> > is what is needed.
>
> Sure. As long as you never transmit the good stuff in the clear
> until you REALLY need it in a war. Wipe out the other guy within
> the first ten days or so, and you're home free; after that, he'll
> be turning your displays into masses of grass...

I don't believe there is much support in the system for the lone wolf
fighter pilot scenerio. There may be soem of that inside the F-22
community, but that space is not the rocking chair career booster it onece
was.

> > The USAF airplane procurement cycle is too slow and bogged down
> > with politics to produce tech advantages in individual manned
> > airborn equipments.
>
> Not to mention the scads of college boys writing code
> to do things they don't understand - and feel (erroneously)
> that the GIs - from E-1s to generals - can never understand.
> Libraries, libraries, libraries; if it doesn't work as spec'd
> with existing, just add others to bog it down some more.

Yes, that kind of thing even comes to the fore in the commercial World.
Tremble spent a fortune trying to be in the aviation avionics business, only
to find that their softhead small GA pilots could not follow a
specification.

> God help everyone if a condition exists which they haven't
> planned to accomodate. (An absolute certainty!)
> If you spend enough money, you'll either fix it or hide the
> errors so well that the things will be sitting in DM before
> anyone figures it out.

The Mars rover just went through what you describe, but they were
fortunately able to hack it back to life.

> > The expendature of $60 billion for space based sensor
> > systems as part of the missile defense (ABM) is the required
> > direction for Pentagon systems and the fighter mafia will only
> > miss the boat again in ignoring the facts. The F-22 being a
> > prime example of USAF not adjusting to USAF requirements in
> > acquisition. Military tech no longer exists in a
> > vacuum.
>
> Once upon a time, John, there was a method where Airman Dukes
> (who just tripped over the answer to a problem) could tell the
> designers/programmers WHAT they did wrong, WHY it doesn't work,
> and HOW he fixed it.

You might have thought so, but today engineers can barely speak to techs.
During my 6 months at BCAG while I was a systems engineer in cabin systems
we had an AT&T flightphone to integrate to a Collins SATCOM. The first
system had already been delivered to another Airline with a Honeywell Satcom
and it should have been a piece of cake for me to just run through the
integration testing and have the DER stamp off.

The first meeting my lead and I had with the chief tech at plant one he
brought up the fact that he had palced a chassis ground wire on the STB
(seat telephone box) to eliminate a shock hazard, as that was his liability
requirement for the testing to go forward. Olin even put a big warning
sticker on the box, but my lead could not understand what he was saying.
Further down the production like I added a chassis ground wire to the
airplane, which greatly upset my two DERs. Now the already released
airplane would have to be changed post release. The DERs expalined to me
that the integration testing was done without the ground and I pointed out
to them that the technician had told them twice right in front of me that
what they said was not true.

Later I discovered my lead was off to AT&T for his new job. Unfortunately
for him, all of AT&T's telephones were scrapped due to their "unsafe
install". I was out due to AT&T's anger, but AT&T was gone from every
airplane. For you see, a short look into the history of AT&T's STB and ZTB
boxes would have shown that the designs were stolen from me in the first
place by DPI Labs, then stolen from them by Global Wolfsburg and then stolen
from them by Olin. Once I had identified the "shock hazard" there was no
higher authority to argue the point with me.

> (Been there, done that.) No longer.
> That avenue is closed; the geeks don't dare admit error; and to
> fix the problem would be a very costly admission indeed.

Sometimes there is a lot of money tied up in some geek's design and changing
it might have system global implications, or even scrap $millions in
equipments.

> Military tech used to be walled off from the just curious by
> classification alone; today, that SOB is hermetically sealed
> deep underground, surrounded by tripwires, moats, mines, and
> dead ends - all to designed to protect the core from infiltration
> by those who know enough to make a difference - and simplify
> the process. It's the vacuum of space...

So true, but in the case of the F-22 even other ivory tower engineers are
ignored.

[WaltBJ]

(phil hunt) wrote in message >...
> On Mon, 12 Apr 2004 13:55:05 +0200, Emmanuel Gustin > wrote:
> >
> >What is needed, clearly, is a revised approach to aircraft
> >development. SNIP:

No mierda, Dick Tracy.
One of Kelly's aids to success was that no one stuck their fingers in
his pies. He knew where he was going, herded his troops in the right
direction, overrode (mostly) the impediments (Viz. A11 security) and
got the job done in an outstanding manner. Now every swinging SOB
sticks his nose in the tent and stirs the pot - it's a wonder anything
gets done, and all the while Congress is both slowing things down with
investigations and continuing pressures to build something/anything
'in my district' and meanwhile the overhead keeps piling up day after
day, year after year, and it's all added to the cost of the airplane.
The 22 should have been in service test in 1990.
Walt BJ

[Tarver Engineering]

"WaltBJ" > wrote in message
om...
> (phil hunt) wrote in message
>...
> > On Mon, 12 Apr 2004 13:55:05 +0200, Emmanuel Gustin
> wrote:
> > >
> > >What is needed, clearly, is a revised approach to aircraft
> > >development. SNIP:
>
> No mierda, Dick Tracy.
> One of Kelly's aids to success was that no one stuck their fingers in
> his pies. He knew where he was going, herded his troops in the right
> direction, overrode (mostly) the impediments (Viz. A11 security) and
> got the job done in an outstanding manner. Now every swinging SOB
> sticks his nose in the tent and stirs the pot - it's a wonder anything
> gets done, and all the while Congress is both slowing things down with
> investigations and continuing pressures to build something/anything
> 'in my district' and meanwhile the overhead keeps piling up day after
> day, year after year, and it's all added to the cost of the airplane.
> The 22 should have been in service test in 1990.

And by 1998 the F-22 should have been cancelled as obsolete.

[phil hunt]

On Tue, 13 Apr 2004 17:37:10 +1000, John Cook > wrote:
>
>>That would be nice, but it appears that *nobody* has that kind of cash
>>around; ISTR that earlier projected Eurofighter Typhoon production estimates
>>have been reduced over the years,
>
>The Eurofighters order number (620) have been stable since about
>1996, so far that is!!! Tranche 2 negotiations may yet hold some
>surprises, but all governments have restated their commitment to the
>full numbers.

I dion't know if this is a true story, but aparently in the 1990s
the British were concerned that the Germans were lacking in
enthusiasm for the project so they inserted big penalty clauses in
for any nation that reduces its order. So if there was a British
cut now, it would be embarrassing, to say the least.

--
"It's easier to find people online who openly support the KKK than
people who openly support the RIAA" -- comment on Wikipedia
(Email: zen19725 at zen dot co dot uk)

[Scott Ferrin]

On Tue, 13 Apr 2004 12:46:05 -0700, "Tarver Engineering"
> wrote:

>
>"WaltBJ" > wrote in message
om...
>> (phil hunt) wrote in message
>...
>> > On Mon, 12 Apr 2004 13:55:05 +0200, Emmanuel Gustin
> wrote:
>> > >
>> > >What is needed, clearly, is a revised approach to aircraft
>> > >development. SNIP:
>>
>> No mierda, Dick Tracy.
>> One of Kelly's aids to success was that no one stuck their fingers in
>> his pies. He knew where he was going, herded his troops in the right
>> direction, overrode (mostly) the impediments (Viz. A11 security) and
>> got the job done in an outstanding manner. Now every swinging SOB
>> sticks his nose in the tent and stirs the pot - it's a wonder anything
>> gets done, and all the while Congress is both slowing things down with
>> investigations and continuing pressures to build something/anything
>> 'in my district' and meanwhile the overhead keeps piling up day after
>> day, year after year, and it's all added to the cost of the airplane.
>> The 22 should have been in service test in 1990.
>
>And by 1998 the F-22 should have been cancelled as obsolete.

As compared to what?

[Ed Rasimus]

On Tue, 13 Apr 2004 07:52:29 -0700, "Tarver Engineering"
> wrote:

>
>"Dweezil Dwarftosser" > wrote in message
...
>> Tarver Engineering wrote:
>> >
>> > "Ed Rasimus" > wrote in message
>> > ...
>> > > On Mon, 12 Apr 2004 17:36:33 +0100, (phil
>> > > hunt) wrote:
>> >
>> > >
>> > > An air superiority system needs high thrust/weight ratio, high
>> > > manueverability, reasonable range, short response time etc. It also
>> > > needs a sensor suite that can find, sort and allocate weapons to the
>> > > enemy. Ideally it should have longer reach than the enemy platform and
>> > > possess sufficient stealth to allow first-look/first-shot.
>> >
>> > The sensor suite for US operations is increasingly space based with
>Global
>> > capability.
>>
>> Only as long as the birdies above don't sustain interference
>> or attack. What then? You still need the traditional means
>> of reliably delivering the weapons to the target. Hotshot
>> fighter jocks could probably still succeed with a grease pencil
>> mark on the sight glass, and memorizing a set of direct bomb
>> tables... but must we resort to WW I tactics every time Ivan,
>> Mustafa, or Won Hung Lo geek out a way to scramble the RF?
>
>If they start jamming communications it won't matter if the information is
>space based, or comming from an AWACS. In order to make any kind of
>comparison you would ahve to compare to what is done today.

Who is "they" and when did they develop a frequency agile comm-jamm
capability? Millimeter wave for intra-flight data sharing?
>
>> > A reliable airborn weapons platform with data link capability
>> > is what is needed.
>>
>> Sure. As long as you never transmit the good stuff in the clear
>> until you REALLY need it in a war. Wipe out the other guy within
>> the first ten days or so, and you're home free; after that, he'll
>> be turning your displays into masses of grass...

>I don't believe there is much support in the system for the lone wolf
>fighter pilot scenerio. There may be soem of that inside the F-22
>community, but that space is not the rocking chair career booster it onece
>was.

Tactically you seem to be out of step with the last fifty years of
fighter operations. There hasn't been a "lone wolf fighter pilot
scenario" in any plans since pre-Korean war. What is being discussed
is the ability to survive on Day One, to go where you need to and then
to dismantle the command/control/communications and the defensive
reaction capability without attriting yourself. There's no "lone wolf"
involved. Colin Powell spoke of putting out their eyes in DS. That's
part of the big picture. The F-22 allows intrusion of a mature IADS
and dissection of it. It isn't about "career booster" it's about
winning wars. That takes people at the pointy end.
>
>
>> > The USAF airplane procurement cycle is too slow and bogged down
>> > with politics to produce tech advantages in individual manned
>> > airborn equipments.
>>
>> Not to mention the scads of college boys writing code
>> to do things they don't understand - and feel (erroneously)
>> that the GIs - from E-1s to generals - can never understand.
>> Libraries, libraries, libraries; if it doesn't work as spec'd
>> with existing, just add others to bog it down some more.
>
>Yes, that kind of thing even comes to the fore in the commercial World.
>Tremble spent a fortune trying to be in the aviation avionics business, only
>to find that their softhead small GA pilots could not follow a
>specification.

Dare I suggest that comparing GA to military tactical aviation is a
bit of apples/oranges? Dentists will continue to kill themselves in
Bonanzas while fighter pilots will develop new ways to de-fur the
feline.




Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

[Ed Rasimus]

On 13 Apr 2004 11:48:15 -0700, (WaltBJ) wrote:

(phil hunt) wrote in message >...
>> On Mon, 12 Apr 2004 13:55:05 +0200, Emmanuel Gustin > wrote:
>> >
>> >What is needed, clearly, is a revised approach to aircraft
>> >development. SNIP:
>
>No mierda, Dick Tracy.
>One of Kelly's aids to success was that no one stuck their fingers in
>his pies. He knew where he was going, herded his troops in the right
>direction, overrode (mostly) the impediments (Viz. A11 security) and
>got the job done in an outstanding manner. Now every swinging SOB
>sticks his nose in the tent and stirs the pot - it's a wonder anything
>gets done, and all the while Congress is both slowing things down with
>investigations and continuing pressures to build something/anything
>'in my district' and meanwhile the overhead keeps piling up day after
>day, year after year, and it's all added to the cost of the airplane.
>The 22 should have been in service test in 1990.
>Walt BJ

While what you say is esssentially correct, the 1990 date is a bit
excessive. I left ATF at Northrop in mid-'88 and at that time
metal-bending was just commencing for FSD. The only real full-scale
mock-up was plywood. Gotta assume that F-22 wasn't that different than
-23.

Was probably pretty good that airframes were airborne in '90, but
avionics were still mostly conceptual. Will definitely agree that the
decade of the '90s really showed a slow-down in development.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

[Tarver Engineering]

"Ed Rasimus" > wrote in message
...
> On Tue, 13 Apr 2004 07:52:29 -0700, "Tarver Engineering"
> > wrote:
>
> >
> >"Dweezil Dwarftosser" > wrote in message
> ...
> >> Tarver Engineering wrote:
> >> >
> >> > "Ed Rasimus" > wrote in message
> >> > ...
> >> > > On Mon, 12 Apr 2004 17:36:33 +0100,
(phil
> >> > > hunt) wrote:
> >> >
> >> > >
> >> > > An air superiority system needs high thrust/weight ratio, high
> >> > > manueverability, reasonable range, short response time etc. It also
> >> > > needs a sensor suite that can find, sort and allocate weapons to
the
> >> > > enemy. Ideally it should have longer reach than the enemy platform
and
> >> > > possess sufficient stealth to allow first-look/first-shot.
> >> >
> >> > The sensor suite for US operations is increasingly space based with
Global
> >> > capability.
> >>
> >> Only as long as the birdies above don't sustain interference
> >> or attack. What then? You still need the traditional means
> >> of reliably delivering the weapons to the target. Hotshot
> >> fighter jocks could probably still succeed with a grease pencil
> >> mark on the sight glass, and memorizing a set of direct bomb
> >> tables... but must we resort to WW I tactics every time Ivan,
> >> Mustafa, or Won Hung Lo geek out a way to scramble the RF?
> >
> >If they start jamming communications it won't matter if the information
is
> >space based, or comming from an AWACS. In order to make any kind of
> >comparison you would ahve to compare to what is done today.
>
> Who is "they" and when did they develop a frequency agile comm-jamm
> capability? Millimeter wave for intra-flight data sharing?

I don't believe there is a they, but John T makes a good point that there is
some possible vulnerability to jamming.

> >> > A reliable airborn weapons platform with data link capability
> >> > is what is needed.
> >>
> >> Sure. As long as you never transmit the good stuff in the clear
> >> until you REALLY need it in a war. Wipe out the other guy within
> >> the first ten days or so, and you're home free; after that, he'll
> >> be turning your displays into masses of grass...
>
> >I don't believe there is much support in the system for the lone wolf
> >fighter pilot scenerio. There may be some of that inside the F-22
> >community, but that space is not the rocking chair career booster it
onece
> >was.
>
> Tactically you seem to be out of step with the last fifty years of
> fighter operations. There hasn't been a "lone wolf fighter pilot
> scenario" in any plans since pre-Korean war. What is being discussed
> is the ability to survive on Day One, to go where you need to and then
> to dismantle the command/control/communications and the defensive
> reaction capability without attriting yourself.

Sure.

> There's no "lone wolf"
> involved. Colin Powell spoke of putting out their eyes in DS. That's
> part of the big picture. The F-22 allows intrusion of a mature IADS
> and dissection of it. It isn't about "career booster" it's about
> winning wars. That takes people at the pointy end.

The only target for the F-22 is Europe and killing Eurofighters is it's only
sold mission.

> >> > The USAF airplane procurement cycle is too slow and bogged down
> >> > with politics to produce tech advantages in individual manned
> >> > airborn equipments.
> >>
> >> Not to mention the scads of college boys writing code
> >> to do things they don't understand - and feel (erroneously)
> >> that the GIs - from E-1s to generals - can never understand.
> >> Libraries, libraries, libraries; if it doesn't work as spec'd
> >> with existing, just add others to bog it down some more.
> >
> >Yes, that kind of thing even comes to the fore in the commercial World.
> >Tremble spent a fortune trying to be in the aviation avionics business,
only
> >to find that their softhead small GA pilots could not follow a
> >specification.
>
> Dare I suggest that comparing GA to military tactical aviation is a
> bit of apples/oranges? Dentists will continue to kill themselves in
> Bonanzas while fighter pilots will develop new ways to de-fur the
> feline.

Well now, Trimble still sells to the military.

[Tarver Engineering]

"Scott Ferrin" > wrote in message
...
> On Tue, 13 Apr 2004 12:46:05 -0700, "Tarver Engineering"
> > wrote:
>
> >
> >"WaltBJ" > wrote in message
> om...
> >> (phil hunt) wrote in message
> >...
> >> > On Mon, 12 Apr 2004 13:55:05 +0200, Emmanuel Gustin
> > wrote:
> >> > >
> >> > >What is needed, clearly, is a revised approach to aircraft
> >> > >development. SNIP:
> >>
> >> No mierda, Dick Tracy.
> >> One of Kelly's aids to success was that no one stuck their fingers in
> >> his pies. He knew where he was going, herded his troops in the right
> >> direction, overrode (mostly) the impediments (Viz. A11 security) and
> >> got the job done in an outstanding manner. Now every swinging SOB
> >> sticks his nose in the tent and stirs the pot - it's a wonder anything
> >> gets done, and all the while Congress is both slowing things down with
> >> investigations and continuing pressures to build something/anything
> >> 'in my district' and meanwhile the overhead keeps piling up day after
> >> day, year after year, and it's all added to the cost of the airplane.
> >> The 22 should have been in service test in 1990.
> >
> >And by 1998 the F-22 should have been cancelled as obsolete.
>
> As compared to what?

The Avro Arrow is probably the only fighter program to be so long in the
tooth prior to delivery.

[Tarver Engineering]

"Ed Rasimus" > wrote in message
...
> On 13 Apr 2004 11:48:15 -0700, (WaltBJ) wrote:
>
> (phil hunt) wrote in message
>...
> >> On Mon, 12 Apr 2004 13:55:05 +0200, Emmanuel Gustin
> wrote:
> >> >
> >> >What is needed, clearly, is a revised approach to aircraft
> >> >development. SNIP:
> >
> >No mierda, Dick Tracy.
> >One of Kelly's aids to success was that no one stuck their fingers in
> >his pies. He knew where he was going, herded his troops in the right
> >direction, overrode (mostly) the impediments (Viz. A11 security) and
> >got the job done in an outstanding manner. Now every swinging SOB
> >sticks his nose in the tent and stirs the pot - it's a wonder anything
> >gets done, and all the while Congress is both slowing things down with
> >investigations and continuing pressures to build something/anything
> >'in my district' and meanwhile the overhead keeps piling up day after
> >day, year after year, and it's all added to the cost of the airplane.
> >The 22 should have been in service test in 1990.
> >Walt BJ
>
> While what you say is esssentially correct, the 1990 date is a bit
> excessive. I left ATF at Northrop in mid-'88 and at that time
> metal-bending was just commencing for FSD. The only real full-scale
> mock-up was plywood. Gotta assume that F-22 wasn't that different than
> -23.

There was no FSD, only Prototype and Production.

> Was probably pretty good that airframes were airborne in '90, but
> avionics were still mostly conceptual. Will definitely agree that the
> decade of the '90s really showed a slow-down in development.

I'll agree with Walt that the airplane needed to be delivered a decade ago.

A few USAF F/A-18s should get the point across. :)

[John Cook]

On Tue, 13 Apr 2004 23:25:19 +0100, (phil
hunt) wrote:

>On Tue, 13 Apr 2004 17:37:10 +1000, John Cook > wrote:
>>
>>>That would be nice, but it appears that *nobody* has that kind of cash
>>>around; ISTR that earlier projected Eurofighter Typhoon production estimates
>>>have been reduced over the years,
>>
>>The Eurofighters order number (620) have been stable since about
>>1996, so far that is!!! Tranche 2 negotiations may yet hold some
>>surprises, but all governments have restated their commitment to the
>>full numbers.
>
>I dion't know if this is a true story, but aparently in the 1990s
>the British were concerned that the Germans were lacking in
>enthusiasm for the project so they inserted big penalty clauses in
>for any nation that reduces its order. So if there was a British
>cut now, it would be embarrassing, to say the least.

Thats one of the rumours floating around, a cancellation results in
such penalties that its a not an option to save any money...

That said, the other option is to screw the companies producing the
aircraft for as much capability as possible for the price...hence the
dealy???

Tranche 2 negotiations shold have been finished by now, some long lead
items are being produced for tranche 2 now due to addition funding
granted by Governments purely due to the Tranche 2 delay.

Best guess would be a signing in the next 3 months or other funding
may be needed to stop a break in production.

Cheers


John Cook

Any spelling mistakes/grammatic errors are there purely to annoy. All
opinions are mine, not TAFE's however much they beg me for them.

Email Address :-
Spam trap - please remove (trousers) to email me
Eurofighter Website :- http://www.eurofighter-typhoon.co.uk

[Ed Rasimus]

On Tue, 13 Apr 2004 17:20:09 -0700, "Tarver Engineering"
> wrote:

>
>"Ed Rasimus" > wrote in message
...
>> On 13 Apr 2004 11:48:15 -0700, (WaltBJ) wrote:

>> >The 22 should have been in service test in 1990.
>> >Walt BJ
>>
>> While what you say is esssentially correct, the 1990 date is a bit
>> excessive. I left ATF at Northrop in mid-'88 and at that time
>> metal-bending was just commencing for FSD. The only real full-scale
>> mock-up was plywood. Gotta assume that F-22 wasn't that different than
>> -23.
>
>There was no FSD, only Prototype and Production.

Dem-Val ended in Fall of '88 and FSD commenced leading to the
selection two years later. The program phases were pretty clearly
spelled out in the RFP and again in the selection contract. Asserting
"there was no FSD, only Prototype and Production" seems to be little
more than an opinion and not in consonance with the readily apparent
sequence of past events.
>
>> Was probably pretty good that airframes were airborne in '90, but
>> avionics were still mostly conceptual. Will definitely agree that the
>> decade of the '90s really showed a slow-down in development.
>
>I'll agree with Walt that the airplane needed to be delivered a decade ago.
>
>A few USAF F/A-18s should get the point across. :)

I don't understand your fascination with USAF F/A-18s. It is most
assuredly a non-stealthy airframe and one not dedicated or even very
well suited to the air dominance mission. IOW, it isn't an A/A fighter
by any stretch.

If (and this is a very big IF), the F-22 should collapse, then a
better choice for all-wx, day/night ground attack is another buy of
F-15E and an update of sensor/weapons suite on F-15C with maybe a
modified F-16 update as well. These would allow continuity of already
deployed systems with the supporting infrastructure--engines,
avionics, training, qualified weapons, simulators. etc. etc. Not a
single factor that I can think of would aim any decision maker toward
F/A-18 for USAF as a substitute for F-22 or F-35.

I will, however, agree with Walt (as I almost inevitably do) that had
the program remained on timeline and operational airframes been
delivered a decade ago, the unit cost would be lower, the avionics
would be more mature and the politics would be irrelevant.




>

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

[Harry Andreas]

In article >, Ed Rasimus
> wrote:


> >A few USAF F/A-18s should get the point across. :)
>
> I don't understand your fascination with USAF F/A-18s. It is most
> assuredly a non-stealthy airframe and one not dedicated or even very
> well suited to the air dominance mission. IOW, it isn't an A/A fighter
> by any stretch.

Could be wrong, but I think his point is that threatening USAF with the
F/A-18 would insult them sufficiently that they would force the
F-22 to conclusion. Right now, other than cancellation, there's nothing
really forcing their hand, and (whether you agree or not) IMO
cancellation at this late stage is improbable, and they know it.


> If (and this is a very big IF), the F-22 should collapse, then a
> better choice for all-wx, day/night ground attack is another buy of
> F-15E

Being actively considered, with upgrades

> and an update of sensor/weapons suite on F-15C

already in the works

> with maybe a modified F-16 update as well.

already in the works

> These would allow continuity of already
> deployed systems with the supporting infrastructure--engines,
> avionics, training, qualified weapons, simulators. etc. etc. Not a
> single factor that I can think of would aim any decision maker toward
> F/A-18 for USAF as a substitute for F-22 or F-35.

Just curious, what is your recollection of the debate surrounding
USAF's buy of the F-4 ?
>
> I will, however, agree with Walt (as I almost inevitably do) that had
> the program remained on timeline and operational airframes been
> delivered a decade ago, the unit cost would be lower, the avionics
> would be more mature and the politics would be irrelevant.

Agree. But someone bit off more than they could chew.

--
Harry Andreas
Engineering raconteur

[Tarver Engineering]

"Ed Rasimus" > wrote in message
...
> On Tue, 13 Apr 2004 17:20:09 -0700, "Tarver Engineering"
> > wrote:
>
> >
> >"Ed Rasimus" > wrote in message
> ...
> >> On 13 Apr 2004 11:48:15 -0700, (WaltBJ) wrote:
>
> >> >The 22 should have been in service test in 1990.
> >> >Walt BJ
> >>
> >> While what you say is esssentially correct, the 1990 date is a bit
> >> excessive. I left ATF at Northrop in mid-'88 and at that time
> >> metal-bending was just commencing for FSD. The only real full-scale
> >> mock-up was plywood. Gotta assume that F-22 wasn't that different than
> >> -23.
> >
> >There was no FSD, only Prototype and Production.
>
> Dem-Val ended in Fall of '88 and FSD commenced leading to the
> selection two years later. The program phases were pretty clearly
> spelled out in the RFP and again in the selection contract. Asserting
> "there was no FSD, only Prototype and Production" seems to be little
> more than an opinion and not in consonance with the readily apparent
> sequence of past events.

Unfortunately for your memory Ed, there was no FSD for the F-22; only
prototype and production. Although the F-22 has produced 17 different
airframes that would have been the FSD birds for any previous fighter, they
are under a production contract. Skipping the FSD phase was supposed to
save money, but all it did was drive an already out of control configuration
to even greater extremes. Fortunatel;y for the program, management was
sacked last year and the configuration was finally frozen.

> >> Was probably pretty good that airframes were airborne in '90, but
> >> avionics were still mostly conceptual. Will definitely agree that the
> >> decade of the '90s really showed a slow-down in development.
> >
> >I'll agree with Walt that the airplane needed to be delivered a decade
ago.
> >
> >A few USAF F/A-18s should get the point across. :)
>
> I don't understand your fascination with USAF F/A-18s. It is most
> assuredly a non-stealthy airframe and one not dedicated or even very
> well suited to the air dominance mission. IOW, it isn't an A/A fighter
> by any stretch.

I was led to understand that the F/A-22 is the new mission.

> If (and this is a very big IF), the F-22 should collapse, then a
> better choice for all-wx, day/night ground attack is another buy of
> F-15E and an update of sensor/weapons suite on F-15C with maybe a
> modified F-16 update as well.

The F-15 is in Gephard's district and the USAF opertunity to have a Super
Eagle is past.

> These would allow continuity of already
> deployed systems with the supporting infrastructure--engines,
> avionics, training, qualified weapons, simulators. etc. etc. Not a
> single factor that I can think of would aim any decision maker toward
> F/A-18 for USAF as a substitute for F-22 or F-35.

I believe the F/A-18E would provide an object lesson for the USAF fighter
mafia in how to comply with USAF reliability and acquisition changes. Once
that point is across somone might be able to explain to the USAF fighter
mafia how space based sensors are the future, as envisioned by USAF.

> I will, however, agree with Walt (as I almost inevitably do) that had
> the program remained on timeline and operational airframes been
> delivered a decade ago, the unit cost would be lower, the avionics
> would be more mature and the politics would be irrelevant.

Politics are the only thing keeping the raptor alive. (ie Georgia pork)

[Tarver Engineering]

"Harry Andreas" > wrote in message
...
> In article >, Ed Rasimus
> > wrote:
>
>
> > >A few USAF F/A-18s should get the point across. :)
> >
> > I don't understand your fascination with USAF F/A-18s. It is most
> > assuredly a non-stealthy airframe and one not dedicated or even very
> > well suited to the air dominance mission. IOW, it isn't an A/A fighter
> > by any stretch.
>
> Could be wrong, but I think his point is that threatening USAF with the
> F/A-18 would insult them sufficiently that they would force the
> F-22 to conclusion. Right now, other than cancellation, there's nothing
> really forcing their hand, and (whether you agree or not) IMO
> cancellation at this late stage is improbable, and they know it.

Much of the money is already spent and the F-22 is a fine slab of Georgia
pork. If the USAF fighter mafia won't get the job done, then they deserve
to be humiliated.

> > If (and this is a very big IF), the F-22 should collapse, then a
> > better choice for all-wx, day/night ground attack is another buy of
> > F-15E
>
> Being actively considered, with upgrades

The super eagle is as dead as Gephardt's political career, but a transfer of
F/A-18E avionics might be possible from the other St Louis Congressional
District.

Keep in mind that all aviation is politics.

1) Consider for a moment some people in control of a flight research center
black balled from funding by USAF for falsifying flight test reports.

2) Consider also some people in control of a flight test research center who
are the children of NAZI rocket scientists.

One has the option of seeking funding outside that service, but the second
is a non-starter under a competitive system.

The Super eagle has about as much chance of being produced as Gephardt has
of being Vice President.

> > and an update of sensor/weapons suite on F-15C
>
> already in the works

Too late. Please choose an option that is still on the table.

> > with maybe a modified F-16 update as well.
>
> already in the works

Real likely, should the F-22 falter. GD may end up wishing they had kept
the Ft Worth line.

[Ed Rasimus]

On Wed, 14 Apr 2004 08:35:39 -0700, (Harry
Andreas) wrote:

>In article >, Ed Rasimus
> wrote:
>
>
>> >A few USAF F/A-18s should get the point across. :)
>>
>> I don't understand your fascination with USAF F/A-18s. It is most
>> assuredly a non-stealthy airframe and one not dedicated or even very
>> well suited to the air dominance mission. IOW, it isn't an A/A fighter
>> by any stretch.
>
>Could be wrong, but I think his point is that threatening USAF with the
>F/A-18 would insult them sufficiently that they would force the
>F-22 to conclusion. Right now, other than cancellation, there's nothing
>really forcing their hand, and (whether you agree or not) IMO
>cancellation at this late stage is improbable, and they know it.

It's nice to have an interpreter aboard. Occasionally the terseness at
the end of the long repeated, multiple-entry threads leaves me
confused. Might be an age thing.
>
>Just curious, what is your recollection of the debate surrounding
>USAF's buy of the F-4 ?

Not an age thing, I guess. I'm not as old as you accuse me of being!

The USAF F-4 came on board in FY 62. The operational airplanes were
entering the inventory in CY '64, the same year I went on active duty.
I didn't know or hear much about the debate as lowly 2/Lt. I was just
happy to go to UPT at Willy and then get my first choice of assignment
and go to Nellis. At Willy, when I saw my first F-4 up close on the
transient flight line I was awed at its size. At Nellis, when I taxied
by the Weapons School flight line in my Thunderchief, it looked a bit
smaller.

Never liked the smoke, the second seat and the lack of a gun. When I
got in the airplane in '72, it finally had a gun (that came in '68),
but still smoked.
>>
>> I will, however, agree with Walt (as I almost inevitably do) that had
>> the program remained on timeline and operational airframes been
>> delivered a decade ago, the unit cost would be lower, the avionics
>> would be more mature and the politics would be irrelevant.
>
>Agree. But someone bit off more than they could chew.

I don't know what was going on across town in Burbank, but at
Hawthorne, I was appalled by the lack of accountability in the
program. A lot was falling through cracks, but I've got little to
compare it to in terms of total industry standards. I do know that the
simulation program was going well, the cockpit displays/symbology was
a thorny problem and the trade/off work was incredibly complex. The
interface with the customer, however, was ongoing and very productive.

The SPO officers were regular visitors and flew a lot of the
simulation stuff with the Northrop staff. They ranged from Captains to
B/G's, all operationally experienced tactical aviators, so they had a
tight hand in defining the requirements.



Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

[Tarver Engineering]

"Ed Rasimus" > wrote in message
...
> On Wed, 14 Apr 2004 08:35:39 -0700, (Harry
> Andreas) wrote:
>
> >In article >, Ed Rasimus
> > wrote:
> >
> >
> >> >A few USAF F/A-18s should get the point across. :)
> >>
> >> I don't understand your fascination with USAF F/A-18s. It is most
> >> assuredly a non-stealthy airframe and one not dedicated or even very
> >> well suited to the air dominance mission. IOW, it isn't an A/A fighter
> >> by any stretch.
> >
> >Could be wrong, but I think his point is that threatening USAF with the
> >F/A-18 would insult them sufficiently that they would force the
> >F-22 to conclusion. Right now, other than cancellation, there's nothing
> >really forcing their hand, and (whether you agree or not) IMO
> >cancellation at this late stage is improbable, and they know it.
>
> It's nice to have an interpreter aboard. Occasionally the terseness at
> the end of the long repeated, multiple-entry threads leaves me
> confused. Might be an age thing.

There is a lot of data in this thread.

> >Just curious, what is your recollection of the debate surrounding
> >USAF's buy of the F-4 ?
>
> Not an age thing, I guess. I'm not as old as you accuse me of being!

OK then, but I have a question for you about when dinosaurs ruled the Earth
....

[Scott Ferrin]

On Tue, 13 Apr 2004 17:17:30 -0700, "Tarver Engineering"
> wrote:

>
>"Scott Ferrin" > wrote in message
...
>> On Tue, 13 Apr 2004 12:46:05 -0700, "Tarver Engineering"
>> > wrote:
>>
>> >
>> >"WaltBJ" > wrote in message
>> om...
>> >> (phil hunt) wrote in message
>> >...
>> >> > On Mon, 12 Apr 2004 13:55:05 +0200, Emmanuel Gustin
>> > wrote:
>> >> > >
>> >> > >What is needed, clearly, is a revised approach to aircraft
>> >> > >development. SNIP:
>> >>
>> >> No mierda, Dick Tracy.
>> >> One of Kelly's aids to success was that no one stuck their fingers in
>> >> his pies. He knew where he was going, herded his troops in the right
>> >> direction, overrode (mostly) the impediments (Viz. A11 security) and
>> >> got the job done in an outstanding manner. Now every swinging SOB
>> >> sticks his nose in the tent and stirs the pot - it's a wonder anything
>> >> gets done, and all the while Congress is both slowing things down with
>> >> investigations and continuing pressures to build something/anything
>> >> 'in my district' and meanwhile the overhead keeps piling up day after
>> >> day, year after year, and it's all added to the cost of the airplane.
>> >> The 22 should have been in service test in 1990.
>> >
>> >And by 1998 the F-22 should have been cancelled as obsolete.
>>
>> As compared to what?
>
>The Avro Arrow is probably the only fighter program to be so long in the
>tooth prior to delivery.
>


You didn't mention what the F-22 is obsolete in comparison to. The
Rafale? Typhoon? What?

[Scott Ferrin]

>> Could be wrong, but I think his point is that threatening USAF with the
>> F/A-18 would insult them sufficiently that they would force the
>> F-22 to conclusion.

It would if the F-15 weren't readily available. IF their only choices
were the Hornet and the F-22.





>
>Much of the money is already spent and the F-22 is a fine slab of Georgia
>pork. If the USAF fighter mafia won't get the job done, then they deserve
>to be humiliated.

"Fighter Mafia" is generally associated with the group that promoted
the Light Weight Fighter back in the day. As far as the F-22 being
pork, it's only pork if it's the *politicians* fighting for the
program against the will of the services. Well I guess that could be
"pure pork" vs different degrees but so far I've not seen anywhere
where the USAF has said they DIDN'T want the F-22.






>
>> > If (and this is a very big IF), the F-22 should collapse, then a
>> > better choice for all-wx, day/night ground attack is another buy of
>> > F-15E
>>
>> Being actively considered, with upgrades
>
>The super eagle is as dead as Gephardt's political career, but a transfer of
>F/A-18E avionics might be possible from the other St Louis Congressional
>District.


If by saying "super eagle" you mean this thing with the new wing and
various stealths mods you're right. Building a Stirke Eagle with the
latest electronics and an APG-63 (or even 77) AESA and HMS is
completely doable though and a far better choice than any Hornet. Put
in a couple of those -132s the Block 60 F-16s get and it would be even
better.





>
>Keep in mind that all aviation is politics.
>
>1) Consider for a moment some people in control of a flight research center
>black balled from funding by USAF for falsifying flight test reports.
>
>2) Consider also some people in control of a flight test research center who
>are the children of NAZI rocket scientists.

>
>One has the option of seeking funding outside that service, but the second
>is a non-starter under a competitive system.
>
>The Super eagle has about as much chance of being produced as Gephardt has
>of being Vice President.
>
>> > and an update of sensor/weapons suite on F-15C
>>
>> already in the works
>
>Too late. Please choose an option that is still on the table.


It's still available.





>
>> > with maybe a modified F-16 update as well.
>>
>> already in the works
>
>Real likely, should the F-22 falter. GD may end up wishing they had kept
>the Ft Worth line.

[Scott Ferrin]

On Wed, 14 Apr 2004 08:35:39 -0700, (Harry
Andreas) wrote:

>In article >, Ed Rasimus
> wrote:
>
>
>> >A few USAF F/A-18s should get the point across. :)
>>
>> I don't understand your fascination with USAF F/A-18s. It is most
>> assuredly a non-stealthy airframe and one not dedicated or even very
>> well suited to the air dominance mission. IOW, it isn't an A/A fighter
>> by any stretch.
>
>Could be wrong, but I think his point is that threatening USAF with the
>F/A-18 would insult them sufficiently that they would force the
>F-22 to conclusion. Right now, other than cancellation, there's nothing
>really forcing their hand, and (whether you agree or not) IMO
>cancellation at this late stage is improbable, and they know it.

It's tough to say. With the Cheyenne they had ten built and in
testing at cancelation. Or they could pull a B-2 "we'll let you build
a total of 30 F-22s and then we're canceling the program. Enjoy."

[Scott Ferrin]

On Wed, 14 Apr 2004 08:50:52 -0700, "Tarver Engineering"
> wrote:

>
>"Ed Rasimus" > wrote in message
...
>> On Tue, 13 Apr 2004 17:20:09 -0700, "Tarver Engineering"
>> > wrote:
>>
>> >
>> >"Ed Rasimus" > wrote in message
>> ...
>> >> On 13 Apr 2004 11:48:15 -0700, (WaltBJ) wrote:
>>
>> >> >The 22 should have been in service test in 1990.
>> >> >Walt BJ
>> >>
>> >> While what you say is esssentially correct, the 1990 date is a bit
>> >> excessive. I left ATF at Northrop in mid-'88 and at that time
>> >> metal-bending was just commencing for FSD. The only real full-scale
>> >> mock-up was plywood. Gotta assume that F-22 wasn't that different than
>> >> -23.
>> >
>> >There was no FSD, only Prototype and Production.
>>

Sometimes they do that. They did it with the Tomcat and they did it
with the F-16. The F-15 and -18 had FSD aircraft with different paint
jobs but that was about the only difference; that and maybe some
electronics stuff. The original F-15 had a few differences from the
following aircraft but that's really no different than what they do in
any flight test program. The chief difference with the F-22 is all
the time they're taking to do it.

[Ed Rasimus]

On Wed, 14 Apr 2004 12:03:14 -0600, Scott Ferrin
> wrote:

>>
>>Much of the money is already spent and the F-22 is a fine slab of Georgia
>>pork. If the USAF fighter mafia won't get the job done, then they deserve
>>to be humiliated.
>
>"Fighter Mafia" is generally associated with the group that promoted
>the Light Weight Fighter back in the day. As far as the F-22 being
>pork, it's only pork if it's the *politicians* fighting for the
>program against the will of the services. Well I guess that could be
>"pure pork" vs different degrees but so far I've not seen anywhere
>where the USAF has said they DIDN'T want the F-22.

To put "Fighter Mafia" in context, it really relates to the cadre of
tactical types that collected in the Pentagon basement requirements
shop that recognized in the sixties that the future of the USAF would
be better served by a flexible tactical force than by the entrenched
leadership that had remained in control after WW II from the bomber
force--LeMay, Brown, et. al.

These were guys like Moody Suter and Boyd who first articulated
concepts of tactical force employment. They evolved into the advocates
of a modern force that worked the compromises between high tech and
high airframe numbers. They developed the thinking for high/low mix
when faced with choices for MiG-17 style volume fighters (think F-5A)
and force-multiplier high cost/high tech systems like F-15.

The true Fighter Mafia built the force that has prevailed globally
over the last 30 years and as a corollary supplanted the SAC generals
with guys like Jack Chain, Joe Ralston, Ron Fogleman, Mike Ryan, Chuck
Horner, etc.

Today, with the consolidation of operational types in Air Combat
Command, the concept of a "fighter mafia" is passe.



Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

[Ed Rasimus]

On Wed, 14 Apr 2004 12:06:24 -0600, Scott Ferrin
> wrote:

>It's tough to say. With the Cheyenne they had ten built and in
>testing at cancelation. Or they could pull a B-2 "we'll let you build
>a total of 30 F-22s and then we're canceling the program. Enjoy."

Sounds like the Calvin Coolidge concept of an Air Force---"why not buy
one airplane and let the aviators take turns flying it?"


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

[Tarver Engineering]

"Scott Ferrin" > wrote in message
...

>
> "Fighter Mafia" is generally associated with the group that promoted
> the Light Weight Fighter back in the day. As far as the F-22 being
> pork, it's only pork if it's the *politicians* fighting for the
> program against the will of the services. Well I guess that could be
> "pure pork" vs different degrees but so far I've not seen anywhere
> where the USAF has said they DIDN'T want the F-22.

The F-22 defines the careers of many senior grade officers in the USAF. It
doesn't get much more political than that. The F-22 became Georgia pork
when a certain California congressman tried to cancel it in '98. When Newt
was first out it was actually possible to end the mysery.

[Tarver Engineering]

"Ed Rasimus" > wrote in message
...
> On Wed, 14 Apr 2004 12:03:14 -0600, Scott Ferrin
> > wrote:
>
> >>
> >>Much of the money is already spent and the F-22 is a fine slab of
Georgia
> >>pork. If the USAF fighter mafia won't get the job done, then they
deserve
> >>to be humiliated.
> >
> >"Fighter Mafia" is generally associated with the group that promoted
> >the Light Weight Fighter back in the day. As far as the F-22 being
> >pork, it's only pork if it's the *politicians* fighting for the
> >program against the will of the services. Well I guess that could be
> >"pure pork" vs different degrees but so far I've not seen anywhere
> >where the USAF has said they DIDN'T want the F-22.
>
> To put "Fighter Mafia" in context, it really relates to the cadre of
> tactical types that collected in the Pentagon basement requirements
> shop that recognized in the sixties that the future of the USAF would
> be better served by a flexible tactical force than by the entrenched
> leadership that had remained in control after WW II from the bomber
> force--LeMay, Brown, et. al.

In essence the purpose of the USAF fighter mafia is to create more pilot
slots by having fighters do bomber's work. That is why we may get 160 F-22s
intead of 50 conventional B-2s.

> These were guys like Moody Suter and Boyd who first articulated
> concepts of tactical force employment. They evolved into the advocates
> of a modern force that worked the compromises between high tech and
> high airframe numbers. They developed the thinking for high/low mix
> when faced with choices for MiG-17 style volume fighters (think F-5A)
> and force-multiplier high cost/high tech systems like F-15.

A cheap readily manufacturable fighter is a must and then a high end air
dominator might be added to the mix. The problem right now is that there is
a war right now that could use the $30 billion for an air dominant F-22; as
opposed to the already air dominant F-15.

> The true Fighter Mafia built the force that has prevailed globally
> over the last 30 years and as a corollary supplanted the SAC generals
> with guys like Jack Chain, Joe Ralston, Ron Fogleman, Mike Ryan, Chuck
> Horner, etc.
>
> Today, with the consolidation of operational types in Air Combat
> Command, the concept of a "fighter mafia" is passe.

No, seats for pilots is not passe. Consider the number of astronauts
holding engineering slots at NASA pre-Columbia disaster. Robots are now the
space explorers of choice, thanks JPL.

[Tarver Engineering]

"Ed Rasimus" > wrote in message
...
> On Wed, 14 Apr 2004 12:06:24 -0600, Scott Ferrin
> > wrote:
>
> >It's tough to say. With the Cheyenne they had ten built and in
> >testing at cancelation. Or they could pull a B-2 "we'll let you build
> >a total of 30 F-22s and then we're canceling the program. Enjoy."
>
> Sounds like the Calvin Coolidge concept of an Air Force---"why not buy
> one airplane and let the aviators take turns flying it?"

That is the theory behind UCAVs. One pilot can fly until he/she is tired
and then someone else can fly.

Reliability->Availability->Revenue

[Harry Andreas]

In article >, Ed Rasimus
> wrote:

> On Wed, 14 Apr 2004 08:35:39 -0700, (Harry
> Andreas) wrote:
>
> >In article >, Ed Rasimus
> > wrote:
> >
> >
> >> >A few USAF F/A-18s should get the point across. :)
> >>
> >> I don't understand your fascination with USAF F/A-18s. It is most
> >> assuredly a non-stealthy airframe and one not dedicated or even very
> >> well suited to the air dominance mission. IOW, it isn't an A/A fighter
> >> by any stretch.
> >
> >Could be wrong, but I think his point is that threatening USAF with the
> >F/A-18 would insult them sufficiently that they would force the
> >F-22 to conclusion. Right now, other than cancellation, there's nothing
> >really forcing their hand, and (whether you agree or not) IMO
> >cancellation at this late stage is improbable, and they know it.
>
> It's nice to have an interpreter aboard. Occasionally the terseness at
> the end of the long repeated, multiple-entry threads leaves me
> confused. Might be an age thing.
> >
> >Just curious, what is your recollection of the debate surrounding
> >USAF's buy of the F-4 ?
>
> Not an age thing, I guess. I'm not as old as you accuse me of being!

LOL. I did remember however that they were fairly new to the fleet
at about the same time you must have been in UPT.


> The USAF F-4 came on board in FY 62. The operational airplanes were
> entering the inventory in CY '64, the same year I went on active duty.
> I didn't know or hear much about the debate as lowly 2/Lt. I was just
> happy to go to UPT at Willy and then get my first choice of assignment
> and go to Nellis. At Willy, when I saw my first F-4 up close on the
> transient flight line I was awed at its size. At Nellis, when I taxied
> by the Weapons School flight line in my Thunderchief, it looked a bit
> smaller.

What I was getting at (viz using F/A-18'S for USAF ) was that the F-4
was the last Navy fighter to be bought by the Air Force. There must
have been a lot of "discussion" of using a Navy a/c in a force that
was essentially century series dedicated USAF platforms.
IIRC, the NIH factor was a component of the decision to buy another
solely USAF a/c, the F-15. How much of a component is still argued.

This bears no relation to the F-35, which is purpose-built from the
get go to be a multi-service a/c.

snip good stuff

--
Harry Andreas
Engineering raconteur

[Harry Andreas]

In article >, "Tarver Engineering"
> wrote:


> > > and an update of sensor/weapons suite on F-15C
> >
> > already in the works
>
> Too late. Please choose an option that is still on the table.

Contracts in hand argue otherwise.


> > > with maybe a modified F-16 update as well.
> >
> > already in the works
>
> Real likely, should the F-22 falter. GD may end up wishing they had kept
> the Ft Worth line.

Was there last month. The Ft Worth line is doing just fine.

--
Harry Andreas
Engineering raconteur

[Chad Irby]

In article >,
"Tarver Engineering" > wrote:

> That is the theory behind UCAVs. One pilot can fly until he/she is
> tired and then someone else can fly.
>
> Reliability->Availability->Revenue

....except that UAVs, for at least the next couple of decades, are going
to be missing the first and second parts of that chain.

"Reliability," in modern terms, means "all weather, day and night," as a
bare minimum. We have enough trouble keeping most of them in the air in
*good* weather. Until they get a decent self-piloting/return/defense
mode for when they lose their uplink, they're just big model airplanes.

"Availability" implies "can do all of the jobs we need them to do."
Even near-future USVs aren't going to be air combat capable, as we
currently need it to be (the ones that can execute reasonable combat
missions like ground attack are going to be *really* vulnerable to
air-to-air interdiction.

"Revenue," maybe, if you include "a lot cheaper" as part of that revenue
stream. But even that part is no guarantee, as we're finding out with
the bigger UAV models.

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

[Harry Andreas]

In article >, Scott Ferrin
> wrote:

> >> > If (and this is a very big IF), the F-22 should collapse, then a
> >> > better choice for all-wx, day/night ground attack is another buy of
> >> > F-15E
> >>
> >> Being actively considered, with upgrades
> >
> >The super eagle is as dead as Gephardt's political career, but a transfer of
> >F/A-18E avionics might be possible from the other St Louis Congressional
> >District.
>
>
> If by saying "super eagle" you mean this thing with the new wing and
> various stealths mods you're right. Building a Stirke Eagle with the
> latest electronics and an APG-63 (or even 77) AESA and HMS is
> completely doable though and a far better choice than any Hornet. Put
> in a couple of those -132s the Block 60 F-16s get and it would be even
> better.

The USAF will NEVER buy Block 60s.

--
Harry Andreas
Engineering raconteur

[Scott Ferrin]

On Wed, 14 Apr 2004 12:58:05 -0700, (Harry
Andreas) wrote:

>In article >, Scott Ferrin
> wrote:
>
>> >> > If (and this is a very big IF), the F-22 should collapse, then a
>> >> > better choice for all-wx, day/night ground attack is another buy of
>> >> > F-15E
>> >>
>> >> Being actively considered, with upgrades
>> >
>> >The super eagle is as dead as Gephardt's political career, but a transfer of
>> >F/A-18E avionics might be possible from the other St Louis Congressional
>> >District.
>>
>>
>> If by saying "super eagle" you mean this thing with the new wing and
>> various stealths mods you're right. Building a Stirke Eagle with the
>> latest electronics and an APG-63 (or even 77) AESA and HMS is
>> completely doable though and a far better choice than any Hornet. Put
>> in a couple of those -132s the Block 60 F-16s get and it would be even
>> better.
>
>The USAF will NEVER buy Block 60s.

What I meant was if the F-22 is cancelled one of the things that could
be put into new Strike Eagles are the -132 engines *that are in* F-16
Block 60s. Even better though would be the more powerful engines both
P&W and GE have tested with 3D nozzles. Still scratching my head as
to why they were both virtually ignored by any potential customers.

[Tarver Engineering]

"Harry Andreas" > wrote in message
...
> In article >, "Tarver Engineering"
> > wrote:
>
>
> > > > and an update of sensor/weapons suite on F-15C
> > >
> > > already in the works
> >
> > Too late. Please choose an option that is still on the table.
>
> Contracts in hand argue otherwise.

It is the build that I question.

> > > > with maybe a modified F-16 update as well.
> > >
> > > already in the works
> >
> > Real likely, should the F-22 falter. GD may end up wishing they had
kept
> > the Ft Worth line.
>
> Was there last month. The Ft Worth line is doing just fine.

Yes.

[Tarver Engineering]

"Chad Irby" > wrote in message
m...
> In article >,
> "Tarver Engineering" > wrote:
>
> > That is the theory behind UCAVs. One pilot can fly until he/she is
> > tired and then someone else can fly.
> >
> > Reliability->Availability->Revenue
>
> ...except that UAVs, for at least the next couple of decades, are going
> to be missing the first and second parts of that chain.

That will be true for perhaps another ten years, but not beyond that.

> "Reliability," in modern terms, means "all weather, day and night," as a
> bare minimum. We have enough trouble keeping most of them in the air in
> *good* weather. Until they get a decent self-piloting/return/defense
> mode for when they lose their uplink, they're just big model airplanes.

The satellite sensors are in the que.

> "Availability" implies "can do all of the jobs we need them to do."

Availability means they will fly at all.

[Ed Rasimus]

On Wed, 14 Apr 2004 12:52:01 -0700, (Harry
Andreas) wrote:

>In article >, Ed Rasimus
> wrote:
>
>> The USAF F-4 came on board in FY 62. The operational airplanes were
>> entering the inventory in CY '64, the same year I went on active duty.
>> I didn't know or hear much about the debate as lowly 2/Lt. I was just
>> happy to go to UPT at Willy and then get my first choice of assignment
>> and go to Nellis. At Willy, when I saw my first F-4 up close on the
>> transient flight line I was awed at its size. At Nellis, when I taxied
>> by the Weapons School flight line in my Thunderchief, it looked a bit
>> smaller.
>
>What I was getting at (viz using F/A-18'S for USAF ) was that the F-4
>was the last Navy fighter to be bought by the Air Force. There must
>have been a lot of "discussion" of using a Navy a/c in a force that
>was essentially century series dedicated USAF platforms.
>IIRC, the NIH factor was a component of the decision to buy another
>solely USAF a/c, the F-15. How much of a component is still argued.

From my perspective, I never heard the NIH argument, although it might
have occurred in some buildings without square corners. The real
"problems" didn't surface until well after purchase decision--the
issue of "missile-only platform" that was proving unsuitable in the
WVR fighting environment of SEA and the rapidly escalating
dissatisfaction of the PSO community without a clearly defined career
track.

As for "last Navy fighter" you probably are overlooking the A-7D
purchase.

Actually in both instances the AF got a lot of design input (not the
basic airframe geometry, but the systems). The F-4 got INS for example
and lots of bomb-carriage capability along with "special weapons"
wiring and control. The A-7 in AF livery came with a "death dot"
bombing system that was vastly superior to the A-7B of the USN.

In fact, as time droned on, both services can be said to have
benefitted from the development of the airplane in sister service use.
>
>This bears no relation to the F-35, which is purpose-built from the
>get go to be a multi-service a/c.

Well, in one sense, yes--but more like the F-84E/F/G than the
F-111A/B. In other words, separate but equal airframes that are
inherently different but similarly shaped.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

[Scott Ferrin]

On Wed, 14 Apr 2004 11:34:04 -0700, "Tarver Engineering"
> wrote:

>
>"Scott Ferrin" > wrote in message
...
>
>>
>> "Fighter Mafia" is generally associated with the group that promoted
>> the Light Weight Fighter back in the day. As far as the F-22 being
>> pork, it's only pork if it's the *politicians* fighting for the
>> program against the will of the services. Well I guess that could be
>> "pure pork" vs different degrees but so far I've not seen anywhere
>> where the USAF has said they DIDN'T want the F-22.
>
>The F-22 defines the careers of many senior grade officers in the USAF. It
>doesn't get much more political than that. The F-22 became Georgia pork
>when a certain California congressman tried to cancel it in '98. When Newt
>was first out it was actually possible to end the mysery.


There are going to be politicians out there who are going to fight the
cancelation of ANY weapon system because it's being built in their
domain. The thing that makes a decison/system/whatver "pork barrel"
is when it's built mainly because the politicians want it to be so
they keep those jobs and get those votes. There are quite a few that
fit that description (V-22) but when it's the people who will be using
it who are clamoring for it it isn't "pork barrel". There is more to
the definition of "pork barrel" than simply "not loved by all". The
simplest test is who wants to buy it and who wants to cancel it. If
the politicians had forced the Sgt. York on the Army that could be
called pork pure and simple. The USAF doing everything in their power
to buy as many F-15s as they could was not pork even though the
politicians would have preferred more cheap F-16s and fewer F-15s.
The C-130J is another example of pork. Is it good? Yep. Did the Air
Force want it? Nope.

[Tarver Engineering]

"Scott Ferrin" > wrote in message
...
> On Wed, 14 Apr 2004 11:34:04 -0700, "Tarver Engineering"
> > wrote:
>
> >
> >"Scott Ferrin" > wrote in message
> ...
> >
> >>
> >> "Fighter Mafia" is generally associated with the group that promoted
> >> the Light Weight Fighter back in the day. As far as the F-22 being
> >> pork, it's only pork if it's the *politicians* fighting for the
> >> program against the will of the services. Well I guess that could be
> >> "pure pork" vs different degrees but so far I've not seen anywhere
> >> where the USAF has said they DIDN'T want the F-22.
> >
> >The F-22 defines the careers of many senior grade officers in the USAF.
It
> >doesn't get much more political than that. The F-22 became Georgia pork
> >when a certain California congressman tried to cancel it in '98. When
Newt
> >was first out it was actually possible to end the mysery.

> There are going to be politicians out there who are going to fight the
> cancelation of ANY weapon system because it's being built in their
> domain.

Non-sequitur.

> The thing that makes a decison/system/whatver "pork barrel"
> is when it's built mainly because the politicians want it to be so
> they keep those jobs and get those votes.

All aviation is politics.

> There are quite a few that
> fit that description (V-22) but when it's the people who will be using
> it who are clamoring for it it isn't "pork barrel". There is more to
> the definition of "pork barrel" than simply "not loved by all". The
> simplest test is who wants to buy it and who wants to cancel it.

I have to go with wether the aircraft woks, or not; but I can understand you
being confused.

> If
> the politicians had forced the Sgt. York on the Army that could be
> called pork pure and simple. The USAF doing everything in their power
> to buy as many F-15s as they could was not pork even though the
> politicians would have preferred more cheap F-16s and fewer F-15s.

Dude, the F-15 was built in Gephardt's District; pure pork. It is the same
as when Newt did it.

> The C-130J is another example of pork. Is it good? Yep.

Define good?

> Did the Air Force want it? Nope.

The C-130J was a risk management driven design based on the possibility of a
failed C-17 program.

Now there is an example the F-22 could strive for, a miracle like the C-17
turnaround. The new management will have had their year before the ax
falls.

[Chad Irby]

In article >,
"Tarver Engineering" > wrote:

> "Chad Irby" > wrote in message
> m...
> > In article >,
> > "Tarver Engineering" > wrote:
> >
> > > That is the theory behind UCAVs. One pilot can fly until he/she is
> > > tired and then someone else can fly.
> > >
> > > Reliability->Availability->Revenue
> >
> > ...except that UAVs, for at least the next couple of decades, are going
> > to be missing the first and second parts of that chain.
>
> That will be true for perhaps another ten years, but not beyond that.

Nope. Some of the more-optimistic folks have claimed that, but all of
the current UAVs out there are showing just how weak that prediction is.
Heck, we had two of the current models crash in the same area, in the
same afternoon. Add in enemy jamming and other countermeasures (or even
a couple of guys in a light plane with shotguns), and UAVs stop looking
quite so nice.

They're great for loafing around in unchallenged airspace, but none of
the ones even in *development* are going to be anything near what we
need.

> > "Reliability," in modern terms, means "all weather, day and night,"
> > as a bare minimum. We have enough trouble keeping most of them in
> > the air in *good* weather. Until they get a decent
> > self-piloting/return/defense mode for when they lose their uplink,
> > they're just big model airplanes.
>
> The satellite sensors are in the que.

They're already using satellite-based uplinks. As anyone with any
satellite receiving experience can tell you, that's not exactly a
guarantee of 100% uptime. If someone figures out where your ground
station is and knocks it offline for more than a few minutes, it can
kill the whole mission.

*Then*, you have to come up with software and hardware that will let
that same UAV fly in heavy weather, when the rain is so heavy the
uplinks fail right after launch, with 30 knot crosswinds. We are
nowhere *near* that sort of capability right now, and nobody is even
attempting to predict when that's going to happen in the near future.

On top of all that, you have to start considering in-flight failures of
UAVs in heavy use. If you lose a few of the important instruments on a
manned fighter, the pilot has a chance of bringing it in by hand. If
you lose that with a Predator, it crashes.

> > "Availability" implies "can do all of the jobs we need them to do."
>
> Availability means they will fly at all.

Nope. If it flies, but can't do the job, it's not available for actual
use. Instead of "availability," use the term "mission capable."

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

[Ed Rasimus]

On Wed, 14 Apr 2004 14:16:41 -0700, "Tarver Engineering"
> wrote:

>
>"Scott Ferrin" > wrote in message
...
>
>> There are going to be politicians out there who are going to fight the
>> cancelation of ANY weapon system because it's being built in their
>> domain.
>
>Non-sequitur.

No, brush up on your Latin. That's a truism, but it definitely is not
a non-sequitur.
>
>> The thing that makes a decison/system/whatver "pork barrel"
>> is when it's built mainly because the politicians want it to be so
>> they keep those jobs and get those votes.
>
>All aviation is politics.

That would be called a baseless assertion. One could as easily say
that "all aviation is business". Or, maybe "all aviation is Freudian
penis-envy...." Nah, sometimes a cigar is just a smoke.
>
>> There are quite a few that
>> fit that description (V-22) but when it's the people who will be using
>> it who are clamoring for it it isn't "pork barrel". There is more to
>> the definition of "pork barrel" than simply "not loved by all". The
>> simplest test is who wants to buy it and who wants to cancel it.
>
>I have to go with wether the aircraft woks, or not; but I can understand you
>being confused.

Every airplane has to be built in someone's district. And, let's agree
that the US is better served by domestic production of our weapons
than international consortium.

If the military is an active participant in the development program
and they decide that it meets requirements, than it is hard to argue
"pork." As mentioned if the military is ambivalent or in opposition,
then you've got "political" and "pork". Maybe a better example is the
years of forcing F-111s on the USAF because John Tower was Speaker.

And, when the F-16 was bought, lo and behold--same builder, same
plant, same district---but no longer pork because now the production
out of Ft. Worth was something we wanted and needed.
>
>>The USAF doing everything in their power
>> to buy as many F-15s as they could was not pork even though the
>> politicians would have preferred more cheap F-16s and fewer F-15s.
>
>Dude, the F-15 was built in Gephardt's District; pure pork. It is the same
>as when Newt did it.

Dude, the F-15 went into production in that district before Gephardt
got elected to that seat. Ditto for the C-130 out of Marietta--except
that one predates Newt by about 25 years. Production started in the
'50s on the Herc line.
>
>> The C-130J is another example of pork. Is it good? Yep.
>
>Define good?

High utility, relatively low cost, totally amortized development etc.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

[Scott Ferrin]

>> >> "Fighter Mafia" is generally associated with the group that promoted
>> >> the Light Weight Fighter back in the day. As far as the F-22 being
>> >> pork, it's only pork if it's the *politicians* fighting for the
>> >> program against the will of the services. Well I guess that could be
>> >> "pure pork" vs different degrees but so far I've not seen anywhere
>> >> where the USAF has said they DIDN'T want the F-22.
>> >
>> >The F-22 defines the careers of many senior grade officers in the USAF.
>It
>> >doesn't get much more political than that. The F-22 became Georgia pork
>> >when a certain California congressman tried to cancel it in '98. When
>Newt
>> >was first out it was actually possible to end the mysery.
>
>> There are going to be politicians out there who are going to fight the
>> cancelation of ANY weapon system because it's being built in their
>> domain.
>
>Non-sequitur.
>
>> The thing that makes a decison/system/whatver "pork barrel"
>> is when it's built mainly because the politicians want it to be so
>> they keep those jobs and get those votes.
>
>All aviation is politics.


Because you say so?





>
>> There are quite a few that
>> fit that description (V-22) but when it's the people who will be using
>> it who are clamoring for it it isn't "pork barrel". There is more to
>> the definition of "pork barrel" than simply "not loved by all". The
>> simplest test is who wants to buy it and who wants to cancel it.
>
>I have to go with wether the aircraft woks, or not; but I can understand you
>being confused.


I have to go by whether the end user thinks it works or not. Not by
the opinion of a wannabe.




>
>> If
>> the politicians had forced the Sgt. York on the Army that could be
>> called pork pure and simple. The USAF doing everything in their power
>> to buy as many F-15s as they could was not pork even though the
>> politicians would have preferred more cheap F-16s and fewer F-15s.
>
>Dude, the F-15 was built in Gephardt's District; pure pork. It is the same
>as when Newt did it.


You could claim that no matter *where* it was built because it was
bound to be built in *somebody's* disctrict. The fact is you don't
know what the term "pork barrel politics" means plain and simple.






>
>> The C-130J is another example of pork. Is it good? Yep.
>
>Define good?

Good as is better than what it replaced. Good as in cost effective.
How do you define good? Whether you like the paint job or not?



>
>> Did the Air Force want it? Nope.
>
>The C-130J was a risk management driven design based on the possibility of a
>failed C-17 program.


The USAF didn't want it. Period. Which part of that don't you
understand? The C-17 is an obvious success yet the USAF was still
forced by politics to buy the J.

[Tarver Engineering]

"Ed Rasimus" > wrote in message
...
> On Wed, 14 Apr 2004 14:16:41 -0700, "Tarver Engineering"
> > wrote:
>
> >
> >"Scott Ferrin" > wrote in message
> ...
> >
> >> There are going to be politicians out there who are going to fight the
> >> cancelation of ANY weapon system because it's being built in their
> >> domain.
> >
> >Non-sequitur.
>
> No, brush up on your Latin. That's a truism, but it definitely is not
> a non-sequitur.

It was non responsive to what I wrote.

> >> The thing that makes a decison/system/whatver "pork barrel"
> >> is when it's built mainly because the politicians want it to be so
> >> they keep those jobs and get those votes.
> >
> >All aviation is politics.
>
> That would be called a baseless assertion. One could as easily say
> that "all aviation is business". Or, maybe "all aviation is Freudian
> penis-envy...." Nah, sometimes a cigar is just a smoke.

That is a truism.

> >> There are quite a few that
> >> fit that description (V-22) but when it's the people who will be using
> >> it who are clamoring for it it isn't "pork barrel". There is more to
> >> the definition of "pork barrel" than simply "not loved by all". The
> >> simplest test is who wants to buy it and who wants to cancel it.
> >
> >I have to go with wether the aircraft woks, or not; but I can understand
you
> >being confused.
>
> Every airplane has to be built in someone's district. And, let's agree
> that the US is better served by domestic production of our weapons
> than international consortium.

And that production is always a pork delivery, because it transfers money
into the District.

> If the military is an active participant in the development program
> and they decide that it meets requirements, than it is hard to argue
> "pork." As mentioned if the military is ambivalent or in opposition,
> then you've got "political" and "pork". Maybe a better example is the
> years of forcing F-111s on the USAF because John Tower was Speaker.

I claim the two are identical from a political support perspective.

Some in USAF are so invested in the F-22 that cancelleation would be the end
of their careers. Instead of a golden parachute to Lockmart they would just
be done.

Once again, aviation politics.

> And, when the F-16 was bought, lo and behold--same builder, same
> plant, same district---but no longer pork because now the production
> out of Ft. Worth was something we wanted and needed.

LOL

Have another drink, Ed.

[Tarver Engineering]

"Scott Ferrin" > wrote in message
...
>
> >> >> "Fighter Mafia" is generally associated with the group that promoted
> >> >> the Light Weight Fighter back in the day. As far as the F-22 being
> >> >> pork, it's only pork if it's the *politicians* fighting for the
> >> >> program against the will of the services. Well I guess that could
be
> >> >> "pure pork" vs different degrees but so far I've not seen anywhere
> >> >> where the USAF has said they DIDN'T want the F-22.
> >> >
> >> >The F-22 defines the careers of many senior grade officers in the
USAF.
> >It
> >> >doesn't get much more political than that. The F-22 became Georgia
pork
> >> >when a certain California congressman tried to cancel it in '98. When
> >Newt
> >> >was first out it was actually possible to end the mysery.
> >
> >> There are going to be politicians out there who are going to fight the
> >> cancelation of ANY weapon system because it's being built in their
> >> domain.
> >
> >Non-sequitur.
> >
> >> The thing that makes a decison/system/whatver "pork barrel"
> >> is when it's built mainly because the politicians want it to be so
> >> they keep those jobs and get those votes.
> >
> >All aviation is politics.

> Because you say so?

Aviation is too much money to be anything but politics. From the choosing
of a vender all the way to operational missions, the aircraft is politics
driven. In the civilian world, every 747 crossing the Pacific is politics,
every Country allowing small GA is doing so for ploitical reasons.

> >> There are quite a few that
> >> fit that description (V-22) but when it's the people who will be using
> >> it who are clamoring for it it isn't "pork barrel". There is more to
> >> the definition of "pork barrel" than simply "not loved by all". The
> >> simplest test is who wants to buy it and who wants to cancel it.
> >
> >I have to go with wether the aircraft woks, or not; but I can understand
you
> >being confused.

> I have to go by whether the end user thinks it works or not. Not by
> the opinion of a wannabe.

I hadn't really elevated you to the level of wannabe, Scott; but a little
self deprecation is a good sign on your part.

> >> If
> >> the politicians had forced the Sgt. York on the Army that could be
> >> called pork pure and simple. The USAF doing everything in their power
> >> to buy as many F-15s as they could was not pork even though the
> >> politicians would have preferred more cheap F-16s and fewer F-15s.
> >
> >Dude, the F-15 was built in Gephardt's District; pure pork. It is the
same
> >as when Newt did it.

> You could claim that no matter *where* it was built because it was
> bound to be built in *somebody's* disctrict. The fact is you don't
> know what the term "pork barrel politics" means plain and simple.

Pork barrel politics means reelection and perhaps a speakership.

> >> The C-130J is another example of pork. Is it good? Yep.
> >
> >Define good?
>
> Good as is better than what it replaced. Good as in cost effective.
> How do you define good? Whether you like the paint job or not?

I'd say the new engines are a disapointment without the new wing and the
derating provides little bang for the buck. The warbird eliminates a crew
member, which is at best a questionable tactic. The incompatability with
the fleet adds to the question of why anyone would replace their already
good C-130H.

> >> Did the Air Force want it? Nope.
> >
> >The C-130J was a risk management driven design based on the possibility
of a
> >failed C-17 program.

> The USAF didn't want it. Period.

What you want and what you get are sometimes different things.

> Which part of that don't you understand? The C-17 is an obvious success
yet the USAF > was still forced by politics to buy the J.

There was no obvious success when the C-17's wing broke well below
specification, exactly as predicted by the Nyquist shake.

[Harry Andreas]

In article >, Scott Ferrin
> wrote:

> On Wed, 14 Apr 2004 12:58:05 -0700, (Harry
> Andreas) wrote:
>
> >In article >, Scott Ferrin
> > wrote:
> >
> >> >> > If (and this is a very big IF), the F-22 should collapse, then a
> >> >> > better choice for all-wx, day/night ground attack is another buy of
> >> >> > F-15E
> >> >>
> >> >> Being actively considered, with upgrades
> >> >
> >> >The super eagle is as dead as Gephardt's political career, but a
transfer of
> >> >F/A-18E avionics might be possible from the other St Louis Congressional
> >> >District.
> >>
> >>
> >> If by saying "super eagle" you mean this thing with the new wing and
> >> various stealths mods you're right. Building a Stirke Eagle with the
> >> latest electronics and an APG-63 (or even 77) AESA and HMS is
> >> completely doable though and a far better choice than any Hornet. Put
> >> in a couple of those -132s the Block 60 F-16s get and it would be even
> >> better.
> >
> >The USAF will NEVER buy Block 60s.
>
> What I meant was if the F-22 is cancelled one of the things that could
> be put into new Strike Eagles are the -132 engines *that are in* F-16
> Block 60s.

Sorry. I mis-read your statement.

> Even better though would be the more powerful engines both
> P&W and GE have tested with 3D nozzles. Still scratching my head as
> to why they were both virtually ignored by any potential customers.

Probably money (acquisition cost) and money (lots of flight test hours)
Is flight test still $1M per flight hour? Last I heard it was.

--
Harry Andreas
Engineering raconteur

[Scott Ferrin]

On Wed, 14 Apr 2004 15:40:18 -0700, (Harry
Andreas) wrote:

>In article >, Scott Ferrin
> wrote:
>
>> On Wed, 14 Apr 2004 12:58:05 -0700, (Harry
>> Andreas) wrote:
>>
>> >In article >, Scott Ferrin
>> > wrote:
>> >
>> >> >> > If (and this is a very big IF), the F-22 should collapse, then a
>> >> >> > better choice for all-wx, day/night ground attack is another buy of
>> >> >> > F-15E
>> >> >>
>> >> >> Being actively considered, with upgrades
>> >> >
>> >> >The super eagle is as dead as Gephardt's political career, but a
>transfer of
>> >> >F/A-18E avionics might be possible from the other St Louis Congressional
>> >> >District.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> If by saying "super eagle" you mean this thing with the new wing and
>> >> various stealths mods you're right. Building a Stirke Eagle with the
>> >> latest electronics and an APG-63 (or even 77) AESA and HMS is
>> >> completely doable though and a far better choice than any Hornet. Put
>> >> in a couple of those -132s the Block 60 F-16s get and it would be even
>> >> better.
>> >
>> >The USAF will NEVER buy Block 60s.
>>
>> What I meant was if the F-22 is cancelled one of the things that could
>> be put into new Strike Eagles are the -132 engines *that are in* F-16
>> Block 60s.
>
>Sorry. I mis-read your statement.
>
>> Even better though would be the more powerful engines both
>> P&W and GE have tested with 3D nozzles. Still scratching my head as
>> to why they were both virtually ignored by any potential customers.
>
>Probably money (acquisition cost) and money (lots of flight test hours)
>Is flight test still $1M per flight hour? Last I heard it was.



I was wondering if a 37k F100 costs that much more than a 29k one.
But you're right on the flight test thing that's for sure. An F-15
with 2 37k engines and 3D nozzles would probably handle a bit
differently :-)

[Scott Ferrin]

>> >> The thing that makes a decison/system/whatver "pork barrel"
>> >> is when it's built mainly because the politicians want it to be so
>> >> they keep those jobs and get those votes.
>> >
>> >All aviation is politics.
>
>> Because you say so?
>
>Aviation is too much money to be anything but politics.


If that were the case the military would never issue requirements
(because it wouldn't matter) and there would be no competitions
(because they wouldn't matter). You'd have the McNamara/TFX scenario
for every program out there.




> From the choosing
>of a vender all the way to operational missions, the aircraft is politics
>driven. In the civilian world, every 747 crossing the Pacific is politics,
>every Country allowing small GA is doing so for ploitical reasons.


Hardly. If anything could be said to be politically driven it would
be the Concorde with all of the perceived presteige it brought with it
and even then they had to take it out of service because it wasn't
cost effective (the safety thing was merely the last nail in the
coffin). It's not politics that makes the world go 'round but $$$
although politics are a close second, but when it comes to military
procurement politics play a too important part but even then it can't
be said that ALL politics are "pork barrel" politics. Even a
simpleton could see that. If program X has a better chance of
succeeding than program Y and the politicians say "nope you're going
to have Y anyway" then it could be argued that it's a "pork barrel"
decision. If X is just flat out better and they choose X then simply
because it falls in some politician's district (and he fought for the
program) doesn't make it a "pork barrel" decision. It's not THAT
difficult of a concept to understand. The ATF program wasn't so clear
cut because while many felt the YF-23 *aircraft* to be a better choice
(myself included), the YF-23 program as a whole was thought to have
less of a chance of delivering what was promised because the
confidence in Northrop and McDonnell Douglas wasn't all that hot at
the time. Thus the decision to procure the F-22. It wasn't so simple
as "some politician wanted votes so he made the airforce buy the
crappy airplane".








>
>> >> There are quite a few that
>> >> fit that description (V-22) but when it's the people who will be using
>> >> it who are clamoring for it it isn't "pork barrel". There is more to
>> >> the definition of "pork barrel" than simply "not loved by all". The
>> >> simplest test is who wants to buy it and who wants to cancel it.
>> >
>> >I have to go with wether the aircraft woks, or not; but I can understand
>you
>> >being confused.
>
>> I have to go by whether the end user thinks it works or not. Not by
>> the opinion of a wannabe.
>
>I hadn't really elevated you to the level of wannabe, Scott;


And I'm sure you can imagine how crushed I am.



>> >> If
>> >> the politicians had forced the Sgt. York on the Army that could be
>> >> called pork pure and simple. The USAF doing everything in their power
>> >> to buy as many F-15s as they could was not pork even though the
>> >> politicians would have preferred more cheap F-16s and fewer F-15s.
>> >
>> >Dude, the F-15 was built in Gephardt's District; pure pork. It is the
>same
>> >as when Newt did it.
>
>> You could claim that no matter *where* it was built because it was
>> bound to be built in *somebody's* disctrict. The fact is you don't
>> know what the term "pork barrel politics" means plain and simple.
>
>Pork barrel politics means reelection and perhaps a speakership.


"Pork Barrel" means feeding the masses under your own jurisdiction to
the detriment of the greater good. That's why the term "pork
barrel" has all of those negative connotations.





>
>> >> The C-130J is another example of pork. Is it good? Yep.
>> >
>> >Define good?
>>
>> Good as is better than what it replaced. Good as in cost effective.
>> How do you define good? Whether you like the paint job or not?
>
>I'd say the new engines are a disapointment without the new wing and the
>derating provides little bang for the buck. The warbird eliminates a crew
>member, which is at best a questionable tactic. The incompatability with
>the fleet adds to the question of why anyone would replace their already
>good C-130H.

That's pork barrel in action. It's better than what they currently
have but not so much better to warrant it's purchase. Now if I were
an air force who had NO C-130s and I wanted some, then J's would be me
best choice. Where all it adds in the case of the USAF is another
maintanance chain and marginal benefit in the big picture. . .




>
>> >> Did the Air Force want it? Nope.
>> >
>> >The C-130J was a risk management driven design based on the possibility
>of a
>> >failed C-17 program.
>
>> The USAF didn't want it. Period.
>
>What you want and what you get are sometimes different things.


Exactly. Pork Barrel.




>
>> Which part of that don't you understand? The C-17 is an obvious success
>yet the USAF > was still forced by politics to buy the J.
>
>There was no obvious success when the C-17's wing broke well below
>specification, exactly as predicted by the Nyquist shake.

When did that happen and when did they start delivering Js? The C-17
is so successful that the USAF has a good chance of getting up to 222
yet they're still getting those J's stuffed down their throats.

[Scott Ferrin]

On Wed, 14 Apr 2004 15:39:55 -0600, Ed Rasimus
> wrote:

>On Wed, 14 Apr 2004 14:16:41 -0700, "Tarver Engineering"
> wrote:
>
>>
>>"Scott Ferrin" > wrote in message
...
>>
>>> There are going to be politicians out there who are going to fight the
>>> cancelation of ANY weapon system because it's being built in their
>>> domain.
>>
>>Non-sequitur.
>
>No, brush up on your Latin. That's a truism, but it definitely is not
>a non-sequitur.
>>
>>> The thing that makes a decison/system/whatver "pork barrel"
>>> is when it's built mainly because the politicians want it to be so
>>> they keep those jobs and get those votes.
>>
>>All aviation is politics.
>
>That would be called a baseless assertion. One could as easily say
>that "all aviation is business". Or, maybe "all aviation is Freudian
>penis-envy...."


Puts a whole new light on submariners.

[Scott Ferrin]

On Wed, 14 Apr 2004 14:47:08 -0700, "Tarver Engineering"
> wrote:

>
>"Ed Rasimus" > wrote in message
...
>> On Wed, 14 Apr 2004 14:16:41 -0700, "Tarver Engineering"
>> > wrote:
>>
>> >
>> >"Scott Ferrin" > wrote in message
>> ...
>> >
>> >> There are going to be politicians out there who are going to fight the
>> >> cancelation of ANY weapon system because it's being built in their
>> >> domain.
>> >
>> >Non-sequitur.
>>
>> No, brush up on your Latin. That's a truism, but it definitely is not
>> a non-sequitur.
>
>It was non responsive to what I wrote.

The topic in general was pork barrel politics.

[Tarver Engineering]

"Scott Ferrin" > wrote in message
...
>
> >> >> The thing that makes a decison/system/whatver "pork barrel"
> >> >> is when it's built mainly because the politicians want it to be so
> >> >> they keep those jobs and get those votes.
> >> >
> >> >All aviation is politics.
> >
> >> Because you say so?
> >
> >Aviation is too much money to be anything but politics.
>
>
> If that were the case the military would never issue requirements
> (because it wouldn't matter) and there would be no competitions
> (because they wouldn't matter).

That would seem to be the nature of Lockheed unflyable entry in the
competition to build a prototype ATF, none of it mattered. From there we
have seen a demonstration of the Peter Principal for profit. USAF did an
excellent job of driving off any Kelly types and tieing the hands of the
rest of the engineers.

[Scott Ferrin]

On Wed, 14 Apr 2004 16:45:16 -0700, "Tarver Engineering"
> wrote:

>
>"Scott Ferrin" > wrote in message
...
>>
>> >> >> The thing that makes a decison/system/whatver "pork barrel"
>> >> >> is when it's built mainly because the politicians want it to be so
>> >> >> they keep those jobs and get those votes.
>> >> >
>> >> >All aviation is politics.
>> >
>> >> Because you say so?
>> >
>> >Aviation is too much money to be anything but politics.
>>
>>
>> If that were the case the military would never issue requirements
>> (because it wouldn't matter) and there would be no competitions
>> (because they wouldn't matter).
>
>That would seem to be the nature of Lockheed unflyable entry in the
>competition to build a prototype ATF, none of it mattered.


The best explanation I've heard is that the USAF chose the F-22
because it was the more manueverable of the two (no idea how they
decided that since Northrop apparently never flew their's to the edge)
and that they had more faith that Lockheed could deliver what they
promised albeit in PC jargon. If that were the case why have them
build prototypes at all? They could have saved everybody a lot of
time and money and just looked the proposals over and picked the one
they wanted to give the contract to. For all I know it could have
been something as simple as "whoa, that F-23 looks a little too
radical for us. Let's stick with a tried and proven configuration"
but they could hardly say *that*.

[Dweezil Dwarftosser]

Ed Rasimus wrote:

> And, when the F-16 was bought, lo and behold--same builder, same
> plant, same district---but no longer pork because now the production
> out of Ft. Worth was something we wanted and needed.

What'dya mean "we", Kimosabe?
US pickle-suit pukes despised that little piece of
pilot wet-dream residue from day one!!

;-)

[Jim Knoyle]

"Chad Irby" > wrote in message
m...
> In article >,
> "Tarver Engineering" > wrote:
>
> > "Chad Irby" > wrote in message
> > m...
> > > In article >,
> > > "Tarver Engineering" > wrote:
> > >
> > > > That is the theory behind UCAVs. One pilot can fly until he/she is
> > > > tired and then someone else can fly.
> > > >
> > > > Reliability->Availability->Revenue
> > >
> > > ...except that UAVs, for at least the next couple of decades, are
going
> > > to be missing the first and second parts of that chain.
> >
> > That will be true for perhaps another ten years, but not beyond that.
>
> Nope. Some of the more-optimistic folks have claimed that, but all of
> the current UAVs out there are showing just how weak that prediction is.
> Heck, we had two of the current models crash in the same area, in the
> same afternoon. Add in enemy jamming and other countermeasures (or even
> a couple of guys in a light plane with shotguns), and UAVs stop looking
> quite so nice.
>
> They're great for loafing around in unchallenged airspace, but none of
> the ones even in *development* are going to be anything near what we
> need.
>
> > > "Reliability," in modern terms, means "all weather, day and night,"
> > > as a bare minimum. We have enough trouble keeping most of them in
> > > the air in *good* weather. Until they get a decent
> > > self-piloting/return/defense mode for when they lose their uplink,
> > > they're just big model airplanes.
> >
> > The satellite sensors are in the que.
>
> They're already using satellite-based uplinks. As anyone with any
> satellite receiving experience can tell you, that's not exactly a
> guarantee of 100% uptime. If someone figures out where your ground
> station is and knocks it offline for more than a few minutes, it can
> kill the whole mission.
>
> *Then*, you have to come up with software and hardware that will let
> that same UAV fly in heavy weather, when the rain is so heavy the
> uplinks fail right after launch, with 30 knot crosswinds. We are
> nowhere *near* that sort of capability right now, and nobody is even
> attempting to predict when that's going to happen in the near future.
>
> On top of all that, you have to start considering in-flight failures of
> UAVs in heavy use. If you lose a few of the important instruments on a
> manned fighter, the pilot has a chance of bringing it in by hand. If
> you lose that with a Predator, it crashes.
>
> > > "Availability" implies "can do all of the jobs we need them to do."
> >
> > Availability means they will fly at all.
>
> Nope. If it flies, but can't do the job, it's not available for actual
> use. Instead of "availability," use the term "mission capable."
>
>
Heck, long ago and far away...
We used to use UAVs of sorts just to tow targets around
for target practice and when they ran out of fuel they would
just pop the parachute and head out to retrieve it with a
motor whaleboat. We had a new XO on board and he
decided we would just boogey right up with our cruiser
and grapple the thing right up over the side. Guess he didn't
realize that the parachute might get sucked right up our
water intake forcing them to shut down the engines!
We were DIW for a couple hours while some SCUBA
divers labored to get the thing out. I heard we were only
45 min. from drifting aground on Sardinia before they finally
got the rag out. Didn't even need no enemy.

JK

[Ed Rasimus]

On Wed, 14 Apr 2004 23:14:03 -0600, Scott Ferrin
> wrote:
>
>The best explanation I've heard is that the USAF chose the F-22
>because it was the more manueverable of the two (no idea how they
>decided that since Northrop apparently never flew their's to the edge)
>and that they had more faith that Lockheed could deliver what they
>promised albeit in PC jargon. If that were the case why have them
>build prototypes at all? They could have saved everybody a lot of
>time and money and just looked the proposals over and picked the one
>they wanted to give the contract to. For all I know it could have
>been something as simple as "whoa, that F-23 looks a little too
>radical for us. Let's stick with a tried and proven configuration"
>but they could hardly say *that*.

The maneuverability aspect is probably quite valid. The -23 was
definitely slanted toward more stealth with F-15 equivalent agility.
The -22 seemed to recognize that the airplane wouldn't live in the
F-117 hidden world and therefore would be agile first and stealthy
second--the 2-D thrust vectoring for example.

The -23 employed a lot of high-tech multiple compound curved surfaces
which Northrop argued they had the machine tool expertise to build
(witness B-2). The Lockheed airplane was arguably more faceted
technology and the recent experience (in 1989) with that company's
production of F-117 made them a less risky choice.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

[phil hunt]

On Wed, 14 Apr 2004 08:35:39 -0700, Harry Andreas > wrote:
>
>Could be wrong, but I think his point is that threatening USAF with the
>F/A-18 would insult them sufficiently that they would force the
>F-22 to conclusion.

What's wrong with the F/A-18?

--
"It's easier to find people online who openly support the KKK than
people who openly support the RIAA" -- comment on Wikipedia
(Email: zen19725 at zen dot co dot uk)

[Scott Ferrin]

On Thu, 15 Apr 2004 07:46:46 -0600, Ed Rasimus
> wrote:

>On Wed, 14 Apr 2004 23:14:03 -0600, Scott Ferrin
> wrote:
>>
>>The best explanation I've heard is that the USAF chose the F-22
>>because it was the more manueverable of the two (no idea how they
>>decided that since Northrop apparently never flew their's to the edge)
>>and that they had more faith that Lockheed could deliver what they
>>promised albeit in PC jargon. If that were the case why have them
>>build prototypes at all? They could have saved everybody a lot of
>>time and money and just looked the proposals over and picked the one
>>they wanted to give the contract to. For all I know it could have
>>been something as simple as "whoa, that F-23 looks a little too
>>radical for us. Let's stick with a tried and proven configuration"
>>but they could hardly say *that*.
>
>The maneuverability aspect is probably quite valid. The -23 was
>definitely slanted toward more stealth with F-15 equivalent agility.
>The -22 seemed to recognize that the airplane wouldn't live in the
>F-117 hidden world and therefore would be agile first and stealthy
>second--the 2-D thrust vectoring for example.

I remember at the time reading quotes from Paul Metz during the flyoff
of the YF-23 easily out turning chase F-15s and F-16s and them having
to use afterburners to stay with it. I don't doubt the F-22 is more
manueverable but at least from what I remember reading it would seem
the -23 was maybe better than the -15 and -16.

[Scott Ferrin]

On Wed, 14 Apr 2004 16:45:16 -0700, "Tarver Engineering"
> wrote:

>
>"Scott Ferrin" > wrote in message
...
>>
>> >> >> The thing that makes a decison/system/whatver "pork barrel"
>> >> >> is when it's built mainly because the politicians want it to be so
>> >> >> they keep those jobs and get those votes.
>> >> >
>> >> >All aviation is politics.
>> >
>> >> Because you say so?
>> >
>> >Aviation is too much money to be anything but politics.
>>
>>
>> If that were the case the military would never issue requirements
>> (because it wouldn't matter) and there would be no competitions
>> (because they wouldn't matter).
>
>That would seem to be the nature of Lockheed unflyable entry in the
>competition to build a prototype ATF, none of it mattered.


At that point in the competition (two designs chosen of seven paper
designs) unless the USAF did a lot of inhouse simulation/studies/ etc.
about the only thing they have to go on is the data the manufacturers
submit with their proposals. Did the USAF (the people deciding who
would build the prototypes) know the Lockheed entry as presented
wouldn't fly? Who knows? Obviously Lockheed themselves didn't know
it or maybe they thought they could put a lot of spin on their
presentation. Looking at the two proposals they chose (Lockheed and
Northrop) it's obvious that experience in stealth was a very high
priority. Certainly neither company had any recent experience turning
out a lot of high end fighters. With that in mind the two most
logical choices would have been Lockheed and Northrop- exactly who
they chose. An interesting sidenote is that GD was third and they
also have been associated with stealth from way back (the
A-12/Kingfisher competition). Boeing was fourth with damn near no
stealth experience (in the white world anyway) and the historical king
of fighter producers McD was 5th. To go from supplying the USAF with
their premier fighter for the last forty or so years (F-4/F-15) to
placing FIFTH in the competition to build a new fighter suggests that
though the USAF wanted it all, aerodynamic performance took a distant
second place behind stealth. It might even be that the air force
*did* know Lockheed's entry was questionable aerodynamically but
stealth was important enough to accept it.

[Tarver Engineering]

"Scott Ferrin" > wrote in message
...
> On Wed, 14 Apr 2004 16:45:16 -0700, "Tarver Engineering"
> > wrote:
>
> >
> >"Scott Ferrin" > wrote in message
> ...
> >>
> >> >> >> The thing that makes a decison/system/whatver "pork barrel"
> >> >> >> is when it's built mainly because the politicians want it to be
so
> >> >> >> they keep those jobs and get those votes.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >All aviation is politics.
> >> >
> >> >> Because you say so?
> >> >
> >> >Aviation is too much money to be anything but politics.
> >>
> >>
> >> If that were the case the military would never issue requirements
> >> (because it wouldn't matter) and there would be no competitions
> >> (because they wouldn't matter).
> >
> >That would seem to be the nature of Lockheed unflyable entry in the
> >competition to build a prototype ATF, none of it mattered.

> At that point in the competition (two designs chosen of seven paper
> designs) unless the USAF did a lot of inhouse simulation/studies/ etc.
> about the only thing they have to go on is the data the manufacturers
> submit with their proposals.

So then, didn't the USAF have similar skills to GD, who are the ones that
clued lockheed?

> Did the USAF (the people deciding who
> would build the prototypes) know the Lockheed entry as presented
> wouldn't fly? Who knows? Obviously Lockheed themselves didn't know
> it or maybe they thought they could put a lot of spin on their
> presentation.

Perhaps Dr. Peter was correct about how to milk the system.

> Looking at the two proposals they chose (Lockheed and
> Northrop) it's obvious that experience in stealth was a very high
> priority. Certainly neither company had any recent experience turning
> out a lot of high end fighters.

Has Lockheed ever built a mass produced fighter before?

> With that in mind the two most
> logical choices would have been Lockheed and Northrop- exactly who
> they chose. An interesting sidenote is that GD was third and they
> also have been associated with stealth from way back (the
> A-12/Kingfisher competition).

It would seem to me that GD would have been the low risk choice.

> Boeing was fourth with damn near no
> stealth experience (in the white world anyway) and the historical king
> of fighter producers McD was 5th.

McDonnell already had two fighter contracts and GD had one. The only logic
that would apply is one where the Pentagon wanted to create an additional
provider.

> To go from supplying the USAF with
> their premier fighter for the last forty or so years (F-4/F-15) to
> placing FIFTH in the competition to build a new fighter suggests that
> though the USAF wanted it all, aerodynamic performance took a distant
> second place behind stealth.

Son, let me tell it like it is, when you take it down the road from number
one you get less, not more.

> It might even be that the air force
> *did* know Lockheed's entry was questionable aerodynamically but
> stealth was important enough to accept it.

Politics.

[Ed Rasimus]

On Thu, 15 Apr 2004 16:18:30 -0600, Scott Ferrin
> wrote:

>On Wed, 14 Apr 2004 16:45:16 -0700, "Tarver Engineering"
> wrote:
>>
>>That would seem to be the nature of Lockheed unflyable entry in the
>>competition to build a prototype ATF, none of it mattered.
>
>
>At that point in the competition (two designs chosen of seven paper
>designs) unless the USAF did a lot of inhouse simulation/studies/ etc.
>about the only thing they have to go on is the data the manufacturers
>submit with their proposals.

Excuse me, but this must be some sort of a time warp that I didn't
live through. As I recall the events, at the end of Dem/Val, the two
manufacturers went through FSD and each produced a couple of flying
prototypes. The requirement was that both manufacturers fly with both
engines--P & W and GE. Avionics demo was left up to the bidders, with
Northrop opting to fly a system on board and Lockheed choosing to
breadboard on a proxy. It certainly wasn't a paper fly-off.


> Did the USAF (the people deciding who
>would build the prototypes) know the Lockheed entry as presented
>wouldn't fly? Who knows? Obviously Lockheed themselves didn't know
>it or maybe they thought they could put a lot of spin on their
>presentation.

Spin on paper? They flew prototypes. Admittedly prototypes aren't
production aircraft, but they are "proof of concept" demonstrators.

> Looking at the two proposals they chose (Lockheed and
>Northrop) it's obvious that experience in stealth was a very high
>priority.

Stealth was a high priority, but Northrop was rolling the B-2 out the
door at Pico Rivera at the time and Lockheed had ended production of
F-117 ten years earlier.


> Certainly neither company had any recent experience turning
>out a lot of high end fighters.

(That would be discounting several thousand F-5A through F aircraft by
Northrop as well as developing YF-17 and participating in
fuselage/tail section production of the F-18 contract.)

> With that in mind the two most
>logical choices would have been Lockheed and Northrop- exactly who
>they chose. An interesting sidenote is that GD was third and they
>also have been associated with stealth from way back (the
>A-12/Kingfisher competition). Boeing was fourth with damn near no
>stealth experience (in the white world anyway) and the historical king
>of fighter producers McD was 5th.

In 1987-88 when I was at Northrop, the two bidders were in
consortia--Northrop was teamed with MacAir while Lockheed was
partnered with Boeing and GD. There certainly wasn't a five contractor
competition in Dem/Val and there wasn't in FSD either. Maybe if we
went back to choosing whether to respond to the ATF RFP....

> To go from supplying the USAF with
>their premier fighter for the last forty or so years (F-4/F-15) to
>placing FIFTH in the competition to build a new fighter suggests that
>though the USAF wanted it all, aerodynamic performance took a distant
>second place behind stealth. It might even be that the air force
>*did* know Lockheed's entry was questionable aerodynamically but
>stealth was important enough to accept it.

None of your statement tracks with my experience in the program, but
maybe you had a better seat.



Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

[Tarver Engineering]

"Ed Rasimus" > wrote in message
...
> On Thu, 15 Apr 2004 16:18:30 -0600, Scott Ferrin
> > wrote:

>
> Spin on paper? They flew prototypes. Admittedly prototypes aren't
> production aircraft, but they are "proof of concept" demonstrators.

The YF-22 was basicly GD's entry in the paper competition.

From there things have pretty much follwed the for profit processes laid out
by Dr. Peter in his book. Lockheed still has time to demonstrate that their
problems are all gone. The "one year" is nearly over.

[Scott Ferrin]

On Thu, 15 Apr 2004 17:00:05 -0600, Ed Rasimus
> wrote:

>On Thu, 15 Apr 2004 16:18:30 -0600, Scott Ferrin
> wrote:
>
>>On Wed, 14 Apr 2004 16:45:16 -0700, "Tarver Engineering"
> wrote:
>>>
>>>That would seem to be the nature of Lockheed unflyable entry in the
>>>competition to build a prototype ATF, none of it mattered.
>>
>>
>>At that point in the competition (two designs chosen of seven paper
>>designs) unless the USAF did a lot of inhouse simulation/studies/ etc.
>>about the only thing they have to go on is the data the manufacturers
>>submit with their proposals.
>
>Excuse me, but this must be some sort of a time warp that I didn't
>live through.


It's probably that age thing kicking in ;-) We're talking about the
decision process the LED to the building of the YF-22 and YF-23.
There were seven designs submitted from seven different companies.
They ranked:

1. Lockheed
2. Northrop
3. GD
4. Boeing
5. McD
6&7 Grumman and Rockwell (don't know the order)


It was at this point that Lockheed and Northrop were chosen to proceed
to building prototypes. Lockheed teamed with GD and Boeing and at
this point GD said "uh, we got some bad news about your design."

[Scott Ferrin]

On Thu, 15 Apr 2004 16:05:50 -0700, "Tarver Engineering"
> wrote:

>
>"Ed Rasimus" > wrote in message
...
>> On Thu, 15 Apr 2004 16:18:30 -0600, Scott Ferrin
>> > wrote:
>
>>
>> Spin on paper? They flew prototypes. Admittedly prototypes aren't
>> production aircraft, but they are "proof of concept" demonstrators.
>
>The YF-22 was basicly GD's entry in the paper competition.


It really is interesting to look at the two entries side by side.
Sure GD's was a single tailed delta but the F-22s horizontal stab is
so far back that if you took it off what remained would be a delta.




>
>From there things have pretty much follwed the for profit processes laid out
>by Dr. Peter in his book. Lockheed still has time to demonstrate that their
>problems are all gone. The "one year" is nearly over.
>

[Scott Ferrin]

>> At that point in the competition (two designs chosen of seven paper
>> designs) unless the USAF did a lot of inhouse simulation/studies/ etc.
>> about the only thing they have to go on is the data the manufacturers
>> submit with their proposals.
>
>So then, didn't the USAF have similar skills to GD, who are the ones that
>clued lockheed?


" It might even be that the air force *did* know Lockheed's entry was
questionable aerodynamically but stealth was important enough to
accept it."




>> Looking at the two proposals they chose (Lockheed and
>> Northrop) it's obvious that experience in stealth was a very high
>> priority. Certainly neither company had any recent experience turning
>> out a lot of high end fighters.
>
>Has Lockheed ever built a mass produced fighter before?

The last was the F-104 and ISTR that most of those were produced
overseas.






>
>> With that in mind the two most
>> logical choices would have been Lockheed and Northrop- exactly who
>> they chose. An interesting sidenote is that GD was third and they
>> also have been associated with stealth from way back (the
>> A-12/Kingfisher competition).
>
>It would seem to me that GD would have been the low risk choice.


On the ATF? Possibly. However typically a single-tailed delta isn't
exactly stellar in air to air after the first turn. Going by the way
they ranked them though it seems like stealth was far and away the
primary consideration.




>
>> Boeing was fourth with damn near no
>> stealth experience (in the white world anyway) and the historical king
>> of fighter producers McD was 5th.
>
>McDonnell already had two fighter contracts and GD had one. The only logic
>that would apply is one where the Pentagon wanted to create an additional
>provider.

Grumman would have been the logical choice if that's all they wanted
to do. They already had experience building figthers and were
current. Yeah it had the Tomcat but even back then production was
starting to taper off.




>
>> To go from supplying the USAF with
>> their premier fighter for the last forty or so years (F-4/F-15) to
>> placing FIFTH in the competition to build a new fighter suggests that
>> though the USAF wanted it all, aerodynamic performance took a distant
>> second place behind stealth.
>
>Son, let me tell it like it is, when you take it down the road from number
>one you get less, not more.

???? Less *what*? Performance? It was number one on the F-15 and
nobody who's flown the F-22 will give the nod to the F-15 when it
comes to flight performance vs. the F-22. Obviously it could be said
"if they'd made flight performance the #1 priority on the F-22 it
would fly better than it currently does". The thing is, what do you
get these days by making it number one? When it comes to flying what
is more important than stealth that the F-22 can't do?





>
>> It might even be that the air force
>> *did* know Lockheed's entry was questionable aerodynamically but
>> stealth was important enough to accept it.
>
>Politics.

Joe politician can kick and scream all he wants, it's not going to
magically bestow stealth expertise on a company. Stealth is what got
Lockheed to contract IMO. Bringing GD onboard is what made the
aircraft a fighter. Boeing. . .well they did something.

[Tarver Engineering]

"Scott Ferrin" > wrote in message
...

> >
> >> Boeing was fourth with damn near no
> >> stealth experience (in the white world anyway) and the historical king
> >> of fighter producers McD was 5th.
> >
> >McDonnell already had two fighter contracts and GD had one. The only
logic
> >that would apply is one where the Pentagon wanted to create an additional
> >provider.
>
> Grumman would have been the logical choice if that's all they wanted
> to do. They already had experience building figthers and were
> current. Yeah it had the Tomcat but even back then production was
> starting to taper off.

Grumman was already building a fighter.

> >> To go from supplying the USAF with
> >> their premier fighter for the last forty or so years (F-4/F-15) to
> >> placing FIFTH in the competition to build a new fighter suggests that
> >> though the USAF wanted it all, aerodynamic performance took a distant
> >> second place behind stealth.
> >
> >Son, let me tell it like it is, when you take it down the road from
number
> >one you get less, not more.
>
> ???? Less *what*? Performance? It was number one on the F-15 and
> nobody who's flown the F-22 will give the nod to the F-15 when it
> comes to flight performance vs. the F-22.

If the avionics stay lit and the tails doesn't delaminate on the F-22.

> Obviously it could be said
> "if they'd made flight performance the #1 priority on the F-22 it
> would fly better than it currently does". The thing is, what do you
> get these days by making it number one? When it comes to flying what
> is more important than stealth that the F-22 can't do?

What you do to maximize revenue is observe Dr. Peter's processes and let the
Pentagon and any stry dogs that happen by make changes to the airplane.
there are always a few milkmen around an airplane project, but the ATF is
it's own dairy.

> >> It might even be that the air force
> >> *did* know Lockheed's entry was questionable aerodynamically but
> >> stealth was important enough to accept it.

> >Politics.

> Joe politician can kick and scream all he wants, it's not going to
> magically bestow stealth expertise on a company. Stealth is what got
> Lockheed to contract IMO. Bringing GD onboard is what made the
> aircraft a fighter. Boeing. . .well they did something.

Tail boom and wire.

[Scott Ferrin]

On Thu, 15 Apr 2004 17:46:28 -0700, "Tarver Engineering"
> wrote:

>
>"Scott Ferrin" > wrote in message
...
>
>> >
>> >> Boeing was fourth with damn near no
>> >> stealth experience (in the white world anyway) and the historical king
>> >> of fighter producers McD was 5th.
>> >
>> >McDonnell already had two fighter contracts and GD had one. The only
>logic
>> >that would apply is one where the Pentagon wanted to create an additional
>> >provider.
>>
>> Grumman would have been the logical choice if that's all they wanted
>> to do. They already had experience building figthers and were
>> current. Yeah it had the Tomcat but even back then production was
>> starting to taper off.
>
>Grumman was already building a fighter.

Yeah but of the three companies producing fighters it was the closest
to finishing up production. Grumman didn't have anything in the
pipeline after the Tomcat and where at this point in the ATF program
NATF was still a consideration Grumman would seem to be a shoe-in if
they were just interested in keeping the manufacturers going. Come to
think of it one of the reasons the F-22 was chosen over the F-23 was
because of the NATF requirement. Lockheed had planned a swing-wing
F-22 for the carrier requirement.




>
>> >> To go from supplying the USAF with
>> >> their premier fighter for the last forty or so years (F-4/F-15) to
>> >> placing FIFTH in the competition to build a new fighter suggests that
>> >> though the USAF wanted it all, aerodynamic performance took a distant
>> >> second place behind stealth.
>> >
>> >Son, let me tell it like it is, when you take it down the road from
>number
>> >one you get less, not more.
>>
>> ???? Less *what*? Performance? It was number one on the F-15 and
>> nobody who's flown the F-22 will give the nod to the F-15 when it
>> comes to flight performance vs. the F-22.
>
>If the avionics stay lit and the tails doesn't delaminate on the F-22.

The F-15 also had problems with delamination. Any idea what airframe
number they implimented the fix in on the F-22? Or is it still on the
to-do list?

[Tarver Engineering]

"Scott Ferrin" > wrote in message
...
> On Thu, 15 Apr 2004 17:46:28 -0700, "Tarver Engineering"
> > wrote:
>
> >
> >"Scott Ferrin" > wrote in message
> ...
> >
> >> >
> >> >> Boeing was fourth with damn near no
> >> >> stealth experience (in the white world anyway) and the historical
king
> >> >> of fighter producers McD was 5th.
> >> >
> >> >McDonnell already had two fighter contracts and GD had one. The only
> >logic
> >> >that would apply is one where the Pentagon wanted to create an
additional
> >> >provider.
> >>
> >> Grumman would have been the logical choice if that's all they wanted
> >> to do. They already had experience building figthers and were
> >> current. Yeah it had the Tomcat but even back then production was
> >> starting to taper off.
> >
> >Grumman was already building a fighter.
>
> Yeah but of the three companies producing fighters it was the closest
> to finishing up production. Grumman didn't have anything in the
> pipeline after the Tomcat and where at this point in the ATF program
> NATF was still a consideration Grumman would seem to be a shoe-in if
> they were just interested in keeping the manufacturers going. Come to
> think of it one of the reasons the F-22 was chosen over the F-23 was
> because of the NATF requirement. Lockheed had planned a swing-wing
> F-22 for the carrier requirement.

Not likely. :)

In fact, the finite element analysis that the F-22 was built off of renders
your comments laughable, Ferrin.

> >> >> To go from supplying the USAF with
> >> >> their premier fighter for the last forty or so years (F-4/F-15) to
> >> >> placing FIFTH in the competition to build a new fighter suggests
that
> >> >> though the USAF wanted it all, aerodynamic performance took a
distant
> >> >> second place behind stealth.
> >> >
> >> >Son, let me tell it like it is, when you take it down the road from
number
> >> >one you get less, not more.
> >>
> >> ???? Less *what*? Performance? It was number one on the F-15 and
> >> nobody who's flown the F-22 will give the nod to the F-15 when it
> >> comes to flight performance vs. the F-22.
> >
> >If the avionics stay lit and the tails doesn't delaminate on the F-22.
>
> The F-15 also had problems with delamination.

What?

> Any idea what airframe
> number they implimented the fix in on the F-22? Or is it still on the
> to-do list?

AV-19 is supposed to be fixed, but there is no way for anyone to know that.

[Ed Rasimus]

On Thu, 15 Apr 2004 18:20:42 -0600, Scott Ferrin
> wrote:

>On Thu, 15 Apr 2004 17:00:05 -0600, Ed Rasimus
> wrote:
>
>>On Thu, 15 Apr 2004 16:18:30 -0600, Scott Ferrin
> wrote:

>>>At that point in the competition (two designs chosen of seven paper
>>>designs) unless the USAF did a lot of inhouse simulation/studies/ etc.
>>>about the only thing they have to go on is the data the manufacturers
>>>submit with their proposals.
>>
>>Excuse me, but this must be some sort of a time warp that I didn't
>>live through.
>
>
>It's probably that age thing kicking in ;-) We're talking about the
>decision process the LED to the building of the YF-22 and YF-23.

You might understand my confusion then. I thought we were talking
about the contract award choice for F-22. To have stated that the AF
bought an unflyable design would require a linkage between paper
proposal and final decision point at the end of the fly-off.

If we're talking about funding of Dem/Val, certainly there was a
decision made to narrow the field (must have been around '84) and
combine capabilities into the two teams. The purpose of Dem/Val (by
definition) is Demonstration/Validation of the proposed concepts. That
meant building the whole proposal package ranging from airframe to
man/machine interface to aerodynamic modeling to training (both
operator and maintainer training were required in the proposal).

By late '87, metal was being bent and configuration was well
established. Simulations were very far along. By late '88 prototypes
were rolled out and flew successfully. After a year of flying both -22
and -23, a selection was announced. Don't see how that equates with
your statement that AF bought an unflyable paper design.
>
>It was at this point that Lockheed and Northrop were chosen to proceed
>to building prototypes. Lockheed teamed with GD and Boeing and at
>this point GD said "uh, we got some bad news about your design."

During Dem/Val a lot of things get tried in simulation and
wind-tunnels. Typically if you get inside the big black hangar you
will find a display of failed tunnel models that were developed along
the way.

In short, I don't think you've announced any sort of "smoking gun."


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

[Scott Ferrin]

On Fri, 16 Apr 2004 06:50:31 -0600, Ed Rasimus
> wrote:

>On Thu, 15 Apr 2004 18:20:42 -0600, Scott Ferrin
> wrote:
>
>>On Thu, 15 Apr 2004 17:00:05 -0600, Ed Rasimus
> wrote:
>>
>>>On Thu, 15 Apr 2004 16:18:30 -0600, Scott Ferrin
> wrote:
>
>>>>At that point in the competition (two designs chosen of seven paper
>>>>designs) unless the USAF did a lot of inhouse simulation/studies/ etc.
>>>>about the only thing they have to go on is the data the manufacturers
>>>>submit with their proposals.
>>>
>>>Excuse me, but this must be some sort of a time warp that I didn't
>>>live through.
>>
>>
>>It's probably that age thing kicking in ;-) We're talking about the
>>decision process the LED to the building of the YF-22 and YF-23.
>
>You might understand my confusion then. I thought we were talking
>about the contract award choice for F-22. To have stated that the AF
>bought an unflyable design would require a linkage between paper
>proposal and final decision point at the end of the fly-off.
>
>If we're talking about funding of Dem/Val, certainly there was a
>decision made to narrow the field (must have been around '84) and
>combine capabilities into the two teams. The purpose of Dem/Val (by
>definition) is Demonstration/Validation of the proposed concepts. That
>meant building the whole proposal package ranging from airframe to
>man/machine interface to aerodynamic modeling to training (both
>operator and maintainer training were required in the proposal).
>
>By late '87, metal was being bent and configuration was well
>established. Simulations were very far along. By late '88 prototypes
>were rolled out and flew successfully. After a year of flying both -22
>and -23, a selection was announced. Don't see how that equates with
>your statement that AF bought an unflyable paper design.


Not mine. Tarver's. What *I* said was that the Lockheed design
chosen to be built into a prototype wouldn't fly. This is the design
that Lockheed submitted that the airforce chose to move forward to the
prototype stage.

http://www.xmission.com/~sferrin/lockheed.jpg


Doesn't look much like a YF-22 does it? Unfortunately the small
picture doesn't really do it justice.

[Scott Ferrin]

>> Yeah but of the three companies producing fighters it was the closest
>> to finishing up production. Grumman didn't have anything in the
>> pipeline after the Tomcat and where at this point in the ATF program
>> NATF was still a consideration Grumman would seem to be a shoe-in if
>> they were just interested in keeping the manufacturers going. Come to
>> think of it one of the reasons the F-22 was chosen over the F-23 was
>> because of the NATF requirement. Lockheed had planned a swing-wing
>> F-22 for the carrier requirement.
>
>Not likely. :)
>
>In fact, the finite element analysis that the F-22 was built off of renders
>your comments laughable, Ferrin.


Sorry but it's pretty much common knowledge Tarver. The fact that a
self-claimed expert like yourself has never heard of it really makes
me question your claim.

http://www.aerospaceweb.org/question/planes/q0132.shtml





>
>> >> >> To go from supplying the USAF with
>> >> >> their premier fighter for the last forty or so years (F-4/F-15) to
>> >> >> placing FIFTH in the competition to build a new fighter suggests
>that
>> >> >> though the USAF wanted it all, aerodynamic performance took a
>distant
>> >> >> second place behind stealth.
>> >> >
>> >> >Son, let me tell it like it is, when you take it down the road from
>number
>> >> >one you get less, not more.
>> >>
>> >> ???? Less *what*? Performance? It was number one on the F-15 and
>> >> nobody who's flown the F-22 will give the nod to the F-15 when it
>> >> comes to flight performance vs. the F-22.
>> >
>> >If the avionics stay lit and the tails doesn't delaminate on the F-22.
>>
>> The F-15 also had problems with delamination.
>
>What?


The F-15 had the same kind of delamination problems with the
horizontal tail that has popped up with the F-22.



>
>> Any idea what airframe
>> number they implimented the fix in on the F-22? Or is it still on the
>> to-do list?
>
>AV-19 is supposed to be fixed, but there is no way for anyone to know that.
>

[Tarver Engineering]

"Scott Ferrin" > wrote in message
...
>
> >> Yeah but of the three companies producing fighters it was the closest
> >> to finishing up production. Grumman didn't have anything in the
> >> pipeline after the Tomcat and where at this point in the ATF program
> >> NATF was still a consideration Grumman would seem to be a shoe-in if
> >> they were just interested in keeping the manufacturers going. Come to
> >> think of it one of the reasons the F-22 was chosen over the F-23 was
> >> because of the NATF requirement. Lockheed had planned a swing-wing
> >> F-22 for the carrier requirement.
> >
> >Not likely. :)
> >
> >In fact, the finite element analysis that the F-22 was built off of
renders
> >your comments laughable, Ferrin.

> Sorry but it's pretty much common knowledge Tarver. The fact that a
> self-claimed expert like yourself has never heard of it really makes
> me question your claim.

It is less common knowlede that such a change would require a complete
redesign of the F-22. The finite element design of the F-22 does not allow
for forces in the direction of any tailhook.

<snip of kook website similar to Kopp's>

[Tarver Engineering]

"Ed Rasimus" > wrote in message
...
> On Thu, 15 Apr 2004 18:20:42 -0600, Scott Ferrin
> > wrote:
>
> >On Thu, 15 Apr 2004 17:00:05 -0600, Ed Rasimus
> > wrote:
> >
> >>On Thu, 15 Apr 2004 16:18:30 -0600, Scott Ferrin
> > wrote:
>
> >>>At that point in the competition (two designs chosen of seven paper
> >>>designs) unless the USAF did a lot of inhouse simulation/studies/ etc.
> >>>about the only thing they have to go on is the data the manufacturers
> >>>submit with their proposals.
> >>
> >>Excuse me, but this must be some sort of a time warp that I didn't
> >>live through.
> >
> >
> >It's probably that age thing kicking in ;-) We're talking about the
> >decision process the LED to the building of the YF-22 and YF-23.
>
> You might understand my confusion then. I thought we were talking
> about the contract award choice for F-22. To have stated that the AF
> bought an unflyable design would require a linkage between paper
> proposal and final decision point at the end of the fly-off.

Nice tap dance.

[Ed Rasimus]

On Fri, 16 Apr 2004 07:49:00 -0700, "Tarver Engineering"
> wrote:

>
>"Ed Rasimus" > wrote in message
>>
>> You might understand my confusion then. I thought we were talking
>> about the contract award choice for F-22. To have stated that the AF
>> bought an unflyable design would require a linkage between paper
>> proposal and final decision point at the end of the fly-off.
>
>Nice tap dance.
>
What have you added to the discussion with that comment?

I worked for Northrop on the program in '87-'88. I've added from my
experience. And, you worked for which of the contenders?


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

[Tarver Engineering]

"Ed Rasimus" > wrote in message
...
> On Fri, 16 Apr 2004 07:49:00 -0700, "Tarver Engineering"
> > wrote:
>
> >
> >"Ed Rasimus" > wrote in message
> >>
> >> You might understand my confusion then. I thought we were talking
> >> about the contract award choice for F-22. To have stated that the AF
> >> bought an unflyable design would require a linkage between paper
> >> proposal and final decision point at the end of the fly-off.
> >
> >Nice tap dance.

> What have you added to the discussion with that comment?

It was the snippage that was the value added, the comment is more of a
marker.

> I worked for Northrop on the program in '87-'88. I've added from my
> experience. And, you worked for which of the contenders?

I would not place either ATF prototype as something I would be proud of at
this point in the program. The machines I make work.

[Scott Ferrin]

On Fri, 16 Apr 2004 07:47:36 -0700, "Tarver Engineering"
> wrote:

>
>"Scott Ferrin" > wrote in message
...
>>
>> >> Yeah but of the three companies producing fighters it was the closest
>> >> to finishing up production. Grumman didn't have anything in the
>> >> pipeline after the Tomcat and where at this point in the ATF program
>> >> NATF was still a consideration Grumman would seem to be a shoe-in if
>> >> they were just interested in keeping the manufacturers going. Come to
>> >> think of it one of the reasons the F-22 was chosen over the F-23 was
>> >> because of the NATF requirement. Lockheed had planned a swing-wing
>> >> F-22 for the carrier requirement.
>> >
>> >Not likely. :)
>> >
>> >In fact, the finite element analysis that the F-22 was built off of
>renders
>> >your comments laughable, Ferrin.
>
>> Sorry but it's pretty much common knowledge Tarver. The fact that a
>> self-claimed expert like yourself has never heard of it really makes
>> me question your claim.
>
>It is less common knowlede that such a change would require a complete
>redesign of the F-22. The finite element design of the F-22 does not allow
>for forces in the direction of any tailhook.

Nobody said it was going to be EXACTLY the same. The fact of the
matter is that from the get go there was going to be a NATF in the
decision equation. It wasn't ever intended that the ATF/NATF would be
as similar as say the F-35A and F-35C




>
><snip of kook website similar to Kopp's>

Yeah those facts are a damn inconvenience aren't they?

[Ed Rasimus]

On Thu, 15 Apr 2004 20:39:17 +0100, (phil
hunt) wrote:

>On Wed, 14 Apr 2004 08:35:39 -0700, Harry Andreas > wrote:
>>
>>Could be wrong, but I think his point is that threatening USAF with the
>>F/A-18 would insult them sufficiently that they would force the
>>F-22 to conclusion.
>
>What's wrong with the F/A-18?

The context was that the F-22 program was badly flawed and the Tarver
assertion was the the program should be cancelled and the USAF
supplied with F/A-18s.

There is nothing per se wrong with F/A-18, but for USAF, what can the
Bug do that an F-15E, F-15C or F-16C can't do?

If you accept the first premise regarding Raptors and then make the
gigantic leap that $xx billion will be written off and we should
revert to a 1970s aircraft with avionics and engine upgrades, then you
would have to have an improvement in capability over the existing
inventory to justify switching platforms.

The F/A-18 can't outperform the F-16 or F-15C in the A/A mission and
it can't out-lift/out-deliver the F-15E in A/G, so why would anyone
suggest adding a new system to the inventory?


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

[Tarver Engineering]

"Scott Ferrin" > wrote in message
...
> On Fri, 16 Apr 2004 07:47:36 -0700, "Tarver Engineering"
> > wrote:
>
> >
> >"Scott Ferrin" > wrote in message
> ...
> >>
> >> >> Yeah but of the three companies producing fighters it was the
closest
> >> >> to finishing up production. Grumman didn't have anything in the
> >> >> pipeline after the Tomcat and where at this point in the ATF program
> >> >> NATF was still a consideration Grumman would seem to be a shoe-in if
> >> >> they were just interested in keeping the manufacturers going. Come
to
> >> >> think of it one of the reasons the F-22 was chosen over the F-23 was
> >> >> because of the NATF requirement. Lockheed had planned a swing-wing
> >> >> F-22 for the carrier requirement.
> >> >
> >> >Not likely. :)
> >> >
> >> >In fact, the finite element analysis that the F-22 was built off of
> >renders
> >> >your comments laughable, Ferrin.
> >
> >> Sorry but it's pretty much common knowledge Tarver. The fact that a
> >> self-claimed expert like yourself has never heard of it really makes
> >> me question your claim.
> >
> >It is less common knowlede that such a change would require a complete
> >redesign of the F-22. The finite element design of the F-22 does not
allow
> >for forces in the direction of any tailhook.
>
> Nobody said it was going to be EXACTLY the same.

It could not be the same internal structure at all; finite element design is
one of the technological advances the F-22 makes major use of.

> The fact of the
> matter is that from the get go there was going to be a NATF in the
> decision equation. It wasn't ever intended that the ATF/NATF would be
> as similar as say the F-35A and F-35C

It is just more bull**** from 20 years ago.

> ><snip of kook website similar to Kopp's>
>
> Yeah those facts are a damn inconvenience aren't they?

Facts are something you have always been in short supply of Ferrin,
otherwise you would have agreed with me about the F-22 from the time I
started posting about it at ram. If you mean that cheerleaders like
yourself like to reference URLs from other cheerleaders, then I agree.

[Tarver Engineering]

"Ed Rasimus" > wrote in message
...
> On Thu, 15 Apr 2004 20:39:17 +0100, (phil
> hunt) wrote:
>
> >On Wed, 14 Apr 2004 08:35:39 -0700, Harry Andreas >
wrote:
> >>
> >>Could be wrong, but I think his point is that threatening USAF with the
> >>F/A-18 would insult them sufficiently that they would force the
> >>F-22 to conclusion.
> >
> >What's wrong with the F/A-18?
>
> The context was that the F-22 program was badly flawed and the Tarver
> assertion was the the program should be cancelled and the USAF
> supplied with F/A-18s.

The F/A-18E works very well.

> There is nothing per se wrong with F/A-18, but for USAF, what can the
> Bug do that an F-15E, F-15C or F-16C can't do?

The F-15 option no longer exists, but I can see the F-16 getting a bump.

> If you accept the first premise regarding Raptors and then make the
> gigantic leap that $xx billion will be written off and we should
> revert to a 1970s aircraft with avionics and engine upgrades, then you
> would have to have an improvement in capability over the existing
> inventory to justify switching platforms.

I tend to agree with McCain.

> The F/A-18 can't outperform the F-16 or F-15C in the A/A mission and
> it can't out-lift/out-deliver the F-15E in A/G, so why would anyone
> suggest adding a new system to the inventory?

Weapons integration into the F/A-18E went very well and I doubt anyone
knowledgable would claim the same for the F-22. We are no longer in a world
where the A/G mission belongs to fighters and the A/A mission is BVR.

[Michael Kelly]

Emmanuel Gustin wrote:
> Why would you drag around a few "silver bullet" aircraft to
> remote wars against countries that are unlikely to offer anything
> able to match a late production F-16? If the commander of such
> an expeditionary force does not really need the full F/A-22
> capability, and the probability is that he (or she) will not, then
> that commander will be very reluctant to burden the already
> strained logistics pipeline with the particular maintenance
> requirements of a handful of unique fighters. The F/A-22 may
> become what the B-1 is today -- a weapon commanders prefer
> to leave at home, because the cost of taking it with you outweighs
> the advantage. Politics aside, of course; I suspect that quite
> a few generals in history have been told "We paid for this
> weapon -- use it".

Emmanuel,

I couldn't disagree with you more on your assessment of the B-1 in
today's Air Force. Your statement above is 180 degrees off from the
current thinking of today's combatant commanders. In fact during OEF
and OIF it was at the top of the list of platforms asked for by them.
Today's Bone is vastly improved from the dark days of the early 90's.

Our ability to fly long distances, loiter for hours on end, react
rapidly to emerging targets, and carry large combat loads is matched by
no other airframe in the USAF. So much so that congress is giving us
money and ordering us to return Bones to service, while talking about
retiring further BUFF's.

Michael Kelly, Bone Maintainer

[Tarver Engineering]

"Michael Kelly" > wrote in message
om...
> Emmanuel Gustin wrote:
> > Why would you drag around a few "silver bullet" aircraft to
> > remote wars against countries that are unlikely to offer anything
> > able to match a late production F-16? If the commander of such
> > an expeditionary force does not really need the full F/A-22
> > capability, and the probability is that he (or she) will not, then
> > that commander will be very reluctant to burden the already
> > strained logistics pipeline with the particular maintenance
> > requirements of a handful of unique fighters. The F/A-22 may
> > become what the B-1 is today -- a weapon commanders prefer
> > to leave at home, because the cost of taking it with you outweighs
> > the advantage. Politics aside, of course; I suspect that quite
> > a few generals in history have been told "We paid for this
> > weapon -- use it".
>
> Emmanuel,
>
> I couldn't disagree with you more on your assessment of the B-1 in
> today's Air Force. Your statement above is 180 degrees off from the
> current thinking of today's combatant commanders. In fact during OEF
> and OIF it was at the top of the list of platforms asked for by them.
> Today's Bone is vastly improved from the dark days of the early 90's.

Emmanuel would have been correct in what he wrote two years ago, but the
bone has lit up.

> Our ability to fly long distances, loiter for hours on end, react
> rapidly to emerging targets, and carry large combat loads is matched by
> no other airframe in the USAF. So much so that congress is giving us
> money and ordering us to return Bones to service, while talking about
> retiring further BUFF's.

Getting the Bone to work is a major setback for any F/A-22.

[Scott Ferrin]

>> Yeah those facts are a damn inconvenience aren't they?
>
>Facts are something you have always been in short supply of Ferrin,

Yet another claim that Tarver can't back up. In our little debates
YOU are the one constantly whining about not being able to post any
references. If you want to show us facts here is your grand
opportunity. Show us a link that talks about those strakes you keep
babbling about on the F-22. Of course you won't. You can't. You're
such a pathetic excuse that you don't have the balls to admit there
AREN'T any references out there because there AREN'T and never have
been strakes on the F-22. You're WRONG. Just like you were WRONG
about the F-22 EVER having canards at any point in the design process.
(I dare ya to deny you ever said THAT).




>otherwise you would have agreed with me about the F-22 from the time I
>started posting about it at ram.

When you actually manage to post something true (by accident most
likely) I'm in complete agreement. I realize you have the disability
of seeing what you want to see but I've *never* claimed the F-22 *as a
program* was a stellar example. My steadfast assertion has been that
as an aircraft it's the best of the available choices. Period. Any
reading comprehension problems you have are your own problem. Feel
free to check dejanews and prove me wrong. Of course you won't. You
wouldn't know what the word "research" meant if you had a dictionary.
(That fat book thing with all the hard to pronounce words and no
pictures).




> If you mean that cheerleaders like
>yourself like to reference URLs from other cheerleaders, then I agree.
>


You must be a glutton for punishment. You're whining because I
referenced someone's URL? I wasn't referencing it for their input I
was referencing it for the picture. A picture that was released by
Lockheed. But hey, you know more than Lockheed, the USAF and the USN
because you think you're an "expert" right? That fact that they also
had information there (that happens to be correct I might add) had
nothing to do with it. The only reason you can never reference
*anything* is because there isn't any. It always makes me laugh when
dumbasses like yourself make wild claims and then whine because nobody
believes them. If you're such an "expert" why is it that you can't
back up the garbage you spew here? Are ALL websites garbage because
they don't flow from the mouth of Tarver? If I state that the B-52
has eight engines on a website does it automatically NOT have eight
engines in your tiny little universe? You're as bad as the pompus ass
a week or two ago who clamied that since he was a "professional" that
he'd killfile anybody who didn't accept everything he said as fact.

[Scott Ferrin]

On Fri, 16 Apr 2004 16:45:11 -0700, "Tarver Engineering"
> wrote:

>
>"Ed Rasimus" > wrote in message
...
>> On Thu, 15 Apr 2004 20:39:17 +0100, (phil
>> hunt) wrote:
>>
>> >On Wed, 14 Apr 2004 08:35:39 -0700, Harry Andreas >
>wrote:
>> >>
>> >>Could be wrong, but I think his point is that threatening USAF with the
>> >>F/A-18 would insult them sufficiently that they would force the
>> >>F-22 to conclusion.
>> >
>> >What's wrong with the F/A-18?
>>
>> The context was that the F-22 program was badly flawed and the Tarver
>> assertion was the the program should be cancelled and the USAF
>> supplied with F/A-18s.
>
>The F/A-18E works very well.
>
>> There is nothing per se wrong with F/A-18, but for USAF, what can the
>> Bug do that an F-15E, F-15C or F-16C can't do?
>
>The F-15 option no longer exists, but I can see the F-16 getting a bump.


What planet do you live on that the F-15 isn't an option? Care to
tell us WHY it is not an option?

[Scott Ferrin]

On Fri, 16 Apr 2004 16:58:02 -0700, "Tarver Engineering"
> wrote:

>
>"Michael Kelly" > wrote in message
om...
>> Emmanuel Gustin wrote:
>> > Why would you drag around a few "silver bullet" aircraft to
>> > remote wars against countries that are unlikely to offer anything
>> > able to match a late production F-16? If the commander of such
>> > an expeditionary force does not really need the full F/A-22
>> > capability, and the probability is that he (or she) will not, then
>> > that commander will be very reluctant to burden the already
>> > strained logistics pipeline with the particular maintenance
>> > requirements of a handful of unique fighters. The F/A-22 may
>> > become what the B-1 is today -- a weapon commanders prefer
>> > to leave at home, because the cost of taking it with you outweighs
>> > the advantage. Politics aside, of course; I suspect that quite
>> > a few generals in history have been told "We paid for this
>> > weapon -- use it".
>>
>> Emmanuel,
>>
>> I couldn't disagree with you more on your assessment of the B-1 in
>> today's Air Force. Your statement above is 180 degrees off from the
>> current thinking of today's combatant commanders. In fact during OEF
>> and OIF it was at the top of the list of platforms asked for by them.
>> Today's Bone is vastly improved from the dark days of the early 90's.
>
>Emmanuel would have been correct in what he wrote two years ago, but the
>bone has lit up.
>
>> Our ability to fly long distances, loiter for hours on end, react
>> rapidly to emerging targets, and carry large combat loads is matched by
>> no other airframe in the USAF. So much so that congress is giving us
>> money and ordering us to return Bones to service, while talking about
>> retiring further BUFF's.
>
>Getting the Bone to work is a major setback for any F/A-22.
>

Well you can hope. It might not help the prospects of an FB-22
(though I doubt it) but I don't see the B-1 filling an air to air role
anytime soon. Do you?

[Tarver Engineering]

"Scott Ferrin" > wrote in message
...
>
> >> Yeah those facts are a damn inconvenience aren't they?
> >
> >Facts are something you have always been in short supply of Ferrin,
>
> Yet another claim that Tarver can't back up. In our little debates
> YOU are the one constantly whining about not being able to post any
> references.

What debate? Once there was me making claims about the F-22 while you and a
bunch of trolls and Lockmart partisans attacked me, but now it turns out I
have been correct all along. You are not really in any position to complain
Ferrin. Now stop your yelling and act like the discredited adult you are.

[Tarver Engineering]

"Scott Ferrin" > wrote in message
...
> On Fri, 16 Apr 2004 16:58:02 -0700, "Tarver Engineering"
> > wrote:
>
> >
> >"Michael Kelly" > wrote in message
> om...
> >> Emmanuel Gustin wrote:
> >> > Why would you drag around a few "silver bullet" aircraft to
> >> > remote wars against countries that are unlikely to offer anything
> >> > able to match a late production F-16? If the commander of such
> >> > an expeditionary force does not really need the full F/A-22
> >> > capability, and the probability is that he (or she) will not, then
> >> > that commander will be very reluctant to burden the already
> >> > strained logistics pipeline with the particular maintenance
> >> > requirements of a handful of unique fighters. The F/A-22 may
> >> > become what the B-1 is today -- a weapon commanders prefer
> >> > to leave at home, because the cost of taking it with you outweighs
> >> > the advantage. Politics aside, of course; I suspect that quite
> >> > a few generals in history have been told "We paid for this
> >> > weapon -- use it".
> >>
> >> Emmanuel,
> >>
> >> I couldn't disagree with you more on your assessment of the B-1 in
> >> today's Air Force. Your statement above is 180 degrees off from the
> >> current thinking of today's combatant commanders. In fact during OEF
> >> and OIF it was at the top of the list of platforms asked for by them.
> >> Today's Bone is vastly improved from the dark days of the early 90's.
> >
> >Emmanuel would have been correct in what he wrote two years ago, but the
> >bone has lit up.
> >
> >> Our ability to fly long distances, loiter for hours on end, react
> >> rapidly to emerging targets, and carry large combat loads is matched by
> >> no other airframe in the USAF. So much so that congress is giving us
> >> money and ordering us to return Bones to service, while talking about
> >> retiring further BUFF's.
> >
> >Getting the Bone to work is a major setback for any F/A-22.
> >
>
> Well you can hope. It might not help the prospects of an FB-22
> (though I doubt it) but I don't see the B-1 filling an air to air role
> anytime soon. Do you?

I don't see the F-22 filling the air to air role anytime soon either. The
one year Congress gave the F-22 program to get their act together is almost
gone and I see no indication that things are better.

[Tarver Engineering]

"Scott Ferrin" > wrote in message
...
> On Fri, 16 Apr 2004 16:45:11 -0700, "Tarver Engineering"
> > wrote:
>
> >
> >"Ed Rasimus" > wrote in message
> ...
> >> On Thu, 15 Apr 2004 20:39:17 +0100, (phil
> >> hunt) wrote:
> >>
> >> >On Wed, 14 Apr 2004 08:35:39 -0700, Harry Andreas
>
> >wrote:
> >> >>
> >> >>Could be wrong, but I think his point is that threatening USAF with
the
> >> >>F/A-18 would insult them sufficiently that they would force the
> >> >>F-22 to conclusion.
> >> >
> >> >What's wrong with the F/A-18?
> >>
> >> The context was that the F-22 program was badly flawed and the Tarver
> >> assertion was the the program should be cancelled and the USAF
> >> supplied with F/A-18s.
> >
> >The F/A-18E works very well.
> >
> >> There is nothing per se wrong with F/A-18, but for USAF, what can the
> >> Bug do that an F-15E, F-15C or F-16C can't do?
> >
> >The F-15 option no longer exists, but I can see the F-16 getting a bump.
>
>
> What planet do you live on that the F-15 isn't an option? Care to
> tell us WHY it is not an option?

Gephardt is retiring.

[John Keeney]

"Scott Ferrin" > wrote in message
...

> Not mine. Tarver's. What *I* said was that the Lockheed design
> chosen to be built into a prototype wouldn't fly. This is the design
> that Lockheed submitted that the airforce chose to move forward to the
> prototype stage.
>
> http://www.xmission.com/~sferrin/lockheed.jpg
>
>
> Doesn't look much like a YF-22 does it? Unfortunately the small
> picture doesn't really do it justice.

Does to me: wing change and a bit different treatment of the
fuselage in front of the wing.
A whole lot more than the Vigilante->Foxbat->Eagle claims
we get around here. That or the F-16 and cranked arrow version.

[Scott Ferrin]

On Fri, 16 Apr 2004 21:21:48 -0700, "Tarver Engineering"
> wrote:

>
>"Scott Ferrin" > wrote in message
...
>> On Fri, 16 Apr 2004 16:45:11 -0700, "Tarver Engineering"
>> > wrote:
>>
>> >
>> >"Ed Rasimus" > wrote in message
>> ...
>> >> On Thu, 15 Apr 2004 20:39:17 +0100, (phil
>> >> hunt) wrote:
>> >>
>> >> >On Wed, 14 Apr 2004 08:35:39 -0700, Harry Andreas
>
>> >wrote:
>> >> >>
>> >> >>Could be wrong, but I think his point is that threatening USAF with
>the
>> >> >>F/A-18 would insult them sufficiently that they would force the
>> >> >>F-22 to conclusion.
>> >> >
>> >> >What's wrong with the F/A-18?
>> >>
>> >> The context was that the F-22 program was badly flawed and the Tarver
>> >> assertion was the the program should be cancelled and the USAF
>> >> supplied with F/A-18s.
>> >
>> >The F/A-18E works very well.
>> >
>> >> There is nothing per se wrong with F/A-18, but for USAF, what can the
>> >> Bug do that an F-15E, F-15C or F-16C can't do?
>> >
>> >The F-15 option no longer exists, but I can see the F-16 getting a bump.
>>
>>
>> What planet do you live on that the F-15 isn't an option? Care to
>> tell us WHY it is not an option?
>
>Gephardt is retiring.
>


So? Does that mean the USAF is all of a sudden going to want to start
buying a derivative of a derivitive of the LOSER in the LWF
competition instead of a fighter with FAR higher performance (F-15)?

[Scott Ferrin]

On Sat, 17 Apr 2004 02:44:05 -0400, "John Keeney" >
wrote:

>
>"Scott Ferrin" > wrote in message
...
>
>> Not mine. Tarver's. What *I* said was that the Lockheed design
>> chosen to be built into a prototype wouldn't fly. This is the design
>> that Lockheed submitted that the airforce chose to move forward to the
>> prototype stage.
>>
>> http://www.xmission.com/~sferrin/lockheed.jpg
>>
>>
>> Doesn't look much like a YF-22 does it? Unfortunately the small
>> picture doesn't really do it justice.
>
>Does to me: wing change and a bit different treatment of the
>fuselage in front of the wing.

More like entirely NEW wing, tail and fuselage. The only thing
remotely the same is the nozzle area between the tails and the number
of fins on the aircraft



>A whole lot more than the Vigilante->Foxbat->Eagle claims
>we get around here.

There is actually some merit to the Vigilante/Foxbat similarities as
Mikoyan himself was quoted as wanting to use the Vigilante as a
starting point.





That or the F-16 and cranked arrow version.
>


You lost me there.

[Scott Ferrin]

On Fri, 16 Apr 2004 21:19:25 -0700, "Tarver Engineering"
> wrote:

>
>"Scott Ferrin" > wrote in message
...
>>
>> >> Yeah those facts are a damn inconvenience aren't they?
>> >
>> >Facts are something you have always been in short supply of Ferrin,
>>
>> Yet another claim that Tarver can't back up. In our little debates
>> YOU are the one constantly whining about not being able to post any
>> references.
>
>What debate? Once there was me making claims about the F-22 while you and a
>bunch of trolls and Lockmart partisans attacked me, but now it turns out I
>have been correct all along.

How do you figure? Even then loosest translation of all that's
transpired doesn't support your claim that the F-22 is a dog. Not
even close. But hey you just keep telling yourself that.


> You are not really in any position to complain
>Ferrin. Now stop your yelling and act like the discredited adult you are.


Same old Tarver. No evidence and no nads to back his claims.

[Henry J Cobb]

Ed Rasimus wrote:
> The context was that the F-22 program was badly flawed and the Tarver
> assertion was the the program should be cancelled and the USAF
> supplied with F/A-18s.
>
> There is nothing per se wrong with F/A-18, but for USAF, what can the
> Bug do that an F-15E, F-15C or F-16C can't do?
>
> If you accept the first premise regarding Raptors and then make the
> gigantic leap that $xx billion will be written off and we should
> revert to a 1970s aircraft with avionics and engine upgrades, then you
> would have to have an improvement in capability over the existing
> inventory to justify switching platforms.
>
> The F/A-18 can't outperform the F-16 or F-15C in the A/A mission and
> it can't out-lift/out-deliver the F-15E in A/G, so why would anyone
> suggest adding a new system to the inventory?

Because it has 90 percent common parts with the only jammer aircraft in
development in the United States.

But the Air Force has concluded that they don't need jamming.

By the time they get there the Navy will have already flattened the
enemy air defenses. ;-)

-HJC

[Tarver Engineering]

"Scott Ferrin" > wrote in message
...
> On Fri, 16 Apr 2004 21:21:48 -0700, "Tarver Engineering"
> > wrote:
>
> >
> >"Scott Ferrin" > wrote in message
> ...
> >> On Fri, 16 Apr 2004 16:45:11 -0700, "Tarver Engineering"
> >> > wrote:
> >>
> >> >
> >> >"Ed Rasimus" > wrote in message
> >> ...
> >> >> On Thu, 15 Apr 2004 20:39:17 +0100,
(phil
> >> >> hunt) wrote:
> >> >>
> >> >> >On Wed, 14 Apr 2004 08:35:39 -0700, Harry Andreas
> >
> >> >wrote:
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >>Could be wrong, but I think his point is that threatening USAF
with
> >the
> >> >> >>F/A-18 would insult them sufficiently that they would force the
> >> >> >>F-22 to conclusion.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >What's wrong with the F/A-18?
> >> >>
> >> >> The context was that the F-22 program was badly flawed and the
Tarver
> >> >> assertion was the the program should be cancelled and the USAF
> >> >> supplied with F/A-18s.
> >> >
> >> >The F/A-18E works very well.
> >> >
> >> >> There is nothing per se wrong with F/A-18, but for USAF, what can
the
> >> >> Bug do that an F-15E, F-15C or F-16C can't do?
> >> >
> >> >The F-15 option no longer exists, but I can see the F-16 getting a
bump.
> >>
> >>
> >> What planet do you live on that the F-15 isn't an option? Care to
> >> tell us WHY it is not an option?
> >
> >Gephardt is retiring.
> >
>
>
> So? Does that mean the USAF is all of a sudden going to want to start
> buying a derivative of a derivitive of the LOSER in the LWF
> competition instead of a fighter with FAR higher performance (F-15)?

I expect that now that the F-15 option is off the table that some F-16
version is what USAF will select, in the event of an F-22 cancellation.
Keep in mind as you rant at me over the political facts, that 90% of all
your F-22 posts are now revealed as bull hockey, Ferrin.

[Ed Rasimus]

On Sat, 17 Apr 2004 08:23:04 -0700, Henry J Cobb > wrote:

>Ed Rasimus wrote:
>>
>> The F/A-18 can't outperform the F-16 or F-15C in the A/A mission and
>> it can't out-lift/out-deliver the F-15E in A/G, so why would anyone
>> suggest adding a new system to the inventory?
>
>Because it has 90 percent common parts with the only jammer aircraft in
>development in the United States.

Which makes the assumption that commonality with "the only jammer
aircraft" is desireable. Or maybe that a tactical platform for jamming
is necessary and the only alternative.
>
>But the Air Force has concluded that they don't need jamming.

I don't know a basis for that asserted conclusion. Electronic warfare
is a continually evolving business. Stand-off jamming is only one
aspect. Self-protection jamming has been a more effective choice for
the USAF. Pods are suitable for multiple-aircraft types and can be
quickly updated or replaced with newer models. A dedicated jamming
aircraft doesn't offer that flexibility.
>
>By the time they get there the Navy will have already flattened the
>enemy air defenses. ;-)

Wasn't that way in my experience. And, how will the Navy get there
without large tanker support? Most of the world's land mass is
unreachable by carrier based aircraft without refueling.

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

[Mike Williamson]

Henry J Cobb wrote:

>
> Because it has 90 percent common parts with the only jammer aircraft in
> development in the United States.
>
> But the Air Force has concluded that they don't need jamming.
>


The Air Force has an airborne jammer/SEAD/C2W platform in operation,
with a major block upgrade underway. During OIF, it performed
with great effect for the Air Force and numerous joint operations.

Mike Williamson
EC-130H Compass Call

[Henry J Cobb]

Mike Williamson wrote:
> Henry J Cobb wrote:
>> Because it has 90 percent common parts with the only jammer aircraft
>> in development in the United States.
>>
>> But the Air Force has concluded that they don't need jamming.
>
> The Air Force has an airborne jammer/SEAD/C2W platform in operation,
> with a major block upgrade underway. During OIF, it performed
> with great effect for the Air Force and numerous joint operations.
>
> Mike Williamson
> EC-130H Compass Call

http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=190
> Specifically, the modified aircraft prevents or degrades
> communications essential to command and control of weapon systems and
> other resources.

Yeah, I should have said dedicated radar jammer to exclude that and the
F-16CJ.

http://www.af.mil/news/airman/0702/sead.html

-HJC

[Scott Ferrin]

>> So? Does that mean the USAF is all of a sudden going to want to start
>> buying a derivative of a derivitive of the LOSER in the LWF
>> competition instead of a fighter with FAR higher performance (F-15)?
>
>I expect that now that the F-15 option is off the table


It's not.



>that some F-16
>version is what USAF will select, in the event of an F-22 cancellation.
>Keep in mind as you rant at me over the political facts, that 90% of all
>your F-22 posts are now revealed as bull hockey, Ferrin.

Like I said. Keep telling yourself that (and I'm sure you will).

[Tarver Engineering]

"Scott Ferrin" > wrote in message
...
>
> >> So? Does that mean the USAF is all of a sudden going to want to start
> >> buying a derivative of a derivitive of the LOSER in the LWF
> >> competition instead of a fighter with FAR higher performance (F-15)?
> >
> >I expect that now that the F-15 option is off the table

> It's not.

Now Scott, I doubt your history of being wrong about the F-22 for so many
years qualifies you to make a statements about F-15s. The politics of the
situation have eliminated any reasonable chance of a Super Eagle, which is
why I joke about F/A-18s for USAF. Within the same City are two very
different political situations.

[Michael Kelly]

Tarver Engineering wrote:
> Emmanuel would have been correct in what he wrote two years ago, but the
> bone has lit up.

Two years ago the Bone was well into its 3rd rotation in support of OEF
and was a very in demand weapons system. 7 BW Bones were routinely
dropping large numbers of JDAM's in support of ANACONDA this time last
year and flew 301 of 301 sorties in support of it, quite impressive.

You'd have to go back at least five years for the original statement to
be true. In all fairness, the Bone was in the middle of the block D
upgrades and availability on any platform in the middle of an upgrade
program is usually pretty poor.

> Getting the Bone to work is a major setback for any F/A-22.


Hardly, now the FB-22 proposal is a different story, but that has a
shorter range and much smaller weapons load. Add SBD's to the Bone and
you're talking about 96 to almost 200 weapons carried.

Michael Kelly, Bone Maintainer

[Tarver Engineering]

"Michael Kelly" > wrote in message
om...
> Tarver Engineering wrote:
> > Emmanuel would have been correct in what he wrote two years ago, but the
> > bone has lit up.
>
> Two years ago the Bone was well into its 3rd rotation in support of OEF
> and was a very in demand weapons system. 7 BW Bones were routinely
> dropping large numbers of JDAM's in support of ANACONDA this time last
> year and flew 301 of 301 sorties in support of it, quite impressive.
>
> You'd have to go back at least five years for the original statement to
> be true. In all fairness, the Bone was in the middle of the block D
> upgrades and availability on any platform in the middle of an upgrade
> program is usually pretty poor.
>
> > Getting the Bone to work is a major setback for any F/A-22.
>
>
> Hardly, now the FB-22 proposal is a different story, but that has a
> shorter range and much smaller weapons load. Add SBD's to the Bone and
> you're talking about 96 to almost 200 weapons carried.

I don't see a need for additional A/G airborn weapons platforms now that we
are not going to cut up the Bones.

[Thomas Schoene]

Henry J Cobb wrote:
> But the Air Force has concluded that they don't need jamming.

No, it hasn't done that at all, Henry. Once again, you write with no actual
knowledge of the situation.

The services did a study (The Airborn Electronic Attack Analysis of
Alternatives) that came back with a whole bunch of options. The Navy
component was pretty clear -- EA-18 was the best option. The Air Force has
a more complex situation and the options ranged from UAVs to widebody jets
to EF-22s to EB-52s or some combination of the above. So they decided that
they needed to look some more to decide if a direct replacement was the
right solution or to pursue something different (like UAVs). AFAIK, they
have not settled on a final solution, but "nothing" is not it. They are
apparently making some moves on fitting B-52s for electronic attack as a
near-term fix.

Two articles that describe the process and the current Air Force situation:

http://www.afa.org/magazine/June2002/0602attack.html

http://www.jedonline.com/default.asp?journalid=4&func=articles&page=0311j24&
year=2003&month=11&doct=ec%20monitor&rsno=4#1

Henry, I'm getting really tired of doing your homework for you, BTW. Lack
of knowledge is excusable. But willful ignorance, even when confronted with
information to the contrary, is simply rude.

--
Tom Schoene Replace "invalid" with "net" to e-mail
"Our country, right or wrong. When right, to be kept right, when
wrong to be put right." - Senator Carl Schurz, 1872

[Scott Ferrin]

On Sat, 17 Apr 2004 17:57:02 -0700, "Tarver Engineering"
> wrote:

>
>"Michael Kelly" > wrote in message
om...
>> Tarver Engineering wrote:
>> > Emmanuel would have been correct in what he wrote two years ago, but the
>> > bone has lit up.
>>
>> Two years ago the Bone was well into its 3rd rotation in support of OEF
>> and was a very in demand weapons system. 7 BW Bones were routinely
>> dropping large numbers of JDAM's in support of ANACONDA this time last
>> year and flew 301 of 301 sorties in support of it, quite impressive.
>>
>> You'd have to go back at least five years for the original statement to
>> be true. In all fairness, the Bone was in the middle of the block D
>> upgrades and availability on any platform in the middle of an upgrade
>> program is usually pretty poor.
>>
>> > Getting the Bone to work is a major setback for any F/A-22.
>>
>>
>> Hardly, now the FB-22 proposal is a different story, but that has a
>> shorter range and much smaller weapons load. Add SBD's to the Bone and
>> you're talking about 96 to almost 200 weapons carried.
>
>I don't see a need for additional A/G airborn weapons platforms now that we
>are not going to cut up the Bones.

Same problem as always- they aren't going to last forever. If ANY
weapon system in the pipeline is an indicator, if we started a clean
sheet replacement for the B-1 it would be decades before we saw
anything in service. Come to think of it though, ISTR the arguement
for the FB-22 as being as a follow on to the Strike Eagle. I've only
heard it mentioned in the same breath as the B-1 once. Even with the
stretch, an FB-22 wouldn't have the range of a B-1 so I don't think
it's an apples/apples comparison. Both Northrop and Lockheed have
kicked around full sized bomber designs in the last four or five years
though. I think things are so much in flux these days that nobody is
sure WHAT they want. You see a supercruising bomber design from
Northrop one day, another from Lockheed a couple years later, then
back to Northrop with a Quiet Supersonic large, long ranged bombing
UCAV. Then toss in things like that Hypersoar that LLNL was doing a
study on and it's anybody's guess as to what we might see. I think
the Air Force figures it has to start *somewhere* though and they know
that at some point the Strike Eagles will have to be replaced and
building an FB-22 along side the F-22 would help them get back some of
those research dollars they invested vs. going with something entirely
new and that's why the FB-22 is even being talked about.

[Scott Ferrin]

On Sat, 17 Apr 2004 13:56:38 -0700, "Tarver Engineering"
> wrote:

>
>"Scott Ferrin" > wrote in message
...
>>
>> >> So? Does that mean the USAF is all of a sudden going to want to start
>> >> buying a derivative of a derivitive of the LOSER in the LWF
>> >> competition instead of a fighter with FAR higher performance (F-15)?
>> >
>> >I expect that now that the F-15 option is off the table
>
>> It's not.
>
>Now Scott, I doubt your history of being wrong about the F-22 for so many
>years

I think you are confusing yourself here. Exactly what was it I was
wrong about? Feel free to quote anything I've said here on the
newsgroups. If you can't find anything to back your claim then shut
your pie hole.

[Scott Ferrin]

The politics of the
>situation have eliminated any reasonable chance of a Super Eagle, which is
>why I joke about F/A-18s for USAF. Within the same City are two very
>different political situations.


It depends on what you consider a "Super Eagle". We'll certainly
never see something along the lines of the F-15XX they were kicking
around ten years ago but an F-15E with an AESA and better engines is
easily doable. The production line isn't shutting down anytime soon
(especially if Singapore decides to go with the Eagle) so it's not
like we wouldn't be able to build them. As far as the USAF *ever*
signing up for "Super"Hornets over Eagles that's something I doubt
Vegas would ever accept bets on.

[Tarver Engineering]

"Scott Ferrin" > wrote in message
...
> On Sat, 17 Apr 2004 17:57:02 -0700, "Tarver Engineering"
> > wrote:
>
> >
> >"Michael Kelly" > wrote in message
> om...
> >> Tarver Engineering wrote:
> >> > Emmanuel would have been correct in what he wrote two years ago, but
the
> >> > bone has lit up.
> >>
> >> Two years ago the Bone was well into its 3rd rotation in support of OEF
> >> and was a very in demand weapons system. 7 BW Bones were routinely
> >> dropping large numbers of JDAM's in support of ANACONDA this time last
> >> year and flew 301 of 301 sorties in support of it, quite impressive.
> >>
> >> You'd have to go back at least five years for the original statement to
> >> be true. In all fairness, the Bone was in the middle of the block D
> >> upgrades and availability on any platform in the middle of an upgrade
> >> program is usually pretty poor.
> >>
> >> > Getting the Bone to work is a major setback for any F/A-22.
> >>
> >>
> >> Hardly, now the FB-22 proposal is a different story, but that has a
> >> shorter range and much smaller weapons load. Add SBD's to the Bone and
> >> you're talking about 96 to almost 200 weapons carried.
> >
> >I don't see a need for additional A/G airborn weapons platforms now that
we
> >are not going to cut up the Bones.
>
> Same problem as always- they aren't going to last forever. If ANY
> weapon system in the pipeline is an indicator, if we started a clean
> sheet replacement for the B-1 it would be decades before we saw
> anything in service.

I don't see another manned bomber being built ever.

> Come to think of it though, ISTR the arguement
> for the FB-22 as being as a follow on to the Strike Eagle. I've only
> heard it mentioned in the same breath as the B-1 once. Even with the
> stretch, an FB-22 wouldn't have the range of a B-1 so I don't think
> it's an apples/apples comparison.

When the Bone was looking at being scrap there was a possible need for
additional bomber fleet, as the B-52 is old. Now that the bone is looking
at bringing back additional aircraft I don't see spending money on more bomb
truck capability as a sound investment.

> Both Northrop and Lockheed have
> kicked around full sized bomber designs in the last four or five years
> though. I think things are so much in flux these days that nobody is
> sure WHAT they want.

X-45 UCAV.

> You see a supercruising bomber design from
> Northrop one day, another from Lockheed a couple years later, then
> back to Northrop with a Quiet Supersonic large, long ranged bombing
> UCAV. Then toss in things like that Hypersoar that LLNL was doing a
> study on and it's anybody's guess as to what we might see. I think
> the Air Force figures it has to start *somewhere* though and they know
> that at some point the Strike Eagles will have to be replaced and
> building an FB-22 along side the F-22 would help them get back some of
> those research dollars they invested vs. going with something entirely
> new and that's why the FB-22 is even being talked about.

I don't see replacing Stike Eagles as a plan at all, as they were an interm
solution while the Bone sucked. Same as the C-130J was designed to manage
risk in case the C-17 program failed to fix their problems.

[Tarver Engineering]

"Scott Ferrin" > wrote in message
...
> On Sat, 17 Apr 2004 13:56:38 -0700, "Tarver Engineering"
> > wrote:
>
> >
> >"Scott Ferrin" > wrote in message
> ...
> >>
> >> >> So? Does that mean the USAF is all of a sudden going to want to
start
> >> >> buying a derivative of a derivitive of the LOSER in the LWF
> >> >> competition instead of a fighter with FAR higher performance (F-15)?
> >> >
> >> >I expect that now that the F-15 option is off the table
> >
> >> It's not.
> >
> >Now Scott, I doubt your history of being wrong about the F-22 for so many
> >years
>
> I think you are confusing yourself here.

Any such "thought" would be projection.

[Scott Ferrin]

>> Same problem as always- they aren't going to last forever. If ANY
>> weapon system in the pipeline is an indicator, if we started a clean
>> sheet replacement for the B-1 it would be decades before we saw
>> anything in service.
>
>I don't see another manned bomber being built ever.

I thought that for a while but I think in the end the comlink to the
UCAVs are never going to be bulletproof and if you make them
completely autonomous you lose too much utility. Not to mention the
likelihood of them ever building a stealthy UCAV big enough to carry a
30k bomb is pretty much zero. "That thing is going to cost HOW much
and it won't even have a man in it???"






>
>> Come to think of it though, ISTR the arguement
>> for the FB-22 as being as a follow on to the Strike Eagle. I've only
>> heard it mentioned in the same breath as the B-1 once. Even with the
>> stretch, an FB-22 wouldn't have the range of a B-1 so I don't think
>> it's an apples/apples comparison.
>
>When the Bone was looking at being scrap there was a possible need for
>additional bomber fleet, as the B-52 is old. Now that the bone is looking
>at bringing back additional aircraft I don't see spending money on more bomb
>truck capability as a sound investment.

This is were we start to see some pork. The USAF doesn't want to
bring many (if any) back out of the boneyard. They feel like using
the funds it would take to bring them back out to upgrade the
*existing* fleet would be a better use of $$$. The politicians are
doing their best to force them to though. We'll have to see how it
pans out. As far as the age thing goes there was a study done in 1999
by the USAF

http://www.xmission.com/~sferrin/Bomber%20Roadmap%201999.pdf

and in it they determined the B-1 will actually crap out structurally
before the B-52. This was done *before* the USAF got all hot about
using the B-1 as an on-call bomb truck so the numbers would be even
more skewed.





>
>> Both Northrop and Lockheed have
>> kicked around full sized bomber designs in the last four or five years
>> though. I think things are so much in flux these days that nobody is
>> sure WHAT they want.
>
>X-45 UCAV.


or X-47? At *best* the X-45C could give you F-117-like ability
provided all it has to do is move the bomb from point A to point B.
If you have to self designate the target forget it. If your link is
jammed forget it. The X-45 in any way shape or form is in NO way a
long-range bomb truck.


>
>> You see a supercruising bomber design from
>> Northrop one day, another from Lockheed a couple years later, then
>> back to Northrop with a Quiet Supersonic large, long ranged bombing
>> UCAV. Then toss in things like that Hypersoar that LLNL was doing a
>> study on and it's anybody's guess as to what we might see. I think
>> the Air Force figures it has to start *somewhere* though and they know
>> that at some point the Strike Eagles will have to be replaced and
>> building an FB-22 along side the F-22 would help them get back some of
>> those research dollars they invested vs. going with something entirely
>> new and that's why the FB-22 is even being talked about.
>
>I don't see replacing Stike Eagles as a plan at all, as they were an interm
>solution while the Bone sucked.

The USAF doesn't share that opinion. As for the Stirke Eagle being an
interim solution to the B-1's troubles you might want to do a little
reading on the subject. Check the dates of the F-15E/F-16XL flyoffs
to those of the B-1. The B-1 was still strictly nuclear when the
majority of the F-15Es were already bought and in service. The two
programs have nothing to do with each other.




> Same as the C-130J was designed to manage
>risk in case the C-17 program failed to fix their problems.

Not even close.

[Scott Ferrin]

On Sat, 17 Apr 2004 21:39:55 -0700, "Tarver Engineering"
> wrote:

>
>"Scott Ferrin" > wrote in message
...
>> On Sat, 17 Apr 2004 13:56:38 -0700, "Tarver Engineering"
>> > wrote:
>>
>> >
>> >"Scott Ferrin" > wrote in message
>> ...
>> >>
>> >> >> So? Does that mean the USAF is all of a sudden going to want to
>start
>> >> >> buying a derivative of a derivitive of the LOSER in the LWF
>> >> >> competition instead of a fighter with FAR higher performance (F-15)?
>> >> >
>> >> >I expect that now that the F-15 option is off the table
>> >
>> >> It's not.
>> >
>> >Now Scott, I doubt your history of being wrong about the F-22 for so many
>> >years
>>
>> I think you are confusing yourself here.
>
>Any such "thought" would be projection.

Just as I thought. No evidence. Nothing to back you up.