Did the Germans have the Norden bombsight?

[Cub Driver]

Reading what appears to be a solid history of FDR and espionage.
Author makes the flat statement that in 1940 someone in the Norden
plant smuggled out the plans, which went to Germany. From these, the
Germans "developed their own bombsight," presumably based on the
Norden. The author points out the irony that at this point we still
wouldn't give Britain the bombsight (we did later).

Any truth to this? What part if any of the Norden sight did the
Germans utilize?

all the best -- Dan Ford
email: (put Cubdriver in subject line)

The Warbird's Forum www.warbirdforum.com
The Piper Cub Forum www.pipercubforum.com
Viva Bush! blog www.vivabush.org

[Dave Eadsforth]

In article >, Cub Driver
> writes
>
>Reading what appears to be a solid history of FDR and espionage.
>Author makes the flat statement that in 1940 someone in the Norden
>plant smuggled out the plans, which went to Germany. From these, the
>Germans "developed their own bombsight," presumably based on the
>Norden. The author points out the irony that at this point we still
>wouldn't give Britain the bombsight (we did later).
>
>Any truth to this? What part if any of the Norden sight did the
>Germans utilize?
>
>all the best -- Dan Ford
>email: (put Cubdriver in subject line)

Probably true - I seem to recall reading about a severe shortage of
pickle barrels in Britain from 1942 until the end of the war...

Cheers,

Dave

--
Dave Eadsforth

[Keith Willshaw]

"Cub Driver" > wrote in message
...
>
> Reading what appears to be a solid history of FDR and espionage.
> Author makes the flat statement that in 1940 someone in the Norden
> plant smuggled out the plans, which went to Germany. From these, the
> Germans "developed their own bombsight," presumably based on the
> Norden. The author points out the irony that at this point we still
> wouldn't give Britain the bombsight (we did later).
>

The Germans did indeed have a complete set of plans
for the Norden bombsight courtesy of the efforts
of an employee named Hermann Lang, a naturalised
German immigrant who worked for Norden in Manhattan

> Any truth to this? What part if any of the Norden sight did the
> Germans utilize?
>

The German Lofte 7 bombsight was developed by people
who had access to the data from Norden and while
not a copy of the Norden design its likely they
learned a lot from it.

As to the US not offering the Nordern to the RAF it was
just as much a factor that the RAF did not consider that
tachometric bombsights such as the Norden, and British
ABS Mk 2 were suitable for night bombing from medium
altitudes. As a result the main BS used bu bomber command
would be the Blackett (MK XIV) which was simpler
and did not require as long a run up as the Norden

Keith

[robert arndt]

> The German Lofte 7 bombsight was developed by people
> who had access to the data from Norden and while
> not a copy of the Norden design its likely they
> learned a lot from it.

http://www.luftarchiv.info/bordgerate/optisch.htm

Lofte 7B-D further down the page.

Rob

[robert arndt]

> As to the US not offering the Nordern to the RAF it was
> just as much a factor that the RAF did not consider that
> tachometric bombsights such as the Norden, and British
> ABS Mk 2 were suitable for night bombing from medium
> altitudes. As a result the main BS used bu bomber command
> would be the Blackett (MK XIV) which was simpler
> and did not require as long a run up as the Norden
>
> Keith

Uh, the Brits DID use the SABS Mk.IIA from 1943 for precision bombing
(in clear weather, of course)!

Rob

[Keith Willshaw]

"robert arndt" > wrote in message
om...
> > As to the US not offering the Nordern to the RAF it was
> > just as much a factor that the RAF did not consider that
> > tachometric bombsights such as the Norden, and British
> > ABS Mk 2 were suitable for night bombing from medium
> > altitudes. As a result the main BS used bu bomber command
> > would be the Blackett (MK XIV) which was simpler
> > and did not require as long a run up as the Norden
> >
> > Keith
>
> Uh, the Brits DID use the SABS Mk.IIA from 1943 for precision bombing
> (in clear weather, of course)!
>
> Rob

The SABS MkII was used in relatively small numbers. At the peak
of its use it was used by only 5 squadrons and in those only 3
aircraft in each were fitted with the SABS. Most were withdrawn
at the end of 1943 and only 617 Squadron was equipped
with the SABS MkIIA IRC

The problem with the SABS was each one was effectively hand made
and the training required to use it effectively was much more intense
than for the MkXIV . ISTR that even the bombardiers of 617 squadron
who were selected from the best available had to have special
coaching to use it effectively. Given the emphasis on area bombing
this was not regarded as justifiable for most units.

Keith

[Keith Willshaw]

"robert arndt" > wrote in message
om...
> > The German Lofte 7 bombsight was developed by people
> > who had access to the data from Norden and while
> > not a copy of the Norden design its likely they
> > learned a lot from it.
>
> http://www.luftarchiv.info/bordgerate/optisch.htm
>
> Lofte 7B-D further down the page.
>
> Rob

Thanks , nice pictures.

Keith

[Jim Herring]

Cub Driver wrote:

> Reading what appears to be a solid history of FDR and espionage.
> Author makes the flat statement that in 1940 someone in the Norden
> plant smuggled out the plans, which went to Germany. From these, the
> Germans "developed their own bombsight," presumably based on the
> Norden. The author points out the irony that at this point we still
> wouldn't give Britain the bombsight (we did later).
>
> Any truth to this? What part if any of the Norden sight did the
> Germans utilize?

The story has been on the history channel. A worker at the Norden plant
stole blueprints and gave them to the Germans. As I recall from the
program, the Germans were able to reproduce the bombsight, but didn't
use it in combat.

--
Jim

carry on

[Jukka O. Kauppinen]

> Any truth to this? What part if any of the Norden sight did the
> Germans utilize?

As already mentioned, they did indeed have Norden plans.

But Germany already had perfectly good bombsights capable of as good
bomb delivery as a Norden. Nothing so spectacular in that one.

For example the Stuvi sights used in Ju-87s and Ju-88s were highly
advanced, computerized sights for their day. They show that building a
advanced and accurate sight was not something that just the British or
Americans were capable of.

jok

[Jim Doyle]

"robert arndt" > wrote in message
om...
> > The German Lofte 7 bombsight was developed by people
> > who had access to the data from Norden and while
> > not a copy of the Norden design its likely they
> > learned a lot from it.
>
> http://www.luftarchiv.info/bordgerate/optisch.htm
>
> Lofte 7B-D further down the page.
>
> Rob

Not being able to read German - could someone please explain the principal
workings of the gunsight in the first diagram? (The two concentric circles
and cross as rear sight, with vane-looking gizmo as foresight - attached to
the MG15).

I'd always wondered about them but never really bothered to find out.

Jim Doyle

[vincent p. norris]

>Probably true - I seem to recall reading about a severe shortage of
>pickle barrels in Britain from 1942 until the end of the war...

You mean Jerry was able to put 50 percent of his bombs within a
thousand feet of the barrels?

vince norris

[Eunometic]

Cub Driver > wrote in message >...
> Reading what appears to be a solid history of FDR and espionage.
> Author makes the flat statement that in 1940 someone in the Norden
> plant smuggled out the plans, which went to Germany. From these, the
> Germans "developed their own bombsight," presumably based on the
> Norden. The author points out the irony that at this point we still
> wouldn't give Britain the bombsight (we did later).

Sounds like ****. If there was spying (I believe there was) it was
not to produce direct copies but to learn of the sites tactical
capabilities. Pretty much standard fair to try and keep abreast of
the other guys abillity.

From 1942 the Germans had the computing wind correcting Lotfe 7
bombsight in general use. It produced a great improvement in accuracy
and the German taste for dive bombing began to wane. It was evaluated
by the RAF and the report on its accuracy suggested that it even be
copied for use by the RAF.

There is no doubt that the germans were quite capable of producing
optics, gyroscopes, servo motors, gears and ball integrators.



>
> Any truth to this? What part if any of the Norden sight did the
> Germans utilize?

None of it.

>
> all the best -- Dan Ford
> email: (put Cubdriver in subject line)
>
> The Warbird's Forum www.warbirdforum.com
> The Piper Cub Forum www.pipercubforum.com
> Viva Bush! blog www.vivabush.org

[Dave Eadsforth]

In article >, vincent p.
norris > writes
>>Probably true - I seem to recall reading about a severe shortage of
>>pickle barrels in Britain from 1942 until the end of the war...
>
>You mean Jerry was able to put 50 percent of his bombs within a
>thousand feet of the barrels?
>
>vince norris

Yes indeed. I seem to remember that MI6 got wind of the German coup and
commandeered every pickle barrel south of Hadrian's wall. Numbers of
these were then placed a calculated distance away from important air
bases, and when the German bombers released their load over the
airfields, the bombs would unaccountably veer off in the direction of
the pile of barrels.

Major reason for the development of the V1 and the V2, I believe...

Cheers,

Dave

--
Dave Eadsforth

[Peter Twydell]

In article >, Dave Eadsforth
> writes
>In article >, vincent p.
>norris > writes
>>>Probably true - I seem to recall reading about a severe shortage of
>>>pickle barrels in Britain from 1942 until the end of the war...
>>
>>You mean Jerry was able to put 50 percent of his bombs within a
>>thousand feet of the barrels?
>>
>>vince norris
>
>Yes indeed. I seem to remember that MI6 got wind of the German coup and
>commandeered every pickle barrel south of Hadrian's wall. Numbers of
>these were then placed a calculated distance away from important air
>bases, and when the German bombers released their load over the
>airfields, the bombs would unaccountably veer off in the direction of
>the pile of barrels.
>
>Major reason for the development of the V1 and the V2, I believe...
>
>Cheers,
>
>Dave
>

Does anybody know where these pickle barrels came from? Were they Lend
Lease? AFAIK we didn't make pickle barrels in the UK at that time, and
I'm not sure if we do now. You can't get the wood, you know (according
to Henry Crun).


Could there have been some linguistic confusion years ago with the WWI
German helmet, the Pickelhaube? Perhaps Billy Mitchell said he wanted to
be able to drop a bomb on a Pickelhaube, and was misquoted.
--
Peter

Ying tong iddle-i po!

[Cub Driver]

>You mean Jerry was able to put 50 percent of his bombs within a
>thousand feet of the barrels?

It would have been only 33 percent, unless he improved on the design.

all the best -- Dan Ford
email: (put Cubdriver in subject line)

The Warbird's Forum www.warbirdforum.com
The Piper Cub Forum www.pipercubforum.com
Viva Bush! blog www.vivabush.org

[Cub Driver]

>I'd always wondered about them but never really bothered to find out.

I think it's like the cost of owning a yacht--if you have to ask, you
can't afford one. (Vincent Astor? Whoever.)

Many things having to do with aviation are so complex, or perhaps are
explained so badly, that my mind goes blank in protest. Bombsights are
one of these. I read a book on the Norden and came away no wiser,
except to marvel: Gosh, how did anyone ever work that out?


all the best -- Dan Ford
email: (put Cubdriver in subject line)

The Warbird's Forum www.warbirdforum.com
The Piper Cub Forum www.pipercubforum.com
Viva Bush! blog www.vivabush.org

[Cub Driver]

>For example the Stuvi sights used in Ju-87s and Ju-88s were highly
>advanced, computerized sights for their day.

Did they ever bomb from 25,000 feet?

Or perhaps it would be fairer to say 20,000 feet, since that was the
USAAC boast involving the pickle barrel.

From what I have read of Japanese raids, 13,000 feet (4,000 meters)
was the most common bomb-run altitude. I should think that when you
increase the altitude by 50 percent (or 100 percent, in the case of
the actual B-17 raids over Germany) you increase the difficulty many
times over.

all the best -- Dan Ford
email: (put Cubdriver in subject line)

The Warbird's Forum www.warbirdforum.com
The Piper Cub Forum www.pipercubforum.com
Viva Bush! blog www.vivabush.org

[Jim Doyle]

"Cub Driver" > wrote in message
...
>
> >I'd always wondered about them but never really bothered to find out.
>
> I think it's like the cost of owning a yacht--if you have to ask, you
> can't afford one. (Vincent Astor? Whoever.)
>
> Many things having to do with aviation are so complex, or perhaps are
> explained so badly, that my mind goes blank in protest. Bombsights are
> one of these. I read a book on the Norden and came away no wiser,
> except to marvel: Gosh, how did anyone ever work that out?
>

Oh yes, I'm with you on that. Sadly I know that - 'Er... what the
hell...?!' - feeling all too well.

>
> all the best -- Dan Ford
> email: (put Cubdriver in subject line)
>
> The Warbird's Forum www.warbirdforum.com
> The Piper Cub Forum www.pipercubforum.com
> Viva Bush! blog www.vivabush.org

[Dave Eadsforth]

In article >, Peter Twydell
> writes
>In article >, Dave Eadsforth
> writes
>>In article >, vincent p.
>>norris > writes
>>>>Probably true - I seem to recall reading about a severe shortage of
>>>>pickle barrels in Britain from 1942 until the end of the war...
>>>
>>>You mean Jerry was able to put 50 percent of his bombs within a
>>>thousand feet of the barrels?
>>>
>>>vince norris
>>
>>Yes indeed. I seem to remember that MI6 got wind of the German coup and
>>commandeered every pickle barrel south of Hadrian's wall. Numbers of
>>these were then placed a calculated distance away from important air
>>bases, and when the German bombers released their load over the
>>airfields, the bombs would unaccountably veer off in the direction of
>>the pile of barrels.
>>
>>Major reason for the development of the V1 and the V2, I believe...
>>
>>Cheers,
>>
>>Dave
>>
>
>Does anybody know where these pickle barrels came from? Were they Lend
>Lease? AFAIK we didn't make pickle barrels in the UK at that time,

We did, but it was a well-kept secret. If the Germans had got to know
even which towns had factories, the factories would have been bombed -
very accurately...

> and
>I'm not sure if we do now. You can't get the wood, you know (according
>to Henry Crun).
>
>
>Could there have been some linguistic confusion years ago with the WWI
>German helmet, the Pickelhaube? Perhaps Billy Mitchell said he wanted to
>be able to drop a bomb on a Pickelhaube, and was misquoted.

Possibly misheard - if he happened to be munching a gherkin at the
time...

Cheers,

Dave

--
Dave Eadsforth

[Krztalizer]

>
>Does anybody know where these pickle barrels came from? Were they Lend
>Lease? AFAIK we didn't make pickle barrels in the UK at that time, and
>I'm not sure if we do now. You can't get the wood, you know

Of course, the Mosquito figured into all of this. Pickle barrels had been
coopered in the UK for many dozens of years in the run up to the "disagreement
among cousins" (as Goebbels described the conflict between Britain and
Germany). During that rather spirited disagreement, the de Havilland company
created the aerial equivelent of a grand piano in its DH 98, and this new
wooden wonder required every barrel shaper, clog carver, and cabinet finisher
in the realm to bend their oars in production of the Mosquito.

But what of the pickle barrel? Production in the UK ceased abruptly with the
first order to DH - an immediate vaccum was created, a wartime critical
shortage in pickle barrels. Just another damned inconvenience of the war.
Even with the required coupons, there was simply no guarantee a proper pickle
barrel could be found.

Well, you all are familiar with the story by now. While touring the great
pickel barrel factories that once lined the Mississippi, Japanese
future-Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto could only marvel at America's pickle barrel
production capability. "We're doomed", he muttered. (In Japanese, of course.)
Later he was able to use his acquired knowledge - one captured JN 25 message,
decoded in the days prior to Pearl Harbor, included the exact locations of each
of the pickle barrels on board the Oklahoma and the Arizona - only luck and a
Seaman named Mojo Nixon kept the Nevada from suffering a similar fate; he is
widely credited with having moved the Nevada's pickle barrel to the dock
alongside the battleship, so he could polish it on the early morning of
December 7th, 19 Fo-tee-won. Tragically... well.. you know.

All of this is pickle barrel history, known by most school children.

The mystery of the English wartime pickle barrels is solved by checking the
makers mark on the bottom of one of the few wartime survivors - on the Imperial
War Museum's pickle barrel, "Old Smellysides", all of the coopers signed their
names as it was the 5,000th pickle barrel to roll off the production line at
the Cape Girardeau plant. That makers mark, faded by decades of service and
overpolishing, is clearly the mark of Henry Ford. Perhaps most famous for his
innovation in pickle barrel production, he earned the nickname 'the American
Coopernicus'.

Yes, of course they were lend-lease. What a ridiculous thing to say.

v/r
Gordon
<====(A+C====>
USN SAR

An LZ is a place you want to land, not stay.

[Tamas Feher]

>There is no doubt that the germans were quite
>capable of producing optics

What's more:
I wonder if anybody can match the Carl Zeiss, Jena plant?

[Laurence Doering]

On Wed, 28 Apr 2004 23:52:59 +0100, Jim Doyle > wrote:
>
> "robert arndt" > wrote in message
> om...
>> > The German Lofte 7 bombsight was developed by people
>> > who had access to the data from Norden and while
>> > not a copy of the Norden design its likely they
>> > learned a lot from it.
>>
>> http://www.luftarchiv.info/bordgerate/optisch.htm
>
> Not being able to read German - could someone please explain the principal
> workings of the gunsight in the first diagram? (The two concentric circles
> and cross as rear sight, with vane-looking gizmo as foresight - attached to
> the MG15).

The caption for the illustrations doesn't say anything about how the sight
is supposed to work. My translation of the caption is:

Left: Example sight picture for the flexible-mount aircraft machine
gun with wind vane bead and ring sight. Right: Flexible-mount MG15
with wind vane bead and ring sight.

The caption above the illustrations just says "Sighting devices for
on-board weapons."

I dunno -- I guess the front bead is supposed to move around the
pivot attached to the gun barrel according to the relative wind.
Maybe it's supposed to help the gunner compensate for windage when
shooting to either side? I assume the whole assembly would be aligned
with the gun barrel when aiming directly forward or aft.


ljd

[Dave Eadsforth]

In article >, Krztalizer
> writes
>>
>>Does anybody know where these pickle barrels came from? Were they Lend
>>Lease? AFAIK we didn't make pickle barrels in the UK at that time, and
>>I'm not sure if we do now. You can't get the wood, you know
>
>Of course, the Mosquito figured into all of this. Pickle barrels had been
>coopered in the UK for many dozens of years in the run up to the "disagreement
>among cousins" (as Goebbels described the conflict between Britain and
>Germany). During that rather spirited disagreement, the de Havilland company
>created the aerial equivelent of a grand piano in its DH 98, and this new
>wooden wonder required every barrel shaper, clog carver, and cabinet finisher
>in the realm to bend their oars in production of the Mosquito.
>
>But what of the pickle barrel? Production in the UK ceased abruptly with the
>first order to DH - an immediate vaccum was created, a wartime critical
>shortage in pickle barrels. Just another damned inconvenience of the war.
>Even with the required coupons, there was simply no guarantee a proper pickle
>barrel could be found.

The song 'Roll out the barrel' was thought by many researchers to be a
metaphor for the Great Lamentations that took place in the traditional
pickle barrel making towns of Lancashire throughout 1941.
>
>Well, you all are familiar with the story by now. While touring the great
>pickel barrel factories that once lined the Mississippi, Japanese
>future-Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto could only marvel at America's pickle barrel
>production capability. "We're doomed", he muttered. (In Japanese, of course.)
>Later he was able to use his acquired knowledge - one captured JN 25 message,
>decoded in the days prior to Pearl Harbor, included the exact locations of each
>of the pickle barrels on board the Oklahoma and the Arizona - only luck and a
>Seaman named Mojo Nixon kept the Nevada from suffering a similar fate; he is
>widely credited with having moved the Nevada's pickle barrel to the dock
>alongside the battleship, so he could polish it on the early morning of
>December 7th, 19 Fo-tee-won. Tragically... well.. you know.
>
>All of this is pickle barrel history, known by most school children.

But not as well documented as it should be. I suggest you undertake a
short monograph on the subject - perhaps Robert Bailey could do the
illustrations? 'Two Minutes to Tea Break' could show a team of barrel
makers clock-watching...
>
>The mystery of the English wartime pickle barrels is solved by checking the
>makers mark on the bottom of one of the few wartime survivors - on the Imperial
>War Museum's pickle barrel, "Old Smellysides", all of the coopers signed their
>names as it was the 5,000th pickle barrel to roll off the production line at
>the Cape Girardeau plant. That makers mark, faded by decades of service and
>overpolishing, is clearly the mark of Henry Ford. Perhaps most famous for his
>innovation in pickle barrel production, he earned the nickname 'the American
>Coopernicus'.

Ouch!
>
>Yes, of course they were lend-lease. What a ridiculous thing to say.

No, not all - a point of clarification is required here. It is not
generally known that of the ten percent of conscripts who were diverted
to the coal mines by Earnest Bevin, a full five percent of these were in
turn diverted to the pickle barrel shadow factories. The lend-lease
barrels did of course far outnumber domestic production, the only issues
being the difficulty in cannibalising parts so that the Civilian Repair
Organisation could rebuild damaged ones. (The difference between the US
inch and the English inch made stave interchangeability difficult at
times.) And again, English hand-made vs US machine produced brought the
usual debates about whether the English staves exhibited a proper
hyperbolic profile...
>
>v/r
>Gordon
><====(A+C====>
> USN SAR
>
>An LZ is a place you want to land, not stay.
>
Cheers,

Dave

--
Dave Eadsforth

[Peter Twydell]

In article >, Krztalizer
> writes
>>
>>Does anybody know where these pickle barrels came from? Were they Lend
>>Lease? AFAIK we didn't make pickle barrels in the UK at that time, and
>>I'm not sure if we do now. You can't get the wood, you know
>
>Of course, the Mosquito figured into all of this. Pickle barrels had been
>coopered in the UK for many dozens of years in the run up to the "disagreement
>among cousins" (as Goebbels described the conflict between Britain and
>Germany). During that rather spirited disagreement, the de Havilland company
>created the aerial equivelent of a grand piano in its DH 98, and this new
>wooden wonder required every barrel shaper, clog carver, and cabinet finisher
>in the realm to bend their oars in production of the Mosquito.
>

What a load of balsa.

The aeronautical connection nearly ended in Bristol in the twenties. See
http://www.pfabristol.flyer.co.uk/december02.htm and look at the Type
72. If that's not a barrel, I'd like to know what is.

>But what of the pickle barrel? Production in the UK ceased abruptly with the
>first order to DH - an immediate vaccum was created, a wartime critical
>shortage in pickle barrels. Just another damned inconvenience of the war.
>Even with the required coupons, there was simply no guarantee a proper pickle
>barrel could be found.
>

Barnes Wallis came up with the Grand Slam, his Ten Tun Bomb, which was
described at the time as "firkin enormous".

>Well, you all are familiar with the story by now. While touring the great
>pickel barrel factories that once lined the Mississippi, Japanese
>future-Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto could only marvel at America's pickle barrel
>production capability. "We're doomed", he muttered. (In Japanese, of course.)
>Later he was able to use his acquired knowledge - one captured JN 25 message,
>decoded in the days prior to Pearl Harbor, included the exact locations of each
>of the pickle barrels on board the Oklahoma and the Arizona - only luck and a
>Seaman named Mojo Nixon kept the Nevada from suffering a similar fate; he is
>widely credited with having moved the Nevada's pickle barrel to the dock
>alongside the battleship, so he could polish it on the early morning of
>December 7th, 19 Fo-tee-won. Tragically... well.. you know.
>
>All of this is pickle barrel history, known by most school children.
>
This wasn't taught at my school, unfortunately, at least not to me. I
gave up History and Latin to concentrate on the techy stuff.

>The mystery of the English wartime pickle barrels is solved by checking the
>makers mark on the bottom of one of the few wartime survivors - on the Imperial
>War Museum's pickle barrel, "Old Smellysides", all of the coopers signed their
>names as it was the 5,000th pickle barrel to roll off the production line at
>the Cape Girardeau plant. That makers mark, faded by decades of service and
>overpolishing, is clearly the mark of Henry Ford. Perhaps most famous for his
>innovation in pickle barrel production, he earned the nickname 'the American
>Coopernicus'.
>
>Yes, of course they were lend-lease. What a ridiculous thing to say.
>
I was only trying to find out.

I suspect you're trying to make me the butt of your humour. Bloody rude
colonial. :-)

>v/r
>Gordon
><====(A+C====>
> USN SAR
>
>An LZ is a place you want to land, not stay.
>

--
Peter

Ying tong iddle-i po!

[Krztalizer]

>>All of this is pickle barrel history, known by most school children.
>
>But not as well documented as it should be. I suggest you undertake a
>short monograph on the subject -

As with most such projects on RAM, I suggest we discuss it to death and refuse
to budge an inch in our respective opinions, ultimately relying on name calling
and political skewering. Deal?

>>Yes, of course they were lend-lease. What a ridiculous thing to say.
>
>No, not all - a point of clarification is required here. It is not
>generally known that of the ten percent of conscripts who were diverted
>to the coal mines by Earnest Bevin, a full five percent of these were in
>turn diverted to the pickle barrel shadow factories. The lend-lease
>barrels did of course far outnumber domestic production, the only issues
>being the difficulty in cannibalising parts so that the Civilian Repair
>Organisation could rebuild damaged ones. (The difference between the US
>inch and the English inch made stave interchangeability difficult at
>times.) And again, English hand-made vs US machine produced brought the
>usual debates about whether the English staves exhibited a proper
>hyperbolic profile...

The later, streamlined US versions just never really took off. Sad, that.

G

[Krztalizer]

> this new
>>wooden wonder required every barrel shaper, clog carver, and cabinet
>finisher
>>in the realm to bend their oars in production of the Mosquito.
>>
>
>What a load of balsa.

Precisely.

>The aeronautical connection nearly ended in Bristol in the twenties. See
>http://www.pfabristol.flyer.co.uk/december02.htm and look at the Type
>72. If that's not a barrel, I'd like to know what is.

Looks like a GB built by the hand-crafting gents over at Jaguar...

>>But what of the pickle barrel? Production in the UK ceased abruptly with the
>>first order to DH - an immediate vaccum was created, a wartime critical
>>shortage in pickle barrels. Just another damned inconvenience of the war.
>>Even with the required coupons, there was simply no guarantee a proper
>pickle
>>barrel could be found.
>>
>
>Barnes Wallis came up with the Grand Slam, his Ten Tun Bomb, which was
>described at the time as "firkin enormous".

Thread drift alert! You have now begun the process of leading us off on a
'metal cylinder of unusually great size, packed with explosives' thread...

>>Well, you all are familiar with the story by now. While touring the great
>>pickel barrel factories that once lined the Mississippi, Japanese
>>future-Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto could only marvel at America's pickle barrel
>>production capability. "We're doomed", he muttered. (In Japanese, of
>course.)
>>Later he was able to use his acquired knowledge - one captured JN 25
>message,
>>decoded in the days prior to Pearl Harbor, included the exact locations of
>each
>>of the pickle barrels on board the Oklahoma and the Arizona - only luck and
>a
>>Seaman named Mojo Nixon kept the Nevada from suffering a similar fate; he is
>>widely credited with having moved the Nevada's pickle barrel to the dock
>>alongside the battleship, so he could polish it on the early morning of
>>December 7th, 19 Fo-tee-won. Tragically... well.. you know.
>>
>>All of this is pickle barrel history, known by most school children.
>>
>This wasn't taught at my school, unfortunately, at least not to me. I
>gave up History and Latin to concentrate on the techy stuff.

I had a classic American education - the word "Latin" was mention on three
occasions during the twelve years I irregularly attended class.

>>Yes, of course they were lend-lease. What a ridiculous thing to say.
>>
>I was only trying to find out.
>
>I suspect you're trying to make me the butt of your humour.

Never, sir. I reserve my butt-making humor for Michael and his Moon Landing
Hoax posts.

>Bloody rude colonial. :-)

Redundant, sir. :)

G

[Dave Eadsforth]

In article >, Krztalizer
> writes
>>>All of this is pickle barrel history, known by most school children.
>>
>>But not as well documented as it should be. I suggest you undertake a
>>short monograph on the subject -
>
>As with most such projects on RAM, I suggest we discuss it to death and refuse
>to budge an inch in our respective opinions, ultimately relying on name calling
>and political skewering. Deal?
>
Is that what happens on RAM? I must have missed this. I can't think of
a single example of rudeness or obtuseness - all I ever read seems to me
to be mature opinions offered after considerable thought, presented in a
humble manner, and in a spirit of generosity.

Whoops - there goes my alarm - time to take my Prozak.

Byeeee!


--
Dave Eadsforth

[WalterM140]

>Does anybody know where these pickle barrels came from? Were they Lend
>Lease?

No, they were exclusively used by the USAAF.

"The target for the Eighth on 4 April was the Renault plant near Paris. Three
diversions drew the German defenders away and permitted the lead 305th Bomb
Group to destroy the complex; 498 out of 500 bombs fell within the target
area."

--"JG 26; Top Guns of the Luftwaffe" p. 156 by Donald L. Caldwell

Walt

[Eunometic]

"Tamas Feher" > wrote in message >...
> >There is no doubt that the germans were quite
> >capable of producing optics
>
> What's more:
> I wonder if anybody can match the Carl Zeiss, Jena plant?

Carl Zeis certaibly had outstandingly precise optics: most of the post
war night vision devices used by both sides of the cold war was based
on their work and patents.

Having the plans for an advanced bombsight means nothing unless you
have the expertise to machine, assemble and calibrate the fine devices
required. Without this the plans are useless.

[Eunometic]

"Jukka O. Kauppinen" > wrote in message >...
> > Any truth to this? What part if any of the Norden sight did the
> > Germans utilize?
>
> As already mentioned, they did indeed have Norden plans.
>
> But Germany already had perfectly good bombsights capable of as good
> bomb delivery as a Norden. Nothing so spectacular in that one.
>
> For example the Stuvi sights used in Ju-87s and Ju-88s were highly
> advanced, computerized sights for their day. They show that building a
> advanced and accurate sight was not something that just the British or
> Americans were capable of.

I believe many if not most of the Ju88s supplied to Finland were
supplied with the Lofte 7 wind correcting computing bombsight.

Most of the myth of the Norden is based around propaganda. The public
of the day like to think that the Americans had a secret weapon while
it also improved troop moral and perhaps conveyed the impression that
cities were not being flatend by high altitude bombing collateral
damage. Maintaining moral around superior weapons is pretty important
and once this myth was started no one was going to stop it.

Really the Norden was not that advanced. It wasn't supplied to the
British not becuase it was too secret but simply because it was in
short supply up untill 1943. It had many deficiencies: it couldn't be
used in a slide bombing attack like the later British sights and
deficiencies in the wide angle optics and speed of tracking made it
useless at low altitudes.

Using ordinary bomb sights reasonably good accuracy could be achieved
at up to 5000 feet.

Sights like the Norden which compensated for wind drift seemed to give
good results from up to 10000 feet.

Various degrees of 'automation' could be introduced.

1 Gyro stabalising the aim point to help the bombadier during run up
while the aircraft was being jostelled and manoevered.

2 Continiously computing the aim point on the basis of aircraft
manoevers and speed changes. (Essentaily the what the Stuvi did I
suspect)

3 Providing a target tracking system that attempted to track the
target on the basis of airspeed and altitude above ground. By then
providing servo motors adjusted by the bombadier or pilot to adjust
for the drift from the target the wind drift rate could be calculated
by integration on a ball integrator and the correction applied to the
continously computed aim point.

4 Corrective manoevers would then be applied either by the bombadier
by signaling with a paddle to the pilot or direct via the autopilot.
(I think Art Kramer mentions that the manual method was mostly used)



>
> jok

[vincent p. norris]

>"The target for the Eighth on 4 April was the Renault plant near Paris. Three
>diversions drew the German defenders away and permitted the lead 305th Bomb
>Group to destroy the complex; 498 out of 500 bombs fell within the target
>area."

The target area was "France," right?

vince norris

[WalterM140]

>>"The target for the Eighth on 4 April was the Renault plant near Paris.
>Three
>>diversions drew the German defenders away and permitted the lead 305th Bomb
>>Group to destroy the complex; 498 out of 500 bombs fell within the target
>>area."

>The target area was "France," right?

No.

"The first mission of April brought more evidence of the value of the
bombardment campaign when Fortresses left the Renault works at Paris a smoking
ruin; It took six months to resume full production, denying the enemy 3,075
lorries...the target was picked out in spite of industrial haze that shrouded
much of the city...bombs of the 305th Fortresses struck at least 19 factory
buildings..."

--"The Mighty Eighth" by Roger Freeman

Walt

[Peter Stickney]

In article >,
Peter Twydell > writes:
> In article >, Krztalizer
> > writes
>>>
>>>Does anybody know where these pickle barrels came from? Were they Lend
>>>Lease? AFAIK we didn't make pickle barrels in the UK at that time, and
>>>I'm not sure if we do now. You can't get the wood, you know
>>
>>Of course, the Mosquito figured into all of this. Pickle barrels had been
>>coopered in the UK for many dozens of years in the run up to the "disagreement
>>among cousins" (as Goebbels described the conflict between Britain and
>>Germany). During that rather spirited disagreement, the de Havilland company
>>created the aerial equivelent of a grand piano in its DH 98, and this new
>>wooden wonder required every barrel shaper, clog carver, and cabinet finisher
>>in the realm to bend their oars in production of the Mosquito.
>>
>
> What a load of balsa.
>
> The aeronautical connection nearly ended in Bristol in the twenties. See
> http://www.pfabristol.flyer.co.uk/december02.htm and look at the Type
> 72. If that's not a barrel, I'd like to know what is.

However, Britain did fall behind in the Flying Pickle Barrel Race,
losing the initiative firt to Stipa in Italy
http://naca.central.cranfield.ac.uk/report.php?NID=1156

And then the Granville Brothers in the U.S.

This lack of British Progrss in Flying Barrels forced them to acquire
Brewster 339 Buffalos to redress the balance.

>
>>But what of the pickle barrel? Production in the UK ceased abruptly with the
>>first order to DH - an immediate vaccum was created, a wartime critical
>>shortage in pickle barrels. Just another damned inconvenience of the war.
>>Even with the required coupons, there was simply no guarantee a proper pickle
>>barrel could be found.
>>
>
> Barnes Wallis came up with the Grand Slam, his Ten Tun Bomb, which was
> described at the time as "firkin enormous".
>
>>Well, you all are familiar with the story by now. While touring the great
>>pickel barrel factories that once lined the Mississippi, Japanese
>>future-Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto could only marvel at America's pickle barrel
>>production capability. "We're doomed", he muttered. (In Japanese, of
>>course.)

Or Boston-accented English. Back Bay, of course (He did go to
Hahvahd, after all)


>>Later he was able to use his acquired knowledge - one captured JN 25 message,
>>decoded in the days prior to Pearl Harbor, included the exact locations of each
>>of the pickle barrels on board the Oklahoma and the Arizona - only luck and a
>>Seaman named Mojo Nixon kept the Nevada from suffering a similar fate; he is
>>widely credited with having moved the Nevada's pickle barrel to the dock
>>alongside the battleship, so he could polish it on the early morning of
>>December 7th, 19 Fo-tee-won. Tragically... well.. you know.

This devious acquisition of knowledge of American Pickle Barrel
construction methods probably accounts for the poor showing of
Brewster's Flying Barrels against the Japanese, in relation to their
performance in Finland.

>>
>>All of this is pickle barrel history, known by most school children.
>>
> This wasn't taught at my school, unfortunately, at least not to me. I
> gave up History and Latin to concentrate on the techy stuff.
>
>>The mystery of the English wartime pickle barrels is solved by checking the
>>makers mark on the bottom of one of the few wartime survivors - on the Imperial
>>War Museum's pickle barrel, "Old Smellysides", all of the coopers signed their
>>names as it was the 5,000th pickle barrel to roll off the production line at
>>the Cape Girardeau plant. That makers mark, faded by decades of service and
>>overpolishing, is clearly the mark of Henry Ford. Perhaps most famous for his
>>innovation in pickle barrel production, he earned the nickname 'the American
>>Coopernicus'.

And demonstrated the shortfall of British Mass Coopsrage
methods. (Spokeshaves vs. pen-knives, Hot Coffee in the Cafeteria, 28
flavors of Ice Cream in the Restaurant...)

> I suspect you're trying to make me the butt of your humour. Bloody rude
> colonial. :-)

Are you trying to make us look like Hog's Heads?

--
Pete Stickney
A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many
bad measures. -- Daniel Webster

[Eunometic]

Cub Driver > wrote in message >...
> >For example the Stuvi sights used in Ju-87s and Ju-88s were highly
> >advanced, computerized sights for their day.
>
> Did they ever bomb from 25,000 feet?

A few Arado 234B Jet bombers made attacks from 10,000 meters using the
Lotfe 7E conected aircraft conected to the Patin autopilot.

Ju 86P with diesels attacked from about 50,000 feet. I don't know if
they used the Lotfe 7.

There were a few specialised Do 217s with a 3rd engine in the
fueselage for engine pressurisingation that could attack from this
altitude and with a small bombload.

The only other aircraft that would be capable of this would be the Ju
388 with the BMW801T (turbo supercharged and intercooled ) version of
the famous engine.

I believe about 300 were built but these were mainly the reconaisance
versions though they may have had a secondary bombing capability.
Interesting aircraft. It had a remotely sighted tail turret. A an
ofset duel periscope with heads in both the ventral and dorsal
position allowed the rear gunner to sweep the upper and lower
hemisphere, avoid the obstruction of the tail and aim the guns.

The Ju 388 nightfiughter variant was meant to tackle B29s attacking at
night so there is no doubt it could opperate at a good speed and
height.

Basically Germany, just like the Russians did not have a strategic
bomber force. By the time the He 177A5 had overcome its considerable
teething problems there wasn't the fuel or escorts to opperate it.

Even Ju88s with a deepened belly for carrying all its bombs internally
which had a maned tail turret never got of the ground. There simply
weren't the resources to change the production lines.

>
> Or perhaps it would be fairer to say 20,000 feet, since that was the
> USAAC boast involving the pickle barrel.

Attacks from 20,000 feet seem to have been unimpressive. CEPs of 1000
ft were typical.

Accuracy must decrease with the square or cube of altitude.


>
> From what I have read of Japanese raids, 13,000 feet (4,000 meters)
> was the most common bomb-run altitude. I should think that when you
> increase the altitude by 50 percent (or 100 percent, in the case of
> the actual B-17 raids over Germany) you increase the difficulty many
> times over.

Art Kramer seems to imply that most of their B26 raids were
8,000-10,000 feet. That would be becuase they actualy had to hit
their targets eg bridges rather than do area bombardment.

I think there would be no way to hit a bridge or even a railway yard
from the height of 20,000 feet.

Whereas an attack at 8000 ft with a stick of bombs would be bound to
straddle and hit the target: bridge, docked ship, wharf, railway yard.

There is some data on the use of the USAAFs azon and razon guided
bombs on the net. Hit rates on brideges I think whent from about 0.5%
using unguided bombs to about 15%-24% using these bombs from
liberators opperating at what would probably be 20,000 feet.

The fact that LeMay went from using B29s at 25,000-30,000 feet to 8000
feet is an indication of the lack of accuracy. Small errors are
opened up to huge error and no wind computing sight can compensate for
multiple layers of wind.

I think using a densely sequenced stick of bombs against long target
like ships bridges however worked fairly well.

>
> all the best -- Dan Ford
> email: (put Cubdriver in subject line)
>
> The Warbird's Forum www.warbirdforum.com
> The Piper Cub Forum www.pipercubforum.com
> Viva Bush! blog www.vivabush.org

[Chris Mark]

>"The first mission of April brought more evidence of the value of the
>bombardment campaign when Fortresses left the Renault works at Paris a
>smoking
>ruin; It took six months to resume full production, denying the enemy 3,075
>lorries...the target was picked out in spite of industrial haze that
>shrouded
>much of the city...bombs of the 305th Fortresses struck at least 19 factory
>buildings..."

As luck would have it, I have a report on the destruction of the French
automobile industry dated 1 Nov. 1944 that reviews the effects of bombing
attacks. It states that the industry was essentially destroyed by May of that
year.
"The works completely or partially destroyed by American bombing comprise
Goodrich, Dunlop and Michelin tire factories, Renault, Ford, Berliet, SKF and
SRO ball bearing works, Standard Oil Co.'s refineries, Castrol oil works,
Potez, Farman, Salmson, Caudron and Gnome & Rhone aircraft factories. Peugeot
was bombed by the English and the foundry wiped out. Citroen was attacked by
the Germans in June, 1940, the fires then started destroying documents but
leaving the main works intact."
Long discussion of the Comite' de l'Organization de l'Automobile, an
organization set up by the Germans to manage French production. Long
discussion of Francois Lehideux, Renault exec who became head of the COA and
was also Minister of Industrial Production, arrested after liberation as a
traitor, along with executives of a number of other auto and tire companies.
Long discussion of extensive and determined German/French quisling efforts to
maximize production.
"Despite these efforts, as a result of US bombing, production declined until by
the spring of 1944 the industrial life of France had practically ceased to
exist.,,,Citroen shut down on May 12, Renault one day later. The French Fiat
company shut down the same day. Peugeot switched to night production because
of electricty shortages, but the workers went on strike to protest night
work.... As a general rule there was no production after the first week of May,
1944...
"Citroen hands were sent to clear up the wreckage of the railway line at
Juvisy, bombed by the RAF. It was well known that the men did little work and
a lot of pillaging....
"There were two attacks on the Goodrich factory at Colombes near Paris. In the
second attack, the place was wiped out, without the loss of life. The Gnome
and Rhone plant close by was attacked at the same time but here more than 600
people were killed owing to lack of shelters and an order that hands should
scatter to the fields. When the Dunlop plant at Montlucon was brought down
only 4 people were killed....
The Renault facilities were considerably destroyed as the result of four
attacks that caused little loss of life..."
Vehicle production figures:
1941 = 56,743
1942 = 44,792
1943 = 20,960
1944 (first six months) =2,512
At the beginning of 1940 France had a total vehicle population of 2.6 million.
As of mid-1944 the population was 620,000.
This is a very long and detailed document, and quite interesting, with details
of Gestapo men assigned to plants, working hours 4 a.m. to 8 p.m. with a
breakfast of malt beverage, lunch of vegetable soup, dinner of vegetable soup,
the requisitioning of bicycles by "rule of Mauser," German officers driving
around in Packard and Buick cars...all sorts of interesting details of life in
occupied industrial France under air attack.
The author is anonymous but is describe as "an experience automotive specialist
who has spent the greater part of his life in France," and writes from
"personal observation and first-hand knowledge."




Chris Mark

[Krztalizer]

>
>Ju 86P with diesels attacked from about 50,000 feet. I don't know if
>they used the Lotfe 7.

"Attacked"? I always thought the 45K+ missions were flown by cameras-only Ju
86s.

>I think there would be no way to hit a bridge or even a railway yard
>from the height of 20,000 feet.

Yards can be a mile long and half mile wide. You could hit that from space.



>The fact that LeMay went from using B29s at 25,000-30,000 feet to 8000
>feet is an indication of the lack of accuracy. Small errors are
>opened up to huge error and no wind computing sight can compensate for
>multiple layers of wind.

Realize also that those B-29s were dropping a far larger percentage of
relatively light fire bombs, in comparison to the 8th's general preference for
GP and HE. Those little bombs scatter in the wind in comparison to a good old
fashioned 500 pounder.

>I think using a densely sequenced stick of bombs against long target
>like ships bridges however worked fairly well.

Against moored ships, yes, against ships at sea, far less so. Midway results
are a good example.

v/r
Gordon
<====(A+C====>
USN SAR

An LZ is a place you want to land, not stay.

[Keith Willshaw]

"WalterM140" > wrote in message
...
> >>"The target for the Eighth on 4 April was the Renault plant near Paris.
> >Three
> >>diversions drew the German defenders away and permitted the lead 305th
Bomb
> >>Group to destroy the complex; 498 out of 500 bombs fell within the
target
> >>area."
>
> >The target area was "France," right?
>
> No.
>
> "The first mission of April brought more evidence of the value of the
> bombardment campaign when Fortresses left the Renault works at Paris a
smoking
> ruin; It took six months to resume full production, denying the enemy
3,075
> lorries...the target was picked out in spite of industrial haze that
shrouded
> much of the city...bombs of the 305th Fortresses struck at least 19
factory
> buildings..."
>
> --"The Mighty Eighth" by Roger Freeman
>
> Walt

From www.renault.com

Unlike other manufacturers who worked for the enemy by day and the
Resistance at night, the Renault management did not ask the Allies to bomb
their factories, as Peugeot did. So Louis Renault did not understand why
Billancourt was the prime target of RAF bombers in March 1942 and on several
subsequent occasions.

Fact is the factory was repeatedly attacked and the most damaging raid
of them was that by the RAF in March 1942 which destroyed 40% of the
factory

Keith

[Peter Twydell]

In article >, Krztalizer
> writes
>> this new
>>>wooden wonder required every barrel shaper, clog carver, and cabinet
>>finisher
>>>in the realm to bend their oars in production of the Mosquito.
>>>
>>
>>What a load of balsa.
>
>Precisely.
>
>>The aeronautical connection nearly ended in Bristol in the twenties. See
>>http://www.pfabristol.flyer.co.uk/december02.htm and look at the Type
>>72. If that's not a barrel, I'd like to know what is.
>
>Looks like a GB built by the hand-crafting gents over at Jaguar...
>
>>>But what of the pickle barrel? Production in the UK ceased abruptly with the
>>>first order to DH - an immediate vaccum was created, a wartime critical
>>>shortage in pickle barrels. Just another damned inconvenience of the war.
>>>Even with the required coupons, there was simply no guarantee a proper
>>pickle
>>>barrel could be found.
>>>
>>
>>Barnes Wallis came up with the Grand Slam, his Ten Tun Bomb, which was
>>described at the time as "firkin enormous".
>
>Thread drift alert! You have now begun the process of leading us off on a
>'metal cylinder of unusually great size, packed with explosives' thread...
>

Not at all: Tuns is barrels, Firkins is barrels, and Butts is barrels,
but Cylinders is drums, so _that's_ OT!

(pedantic note: it was Upkeep, the dams weapon, that was cylindrical)

>>>Well, you all are familiar with the story by now. While touring the great
>>>pickel barrel factories that once lined the Mississippi, Japanese
>>>future-Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto could only marvel at America's pickle barrel
>>>production capability. "We're doomed", he muttered. (In Japanese, of
>>course.)
>>>Later he was able to use his acquired knowledge - one captured JN 25
>>message,
>>>decoded in the days prior to Pearl Harbor, included the exact locations of
>>each
>>>of the pickle barrels on board the Oklahoma and the Arizona - only luck and
>>a
>>>Seaman named Mojo Nixon kept the Nevada from suffering a similar fate; he is
>>>widely credited with having moved the Nevada's pickle barrel to the dock
>>>alongside the battleship, so he could polish it on the early morning of
>>>December 7th, 19 Fo-tee-won. Tragically... well.. you know.
>>>
>>>All of this is pickle barrel history, known by most school children.
>>>
>>This wasn't taught at my school, unfortunately, at least not to me. I
>>gave up History and Latin to concentrate on the techy stuff.
>
>I had a classic American education - the word "Latin" was mention on three
>occasions during the twelve years I irregularly attended class.
>
>>>Yes, of course they were lend-lease. What a ridiculous thing to say.
>>>
>>I was only trying to find out.
>>
>>I suspect you're trying to make me the butt of your humour.
>
>Never, sir. I reserve my butt-making humor for Michael and his Moon Landing
>Hoax posts.
>
>>Bloody rude colonial. :-)
>
>Redundant, sir. :)
>

Or is it tautological? I never know the difference.

>G

--
Peter

Ying tong iddle-i po!

[Cub Driver]

On 29 Apr 2004 14:51:56 GMT, (Krztalizer) wrote:

>Of course, the Mosquito figured into all of this. Pickle barrels had been
>coopered in the UK for many dozens of years i

I suppose the rain accumulating in the barrels served as a breeding
ground for the mozzies?

By the way, has it really stopped raining in Britain? All the movies I
see these days are shot in sunlight. Not at all the clime I remember
at Manchester! when I wrote the following:

It always rains in Blighty.
The gods need not be urged.
For why incur Almighty
When the whole damn Isle's submerged?


all the best -- Dan Ford
email: (put Cubdriver in subject line)

The Warbird's Forum www.warbirdforum.com
The Piper Cub Forum www.pipercubforum.com
Viva Bush! blog www.vivabush.org

[Cub Driver]

On 30 Apr 2004 05:00:14 GMT, (Krztalizer) wrote:

>>The fact that LeMay went from using B29s at 25,000-30,000 feet to 8000
>>feet is an indication of the lack of accuracy. Small errors are
>>opened up to huge error and no wind computing sight can compensate for
>>multiple layers of wind.
>
>Realize also that those B-29s were dropping a far larger percentage of
>relatively light fire bombs, in comparison to the 8th's general preference for
>GP and HE.

I'm not sure that the 20th AF was dropping incendiaries all that much,
before the March fire raid. It was a whole radical change in tactics,
not merely a change in altitude.

The problem over Japan as I understand it was the jet stream--indeed,
that this was the *discovery* of the jet stream. Flying with the jet
stream, the planes were too fast for the Norden to be effective.
Flying against it, they were too vulnerable to flak. (Winter of
1944-45.) And I suppose that flying at right angles to it meant they
couldn't hit anything, though I never read that.

The 20th dropped plenty of HE, though I confess I don't know what
weight the bombs were. (There was a plan, in the summer of 1945, to
hang a Grand Slam or Tall Boy under each wing of a B-29. The planes
were actually being modified for this task in the U.S. when the war
ended.) And the last raid involved only one fire raid as I recall, and
several mining missions, with all other missions being HE on plants
and arsenals.


all the best -- Dan Ford
email: (put Cubdriver in subject line)

The Warbird's Forum www.warbirdforum.com
The Piper Cub Forum www.pipercubforum.com
Viva Bush! blog www.vivabush.org

[Tarver Engineering]

"Eunometic" > wrote in message
m...

> 1 Gyro stabalising the aim point to help the bombadier during run up
> while the aircraft was being jostelled and manoevered.

The gyro stabilized the entire airplane along a track, once engaged.

> 2 Continiously computing the aim point on the basis of aircraft
> manoevers and speed changes. (Essentaily the what the Stuvi did I
> suspect)

All that is necessary to intercept a track along which one wishes to bomb.

> 3 Providing a target tracking system that attempted to track the
> target on the basis of airspeed and altitude above ground. By then
> providing servo motors adjusted by the bombadier or pilot to adjust
> for the drift from the target the wind drift rate could be calculated
> by integration on a ball integrator and the correction applied to the
> continously computed aim point.

The airplane automation was actually quite new and the PDI was an INS
display for the many years until standalone PDIs were eliminated through the
use of instrument transfer relays.

> 4 Corrective manoevers would then be applied either by the bombadier
> by signaling with a paddle to the pilot or direct via the autopilot.
> (I think Art Kramer mentions that the manual method was mostly used)

The gyro will only hold the airplane on track for a short period and a human
had to fly a heading to intercept the correct track.

[[email protected]]

Peter Twydell > wrote:

>
>Does anybody know where these pickle barrels came from? Were they Lend
>Lease? AFAIK we didn't make pickle barrels in the UK at that time, and
>I'm not sure if we do now. You can't get the wood, you know (according
>to Henry Crun).
>
>
>Could there have been some linguistic confusion years ago with the WWI
>German helmet, the Pickelhaube? Perhaps Billy Mitchell said he wanted to
>be able to drop a bomb on a Pickelhaube, and was misquoted.

Well, I wooden know 'bout no pickle barrels but we sure gotta
lotta pork barrels in our Capitol
--

-Gord.

[WalterM140]

>Fact is the factory was repeatedly attacked and the most damaging raid
>of them was that by the RAF in March 1942 which destroyed 40% of the
>factory

Details?

But the point is that 498 bombs out of 500 hitting the target is in fact
"pickle barrel" accuracy.

"Pickle barrel" accuracy was attainable and it was attained.

What is striking about all this is how hard some Brits will work to belittle
the honest achievements of others.

Walt

[Keith Willshaw]

"WalterM140" > wrote in message
...
> >Fact is the factory was repeatedly attacked and the most damaging raid
> >of them was that by the RAF in March 1942 which destroyed 40% of the
> >factory
>
> Details?
>
> But the point is that 498 bombs out of 500 hitting the target is in fact
> "pickle barrel" accuracy.
>

The quotes was that 489 hit the target area, the definition of
the target area has not been defined

> "Pickle barrel" accuracy was attainable and it was attained.
>
> What is striking about all this is how hard some Brits will work to
belittle
> the honest achievements of others.
>

I have never and will never belittle the efforts of the US
airmen who fought and died in WW2. I make a point of
paying my respects at the US War Cemetery in Cambridge
at least once a year.

You however seem unwilling to make the same allowance
for the efforts of the Commonwealt forces. There are
two ex bomber bases within 5 miles of my house.

Bassingbourn which was used by the USAAF and
Gransden Lodge from which RCAF aircraft flew.

Both played their part in final victory and young men
of both air forces flew their missions knowing their
chances of survival were poor.

They deserve better than your bile.

Keith

[Jim Doyle]

"Emmanuel Gustin" > wrote in message
...
> "Jim Doyle" > wrote in message
> . ..
>
> > Not being able to read German - could someone please explain the
principal
> > workings of the gunsight in the first diagram? (The two concentric
circles
> > and cross as rear sight, with vane-looking gizmo as foresight - attached
> to
> > the MG15).
>
> Vane sights. In a flexible gun position, gunners must take into
> account not only 'lead' on the target but also relative wind.
> If the gun is aimed perpendicular to the direction of flight the
> bullet will have, relative to the air, a sideways as well as
> a forward velocity component, so drag will caused it to fall
> behind the line of sight. The size of the effect depends on the
> angle and on the speed of the aircraft the gunner is sitting in.
>
> Hence the spring-loaded vane sight. If the gun is pointing aft,
> the bead is in line with the barrel. If the gun is pointed sideways,
> the vane will be pushed at by the air current, and the bead will
> move in the opposite direction, indicating the correction angle.
> The larger the rotation of the gun or the speed of the aircraft,
> the larger the movement of the bead. A lot of ingenuity went
> into the design of such sights during WWI and afterwards, until
> most people standardised on reflector sights.
>
> Lead, of course, must still be judged by the gunner from the
> distance and the relative speed of the two aircraft, using the
> deflection rings.
>
> The Germans continued to use such sights longer than others,
> it seems -- but they made relatively little use of gun turrets.
> IIRC one US bomber group also used them on the waist gun
> positions of B-17s, with good results.

Cheers for that, it all makes sense!

I guess though - no matter what sight adjustments you make - having a sharp,
skilled and determined gunner is what makes the difference. I don't imagine
that in combat you'd be crouched over you gun and squinting through the
sights hoping the drift's correct when the enemy's bearing down on you,
cannons blazing!

Jim Doyle

>
> --
> Emmanuel Gustin
> Emmanuel dot Gustin @t skynet dot be
> Flying Guns Books and Site: http://users.skynet.be/Emmanuel.Gustin/
>
>

[WalterM140]

>> >Fact is the factory was repeatedly attacked and the most damaging raid
>> >of them was that by the RAF in March 1942 which destroyed 40% of the
>> >factory
>>

>> Details?
>>

I'll ask again. Details?

Walt

[WalterM140]

>The quotes was that 489 hit the target area, the definition of
>the target area has not been defined

I posted it, after all. The quote was clearly 498, not 489, as if that
mattered.

>> "Pickle barrel" accuracy was attainable and it was attained.
>>
>> What is striking about all this is how hard some Brits will work to
>belittle
>> the honest achievements of others.
>>
>

>I have never and will never belittle the efforts of the US
>airmen who fought and died in WW2. I make a point of
>paying my respects at the US War Cemetery in Cambridge
>at least once a year.

I go down to the military cemetary in Chattanooga. There are mostly dead from
the Civil War, but there are a number of WWII dead there as well.

>You however seem unwilling to make the same allowance
>for the efforts of the Commonwealt forces. There are
>two ex bomber bases within 5 miles of my house.

I grew up right outside the national battlefield at Chickamauga.

>Bassingbourn which was used by the USAAF and
>Gransden Lodge from which RCAF aircraft flew.

Yes, the 91st Bomb Group was stationed at Bassingbourn. More B-17's failed to
return to Bassingbourn than from any other station -- 420, IIRC.

>Both played their part in final victory and young men
>of both air forces flew their missions knowing their
>chances of survival were poor.

But now the "pickle barrel" accuracy they set for a goal is belittled and made
fun of by the people they helped to save.


>They deserve better than your bile.
>

The history of Bomber Command has benefited by a smoke screen of propaganda and
wishful thinking for 60 years.

I think that is why some seem so determined to belittle the honest
accomplishments of others.

Walt

[vincent p. norris]

>>Both played their part in final victory and young men
>>of both air forces flew their missions knowing their
>>chances of survival were poor.
>
>But now the "pickle barrel" accuracy they set for a goal is belittled and made
>fun of by the people they helped to save.

The "pickle barrel" claim originated with propagandists of the Norden
Company and the War Department, not the brave men who flew the
missions.

The U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey was quite critical of the
effectiveness of strategic bombing. This in no way reflects on the
courage and sacrifice of the men who flew the missions.

vince norris

[Dave Eadsforth]

In article >, Jim
Doyle > writes
>
>"Emmanuel Gustin" > wrote in message
...
>> "Jim Doyle" > wrote in message
>> . ..
>>
SNIP of lots
>>
>> The Germans continued to use such sights longer than others,
>> it seems -- but they made relatively little use of gun turrets.
>> IIRC one US bomber group also used them on the waist gun
>> positions of B-17s, with good results.
>
>Cheers for that, it all makes sense!
>
>I guess though - no matter what sight adjustments you make - having a sharp,
>skilled and determined gunner is what makes the difference. I don't imagine
>that in combat you'd be crouched over you gun and squinting through the
>sights hoping the drift's correct when the enemy's bearing down on you,
>cannons blazing!
>
>Jim Doyle
>
Or even being mindful of your training:

'Short bursts, aimed with appropriate deflection, at threatening targets
within range. Conserve your ammunition."

Cheers,

Dave
--
Dave Eadsforth

[Keith Willshaw]

"WalterM140" > wrote in message
...
> >> >Fact is the factory was repeatedly attacked and the most damaging raid
> >> >of them was that by the RAF in March 1942 which destroyed 40% of the
> >> >factory
> >>
>
> >> Details?
> >>
>
> I'll ask again. Details?
>

From MOD Archives

Bomber Command launched its largest raid thus far of the war, in March 1942
against the large Renault factory at Boulogne-Billancourt, Paris, which was
an important source of trucks for the German military. Some 235 bombers
attacked, in an hitherto unprecedented concentration over the target - 121
per hour - which demonstrated that the risk of collision at night was lower
than feared, no accidents being suffered. The raid was a great success -
300 bombs fell directly on the factory, causing an estimated loss of
production of 2,300 trucks and destroyed 40% of the factory.

From Military History Online
Author Brian Grafton

March 3/4 saw the opening of the assault, with an attack on the Renault
works at Billancourt. This was the first major night raid on a non-German
town, and was undertaken only after much soul-searching by the Air Ministry.
It was a striking success, testing many new techniques and devices. The
bomber force was streamed; they bombed at relatively low level; they bombed
by the light of flares; they hit their target with almost the full weight of
available bombers (223 of 235 aircraft found their target). Losses were very
light (one Wellington was lost), and damage was evaluated as 'heavy'

Keith

[Cub Driver]

On Sat, 1 May 2004 11:42:36 +0200, "Emmanuel Gustin"
> wrote:

>The hit probability with such
>weapons was probably far too low to justify carrying the heavy
>weapons and endangering the life of the gunners.

I am continually amazed at how many planes were indeed shot down by
bomber gunners.

W/O Hazzard was flying a Lockheed Hudson light bomber (the windows of
the transport still in place!) on a solo raid of the Japanese airfield
at Akyab in May 1942. Three Nakajima Hayabusas (Oscars) chased him out
to sea. He flew at low level so they couldn't get beneath him, and
they took turns taking runs on him.

His rear gunner was the aptly named Sgt McLuckie. I'm not sure how
sophisticated his sight was, but he winged one of the Hayabusas badly
enough that it turned back to Burma. The second attack was made by Col
Kato, commander of the 64th Sentai and the most famous army fighter
pilot in Japan. (The Japanese did have some individual heroes.)
McLuckie lit up Kato's Hayabusa, and the colonel made the obligatory
suicide divide into the sea.

That was May 21?, 1942. All of Japan went into mourning, and Kato was
promoted two grades to buck general and enshrined as a war god. His
diary was published in the newspapers. It was much bigger shock to
Japan than the Midway defeat (about which the navy did not admit
much), and the whole tenor of Japanese newspapers changed to one of
bitter resolve from the previous triumphalism.

The British learned of it on the radio and decorated Hazzard. I'm not
sure about McLuckie.

all the best -- Dan Ford
email: (put Cubdriver in subject line)

The Warbird's Forum www.warbirdforum.com
The Piper Cub Forum www.pipercubforum.com
Viva Bush! blog www.vivabush.org

[WalterM140]

>The "pickle barrel" claim originated with propagandists of the Norden
>Company and the War Department, not the brave men who flew the
>missions.

It was the standard the crews trained toward. Pickle barrels were common
sights in the grocery stores of the day. In fact, I have the impression they
were larger than regular barrels. :)

It proved pretty rare to achieve that sort of accuracy in Europe. But if you
don't set a goal, you surely can't do very well.

We know that the USAAF had to abandon the idea of bombing only in visual
conditions. There were too few days when this was possible to justify the very
expensive bomber force nor was it possible to hurt the Germans badly enough.

It proved very difficult to make accurate attacks with blind bombing methods.
In "Half a WIng, Three Engines, and a Prayer" the author relates a mission
that had a German target as primary. That target was obscured. A Belgian air
field was selected as a target of opportunity. The group made a couple of runs
on that target that weren't within the norm. Ultimately, the group broup their
bombs back to Molesworth. At the debrief the group commander said: "Next
time, leave those bombs in Germany!"

And I think that over time it became acceptable to think that any bomb that hit
Germany was a good bomb. That proved not to be the case.

>The U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey was quite critical of the
>effectiveness of strategic bombing. This in no way reflects on the
>courage and sacrifice of the men who flew the missions.

As Art Kramer likes to point out, the US Strategic Bombing Survey authors had
an ax to grind. Their objectivity is somewhat suspect. But obviously, as the
Germans held out until the very end and given the tremendous cost in blood and
treasure, obviously the bombing was a big disappointment.

There was a lot of disagreememt on what to bomb and a general inability to get
enough bombs on decisive targets. The Germans also expended great effort to
repair what damage was done.

The targets that the Americans chose early on, specifically aircraft factories
and ball bearing plants, proved pretty resilient to damage. The USAAF also
early on flew a lot of raids to help suppress the U-Boats. Saint Nazaire was
"flak city" well before the first US bomber went to Germany. The US effort
also suffered from poor leadership in the form of Eaker and Hunter (the fighter
commander). Once they were replaced, things immediately improved dramatically.
Of course having a big infusion of new bomb groups and Mustang equipped groups
didn't hurt either. The Americans also determined to hit oil targets, which was
the one big success of the bombing. The RAF helped on this, but Harris was
reluctant to act, and adamant that this was a waste, when it was the one target
system that could collapse the German economy.

Walt

[WalterM140]

>"WalterM140" > wrote in message
...
>> >> >Fact is the factory was repeatedly attacked and the most damaging raid
>> >> >of them was that by the RAF in March 1942 which destroyed 40% of the
>> >> >factory
>> >>
>>
>> >> Details?
>> >>
>>
>> I'll ask again. Details?
>>
>
>From MOD Archives
>
> Bomber Command launched its largest raid thus far of the war, in March 1942
>against the large Renault factory at Boulogne-Billancourt, Paris, which was
>an important source of trucks for the German military. Some 235 bombers
>attacked, in an hitherto unprecedented concentration over the target - 121
>per hour - which demonstrated that the risk of collision at night was lower
>than feared, no accidents being suffered. The raid was a great success -
>300 bombs fell directly on the factory, causing an estimated loss of
>production of 2,300 trucks and destroyed 40% of the factory.

Well, that is clearly not the -most- successful attack as the 4/4/43 raid
deprived the Germans of over 3,000 lorries and 498 out of 500 bombs fell into
the factory area.

What you've also shown inadvertantly is that, given the accuracy over this
French target, defenses over German targets degraded RAF accuracy very badly
indeed.

The German night fighters in particular degraded RAF accuracy on many, in fact
most occasions, where they made an effective interception.

German defenses degraded RAF accuracy in a way that there is no parallel for
on the USAAF side. In some instances of almost fanatic resistance by the
Germans, some of the most accurate bombing of the war was still done by USAAF
units.

Two instances:

"Over 900
bombers were detailed and 886 actually dispatched over the Essex coast
for
plants in the Leipzig area; although the two leading combat wings
attacked
an FW 190 repair depot at Zwickau in the same area which, apart from
its own
importance, served to mislead the enemy as to the chief
objectives...Soon
after the leading bombers of the 3rd Division had turned north-east
after a
south-easterly thrust across Belgium, they were met by an estimated
200
enemy interceptors. Spaatz was correct in his speculation that the
Luftwaffe
would rise to meet strikes against oil plants, although at this point
the
enemy could not have known the bombers' ultimate destination. From
12.25
hrs. for 35 minutes, the two composite 4th wing formations headed for
Zwickau experienced determined oppostion. Mass saturation tactics were
pressed so close that at least one rammed a B-17. From this ordeal the
4th
emerged in some disorder. Colonel Vandevanter flying with his 385th
Group in
the lead, ordered the formation to reduce speed so that others could
reform;
this undoubtedly added to the good bombing later achieved-- the 385th
managed to place 97% of their bombs within 2,000 ft of the aiming
point.
Four times the 4th Wing was attacked on the mission, losing 11
Fortresses, 7
from the 447th group.
The 3rd division's 45th and 13th wings attacked the Brux oil plant
leaving
it burning and inoperative, while Liberators of 2nd Division achieved
similar results at Zeitz and Bohlen; great damage too, was inflicted
at
Merseburg and Lutzendorf by the 1st Division."

--"The Mighty Eighth" p. 141-42 by Roger Freeman

"Lt. Col Ross Milton, formerly of Polebrook and now of the 91st, was
allergic
to tough rides. It seemed every time he led the Wing, he would
ineveitably
wind up in the front position, whether the mission was so laid out or
not, and
the mission would meet violent opposition. Oschersleben was no
exception.
Leading the combat wing formation, he found himself in front and, for
the most
part, without fighter escort almost throughout the trip. Over an hour
before
reaching the target, the Wing was jumped by a large number of Jerry
fighters.
The lead aircraft was badly hit. An engine was lost, several cannon
shells
exploded in the cockpit, and Col Milton and Captain Everett, the
pilot, were
both painfully wounded. The Wing nevertheless ploughed through and
bombed the
target, although 13 aircraft were lost in the attack. The 91st
Group's bombs
went astray due to structural damage in the lead ship which affected
the
mounting of the bombsight, but the 381st's bombs fell true and
straight on the
MPI, and these bombs and those of the wings that followed did a
complete
demolition job on an important aircraft factory."

-"Mighty Eighth War Diary" pp. 165-66


Walt

Walt

Walt








>
>

[Jukka O. Kauppinen]

>>>For example the Stuvi sights used in Ju-87s and Ju-88s were highly
>>>advanced, computerized sights for their day.
>>
>>Did they ever bomb from 25,000 feet?

> A few Arado 234B Jet bombers made attacks from 10,000 meters using the
> Lotfe 7E conected aircraft conected to the Patin autopilot.


Stuvi was a dive bombing sight, which the Ju87-88 pilots claimed was
capable of placing the bombs exactly to the wanted spot, within few
meters accuracy.

The largest use of the Lofte and other level bombing sights on high
altitude bombing that I can imagine right now would be the Heinkel 177
raids on eastern front. The attacks on London during '44 were made in
glide I think.

I don't have the 177 resources at hand right now, but my understanding
is that these attacks, for example the destruction of Velikiye Luki
supply depots, were highly effective high altitude level bombing raids.
What altitude exactly, that I don't know, but far higher than the
general combat altitude in the eastern front, as the intercepting Soviet
pilots were reported to be having trouble reaching the Heinkels.

jok

[M. J. Powell]

In message >, WalterM140
> writes
>>>
>Soon
>after the leading bombers of the 3rd Division had turned north-east
>after a
>south-easterly thrust across Belgium, they were met by an estimated
>200
>enemy interceptors. Spaatz was correct in his speculation that the
>Luftwaffe
>would rise to meet strikes against oil plants, although at this point
>the
>enemy could not have known the bombers' ultimate destination.

Isn't this sentence self-contradicting?

Mike
--
M.J.Powell

[WalterM140]

>Spaatz was correct in his speculation that the
>>Luftwaffe
>>would rise to meet strikes against oil plants, although at this point
>>the
>>enemy could not have known the bombers' ultimate destination.
>
>Isn't this sentence self-contradicting?

It was a strike on an oil plant. The Germans did rise to meet it.

I'd say that once the bombers reached a certain point, the Germans knew an
important raid was in the offing. They had to respond. Don't forget that the
Germans also increased the number of flak guns around the oil facilities in
this time frame. There was no doubt that the Germans would fight for the oil
plants. They had by this time pretty much stopped opposing strikes against
France.

Walt

[M. J. Powell]

In message >, WalterM140
> writes
>>Spaatz was correct in his speculation that the
>>>Luftwaffe
>>>would rise to meet strikes against oil plants, although at this point
>>>the
>>>enemy could not have known the bombers' ultimate destination.
>>
>>Isn't this sentence self-contradicting?
>
>It was a strike on an oil plant. The Germans did rise to meet it.

But they didn't know the target.
>
>I'd say that once the bombers reached a certain point, the Germans knew an
>important raid was in the offing. They had to respond.

Which has nothing to do with your assertion that they had to respond to
an attack on an oil target.

> Don't forget that the
>Germans also increased the number of flak guns around the oil facilities in
>this time frame. There was no doubt that the Germans would fight for the oil
>plants. They had by this time pretty much stopped opposing strikes against
>France.

Irrelevant to my point.

Mike

[WalterM140]

>Irrelevant to my point.

Take it up with Roger Freeman. He wrote the text you take issue with.

Walt

[vincent p. norris]

>>The U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey was quite critical of the
>>effectiveness of strategic bombing. This in no way reflects on the
>>courage and sacrifice of the men who flew the missions.
>
>As Art Kramer likes to point out, the US Strategic Bombing Survey authors had
>an ax to grind. Their objectivity is somewhat suspect.

Well, Art has an ax to grind, too. What was the Survey's alleged ax?

Is there any *evidence* to support that charge?

>Germans held out until the very end and given the tremendous cost in blood and
>treasure, obviously the bombing was a big disappointment.

I'm not so sure about that. This thread was about the accuracy of the
Norden sight. But as I've mentioned before and others have agreed,
the bombing may have been primarily to destroy the LW, not to destroy
targets on the ground. Thus the question whether the bombs landed in
a pickle barrel is irrelevant. Even if industrial production
continued, and even grew, we achieved aerial supremacy and were able
to invade Europe. So the bombing was not a "big disappointment."

vince norris

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

This will probably appear in the wrong place thanks to a buggy news server.
WalterM140 wrote in message >...
>>"WalterM140" > wrote in message
...
>>> >> >Fact is the factory was repeatedly attacked and the most damaging raid
>>> >> >of them was that by the RAF in March 1942 which destroyed 40% of the
>>> >> >factory

>>From MOD Archives
>>
>> Bomber Command launched its largest raid thus far of the war, in March 1942
>>against the large Renault factory at Boulogne-Billancourt, Paris, which was
>>an important source of trucks for the German military. Some 235 bombers
>>attacked, in an hitherto unprecedented concentration over the target - 121
>>per hour - which demonstrated that the risk of collision at night was lower
>>than feared, no accidents being suffered. The raid was a great success -
>>300 bombs fell directly on the factory, causing an estimated loss of
>>production of 2,300 trucks and destroyed 40% of the factory.
>
>Well, that is clearly not the -most- successful attack as the 4/4/43 raid
>deprived the Germans of over 3,000 lorries and 498 out of 500 bombs fell
>into the factory area.

Firstly the quote says target area, not factory area secondly the reality
is one raid can be more damaging and the other cause more production
loss, people can be reassigned to say night shift in order to get around
damaged machinery.

The 305th deceived a DUC for the mission, which makes it look like
a very above average USAAF raid.

>What you've also shown inadvertantly is that, given the accuracy over this
>French target, defenses over German targets degraded RAF accuracy
>very badly indeed.

So we are busy working through Walter's fictional view of the war, still to
come is the attempt to claim the RAF did not drop any 4,000 pound bombs
on Germany before September 1944, amongst others.

Walter will ignore the loss of accuracy with distance that all bombers
suffer from, and night bombers in particular. The navigation errors,
the problems with long distance weather forecasts.

>The German night fighters in particular degraded RAF accuracy on many,
>in fact most occasions, where they made an effective interception.

Effective interception will no doubt be defined as an interception
where Walter thinks accuracy was reduced.

Walter may try and trot out his "proof" of this, RAF raids on Berlin in
winter 1943, just about the hardest target in the book. He will then use
ideas like measuring accuracy from the official aiming point even when
the pathfinders marked another point 1 to 2 miles away.

Not to mention he is comparing RAF bombers under flak and fighter
attack when bombing to USAAF bombers under flak attack only.

> German defenses degraded RAF accuracy in a way that there is no parallel
>for on the USAAF side. In some instances of almost fanatic resistance by the
>Germans, some of the most accurate bombing of the war was still done by
>USAAF units.

Translation Walter will go looking through the archives for stories of
USAAF units doing well under heavy fire, and will then compare these
as "typical" to the worst raids he can find run by the RAF, as "typical".

The USAAF people do not need this sort of junk thrown at them, that
they need this sort of bias to look good.

We know the airmen were human, so when the 8th air force bombing
accuracy report for the period 1 October 1943 to 1 March 1944 reports
39.7% of error due to "nerves", reduced efficiencies due to flak evasion
and an extra 21.7% error due to the increased bombing altitudes, we know
this is men reacting under the greatest stress possible, being human. Not
super human. Or the 8th air force report that noted an increase in bombing
error with an increase in the flak defences.

Bomber Command had its creep back problems.

Welcome to humanity and the fact the men went out and did their job.

>Two instances:

>"Over 900 bombers were detailed and 886 actually dispatched
>over the Essex coast for plants in the Leipzig area; although the
>two leading combat wings attacked an FW 190 repair depot at
>Zwickau in the same area which, apart from its own
>importance, served to mislead the enemy as to the chief
>objectives...Soon after the leading bombers of the 3rd Division
>had turned north-east after a south-easterly thrust across Belgium,
>they were met by an estimated 200 enemy interceptors. Spaatz
>was correct in his speculation that the Luftwaffe would rise to meet
>strikes against oil plants, although at this point the
>enemy could not have known the bombers' ultimate destination. From
>12.25 hrs. for 35 minutes, the two composite 4th wing formations headed for
>Zwickau experienced determined oppostion. Mass saturation tactics were
>pressed so close that at least one rammed a B-17. From this ordeal the
>4th emerged in some disorder. Colonel Vandevanter flying with his 385th
>Group in the lead, ordered the formation to reduce speed so that others could
>reform; this undoubtedly added to the good bombing later achieved-- the 385th
>managed to place 97% of their bombs within 2,000 ft of the aiming
>point. Four times the 4th Wing was attacked on the mission, losing 11
>Fortresses, 7 from the 447th group.
>The 3rd division's 45th and 13th wings attacked the Brux oil plant
>leaving it burning and inoperative, while Liberators of 2nd Division achieved
>similar results at Zeitz and Bohlen; great damage too, was inflicted at
>Merseburg and Lutzendorf by the 1st Division."
>
>--"The Mighty Eighth" p. 141-42 by Roger Freeman

And yes, Spaatz did not tell the Luftwaffe he was after oil targets that
day, it was good flying weather and the Luftwaffe reacted.

This is the usual stuff, mission 353, 12 May 1944, 1st Bomb Division
2 MIA and 3 written off, 2nd Bomb Division 3 MIA and 5 written off
3rd Bomb Division 41 MIA and 1 written off. "Strong enemy fighter
reaction against leading elements of 3rd Bomb Division." The
96th lost 12 the 452nd 14 bombers. There were 42 losses from 295
despatched, 258 effective sorties, so these two groups lost over half
the total lost.

I should add the 447th group lost 7 aircraft, the rest no more than 2,
the 385th group, praised above lost 2 aircraft including one that
as abandoned over the Thames, and we can presume it was the
best bombing, otherwise why include the result. Look like the
385th took heavy fighter fire or rather managed to escape the
fight but with some disorganisation?

So the USAAF formation that loses 1 aircraft MIA is used as the
guide to how well a USAAF formation does when under "almost
fanatic resistance". Says it all really. Last time this quote was
trotted out it was an attempt to prove how good the unescorted
B-17 was.

By the way the Germans reported around an 18% drop in avgas
production as a result of the 12 May raids, down from 5,845
tons per day to 4,821 tons per day. Zeitz, attacked by the 2nd
bomb division is said to have lost all production for a time
according to the USSBS, Leuna attacked by the 1st bomb
division also lost 100% of production for two weeks.

So most of the loss appears to come from the other two strikes,
not the one on Zwickau and Brux, which would indicate the raid
overall was the least effective. Zeitz lost 519 tons per day of
production of all fuels (not avgas) due to the 12 May raids.

So now we go to 11 January 1944,

>"Lt. Col Ross Milton, formerly of Polebrook and now of the 91st, was
>allergic to tough rides. It seemed every time he led the Wing, he would
>ineveitably wind up in the front position, whether the mission was so laid
>out or not, and the mission would meet violent opposition. Oschersleben
>was no exception. Leading the combat wing formation, he found himself
>in front and, for the most part, without fighter escort almost throughout the trip.
> Over an hour before reaching the target, the Wing was jumped by a large
>number of Jerry fighters. The lead aircraft was badly hit. An engine was lost,
>several cannon shells exploded in the cockpit, and Col Milton and Captain
>Everett, the pilot, were both painfully wounded. The Wing nevertheless ploughed
>through and bombed the target, although 13 aircraft were lost in the attack.
>The 91st Group's bombs went astray due to structural damage in the lead ship
>which affected the mounting of the bombsight, but the 381st's bombs fell true
>and straight on the MPI, and these bombs and those of the wings that followed
>did a complete demolition job on an important aircraft factory."
>
>-"Mighty Eighth War Diary" pp. 165-66

Note Freeman is quoting the wartime assessments, not the actual
damage report put together by the Germans. The USSBS notes
the acceptances from the Argo plant were 12/43 39, 1/44 67, 2/44
22, 3/44 111. Not exactly a complete demolition job.

Mission 182, 177 B-17s to Oschersleben, lost 34 plus 2 written off,
the 381st lost 8 aircraft that day, so this is an example of a USAAF
formation holding together under heavy attack. The point to make
is if this were the rule that Walter's fiction tries to claim it is then there
would be no necessity to highlight it.

The 14th October 1943 raid, 16 bomb groups, 229 bombers, 459
1,000 pound, 663 500 pound, 1,751 100 pound incendiary
bombs or 482.8 tons of bombs, 18.1% incendiary. 3 groups
missed the targets, 5 had less than 10% of bombs within 500
feet of the aiming point, overall 10% of bombs within 500 feet
of the aiming point, the 351st with 29% was the best, there
were 63 direct hits out of 2,873 bombs or 2.2%.

The disorganisation caused by the defences was a major cause
of the errors. I only have to show the airmen were human, not
super human to refute the fiction.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

[Cub Driver]

> What was the Survey's alleged ax?

Us Bus set out to prove that strategic bombing won the war, in order
to bolster the case for an independent USAF. Or so it is often said.

all the best -- Dan Ford
email: (put Cubdriver in subject line)

The Warbird's Forum www.warbirdforum.com
The Piper Cub Forum www.pipercubforum.com
Viva Bush! blog www.vivabush.org

[Stephen Harding]

Cub Driver wrote:

>>What was the Survey's alleged ax?
>
> Us Bus set out to prove that strategic bombing won the war, in order
> to bolster the case for an independent USAF. Or so it is often said.

But it's also been said that it was an attempt by Army ground
officers to prove that bombing didn't do much to win the war.

I didn't realize the Survey was begun even before the war was
over in Europe, and four of the survey members were actually
killed in action. The members of the survey consisted of 300
civilians along with 350 officers and 500 enlisted men, so it
was a large effort.

Besides looking over targets themselves for the effects of the
bombings, they also looked for German war records as well, which
were found in offices, private homes, safe-deposit boxes, in
barns, caves, in one occasion a hen-house and in two occasions
coffins!

Given the generally favorable conclusions toward air power of
the survey, it seems a tough sell to call it an attempt to
degrade effectiveness of this form of war making.

But I've been unable to find, in my very cursory look, exactly
*who* did the survey; largely USAAF or Army ground personnel?
The list of "officers of the survey" in the report foreward
lists no rank along with the names, so they seem simply to be
civilians from the War Dept [along with the Sect'y as well].

Since so many people were involved in making the survey [in Europe;
there was a Pacific one too], it would seem any attempt to "spin"
the results would have to come from higher ups, in the overall
Army or War Dept command.


SMH



SMH

[WalterM140]

Mr. Sinclair in his usual carping manner:

>Firstly the quote says target area, not factory area secondly the reality
>is one raid can be more damaging and the other cause more production
>loss, people can be reassigned to say night shift in order to get around
>damaged machinery.

So what?

>The 305th deceived a DUC for the mission, which makes it look like
>a very above average USAAF raid.

Of a type far beyond the capacity of the RAF.

>>What you've also shown inadvertantly is that, given the accuracy over this
>>French target, defenses over German targets degraded RAF accuracy
>>very badly indeed.
>

>So we are busy working through Walter's fictional view of the war, still to
>come is the attempt to claim the RAF did not drop any 4,000 pound bombs
>on Germany before September 1944, amongst others.
>

You're being very careful, because you know what Martn Middlebrooks said in
"The Berlin Raids" backs me up. The RAF was deterred by the German defenses in
a way that has no parallel with the USAAF.

>Walter will ignore the loss of accuracy with distance that all bombers
>suffer from, and night bombers in particular. The navigation errors,
>the problems with long distance weather forecasts.

It's correct that night bombers were more inaccurate than day bombers. You
couldn't find that ol' pickle barrel in a Lancaster. Only B-17's and B-24's
could find them.

>>The German night fighters in particular degraded RAF accuracy on many,
>>in fact most occasions, where they made an effective interception.
>
>Effective interception will no doubt be defined as an interception
>where Walter thinks accuracy was reduced.

Me, and the official history:

"In January the British losses rose to 6.15 percent of all sorties against
Berlin and to 7.2 per cent against Stettin, Brunswick and Madgeburg. But the
effectiveness of the German defenses was not confined to destruction. Harrassed
all the way to their distant targets with bombs on board, many of the bombers
were forced to turn back in a damaged condition. Combat and evasive action
scattered the remainder over the sky so that they no longer arrived on the
target as a coherent force. Much as Berlin and the other cities suffered from
the bombing terror of the winter of 1943/44, they were spared the total
extinction that had been the enemy's prognosis.

To quote from the British
official history, "The Strategic Air Offensive against Germany":

"Bomber Command was compelled, largely by the German night-fighter force, to
draw away from its primary target, Berlin, to disperse its effort and to persue
its operations by apparently less efficient means than hitherto. ... The Battle
of Berlin was more than a failure. It was a defeat."

Luftwaffe War Diaries, p.339 by Cajus Bekker

And consider this text from "The Berlin Raids" by Martin
Middlebrook:

"Fauquier [the master bomber] devoted most of his efforts to encouraging
the Main Force to press right on into the target and not to release their bombs
prematurely. It was not easy. He could deride the flak, but Main Force crews
harrassed by fighter attack were not always inclined to listen."

-- "The Berlin Raids p.65 by Martin Middlebrooks


"The raid proceded in no better, no worse, manner than so many raids beyond
the range of oboe. Enough of the 49 pathfinder
backers-up and re-centerers arrived to produce a steady supply
of green TIs. The planned route from the south east was never
achieved. It is clear from the evidence of bombing photographs, that once
the early raid markers and bombs were seen to go down, both the pathfinders
backers-up and the main force swung in from due south, neither being
prepared to spend the extra time in
the target area flying to a theoretical turning point futher on."

They were not prepared to fly further to the briefed point because they
were being heavily engaged by night fighters. Middlebrook makes that plain.

"Many of the Main Force crews were bombing the first markers they saw, instead
of the centre of the markers as ordered, or were dropping short of the markers;
a long 'creepback' developed. The night was clear. Bomber Command's
Operational Research Section later examined 468 bombing photgraphs and
concluded that only five aircraft had bombed within three miles of the correct
Aiming Point, that only a quarter of the force bombed the vulnerable area of
Berlin, and that most of the remainer bombed lightly built up suburban areas."

Ibid p. 66

So we can see that although the RAF had a fairly good attack against the
Renault factory near Paris -- although not as good as the 8th AF raid of 4/4/43
-- that accuracy did not translate onto German targets. The RAF was deterred
by the NJG in a way that has no parallel on the USAAF side.

>Walter may try and trot out his "proof" of this, RAF raids on Berlin in
>winter 1943, just about the hardest target in the book.

Are you saying it was darker over Germany than it was over France?

He will then use
>ideas like measuring accuracy from the official aiming point even when
>the pathfinders marked another point 1 to 2 miles away.

Wow. Looks like the Pathfinders had a tough time locating that ol' pickle
barrel, huh?

>Not to mention he is comparing RAF bombers under flak and fighter
>attack when bombing to USAAF bombers under flak attack only.

I didn't do that, and I don't think it applies. Unless you can show that the
night fighters were more likely to fight in their flak than the day fighters
were.

>> German defenses degraded RAF accuracy in a way that there is no parallel
>>for on the USAAF side. In some instances of almost fanatic resistance by
>the
>>Germans, some of the most accurate bombing of the war was still done by
>>USAAF units.
>
>Translation Walter will go looking through the archives for stories of
>USAAF units doing well under heavy fire, and will then compare these
>as "typical" to the worst raids he can find run by the RAF, as "typical".
>
>The USAAF people do not need this sort of junk thrown at them, that
>they need this sort of bias to look good.
>
>We know the airmen were human, so when the 8th air force bombing
>accuracy report for the period 1 October 1943 to 1 March 1944 reports
>39.7% of error due to "nerves", reduced efficiencies due to flak evasion
>and an extra 21.7% error due to the increased bombing altitudes, we know
>this is men reacting under the greatest stress possible, being human. Not
>super human. Or the 8th air force report that noted an increase in bombing
>error with an increase in the flak defences.
>
>Bomber Command had its creep back problems.
>
>Welcome to humanity and the fact the men went out and did their job.
>
>>Two instances:
>
>>"Over 900 bombers were detailed and 886 actually dispatched
>>over the Essex coast for plants in the Leipzig area; although the
>>two leading combat wings attacked an FW 190 repair depot at
>>Zwickau in the same area which, apart from its own
>>importance, served to mislead the enemy as to the chief
>>objectives...Soon after the leading bombers of the 3rd Division
>>had turned north-east after a south-easterly thrust across Belgium,
>>they were met by an estimated 200 enemy interceptors. Spaatz
>>was correct in his speculation that the Luftwaffe would rise to meet
>>strikes against oil plants, although at this point the
>>enemy could not have known the bombers' ultimate destination. From
>>12.25 hrs. for 35 minutes, the two composite 4th wing formations headed for
>>Zwickau experienced determined oppostion. Mass saturation tactics were
>>pressed so close that at least one rammed a B-17. From this ordeal the
>>4th emerged in some disorder. Colonel Vandevanter flying with his 385th
>>Group in the lead, ordered the formation to reduce speed so that others
>could eform; this undoubtedly added to the good bombing later achieved-- the
>385th
>>managed to place 97% of their bombs within 2,000 ft of the aiming
>>point. Four times the 4th Wing was attacked on the mission, losing 11
>>Fortresses, 7 from the 447th group.
>>The 3rd division's 45th and 13th wings attacked the Brux oil plant
>>leaving it burning and inoperative, while Liberators of 2nd Division
>achieved
>>similar results at Zeitz and Bohlen; great damage too, was inflicted at
>>Merseburg and Lutzendorf by the 1st Division."
>>
>>--"The Mighty Eighth" p. 141-42 by Roger Freeman
>
>And yes, Spaatz did not tell the Luftwaffe he was after oil targets that
>day, it was good flying weather and the Luftwaffe reacted.
>
>This is the usual stuff, mission 353, 12 May 1944, 1st Bomb Division
>2 MIA and 3 written off, 2nd Bomb Division 3 MIA and 5 written off
>3rd Bomb Division 41 MIA and 1 written off. "Strong enemy fighter
>reaction against leading elements of 3rd Bomb Division." The
>96th lost 12 the 452nd 14 bombers. There were 42 losses from 295
>despatched, 258 effective sorties, so these two groups lost over half
>the total lost.
>
>I should add the 447th group lost 7 aircraft, the rest no more than 2,
>the 385th group, praised above lost 2 aircraft including one that
>as abandoned over the Thames, and we can presume it was the
>best bombing, otherwise why include the result. Look like the
>385th took heavy fighter fire or rather managed to escape the
>fight but with some disorganisation?
>
>So the USAAF formation that loses 1 aircraft MIA is used as the
>guide to how well a USAAF formation does when under "almost
>fanatic resistance". Says it all really. Last time this quote was
>trotted out it was an attempt to prove how good the unescorted
>B-17 was.

Unescorted B-17's could achieve outstanding accuracy despite the worst the
Germans could do.

The 385th formation was in "some disorder" from the German attacks, but still
managed to get a good bomb pattern. They were not deterred by the German
defenses in the same sort of way the official British history says the RAF was.

>By the way the Germans reported around an 18% drop in avgas
>production as a result of the 12 May raids, down from 5,845
>tons per day to 4,821 tons per day. Zeitz, attacked by the 2nd
>bomb division is said to have lost all production for a time
>according to the USSBS, Leuna attacked by the 1st bomb
>division also lost 100% of production for two weeks.
>
>So most of the loss appears to come from the other two strikes,
>not the one on Zwickau and Brux, which would indicate the raid
>overall was the least effective. Zeitz lost 519 tons per day of
>production of all fuels (not avgas) due to the 12 May raids.
>
>So now we go to 11 January 1944,
>
>>"Lt. Col Ross Milton, formerly of Polebrook and now of the 91st, was
>>allergic to tough rides. It seemed every time he led the Wing, he would
>>ineveitably wind up in the front position, whether the mission was so laid
>>out or not, and the mission would meet violent opposition. Oschersleben
>>was no exception. Leading the combat wing formation, he found himself
>>in front and, for the most part, without fighter escort almost throughout
>the trip.
>> Over an hour before reaching the target, the Wing was jumped by a large
>>number of Jerry fighters. The lead aircraft was badly hit. An engine was
>lost,
>>several cannon shells exploded in the cockpit, and Col Milton and Captain
>>Everett, the pilot, were both painfully wounded. The Wing nevertheless
>ploughed
>>through and bombed the target, although 13 aircraft were lost in the attack.
>>The 91st Group's bombs went astray due to structural damage in the lead ship
>>which affected the mounting of the bombsight, but the 381st's bombs fell
>true
>>and straight on the MPI, and these bombs and those of the wings that
>followed
>>did a complete demolition job on an important aircraft factory."
>>
>>-"Mighty Eighth War Diary" pp. 165-66
>
>Note Freeman is quoting the wartime assessments, not the actual
>damage report put together by the Germans. The USSBS notes
>the acceptances from the Argo plant were 12/43 39, 1/44 67, 2/44
>22, 3/44 111. Not exactly a complete demolition job.
>
>Mission 182, 177 B-17s to Oschersleben, lost 34 plus 2 written off,
>the 381st lost 8 aircraft that day, so this is an example of a USAAF
>formation holding together under heavy attack. The point to make
>is if this were the rule that Walter's fiction tries to claim it is then
>there
>would be no necessity to highlight it.

That's just flat weird.

The 303rd group also bombed Oschersleben on 1/11/44.

"The first pass made at our group included 30 to 35 ME-109's and FW-190s. The
low group, to our left, had three Forts go down from this first pass. We also
saw three German fghters shot down by this group during this time. The No. 4
ship, lead ship of our element and on whose wing we were flying formation, had
it's No. 1 engine hit. It immediately burst into flames and dropped out of
formation. A few minutes later, this plane exploded.

It is impossible to say who was in the "No.4 ship" that Vern Moncur saw go
down. The fight was far too concentrated and violent for an accurate accounting
of all the casualties, and the Group's records are unclear.' It is easier to
account for the first three losses in the Hell's Angels low group that Moncur
recorded. "Bad Check", a Fortress Hullar's crew had flown early in their tour,
and one of the Group's original aircraft, was one of the first to go. Lt. G.S.
McClellan's crew was aboard her in the No.7 slot of the low group's low
squadron. Lt. Robert Sheets's crew aboard the "City of Wanette" in the squadron
lead saw "Bad Check" at 12,000 feet circling in a tight turn. Other crews
reported her going down with the wheels down, and Lt. James Fowler learned that
night that 10 chutes were seen to come from her. Lt. McClellan was on his 18th
trip and the rest of his crew was not far behind except for Lt. W.A. Fisher,
the copilot from B-26s who was on his first B-17 raid. "Bad Check" was on her
45th mission. She reportedly went down some time between 1055 and 1105 near the
town of Lienen, 20 miles Southwest of Osnabruck.

Next to die was probably "Flak Wolf", Woddrop's favorite and the Queen that
had taken Hullar's crew on their first mission. She was flown by Lt.
J.W. Carothers's crew, most of whom were on their fourth mission. They were in
the No.6 slot of the low group's low squadron, and from the nose of "The Flying
Bitch", at the head of the low squadron's second element, Lt.
E.L. Cronin, bombardier of Lt. K.A. Hoeg's crew, "saw Carothers pull off to the
left and explode. Had time "to get men out. Saw three chutes plus some,objects,
perhaps men." "Flak Wolfs" end was also observed by Lt. T. Lamarr Simmons
aboard S for Sugar in the No.5 ,low squadron slot: "I saw several bombers
explode before this, maybe three or four, but this one made a really vivid
impression on me. I saw a wing fall off the plane, and then the whole fuselage
just came apart with a whole bunch of pieces in the air and fire all over the
place. I didn't see anybody get out." "Flak Wolf" was on her 40th raid. She
crashed at Kloster Oesede, just South of Osnabruck.

Lt. Hallden's No. 896 in ttle No.6 position of the low group's lead squadron
was another early loss. From the No.4 squadron position, Lt.
F.F. Wilson's crew in B-17G 42-31471 saw Hallden's bomber at 1055, just as an
FW-190 was attacking from seven o'clock low. They reported his ship "in
distress at 19,500 feet on a heading of 120 degrees...The aircraft was on fire
and went out of formation into a spin. The tail section came off. Three men but
no parachutes were seen." Most of Hallden's crew were on their fourth raid. No.
896 crashed near Kirchlengren, due Eastof Osnabriick and North of the Group's
inbound track to the IP.
The 190 that got them did not get away. Lt. Wilson's tail gunner, Sgt.
W.G. Hubley, opened fire and "the fighter blew up and pilot bailed out." Hubley
got credit for a kill.


.. Schwaebe's crew, flying the "War Bride" in the No.2 slot of the low group's
high squadron, peeled out of formation. This Fortress, which had taken Lt. Jack
Hendry home from so many missions, was last seen at 17,000 feet by Lt. E.S.
Harrison's crew from B 17G 42-39885 in the No.6 position of the lead group's
low squadron. They reported her going down "under control" but no chutes were
noted. It was the War Bride's 35th mission, and the seventh for half of Lt.
Schwaebe's crew. The ship crashed near Detmold, about 30 miles Southeast of
Osnabriick.

These observations are consistent with what Lt. N.E. Shoup's crew, flying B-17F
41-24605 in the No.5 slot of the low group's high squadron, reported. At 1113
they saw a "B-17 out of control,-eight chutes," together with another B-17 that
exploded with no chutes. Two minutes later they saw a third Fortress with the
tail shot off and no chutes.

At 1117 another Fortress fell. This bomber was Lt. W.A. Purcell's "Baltimore
Bounce". Lt. Purcell's crew had gone on the raid as a spare, taking a.position
in the lead squadron for one of four 303rd ships that aborted from the two
group formations. Vern Moncur had the best view of her end:

"Soon after the loss of the No.4 ship, the No.3 ship ahead of us also caught on
fire in the No.1 engine and peeled out of formation. This ship exploded, also.
Lt. Purcell was the pilot, and he and his crew didn't have a chance. (Purcell
and I had been together through all of our training.) I then moved my ship up
into the No.3 position, flying on the left wing of the Wing Leader, General
Travis." The "Eight Ball's" crew saw "Baltimore Bounce" blow up, as did Lt.
H.S.
Dahleen's crew from B-17G 42-31183 in the No.5 slot of the lead squadron
formation....

According to Darrell Gust, "Bombs were away at 11:48 and our tail
gunner/observer reported an excellent clustering of bombs right on the target."
The groups' photo interpretation report provides further confirmation of just
how good Fawcett's aim had been:

"The pattern of bomb bursts is seen centered squarely on the target with a
heavy concentration of both high explosives and incendiaries scattered on and
among the buildings of the plant. Three hits are seen on" a storage area in
which aircraft are stored under a camouflage netting. An undetermined number of
hits are seen on the Main Machine Shop, the Final Assembly Shop, and a probable
Components Erecting Shop. Direct hits or near misses are seen on another
Components Erecting Shop, a possible repair shop, and seven other smaller
unidentified buildings...In addition, high explosive bursts are seen scattered
over approximately one-third of the factory airfield and on an adjacent road
°and railway.

Incendiaries fell in the target area and across the railway sidings and the
freight depot immediately south of the target...The high explosive bombs on the
target were dropped by the 303rd lead Group and apparently by the 303rd low
Group. Incendiaries dropped by the 379th Group flying high fell on the target
and also immediately south of it...Fires appear to have been started in the
plant as a result of the attack."

The Hell's Angels had succeeded in their mission, but the enemy continued to
make the Americans pay. As the formation pulled out to the north, homeward
bound on a westward track running from Brunswick to Hannover, the German
fighters were making attacks only slightly less intense than those going in."

--"Half a Wing, Three Engines and a Prayer" pp.314-331 by Brian D. O'Neill

The USAAF was not deterred by German fighter attacks the way the RAF was
deterred by night fighter attacks. The 8/17/43 raid by the Fourth Bomb Wing on
Regensburg was another example of very accurate bombing despite heavy
opposition by the Germans.

>
>The 14th October 1943 raid, 16 bomb groups, 229 bombers, 459
>1,000 pound, 663 500 pound, 1,751 100 pound incendiary
>bombs or 482.8 tons of bombs, 18.1% incendiary. 3 groups
>missed the targets, 5 had less than 10% of bombs within 500
>feet of the aiming point, overall 10% of bombs within 500 feet
>of the aiming point, the 351st with 29% was the best, there
>were 63 direct hits out of 2,873 bombs or 2.2%.

All well and good. The RAF could be deterred by the German defenses in a way
that had no parallel with the USAAF.

>
>The disorganisation caused by the defences was a major cause
>of the errors. I only have to show the airmen were human, not
>super human to refute the fiction.
>

There's no fiction involved. The RAF was deterred by the defenses over Germany
in a way that has no parallel with the USAAF. The RAF raid on the Renault
plant gives us an insight into exactly -how- badly Bomber Command accuracy was
degraded by that opposition-- quite a lot.

Walt

[WalterM140]

> So the bombing was not a "big disappointment."

The Bomber Barons promised to win the war without having to invade at all.
When you consider that the RAF had 55,000 KIA, the same number of officers
killed in World War One, it has to be a disappointment. The same thing is true
of the Americans. A lot of effort and relatively little return.

Walt

[Eunometic]

"Tarver Engineering" > wrote in message >...
> "Eunometic" > wrote in message
> m...
>
> > 1 Gyro stabalising the aim point to help the bombadier during run up
> > while the aircraft was being jostelled and manoevered.
>
> The gyro stabilized the entire airplane along a track, once engaged.

That might be conceovable but I don't know of any bombsight that
worked quite like that.

The computing wind correcting bombsights were, from all acounts that
i've read, gyro stabalised and were able to calculate the aircrafts
wind drift and thus make corrections for that error but they did not
actualy gyro stabalised the aircaft. Gyrostabalisation could occur if
the bombsight was switched through to the auto-pilot.

Becuase of the unreliability of the link between norden and auto-pilot
Art kramer has mentioned that they usually attacked using an indicator
that was relayed from bombadier to pilot.



>
> > 2 Continiously computing the aim point on the basis of aircraft
> > manoevers and speed changes. (Essentaily the what the Stuvi did I
> > suspect)
>
> All that is necessary to intercept a track along which one wishes to bomb.

The Stuvi was a dive bombing sight not a level bombing sight. It
computed a continious aim point as the aircraft entered a dive or
glide. Accuracy in a 8000 feet to 5000 22 degree dive could be within
10 meters. Ju 88s could have both Stuvi and Lotfe 7s.


>
> > 3 Providing a target tracking system that attempted to track the
> > target on the basis of airspeed and altitude above ground. By then
> > providing servo motors adjusted by the bombadier or pilot to adjust
> > for the drift from the target the wind drift rate could be calculated
> > by integration on a ball integrator and the correction applied to the
> > continously computed aim point.
>
> The airplane automation was actually quite new and the PDI was an INS
> display for the many years until standalone PDIs were eliminated through the
> use of instrument transfer relays.
>
> > 4 Corrective manoevers would then be applied either by the bombadier
> > by signaling with a paddle to the pilot or direct via the autopilot.
> > (I think Art Kramer mentions that the manual method was mostly used)
>
> The gyro will only hold the airplane on track for a short period and a human
> had to fly a heading to intercept the correct track.


Some of the more advanced sights, better than the norden, would allow
more manoevering or attack while the aircraft was descending.

[Peter Twydell]

In article >, WalterM140
> writes
>> So the bombing was not a "big disappointment."
>
>The Bomber Barons promised to win the war without having to invade at all.
>When you consider that the RAF had 55,000 KIA, the same number of officers
>killed in World War One, it has to be a disappointment. The same thing is true
>of the Americans. A lot of effort and relatively little return.
>
>Walt

So what would have the level of German armament production have been
WITHOUT the strategic bombing offensive?


Why are you so determined to denigrate the RAF? Are you related to that
Brennan creep?

Both RAF and 8th AF Bomber Commands did a tough job to the best of their
ability. To try to prove one was "better" or "worse" than the other is
ridiculous. Comparisons are odious, and, on the available evidence, so
are you. Just like a child calling names. Get a life.
--
Peter

Ying tong iddle-i po!

[Cub Driver]

>The computing wind correcting bombsights were, from all acounts that
>i've read, gyro stabalised and were able to calculate the aircrafts
>wind drift and thus make corrections for that error but they did not
>actualy gyro stabalised the aircaft

As I understand it, the bombardier flew the airplane on the bombing
run, at least on the heavies.

(Must have been hell on the pilot! When you are flying the airplane,
you have a feeling--however wrong it may be--that you are in control
of its fate. The bomb run reduced the pilot to the status of a
terror-ridden radio operator.)

all the best -- Dan Ford
email: (put Cubdriver in subject line)

The Warbird's Forum www.warbirdforum.com
The Piper Cub Forum www.pipercubforum.com
Viva Bush! blog www.vivabush.org

[Paul J. Adam]

In message >, "Gord
writes
>Well, I wooden know 'bout no pickle barrels but we sure gotta
>lotta pork barrels in our Capitol

Trouble is, dropping bombs into *pork* barrels is called terrorism these
days...

--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBox<at>jrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

This will probably appear in the wrong place thanks to a buggy news server.


WalterM140 wrote in message >...
>Mr. Sinclair in his usual carping manner:

Walter needs to editorialise the facts away.

This is quite amusing, apparently the attacks on Billancourt are
an accuracy measure, a base line for how much the defences
affected accuracy, but only for the RAF, not for the USAAF.

Not surprising really, if the claim is 498 out of 500 USAAF "fell
on the factory". This was 4 April 1943.

Now go to Huls, in Germany, 22 June 1943, it was a 541 acre site,
0.845 square miles. The bombs fell over a 12 square mile area,
with 20% within the factory fences, not on the factory.

Given the amount of open space in the factory area we have gone
from 99.6% to around 5% or less accuracy. And under the rules being
used this must all be due to the effects of the defences.

Just ignore the attacks on Billancourt were much more effective
mainly because of the weak defences, both fighter and flak, enabling a
lower bombing altitude. Choosing them as a baseline is bad enough,
using it as a baseline for only one air force shows the standard agenda.

It is simple really, take a couple of quotes on the RAF strategic
situation, pretend they are about bombers on the tactical level,
a quote from a master bomber on an area raid and ignore the
problems master bombers had with such raids and the other
problems that night. Having done that go find a couple of the
well documented missions where USAAF bombers performed
above average. Announce this as the USAAF standard and
ignore the USAAF and USSBS reports on bombing accuracy
and, in particular, the way defences degraded accuracy. If one
RAF bomber crew flinched once it is the RAF standard, it one
USAAF formation took heavy losses but bombed accurately it
is the USAAF standard.

Just like before when USAAF success is based on the Luftwaffe
moving 4% of its fighter force but RAF success is measured on
the effects on the German economy, the output of tens of millions
of workers. Walter must really hate the USAAF to smear it like
he does, the way he claims it needs the contest rigged to look
good.

Think of it this way, go find the stories of the RAF bombers that
continued on to attack the target despite heavy damage on the
way out, then go look for the times USAAF bomb groups missed
their target, use these to compare the effects of the air forces.

The men who flew the missions do not need this sort of damage
to their reputations.

>>Firstly the quote says target area, not factory area secondly the reality
>>is one raid can be more damaging and the other cause more production
>>loss, people can be reassigned to say night shift in order to get around
>>damaged machinery.
>
>So what?

As usual with Walter anything that disturbs his view is dismissed.

>>The 305th deceived a DUC for the mission, which makes it look like
>>a very above average USAAF raid.
>
>Of a type far beyond the capacity of the RAF.

Yes folks, after being told an RAF raid was credited with destroying
40% of the factory Walter will simply ignore it.

>>>What you've also shown inadvertantly is that, given the accuracy over this
>>>French target, defenses over German targets degraded RAF accuracy
>>>very badly indeed.
>>
>>So we are busy working through Walter's fictional view of the war, still to
>>come is the attempt to claim the RAF did not drop any 4,000 pound bombs
>>on Germany before September 1944, amongst others.
>
>You're being very careful, because you know what Martn Middlebrooks said in
>"The Berlin Raids" backs me up.

You know Walter is in trouble when he throws other people's names
in front of his opinions. The 4,000 pound bomb idea gives a measure
of his detachment from reality. Most of this post is cut and paste, it
saves so much work, and gives you an idea of how Walter will simply
repeat the same discredited claims over and over.

>The RAF was deterred by the German defenses in
>a way that has no parallel with the USAAF.

Walter will go through the hundreds of raids launched in WWII, find
good USAAF ones, find bad RAF ones, and "prove" his case with
the careful selection of evidence. In this case the baseline is RAF
raids on Berlin in the winter of 1943/44.

>>Walter will ignore the loss of accuracy with distance that all bombers
>>suffer from, and night bombers in particular. The navigation errors,
>>the problems with long distance weather forecasts.
>
>It's correct that night bombers were more inaccurate than day bombers. You
>couldn't find that ol' pickle barrel in a Lancaster. Only B-17's and B-24's
>could find them.

The USSBS went out and counted the bombs on 3 major German oil
plants, they found, in late 1944 and early 1945 the night bombers were,
on average more accurate than the day bombers. They also found the
bigger bombs and longer raid times mean the night raids were more
destructive. People know the night bombers started off with very bad
accuracy, on average, but the rise of electronic aids changed that.

Killing pickle barrels only matters if they are the great secret weapon,
and it is interesting to note these wonder weapons were invisible to
the B-26s etc as well, even when they had the same bomb sights as
the B-17/24s. Makes the agenda quite clear, claim everything for the
USAAF heavy bombers.

>>>The German night fighters in particular degraded RAF accuracy on many,
>>>in fact most occasions, where they made an effective interception.
>>
>>Effective interception will no doubt be defined as an interception
>>where Walter thinks accuracy was reduced.

By the way, Walter has never read the British Official history,
relying on selected quotes of the work in other books.

>Me, and the official history:
>
>"In January the British losses rose to 6.15 percent of all sorties against
>Berlin and to 7.2 per cent against Stettin, Brunswick and Madgeburg. But the
>effectiveness of the German defenses was not confined to destruction. Harrassed
>all the way to their distant targets with bombs on board, many of the bombers
>were forced to turn back in a damaged condition. Combat and evasive action
>scattered the remainder over the sky so that they no longer arrived on the
>target as a coherent force. Much as Berlin and the other cities suffered from
>the bombing terror of the winter of 1943/44, they were spared the total
>extinction that had been the enemy's prognosis.

Note the above quote says that bombers were shot down or forced to
turn back early by the defences, nothing unique there. Now note it goes
on to note how the defences disrupted the timing of the attack, again
nothing unusual there (remember the claimed slow down to reorganise
quote about a USAAF mission?). Timing was important, at night to
arrive while the markers were visible and maximise countermeasure
cover, by day to minimise smoke and dust problems and maximise
fighter cover.

It says nothing about healthy bombers failing to attack.

>To quote from the British
>official history, "The Strategic Air Offensive against Germany":
>
>"Bomber Command was compelled, largely by the German night-fighter force, to
>draw away from its primary target, Berlin, to disperse its effort and to persue
>its operations by apparently less efficient means than hitherto. ... The Battle
>of Berlin was more than a failure. It was a defeat."
>
>Luftwaffe War Diaries, p.339 by Cajus Bekker

Walter loves this quote, he continually uses it without noting it is a
manufactured one. Nor that it says nothing about individual bombers,
only the force as a whole, the parallel with the USAAF pull back in
October 1943.

The text in the official history is actually,

"The Battle of Berlin was more than a failure. It was a defeat."

(13 pages)

"Bomber Command was compelled, largely by the German night-fighter force, to
draw away from its primary target, Berlin, to disperse its effort and to persue
its operations by apparently less efficient means than hitherto. ... "

From December 2000,

Well yes Bekker is quoting the official history. The final two sentences
are from page 193 volume 2. The first is from page 206 volume 2.
Bekker makes it clear the quote is from two separate pages, without
noting the final sentence appears pages before the first one.

Walter has been told this before and as stated he actually has
entered the text in the correct order, without noting the 13 page
gap between parts of the text.

So it is a non quote, since the last sentence of it appears on a
page before the rest of the quote.

Walter replied to the above sentence with:

>Well of course that is incorrect.

Oh good, and there is a reason for the declaration? The way I
see it reversing the order of the sentences means it is not
quoting the author. Let alone the fact the final part of the "quote"
is from 13 pages before. I gather Walter would be happy if posters
came along and rearranged his posts to suit when replying then,
and claimed them as his meaning. The "quote" is made up of
two separate quotes, as Bekker makes clear in his book, without
specifying what came from which page.

So, Walter, why do you think it is a valid way to quote a work?

The quote makes it very clear Bomber Command had been
defeated in the Battle of Berlin, it had to withdraw. And it clearly
shows the quote says nothing at all like the "conclusions" about
deterrence on individual raids Walter has drawn, it exactly parallels
the need for the 8th to pull back in October 1943.

From November 2000,

The text in the Official History is from the section detailing the
effects of the battle of Berlin. It does not deal with any particular
raid as such, it deals with the fact the defences were then usually
able to inflict unsustainable losses on the attackers. In other
words Bomber Command had been defeated and would need
to change things to be able to continue to bomb the preferred
targets, exactly the same as what faced the 8th Air Force in
October 1943.

To state it again, the official history is misquoted, misinterpreted
and talks about the ability of Bomber Command to continue to
mount a series of raids, not about the effect of the defences on
a raid.

From November 2000,

Page 193 British Official History. Putting the text Walter
really likes to use in its proper context,

"The expectations of the Commander in Chief had not been fulfilled,
and by that standard the Battle of Berlin had been a failure. The
attacks on the capital itself had not "cost Germany the war" nor
had the broader Lancaster offensive brought the enemy to, or,
as events were to show, anywhere near, the point of capitulation
on 1 April 1944. **Moreover, in the operational sense, the Battle
of Berlin was more than a failure, it was a defeat.** The disastrous
Nuremberg operation, in which the missing rate was no less than
11.8% brought the Bomber Command tactics of massed and
concentrated attack against major targets to a dead stop and
they were not again resumed until the entire air situation over
Germany had been radically altered."

(Bomber Command bombed German targets 5 times in April
mainly in the south and west of the country, including an attacks
to take advantage of moonlight nights, Friedrichshafen for
example).

To continue the quote, after removal of slightly over a paragraph
where Harris talks about losses and asks for nightfighters, bottom
of page 193 and on to page 194.

"The implication was equally clear. The German nightfighter force
had interposed itself between Bomber Command and its
strategic object, at any rate in so far as the latter involved sustained
operations of deep penetration. Thus, as for some time the Air Staff,
and in particular, its deputy chief, Air Marshal Bottomley, had
feared, the night offensive was brought to a situation dangerously
similar to that which had already checked the day offensive of the
US 8th Bomber Command.
The operations against Schweinfurt and Nuremberg became
famous as isolated disasters, but their real significance lay in
the fact that they marked the culminating points, the former in
the day and the latter in the night offensive, of two rising tides
of insupportable casualty rates. These made the relevance, if
not the means of application, of the Pointblank intermediate
objective (Luftwaffe destruction) abundantly clear not only to
those charges with the preparations for Overlord but also to
those responsible for the continuation of the Strategic Air
Offensive or, in the code of the time, the Pointblank ultimate
objective. This was because they had destroyed the American
theory that formations of heavy bombers would be able to
defend themselves in daylight and because, equally, they
had shown that the British night offensive could not be
indefinitely sustained by the tactics of evasion, deception
and radar counter action alone. It was well that they also
introduced, only partly in the relationship of cause and
effect, the era of the long range fighter which, fortunately,
was no longer an insoluble technical problem."

To complete it here comes the text before the rest of the
text Walter uses, page 206, the previous paragraph in the
history is about how it was discovered most of the night
fighters were in northern Germany.

"It was this which led Bomber Command to change not only
its tactics but also, and in the process, its strategy. The
attack on Berlin was almost broken off. In fact, there was
only one further major operation against the capital in this
phase of the campaign and that did not take place until the
night of 24 March. Meanwhile a much greater proportion of
the effort was brought to bear against towns in the Southern
part of Germany and these were generally approached by
southerly routes. The number of route markers which
served to guide the nightfighters as well as the night
bombers, was severely reduced, the attacks were often
divided into two waves which approached by different ways
and struck at different times and a much greater effort was
thrown into diversionary operations. **Thus Bomber
Command was compelled, largely by the German night-fighter
force, to draw away from its primary target, Berlin, to disperse
its effort and to persue its operations by apparently less
efficient means than hitherto.** The situation, in view of the fact
that Berlin was by no means destroyed, meant that the Germans
had already won the Battle of Berlin."

The history notes the southern raids had about 2/3 the casualties
of the northern raids.

Now consider the following text,

The 8th Air force was compelled, largely by the German day-fighter force,
to draw away from its primary target, German industry, to disperse its effort
and to persue its operations by apparently less efficient means than hitherto.
.... The Battles of October 1943 were more than a failure. They were a defeat.

You see Walter tries to announce any RAF defeat is absolute, no
chance of coming back, the USAAF may suffer defeats but has
a near instant answer and carries on.

Now to the next quote.

The text before the passage used by Walter is a quote from
Farquier's navigator

"It was a good, clear night below and we had an excellent view
of the city. I was in the bomb aimers position. My main
function was to assess the accuracy of the T.I.s. Johnny would
then broadcast the information to all crews: "those green TIs
are short - aim for the red ones further on" "disregard the TIs
on your left" etc. Then he would encourage the Main Force with
such comments as, "Come on in, fellows! The flak is nowhere
near as bad as it looks!". He had an excellent R/T voice which
came over loud and clear to all we later talked with. It no
doubt helped to calm jittery nerves and, I believe, it helped
produce a better concentration of bombs on the aiming point"

Note how the master bomber is trying to tell the bombers there
are badly placed markers.

>And consider this text from "The Berlin Raids" by Martin
>Middlebrook:
>
>"Fauquier [the master bomber] devoted most of his efforts to encouraging
>the Main Force to press right on into the target and not to release their bombs
>prematurely. It was not easy. He could deride the flak, but Main Force crews
>harrassed by fighter attack were not always inclined to listen."
>
> -- "The Berlin Raids p.65 by Martin Middlebrooks

A master bomber aircraft had been used on two of the recent
raids but little success had been achieved. Group captain
John Searby who had successfully used the (master bomber)
technique over Peenemunde says

"There was a big difference between a limited "moonlight
special" like Peenemunde and the area attacks which were
much more difficult, with the sheer confusion of the
bombing, the defences, smoke, fires and, of course, the
terrific mass of searchlights. It was not like the relatively
easy target conditions of Peenemunde. The master bomber
on a area attack was a refinement that did not make much
difference, because a chap could just could not see the
ground properly.

"And Wing Commander Ken Burns, who had been the Master Bomber
over Nuremberg, says:

"I think that the reason for the discontinuance of the tactic
may have been that on very large areas in poor visibility it was
extremely difficult to drop the primary markers accurately, and
that most crews of the Main Force and some of the backers-Up
had only one thought in their mind at the target and that was to
get in, release their bombs and get out, and not let their own
intercom be messed up by incoming instructions." "

A Master bomber was used only once more in a raid to
Montlucon in France mid September, before the practice
was discontinued for 6 months.

The impression I receive is the master bomber effectiveness is more
to do with the confusion of a large raid coupled with the newness of the
tactic, if the instructions do not make sense then by definition they will
be ignored.

>"The raid proceded in no better, no worse, manner than so many raids beyond
>the range of oboe. Enough of the 49 pathfinder
>backers-up and re-centerers arrived to produce a steady supply
>of green TIs. The planned route from the south east was never
>achieved. It is clear from the evidence of bombing photographs, that once
>the early raid markers and bombs were seen to go down, both the pathfinders
>backers-up and the main force swung in from due south, neither being
>prepared to spend the extra time in
>the target area flying to a theoretical turning point futher on."
>
>They were not prepared to fly further to the briefed point because they
>were being heavily engaged by night fighters. Middlebrook makes that plain.

When Walter runs an editorial you know the quote does not say what
he claims for it, the Middlebrook words do not even appear.

Ignoring the problems with raid timing and fuel loads on a long distance
raid, things like the wind shift. The briefed point was beyond Berlin, in
an attempt to lay a bomb pattern in a different direction to normal, the
bombers would fly beyond and then turn back. Things like the timing
going astray changed that as well as the idea of spending minimum
time in the Berlin defence zone.

>"Many of the Main Force crews were bombing the first markers they saw, instead
>of the centre of the markers as ordered, or were dropping short of the markers;
>a long 'creepback' developed. The night was clear. Bomber Command's
>Operational Research Section later examined 468 bombing photgraphs and
>concluded that only five aircraft had bombed within three miles of the correct
>Aiming Point, that only a quarter of the force bombed the vulnerable area of
>Berlin, and that most of the remainer bombed lightly built up suburban areas."
>
>Ibid p. 66

Like I mentioned, Walter will measure accuracy from an aiming point
that was not marked.

The raid caused scattered damage including villages outside Berlin and
every government building on the Wilhelmstrasse. Note the quotes Walter
uses make it clear there were markers away from the correct aiming point.

If you look up the Bomber Command War Diaries you discover
the following, the Pathfinders did not identify the correct aiming
point, in the centre of the city, but rather marked one on the
outskirts. The main force was late, another reason why the
crews were in a hurry to bomb and go on a long range mission.

So comparing the actual bomb pattern to the planned aiming
point ignores the fact the crews were bombing the wrong
aiming point.

The RAAF history notes the Germans dropped dummy markers,
parachute flares were dropped over the bombers, and the main
problem was apparently a major wind shift that upset the
pathfinders, which would be another cause of anxiety for the
crews on such a long distance mission, running out of fuel on
the way home thanks to being late and a wind shift would not
be wanted.

Defences (passive and active) were part of the reason, tight
concentrations of markers were the way to achieve accurate raids.

Actually the Berlin raids makes a point that creep back was
also effected by the accuracy of the marking, if a number of
scattered markers went down then the bombing was dispersed
leading to a bomb trail at times.

>So we can see that although the RAF had a fairly good attack against the
>Renault factory near Paris -- although not as good as the 8th AF raid of 4/4/43
>-- that accuracy did not translate onto German targets. The RAF was deterred
>by the NJG in a way that has no parallel on the USAAF side.

Yes folks, the only thing that stops RAF night bomber accuracy is
German defences, nothing else. The WWII RAF has an all weather
ability the modern USAF would really like.

>>Walter may try and trot out his "proof" of this, RAF raids on Berlin in
>>winter 1943, just about the hardest target in the book.
>
>Are you saying it was darker over Germany than it was over France?

As can be seen from the remark Walter is going to ignore the difference
between a shallow and deep penetration

> He will then use
>>ideas like measuring accuracy from the official aiming point even when
>>the pathfinders marked another point 1 to 2 miles away.
>
>Wow. Looks like the Pathfinders had a tough time locating that ol' pickle
>barrel, huh?

Yes folks, as can be seen Walter needs to simply mismeasure everything
to push the fiction. It was a major reason the Berlin raids failed to do the
sort of damage Harris wanted, the inability to normally accurately mark a
target that far from Britain in early 1944.

>>Not to mention he is comparing RAF bombers under flak and fighter
>>attack when bombing to USAAF bombers under flak attack only.
>
>I didn't do that, and I don't think it applies. Unless you can show that the
>night fighters were more likely to fight in their flak than the day fighters
>were.

Walter you really need to understand the way the JG300 series of units
operated, they had no radar, they intercepted over the target.

See above how Walter posts quotes he either does not read or simply
cannot comprehend, the last line on fighters.

"He could deride the flak, but Main Force crews harrassed by fighter
attack were not always inclined to listen."

Translation Walter will go looking through the archives for stories of
USAAF units doing well under heavy fire, and will then compare these
as "typical" to the worst raids he can find run by the RAF, as "typical".

The USAAF people do not need this sort of junk thrown at them, that
they need this sort of bias to look good.

We know the airmen were human, so when the 8th air force bombing
accuracy report for the period 1 October 1943 to 1 March 1944 reports
39.7% of error due to "nerves", reduced efficiencies due to flak evasion
and an extra 21.7% error due to the increased bombing altitudes, we know
this is men reacting under the greatest stress possible, being human. Not
super human. Or the 8th air force report that noted an increase in bombing
error with an increase in the flak defences.

Bomber Command had its creep back problems.

Welcome to humanity and the fact the men went out and did their job.

(snip)

>>So the USAAF formation that loses 1 aircraft MIA is used as the
>>guide to how well a USAAF formation does when under "almost
>>fanatic resistance". Says it all really. Last time this quote was
>>trotted out it was an attempt to prove how good the unescorted
>>B-17 was.
>
>Unescorted B-17's could achieve outstanding accuracy despite the worst the
>Germans could do.

Yes folks, when in trouble change the subject, ignore the number of
kill claims the fighters assigned to the mission recorded, just pretend
there was no escort. Above all no mention the candidate for receiving
"almost fanatical resistance" suffered 1 aircraft MIA.

>The 385th formation was in "some disorder" from the German attacks, but still
>managed to get a good bomb pattern. They were not deterred by the German
>defenses in the same sort of way the official British history says the RAF was.

This is good, firstly the force lost 1 bomber, so you would hope they
were not heavily disorganised, but it appears they did suffer some
problems. Secondly Walter is in trouble again, this time throwing
the RAF history in, since the book does not say what Walter is
saying.

(snip)

>>Note Freeman is quoting the wartime assessments, not the actual
>>damage report put together by the Germans. The USSBS notes
>>the acceptances from the Argo plant were 12/43 39, 1/44 67, 2/44
>>22, 3/44 111. Not exactly a complete demolition job.
>>
>>Mission 182, 177 B-17s to Oschersleben, lost 34 plus 2 written off,
>>the 381st lost 8 aircraft that day, so this is an example of a USAAF
>>formation holding together under heavy attack. The point to make
>>is if this were the rule that Walter's fiction tries to claim it is then
>>there would be no necessity to highlight it.
>
>That's just flat weird.
>
>The 303rd group also bombed Oschersleben on 1/11/44.

The 303rd lost 11 bombers on 11 January 1944. I will snip the
description of the losses, most of which occurred before the
target, the quote is noting at times different views of the same loss.

(snip)

>According to Darrell Gust, "Bombs were away at 11:48 and our tail
>gunner/observer reported an excellent clustering of bombs right on the target."
> The groups' photo interpretation report provides further confirmation of just
>how good Fawcett's aim had been:
>
>"The pattern of bomb bursts is seen centered squarely on the target with a
>heavy concentration of both high explosives and incendiaries scattered on and
>among the buildings of the plant. Three hits are seen on" a storage area in
>which aircraft are stored under a camouflage netting. An undetermined number of
>hits are seen on the Main Machine Shop, the Final Assembly Shop, and a probable
>Components Erecting Shop. Direct hits or near misses are seen on another
>Components Erecting Shop, a possible repair shop, and seven other smaller
>unidentified buildings...In addition, high explosive bursts are seen scattered
>over approximately one-third of the factory airfield and on an adjacent road
>°and railway.

In other words these bombs missed their target and came down on
facilities nearby, we are talking accuracy here, hitting the official
target, not nearby ones, under the current absurd rules.

>Incendiaries fell in the target area and across the railway sidings and the
>freight depot immediately south of the target...The high explosive bombs on the
>target were dropped by the 303rd lead Group and apparently by the 303rd low
>Group. Incendiaries dropped by the 379th Group flying high fell on the target
>and also immediately south of it...Fires appear to have been started in the
>plant as a result of the attack."
>
> The Hell's Angels had succeeded in their mission, but the enemy continued to
>make the Americans pay. As the formation pulled out to the north, homeward
>bound on a westward track running from Brunswick to Hannover, the German
>fighters were making attacks only slightly less intense than those going in."
>
>--"Half a Wing, Three Engines and a Prayer" pp.314-331 by Brian D. O'Neill
>
>The USAAF was not deterred by German fighter attacks the way the RAF was
>deterred by night fighter attacks.

Yes folks, if you can find two examples over the period of the war your
case is proved, just ignore the cases where the USAAF bombers missed.
Especially if you can use wartime assessments of accuracy and, in
particular, damage. Note there is no measure of how many bombs
missed the target, only that some did and implying most.

>The 8/17/43 raid by the Fourth Bomb Wing on
>Regensburg was another example of very accurate bombing despite heavy
>opposition by the Germans.

As people have gathered by his choice of references Walter has decided
the USAAF is "Magnificent Men in their Flying Machines" and everyone
else are short sighted fools.

Note the holes in the bomb damage quote above, with Walter
it is a good bet to assume there are things in there that do not help
his fiction. Note the 379th is mentioned, it lost 1 aircraft.

>>The 14th October 1943 raid, 16 bomb groups, 229 bombers, 459
>>1,000 pound, 663 500 pound, 1,751 100 pound incendiary
>>bombs or 482.8 tons of bombs, 18.1% incendiary. 3 groups
>>missed the targets, 5 had less than 10% of bombs within 500
>>feet of the aiming point, overall 10% of bombs within 500 feet
>>of the aiming point, the 351st with 29% was the best, there
>>were 63 direct hits out of 2,873 bombs or 2.2%.
>
>All well and good. The RAF could be deterred by the German defenses in a way
>that had no parallel with the USAAF.

Yes folks, when confronted with the facts Walter simply repeats the lies.

>>The disorganisation caused by the defences was a major cause
>>of the errors. I only have to show the airmen were human, not
>>super human to refute the fiction.
>>
>There's no fiction involved.

Walter is basically wall to wall fiction.

>The RAF was deterred by the defenses over Germany
>in a way that has no parallel with the USAAF.

It seems Walter is going to simply pretend the range of radio aids
had no bearing on night raid accuracy.

>The RAF raid on the Renault
>plant gives us an insight into exactly -how- badly Bomber Command accuracy
>was degraded by that opposition-- quite a lot.

USAAF raid on France, 99.6% accuracy claimed, on Germany, Huls
around 5% accuracy.

It is simple really, to make the comparison erase the bad USAAF results
and pretend real hard, find the worst RAF raids and pretend real hard.

Strenuously ignore the many factors like weather, training and luck
that make a difference in bombing accuracy, just claim it is all
defences.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

[WalterM140]

>As can be seen from the remark Walter is going to ignore the difference
>between a shallow and deep penetration

As we've seen, and you seem to confirm, that applied to the RAF, it didn't
apply to the USAAF.

The USAAF force on 8/17/43 at Regensburg had good effect on target. That was a
deep penetration. It was heavily attacked. So did the raid of 1/11/44. That
raid was heavily attacked but still had a very successful bombing, and so did
the various raids of 5/12/44 which were also heavily opposed. There were many
others.

If you could show that some US attacks had poor effect on target because of
flak or fighters as opposed to clouds, haze, bad navigation or just poor bomb
aiming, then you might have something. But I don't think you can do that.
You'll just continue to carp at the Americans.

This raid on the Renault plant shows what the RAF could do against undefended
targets. I mean, after all, it -was- dark, wasn't it?

But over Germany, the accuracy dropped dramatically.

But the Americans could and often did get really good effect on target as at
the Renault plant on 4/4/43, and they could do it on the 8/17/43 Regensburg
raid -- no matter what the Germans did.

This is a progression we've seen before; your notes, and this is a good
example, get so over the top ridiculous that I am willing to leave them
largely unaswered. They won't sway anybody worth swaying.

Walt

[WalterM140]

>>I didn't do that, and I don't think it applies. Unless you can show that the
>>night fighters were more likely to fight in their flak than the day fighters
>>were.

>Walter you really need to understand the way the JG300 series of units
>operated, they had no radar, they intercepted over the target.
>

And you -know- that when they did that, they was supposed to operate above the
flak, which was only supposed to fire up to a certain altitude when the wild
boars were operating.

Walt

[WalterM140]

>"He could deride the flak, but Main Force crews harrassed by fighter
>attack were not always inclined to listen."
>
>Translation Walter will go looking through the archives for stories of
>USAAF units doing well under heavy fire, and will then compare these
>as "typical" to the worst raids he can find run by the RAF, as "typical".
>

You're welcome to show the opposite. Instead you just carp.

US raids on 8/17/43, 1/11/44, and 5/12/44 -- just off the top of my head -- had
good effect on target despite heavy German resistance and severe loss.

If you can find some US raids that were not effective due to flak and fighters,
as opposed to weather, poor navigation, poor bomb aiming, or some other factor,
go for it.

Walt

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Ah yes, the wipe the slate clean approach again.

WalterM140 wrote in message >...
>>As can be seen from the remark Walter is going to ignore the difference
>>between a shallow and deep penetration
>
>As we've seen, and you seem to confirm, that applied to the RAF, it didn't
>apply to the USAAF.

Seen the bomb photographs from the USAAF strikes on Switzerland?
Or do you subscribe to the theory the raids were some sort of deliberate
message to the Swiss?

Note how Walter deletes my words so he can pretend I agree with him.

>The USAAF force on 8/17/43 at Regensburg had good effect on target. That
>was a
>deep penetration. It was heavily attacked. So did the raid of 1/11/44. That
>raid was heavily attacked but still had a very successful bombing, and so did
>the various raids of 5/12/44 which were also heavily opposed. There were
>many others.

The 8th air force mounted around 1,000 missions during the war, I have
no idea of the average number of groups per mission but say it was 20.
So 20,000 results, Walter is reciting the results of 2 groups that came
under heavy attack and did well, at least one received a unit citation,
apparently they were handed out for average results. The May 1944
raid the example group under heavy attack lost 1 aircraft MIA,

"So the USAAF formation that loses 1 aircraft MIA is used as the
guide to how well a USAAF formation does when under "almost
fanatic resistance". Says it all really. Last time this quote was
trotted out it was an attempt to prove how good the unescorted
B-17 was."

Bomber Command launched over 1,000 raids in WWII, Walter finds
a raid description, and tells us all how only the nightfighters affected
accuracy that night.

Now for Regensburg, remember we are talking about "almost fanatical
resistance", affecting bombing accuracy. There were146 B-17s sent
with 127 credited with bombing the target, 24 lost and 1 written off.
Every group participating received a unit citation. All the information is
in the Mighty 8th War Diary, a work Walter claims to have.

There were 7 bomb groups sent.
The 96th lost no aircraft, claimed 5 kills and had 19 out of 21 bomb the target.
The 388th lost 1 aircraft after bombing the target and claimed 7 kills.
The 84th had 20 out of 21 bomb the target, lost 1 and claimed 13 kills.
The 385th had 19 out of 21 bomb the target, lost 3 and claimed 48 kills.
The 95th had 14 out of 21 bomb the target, lost 4 and claimed 25 kills.
The 390th had all aircraft bomb the target, but lost 6 and claimed 6 kills.
The 100th had 14 out of 21 bomb the target, lost 9 and claimed 36 kills.

Walter wants to claim the entire 4th wing did well after encountering
heavy resistance. The numbers indicate the candidates are the 95th
and 100th, in terms of number of aircraft lost before the target and the
385th in terms of kills claimed.

>If you could show that some US attacks had poor effect on target because of
>flak or fighters as opposed to clouds, haze, bad navigation or just poor bomb
>aiming, then you might have something. But I don't think you can do that.
>You'll just continue to carp at the Americans.

You see, when I post the USAAF bomb reports, and so on they are
deleted.

"We know the airmen were human, so when the 8th air force bombing
accuracy report for the period 1 October 1943 to 1 March 1944 reports
39.7% of error due to "nerves", reduced efficiencies due to flak evasion
and an extra 21.7% error due to the increased bombing altitudes, we know
this is men reacting under the greatest stress possible, being human. Not
super human. Or the 8th air force report that noted an increase in bombing
error with an increase in the flak defences."

>This raid on the Renault plant shows what the RAF could do against undefended
>targets. I mean, after all, it -was- dark, wasn't it?

By the way folks the undefended bit is dropped when the USAAF attacks
the target. And the difference between a shallow and deep penetration
is going to be ignored.

>But over Germany, the accuracy dropped dramatically.

Walter has one raid in France and one raid in Germany to prove it so.

>But the Americans could and often did get really good effect on target as at
>the Renault plant on 4/4/43, and they could do it on the 8/17/43 Regensburg
>raid -- no matter what the Germans did.

Yes folks, the Renault plant becomes defended when the USAAF
appears and undefended when the RAF appears. Regensburg
is dealt with above.

To the next ">" is simply my material that had to be deleted,

"This is quite amusing, apparently the attacks on Billancourt are
an accuracy measure, a base line for how much the defences
affected accuracy, but only for the RAF, not for the USAAF.

Not surprising really, if the claim is 498 out of 500 USAAF "fell
on the factory". This was 4 April 1943.

Now go to Huls, in Germany, 22 June 1943, it was a 541 acre site,
0.845 square miles. The bombs fell over a 12 square mile area,
with 20% within the factory fences, not on the factory.

Given the amount of open space in the factory area we have gone
from 99.6% to around 5% or less accuracy. And under the rules being
used this must all be due to the effects of the defences.

Just ignore the attacks on Billancourt were much more effective
mainly because of the weak defences, both fighter and flak, enabling a
lower bombing altitude. Choosing them as a baseline is bad enough,
using it as a baseline for only one air force shows the standard agenda.

It is simple really, take a couple of quotes on the RAF strategic
situation, pretend they are about bombers on the tactical level,
a quote from a master bomber on an area raid and ignore the
problems master bombers had with such raids and the other
problems that night. Having done that go find a couple of the
well documented missions where USAAF bombers performed
above average. Announce this as the USAAF standard and
ignore the USAAF and USSBS reports on bombing accuracy
and, in particular, the way defences degraded accuracy. If one
RAF bomber crew flinched once it is the RAF standard, it one
USAAF formation took heavy losses but bombed accurately it
is the USAAF standard.

Just like before when USAAF success is based on the Luftwaffe
moving 4% of its fighter force but RAF success is measured on
the effects on the German economy, the output of tens of millions
of workers. Walter must really hate the USAAF to smear it like
he does, the way he claims it needs the contest rigged to look
good.

Think of it this way, go find the stories of the RAF bombers that
continued on to attack the target despite heavy damage on the
way out, then go look for the times USAAF bomb groups missed
their target, use these to compare the effects of the air forces.

The men who flew the missions do not need this sort of damage
to their reputations."

>This is a progression we've seen before; your notes, and this is a good
>example, get so over the top ridiculous that I am willing to leave them
>largely unaswered. They won't sway anybody worth swaying.

Translation, Walter cannot answer them, so they need to be ignored.
Meantime I go on collecting nice emails about my posts.

WalterM140 wrote in message >...
>>>I didn't do that, and I don't think it applies. Unless you can show that the
>>>night fighters were more likely to fight in their flak than the day fighters
>>>were.
>
>>Walter you really need to understand the way the JG300 series of units
>>operated, they had no radar, they intercepted over the target.
>
>And you -know- that when they did that, they was supposed to operate above the
>flak, which was only supposed to fire up to a certain altitude when the wild
>boars were operating.

Walter is always good for a great laugh. After trying to claim the
nightfighters were not intercepting over the target, despite the
quote he posted stating it, the claim has to be deleted.

Remember the whole point is the claim the nightfighters reduced
bombing accuracy, and willingness to approach the target, which
means must have been attacking over the target.

People can now go and read the many complaints made about the
Luftwaffe flak units ignoring any flak ceilings, in contrast to the
admired Naval flak units. See Aders in his History of the German
Nightfighter force.

Walter will now show us the documentation that shows no flak kills
on the night, and/or the way all RAF aircraft were above the flak
ceiling and/or they knew they were above the flak ceiling, all after
proving there was a flak ceiling in place that night and it was
adhered to.

WalterM140 wrote in message >...
>>"He could deride the flak, but Main Force crews harrassed by fighter
>>attack were not always inclined to listen."
>>
>>Translation Walter will go looking through the archives for stories of
>>USAAF units doing well under heavy fire, and will then compare these
>>as "typical" to the worst raids he can find run by the RAF, as "typical".
>
>You're welcome to show the opposite. Instead you just carp.

Translation, when I include the reports they are ignored or deleted.

>US raids on 8/17/43, 1/11/44, and 5/12/44 -- just off the top of my head -- had
>good effect on target despite heavy German resistance and severe loss.

I like the "off the top of my head" line, implying Walter has actually done
some sort of research as opposed to committing to memory the really
good results ("boys own flying adventures") and then trying to claim they
are typical. Major Bigglesworth for the RAF anyone?

>If you can find some US raids that were not effective due to flak and fighters,
>as opposed to weather, poor navigation, poor bomb aiming, or some other factor,
>go for it.

This is just cut and paste from the current thread.


"The 14th October 1943 raid, 16 bomb groups, 229 bombers, 459
1,000 pound, 663 500 pound, 1,751 100 pound incendiary
bombs or 482.8 tons of bombs, 18.1% incendiary. 3 groups
missed the targets, 5 had less than 10% of bombs within 500
feet of the aiming point, overall 10% of bombs within 500 feet
of the aiming point, the 351st with 29% was the best, there
were 63 direct hits out of 2,873 bombs or 2.2%.

The disorganisation caused by the defences was a major cause
of the errors. I only have to show the airmen were human, not
super human to refute the fiction."

Keep your postings refuting Walter, and it is simple to cut and paste
the same, unanswered, replies when the same junk claims are made
using the same junk "proof".

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Cub Driver wrote in message ...
>On 30 Apr 2004 05:00:14 GMT, (Krztalizer) wrote:
>
>>Realize also that those B-29s were dropping a far larger percentage of
>>relatively light fire bombs, in comparison to the 8th's general preference for
>>GP and HE.
>
>I'm not sure that the 20th AF was dropping incendiaries all that much,
>before the March fire raid. It was a whole radical change in tactics,
>not merely a change in altitude.

Table 126 USAAF statistical digest, tons of bombs dropped by the
20th Air Force, columns are date / total bomb tonnage / HE tonnage
/ incendiary tonnage

Jun-44 / 547 / 501 / 46
Jul-44 / 209 /209 / 0
Aug-44 / 252 / 184 / 68
Sep-44 / 521 / 521 / 0
Oct-44 / 1,669 / 1,023 / 646
Nov-44 / 2,205 / 1,758 / 447
Dec-44 / 3,661 / 3,051 / 610
Jan-45 / 3,410 / 2,511 / 899
Feb-45 / 4,020 / 2,401 / 1,619
Mar-45 / 15,283 / 4,105 / 11,178
Apr-45 / 17,492 / 13,209 / 4,283
May-45 / 24,285 / 6,937 / 17,348
Jun-45 / 32,542 / 9,954 / 22,588
Jul-45 / 43,091 / 9,766 / 33,325
Aug-45 / 21,873 / 8,641 / 13,232

1944 / 9,064 / 7,247 / 1,817
1945 / 161,996 / 57,524 / 104,472
Total / 171,060 / 64,771 / 106,289

>The problem over Japan as I understand it was the jet stream--indeed,
>that this was the *discovery* of the jet stream. Flying with the jet
>stream, the planes were too fast for the Norden to be effective.
>Flying against it, they were too vulnerable to flak. (Winter of
>1944-45.) And I suppose that flying at right angles to it meant they
>couldn't hit anything, though I never read that.

My understanding is basically the same except that it would be
the discovery of the jet stream over Japan, not the jet stream
per se.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email

[WalterM140]

>>As we've seen, and you seem to confirm, that applied to the RAF, it didn't
>>apply to the USAAF.
>
>Seen the bomb photographs from the USAAF strikes on Switzerland?
>Or do you subscribe to the theory the raids were some sort of deliberate
message to the Swiss?

I don't know if you are being obtuse or not.

The Americans carried their targeting systems with them. Shallow or deep, it
made no difference.

>>The USAAF force on 8/17/43 at Regensburg had good effect on target. That
>>was a
>>deep penetration. It was heavily attacked. So did the raid of 1/11/44. That
>>raid was heavily attacked but still had a very successful bombing, and so
>did
>>the various raids of 5/12/44 which were also heavily opposed. There were
>>many others.
>
>The 8th air force mounted around 1,000 missions during the war, I have
>no idea of the average number of groups per mission but say it was 20.
>So 20,000 results, Walter is reciting the results of 2 groups that came
>under heavy attack and did well, at least one received a unit citation,
>apparently they were handed out for average results. The May 1944
>raid the example group under heavy attack lost 1 aircraft MIA,
>

I'm saying you can't show that German opposition degraded the accuracy of the
USAAF attacks, the way the nightfighters drgraded the accuracy of Bomber
Command over Germany.

>"So the USAAF formation that loses 1 aircraft MIA is used as the
>guide to how well a USAAF formation does when under "almost
>fanatic resistance".

That wasn't the only example. As I indcate, you are getting so over the top
ridiculous, you can almost be ignored.

Just because that formation lost only one aircraft doesn't mean they were not
heavily attacked. As Freeman indicates, the formation at one point was in some
disorder. They still bombed accurately.

In part of your note of yesterday that I didn't feel warranted a response, you
indicated that the experience of the 303rd on the 1/11/44 raid was invalid
--because they were not under attack -- in the target area--. That is so
completely ridiculous. You seem to have your little coterie of supporters
hovering around who won't post themselves, but will make up little funny
stories about pickle barrels. Maybe you are impressing them.

Says it all really. Last time this quote was
>trotted out it was an attempt to prove how good the unescorted
>B-17 was."
>

Unescorted B-17's could get good effect on target despite the worst the Germans
could do. Not so the RAF, as the official history shows.

>Bomber Command launched over 1,000 raids in WWII, Walter finds
>a raid description, and tells us all how only the nightfighters affected
>accuracy that night.
>

Walt saw a lot of anecdotal evidence of that and was interested to learn that
the offical British history confirmed it.

>Now for Regensburg, remember we are talking about "almost fanatical
>resistance", affecting bombing accuracy.

--Not-- affecting bombing accuracy--

There were146 B-17s sent
>with 127 credited with bombing the target, 24 lost and 1 written off.
>Every group participating received a unit citation. All the information is
>in the Mighty 8th War Diary, a work Walter claims to have.

Yeah, found it on the remnants table. Cheap.

>
>There were 7 bomb groups sent.
>The 96th lost no aircraft, claimed 5 kills and had 19 out of 21 bomb the
>target.
>The 388th lost 1 aircraft after bombing the target and claimed 7 kills.
>The 84th had 20 out of 21 bomb the target, lost 1 and claimed 13 kills.
>The 385th had 19 out of 21 bomb the target, lost 3 and claimed 48 kills.
>The 95th had 14 out of 21 bomb the target, lost 4 and claimed 25 kills.
>The 390th had all aircraft bomb the target, but lost 6 and claimed 6 kills.
>The 100th had 14 out of 21 bomb the target, lost 9 and claimed 36 kills.
>
>Walter wants to claim the entire 4th wing did well after encountering
>heavy resistance.

Walt said no such thing. You're a lying son of a bitch, aren't you?

Walt wants to say there was good effect on target. You are making things up
from whole cloth. But doubtless your buddies are glad you are defending the
right.

The numbers indicate the candidates are the 95th
>and 100th, in terms of number of aircraft lost before the target and the
>385th in terms of kills claimed.
>

And all this pedantry shows what exactly?

>>If you could show that some US attacks had poor effect on target because of
>>flak or fighters as opposed to clouds, haze, bad navigation or just poor
>bomb
>>aiming, then you might have something. But I don't think you can do that.
>>You'll just continue to carp at the Americans.
>
>You see, when I post the USAAF bomb reports, and so on they are
>deleted.
>

Address the point, Sinclair. Can you show that flak or fighters degraded USAAF
accuracy?

The answer is no, you cannot. So you just carp and parade your pedant's
pedigree.


>"We know the airmen were human, so when the 8th air force bombing
>accuracy report for the period 1 October 1943 to 1 March 1944 reports
>39.7% of error due to "nerves", reduced efficiencies due to flak evasion
>and an extra 21.7% error due to the increased bombing altitudes, we know
>this is men reacting under the greatest stress possible, being human.

We know the Germans are clear that the USAAF hurt them much worse than the RAF
did.


Not
>super human. Or the 8th air force report that noted an increase in bombing
>error with an increase in the flak defences."
>

Which you don't quote.


>>This raid on the Renault plant shows what the RAF could do against
>undefended
>>targets. I mean, after all, it -was- dark, wasn't it?
>
>By the way folks the undefended bit is dropped when the USAAF attacks
>the target.

It was dark, right? There was good effect on target, right? It was
undefended, right?

It helps establish a baseline for accuracy. And as I indicated the other day,
we can see clearly that over German targets, that accuracy was seriously
degraded by the German defenses in a way that has no parallel in the USAAF
experience.

And the difference between a shallow and deep penetration
>is going to be ignored.
>

As I said earlier, the USAAF took their targeting systems with them. You're
confirming that the vaunted RAF had an accuracy problem due to its technology.

Okay, fine. Too bad they didn't have better aircraft. Then they could have
attacked by day.

Too bad they didn't develop a better heavy machine gun for defense, or a
bomber with a very strong stucture, or very forgiving flight characteristics,
or one that could fly in tight formations above the worst of the flak. Too bad
they didn't have an aircraft like the B-17.

>>But over Germany, the accuracy dropped dramatically.
>
>Walter has one raid in France and one raid in Germany to prove it so.
>

You don't deny it. As I suggest above, Mr. Wiltshaw, I believe it was, started
the ball rolling on this by showing that that RAF could get pretty could
concentration on an undefended factory. But over Germany where there were
flak, fighters and searchlights, they had to settle for attacking whole cities
and burning out the workers, not burning down the factories.

The Americans didn't have to do that.

>>But the Americans could and often did get really good effect on target as at
>>the Renault plant on 4/4/43, and they could do it on the 8/17/43 Regensburg
>>raid -- no matter what the Germans did.
>
>Yes folks, the Renault plant becomes defended when the USAAF
>appears and undefended when the RAF appears.

The Renault factory was undefended when the Americans hit it. After they left
the target area, they were attacked by JG 26. The point is that when the USAAF
-and- the RAF hit it, it was undefended. And the Americans could get good
effect on target despite the worst the Germans could do. Not so the RAF.

Regensburg
>is dealt with above.
>
>To the next ">" is simply my material that had to be deleted,

A lot of your material is over the top ridiculous.

You delete a lot of my material; I don't mind.

>
>"This is quite amusing, apparently the attacks on Billancourt are
>an accuracy measure, a base line for how much the defences
>affected accuracy, but only for the RAF, not for the USAAF.
>

I think you are lying. I think you took my meaning perfectly.

>Not surprising really, if the claim is 498 out of 500 USAAF "fell
>on the factory". This was 4 April 1943.
>
>Now go to Huls, in Germany, 22 June 1943, it was a 541 acre site,
>0.845 square miles. The bombs fell over a 12 square mile area,
>with 20% within the factory fences, not on the factory.
>

Huels was badly damaged. But I don't see the point. You don't address the
point.

Can you show that USAAF accuracy was degraded by flak and fighters, or even by
fighters, the way the official British history shows that the RAF's accuracy
was degraded when intercepted by the NJG?

No, you can't. You can only carp.

>Given the amount of open space in the factory area we have gone
>from 99.6% to around 5% or less accuracy. And under the rules being
>used this must all be due to the effects of the defences.
>

Huels was badly damaged.

>Just ignore the attacks on Billancourt were much more effective
>mainly because of the weak defences,

I have actually addressed the attack on the Renualt plant at Billancourt quite
a bit. but we can see on one hand accuarcy against an undefended target --
Billancourt-- and the accuracy over German targets and we can say,
"hmmmmmmm....big difference."


both fighter and flak, enabling a
>lower bombing altitude. Choosing them as a baseline is bad enough,
>using it as a baseline for only one air force shows the standard agenda.
>

Both Air Forces attacked it. But the USAAF could get the same accuracy despite
the worst the Germans could do; RAF accuracy was degraded when the defenses
made a strong reaction.


>It is simple really, take a couple of quotes on the RAF strategic
>situation, pretend they are about bombers on the tactical level,

Yeah, well. The German night fighters were not harrasssing British bombers
over Germany on a strategic level. It was pretty personal.

>a quote from a master bomber on an area raid and ignore the
>problems master bombers had with such raids and the other
>problems that night.

It was noted on enough missions to be noted in the official history.

You're boring me, Sinclair.

Having done that go find a couple of the
>well documented missions where USAAF bombers performed
>above average. Announce this as the USAAF standard and
>ignore the USAAF and USSBS reports on bombing accuracy
>and, in particular, the way defences degraded accuracy.

I haven't seen anything that indicated that fighters degraded the accuracy. On
many raids, the bombing was very accurate no matter how the Germans reacted.

You are welcome to lay aside your charts and abstracts and cite some actual
raids where the RAF had good concentration on target despite being heavily
engaged by the NJG. Seriously, I think there was at least one.

If one
>RAF bomber crew flinched once it is the RAF standard, it one
>USAAF formation took heavy losses but bombed accurately it
>is the USAAF standard.

But that wasn't the case.

If one RAF bomber crew flinched?

"The night was clear. Bomber Command's
Operational Research Section later examined 468 bombing photgraphs and
concluded that only five aircraft had bombed within three miles of the correct
Aiming Point, that only a quarter of the force bombed the vulnerable area of
Berlin, and that most of the remainer bombed lightly built up suburban areas."

Five aircraft out of 468? Who do you think you are fooling Sinclair? That's
a lot of flinching.

I cite one raid. As far as i know, you've -never- cited a good raid by the
RAF, one that had pretty good effect on target. Of course the targets were
whole cities. That should make it easier. Can you cite such a raid or raids?
Besides raids that resulted in the random firestorm, or the advent of window?
I've cited several raids. Thanks for mentioning Huels. That raid had good
effect on target, as did the others I named.

Now you name some significant Main Force raids of equal effect. And you have
this advantage -- the RAF targeted whole cities, typically.


>
>Just like before when USAAF success is based on the Luftwaffe
>moving 4% of its fighter force but RAF success is measured on
>the effects on the German economy, the output of tens of millions
>of workers.

What I showed there was that after more than a year of Harris' command, the
effect of British bombing on the German economy was nil. On the other hand,
the Germans were very concerned over USAAF operations and after a period of
less than a year were giving them priority in the defense.

Now, if we extrapolate, we see after a year of USAAF operations the double
strike raid against Regensburg/Shweinfurt on 8/17/43 -- a year after the first
raid. What sort of effort was Bomber Command having on 9/1/40, a year after the
war started? Or maybe we can add 8 months, the time between the attack on
Pearl Harbor and the first USAAF raid. Let's see, that takes us to the Summer
of 1941. What effect was the RAF having on German industry in that time frame?

Almost none.

Isn't that about the time the Butts report came out? So given the same time
frames to develop, the USAAF is wrecking the Regansburg ME-109 factory, the
British were trying to improve on getting 3 aircraft out of 100 within five
miles of the target.

This just gets better and better. Or more embarrassing for you.

Walter must really hate the USAAF to smear it like
>he does, the way he claims it needs the contest rigged to look
>good.
>

Do you remember that thread on the moderated WWII group called "Was the
daylight bombing campaign necessary?"

We've come a long way since then, haven't we? Now the question is, since you
seem to agree that RAF accuracy over distance was so poor, why was the RAF
wasting its time dropping so many bombs so inaccurately at night? I mean, the
accuracy over Germany, when compared to that raid on the Renault plant -- it's
sort of pitiful, isn't it?

>Think of it this way, go find the stories of the RAF bombers that
>continued on to attack the target despite heavy damage on the
>way out

On the way out, the target had already been attacked.

, then go look for the times USAAF bomb groups missed
>their target, use these to compare the effects of the air forces.
>

The Americans sometimes missed, and missed wide. You're dodging the question
that we have wandered on to. Did the German fighter defenses degrade the US
bombing the way it did the British bombing?

I think the answer is no, and your dodging seems to confirm that you have no
information to the contrary.

>The men who flew the missions do not need this sort of damage
>to their reputations."
>
>>This is a progression we've seen before; your notes, and this is a good
>>example, get so over the top ridiculous that I am willing to leave them
>>largely unaswered. They won't sway anybody worth swaying.
>
>Translation, Walter cannot answer them, so they need to be ignored.

People can judge for themselves.

>Meantime I go on collecting nice emails about my posts.
>

I've no doubt you do. If you are hishonest enough to post it, there are those
hopeful enough to buy it.

>WalterM140 wrote in message >...
>>>>I didn't do that, and I don't think it applies. Unless you can show that
>the
>>>>night fighters were more likely to fight in their flak than the day
>fighters
>>>>were.
>>
>>>Walter you really need to understand the way the JG300 series of units
>>>operated, they had no radar, they intercepted over the target.
>>
>>And you -know- that when they did that, they was supposed to operate above
>the
>>flak, which was only supposed to fire up to a certain altitude when the wild
>>boars were operating.
>
>Walter is always good for a great laugh.

I'm right; you tried to fool people.

After trying to claim the
>nightfighters were not intercepting over the target, despite the
>quote he posted stating it, the claim has to be deleted.
>

See above. You lied, and as is often the case, you got caught.

>Remember the whole point is the claim the nightfighters reduced
>bombing accuracy, and willingness to approach the target, which
>means must have been attacking over the target.
>

It doesn't mean that at all; you are blatantly lying. I even provided the
quote:

"Fauquier [the master bomber] devoted most of his efforts to encouraging
the Main Force to press right on into the target and not to release their bombs
prematurely. It was not easy. He could deride the flak, but Main Force crews
harrassed by fighter attack were not always inclined to listen."

-- "The Berlin Raids p.65 by Martin Middlebrooks

What you know damn well was the case, was that the bulk of both day and night
fighter attackes happened well before the target. Ever hear of the Kammhuber
line?

You are so easy to show as a liar. You're pitiful.


>People can now go and read the many complaints made about the
>Luftwaffe flak units ignoring any flak ceilings, in contrast to the
>admired Naval flak units. See Aders in his History of the German
>Nightfighter force.

That wouldn't be the point, would it? Why didn't you post that before in this
thread? The German flak was supposed to moderate their fire when the wild
boars were around. Most of the fighter activity took place away from the
target cities, for both forces.

>
>Walter will now show us the documentation that shows no flak kills
>on the night, and/or the way all RAF aircraft were above the flak
>ceiling and/or they knew they were above the flak ceiling, all after
>proving there was a flak ceiling in place that night and it was
>adhered to.
>

I don't have to. What you posted was complete bull****.

>WalterM140 wrote in message >...
>>>"He could deride the flak, but Main Force crews harrassed by fighter
>>>attack were not always inclined to listen."
>>>
>>>Translation Walter will go looking through the archives for stories of
>>>USAAF units doing well under heavy fire, and will then compare these
>>>as "typical" to the worst raids he can find run by the RAF, as "typical".

It somehow made its way into the official history.

>>
>>You're welcome to show the opposite. Instead you just carp.
>
>Translation, when I include the reports they are ignored or deleted.


And blah blah blah. You can't show it, so you just carp.

>
>>US raids on 8/17/43, 1/11/44, and 5/12/44 -- just off the top of my head --
>had
>>good effect on target despite heavy German resistance and severe loss.
>
>I like the "off the top of my head" line, implying Walter has actually done
>some sort of research as opposed to committing to memory the really
>good results ("boys own flying adventures") and then trying to claim they
>are typical. Major Bigglesworth for the RAF anyone?

Are you saying those raids didn't have good effect on target? Or that they
were not heaviy opposed, or what exactly?

>
>>If you can find some US raids that were not effective due to flak and
>fighters,
>>as opposed to weather, poor navigation, poor bomb aiming, or some other
>factor,
>>go for it.
>
>This is just cut and paste from the current thread.
>
>
>"The 14th October 1943 raid, 16 bomb groups, 229 bombers, 459
>1,000 pound, 663 500 pound, 1,751 100 pound incendiary
>bombs or 482.8 tons of bombs, 18.1% incendiary. 3 groups
>missed the targets, 5 had less than 10% of bombs within 500
>feet of the aiming point, overall 10% of bombs within 500 feet
>of the aiming point, the 351st with 29% was the best, there
>were 63 direct hits out of 2,873 bombs or 2.2%.
>
>The disorganisation caused by the defences was a major cause
>of the errors. I only have to show the airmen were human, not
>super human to refute the fiction."

Where do you show the defenses caused the errors?

The ball bearing plants at Shweinfurt on 10/14/43, to quote Freeman were
"heavily hit." The 351st group placed all bombs within 1,000 feet of the
aiming point. This, in spite of heavy fighter opposition.


Walt

[Cub Driver]

>My understanding is basically the same except that it would be
>the discovery of the jet stream over Japan, not the jet stream
>per se.

Was it generally known? It seemed to surprise everyone when it
appeared over Japan, though I suppose it was journalists/historians
who were surprised, rather than meteorologists?

Is the jet stream over Japan the same altitude as elsewhere, or does
it move up and down so much as to make this moot?

How wide is the jet stream? On the evening wx forecast, it is always
depicted as a blue tunnel or worm (usually heading for New England).
Is it hundreds or thousands of miles wide?

all the best -- Dan Ford
email: (put Cubdriver in subject line)

The Warbird's Forum www.warbirdforum.com
The Piper Cub Forum www.pipercubforum.com
Viva Bush! blog www.vivabush.org

[Presidente Alcazar]

On 03 May 2004 10:13:47 GMT, (WalterM140) wrote:

>This is a progression we've seen before; your notes, and this is a good
>example, get so over the top ridiculous that I am willing to leave them
>largely unaswered.

Don't stop at the "largely".

Gavin Bailey

--

Now see message: "Boot sector corrupt. System halted. All data lost."
Spend thousands of dollar on top grade windows system. Result better
than expected. What your problem? - Bart Kwan En

[Laurence Doering]

On Tue, 04 May 2004 05:41:18 -0400, Cub Driver > wrote:
>
>>My understanding is basically the same except that it would be
>>the discovery of the jet stream over Japan, not the jet stream
>>per se.
>
> Was it generally known? It seemed to surprise everyone when it
> appeared over Japan, though I suppose it was journalists/historians
> who were surprised, rather than meteorologists?

Before World War II, meteorologists suspected that something like the
jet stream must exist based on the observed movement of storm systems
and of high-altitude clouds. Most sources seem to agree, though, that
the existence of jet streams was not confirmed until they were
actually encountered in high-altitude flight during the war.

> Is the jet stream over Japan the same altitude as elsewhere, or does
> it move up and down so much as to make this moot?

Jet streams vary in altitude between about 6 and 9 miles, over Japan
and elsewhere. According to the web page at

<http://www.historyhouse.com/in_history/balloon_1/>

Japanese meteorologists independently confirmed the existence of the
jet stream using instrumented balloons during the winter of 1943-44,
and the Japanese incendiary balloon campaign from November 1944 to
March 1945 was based on the theory that the jet stream would carry
balloons across the Pacific from Japan to the west coast of the US.

(True, as it turned out, though only a small percentage of the ten
thousand or so balloons launched actually landed in the US, and the
only fatalities caused by the campaign were six picnickers who were
killed near Bly, Oregon, when they found a balloon and it detonated
when they tried to pull it down from a tree.)

> How wide is the jet stream? On the evening wx forecast, it is always
> depicted as a blue tunnel or worm (usually heading for New England).
> Is it hundreds or thousands of miles wide?

Jet streams vary between about one and four hundred miles wide, and
one to three miles deep. Wind speeds of three hundred mph or greater
are possible in winter.


ljd

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

This will probably appear in the wrong place thanks to a buggy news server.

Ah yes, stage 2 of the wipe the slate clean approach again, assume
everyone has forgotten the earlier problems with the "proof" and simply
resubmit it.

So we have an attempt to prove the degradation of bombing
accuracy was mainly due to the defences in the RAF case and
the weather in the USAAF case.

To prove this, select a group of USAAF raids, often using the
results of units that received citations, claim these are typical.
Ignore that in some cases the heavy fighter attacks claimed
resulted in zero or one bomber MIA and few kill claims logged
by the gunners, definitely ignore the fact some of the formations
lost their aircraft after bombing.

You see even in the worst raids there were units that were not
engaged by the fighter defences. Even when some groups were
heavily hit it was often the one squadron that took most of the losses.
Decline to mention the fighters usually held off near the target to
give the flak a chance.

Just ignore all this and announce this is the USAAF baseline.

Select one RAF raid where the marking was in the wrong place,
where the bombers came under fighter attack during the bomb
run (later strenuously deny the contents of the quote used to
show this). Measure accuracy from the official aiming point.

Announce this as the RAF baseline.

Announce how this proves the case. Wonder why so many people
are busy laughing.

Throw around accusations of lies in reply.


WalterM140 wrote in message >...
>>>As we've seen, and you seem to confirm, that applied to the RAF, it didn't
>>>apply to the USAAF.
>>
>>Seen the bomb photographs from the USAAF strikes on Switzerland?
>>Or do you subscribe to the theory the raids were some sort of deliberate
>>message to the Swiss?

Deleted text,

"Note how Walter deletes my words so he can pretend I agree with him."

>I don't know if you are being obtuse or not.
>
>The Americans carried their targeting systems with them. Shallow or deep, it
>made no difference.

Walter is clearly not up on the USAAF use of ground based radio
aids in 1944 and 1945.

So Walter presumably believes the attacks on Switzerland were deliberate.

>>>The USAAF force on 8/17/43 at Regensburg had good effect on target. That
>>>was a
>>>deep penetration. It was heavily attacked. So did the raid of 1/11/44. That
>>>raid was heavily attacked but still had a very successful bombing, and so
>>did
>>>the various raids of 5/12/44 which were also heavily opposed. There were
>>>many others.
>>
>>The 8th air force mounted around 1,000 missions during the war, I have
>>no idea of the average number of groups per mission but say it was 20.
>>So 20,000 results, Walter is reciting the results of 2 groups that came
>>under heavy attack and did well, at least one received a unit citation,
>>apparently they were handed out for average results. The May 1944
>>raid the example group under heavy attack lost 1 aircraft MIA,
>
>I'm saying you can't show that German opposition degraded the accuracy of the
>USAAF attacks, the way the nightfighters drgraded the accuracy of Bomber
>Command over Germany.

The reality is Walter knows I can show it, hence the way he deletes
the evidence. His claims over state the effect on the RAF and under
state the effect on the USAAF. Standard stuff really.

>>"So the USAAF formation that loses 1 aircraft MIA is used as the
>>guide to how well a USAAF formation does when under "almost
>>fanatic resistance".
>
>That wasn't the only example. As I indcate, you are getting so over the top
>ridiculous, you can almost be ignored.

Yes folks, when Walter is caught deciding losing 1 aircraft is to be
the definition of heavy fighter attack he will simply attack the person
showing the real evidence.

>Just because that formation lost only one aircraft doesn't mean they were not
>heavily attacked. As Freeman indicates, the formation at one point was in some
>disorder. They still bombed accurately.

By the way Walter now assumes they were heavily attacked.

Remember the bomber gunner multiplication table? Similar thing for the
fighter encounter table.

This is from an RAF report, the 31 March 1945 raid when the formation
was hit by around 30 Me262s who made a single pass, knocking down
around 4 bombers, "78 encounters and 28 crews reported one or more
combats".

>In part of your note of yesterday that I didn't feel warranted a response, you
>indicated that the experience of the 303rd on the 1/11/44 raid was invalid
>--because they were not under attack -- in the target area--. That is so
>completely ridiculous.

Yes folks, when Walter is in trouble just invent other people's
words while forgetting his. It will be interesting to see what text
Walter uses to substantiate this claim, the text I wrote,

"The 303rd lost 11 bombers on 11 January 1944. I will snip the
description of the losses, most of which occurred before the
target, the quote is noting at times different views of the same loss.

In other words these bombs missed their target and came down on
facilities nearby, we are talking accuracy here, hitting the official
target, not nearby ones, under the current absurd rules.

Yes folks, if you can find two examples over the period of the war your
case is proved, just ignore the cases where the USAAF bombers missed.
Especially if you can use wartime assessments of accuracy and, in
particular, damage. Note there is no measure of how many bombs
missed the target, only that some did and implying most."

See anything of being attacked over the target,? As opposed to
pointing out the RAF bombers were attacked by fighters over
the target, in Walter provided evidence, which he goes on
below to try and deny.

>You seem to have your little coterie of supporters
>hovering around who won't post themselves, but will make up little funny
>stories about pickle barrels. Maybe you are impressing them.

Translation Walter has noted his fiction is unsupported. Note how
Walter has been obsessed with pickle barrels recently.

> Says it all really. Last time this quote was
>>trotted out it was an attempt to prove how good the unescorted
>>B-17 was."
>
>Unescorted B-17's could get good effect on target despite the worst the Germans
>could do. Not so the RAF, as the official history shows.

It is quite simple folks, note how the Official History quotes are not
repeated here, they had to be cut out immediately I put the full
context in.

Apparently unescorted RAF B-17s could not hit targets if we are to
take the above words literally.

Alternatively we are back at the usual boys own stuff, the B-17 heavy
fighter idea. Junk.

>>Bomber Command launched over 1,000 raids in WWII, Walter finds
>>a raid description, and tells us all how only the nightfighters affected
>>accuracy that night.
>
>Walt saw a lot of anecdotal evidence of that and was interested to learn that
>the offical British history confirmed it.

It is quite simple folks, note how the Official History quotes are not
repeated here, they had to be cut out immediately I put the full
context in.

As for anecdotal evidence Walter trawls books looking for quotes
he can use, out of context and heavily edited if needed.

>>Now for Regensburg, remember we are talking about "almost fanatical
>>resistance", affecting bombing accuracy.
>
>--Not-- affecting bombing accuracy--
>
> There were146 B-17s sent
>>with 127 credited with bombing the target, 24 lost and 1 written off.
>>Every group participating received a unit citation. All the information is
>>in the Mighty 8th War Diary, a work Walter claims to have.
>
>Yeah, found it on the remnants table. Cheap.

Thanks for the confirmation, it helps when I quote the diary
because it shows how selectively Walter uses any work.

>>There were 7 bomb groups sent.
>>The 96th lost no aircraft, claimed 5 kills and had 19 out of 21 bomb the
>>target.
>>The 388th lost 1 aircraft after bombing the target and claimed 7 kills.
>>The 84th had 20 out of 21 bomb the target, lost 1 and claimed 13 kills.
>>The 385th had 19 out of 21 bomb the target, lost 3 and claimed 48 kills.
>>The 95th had 14 out of 21 bomb the target, lost 4 and claimed 25 kills.
>>The 390th had all aircraft bomb the target, but lost 6 and claimed 6 kills.
>>The 100th had 14 out of 21 bomb the target, lost 9 and claimed 36 kills.
>>
>>Walter wants to claim the entire 4th wing did well after encountering
>>heavy resistance.
>
>Walt said no such thing. You're a lying son of a bitch, aren't you?

Walter's words,

"The 8/17/43 raid by the Fourth Bomb Wing on
Regensburg was another example of very accurate bombing despite heavy
opposition by the Germans."

Anybody see anything about some of the formations, as opposed to
the whole wing? Walter will presumably accuse Walter of telling lies.

>Walt wants to say there was good effect on target. You are making things up
>from whole cloth. But doubtless your buddies are glad you are defending the
>right.

Translation Walter will simply wish away unpleasant facts.

> The numbers indicate the candidates are the 95th
>>and 100th, in terms of number of aircraft lost before the target and the
>>385th in terms of kills claimed.
>
>And all this pedantry shows what exactly?

How about that. I accurately report what the USAAF did and Walter
simply ignores it, not for him to let people see the facts and decide
for themselves, the fact free editorial laced with the "right" conclusions
is the preferred option.

>>>If you could show that some US attacks had poor effect on target because of
>>>flak or fighters as opposed to clouds, haze, bad navigation or just poor
>>bomb
>>>aiming, then you might have something. But I don't think you can do that.
>>>You'll just continue to carp at the Americans.
>>
>>You see, when I post the USAAF bomb reports, and so on they are
>>deleted.
>
>Address the point, Sinclair. Can you show that flak or fighters degraded USAAF
>accuracy?
>
>The answer is no, you cannot. So you just carp and parade your pedant's
>pedigree.

"We know the airmen were human, so when the 8th air force bombing
accuracy report for the period 1 October 1943 to 1 March 1944 reports
39.7% of error due to "nerves", reduced efficiencies due to flak evasion
and an extra 21.7% error due to the increased bombing altitudes, we know
this is men reacting under the greatest stress possible, being human.

Note this is an 8th Air Force document reporting the bombing results.
I could add the various USSBS accuracy reports and even Doolittle
noting the environment became better leading to better results. Walter
normally deletes the evidence.

Doolittle when commenting on improvements in accuracy during 1944,
"there were no real improvements in bombing equipment. The improvement
was in the environment in which the bombing took place." In other words
fewer fighter interceptions as the main decrease in resistance.

>>"We know the airmen were human, so when the 8th air force bombing
>>accuracy report for the period 1 October 1943 to 1 March 1944 reports
>>39.7% of error due to "nerves", reduced efficiencies due to flak evasion
>>and an extra 21.7% error due to the increased bombing altitudes, we know
>>this is men reacting under the greatest stress possible, being human.
>
>We know the Germans are clear that the USAAF hurt them much worse
>than the RAF did.

As you can see when confronted with the evidence Walter either
deletes it or changes the subject, back to a favourite junk claim,
from carefully selected quotes.

>Not
>>super human. Or the 8th air force report that noted an increase in bombing
>>error with an increase in the flak defences."
>
>Which you don't quote.

Walter keeps deleting the evidence.

The calculation was each flak gun added 4.5 feet to error, rather precise.
Apart from misidentifying targets, crews improperly levelled gyroscopes
and cut bomb runs short.

>>>This raid on the Renault plant shows what the RAF could do against
>>undefended
>>>targets. I mean, after all, it -was- dark, wasn't it?
>>
>>By the way folks the undefended bit is dropped when the USAAF attacks
>>the target.
>
>It was dark, right? There was good effect on target, right? It was
>undefended, right?

Translation Walter is going to ignore his original claim and pretend
to answer other questions.

>It helps establish a baseline for accuracy. And as I indicated the other day,
>we can see clearly that over German targets, that accuracy was seriously
>degraded by the German defenses in a way that has no parallel in the USAAF
>experience.

It is simple really, find a report on an RAF raid on Berlin, misrepresent
the report, find a report on a USAAF where bombing accuracy was good,
even when parts of the formation lost heavily, ignore things like unit
citations presented, claim both raids are "typical" and smear from there.

>>And the difference between a shallow and deep penetration
>>is going to be ignored.
>
>As I said earlier, the USAAF took their targeting systems with them. You're
>confirming that the vaunted RAF had an accuracy problem due to its technology.

Quite correct, radio aids made a big difference to long range
night raids. And as the electronics became better the result
was the night raids ended up more accurate, on average.

> Okay, fine. Too bad they didn't have better aircraft. Then they could have
>attacked by day.

People can see the "boys own" things here. Walter should be
railing against the diversion of resources from more B-17s into
P-51s is the B-17 was such a good heavy fighter.

Day bombing required strong fighter cover, not heavily armed
bombers.

> Too bad they didn't develop a better heavy machine gun for defense, or a
>bomber with a very strong stucture, or very forgiving flight characteristics,
>or one that could fly in tight formations above the worst of the flak. Too bad
>they didn't have an aircraft like the B-17.

Sort of summarises everything doesn't it? The penalties for heavy
armament, higher altitudes and so on are ignored, if the B-17 did it
then it must be good.

Agitate to replace those B-1s, 2s and 52s then.

>>>But over Germany, the accuracy dropped dramatically.
>>
>>Walter has one raid in France and one raid in Germany to prove it so.
>>
>You don't deny it.

Walter the accuracy dropped dramatically between undefended
and defended targets, by day and night. Accuracy dropped
with distance more quickly by night than day.

>As I suggest above, Mr. Wiltshaw, I believe it was, started
>the ball rolling on this by showing that that RAF could get pretty could
>concentration on an undefended factory. But over Germany where there were
>flak, fighters and searchlights, they had to settle for attacking whole cities
>and burning out the workers, not burning down the factories.
>
>The Americans didn't have to do that.

People can note that for all the years 1943 to 1945 the 8th dropped
more bombs by non visual sighting, the USAAF did have to settle for
area attacks for a high percentage of its efforts, comparable to the
Bomber Command percentages in 1944/45.

>>>But the Americans could and often did get really good effect on target as at
>>>the Renault plant on 4/4/43, and they could do it on the 8/17/43 Regensburg
>>>raid -- no matter what the Germans did.
>>
>>Yes folks, the Renault plant becomes defended when the USAAF
>>appears and undefended when the RAF appears.
>
>The Renault factory was undefended when the Americans hit it. After they left
>the target area, they were attacked by JG 26. The point is that when the USAAF
>-and- the RAF hit it, it was undefended. And the Americans could get good
>effect on target despite the worst the Germans could do. Not so the RAF.

Yes folks, the fact the USAAF bombers were hit after they had bombed
is still proof of how they could do if they were hit before they had bombed.
This is really funny.

> Regensburg
>>is dealt with above.
>>
>>To the next ">" is simply my material that had to be deleted,
>
>A lot of your material is over the top ridiculous.

Translation, unanswerable.

>You delete a lot of my material; I don't mind.

Walter will now present evidence of all this deletion, beyond me
deleting the 303rd's combat report for 11 January 1944. He will
be unable to.

>>"This is quite amusing, apparently the attacks on Billancourt are
>>an accuracy measure, a base line for how much the defences
>>affected accuracy, but only for the RAF, not for the USAAF.
>>
>I think you are lying. I think you took my meaning perfectly.

Yes folks, Walter wants to set up a skewed comparison.

>>Not surprising really, if the claim is 498 out of 500 USAAF "fell
>>on the factory". This was 4 April 1943.
>>
>>Now go to Huls, in Germany, 22 June 1943, it was a 541 acre site,
>>0.845 square miles. The bombs fell over a 12 square mile area,
>>with 20% within the factory fences, not on the factory.
>>
>Huels was badly damaged. But I don't see the point. You don't address the
>point.

The point is bombing accuracy and the difference obtained when
attacking a weakly defended target in France and a strongly
defended target in Germany.

So Walter changes the subject, to how much damage was done.

>Can you show that USAAF accuracy was degraded by flak and fighters, or even by
>fighters, the way the official British history shows that the RAF's accuracy
>was degraded when intercepted by the NJG?
>
>No, you can't. You can only carp.

Translation, the official history does not support Walter, and the
rest of the junk flows from there.

>>Given the amount of open space in the factory area we have gone
>>from 99.6% to around 5% or less accuracy. And under the rules being
>>used this must all be due to the effects of the defences.
>>
>Huels was badly damaged.

Yes folks, when talking bombing accuracy run a mile from the
actual accuracy figures.

>>Just ignore the attacks on Billancourt were much more effective
>>mainly because of the weak defences,
>
>I have actually addressed the attack on the Renualt plant at Billancourt quite
>a bit. but we can see on one hand accuracy against an undefended target --
>Billancourt-- and the accuracy over German targets and we can say,
>"hmmmmmmm....big difference."

See above for the difference in USAAF accuracy.

>both fighter and flak, enabling a
>>lower bombing altitude. Choosing them as a baseline is bad enough,
>>using it as a baseline for only one air force shows the standard agenda.
>>
>
>Both Air Forces attacked it. But the USAAF could get the same accuracy despite
>the worst the Germans could do; RAF accuracy was degraded when the defenses
>made a strong reaction.

As people can see Walter prefers to hope no one has a short
term memory. Apparently 498 out of 500 bombs on the French
factory is equal to 20% in the factory fences and around 1/4 of
that on the German factory, but only for the USAAF.

>>It is simple really, take a couple of quotes on the RAF strategic
>>situation, pretend they are about bombers on the tactical level,
>
>Yeah, well. The German night fighters were not harrasssing British bombers
>over Germany on a strategic level. It was pretty personal.

It is simple really, take a couple of quotes on the RAF strategic
situation, pretend they are about bombers on the tactical level.
As can be seen the pretence continues.

>>a quote from a master bomber on an area raid and ignore the
>>problems master bombers had with such raids and the other
>>problems that night.
>
>It was noted on enough missions to be noted in the official history.

People can note the gaps between what works say and what
Walter wants them to say.

>You're boring me, Sinclair.

Good. Given the amusement I derive.

> Having done that go find a couple of the
>>well documented missions where USAAF bombers performed
>>above average. Announce this as the USAAF standard and
>>ignore the USAAF and USSBS reports on bombing accuracy
>>and, in particular, the way defences degraded accuracy.
>
>I haven't seen anything that indicated that fighters degraded the accuracy. On
>many raids, the bombing was very accurate no matter how the Germans reacted.

Translation Walter will not go looking for the total body of evidence,
just the reports of above average achievement by the USAAF.

>You are welcome to lay aside your charts and abstracts and cite some actual
>raids where the RAF had good concentration on target despite being heavily
>engaged by the NJG. Seriously, I think there was at least one.

This is good, it will be interesting to see what the rules are supposed
to be here, what raids qualify geographically and time wise.

> If one
>>RAF bomber crew flinched once it is the RAF standard, it one
>>USAAF formation took heavy losses but bombed accurately it
>>is the USAAF standard.
>
>But that wasn't the case.
>
>If one RAF bomber crew flinched?
>
>"The night was clear. Bomber Command's
>Operational Research Section later examined 468 bombing photgraphs and
>concluded that only five aircraft had bombed within three miles of the correct
>Aiming Point, that only a quarter of the force bombed the vulnerable area of
>Berlin, and that most of the remainer bombed lightly built up suburban areas."
>
>Five aircraft out of 468? Who do you think you are fooling Sinclair? That's
>a lot of flinching.

Yes folks, the Walter rule of RAF reporting, do not mention that night
the pathfinders marked the wrong area, not the aiming point, nor
the markers dropped away from the concentration at what was
thought to be the aiming point.

In other words folks, take a USAAF formation that attacked an
alternative target, measure how far that target was from the
primary target, use that as a measure of the error and the USAAF
crews "bravery".

Remember the raids Walter cites, on 12 and 28 May 1944, the
USAAF ones against oil raids, the strike on Zeitz had 20.8%
of bombs on the plant with visual bombing according to the
USSBS, the 1.5 square mile Leuna plant had 37.9% hit, I
believe the current absurd criteria is "that is a lot of flinching".

Walter likes to smear the men in the bombers.

From my original post to this thread,

"Walter may try and trot out his "proof" of this, RAF raids on Berlin in
winter 1943, just about the hardest target in the book. He will then use
ideas like measuring accuracy from the official aiming point even when
the pathfinders marked another point 1 to 2 miles away."

>I cite one raid. As far as i know, you've -never- cited a good raid by the
>RAF, one that had pretty good effect on target. Of course the targets were
>whole cities. That should make it easier. Can you cite such a raid or raids?
>Besides raids that resulted in the random firestorm, or the advent of window?
>I've cited several raids. Thanks for mentioning Huels. That raid had good
>effect on target, as did the others I named.
>
>Now you name some significant Main Force raids of equal effect. And you have
>this advantage -- the RAF targeted whole cities, typically.

This is really good, apparently I have to go find RAF raids that
really heavily damaged a city, the USAAF raids that they will
be compared to have to heavily damage a factory, using
wartime intelligence about USAAF damage levels.

Sort of summarises Walter's rules quite well.

Lets see now, the Alkett works in Berlin, November 1943, the loss
of Stug production was so bad it was the major reason a Panzer
IV line was changed to Stug IV.

>>Just like before when USAAF success is based on the Luftwaffe
>>moving 4% of its fighter force but RAF success is measured on
>>the effects on the German economy, the output of tens of millions
>>of workers.
>
>What I showed there was that after more than a year of Harris' command, the
>effect of British bombing on the German economy was nil. On the other hand,
>the Germans were very concerned over USAAF operations and after a period of
>less than a year were giving them priority in the defense.

Yes folks, apart from the basic junk claims see the double
standard, the RAF is measured on the effects on the economy,
the USAAF on the effects on the military.

>Now, if we extrapolate, we see after a year of USAAF operations the double
>strike raid against Regensburg/Shweinfurt on 8/17/43 -- a year after the first
>raid. What sort of effort was Bomber Command having on 9/1/40, a year after the
>war started? Or maybe we can add 8 months, the time between the attack on
>Pearl Harbor and the first USAAF raid. Let's see, that takes us to the Summer
>of 1941. What effect was the RAF having on German industry in that time frame?
>
>Almost none.

Walter will of course ignore the effects of the USAAF on the
German economy in the same time frame. The fact that before
1944 the main effects of the bomber offensive were military and
that in any case the economic effects from 1943 onwards were
the result of the joint offensive.

Therefore judge the RAF on economic effects and USAAF on
the military effects.

>Isn't that about the time the Butts report came out? So given the same time
>frames to develop, the USAAF is wrecking the Regansburg ME-109 factory, the
>British were trying to improve on getting 3 aircraft out of 100 within five
>miles of the target.
>
>This just gets better and better. Or more embarrassing for you.

Yes folks, just use different rules for the different "competitors"
and you can rig the results quite well.

Wrecking the Regensburg factory is apparently defined as the
Luftwaffe accepting over 600 fighters from it in the last quarter
of 1943, versus around half that in the first quarter of 1943.

It is apparent Walter will continue to ignore figures like the USSBS
reporting that on average in good to fair weather in the final 4 months
of 1944 35.7% of the 8th's bombs landed over 1/2 a mile away from
the aiming point, including 17.6% over a mile away. The RAF aircraft
that missed are automatically accused of being deterred by fighters
and flak, the USAAF are automatically excused

> Walter must really hate the USAAF to smear it like
>>he does, the way he claims it needs the contest rigged to look
>>good.
>
>Do you remember that thread on the moderated WWII group called "Was the
>daylight bombing campaign necessary?"
>
>We've come a long way since then, haven't we?

I did not post any article under that topic so I do not recall it,
I simply note Walter has been pushing the same skewed
claims for years.

>Now the question is, since you
>seem to agree that RAF accuracy over distance was so poor, why was the RAF
>wasting its time dropping so many bombs so inaccurately at night? I mean, the
>accuracy over Germany, when compared to that raid on the Renault plant -- it's
>sort of pitiful, isn't it?

Sort of summarises Walter quite well, why did the 8th bother
using H2X at all under the same rules, given the accuracy,
originally worse than the 1941 night bombers.

>>Think of it this way, go find the stories of the RAF bombers that
>>continued on to attack the target despite heavy damage on the
>>way out
>
>On the way out, the target had already been attacked.

Outbound from base Walter.

>, then go look for the times USAAF bomb groups missed
>>their target, use these to compare the effects of the air forces.
>
>The Americans sometimes missed, and missed wide. You're dodging the >question
>that we have wandered on to. Did the German fighter defenses degrade the US
>bombing the way it did the British bombing?
>
>I think the answer is no, and your dodging seems to confirm that you have no
>information to the contrary.

Translation Walter deletes the replies and then announces other
people are dodging the question. Walter goes looking for a couple
of good USAAF examples, a bad RAF one and then claims these
are typical.

Use USAAF raids where the formation suffered 0 or 1 loss, or losses
after they had bombed as "good" examples of fighter interception
effects on bombing accuracy. The result is what matters, the evidence
is irrelevant.

>>The men who flew the missions do not need this sort of damage
>>to their reputations."
>>
>>>This is a progression we've seen before; your notes, and this is a good
>>>example, get so over the top ridiculous that I am willing to leave them
>>>largely unaswered. They won't sway anybody worth swaying.
>>
>>Translation, Walter cannot answer them, so they need to be ignored.
>
>People can judge for themselves.

Oh they are, believe me, they are.

>>Meantime I go on collecting nice emails about my posts.
>
>I've no doubt you do. If you are hishonest enough to post it, there are those
>hopeful enough to buy it.

Translation Walter is finding his junk is unsupported in forums
where people know their air war history.

>>WalterM140 wrote in message >...
>>>>>I didn't do that, and I don't think it applies. Unless you can show that
>>the
>>>>>night fighters were more likely to fight in their flak than the day
>>fighters
>>>>>were.
>>>
>>>>Walter you really need to understand the way the JG300 series of units
>>>>operated, they had no radar, they intercepted over the target.
>>>
>>>And you -know- that when they did that, they was supposed to operate above
>>the
>>>flak, which was only supposed to fire up to a certain altitude when the wild
>>>boars were operating.
>>
>>Walter is always good for a great laugh.
>
>I'm right; you tried to fool people.

Walter is always good for a great laugh.

>After trying to claim the
>>nightfighters were not intercepting over the target, despite the
>>quote he posted stating it, the claim has to be deleted.
>
>See above. You lied, and as is often the case, you got caught.

Translation, the quote does not say what Walter wants it to say,
so declare everyone else a liar. The fun thing is Walter simply
invents these liar claims like he invents the rest of his fiction.
The more Walter accuses people of lies the closer you are to the
truth.

>>Remember the whole point is the claim the nightfighters reduced
>>bombing accuracy, and willingness to approach the target, which
>>means must have been attacking over the target.
>
>It doesn't mean that at all; you are blatantly lying. I even provided the
>quote:
>
>"Fauquier [the master bomber] devoted most of his efforts to encouraging
>the Main Force to press right on into the target and not to release their bombs
>prematurely. It was not easy. He could deride the flak, but Main Force crews
>harrassed by fighter attack were not always inclined to listen."
>
> -- "The Berlin Raids p.65 by Martin Middlebrooks

Yes folks, apparently when listening to the master bomber's VHF
instructions, as they approached the target, "harassed by fighter
attack" does not mean they were under fighter attack while
approaching the target. The only time the master bomber
instructions are useful is basically on the bomb run.

The really good laugh for the post. I mean there is no point listening
to the master bomber if you are leaving the target. Also note the
problems with listening to the master bomber and the intercom at
the same time.

Walter will ignore the reported problems with master bombers and
area attacks, the additional confusion that made his instructions
unclear at times and so on.

As a point in logic when do bombers listen for the bombing instructions?
On the bomb run or way before or after?

>What you know damn well was the case, was that the bulk of both day and night
>fighter attackes happened well before the target. Ever hear of the Kammhuber
>line?
>
>You are so easy to show as a liar. You're pitiful.

Walter's definition of liar is people who contradicts him.

Where do we start with this one. When the Germans largely abandoned
the Kammhuber line after the use of window, and to an extent the tighter
bomber streams, was discussed Walter spent a lot of time saying all the
British had done was make the Germans do better. The running commentary
approach, feeding the fighters into the bomber stream, was adopted in the
second half of 1943, after things like better navigation systems were fitted.
This was backed up by the single engined nightfighters attacking over the
target.

It is quite simple, Walter uses the Luftwaffe interception system from
early 1943 and tries to pretend it was around in late 1943. He needs
to erase the fighters or flak from the defences against the RAF raid he
has chosen. Ignoring the quote he posts that reports both are present.

>>People can now go and read the many complaints made about the
>>Luftwaffe flak units ignoring any flak ceilings, in contrast to the
>>admired Naval flak units. See Aders in his History of the German
>>Nightfighter force.
>
>That wouldn't be the point, would it? Why didn't you post that before in this
>thread? The German flak was supposed to moderate their fire when the wild
>boars were around. Most of the fighter activity took place away from the
>target cities, for both forces.

Walter will simply ignore the fact that for the period of RAF raids he
has chosen the Luftwaffe had fighter forces dedicated to intercepting
over the target. He will go with the wartime averages, not the actual
defences faced by the bombers on the selected raids. That would
wreck the fiction.

>>Walter will now show us the documentation that shows no flak kills
>>on the night, and/or the way all RAF aircraft were above the flak
>>ceiling and/or they knew they were above the flak ceiling, all after
>>proving there was a flak ceiling in place that night and it was
>>adhered to.
>
>I don't have to. What you posted was complete bull****.

Translation Walter cannot handle the truth. So he invents parts of
his assumed RAF raid, trying to erase the fighters over the target,
but when he cannot do that try and erase the flak over the target.

>>WalterM140 wrote in message >...
>>>>"He could deride the flak, but Main Force crews harrassed by fighter
>>>>attack were not always inclined to listen."
>>>>
>>>>Translation Walter will go looking through the archives for stories of
>>>>USAAF units doing well under heavy fire, and will then compare these
>>>>as "typical" to the worst raids he can find run by the RAF, as "typical".
>
>It somehow made its way into the official history.

I see. The above quote made it into the official history, or is it
another case of myths being appended to the text?

>>>You're welcome to show the opposite. Instead you just carp.
>>
>>Translation, when I include the reports they are ignored or deleted.

>And blah blah blah. You can't show it, so you just carp.

The reports are repeated above, people can check to see how often
Walter ignores or deletes them if they want to.

>>>US raids on 8/17/43, 1/11/44, and 5/12/44 -- just off the top of my head --
>>had
>>>good effect on target despite heavy German resistance and severe loss.
>>
>>I like the "off the top of my head" line, implying Walter has actually done
>>some sort of research as opposed to committing to memory the really
>>good results ("boys own flying adventures") and then trying to claim they
>>are typical. Major Bigglesworth for the RAF anyone?
>
>Are you saying those raids didn't have good effect on target? Or that they
>were not heaviy opposed, or what exactly?

Change the subject time, ignore the reality Walter has a carefully
selected group of "typical" raids".

>>>If you can find some US raids that were not effective due to flak and
>>fighters,
>>>as opposed to weather, poor navigation, poor bomb aiming, or some other
>>factor,
>>>go for it.
>>
>>This is just cut and paste from the current thread.
>>
>>
>>"The 14th October 1943 raid, 16 bomb groups, 229 bombers, 459
>>1,000 pound, 663 500 pound, 1,751 100 pound incendiary
>>bombs or 482.8 tons of bombs, 18.1% incendiary. 3 groups
>>missed the targets, 5 had less than 10% of bombs within 500
>>feet of the aiming point, overall 10% of bombs within 500 feet
>>of the aiming point, the 351st with 29% was the best, there
>>were 63 direct hits out of 2,873 bombs or 2.2%.
>>
>>The disorganisation caused by the defences was a major cause
>>of the errors. I only have to show the airmen were human, not
>>super human to refute the fiction."
>
>Where do you show the defenses caused the errors?

From the reports of the air force and crews.

>The ball bearing plants at Shweinfurt on 10/14/43, to quote Freeman were
>"heavily hit." The 351st group placed all bombs within 1,000 feet of the
>aiming point. This, in spite of heavy fighter opposition.

On 14 October 1943 the 351st group sent 10, had 6 attack, claimed
4 kills while losing 1 MIA.

You can see the Walter definitions working quite well, find a raid where
some of the US bombers were heavily opposed, then report the bombing
results of the formations that were fortunate enough to have escaped
heavy fighter attack.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email

[Cub Driver]

On 4 May 2004 18:27:56 GMT, Laurence Doering > wrote:

>Jet streams vary between about one and four hundred miles wide, and
>one to three miles deep. Wind speeds of three hundred mph or greater
>are possible in winter.

Fascinating stuff. Thanks.

(Must wreak havoc with arrival times in London! I suppose pilots must
get permission to ride a 300 mph jet stream? That could shave two
hours off a flight BOS-LON.)

all the best -- Dan Ford
email: (put Cubdriver in subject line)

The Warbird's Forum www.warbirdforum.com
The Piper Cub Forum www.pipercubforum.com
Viva Bush! blog www.vivabush.org

[ArtKramr]

>ubject: Re: Did the Germans have the Norden bombsight?
>From: "Geoffrey Sinclair"
>Date: 5/5/04 12:18 AM Pacific

>Walter is clearly not up on the USAAF use of ground based radio
>aids in 1944 and 1945.
>
>So Walter presumably believes the attacks on Switzerland were deliberate.

I am no longer subscribed to this NG but I do look in now and again and caught
this post. Walter is right. The attack on Switzerland was a deliberate mission
to take out the I.W.C plant in Schaffhausen in Northern Switzerland. They were
producing fuses and timers for German torpedoes. And the "lost" bomb group that
had an "accidental" release over the factory put it out of operation. We
"apologised" but it was made known to the Swiss that if that factory ever was
put back in operation we might just have another "accidental" release. All
of us who were flying at the time knew of this and had a good laugh over it and
a ":well done": as well. It is all detailed in a book titled, " The Day we
Bombed Switzerland" by the group CO who led the B-24 raid that day. I think you
owe Walt an apology.




Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

[Keith Willshaw]

"ArtKramr" > wrote in message
...
> >ubject: Re: Did the Germans have the Norden bombsight?
> >From: "Geoffrey Sinclair"
> >Date: 5/5/04 12:18 AM Pacific
>
> >Walter is clearly not up on the USAAF use of ground based radio
> >aids in 1944 and 1945.
> >
> >So Walter presumably believes the attacks on Switzerland were deliberate.
>
> I am no longer subscribed to this NG but I do look in now and again and
caught
> this post. Walter is right. The attack on Switzerland was a deliberate
mission
> to take out the I.W.C plant in Schaffhausen in Northern Switzerland. They
were
> producing fuses and timers for German torpedoes. And the "lost" bomb group
that
> had an "accidental" release over the factory put it out of operation. We
> "apologised" but it was made known to the Swiss that if that factory
ever was
> put back in operation we might just have another "accidental" release.
All
> of us who were flying at the time knew of this and had a good laugh over
it and
> a ":well done": as well. It is all detailed in a book titled, " The Day we
> Bombed Switzerland" by the group CO who led the B-24 raid that day. I
think you
> owe Walt an apology.
>

I note from the book review that central to the story is
that the bombing was accidental and the story of the aircrew's
court martial. This does not appear to be the the story of the
Schaffhausen raid but the attack on Zurich in March 1945

The story of the Zurich raid is available on line at

http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj00/sum00/helmreich1.htm

The crews believed they were bombing Freiburg, they hit
Zurich, weather was bad with 100% cloud cover and
they had 'fixed' their target using radar and gee.

The US paid reparations to the Swiss Government
and formally apologised for the error

Keith

[Dave Eadsforth]

In article >, Keith Willshaw <keithnospam@kwillsh
aw.demon.co.uk> writes
>
SNIP
>>
>
>I note from the book review that central to the story is
>that the bombing was accidental and the story of the aircrew's
>court martial. This does not appear to be the the story of the
>Schaffhausen raid but the attack on Zurich in March 1945
>
>The story of the Zurich raid is available on line at
>
>http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj00/sum00/helmreich1.htm
>
>The crews believed they were bombing Freiburg, they hit
>Zurich, weather was bad with 100% cloud cover and
>they had 'fixed' their target using radar and gee.
>
>The US paid reparations to the Swiss Government
>and formally apologised for the error
>
>Keith
>
>
I do not have a comprehensive history of Swiss-German relations during
the war, but I have gleaned that when war began, the Germans tried to
demonstrate to the Swiss that they had better play ball. The Swiss
answer was to fortify the approaches from Germany and install the most
sophisticated fire control for the artillery they had dug into the
mountains. (Effectively a ranged pantograph system - if a tank was
reported to be in a field they could shoot at it in thick fog and hit
it). And a German officer who remarked that Germany could attack
Switzerland with twice as many men got the reply that that would mean
each Swiss soldier would have to shoot twice.

And the Swiss did supply sophisticated devices to both sides - par for
the course for the 20th century - Sir Basil Zaharoff supplied arms to
both the British and the Boers during the South African War and was
decorated by both sides...

And the Swiss did shoot down German aircraft sent by Goering to
'demonstrate' over Swiss territory.

A good start, but it seemed it slipped later on, when Switzerland
supplied Germany with raw materials, allowed passage between Germany and
Italy, and appeared very reluctant, post war, to track down booty
confiscated by the Nazis. (Up to mid-1943, the Swiss might have judged
that an attack by the Axis was a real threat, and played a careful
game.)

Be interesting to know if anyone has ever written a history of the
period and has had access to the actual Swiss government policies at
that time (or is it all secret for eternity?).

Cheers,

Dave
>

--
Dave Eadsforth

[Keith Willshaw]

"Dave Eadsforth" > wrote in message
...
> In article >, Keith Willshaw <keithnospam@kwillsh
> aw.demon.co.uk> writes

>
> And the Swiss did shoot down German aircraft sent by Goering to
> 'demonstrate' over Swiss territory.
>

Indeed and to add insult to injury did so using German supplied
Me-109's which incident should have indicated to the Luftwaffe
that the Me-110 (which the Germans chose for the operation)
were no match for single engined fighters.

Keith

[Peter Kemp]

On Wed, 05 May 2004 05:28:58 -0400, Cub Driver
> wrote:

>On 4 May 2004 18:27:56 GMT, Laurence Doering > wrote:
>
>>Jet streams vary between about one and four hundred miles wide, and
>>one to three miles deep. Wind speeds of three hundred mph or greater
>>are possible in winter.
>
>Fascinating stuff. Thanks.
>
>(Must wreak havoc with arrival times in London! I suppose pilots must
>get permission to ride a 300 mph jet stream? That could shave two
>hours off a flight BOS-LON.)

It's standard to use the jetstream (a couple of minutes of bumps to
get inside, if the pilot is good/lucky/got good met data)

Transatlantic EW is several hours longer than WE for that reason.

Peter Kemp

[[email protected]]

Peter Kemp > wrote:

>On Wed, 05 May 2004 05:28:58 -0400, Cub Driver
> wrote:
>
>>On 4 May 2004 18:27:56 GMT, Laurence Doering > wrote:
>>
>>>Jet streams vary between about one and four hundred miles wide, and
>>>one to three miles deep. Wind speeds of three hundred mph or greater
>>>are possible in winter.
>>
>>Fascinating stuff. Thanks.
>>
>>(Must wreak havoc with arrival times in London! I suppose pilots must
>>get permission to ride a 300 mph jet stream? That could shave two
>>hours off a flight BOS-LON.)
>
>It's standard to use the jetstream (a couple of minutes of bumps to
>get inside, if the pilot is good/lucky/got good met data)
>
>Transatlantic EW is several hours longer than WE for that reason.
>
>Peter Kemp

Well, it would be if you were silly enough to flight plan those
altitudes in their vicinity when going EW
--

-Gord.

[Peter Kemp]

On Thu, 06 May 2004 00:51:47 GMT, "Gord Beaman" )
wrote:

>Peter Kemp > wrote:
>
>>On Wed, 05 May 2004 05:28:58 -0400, Cub Driver
> wrote:
>>
>>>On 4 May 2004 18:27:56 GMT, Laurence Doering > wrote:
>>>
>>>>Jet streams vary between about one and four hundred miles wide, and
>>>>one to three miles deep. Wind speeds of three hundred mph or greater
>>>>are possible in winter.
>>>
>>>Fascinating stuff. Thanks.
>>>
>>>(Must wreak havoc with arrival times in London! I suppose pilots must
>>>get permission to ride a 300 mph jet stream? That could shave two
>>>hours off a flight BOS-LON.)
>>
>>It's standard to use the jetstream (a couple of minutes of bumps to
>>get inside, if the pilot is good/lucky/got good met data)
>>
>>Transatlantic EW is several hours longer than WE for that reason.
>>
>>Peter Kemp
>
>Well, it would be if you were silly enough to flight plan those
>altitudes in their vicinity when going EW

I'll resist the urge to say 'duh'. Obviously the flights heading West
don't enter the Jet Stream. If I was not clear then I apologise
profusely and humble myself before one and all :-P

Peter Kemp

[Cub Driver]

>Transatlantic EW is several hours longer than WE for that reason.

I just looked at some schedules, and they seem to be 7 hours in either
direction, BOS-LHR.

That was for September. Here's one in May: 6.5 hours going over, 7
hours 5 mins coming back.

Okay, maybe half an hour difference, depending on time of year.

all the best -- Dan Ford
email: (put Cubdriver in subject line)

The Warbird's Forum www.warbirdforum.com
The Piper Cub Forum www.pipercubforum.com
Viva Bush! blog www.vivabush.org

[Cub Driver]

>And the Swiss did shoot down German aircraft sent by Goering to
>'demonstrate' over Swiss territory.

More often they refueled errant German aircraft and sent them on their
way, while they several times shot down American aircraft that were
battle-damaged and obviously looking for a place to land. More than
1,000 U.S. airmen were interned in Switzerland, and more than a few
had been shot down by the Swiss. To the best of my knowledge, no
German airmen were so interned. See "Shot From the Sky" by Cathryn
Price www.warbirdforum.com/captivit.htm

Indeed, Swiss brutality toward their American (and a few British)
prisoners is an interesting commentary on the perils of being a
captive, apropros the current scandal in Iraq. Prisons are Bad Things
for those inside them.


all the best -- Dan Ford
email: (put Cubdriver in subject line)

The Warbird's Forum www.warbirdforum.com
The Piper Cub Forum www.pipercubforum.com
Viva Bush! blog www.vivabush.org

[Cub Driver]

>Be interesting to know if anyone has ever written a history of the
>period and has had access to the actual Swiss government policies at
>that time

There are a couple books on the subject. I posted on Shot From the
Sky. I've also read a book (very pro-Swiss) on the Swiss martial
defenses and their preparations for invasion (basically, giving up a
third of the country to the Germans--along with the militia troops
assigned to defend the low ground--while the professional army
retreated to the mountains.

Curiously, I don't recall any big plans for the south. Of course the
Italians would hit the high ground almost immediately.

all the best -- Dan Ford
email: (put Cubdriver in subject line)

The Warbird's Forum www.warbirdforum.com
The Piper Cub Forum www.pipercubforum.com
Viva Bush! blog www.vivabush.org

[Keith Willshaw]

"Dave Eadsforth" > wrote in message
...
> In article >, Keith Willshaw <keithnospam@kwillsh
> aw.demon.co.uk> writes
> >

>
> Be interesting to know if anyone has ever written a history of the
> period and has had access to the actual Swiss government policies at
> that time (or is it all secret for eternity?).
>

I havent read it personally but Stephen Hallbrook
covered the subject some years ago

Halbrook, Stephen P.
Target Switzerland: Swiss Armed Neutrality in World War II.
Rockville Centre, NY: Sarpedon, 1998
ISBN 1-885119-53-4
320 pages

Keith

[Cub Driver]

>Halbrook, Stephen P.
>Target Switzerland: Swiss Armed Neutrality in World War II.

That was the book I had in mind--title slipped my mind.

As posted, I thought it rather uncritically pro-Swiss. More like a
publicity piece than serious history. It was in the local university
library.


all the best -- Dan Ford
email: (put Cubdriver in subject line)

The Warbird's Forum www.warbirdforum.com
The Piper Cub Forum www.pipercubforum.com
Viva Bush! blog www.vivabush.org

[Dave Eadsforth]

In article >, Keith Willshaw <keithnospam@kwillshaw
..demon.co.uk> writes
>
>"Dave Eadsforth" > wrote in message
...
>> In article >, Keith Willshaw <keithnospam@kwillsh
>> aw.demon.co.uk> writes
>> >
>
>>
>> Be interesting to know if anyone has ever written a history of the
>> period and has had access to the actual Swiss government policies at
>> that time (or is it all secret for eternity?).
>>
>
>I havent read it personally but Stephen Hallbrook
>covered the subject some years ago
>
>Halbrook, Stephen P.
>Target Switzerland: Swiss Armed Neutrality in World War II.
>Rockville Centre, NY: Sarpedon, 1998
>ISBN 1-885119-53-4
>320 pages
>
>Keith
>
>
Thanks for that - will track down...

Cheers,

Dave

--
Dave Eadsforth

[Dave Eadsforth]

In article >, Cub Driver
> writes
>
>>And the Swiss did shoot down German aircraft sent by Goering to
>>'demonstrate' over Swiss territory.
>
>More often they refueled errant German aircraft and sent them on their
>way, while they several times shot down American aircraft that were
>battle-damaged and obviously looking for a place to land. More than
>1,000 U.S. airmen were interned in Switzerland, and more than a few
>had been shot down by the Swiss. To the best of my knowledge, no
>German airmen were so interned. See "Shot From the Sky" by Cathryn
>Price www.warbirdforum.com/captivit.htm
>
Just read the jacket blurb - most surprised the Swiss did not seem to
take account of possible retribution once it was clear the allies would
win.

>Indeed, Swiss brutality toward their American (and a few British)
>prisoners is an interesting commentary on the perils of being a
>captive, apropros the current scandal in Iraq. Prisons are Bad Things
>for those inside them.
>
>
>all the best -- Dan Ford
>email: (put Cubdriver in subject line)
>
>The Warbird's Forum www.warbirdforum.com
>The Piper Cub Forum www.pipercubforum.com
>Viva Bush! blog www.vivabush.org

--
Dave Eadsforth

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Cub Driver wrote in message ...
>On 4 May 2004 18:27:56 GMT, Laurence Doering > wrote:
>
>>Jet streams vary between about one and four hundred miles wide, and
>>one to three miles deep. Wind speeds of three hundred mph or greater
>>are possible in winter.
>
>Fascinating stuff. Thanks.
>
>(Must wreak havoc with arrival times in London! I suppose pilots must
>get permission to ride a 300 mph jet stream? That could shave two
>hours off a flight BOS-LON.)


A few years ago now a Qantas 747 flight to Fiji managed a supersonic
ground speed thanks to a good tail wind.

Generally flights east to west take longer than west to east thanks to
the fact the atmosphere is basically moving to the east. Though again
this will vary with season and location.

It is also not necessarily a good thing to arrive early at a busy airport,
with its problems in allocating landing slots and terminal access.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

This will probably appear in the wrong place thanks to a buggy news server.


ArtKramr wrote in message >...
>>From: "Geoffrey Sinclair"
>
>>Walter is clearly not up on the USAAF use of ground based radio
>>aids in 1944 and 1945.
>>
>>So Walter presumably believes the attacks on Switzerland were deliberate.
>
>I am no longer subscribed to this NG but I do look in now and again and caught
>this post. Walter is right. The attack on Switzerland was a deliberate mission
>to take out the I.W.C plant in Schaffhausen in Northern Switzerland. They were
>producing fuses and timers for German torpedoes. And the "lost" bomb group that
>had an "accidental" release over the factory put it out of operation. We
>"apologised" but it was made known to the Swiss that if that factory ever was
>put back in operation we might just have another "accidental" release. All
>of us who were flying at the time knew of this and had a good laugh over it and
>a ":well done": as well. It is all detailed in a book titled, " The Day we
>Bombed Switzerland" by the group CO who led the B-24 raid that day. I think you
>owe Walt an apology.

Hello Art,

According to Richard Davis's USAAF heavy bomber raids list the 8th's
bombers hit targets in Switzerland on the following occasions.

Schaffhausen 1 April 44 using H2X, 38 aircraft, 96.5 tons of bombs
Basel 22 February 45, Visual bombing, 1 aircraft, 3.0 tons of bombs
Basel 4 March 45, Visual bombing, 9 aircraft, 21.5 tons of bombs
Zurich 4 March 45, using H2X, 6 aircraft, 12.7 tons of bombs.

Spaatz was sent to Switzerland to personally apologise after the
4 March 1945 raids and the "safety zone" around Switzerland was
expanded.

I think you will find "The Day we bombed Switzerland" deals with
the 1945 events, not the 1944 one.

As for the 1 April 1944 raid, it appears the wartime story is at odds
with what actually happened, though the net throws up various accounts
of what happened that day, with varying civilian death tolls.

http://www.b24.net/missions/partb.htm

Mission #59
1 April 1944
Field Order 250
Target: Schaffhausen

This mission of the Group was to be recorded as one having embarassing
overtones with international complications between the embassaries of the
United States and Switzerland. The briefed target was Ludwigshafen’s
chemical works the mission to be led by a PFF radar ship. General briefings
were held for (24) aircrews with (23) taking off commencing around 0645
hours. Enroute to the briefed target, the PFF lead ship erred in piotage while
flying over an undercast and led the Group aircraft far south of course into
southern Germany near Lake Constance and approximately (10) miles into
neutral Switzerland. It was learned after landing that the unit had bombed a
forested area (3) miles southeast of the Swiss city of Schaffhausen some
(120) miles southeast of the briefed target of Ludwigshafen. A total of (1184)
100# bombs had been released in the area. No enemy aircraft were
encountered, but some AA fire was experienced with (9) aircraft picking up
battle damage. All airplanes returned around 1445 hours. As could be
expected in the aftermath, a great deal of explanation had to be given on the
results of this mission.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email

[Cub Driver]

On Fri, 7 May 2004 14:52:29 +1000, "Geoffrey Sinclair"
> wrote:

>I think you will find "The Day we bombed Switzerland" deals with
>the 1945 events, not the 1944 one.

I sent this book to Art, so he ought to have known that there was more
than one such raid, and that the raid described in the book was
inadvertent.

This is the trail in which Jimmy Stewart was the president? of the
court martial that tried the pilot for going astray. (He was cleared,
as I recall.)

http://www.warbirdforum.com/switz.htm

(The book is still available! Amazing.)

all the best -- Dan Ford
email: (put Cubdriver in subject line)

The Warbird's Forum www.warbirdforum.com
The Piper Cub Forum www.pipercubforum.com
Viva Bush! blog www.vivabush.org

[WalterM140]

>According to Richard Davis's USAAF heavy bomber raids list the 8th's
>bombers hit targets in Switzerland on the following occasions.
>

>Schaffhausen 1 April 44 using H2X, 38 aircraft, 96.5 tons of bombs
>Basel 22 February 45, Visual bombing, 1 aircraft, 3.0 tons of bombs
>Basel 4 March 45, Visual bombing, 9 aircraft, 21.5 tons of bombs
>Zurich 4 March 45, using H2X, 6 aircraft, 12.7 tons of bombs.
>
>Spaatz was sent to Switzerland to personally apologise after the
>4 March 1945 raids and the "safety zone" around Switzerland was
>expanded.
>
>I think you will find "The Day we bombed Switzerland" deals with
>the 1945 events, not the 1944 one.
>
>As for the 1 April 1944 raid, it appears the wartime story is at odds
>with what actually happened, though the net throws up various accounts
>of what happened that day, with varying civilian death tolls.
>
>http://www.b24.net/missions/partb.htm
>
>Mission #59
>1 April 1944
>Field Order 250
>Target: Schaffhausen
>
>This mission of the Group was to be recorded as one having embarassing
>overtones with international complications between the embassaries of the
>United States and Switzerland. The briefed target was Ludwigshafen’s
>chemical works the mission to be led by a PFF radar ship. General briefings
>were held for (24) aircrews with (23) taking off commencing around 0645
>hours. Enroute to the briefed target, the PFF lead ship erred in piotage
>while
>flying over an undercast and led the Group aircraft far south of course into
>southern Germany near Lake Constance and approximately (10) miles into
>neutral Switzerland. It was learned after landing that the unit had bombed a
>forested area (3) miles southeast of the Swiss city of Schaffhausen some
>(120) miles southeast of the briefed target of Ludwigshafen. A total of
>(1184)
>100# bombs had been released in the area. No enemy aircraft were
>encountered, but some AA fire was experienced with (9) aircraft picking up
>battle damage. All airplanes returned around 1445 hours.

It's all insults now, isn't it?

"Not surprisingly, a navigator would sometimes get so hopelessly confused that
his plane would drop its bombs on a dummy city, the wrong city or even
occasionally, on an RAF base back in England. In one notorious instance, a
Whitley plowed through an overcast sky, unloaded its bombs on an airfield
below, then ran out of gas crash landed in a cabbage patch. All four men
aboard scrambled to safety and set fire to the plane to keep it from falling
into enemy hands. Then, hoping to make a getaway by daylight, they hid in a
nearby barn. They were confronted there by an apoplectic RAF group captain who
had watched the whole affair from his own control tower."

-- "The Air War in Europe" p. 34, Time-Life Books


The Germans are clear that the USAAF hurt them much worse than the RAF, that
even when the day bombers were still inferior in numbers, that more attention
was given to defense against day bombers versus night, further, according to
the Chief of the Air Staff, that but for the favorable situation brought on by
the Americans, Bomber Command would have suffered a "visible and humiliating
defeat."


Walt

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Cub Driver wrote in message ...
>On Fri, 7 May 2004 14:52:29 +1000, "Geoffrey Sinclair"
> wrote:
>
>>I think you will find "The Day we bombed Switzerland" deals with
>>the 1945 events, not the 1944 one.
>
>I sent this book to Art, so he ought to have known that there was more
>than one such raid, and that the raid described in the book was
>inadvertent.
>
>This is the trail in which Jimmy Stewart was the president? of the
>court martial that tried the pilot for going astray. (He was cleared,
>as I recall.)

James Stewart was the president of the court martial, I do not know
the verdicts reached.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

WalterM140 wrote in message >...

deleted text,

"Walter is clearly not up on the USAAF use of ground based radio
aids in 1944 and 1945.

So Walter presumably believes the attacks on Switzerland were deliberate."

>>According to Richard Davis's USAAF heavy bomber raids list the 8th's
>>bombers hit targets in Switzerland on the following occasions.
>>
>>Schaffhausen 1 April 44 using H2X, 38 aircraft, 96.5 tons of bombs
>>Basel 22 February 45, Visual bombing, 1 aircraft, 3.0 tons of bombs
>>Basel 4 March 45, Visual bombing, 9 aircraft, 21.5 tons of bombs
>>Zurich 4 March 45, using H2X, 6 aircraft, 12.7 tons of bombs.
>>
>>Spaatz was sent to Switzerland to personally apologise after the
>>4 March 1945 raids and the "safety zone" around Switzerland was
>>expanded.
>>
>>I think you will find "The Day we bombed Switzerland" deals with
>>the 1945 events, not the 1944 one.
>>
>>As for the 1 April 1944 raid, it appears the wartime story is at odds
>>with what actually happened, though the net throws up various accounts
>>of what happened that day, with varying civilian death tolls.
>>
>>http://www.b24.net/missions/partb.htm
>>
>>Mission #59
>>1 April 1944
>>Field Order 250
>>Target: Schaffhausen
>>
>>This mission of the Group was to be recorded as one having embarassing
>>overtones with international complications between the embassaries of the
>>United States and Switzerland. The briefed target was Ludwigshafen’s
>>chemical works the mission to be led by a PFF radar ship. General briefings
>>were held for (24) aircrews with (23) taking off commencing around 0645
>>hours. Enroute to the briefed target, the PFF lead ship erred in piotage
>>while
>>flying over an undercast and led the Group aircraft far south of course into
>>southern Germany near Lake Constance and approximately (10) miles into
>>neutral Switzerland. It was learned after landing that the unit had bombed a
>>forested area (3) miles southeast of the Swiss city of Schaffhausen some
>>(120) miles southeast of the briefed target of Ludwigshafen. A total of
>>(1184)
>>100# bombs had been released in the area. No enemy aircraft were
>>encountered, but some AA fire was experienced with (9) aircraft picking up
>>battle damage. All airplanes returned around 1445 hours.
>
>It's all insults now, isn't it?

In case people are wondering the topic was how bombing accuracy
degraded with distance during WWII, more so for the night than
day bombers. Then add Walter's basic ignorance of the radio aids
used by the USAAF.

Now add the accurate recording of USAAF raids is considered all
insults and instead of discussing the raids there is simply an "RAF
did dumb things too" attempt, as if, somehow, in a campaign lasting
years there would not be such incidents. No matter which air force
was involved.

>"Not surprisingly, a navigator would sometimes get so hopelessly confused that
>his plane would drop its bombs on a dummy city, the wrong city or even
>occasionally, on an RAF base back in England.

Dummy target and wrong city are standard errors, that happened in
daylight and night time bombing. It would be interesting to read
of the incidents where RAF bases were bombed. The early night
raids could miss the target country.

>In one notorious instance, a
>Whitley plowed through an overcast sky, unloaded its bombs on an airfield
>below, then ran out of gas crash landed in a cabbage patch. All four men
>aboard scrambled to safety and set fire to the plane to keep it from falling
>into enemy hands. Then, hoping to make a getaway by daylight, they hid in a
>nearby barn. They were confronted there by an apoplectic RAF group captain who
>had watched the whole affair from his own control tower."

The Whitley in the cabbage patch, if this is K8969 then it was
on the night of 3 September 1939, it was a French cabbage
patch and the aircraft was on a leaflet raid.

>-- "The Air War in Europe" p. 34, Time-Life Books

Yes the boys own adventure references continue.

>The Germans are clear that the USAAF hurt them much worse than the RAF, that
>even when the day bombers were still inferior in numbers, that more attention
>was given to defense against day bombers versus night, further, according to
>the Chief of the Air Staff, that but for the favorable situation brought on by
>the Americans, Bomber Command would have suffered a "visible and humiliating
>defeat."

You can see Walter's agenda here, the words attributed to the RAF
Chief of Air Staff were written by another person, the author of the
book where Walter finds a Portal quote, they are not Portal's words.

Walter simply pretends to wipe the slate clean and then resubmits the
same junk claims over and over, the "much worse" and "more attention"
claims being the ones to resurface this time.


Now for the "look what I did after 1 year" event.

Of course the allies aided each other, despite the chance that people
would come along later and simply ignore the aid.

The USAAF in England sourced 49% of its supplies from British
sources until July 1943, plus obtained other British supplies through
the Quartermaster system. In the period June 1942 to June 1944
the British supplied to US forces in England 63% of Quartermaster,
58% of engineer, 49% of medical, 25% of Chemical Warfare, 22%
of signal corps and 21% of Air Force supplies, some 6.8 million
measurement tons of supplies January 1942 to June 1944.

In theory this means if the British failed to aid the USAAF then the
300 aircraft missions of August 1943 would be 150 aircraft. In fact
given the nature of the equipment supplied, like radios, the raids
would have been at lower strengths, then add services like air
sea rescue and reconnaissance. Bomber Command also reported
adverse effects from the loss of airfields to US units.

In the 1940 to 1942 period Bomber command benefited indirectly from
US aircraft, either purchased or lend lease, being sent to overseas
areas, increasing the amount of British home production that could be
retained in Britain. In more direct assistance in April/May 1943
Bomber Command took delivery of the first Lancaster IIIs, with their
US built Merlin engines.

And so on throughout the war.

The next point to make is the idea the general war situation was
the same August 1942 to August 1943 versus May 1940 to May
1941, the idea is simply junk. Bomber Command ended 1942
with fewer squadrons than it started with thanks to the need to
send units to the middle and far east.

The next point is the RAF change over from 2 to 4 engine bombers.
Harris reports in February 1942 his average availability, aircraft with
crews was 374, made up of 55 light, 275 medium and 44 heavy,
after hovering at around 400 all year in December 1942 the figure
was 419, 45 light, 111 medium and 262 heavy. In terms of standard
2 flight squadrons (some squadrons had 3 flights and so were 50%
larger than "normal"), in February 1942 there were 37 operational
and 18 non operational squadrons, in December it was 32.5 and
18 respectively. The last Whitley operation was 29 April, the last
Manchester operation on 25 June, the last Blenheim operation on
17 August, the last Hampden operation on September 14 1942,
you can see the major change in bomber mix. The last Wellington
bombing operation with Bomber Command was 8 October 1943.

There would be a major jump in strength in January 1943 as the
Canadian group was made operational, 514 aircraft, 313 heavy,
January 1944 strength was 869 aircraft, 818 heavy, (this is despite
the loss of the day bomber force, sent to the 2nd Tactical Air Force
on 1 June 1943). Strength in January 1945 was 1,434 aircraft,
1,287 heavy.

The really absurd thing is the idea the B-17 needs to be compared
to the Blenheim, Whitley or Hampden to look good, in this "after 1
year" false comparison.

Using the RAF official history figures, long tons, the first 12 months
of Bomber Command operations, to end August 1940 dropped
6,765 tons of bombs, May 1940 to April 1941 it was 19,236 tons.
For the 8th Air Force August 1942 to July 1943 it was 13,424 tons.

The main effects of the early Bomber attacks was military, the
flak and fighter defences and this continued probably into 1944.

In May 1940 the Luftwaffe nightfighter force was effectively non
existent, by 17 August 1940 the night fighter force had grown from
near zero to 102 aircraft, by the end of the year NJG 1, 2 and 3 had
been created, though they were certainly not at full strength. They
had 245 aircraft between them on 24 June 1941.

The day fighter strength in the west went like this, on 27 July 1942 388,
20 June 1943 696, 20 September 1943 899.

So after the attempts to show how the Luftwaffe increased the strength
in April 1943 by telling us the strength in August and December 1943
we now have the bombing accuracy figures for heavily attacked USAAF
formations, with most of the examples being formations that were not
heavily attacked, with something like 20,000 examples to take from
we are given 2 or 3 and told to accept them as typical.

Meantime 1 RAF raid is used, with a quote telling us the bombers
were under flak and fighter attack, and then accusation of lies when
the flak and fighter attacks are pointed out. This raid is used as
typical, with accuracy measured from the official aiming point, not
the area marked on the night. Oh yes, after the deployment of
"window" the Luftwaffe changed night tactics to trying to "swim in
the [bomber] stream" and interception over the target, the most
effective being when the fighters could be fed into the bomber
stream. On the 31 August 1943 raid on Berlin an estimated 2/3 of
the 47 aircraft lost that night were to fighters over or near Berlin.

Finally it seems the firestorm raid on Hamburg achieved about
normal accuracy for the night bombers at that time, around 2/3
of the bombs within 3 miles in good weather (around half in
moderate weather). Showing the reality the night bombers had
target identification problems while doing area raids even without
strong fighter defences. The 8th noted even in good to fair weather
in late 1944 the heavies managed 91.5% within 3 miles, showing
the daylight problems with hitting targets. The RAF reported during
the same time period, late 1944, the night bombers were achieving
91 to 95% in good weather and 97 to 98% in moderate weather,
which is an interesting result, either a statistical fluke or an indicator
of the rise in electronic bombing aids.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

[Mary Shafer]

On Sat, 1 May 2004 11:42:36 +0200, "Emmanuel Gustin"
> wrote:


> The problem was that people with a real skill in airborne
> gunnery were extremely rare. Most gunners and pilots were
> very, very bad at estimating range and lead without some
> assistance (underestimating it by half was common), and the
> probability they would hit their target was correspondingly
> low.

Is this, by any chance, why skeet shooting is so popular at base gun
clubs? Art shoots skeet at Nellis and meets all kinds of fighter
pilots. I shoot a 1903A on the rare not-just-skeet days at the EDW
gun club and see a lot of pilots with shotguns.

Mary

--
Mary Shafer Retired aerospace research engineer

[Mary Shafer]

On Wed, 05 May 2004 05:28:58 -0400, Cub Driver
> wrote:

> (Must wreak havoc with arrival times in London! I suppose pilots must
> get permission to ride a 300 mph jet stream? That could shave two
> hours off a flight BOS-LON.)

No permission that I know of, although it shows up in the flight
planning. When the jet stream and the flight track coincide, the
ground speeds really soar. However, the jet stream doesn't follow
great circle routes, so sometimes it's a crosswind instead of a tail
wind going east[1].

We once flew from Hawaii to San Francisco that set a record for the
Honolulu-SFO route. It was about an hour shorter than the usual time,
purely because of the jet stream. It was winter, of course, probably
January.

We'd pre-boarded and got to see the flight attendants reaction to the
captain's announcement of the flight time. They were quite dismayed,
because they weren't going to have time to serve dinner and show the
movie sequentially. As it was, I think the movie ended on final, well
after the landing announcement, and they'd really sprinted through the
drink and dinner service to manage that.

Anyway, the jet stream is why Everest has that plume of ice crystals
downwind all the time; Everest trips the flow, making the moisture
condense. Before aircraft, that was the only direct manifestation,
except for storm tracks, which were more estimated than measured in
most of the world.

It's called the jet stream because it's up where only jets fly, or at
least jet airliners.

[1] Being in SoCal, I go pretty far north to get to London, so the jet
stream doesn't do me as much good as it does easterners.

Mary

--
Mary Shafer Retired aerospace research engineer

[John R Weiss]

"Mary Shafer" > wrote...
>
>> (Must wreak havoc with arrival times in London! I suppose pilots must
>> get permission to ride a 300 mph jet stream? That could shave two
>> hours off a flight BOS-LON.)
>
> No permission that I know of, although it shows up in the flight
> planning. When the jet stream and the flight track coincide, the
> ground speeds really soar. However, the jet stream doesn't follow
> great circle routes, so sometimes it's a crosswind instead of a tail
> wind going east[1].

Seldom is the jet stream 300 mph -- nominal maximum in the winter time is
200 knots or so, though I've seen 220 knots a couple times...

Airline dispatchers routinely adjust routes to take advantage of favorable
jetstream winds, and to avoid horrendous headwinds when possible. Various
ATC agencies do their part as well, adjusting oceanic tracks with the
migration of the jetstreams.

[vincent p. norris]

>Is this, by any chance, why skeet shooting is so popular at base gun
>clubs?

When I was a pilot in the marines, Mary, 50 years ago, we had a skeet
range and a very large allotment of rounds per year. I don't recall
the number, but I never got anywhere near using up my allotment.

I presume the reason for poviding us the facilities and ammunition was
to sharpen our shooting skills. But the reason it was '"popular" was
that guys who like to fly tend to be guys who like to shoot,

vince norris

[Cub Driver]

>the jet stream doesn't follow
>great circle routes, so sometimes it's a crosswind instead of a tail
>wind going east[1].

This might explain why it never seems to affect the flight as much as
300 mph would lead one to believe. As I said, all I can see in a
seven-hour flight is half an hour, though that of course is the
schedule, and perhaps one can't predict sufficiently far in advance
for a schedule. I certainly never recall being on a BOS-LON flight
that got there an hour early, never mind two hours!

We got fairly far north also. Several times I've flown to Italy, which
for me entailed flying first to Dulles (United). The first hour, it
seemed, had me retracing my route up the east coast (which does of
course move ENE, then NE) of the U.S. and Canada.

Must be quite a choice, between the Great Circle and the jet stream.
Or is the route absolutely determined by ATC, not the pilot?

BTW, if it's called jet stream because of jets, what did the 20th AF
call it in 1945?


all the best -- Dan Ford
email: (put Cubdriver in subject line)

The Warbird's Forum www.warbirdforum.com
The Piper Cub Forum www.pipercubforum.com
Viva Bush! blog www.vivabush.org

[[email protected]]

Mary Shafer > wrote:

>On Sat, 1 May 2004 11:42:36 +0200, "Emmanuel Gustin"
> wrote:
>
>
>> The problem was that people with a real skill in airborne
>> gunnery were extremely rare. Most gunners and pilots were
>> very, very bad at estimating range and lead without some
>> assistance (underestimating it by half was common), and the
>> probability they would hit their target was correspondingly
>> low.
>
>Is this, by any chance, why skeet shooting is so popular at base gun
>clubs? Art shoots skeet at Nellis and meets all kinds of fighter
>pilots. I shoot a 1903A on the rare not-just-skeet days at the EDW
>gun club and see a lot of pilots with shotguns.
>
>Mary

Yes...skeet clubs were formed years ago on
almost all military airbases...they're free
access (afik) and are quite popular, that was
the reason given to me for their existence,
and although they're likely not as useful for
their original purpose as they once were,
their popularity has given them a reason for
being. Lot's of fun.
--

-Gord.

[Eunometic]

"Emmanuel Gustin" > wrote in message >...
> "Cub Driver" > wrote in message
> ...
>
> > As I said, all I can see in a
> > seven-hour flight is half an hour, though that of course is the
> > schedule, and perhaps one can't predict sufficiently far in advance
> > for a schedule. I certainly never recall being on a BOS-LON flight
> > that got there an hour early, never mind two hours!
>
> That may depend on the airline. My experience on cross-Atlantic
> flights is that the scheduled time difference is 45 minutes, and
> that the flight "downwind" is the one more liekly to arrive on time,
> even if there are delays at departure.
>
> > BTW, if it's called jet stream because of jets, what did the 20th AF
> > call it in 1945?
>
> The Germans named it "Strahlstroemung" in 1939, well before
> jet aircraft were around. Jet stream is the straightforward
> translation.

My favourite word is "Duesenstrahljaeger".

[French, from Old French, from jeter, to spout forth, throw, from
Vulgar Latin *iectre, alteration of Latin iactre, frequentative of
iacere, to throw. See y- in Indo-European Roots.]