RAF Typhoons confirmed gunless?

[Prowlus]

Has the RAF confirmed that their T.1 and F.1 Typhoons are to be
supplied without the mauser gun capabilities? According to Typhoon's
entry on RAF's website there doesn't seem to have mention of a 27mm
mauser on the fighter

http://www.raf.mod.uk/equipment/typhoon.html


Smart move for an aircraft that is supposed to do Air defence and
close air support missions

[John Cook]

On 3 May 2004 10:39:47 -0700, (Prowlus) wrote:



Thats a bit of an awkward question!, UK Government sources have
indicated the gun is only to be fitted to RAF Tranche 1 aircraft,
however others have mentioned that the gun may be installed on all RAF
tranches, Now whether they are used or trained for use is another
thing, tranche II negotiations may make the distiction clearer.

Till then the official line is IIRC - Tranche 1 RAF will have it
fitted (55 aircraft) but not supported or trained with - ranche II
148 will not have it fitted.

Cheers




>Has the RAF confirmed that their T.1 and F.1 Typhoons are to be
>supplied without the mauser gun capabilities? According to Typhoon's
>entry on RAF's website there doesn't seem to have mention of a 27mm
>mauser on the fighter
>
>http://www.raf.mod.uk/equipment/typhoon.html
>
>
>Smart move for an aircraft that is supposed to do Air defence and
>close air support missions

John Cook

Any spelling mistakes/grammatic errors are there purely to annoy. All
opinions are mine, not TAFE's however much they beg me for them.

Email Address :-
Spam trap - please remove (trousers) to email me
Eurofighter Website :- http://www.eurofighter-typhoon.co.uk

[TJ]

(Prowlus) wrote in message >...
> Has the RAF confirmed that their T.1 and F.1 Typhoons are to be
> supplied without the mauser gun capabilities? According to Typhoon's
> entry on RAF's website there doesn't seem to have mention of a 27mm
> mauser on the fighter
>
> http://www.raf.mod.uk/equipment/typhoon.html
>
>
> Smart move for an aircraft that is supposed to do Air defence and
> close air support missions

The UK Ministry of Defence officially released the RAF designations
for the Typhoon on June 30 2003. Two-seat trainer variants will be
designated Typhoon T.1 or Typhoon T.1A, depending on the production
batch of the aircraft, whilst single-seat aircraft will be designated
Typhoon F.2.

The RAF website still has the single-seater as the F.1. It took the
webmaster long enough to update the fact that the RAF Harriers are not
fitted out for cannons.

TJ

[David E. Powell]

"TJ" > wrote in message
om...
> (Prowlus) wrote in message
>...
> > Has the RAF confirmed that their T.1 and F.1 Typhoons are to be
> > supplied without the mauser gun capabilities? According to Typhoon's
> > entry on RAF's website there doesn't seem to have mention of a 27mm
> > mauser on the fighter
> >
> > http://www.raf.mod.uk/equipment/typhoon.html
> >
> > Smart move for an aircraft that is supposed to do Air defence and
> > close air support missions
>
> The UK Ministry of Defence officially released the RAF designations
> for the Typhoon on June 30 2003. Two-seat trainer variants will be
> designated Typhoon T.1 or Typhoon T.1A, depending on the production
> batch of the aircraft, whilst single-seat aircraft will be designated
> Typhoon F.2.
>
> The RAF website still has the single-seater as the F.1. It took the
> webmaster long enough to update the fact that the RAF Harriers are not
> fitted out for cannons.
>
> TJ

Surely they can't save that much weight or cost in mounting out a cannon or
two. Can't hurt to have the gun option, for air to air or air to ground.

DEP

[Ian]

"David E. Powell" > wrote in message
s.com...
> "TJ" > wrote in message
> om...
> > (Prowlus) wrote in message
> >...
> > > Has the RAF confirmed that their T.1 and F.1 Typhoons are to be
> > > supplied without the mauser gun capabilities? According to Typhoon's
> > > entry on RAF's website there doesn't seem to have mention of a 27mm
> > > mauser on the fighter
> > >
> > > http://www.raf.mod.uk/equipment/typhoon.html
> > >
> > > Smart move for an aircraft that is supposed to do Air defence and
> > > close air support missions
> >
> > The UK Ministry of Defence officially released the RAF designations
> > for the Typhoon on June 30 2003. Two-seat trainer variants will be
> > designated Typhoon T.1 or Typhoon T.1A, depending on the production
> > batch of the aircraft, whilst single-seat aircraft will be designated
> > Typhoon F.2.
> >
> > The RAF website still has the single-seater as the F.1. It took the
> > webmaster long enough to update the fact that the RAF Harriers are not
> > fitted out for cannons.
> >
> > TJ
>
> Surely they can't save that much weight or cost in mounting out a cannon
or
> two. Can't hurt to have the gun option, for air to air or air to ground.
>
It wasn't really to do with weight or cost of cannon - was more to do with
cost of qualifying the equipment for use when the gun was being fired. The
vibration and exhaust gas analysis is apparently quite expensive (but since
they share common equipments with the other countries, I don't quite
understand this as they are getting the same guns??)

[John Cook]

On Sat, 8 May 2004 08:06:15 +0100, "Ian" > wrote:

>
>"David E. Powell" > wrote in message
s.com...
>> "TJ" > wrote in message
>> om...
>> > (Prowlus) wrote in message
>> >...
>> > > Has the RAF confirmed that their T.1 and F.1 Typhoons are to be
>> > > supplied without the mauser gun capabilities? According to Typhoon's
>> > > entry on RAF's website there doesn't seem to have mention of a 27mm
>> > > mauser on the fighter
>> > >
>> > > http://www.raf.mod.uk/equipment/typhoon.html
>> > >
>> > > Smart move for an aircraft that is supposed to do Air defence and
>> > > close air support missions
>> >
>> > The UK Ministry of Defence officially released the RAF designations
>> > for the Typhoon on June 30 2003. Two-seat trainer variants will be
>> > designated Typhoon T.1 or Typhoon T.1A, depending on the production
>> > batch of the aircraft, whilst single-seat aircraft will be designated
>> > Typhoon F.2.
>> >
>> > The RAF website still has the single-seater as the F.1. It took the
>> > webmaster long enough to update the fact that the RAF Harriers are not
>> > fitted out for cannons.
>> >
>> > TJ
>>
>> Surely they can't save that much weight or cost in mounting out a cannon
>or
>> two. Can't hurt to have the gun option, for air to air or air to ground.
>>
>It wasn't really to do with weight or cost of cannon - was more to do with
>cost of qualifying the equipment for use when the gun was being fired. The
>vibration and exhaust gas analysis is apparently quite expensive (but since
>they share common equipments with the other countries, I don't quite
>understand this as they are getting the same guns??)
>

One of the points sugested to me was the vibration of the gun was
detrimental to the avionics/airframe, this in conjunction with the
training/maintainence/logistics etc would save about £6M, not a small
amout, but IMHO worth spending it, as it should be used in the RAF,
its always better to have it and not use it, than need it and not
have it.


Cheers

John Cook

Any spelling mistakes/grammatic errors are there purely to annoy. All
opinions are mine, not TAFE's however much they beg me for them.

Email Address :-
Spam trap - please remove (trousers) to email me
Eurofighter Website :- http://www.eurofighter-typhoon.co.uk

[Paul J. Adam]

In message >, David
E. Powell > writes
>Surely they can't save that much weight or cost in mounting out a cannon or
>two.

The cannon's not that expensive.

Now, flying enough sorties for the aircrew to become and remain
proficient in its use, *that* gets expensive (airframe hours, range
time, et cetera - adds up fast).

>Can't hurt to have the gun option, for air to air or air to ground.

It costs money, which is in seriously short supply. What will you give
up instead?

--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBox<at>jrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

[Dave Eadsforth]

In article >, Paul J. Adam
> writes
>In message >, David
>E. Powell > writes
>>Surely they can't save that much weight or cost in mounting out a cannon or
>>two.
>
>The cannon's not that expensive.
>
>Now, flying enough sorties for the aircrew to become and remain
>proficient in its use, *that* gets expensive (airframe hours, range
>time, et cetera - adds up fast).
>
>>Can't hurt to have the gun option, for air to air or air to ground.
>
>It costs money, which is in seriously short supply. What will you give
>up instead?
>
Is it necessary to think of giving up something instead? If cannon are
'the cost of doing business' for a fighter - a necessary contingency -
then the money should be allocated.

Over the last few decades, British defence funding has been dogged by
the motto 'there isn't going to be another real war, old chap' but of
course wars have a habit of turning up - and then we are stuffed.
During the Falklands we had ships that were wired up with cable that
gave off toxic fumes when it burned, and the men had overalls of man-
made fibre that shrunk nicely onto the body when close to a fire. And
as for the prospect of ships being attacked by more than one aircraft at
a time - couldn't possibly happen. Close defence? Lord 'what's a
Vulcan cannon' Chalfont didn't have much to offer when questioned on the
subject.

All such defects can be guaranteed to have been foreseen - and the
warnings filtered out by a staffing system under pressure from the
Treasury. We have the competence to avoid these traps, we just lack a
coherent vision at the top.

Cheers,

Dave

--
Dave Eadsforth

[Paul J. Adam]

In message >, Dave Eadsforth
> writes
>In article >, Paul J. Adam
> writes
>>It costs money, which is in seriously short supply. What will you give
>>up instead?
>>
>Is it necessary to think of giving up something instead?

Funding is finite and the list of desirable items is larger than the
money available.

>If cannon are
>'the cost of doing business' for a fighter - a necessary contingency -
>then the money should be allocated.

Is the cannon more or less important than the towed decoys for the DASS?

Is the cannon more or less important than ASRAAM integration?

Do you fund the cannon before or after fitting ALARM capability?

....and so it goes.

>Over the last few decades, British defence funding has been dogged by
>the motto 'there isn't going to be another real war, old chap' but of
>course wars have a habit of turning up - and then we are stuffed.

Add also that the politicians declare that "the UK will only face
conflicts in these particular areas" and make cuts accordingly: usually
followed by an out-of-area problem which of course HM Forces are
expected to deal with anyway.

>During the Falklands we had ships that were wired up with cable that
>gave off toxic fumes when it burned, and the men had overalls of man-
>made fibre that shrunk nicely onto the body when close to a fire. And
>as for the prospect of ships being attacked by more than one aircraft at
>a time - couldn't possibly happen. Close defence? Lord 'what's a
>Vulcan cannon' Chalfont didn't have much to offer when questioned on the
>subject.

I can offer quite a few modern examples: the problem keeps coming down
to funding. Better some capability than no capability: other shortfalls
can hopefully be closed by UOR.

Until "screwing up defence" becomes an election issue, it's not a
problem for our lords and masters: and until then it's easy to keep
squeezing defence in the sacred name of Schoolsandhospitals.

>All such defects can be guaranteed to have been foreseen - and the
>warnings filtered out by a staffing system under pressure from the
>Treasury. We have the competence to avoid these traps, we just lack a
>coherent vision at the top.

Not even that; we just have a political class accustomed to a "can do"
attitude from the Forces, and too much experience of getting results
despite repeated cuts.

--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBox<at>jrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

[Harry Andreas]

In article >, John Cook
> wrote:

> >It wasn't really to do with weight or cost of cannon - was more to do with
> >cost of qualifying the equipment for use when the gun was being fired. The
> >vibration and exhaust gas analysis is apparently quite expensive (but since
> >they share common equipments with the other countries, I don't quite
> >understand this as they are getting the same guns??)
> >
>
> One of the points sugested to me was the vibration of the gun was
> detrimental to the avionics/airframe, this in conjunction with the
> training/maintainence/logistics etc would save about £6M, not a small
> amout, but IMHO worth spending it, as it should be used in the RAF,
> its always better to have it and not use it, than need it and not
> have it.
>
The acoustic noise levels associated with a gun firing are high, but not a
driver in the life of the equipment since the duty factor is so low.
That is to say, they don't actually fire the gun that much.
Most of the equipments will have an acoustic noise spec anyway, just due
to proximity to bays, inlets, etc.

Gun gas composition is well known and is far less corrosive than the
acidic salt spray that blows over the flight deck of a carrier.

I doubt it's engineering factors that are driving the gun. More likely is
(as you say) the training/maintainence/logistics and their contribution
to life cycle costs.

--
Harry Andreas
Engineering raconteur

[Dave Eadsforth]

In article >, Paul J. Adam
> writes
>In message >, Dave Eadsforth
> writes
>>In article >, Paul J. Adam
> writes
>>>It costs money, which is in seriously short supply. What will you give
>>>up instead?
>>>
>>Is it necessary to think of giving up something instead?
>
>Funding is finite and the list of desirable items is larger than the
>money available.

Cannot disagree with that - but because of this it is vital to maintain
a grasp on which items must retain 100 percent effectiveness
>
>>If cannon are
>>'the cost of doing business' for a fighter - a necessary contingency -
>>then the money should be allocated.
>
>Is the cannon more or less important than the towed decoys for the DASS?
>
>Is the cannon more or less important than ASRAAM integration?
>
>Do you fund the cannon before or after fitting ALARM capability?
>
>...and so it goes.

Specifically concerning cannon: cannon provide a very fundamental
capability - and cheaply. They are there when all else is:

used up;
failed;
inappropriate.

Air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles are vulnerable to countermeasures
- and you don't know what the enemy might have up his sleeve until he
unveils it; so you might experience disappointment at a vital moment.
Missiles are also somewhat poor for delivering warnings - the shot tends
to go into the target instead of across the bows. And if you want to
bring any vehicle (boat/truck) to a halt instead of annihilating it
cannon are the only option.
>

>>Over the last few decades, British defence funding has been dogged by
>>the motto 'there isn't going to be another real war, old chap' but of
>>course wars have a habit of turning up - and then we are stuffed.
>
>Add also that the politicians declare that "the UK will only face
>conflicts in these particular areas" and make cuts accordingly: usually
>followed by an out-of-area problem which of course HM Forces are
>expected to deal with anyway.

Indeed - and flexibility is key in such situations.
>
>>During the Falklands we had ships that were wired up with cable that
>>gave off toxic fumes when it burned, and the men had overalls of man-
>>made fibre that shrunk nicely onto the body when close to a fire. And
>>as for the prospect of ships being attacked by more than one aircraft at
>>a time - couldn't possibly happen. Close defence? Lord 'what's a
>>Vulcan cannon' Chalfont didn't have much to offer when questioned on the
>>subject.
>
>I can offer quite a few modern examples: the problem keeps coming down
>to funding. Better some capability than no capability: other shortfalls
>can hopefully be closed by UOR.
>
Agreed some capability better than none, but it is no good having a
weapon system that is 80 percent as good as the enemy's - if it is to be
deployed it must be 100 percent as good if not better, and the savings
can come from elsewhere. The forces should not have to blunt their
teeth - that is a terrible and dangerous option.

>Until "screwing up defence" becomes an election issue, it's not a
>problem for our lords and masters: and until then it's easy to keep
>squeezing defence in the sacred name of Schoolsandhospitals.
>
Yes, and the mishandling of the Iraq situation does not help the case
for 100 percent forces that are ready for anything if such forces are
perceived to be vulnerable to 'misuse' (Personal view: Never mind the
WMD - I'd have invaded Iraq if the Iraqi consul had double parked in
Kensington...)

>>All such defects can be guaranteed to have been foreseen - and the
>>warnings filtered out by a staffing system under pressure from the
>>Treasury. We have the competence to avoid these traps, we just lack a
>>coherent vision at the top.
>
>Not even that; we just have a political class accustomed to a "can do"
>attitude from the Forces, and too much experience of getting results
>despite repeated cuts.
>
I can only agree with that too - they are better than the politicians
deserve. I spent years working alongside the military and I know their
private thoughts on such matters - but regrettably cannot reproduce them
here.

Cheers,

Dave

--
Dave Eadsforth

[phil hunt]

On Mon, 10 May 2004 00:16:44 +0100, Paul J. Adam > wrote:
>In message >, Dave Eadsforth
> writes
>>In article >, Paul J. Adam
> writes
>>>It costs money, which is in seriously short supply. What will you give
>>>up instead?
>>>
>>Is it necessary to think of giving up something instead?
>
>Funding is finite and the list of desirable items is larger than the
>money available.
>
>>If cannon are
>>'the cost of doing business' for a fighter - a necessary contingency -
>>then the money should be allocated.
>
>Is the cannon more or less important than the towed decoys for the DASS?
>
>Is the cannon more or less important than ASRAAM integration?
>
>Do you fund the cannon before or after fitting ALARM capability?
>
>...and so it goes.

I can think of several purchases the MoD has made in recent years
which didn't represent value for money (IMO) and which together
would have saved more than enough to fund Typhoon fully:

1. funding development of F-35, cost: GBP 2 bn. This is a US plane
and Britain doesn't get any significant control over the program.
It's quite likely the Americans will only sell us a second-rate
version without full stealth capabilities. Better would have been to
wait until F-35 is in service and then have a competition with it
and other carrier-borne fighter-bombers.

2. development of Boxer/MRAV, cost GBP ??? m. There was really no
need to fund development of a new 8x8 vehicle -- plenty exist
already, and automotive technology is mature, thus only incremental
improvements could be expected over what already exists. It's even
more of a waste of money, since the UK has withdrawn from the
programme.

3. FCLV (Future Command and Liaison Vehicle), cost: GBP 200 m. This
is a light truck, it looks like an over-sized land rover (there's a
picture at http://www.zen19725.zen.co.uk/weblog/art_222.html).
Britain is buying 400 of themv at over GBP 400,000 each, or about
20 times the cost of the land rovers they'll be replacing. I dare
say it's a good vehicle, but is it really worth 20 times more than
a land rover? I don't think so.

4. Apache. cost: GBP 2.5 bn. attack helicopters are over-rated, and
would probably suffer terrible casualties against an opponent well
armed with HMGs, autocannon, and man-portable SAMs.

5. Poodling for Bush, cost: GBP ??? bn. Britain's involvement in the
invasion of Iraq was political, designed to cloth the American
invasion with a veneer of multilateral respectability. A much
smaller force, say a single brigade, or just a battalion, would have
served this politcal end just as well. I'm sure the USA would have
cocked up the occupation just as badly without British involvement.

That lot's probably about 10 billion quid altogether, which would
pay for a few Eurofighters, and would mean the MoD wouldn't have to
be scraping for savings on not using the guns.

>I can offer quite a few modern examples: the problem keeps coming down
>to funding.

Does it though? There are countries that sped less on their military
than the UK, but seem to get better value than us. Consider Sweden,
for example. This country has a per capita GDP about the same as
Britain's, and spends a similar proportion of GDP on its armed
forces (2.5 % for Britian, 2% for Sweden). Imagine if Sweden and
Britian had a land border and were hostile towards each other; who
would win? Sweden could mobilise a larger army, and would probably
get air supertiority quite quickly, since Britain doesn't currently
have an air superiority fighter. Now consider that Sweden's
population is *one seventh* of the UK's -- why doesn't Britain have
a more capable military than such a small country? One reason is the
Royal Navy, another is Breitisan's cabability to deploy forces
overseas without full mobilisation, but I don't swee how these
together make up the whole discrepency. Judging by the programmes
I've listed above, the MoD seems to be remarkably insouciant about
value for money.

> Better some capability than no capability: other shortfalls
>can hopefully be closed by UOR.
>
>Until "screwing up defence" becomes an election issue, it's not a
>problem for our lords and masters: and until then it's easy to keep
>squeezing defence in the sacred name of Schoolsandhospitals.

Having a decent education system is a pre-requisite to having a
powerful military: ignorant people can't design weapons, they are
harder to train as soldiers, and they don't provide the economic
foundation to fund any of these things.


--
"It's easier to find people online who openly support the KKK than
people who openly support the RIAA" -- comment on Wikipedia
(Email: zen19725 at zen dot co dot uk)

[phil hunt]

On Mon, 10 May 2004 18:25:42 +0100, Dave Eadsforth > wrote:
>
>Air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles are vulnerable to countermeasures
>- and you don't know what the enemy might have up his sleeve until he
>unveils it; so you might experience disappointment at a vital moment.
>Missiles are also somewhat poor for delivering warnings - the shot tends
>to go into the target instead of across the bows. And if you want to
>bring any vehicle (boat/truck) to a halt instead of annihilating it
>cannon are the only option.

I'd add that people have thought guns on aircraft were useless
before, and have ended up re-instating them.

--
"It's easier to find people online who openly support the KKK than
people who openly support the RIAA" -- comment on Wikipedia
(Email: zen19725 at zen dot co dot uk)

[Paul J. Adam]

In message >, phil hunt
> writes
>On Mon, 10 May 2004 00:16:44 +0100, Paul J. Adam <news@jrwly
>nch.demon.co.uk> wrote:
>>...and so it goes.
>
>I can think of several purchases the MoD has made in recent years
>which didn't represent value for money (IMO) and which together
>would have saved more than enough to fund Typhoon fully:

Of course. Naturally, procurement authorities are fully prescient.

>>I can offer quite a few modern examples: the problem keeps coming down
>>to funding.
>
>Does it though?

Yes. Defence is not a vote-winner: being able to boast about how much
you spent on the sacred schoolsandhospitals is.

>There are countries that sped less on their military
>than the UK, but seem to get better value than us. Consider Sweden,
>for example. This country has a per capita GDP about the same as
>Britain's, and spends a similar proportion of GDP on its armed
>forces (2.5 % for Britian, 2% for Sweden). Imagine if Sweden and
>Britian had a land border and were hostile towards each other; who
>would win?

Sweden, easily, because nobody expects Sweden to be able to fight out of
area, maintain a blue-water navy, have credible amphibious forces that
can deploy outside home waters... life is easy when you only have to
fight at home.

Now, if Sweden felt it necessary to put a battalion of troops into the
People's Republick of Uckfay Ouyay to get their people out alive ahead
of the revolution... how would they do that?

--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBox<at>jrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

[Paul J. Adam]

In message >, Dave Eadsforth
> writes
>In article >, Paul J. Adam
> writes
>>Funding is finite and the list of desirable items is larger than the
>>money available.
>
>Cannot disagree with that - but because of this it is vital to maintain
>a grasp on which items must retain 100 percent effectiveness

And which are less crucial.

>>Is the cannon more or less important than the towed decoys for the DASS?
>>
>>Is the cannon more or less important than ASRAAM integration?
>>
>>Do you fund the cannon before or after fitting ALARM capability?
>>
>>...and so it goes.
>
>Specifically concerning cannon: cannon provide a very fundamental
>capability - and cheaply. They are there when all else is:
>
>used up;
>failed;
>inappropriate.

They're also short-ranged, inaccurate, bloody hard to use...

>Air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles are vulnerable to countermeasures

So is the gun - you're using a gunsight that depends on range and rate
input from the radar. The enemy screws with your radar, he screws with
your gun solution.

Or you can spray'n'pray with a fixed reticule or a basic gyro sight -
with not many rounds. It can be done, it used to be the rule, but it
needs a lot of skill and practice (for which read money) and it has an
extremely limited firing envelope compared to modern weapons.

Chop the gun and you'll *guarantee* that there'll be a time when some
pilot needed it and didn't have it. Can't argue with that. But there's
only so much money: what do you tell the families of the pilots killed
because the DASS was cut back / the ground troops told that "sorry,
Brimstone was less important than the gun"...

I'd prefer to keep the capability myself: but it's less essential than
some of the other possible cuts.

>- and you don't know what the enemy might have up his sleeve until he
>unveils it;

There's an old rule of bayonet fighting: the guy with the last bullet
wins. If the enemy still has one missile and you're down to guns, you're
in the kimchi. (And having a gun and the training to use it isn't much
use against an incoming AAM or SAM)

>Missiles are also somewhat poor for delivering warnings - the shot tends
>to go into the target instead of across the bows.

Trouble is, for combat use you don't want tracers (which warn the enemy
they're under fire). But with no tracers, how do they know they're being
shot at?

The warnings that you've been intercepted are clear, promulgated by the
ICAO and don't require a cannon.

>And if you want to
>bring any vehicle (boat/truck) to a halt instead of annihilating it
>cannon are the only option.

27mm high-explosive cannon shells, arriving twenty or thirty a second,
are not reliably able to "bring vehicles to a halt". Trouble is, they
aren't reliably able to stop them either.

Back during Viet Nam, the US armed gunship aircraft with 7.62mm miniguns
and 20mm cannon; evolution was rapid, as air defences meant higher
standoff altitudes and the gunships moved from close support to
interdiction.

The AC-130s went from .30" and 20mm batteries, to 20mm and 40mm, to
discovering that even 20mm wasn't an effective truck killer, and ended
up with a mixed battery of 25mm, 40mm and 105mm(!)

>>Add also that the politicians declare that "the UK will only face
>>conflicts in these particular areas" and make cuts accordingly: usually
>>followed by an out-of-area problem which of course HM Forces are
>>expected to deal with anyway.
>
>Indeed - and flexibility is key in such situations.

'Flexibility' for aircraft translates to payload, which can be turned
into fuel or ordnance.

One wonders how the Sea Harriers would have fared during the Falklands
had they been able to trade their ADEN gun pods for more Sidewinders
(like the twin-rail launcher that would have doubled their offence) and
most especially more fuel to let them have more time on station.

>>I can offer quite a few modern examples: the problem keeps coming down
>>to funding. Better some capability than no capability: other shortfalls
>>can hopefully be closed by UOR.
>>
>Agreed some capability better than none, but it is no good having a
>weapon system that is 80 percent as good as the enemy's -

Tell that to any tank crewman who took a M4 Sherman against a SS Panzer
unit. Or any pilot who was flying a P-51 or Tempest where Me262s were
expected.

Being "better" only counts if you can bring that advantage fully to
bear. To be controversial, the US Army's Rangers clearly and completely
outclassed the Somali militiamen in 1993 - but who retreated and who was
left running the country?

>if it is to be
>deployed it must be 100 percent as good if not better, and the savings
>can come from elsewhere.

What will you give up to pay for keeping the Typhoon crews fully trained
in air-to-air and air-to-ground gunnery? Be specific and stick to the
remit of the relevant IPT for the required savings. Where will you find
the money through the life of the aircraft?

>The forces should not have to blunt their
>teeth - that is a terrible and dangerous option.

That's what the politicians demand and the electorate approves. Until
the voters protest, the politicians will keep on slicing.

--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBox<at>jrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

[Paul J. Adam]

In message >, phil hunt
> writes
>I'd add that people have thought guns on aircraft were useless
>before, and have ended up re-instating them.

Folk have thought horsed cavalry with sabres obsolete, and reinstated
them - or not. (It's worth remembering that one 2Lt George S. Patton
wrote the US Army's last sabre manual-of-arms... but failed to keep
horse cavalry close to the front, and didn't push for the issue of
sabres to all troops, when he was a commander in WW2)


You'd certainly like to keep the gun if all else was funded: but when
the budget axe falls, what will you give up before you sacrifice the
gun?
--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBox<at>jrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

[Dave Eadsforth]

In article >, phil hunt
> writes
>On Mon, 10 May 2004 00:16:44 +0100, Paul J. Adam >
>wrote:
>>In message >, Dave Eadsforth
> writes
>>>In article >, Paul J. Adam
> writes
>>>>It costs money, which is in seriously short supply. What will you give
>>>>up instead?
>>>>
>>>Is it necessary to think of giving up something instead?
>>
>>Funding is finite and the list of desirable items is larger than the
>>money available.
>>
>>>If cannon are
>>>'the cost of doing business' for a fighter - a necessary contingency -
>>>then the money should be allocated.
>>
>>Is the cannon more or less important than the towed decoys for the DASS?
>>
>>Is the cannon more or less important than ASRAAM integration?
>>
>>Do you fund the cannon before or after fitting ALARM capability?
>>
>>...and so it goes.
>
>I can think of several purchases the MoD has made in recent years
>which didn't represent value for money (IMO) and which together
>would have saved more than enough to fund Typhoon fully:
>
>1. funding development of F-35, cost: GBP 2 bn. This is a US plane
>and Britain doesn't get any significant control over the program.
>It's quite likely the Americans will only sell us a second-rate
>version without full stealth capabilities. Better would have been to
>wait until F-35 is in service and then have a competition with it
>and other carrier-borne fighter-bombers.
>
>2. development of Boxer/MRAV, cost GBP ??? m. There was really no
>need to fund development of a new 8x8 vehicle -- plenty exist
>already, and automotive technology is mature, thus only incremental
>improvements could be expected over what already exists. It's even
>more of a waste of money, since the UK has withdrawn from the
>programme.
>
>3. FCLV (Future Command and Liaison Vehicle), cost: GBP 200 m. This
>is a light truck, it looks like an over-sized land rover (there's a
>picture at http://www.zen19725.zen.co.uk/weblog/art_222.html).
>Britain is buying 400 of themv at over GBP 400,000 each, or about
>20 times the cost of the land rovers they'll be replacing. I dare
>say it's a good vehicle, but is it really worth 20 times more than
>a land rover? I don't think so.
>
>4. Apache. cost: GBP 2.5 bn. attack helicopters are over-rated, and
>would probably suffer terrible casualties against an opponent well
>armed with HMGs, autocannon, and man-portable SAMs.
>
>5. Poodling for Bush, cost: GBP ??? bn. Britain's involvement in the
>invasion of Iraq was political, designed to cloth the American
>invasion with a veneer of multilateral respectability. A much
>smaller force, say a single brigade, or just a battalion, would have
>served this politcal end just as well. I'm sure the USA would have
>cocked up the occupation just as badly without British involvement.
>
>That lot's probably about 10 billion quid altogether, which would
>pay for a few Eurofighters, and would mean the MoD wouldn't have to
>be scraping for savings on not using the guns.
>
>>I can offer quite a few modern examples: the problem keeps coming down
>>to funding.
>
>Does it though? There are countries that sped less on their military
>than the UK, but seem to get better value than us. Consider Sweden,
>for example. This country has a per capita GDP about the same as
>Britain's, and spends a similar proportion of GDP on its armed
>forces (2.5 % for Britian, 2% for Sweden). Imagine if Sweden and
>Britian had a land border and were hostile towards each other; who
>would win? Sweden could mobilise a larger army, and would probably
>get air supertiority quite quickly, since Britain doesn't currently
>have an air superiority fighter. Now consider that Sweden's
>population is *one seventh* of the UK's -- why doesn't Britain have
>a more capable military than such a small country? One reason is the
>Royal Navy, another is Breitisan's cabability to deploy forces
>overseas without full mobilisation, but I don't swee how these
>together make up the whole discrepency. Judging by the programmes
>I've listed above, the MoD seems to be remarkably insouciant about
>value for money.
>
>> Better some capability than no capability: other shortfalls
>>can hopefully be closed by UOR.
>>
>>Until "screwing up defence" becomes an election issue, it's not a
>>problem for our lords and masters: and until then it's easy to keep
>>squeezing defence in the sacred name of Schoolsandhospitals.
>
>Having a decent education system is a pre-requisite to having a
>powerful military: ignorant people can't design weapons, they are
>harder to train as soldiers, and they don't provide the economic
>foundation to fund any of these things.
>
>
You have touched on a philosophic point here. At present, the British
government believes that you can recruit soldiers as required, use them,
and after a number of years shove them back into a society that has
little understanding of either soldiering or the diplomatic realities
that justify its existence. It has always been true that an army
reflects the society from which it springs - and Britain should ponder
the implications of that.

All professions benefit from recruiting from a pool of people who
understand the role of that profession and are motivated to join it.
So, when Britain recruits its military forces mainly from the dole
queue, which has been the case for a long time now, what will be the
result?

Well, better than you might expect. While many priceless NCOs have
taken early departure, the training system remains intact, so the
recruits do get a solid foundation - unless they are headed for a a non-
combatant role in which case the soldiering capability will be 'thin'.
While we still develop a clutch of outstanding soldiers we have to cope
with the fact that the average recruit still lacks the depth of skill,
understanding and commitment of his counterpart of a few decades ago.

So, at present, the Home Office wants the population to act like sheep,
the Politically Correct want the population to act like amoebas, and the
Foreign Office would like a credible military posture. These cannot be
reconciled. We need some leadership here; leadership that cope with the
rough edge that the British can often present, but I'm afraid that the
mediocre lawyers who inhabit the higher layers of government are poorly
placed to supply it. I yearn for a reincarnated Earnest Bevin, but I
suspect that that is out of the question.

Cheers,

Dave

--
Dave Eadsforth

[John Cook]

On Mon, 10 May 2004 09:20:35 -0700, (Harry
Andreas) wrote:

>In article >, John Cook
> wrote:
>
>> >It wasn't really to do with weight or cost of cannon - was more to do with
>> >cost of qualifying the equipment for use when the gun was being fired. The
>> >vibration and exhaust gas analysis is apparently quite expensive (but since
>> >they share common equipments with the other countries, I don't quite
>> >understand this as they are getting the same guns??)
>> >
>>
>> One of the points sugested to me was the vibration of the gun was
>> detrimental to the avionics/airframe, this in conjunction with the
>> training/maintainence/logistics etc would save about £6M, not a small
>> amout, but IMHO worth spending it, as it should be used in the RAF,
>> its always better to have it and not use it, than need it and not
>> have it.
>>
>The acoustic noise levels associated with a gun firing are high, but not a
>driver in the life of the equipment since the duty factor is so low.
>That is to say, they don't actually fire the gun that much.
>Most of the equipments will have an acoustic noise spec anyway, just due
>to proximity to bays, inlets, etc.

IIRC It wasn't so much acoustics as the couple of tonnes of recoil!!,
;-), I understand the concepts of not fighting with guns anymore, but
I really think you need them for those 'other' circumstances.
'Other' meaning all the things you never thought likely to happen.

Cheers


>Gun gas composition is well known and is far less corrosive than the
>acidic salt spray that blows over the flight deck of a carrier.
>
>I doubt it's engineering factors that are driving the gun. More likely is
>(as you say) the training/maintainence/logistics and their contribution
>to life cycle costs.

John Cook

Any spelling mistakes/grammatic errors are there purely to annoy. All
opinions are mine, not TAFE's however much they beg me for them.

Email Address :-
Spam trap - please remove (trousers) to email me
Eurofighter Website :- http://www.eurofighter-typhoon.co.uk

[phil hunt]

On Tue, 11 May 2004 00:18:02 +0100, Dave Eadsforth > wrote:
>
>You have touched on a philosophic point here. At present, the British
>government believes that you can recruit soldiers as required, use them,
>and after a number of years shove them back into a society that has
>little understanding of either soldiering

Soldiering is like any other job, you don't have much understanding
of it until you've done it. I don't really see how that could not be
the case.

>or the diplomatic realities
>that justify its existence. It has always been true that an army
>reflects the society from which it springs - and Britain should ponder
>the implications of that.

Which are?

>All professions benefit from recruiting from a pool of people who
>understand the role of that profession and are motivated to join it.
>So, when Britain recruits its military forces mainly from the dole
>queue, which has been the case for a long time now, what will be the
>result?
>
>Well, better than you might expect. While many priceless NCOs have
>taken early departure, the training system remains intact, so the
>recruits do get a solid foundation - unless they are headed for a a non-
>combatant role in which case the soldiering capability will be 'thin'.
>While we still develop a clutch of outstanding soldiers we have to cope
>with the fact that the average recruit still lacks the depth of skill,
>understanding and commitment of his counterpart of a few decades ago.
>
>So, at present, the Home Office wants the population to act like sheep,
>the Politically Correct want the population to act like amoebas, and the
>Foreign Office would like a credible military posture.

I'm not sure what you're getting at here.


--
"It's easier to find people online who openly support the KKK than
people who openly support the RIAA" -- comment on Wikipedia
(Email: zen19725 at zen dot co dot uk)

[Alex Walton]

On Mon, 10 May 2004 22:46:52 +0100, (phil
hunt) wrote:

<snip>
>3. FCLV (Future Command and Liaison Vehicle), cost: GBP 200 m. This
>is a light truck, it looks like an over-sized land rover (there's a
>picture at http://www.zen19725.zen.co.uk/weblog/art_222.html).
>Britain is buying 400 of themv at over GBP 400,000 each, or about
>20 times the cost of the land rovers they'll be replacing. I dare
>say it's a good vehicle, but is it really worth 20 times more than
>a land rover? I don't think so.

(Apologies for the late response, and a bit off topic but...)

FCLV replaces the Ferret scout car which, as it has been out of
service for over a decade, has seen it's roles temporarily filled by a
variety of vehicles including Land Rovers, CVR(T) and Saxon. FCLV is
in no way a replacement for the Land Rover - I wish it was as the MoD
would be buying thousands of them.

Also, the contract for 401 vehicles is worth GBP125m and includes some
support costs, putting each FCLV at less than GBP 315,000.


Alex Walton
----
Royal Navy & Fleet Air Arm pages:
http://www.btinternet.com/~a.c.walton/navy/navy.html
----

[phil hunt]

On Fri, 14 May 2004 14:36:09 +0000 (UTC), Alex Walton > wrote:
>On Mon, 10 May 2004 22:46:52 +0100, (phil
>hunt) wrote:
>
><snip>
>>3. FCLV (Future Command and Liaison Vehicle), cost: GBP 200 m. This
>>is a light truck, it looks like an over-sized land rover (there's a
>>picture at http://www.zen19725.zen.co.uk/weblog/art_222.html).
>>Britain is buying 400 of themv at over GBP 400,000 each, or about
>>20 times the cost of the land rovers they'll be replacing. I dare
>>say it's a good vehicle, but is it really worth 20 times more than
>>a land rover? I don't think so.
>
>(Apologies for the late response, and a bit off topic but...)
>
>FCLV replaces the Ferret scout car which, as it has been out of
>service for over a decade, has seen it's roles temporarily filled by a
>variety of vehicles including Land Rovers, CVR(T) and Saxon. FCLV is
>in no way a replacement for the Land Rover - I wish it was as the MoD
>would be buying thousands of them.
>
>Also, the contract for 401 vehicles is worth GBP125m and includes some
>support costs, putting each FCLV at less than GBP 315,000.

According to an MoD press release[1], the value of the contract was
"Over #200 million". I assume "#" means pounds.

However, the press release predate the reduction in the contract to
4012 vehicles -- did the unit cost go down during negotiations for
this reduction?

[1] http://www.mod.uk/dpa/way_ahead_for_mrav_and_fclv.htm

--
"It's easier to find people online who openly support the KKK than
people who openly support the RIAA" -- comment on Wikipedia
(Email: zen19725 at zen dot co dot uk)

[Dave Eadsforth]

In article >, phil hunt
> writes
>On Tue, 11 May 2004 00:18:02 +0100, Dave Eadsforth >
>wrote:
>>
Apologies for late reply - been away...

>>You have touched on a philosophic point here. At present, the British
>>government believes that you can recruit soldiers as required, use them,
>>and after a number of years shove them back into a society that has
>>little understanding of either soldiering
>
>Soldiering is like any other job, you don't have much understanding
>of it until you've done it. I don't really see how that could not be
>the case.
>
Actually a very critical job, and best done by people with a belief
system that matches role. When soldiers have spectacularly misbehaved
(extreme violence, murder) the army says 'well, we do get as many bad
eggs as the rest of society'. That is because they are desperate to
recruit (and, I am informed, get more bad eggs because of that). For a
role that is supposed to defend the realm and project Britain's moral
force in the world this is not a good start.

>>or the diplomatic realities
>>that justify its existence. It has always been true that an army
>>reflects the society from which it springs - and Britain should ponder
>>the implications of that.
>
>Which are?

If society cannot motivate sufficient (good) people to join the forces
and carry out the necessary operations from time to time, then what does
it say about society's understanding of the need and its resolve to
fulfil it? Not a lot - more of this later.

We are sending troops out with the eyes (i.e. news cameras) of the world
upon them. They have to behave impeccably, obeying green card rules at
all times and put up with hell of a lot of provocation and danger. Not
for the faint hearted or those who only joined because they couldn't get
a job elsewhere (and joining the army is generally regarded as the last
resort in what are termed the lower socio-economic groups). And we do
have an influential political sector that openly describes our armed
forces as a necessary evil, rather than a profession that risks its
lives to support government policies. Nice clear message to the
prospective recruit?
>
>>All professions benefit from recruiting from a pool of people who
>>understand the role of that profession and are motivated to join it.
>>So, when Britain recruits its military forces mainly from the dole
>>queue, which has been the case for a long time now, what will be the
>>result?
>>
>>Well, better than you might expect. While many priceless NCOs have
>>taken early departure, the training system remains intact, so the
>>recruits do get a solid foundation - unless they are headed for a a non-
>>combatant role in which case the soldiering capability will be 'thin'.
>>While we still develop a clutch of outstanding soldiers we have to cope
>>with the fact that the average recruit still lacks the depth of skill,
>>understanding and commitment of his counterpart of a few decades ago.
>>
>>So, at present, the Home Office wants the population to act like sheep,
>>the Politically Correct want the population to act like amoebas, and the
>>Foreign Office would like a credible military posture.
>
>I'm not sure what you're getting at here.
>
I'll try to keep it short, before someone asks what this debate is doing
in RAM. Basically, pre-war, society had firm views about right and
wrong. If you did wrong you got punished, and the law supported the
citizen who acted to prevent a crime or who acted in defence against a
criminal act. Result - relatively few criminals and little violence.
Post-war, (possibly due to some rogue shrinks getting into the Home
Office) the criminal was transformed into the victim of circumstances.
It's all very well saying you understand why crimes are committed -
quite another to 'mediate' (yes, there is a formal programme for
criminals to say 'sorry' and for the victim to smile and say 'I know
you're a good lad at heart, I forgive you') between the criminal and the
victim and allow the criminal to mentally justify his actions - because
that is what they do. And as we know, self-help by the victim is
severely punished (ever read Pinocchio - the scene with the gorilla
judge?). Result? Little fear of social reaction or the legal system.
Criminals are turned out on a production line.

And the PC brigade would have people react in an even more docile manner
in the face of crime. And as for trying to bring your children up to
respect the law - absolutely criminal - don't people understand that all
behaviour is valid? (Apart from questioning PC that is...)

So how does society react to all this? Quite simply, if there are no
social values to be supported by the government then what is there that
is supposed to be worth defending? What exactly would society's sons
and daughters achieve in the forces that has any meaning?

Could this be why we have such trouble in recruiting, and get so many
bad eggs? (My understanding on this is from servicemen, not from my own
fevered imagination or hearsay.)

So, please forgive the tirade, but I think that post-war governments
have cocked it up. They have brought about the present high rate of
crime (last time I looked, we had more prisons, and criminals to live in
them, than any other country in Europe) and lack of social cohesion and
commitment to social values by having adopted a clutch of policies that
previous generations (going back a mere 10,000 years or so) would
instantly have recognised as stupid.
>
Cheers,

Dave

--
Dave Eadsforth

[phil hunt]

On Mon, 17 May 2004 06:40:43 +0100, Dave Eadsforth > wrote:
>
>So how does society react to all this? Quite simply, if there are no
>social values to be supported by the government then what is there that
>is supposed to be worth defending? What exactly would society's sons
>and daughters achieve in the forces that has any meaning?
>
>Could this be why we have such trouble in recruiting, and get so many
>bad eggs? (My understanding on this is from servicemen, not from my own
>fevered imagination or hearsay.)

I think you'll being overly cynical. While Britain isn't perfect,
by any means (nor has it ever been), I doubt the armed forces would
have much problem getting recruits if the countrey really was in
serious danger, as it was in 1940.

--
"It's easier to find people online who openly support the KKK than
people who openly support the RIAA" -- comment on Wikipedia
(Email: zen19725 at zen dot co dot uk)

[Dave Eadsforth]

In article >, phil hunt
> writes
>On Mon, 17 May 2004 06:40:43 +0100, Dave Eadsforth >
>wrote:
>>
>>So how does society react to all this? Quite simply, if there are no
>>social values to be supported by the government then what is there that
>>is supposed to be worth defending? What exactly would society's sons
>>and daughters achieve in the forces that has any meaning?
>>
>>Could this be why we have such trouble in recruiting, and get so many
>>bad eggs? (My understanding on this is from servicemen, not from my own
>>fevered imagination or hearsay.)
>
>I think you'll being overly cynical.

Quite possibly - comes with increasing age and seeing doomed ideas
repackaged and re-presented every couple of decades.

> While Britain isn't perfect,
>by any means (nor has it ever been), I doubt the armed forces would
>have much problem getting recruits if the countrey really was in
>serious danger, as it was in 1940.
>
Yes, I agree that the country would pull together again if there were an
event that could be interpreted as a direct threat; although we have to
cope with the fact that throughout the 20th century (including the WWI
and WWII years) about 25 percent of the country were against military
action. But a direct threat of that type is much less likely to happen
than those which build up further afield; we need to be clever enough to
correctly gauge those events in the world that will, if not tackled in
time, cause big problems in the future; and take appropriate action.

Here we have a problem. For diplomatic reasons we cannot have the
government openly identifying specific future trouble spots. As usual,
diplomatic moves have to be made in secret until a plan of action
(usually involving allies) has been put together. Then we go through a
period of what is euphemistically termed 'political preparation of the
people' i.e. a spin programme (dossiers?) aimed at convincing us that
the action is necessary: we then send an under-equipped force. The 'can
do' professionalism of the best of our forces can then often do the job
in spite of the difficulties. (However, more and more military people
are warning that the whole effort will come apart at the seams if more
is not done to maintain our forces.)

In the coming decades we are virtually certain to have to undertake more
military operations around the world. The Iraq operation has been
viewed by many as being about oil - it could be in fact be one of many
'resource wars' that the west will be engaged in from now on. Rather
than having the public spun into supporting each individual operation,
which will become counter productive, we need to have a permanent
willingness to support military action; not 'political preparation' each
time. The people should be treated in a mature fashion; our society
will have to be geared to treating large military operations fact of
life (and not lulled by Mr Blair's assertion of a few years ago about
this generation being the first not to have to don a uniform). Military
service needs to be viewed as a necessary and respectable profession
(again), and given more depth within our society. This does not mean
that we have to become actually militaristic - simply reversing some of
the worst trends of the last few decades would probably be enough:

1. Make foreign affairs more of a serious political issue. We rely on
the world being a (half) orderly place so we can trade and generate the
resources we need for the NHS etc. etc. Society needs to be in no doubt
that this will require a greater willingness to support the maintenance
and use of our armed forces - that that means sufficient quantities of
first rate equipment and sufficient numbers of motivated recruits. This
will take leadership, and I doubt that we will see it from a prime
minister whose grasp on political reality was so weak that he once
belonged to CND. I mentioned Earnest Bevin a couple of posts ago. He
was instrumental in mobilising the labour movement against the threat of
Nazism prior to WWII and as Foreign Secretary was primarily responsible
for showing the need for Britain having its own nuclear weapons. But he
was no warmonger - just a perceptive man who knew what had to be done to
maintain peace. I wish I believed in reincarnation.

2. Support the collateral areas. The government needs to invest more
in the Territorial Army; and even refraining from present efforts to
strangle target shooting would help.

3. Be distinctly more robust when dealing with the anti-military.
Instead of just shrugging, tell them that the majority of people in the
country do not want to be victims of their lamentable judgement - a weak
military capability has NEVER served ANY population in recorded history.

Tirade number two over :-)

Cheers,

Dave

(Personal political position - an Extreme Centralist...)

--
Dave Eadsforth

[Gernot Hassenpflug]

>>>>> "Dave" == Dave Eadsforth > writes:

/.. bloody good post snipped../

Dave> Tirade number two over :-)

Damn Dave, can you do that at will? I darned well agree with you there
on all points.
--
G Hassenpflug * IJN & JMSDF equipment/history fan

[Greg Hennessy]

On Wed, 19 May 2004 09:42:10 +0100, Dave Eadsforth
> wrote:


>I mentioned Earnest Bevin a couple of posts ago. He
>was instrumental in mobilising the labour movement against the threat of
>Nazism prior to WWII and as Foreign Secretary was primarily responsible
>for showing the need for Britain having its own nuclear weapons. But he
>was no warmonger - just a perceptive man who knew what had to be done to
>maintain peace.


Ernie Bevin was a real honest to goodness patriot. Someone who knew what
statist dictatorships looked like and wasnt afraid to condemn and their
agents for what they were.

He was destested on the Left for doing so.


greg

--
"vying with Platt for the largest gap
between capability and self perception"

[Dave Eadsforth]

In article >, Gernot Hassenpflug
> writes
>>>>>> "Dave" == Dave Eadsforth > writes:
>
>/.. bloody good post snipped../
>
> Dave> Tirade number two over :-)
>
>Damn Dave, can you do that at will? I darned well agree with you there
>on all points.

Thanks, Gernot - I only wax lyrical when I get wound up about a
situation - but it happens more and more these days... :-(

Cheers,

Dave

--
Dave Eadsforth

[Dave Eadsforth]

In article >, Greg Hennessy
> writes
>On Wed, 19 May 2004 09:42:10 +0100, Dave Eadsforth
> wrote:
>
>
>>I mentioned Earnest Bevin a couple of posts ago. He
>>was instrumental in mobilising the labour movement against the threat of
>>Nazism prior to WWII and as Foreign Secretary was primarily responsible
>>for showing the need for Britain having its own nuclear weapons. But he
>>was no warmonger - just a perceptive man who knew what had to be done to
>>maintain peace.
>
>
>Ernie Bevin was a real honest to goodness patriot. Someone who knew what
>statist dictatorships looked like and wasnt afraid to condemn and their
>agents for what they were.

One of my few genuine heroes...
>
>He was destested on the Left for doing so.
>
A good qualification for anyone to achieve :-)
>
>greg
>
Cheers,

Dave

--
Dave Eadsforth

[Paul J. Adam]

In message >, Dave Eadsforth
> writes
>Tirade number two over :-)

<applause>

--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBox<at>jrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

[Peter Kemp]

On Wed, 19 May 2004 09:42:10 +0100, Dave Eadsforth
> wrote:

I agree with most of what you said except...

>3. Be distinctly more robust when dealing with the anti-military.
>Instead of just shrugging, tell them that the majority of people in the
>country do not want to be victims of their lamentable judgement - a weak
>military capability has NEVER served ANY population in recorded history.

Hasn't bothered Iceland in the last thousand years or so, no is New
Zealand at much risk despite their woeful military. On the flip side,
having a military too strong has damaged dozens of countries around
the world, whether from sheer overinvestment crippling the economy
(USSR in times past, NK now), the miltary having too much political
power, either through constitutional means or via coup d'etat
(Pakistan, Liberia, etc ad nauseum), or simply soldiers terrorising
their own civilians at the leaders behest (Iraq, Sudan etc etc etc)

>Tirade number two over :-)

A worthwhile tirade. I for one wished more election campaigns
addressed more than schoolsandhospitals, and included things like
foreign policy and defence.

>(Personal political position - an Extreme Centralist...)

I'm slightly to the middle of that position myself :-)

Peter Kemp

[Dave Eadsforth]

In article >, Paul J. Adam
> writes
>In message >, Dave Eadsforth
> writes
>>Tirade number two over :-)
>
><applause>
>
Just throw money!

Dave

--
Dave Eadsforth

[Dave Eadsforth]

In article >, Peter Kemp
> writes
>On Wed, 19 May 2004 09:42:10 +0100, Dave Eadsforth
> wrote:
>
>I agree with most of what you said except...
>
>>3. Be distinctly more robust when dealing with the anti-military.
>>Instead of just shrugging, tell them that the majority of people in the
>>country do not want to be victims of their lamentable judgement - a weak
>>military capability has NEVER served ANY population in recorded history.
>
>Hasn't bothered Iceland in the last thousand years or so, no is New
>Zealand at much risk despite their woeful military. On the flip side,
>having a military too strong has damaged dozens of countries around
>the world, whether from sheer overinvestment crippling the economy
>(USSR in times past, NK now), the miltary having too much political
>power, either through constitutional means or via coup d'etat
>(Pakistan, Liberia, etc ad nauseum), or simply soldiers terrorising
>their own civilians at the leaders behest (Iraq, Sudan etc etc etc)
>
Yup, I'll accept those points - I was thinking of adequate military
capability as opposed to overlarge for purposes of aggression or
subjugation. Iceland and NZ do benefit from particular geopolitical
profiles, but any island still needs a bit of reach if it is to avoid
unwelcome infringements. Iceland did benefit from having an adequate
and determined coastguard service as it was able to enforce a fishing
settlement against the UK (setting the moral debate aside, they
calculated Britain's response - and won...).

>>Tirade number two over :-)
>
>A worthwhile tirade. I for one wished more election campaigns
>addressed more than schoolsandhospitals, and included things like
>foreign policy and defence.
>
>>(Personal political position - an Extreme Centralist...)
>
>I'm slightly to the middle of that position myself :-)
>
That should keep the canvassers occupied...

>Peter Kemp

Cheers,

Dave

--
Dave Eadsforth

[phil hunt]

On Wed, 19 May 2004 09:42:10 +0100, Dave Eadsforth > wrote:
>
>In the coming decades we are virtually certain to have to undertake more
>military operations around the world.

While Britain may well do so, I question whether we will have to. We
didn't have to in Iraq, for example.


--
"It's easier to find people online who openly support the KKK than
people who openly support the RIAA" -- comment on Wikipedia
(Email: zen19725 at zen dot co dot uk)

[David E. Powell]

"Dave Eadsforth" > wrote in message
...
> In article >, Paul J. Adam
> > writes
> >In message >, Dave Eadsforth
> > writes
> >>Tirade number two over :-)
> >
> ><applause>
> >
> Just throw money!
>
> Dave

Just put a 20mm or 30mm gun on if they don't want the Mauser.... I am sure
they can rig a gun pod if they have to.... right?

> --
> Dave Eadsforth