Naval Air Refueling Needs Deferred in Air Force Tanker Plan

[Henry J Cobb]

http://www.military.com/NewContent/0,13190,NL_AFTank_042804,00.html
> Will the Air Force fulfill the Navy requirement for simultaneous
> refueling capability and, if so, when?

-HJC

[Kevin Brooks]

"Henry J Cobb" > wrote in message
...
> http://www.military.com/NewContent/0,13190,NL_AFTank_042804,00.html
> > Will the Air Force fulfill the Navy requirement for simultaneous
> > refueling capability and, if so, when?
>
> -HJC

Henry, you need to be a bit more careful in your citations (nothing new
about that...). Note that the article indicates: "Naval air forces,
including the Marine Corps' 72 F/A-18D fighters, require tankers to refuel
more than one fighter jet at a time with the hose reel system." Hogwash.
"Require"? How many USN tanker aircraft can feed two receivers at once? The
S-3 in tanking mode? Nope. The F/A-18E in tanker mode? Nope.

Your article also tries to gloss over the fact that numerous USAF tankers
are indeed capable of refueling USN aircraft--all of the KC-10's and
whichever KC-135's are fitted with the hose/drogue attachments. The tankers
the USAF needs to buy/lease *now* are needed to replace the older KC-135's;
their introduction into the force without an initial hose/drogue capability
will not be of serious detriment to the USN's capabilities, as the KC-10's
and the KC-135R's with hose/drogue will continue to fly missions.

Maybe you need to address this in a different manner...perhaps asking if it
might be more fair if the USAF agreed to support *all* USN tanking
requirements at such time as the USN agrees to actually support all of the
USAF's airborne jamming requirements (you seem to have missed the fact that
the USN recently cut one of its EA-6 squadrons, despite a continuing
shortage of that joint asset...). But you also are missing another
factor...if the land-based tankers are so ctitical to USN aviation
capabilities, why do you need the CVN's in the first place? If you can get
land based tanker support into the fray to support the USN strikers, you are
also within range of getting the USAF strikers into the fight, especially
the heavies...

Brooks

[Henry J Cobb]

Kevin Brooks wrote:
> "Henry J Cobb" > wrote in message
>>http://www.military.com/NewContent/0,13190,NL_AFTank_042804,00.html
>> > Will the Air Force fulfill the Navy requirement for simultaneous
>> > refueling capability and, if so, when?
>
> Henry, you need to be a bit more careful in your citations (nothing new
> about that...). Note that the article indicates: "Naval air forces,
> including the Marine Corps' 72 F/A-18D fighters, require tankers to refuel
> more than one fighter jet at a time with the hose reel system." Hogwash.
> "Require"? How many USN tanker aircraft can feed two receivers at once? The
> S-3 in tanking mode? Nope. The F/A-18E in tanker mode? Nope.

Are the Marines still part of the Navy Department?

And the KC-767 will be able to carry at least a little more fuel than a
Superhornet, or a KC-130J even.

> Maybe you need to address this in a different manner...perhaps asking if it
> might be more fair if the USAF agreed to support *all* USN tanking
> requirements at such time as the USN agrees to actually support all of the
> USAF's airborne jamming requirements (you seem to have missed the fact that
> the USN recently cut one of its EA-6 squadrons, despite a continuing
> shortage of that joint asset...).

I've already noted the Air Force shortage of jammers in another thread.

Perhaps they should start buying Growlers?

> But you also are missing another
> factor...if the land-based tankers are so ctitical to USN aviation
> capabilities, why do you need the CVN's in the first place? If you can get
> land based tanker support into the fray to support the USN strikers, you are
> also within range of getting the USAF strikers into the fight, especially
> the heavies...

Sea basing still needs work on delivering fuel, cargo and people to an
OMFTS force.

-HJC

[C Knowles]

Just some observations.

The article is not clear on the fact that the 767 WILL have a drogue on
every mission, like the KC-10. It will not have multiple wing pods, only a
centerline hose. Hence it does not meet the "simultaneous" capability
required by the USN.

So why doesn't the AF have this desperately needed requirement? Because the
AF uses a boom that can offload fuel 2-3 times a fast, and requires less
cycle time? Maybe the USN should consider putting receptacles next to the
probes on their fighters, ala the F-101 and F-105. Or buy more KC-130s.

The pods on KC-10s are WARPs (Wing Air Refueling Pod) while the KC-135
version is the MPRs (Multi-Point Refueling System). Essentially the same
pod but not interchangeable.

Curt


"Henry J Cobb" > wrote in message
...
> http://www.military.com/NewContent/0,13190,NL_AFTank_042804,00.html
> > Will the Air Force fulfill the Navy requirement for simultaneous
> > refueling capability and, if so, when?
>
> -HJC

[Kevin Brooks]

"Henry J Cobb" > wrote in message
...
> Kevin Brooks wrote:
> > "Henry J Cobb" > wrote in message
> >>http://www.military.com/NewContent/0,13190,NL_AFTank_042804,00.html
> >> > Will the Air Force fulfill the Navy requirement for simultaneous
> >> > refueling capability and, if so, when?
> >
> > Henry, you need to be a bit more careful in your citations (nothing new
> > about that...). Note that the article indicates: "Naval air forces,
> > including the Marine Corps' 72 F/A-18D fighters, require tankers to
refuel
> > more than one fighter jet at a time with the hose reel system." Hogwash.
> > "Require"? How many USN tanker aircraft can feed two receivers at once?
The
> > S-3 in tanking mode? Nope. The F/A-18E in tanker mode? Nope.
>
> Are the Marines still part of the Navy Department?

What does *that* matter? If it was freakin' *required*, then why all of the
fuss to get the F/A-18E into the tanking game? Why is it possible for the
USAF to do quite well with single-point tanking, while the USN 9despite its
own loooong history of also using single point tanking) would find it so
distatsteful (if, that is, you take the author's words as true--which they
ain't, in this case)?

>
> And the KC-767 will be able to carry at least a little more fuel than a
> Superhornet, or a KC-130J even.

So what? Your "source" says the USN *requires* multi-point tanking
capability--and that plainly is NOT the case.

>
> > Maybe you need to address this in a different manner...perhaps asking if
it
> > might be more fair if the USAF agreed to support *all* USN tanking
> > requirements at such time as the USN agrees to actually support all of
the
> > USAF's airborne jamming requirements (you seem to have missed the fact
that
> > the USN recently cut one of its EA-6 squadrons, despite a continuing
> > shortage of that joint asset...).
>
> I've already noted the Air Force shortage of jammers in another thread.

And you conveniently missed out on the FACT that the USN was then tasked to
provide jamming support for the joint force, eh? Something they have found
hard to do--even before they dumped that squadron...

>
> Perhaps they should start buying Growlers?

Why would the USAF want to buy an aircraft with a known range shortfall for
this mission?

>
> > But you also are missing another
> > factor...if the land-based tankers are so ctitical to USN aviation
> > capabilities, why do you need the CVN's in the first place? If you can
get
> > land based tanker support into the fray to support the USN strikers, you
are
> > also within range of getting the USAF strikers into the fight,
especially
> > the heavies...
>
> Sea basing still needs work on delivering fuel, cargo and people to an
> OMFTS force.

You are getting more dense every day... Now, if the USN is so dependent upon
land-based tanking, why is the CVN of such tremendous value, given that we
could just as well be deploying B-1's, B-52's, and even F-15E's from the
same base (or other bases in that area) that the tankers are operating from
to perform the missions instead of having a CVN (and attendant resources)
lurching around dependent upon land-based air support?

Brooks

>
> -HJC

[Kevin Brooks]

"C Knowles" > wrote in message
om...
> Just some observations.
>
> The article is not clear on the fact that the 767 WILL have a drogue on
> every mission, like the KC-10. It will not have multiple wing pods, only
a
> centerline hose. Hence it does not meet the "simultaneous" capability
> required by the USN.

The hang up is the use of the word "required". The USN's own tanking assets
on board their carriers are single-point hose/drogue assets; for them to
"require" that other providers have to perform better is a bit odd, sort of
like looking the gift-horse in the mouth (unless the USN wants to pony up
the additional bucks required to make the 767 a multi-point platform,
something I have not seen them express any desire to do as of yet).

Brooks

>
> So why doesn't the AF have this desperately needed requirement? Because
the
> AF uses a boom that can offload fuel 2-3 times a fast, and requires less
> cycle time? Maybe the USN should consider putting receptacles next to the
> probes on their fighters, ala the F-101 and F-105. Or buy more KC-130s.
>
> The pods on KC-10s are WARPs (Wing Air Refueling Pod) while the KC-135
> version is the MPRs (Multi-Point Refueling System). Essentially the same
> pod but not interchangeable.
>
> Curt
>
>
> "Henry J Cobb" > wrote in message
> ...
> > http://www.military.com/NewContent/0,13190,NL_AFTank_042804,00.html
> > > Will the Air Force fulfill the Navy requirement for simultaneous
> > > refueling capability and, if so, when?
> >
> > -HJC
>
>

[Guy Alcala]

Kevin Brooks wrote:

> "Henry J Cobb" > wrote in message
> ...
> > Kevin Brooks wrote:
> > > "Henry J Cobb" > wrote in message
> > >>http://www.military.com/NewContent/0,13190,NL_AFTank_042804,00.html
> > >> > Will the Air Force fulfill the Navy requirement for simultaneous
> > >> > refueling capability and, if so, when?
> > >
> > > Henry, you need to be a bit more careful in your citations (nothing new
> > > about that...). Note that the article indicates: "Naval air forces,
> > > including the Marine Corps' 72 F/A-18D fighters, require tankers to
> refuel
> > > more than one fighter jet at a time with the hose reel system." Hogwash.
> > > "Require"? How many USN tanker aircraft can feed two receivers at once?
> The
> > > S-3 in tanking mode? Nope. The F/A-18E in tanker mode? Nope.
> >
> > Are the Marines still part of the Navy Department?
>
> What does *that* matter? If it was freakin' *required*, then why all of the
> fuss to get the F/A-18E into the tanking game? Why is it possible for the
> USAF to do quite well with single-point tanking, while the USN 9despite its
> own loooong history of also using single point tanking) would find it so
> distatsteful (if, that is, you take the author's words as true--which they
> ain't, in this case)?

Kevin, while it's highly unusual for me to support anything that HJC puts
forward, I find the article in question pretty accurately reflects the issues.
A boom typically has double (or more) the transfer rate of a
drogue/fighter-sized probe. That's why the USAF decided to adopt them in the
first place, for SAC's bombers, so that refueling took much less time. Single
point drogues are better than nothing, but just as the article says, they limit
the size of the strike flight (or require far more tankers), because the first
a/c to refuel has used up most of the fuel it has received by the time that the
last guy is done. From DS on the USN has relied increasingly on USAF and
foreign land-based tankers, because their own tankers lack the
numbers/offload/loiter/drogue stations to allow them to go far inland with
large strikes. The USMC has its KC-130s, which are at least dual-point, but
they're limited to perhaps 6 a/c in a flight pre-strike, with four preferred,
before they meet the law of diminishing returns. A single-point boom tanker is
about the same. It's not that the navy can't use their S-3s or F-18E/Fs
exclusively, it's just that they're limited in the size/radius of their strikes
when they do so.

Given our increasing jointness, it does seem odd that the KC-767 isn't planned
to have provision for wing drogues from the get-go. It's clearly an
inter-service budget issue, but single point drogues just don't cut it for big
strikes; if they did, we wouldn't have fit out those KC-10As and KC-135Rs for
wing drogues (Flight Refueling MK.32s IIRC). It's a simple matter of fuel
throughput per unit time. Large, land-based drogue tankers should have at least
two drogue stations, with three preferred (see the Victor K.2; there was even a
USN Convair seaplane with FOUR drogues):

http://www.aviation-history.com/convair/tradewind.html

Less than two drogue stations is not making use of a large a/c's wingspan.
Naturally, they don't all have to be fitted with them all the time, as there is
a weight, drag and maintenance penalty, but they sure as hell should be capable
of fitting them. Hell, Boeing is even talking about a BWB tanker with two
_booms_.

That the RAF Tristars don't have wing pods has been a minor scandal for almost
20 years now. They were supposed to get them, and initial cursory engineering
evaluations indicated that the wing structure could take them, but when it came
time to get serious they found out there were issues that were going to require
very expensive modifications (splitting the ailerons or maybe it was the flaps
was part of it, IIRR), so they've been stuck with a pair of centerline drogues
ever since. That provides redundancy, but doesn't increase the receiver
servicing rate.

> > And the KC-767 will be able to carry at least a little more fuel than a
> > Superhornet, or a KC-130J even.
>
> So what? Your "source" says the USN *requires* multi-point tanking
> capability--and that plainly is NOT the case.

For most of the deeper missions, including most of the combat missions that have
been flown from DS on, they do. If they aren't going very far, and/or are using
small strike packages at fairly wide intervals, they don't. Neither has been
typical of USN combat ops for the last 14 years.

<snip>

> > > But you also are missing another
> > > factor...if the land-based tankers are so ctitical to USN aviation
> > > capabilities, why do you need the CVN's in the first place? If you can
> get
> > > land based tanker support into the fray to support the USN strikers, you
> are
> > > also within range of getting the USAF strikers into the fight,
> especially
> > > the heavies...
> >
> > Sea basing still needs work on delivering fuel, cargo and people to an
> > OMFTS force.
>
> You are getting more dense every day... Now, if the USN is so dependent upon
> land-based tanking, why is the CVN of such tremendous value, given that we
> could just as well be deploying B-1's, B-52's, and even F-15E's from the
> same base (or other bases in that area) that the tankers are operating from
> to perform the missions instead of having a CVN (and attendant resources)
> lurching around dependent upon land-based air support?

There are obviously ramp space and arrival time/support issues. Clearly you can
get a force of tankers in theater a lot faster than a force of tankers PLUS a
force of fighters and all their support. The CVWs are already on station with
everything but the tanking (and maybe some E-3s/JSTARS).

Guy

[Kevin Brooks]

"Guy Alcala" > wrote in message
. ..
> Kevin Brooks wrote:
>
> > "Henry J Cobb" > wrote in message
> > ...
> > > Kevin Brooks wrote:
> > > > "Henry J Cobb" > wrote in message
> > > >>http://www.military.com/NewContent/0,13190,NL_AFTank_042804,00.html
> > > >> > Will the Air Force fulfill the Navy requirement for simultaneous
> > > >> > refueling capability and, if so, when?
> > > >
> > > > Henry, you need to be a bit more careful in your citations (nothing
new
> > > > about that...). Note that the article indicates: "Naval air forces,
> > > > including the Marine Corps' 72 F/A-18D fighters, require tankers to
> > refuel
> > > > more than one fighter jet at a time with the hose reel system."
Hogwash.
> > > > "Require"? How many USN tanker aircraft can feed two receivers at
once?
> > The
> > > > S-3 in tanking mode? Nope. The F/A-18E in tanker mode? Nope.
> > >
> > > Are the Marines still part of the Navy Department?
> >
> > What does *that* matter? If it was freakin' *required*, then why all of
the
> > fuss to get the F/A-18E into the tanking game? Why is it possible for
the
> > USAF to do quite well with single-point tanking, while the USN 9despite
its
> > own loooong history of also using single point tanking) would find it so
> > distatsteful (if, that is, you take the author's words as true--which
they
> > ain't, in this case)?
>
> Kevin, while it's highly unusual for me to support anything that HJC puts
> forward, I find the article in question pretty accurately reflects the
issues.
> A boom typically has double (or more) the transfer rate of a
> drogue/fighter-sized probe.

Yep.

That's why the USAF decided to adopt them in the
> first place, for SAC's bombers, so that refueling took much less time.
Single
> point drogues are better than nothing, but just as the article says, they
limit
> the size of the strike flight (or require far more tankers), because the
first
> a/c to refuel has used up most of the fuel it has received by the time
that the
> last guy is done.

Yep.

From DS on the USN has relied increasingly on USAF and
> foreign land-based tankers, because their own tankers lack the
> numbers/offload/loiter/drogue stations to allow them to go far inland
with
> large strikes. The USMC has its KC-130s, which are at least dual-point,
but
> they're limited to perhaps 6 a/c in a flight pre-strike, with four
preferred,
> before they meet the law of diminishing returns. A single-point boom
tanker is
> about the same. It's not that the navy can't use their S-3s or F-18E/Fs
> exclusively, it's just that they're limited in the size/radius of their
strikes
> when they do so.

Which is why the USAF will still have the capability of supporting the USN,
with both single and dual point refueling. The fact that the 767 won't have
that multi-point capability up-front is NOT going to create a critical
situation for the USN.

>
> Given our increasing jointness, it does seem odd that the KC-767 isn't
planned
> to have provision for wing drogues from the get-go.

Not necessarily. The USAF is getting to the desperation point in regards to
the 135E's--they are either going to have to poop a lot of money to upgrade
them (not the wisest choice, given their age and condition), or they have to
get a replacement in the air, and rather quickly. That last part (quickly)
seems to merit a sort-of-spiral approach, to me; get them into service ASAP
with the boom and single-point drogue (while still having the 135R's in
service, some with the multi-point hoses), and then worry about bringing
them up to a higher standard later, when the time-crunch is not so critical.

It's clearly an
> inter-service budget issue, but single point drogues just don't cut it for
big
> strikes; if they did, we wouldn't have fit out those KC-10As and KC-135Rs
for
> wing drogues (Flight Refueling MK.32s IIRC). It's a simple matter of fuel
> throughput per unit time.

Which KC-10's and KC-135R's will still be serving, you should add. Correct
me if I am wrong, but the aircraft that the 767's are destined to replace,
the 135E's, do not have the multi-point refueling capability, either, do
they?

Large, land-based drogue tankers should have at least
> two drogue stations, with three preferred (see the Victor K.2; there was
even a
> USN Convair seaplane with FOUR drogues):
>
> http://www.aviation-history.com/convair/tradewind.html
>
> Less than two drogue stations is not making use of a large a/c's wingspan.
> Naturally, they don't all have to be fitted with them all the time, as
there is
> a weight, drag and maintenance penalty, but they sure as hell should be
capable
> of fitting them. Hell, Boeing is even talking about a BWB tanker with two
> _booms_.

So what you are saying is that we should delay the program even further than
it already has been, so that all of the new aircraft are capable of
performing a mission that only a certain portion of the joint force (the USN
strikers and whatnot) can receive from them the same level of support...that
they can already get from the other aircraft that will be remaining in
service? I don't necessarily agree with that analysis (and neither does the
USAF, apparently).

>
> That the RAF Tristars don't have wing pods has been a minor scandal for
almost
> 20 years now. They were supposed to get them, and initial cursory
engineering
> evaluations indicated that the wing structure could take them, but when it
came
> time to get serious they found out there were issues that were going to
require
> very expensive modifications (splitting the ailerons or maybe it was the
flaps
> was part of it, IIRR), so they've been stuck with a pair of centerline
drogues
> ever since. That provides redundancy, but doesn't increase the receiver
> servicing rate.
>
> > > And the KC-767 will be able to carry at least a little more fuel than
a
> > > Superhornet, or a KC-130J even.
> >
> > So what? Your "source" says the USN *requires* multi-point tanking
> > capability--and that plainly is NOT the case.
>
> For most of the deeper missions, including most of the combat missions
that have
> been flown from DS on, they do. If they aren't going very far, and/or are
using
> small strike packages at fairly wide intervals, they don't. Neither has
been
> typical of USN combat ops for the last 14 years.

Then maybe they need to fork over some bucks for some additional multi-point
pods for the KC-135R's... In actuality, that would probably be the best
solution anyway--they would get their improved support capability a lot more
quickly that way (versus waiting for the 767's to come on line). So is the
USN really concerned about the level of tanking support they can count on,
or are they just posturing for the purpose of budget fighting? Another
thought--the USN has been buying C-40's of late--if they are so keenly
worried about their refueling capability, why did they never think about
including a secondary tanker role for that aircraft, or that class of
aircraft, such that they could help themselves out? Probably not, because
that would have required them to spend their own part of the budget
pie...much better to have the USAF spend their money, eh?

>
> <snip>
>
> > > > But you also are missing another
> > > > factor...if the land-based tankers are so ctitical to USN aviation
> > > > capabilities, why do you need the CVN's in the first place? If you
can
> > get
> > > > land based tanker support into the fray to support the USN strikers,
you
> > are
> > > > also within range of getting the USAF strikers into the fight,
> > especially
> > > > the heavies...
> > >
> > > Sea basing still needs work on delivering fuel, cargo and people to an
> > > OMFTS force.
> >
> > You are getting more dense every day... Now, if the USN is so dependent
upon
> > land-based tanking, why is the CVN of such tremendous value, given that
we
> > could just as well be deploying B-1's, B-52's, and even F-15E's from the
> > same base (or other bases in that area) that the tankers are operating
from
> > to perform the missions instead of having a CVN (and attendant
resources)
> > lurching around dependent upon land-based air support?
>
> There are obviously ramp space and arrival time/support issues.

Sometimes. Believe it or not, I am not in favor of junking the CVN
fleet--but neither is the USN making a great case for the CVN's value when
they whine about the USAF not optimizing *all* of its tankers to support
their needs--especially when at the same time they have proven rather
unwilling to resource their own part of the joint package (the EA-6 jammer
force) to support all of the USAF's needs (note that the USAF is making
serious noises about going back into the jamming business, likely with the
B-52 as the initial platform). The USN might want to be careful how far they
go in pointing fingers in regards to the 'They are not supporting us like
they are supposed to" manner, lest the fickle-finger end up pointing back in
their direction.

Clearly you can
> get a force of tankers in theater a lot faster than a force of tankers
PLUS a
> force of fighters and all their support.

Can you? I am not sure about that (note how quickly we got the lead
squadrons of the 1st TFW into Saudi Arabia in 1990), especially since
getting all of those tankers into the theater is only going to do you some
good if the fuel for them to haul is also present, or readily available, at
that operating location. How much more trouble is it for the USAF to put a
force that could easily surpass the per-day delivered-tonnage capability of
a CVSG (given your premise that the CVN is having to operate from extended
range itself)? Three or four B-1B's or B-52's alone can acheive that. OEF
demonstrated the use of both F-15E's and F-16's in conducting pretty long
range strike operations (from the PG around Iran, up to Afghanistan and back
again, at greater range than the CVN-based strikers were enduring). Worried
about an enemy air threat? Then you have your standoff attack systems, along
with B-2's. Yes, there are other issues (hauling in the bombs, etc.), but
they are not insurmountable (i.e., we still have a surface transport
capability, augmented by air transport assets).

Should we can the CVN's? No, of course not. But they can continue to operate
a few more years with the support of KC-135R's and KC-10's without HAVING to
have the 767's *optimized* for their very own use.

Brooks

The CVWs are already on station with
> everything but the tanking (and maybe some E-3s/JSTARS).
>
> Guy
>

[Guy Alcala]

Kevin Brooks wrote:

> "Guy Alcala" > wrote in message
> . ..
> > Kevin Brooks wrote:

<snip>

>
> > Kevin, while it's highly unusual for me to support anything that HJC puts
> > forward, I find the article in question pretty accurately reflects the
> issues.
> > A boom typically has double (or more) the transfer rate of a
> > drogue/fighter-sized probe.
>
> Yep.
>
> That's why the USAF decided to adopt them in the
> > first place, for SAC's bombers, so that refueling took much less time.
> Single
> > point drogues are better than nothing, but just as the article says, they
> limit
> > the size of the strike flight (or require far more tankers), because the
> first
> > a/c to refuel has used up most of the fuel it has received by the time
> that the
> > last guy is done.
>
> Yep.
>
> From DS on the USN has relied increasingly on USAF and
> > foreign land-based tankers, because their own tankers lack the
> > numbers/offload/loiter/drogue stations to allow them to go far inland
> with
> > large strikes. The USMC has its KC-130s, which are at least dual-point,
> but
> > they're limited to perhaps 6 a/c in a flight pre-strike, with four
> preferred,
> > before they meet the law of diminishing returns. A single-point boom
> tanker is
> > about the same. It's not that the navy can't use their S-3s or F-18E/Fs
> > exclusively, it's just that they're limited in the size/radius of their
> strikes
> > when they do so.
>
> Which is why the USAF will still have the capability of supporting the USN,
> with both single and dual point refueling. The fact that the 767 won't have
> that multi-point capability up-front is NOT going to create a critical
> situation for the USN.

But it may be critical for bed-down and other operational issues, and it's
definitely inefficient. Besides,who says we're only supporting the USN? In
various conflicts we've had help from Canadian and Spanish Hornets, plus the
RAF, AMI, KDF, RNAF, Luftwaffe etc. They've helped us with _their_ multi-point
tankers on occasion.

> > Given our increasing jointness, it does seem odd that the KC-767 isn't
> planned
> > to have provision for wing drogues from the get-go.
>
> Not necessarily. The USAF is getting to the desperation point in regards to
> the 135E's--they are either going to have to poop a lot of money to upgrade
> them (not the wisest choice, given their age and condition), or they have to
> get a replacement in the air, and rather quickly.

The justification for that has always been somewhat questionable. Only a few
years ago they were projecting the 135E's fatigue life out 30 or 40 years,
although the engines were probably going to need replacement. Let's face it,
the 767 deal has more than a little to do with keeping Boeing's 767 line open
and people employed. Would it be a good thing to get some newer tankers?
Sure. Do we need them right now, because the 135Es are falling apart? That's
arguable.

> That last part (quickly)
> seems to merit a sort-of-spiral approach, to me; get them into service ASAP
> with the boom and single-point drogue (while still having the 135R's in
> service, some with the multi-point hoses), and then worry about bringing
> them up to a higher standard later, when the time-crunch is not so critical.

I see it as entirely budget-driven, with the huge bow-wave they've already got
going restricting them. Indeed, that was the primary reason for the KC-767
lease rather than buy in the first place.

> It's clearly an
> > inter-service budget issue, but single point drogues just don't cut it for
> big
> > strikes; if they did, we wouldn't have fit out those KC-10As and KC-135Rs
> for
> > wing drogues (Flight Refueling MK.32s IIRC). It's a simple matter of fuel
> > throughput per unit time.
>
> Which KC-10's and KC-135R's will still be serving, you should add. Correct
> me if I am wrong, but the aircraft that the 767's are destined to replace,
> the 135E's, do not have the multi-point refueling capability, either, do
> they?

No, they don't, and the 767's will at least be able to refuel both types of
refueling systems on the same sortie, and they'll have a proper drogue rather
than that ******* afterthought on the end of the boom. OTOH, we're also buying
fewer of them than the 135Es they're supposed to replace (differing MC rates
obviously play a part). But in big strikes, it's the number of refueling
drogues/booms in the air that determine the service rate, and it's silly to have
to use (and bed-down) double the number of a/c if we don't need to.

> Large, land-based drogue tankers should have at least
> > two drogue stations, with three preferred (see the Victor K.2; there was
> even a
> > USN Convair seaplane with FOUR drogues):
> >
> > http://www.aviation-history.com/convair/tradewind.html
> >
> > Less than two drogue stations is not making use of a large a/c's wingspan.
> > Naturally, they don't all have to be fitted with them all the time, as
> there is
> > a weight, drag and maintenance penalty, but they sure as hell should be
> capable
> > of fitting them. Hell, Boeing is even talking about a BWB tanker with two
> > _booms_.
>
> So what you are saying is that we should delay the program even further than
> it already has been, so that all of the new aircraft are capable of
> performing a mission that only a certain portion of the joint force (the USN
> strikers and whatnot) can receive from them the same level of support...that
> they can already get from the other aircraft that will be remaining in
> service? I don't necessarily agree with that analysis (and neither does the
> USAF, apparently).

I'm saying that it makes far more sense now to buy the capability up front that
we know we'll be adding down the road, especially since the R&D work is largely
being paid for by Italy and Japan, than to add it years from now when we know
it's going to be more expensive to do so. If that means we buy a/c at a slower
rate (and more refueling pods), good. We plan to be operating from more austere
bases, which tend to be somewhat limited in ramp space, so anything we can do
that limits that is a plus. That was indeed one of the USAF's arguments against
the A330 -- that it took up too much ramp space while providing no more
refueling stations than the 767. They considered the A330's somewhat greater
offload irrelevant for the tactical refueling mission; they were concerned with
the number of booms/drogues on station while minimizing the ground footprint. If
that logic is valid, then buying dual rather than single-point capability is
even more valuable as a way of minimizing the ground footprint. See below.

<snip>

> > > So what? Your "source" says the USN *requires* multi-point tanking
> > > capability--and that plainly is NOT the case.
> >
> > For most of the deeper missions, including most of the combat missions
> that have
> > been flown from DS on, they do. If they aren't going very far, and/or are
> using
> > small strike packages at fairly wide intervals, they don't. Neither has
> been
> > typical of USN combat ops for the last 14 years.
>
> Then maybe they need to fork over some bucks for some additional multi-point
> pods for the KC-135R's... In actuality, that would probably be the best
> solution anyway--they would get their improved support capability a lot more
> quickly that way (versus waiting for the 767's to come on line).

I completely agree.

> So is the
> USN really concerned about the level of tanking support they can count on,
> or are they just posturing for the purpose of budget fighting?

As I said, there's a question of interservice budgeting, and who pays for what.

> Another
> thought--the USN has been buying C-40's of late--if they are so keenly
> worried about their refueling capability, why did they never think about
> including a secondary tanker role for that aircraft, or that class of
> aircraft, such that they could help themselves out? Probably not, because
> that would have required them to spend their own part of the budget
> pie...much better to have the USAF spend their money, eh?

I'm sure they think so. OTOH, FAIK the USAF would have fought against any such
proposal with tooth and nail. The navy has in the past considered buying their
own land-based tanker fleet, but ISTR that SAC (at the time) in effect said
"over our dead body." IIRR the Tradewind was an attempt to get around that;
after all, the USAF could hardly complain about seaplanes.

I imagine AMC would act similarly proprietarily today, but the point (to me, at
least) isn't which service provides the capability, but that it be provided.

<snip area of general agreement>

> Clearly you can
> > get a force of tankers in theater a lot faster than a force of tankers
> PLUS a
> > force of fighters and all their support.
>
> Can you? I am not sure about that (note how quickly we got the lead
> squadrons of the 1st TFW into Saudi Arabia in 1990), especially since
> getting all of those tankers into the theater is only going to do you some
> good if the fuel for them to haul is also present, or readily available, at
> that operating location.

The 1st TFW had an A/A role, IIRR deployed with a full loadout of missiles on
thea/c and could fairly easily bring an adequate number of reloads with them, or
fly them in later. A/G ordnance can be a very different matter, although PGMs
help that aspect. I can't remember if it was the A-10s or F-15Es, but in one of
Smallwood's books (I think), aircrews described just how limited their A/G
ordnance options were right after they deployed. Fuel, OTOH, is relatively
available anywhere a commercial airliner is able to operate from. Maybe you
need to haul in JP-5/8 for the tactical a/c, but the tankers themselves should
be able to operate on Jet A/A-1.

> How much more trouble is it for the USAF to put a
> force that could easily surpass the per-day delivered-tonnage capability of
> a CVSG (given your premise that the CVN is having to operate from extended
> range itself)?

If they've got sufficient time to get set up in advance, fine, but crises often
don't provide that kind of time. We've been lucky that most of our wars in the
past decade and a half (OAF somewhat excepted) have given us some lead time to
get ready.

> Three or four B-1B's or B-52's alone can acheive that.

And provided you're willing to send them in without any SEAD at the start of the
war, and multi-hour cycle times are no problem, great.

> OEF
> demonstrated the use of both F-15E's and F-16's in conducting pretty long
> range strike operations (from the PG around Iran, up to Afghanistan and back
> again, at greater range than the CVN-based strikers were enduring).

Sure did. Using those USAF tankers with booms to maximise the transfer rate.
And it helped that we were already set up in the area flying Southern Watch
sorties. But we're not there now, although we do still have some presence in
the 'Stans, IIRC.

> Worried
> about an enemy air threat? Then you have your standoff attack systems, along
> with B-2's. Yes, there are other issues (hauling in the bombs, etc.), but
> they are not insurmountable (i.e., we still have a surface transport
> capability, augmented by air transport assets).
>
> Should we can the CVN's? No, of course not. But they can continue to operate
> a few more years with the support of KC-135R's and KC-10's without HAVING to
> have the 767's *optimized* for their very own use.

Provided we have sufficient space for all those tanker a/c in theater, fine, but
it's still wasteful to use two a/c and crews to do the job of one. Of course,
if you're cycling flights of two constantly through the tankers, no big deal,
but gorilla packages are another matter. And we may well need to help tank our
allies (assuming we have any). Many of them are buying their own multi-point
drogue tankers now, which helps both of us if they're along for the ride.

Guy

[Kevin Brooks]

"Guy Alcala" > wrote in message
. ..
> Kevin Brooks wrote:
>
> > "Guy Alcala" > wrote in message
> > . ..
> > > Kevin Brooks wrote:
>
> <snip>
>
> >
> > > Kevin, while it's highly unusual for me to support anything that HJC
puts
> > > forward, I find the article in question pretty accurately reflects the
> > issues.
> > > A boom typically has double (or more) the transfer rate of a
> > > drogue/fighter-sized probe.
> >
> > Yep.
> >
> > That's why the USAF decided to adopt them in the
> > > first place, for SAC's bombers, so that refueling took much less time.
> > Single
> > > point drogues are better than nothing, but just as the article says,
they
> > limit
> > > the size of the strike flight (or require far more tankers), because
the
> > first
> > > a/c to refuel has used up most of the fuel it has received by the time
> > that the
> > > last guy is done.
> >
> > Yep.
> >
> > From DS on the USN has relied increasingly on USAF and
> > > foreign land-based tankers, because their own tankers lack the
> > > numbers/offload/loiter/drogue stations to allow them to go far inland
> > with
> > > large strikes. The USMC has its KC-130s, which are at least
dual-point,
> > but
> > > they're limited to perhaps 6 a/c in a flight pre-strike, with four
> > preferred,
> > > before they meet the law of diminishing returns. A single-point boom
> > tanker is
> > > about the same. It's not that the navy can't use their S-3s or
F-18E/Fs
> > > exclusively, it's just that they're limited in the size/radius of
their
> > strikes
> > > when they do so.
> >
> > Which is why the USAF will still have the capability of supporting the
USN,
> > with both single and dual point refueling. The fact that the 767 won't
have
> > that multi-point capability up-front is NOT going to create a critical
> > situation for the USN.
>
> But it may be critical for bed-down and other operational issues, and it's
> definitely inefficient. Besides,who says we're only supporting the USN?
In
> various conflicts we've had help from Canadian and Spanish Hornets, plus
the
> RAF, AMI, KDF, RNAF, Luftwaffe etc. They've helped us with _their_
multi-point
> tankers on occasion.

And that help has been appreciated. But that does not really imply that we
have to optimize *all* of our aircraft to perform multi-point refueling
right *now*.

>
> > > Given our increasing jointness, it does seem odd that the KC-767 isn't
> > planned
> > > to have provision for wing drogues from the get-go.
> >
> > Not necessarily. The USAF is getting to the desperation point in regards
to
> > the 135E's--they are either going to have to poop a lot of money to
upgrade
> > them (not the wisest choice, given their age and condition), or they
have to
> > get a replacement in the air, and rather quickly.
>
> The justification for that has always been somewhat questionable. Only a
few
> years ago they were projecting the 135E's fatigue life out 30 or 40 years,
> although the engines were probably going to need replacement. Let's face
it,
> the 767 deal has more than a little to do with keeping Boeing's 767 line
open
> and people employed. Would it be a good thing to get some newer tankers?
> Sure. Do we need them right now, because the 135Es are falling apart?
That's
> arguable.

Firstly, "only a few years ago" was before we (again) had to surge tanker
support for two recent operations--that eats into remaining lifespan
(operating hours for the tanker force being about a third higher than they
were pre-9/11). Second, if you are going to replace the engines (and
associated controls), you are talking about a sizeable investment (witness
the never-ending debate over the wisdom of reengining the B-52's, C-5's,
etc.) right there. Then you have to remember that the E models have also not
undergone other avionics updates due to their age/limited lifespan
remaining, so if you want to keep them around you are going to have to do
the whole PACER CRAIG thing, etc. In other words, turn them all into R
models--which does not sound like a real wise investment.

It is beyond argument that the E models are the anchormen when it comes to
MC rate (about 78% for the E models, versus 82% for the R models, based upon
GAO figures for May 2003). Without reengining, and taking them up to the R
standard, this MC rate difference will only grow--it drops below 75% and I'd
think the USAF leadership will really start to howl. Corrosion maintenace is
another (growing) concern, and it will eat up more and more money as we try
to stretch out the E model's lifespan. Oddly, even the GAO noted that they
recommended that the USAF start paying serious attention to replacing the
KC-135 fleet as early as 1996 (of course, in typical GAO style, they have
managed to cover their bases in all eventualities, so they can always say,
"Told ya so!" regardless of how we proceed...).

>
> > That last part (quickly)
> > seems to merit a sort-of-spiral approach, to me; get them into service
ASAP
> > with the boom and single-point drogue (while still having the 135R's in
> > service, some with the multi-point hoses), and then worry about bringing
> > them up to a higher standard later, when the time-crunch is not so
critical.
>
> I see it as entirely budget-driven, with the huge bow-wave they've already
got
> going restricting them. Indeed, that was the primary reason for the
KC-767
> lease rather than buy in the first place.

The lease came about because it (a) allowed the USAF to recapitalize the
oldest portion of the tanker fleet in the most rapid fashion, and (b)
because it was also beneficial to Boeing in terms of keeping the 767 line
open. Don't act as if the latter is a "bad" thing--we have paced procurement
programs to keep assembly operations going for decades, be it the C-130 or
the M-1 tank. Consider how much MORE it would cost to *buy* the 767's if we
drag this out through the usual (overly long) procurement cycle, and the
line has in the meanwhile shut down; restarting a line is not going to be
cheap. Some folks cry that this is a "help out Boeing" deal--I don't agree,
at least completely, as it also helps out the USAF in getting timely
replacements for the aging KC-135 fleet; and to be honest, even if it *were*
more of a "help out Boeing" deal it would not concern me greatly, as I see a
necessity in our keeping alive the kind of combined commercial/military
transport production capability that we NEED to have, unless you are willing
to be 100% reliant upon a foreign provider for our future tanking and heavy
transport needs (I for one would hate to see the French government in a
position to slow down or stop delivery of such a critical asset merely
because they would want to show us they could do it).

>
> > It's clearly an
> > > inter-service budget issue, but single point drogues just don't cut it
for
> > big
> > > strikes; if they did, we wouldn't have fit out those KC-10As and
KC-135Rs
> > for
> > > wing drogues (Flight Refueling MK.32s IIRC). It's a simple matter of
fuel
> > > throughput per unit time.
> >
> > Which KC-10's and KC-135R's will still be serving, you should add.
Correct
> > me if I am wrong, but the aircraft that the 767's are destined to
replace,
> > the 135E's, do not have the multi-point refueling capability, either, do
> > they?
>
> No, they don't, and the 767's will at least be able to refuel both types
of
> refueling systems on the same sortie, and they'll have a proper drogue
rather
> than that ******* afterthought on the end of the boom. OTOH, we're also
buying
> fewer of them than the 135Es they're supposed to replace (differing MC
rates
> obviously play a part). But in big strikes, it's the number of refueling
> drogues/booms in the air that determine the service rate, and it's silly
to have
> to use (and bed-down) double the number of a/c if we don't need to.

That does not necessarily hold true. If the requirement to provide
hose/drogue capability in-theater is 8that* important in a given case, you
send the KC-10's and multi-point 135R's forward, and use the other aircraft
(i.e., these pre-improvement 767's) to handle the usual airbridge su[pport
operations into the theater. So what you really seem to be saying is that
the 767's, even without initial multi-point capability, offer an improvement
to the current level of support that can be afforded to the USN?

>
> > Large, land-based drogue tankers should have at least
> > > two drogue stations, with three preferred (see the Victor K.2; there
was
> > even a
> > > USN Convair seaplane with FOUR drogues):
> > >
> > > http://www.aviation-history.com/convair/tradewind.html
> > >
> > > Less than two drogue stations is not making use of a large a/c's
wingspan.
> > > Naturally, they don't all have to be fitted with them all the time, as
> > there is
> > > a weight, drag and maintenance penalty, but they sure as hell should
be
> > capable
> > > of fitting them. Hell, Boeing is even talking about a BWB tanker with
two
> > > _booms_.
> >
> > So what you are saying is that we should delay the program even further
than
> > it already has been, so that all of the new aircraft are capable of
> > performing a mission that only a certain portion of the joint force (the
USN
> > strikers and whatnot) can receive from them the same level of
support...that
> > they can already get from the other aircraft that will be remaining in
> > service? I don't necessarily agree with that analysis (and neither does
the
> > USAF, apparently).
>
> I'm saying that it makes far more sense now to buy the capability up front
that
> we know we'll be adding down the road, especially since the R&D work is
largely
> being paid for by Italy and Japan, than to add it years from now when we
know
> it's going to be more expensive to do so.


Whoah there, hoss. If the R&D is being picked up elsewhere (by virtue of
those foreign sales you mention), that advantage does not go away because we
dicide not to implement the multi-point system up-front. That R&D effort is
still applicable. And you are avoiding the fact that it will slow the
delivery timeline if we have to go with this optimization up-front.

If that means we buy a/c at a slower
> rate (and more refueling pods), good.

Good? I disagree. So does the USAF, from what I have read.

We plan to be operating from more austere
> bases, which tend to be somewhat limited in ramp space, so anything we can
do
> that limits that is a plus. That was indeed one of the USAF's arguments
against
> the A330 -- that it took up too much ramp space while providing no more
> refueling stations than the 767. They considered the A330's somewhat
greater
> offload irrelevant for the tactical refueling mission; they were concerned
with
> the number of booms/drogues on station while minimizing the ground
footprint. If
> that logic is valid, then buying dual rather than single-point capability
is
> even more valuable as a way of minimizing the ground footprint. See
below.

In the long run, yes. But is it worth slowing delivery up-front even further
than it already has been slowed?

>
> <snip>
>
> > > > So what? Your "source" says the USN *requires* multi-point tanking
> > > > capability--and that plainly is NOT the case.
> > >
> > > For most of the deeper missions, including most of the combat missions
> > that have
> > > been flown from DS on, they do. If they aren't going very far, and/or
are
> > using
> > > small strike packages at fairly wide intervals, they don't. Neither
has
> > been
> > > typical of USN combat ops for the last 14 years.
> >
> > Then maybe they need to fork over some bucks for some additional
multi-point
> > pods for the KC-135R's... In actuality, that would probably be the best
> > solution anyway--they would get their improved support capability a lot
more
> > quickly that way (versus waiting for the 767's to come on line).
>
> I completely agree.
>
> > So is the
> > USN really concerned about the level of tanking support they can count
on,
> > or are they just posturing for the purpose of budget fighting?
>
> As I said, there's a question of interservice budgeting, and who pays for
what.
>
> > Another
> > thought--the USN has been buying C-40's of late--if they are so keenly
> > worried about their refueling capability, why did they never think about
> > including a secondary tanker role for that aircraft, or that class of
> > aircraft, such that they could help themselves out? Probably not,
because
> > that would have required them to spend their own part of the budget
> > pie...much better to have the USAF spend their money, eh?
>
> I'm sure they think so. OTOH, FAIK the USAF would have fought against any
such
> proposal with tooth and nail. The navy has in the past considered buying
their
> own land-based tanker fleet, but ISTR that SAC (at the time) in effect
said
> "over our dead body." IIRR the Tradewind was an attempt to get around
that;
> after all, the USAF could hardly complain about seaplanes.
>
> I imagine AMC would act similarly proprietarily today, but the point (to
me, at
> least) isn't which service provides the capability, but that it be
provided.

But they oddly don't have a problem with the USMC buying C-130J's to augment
their current tanker fleet. Personally, I doubt the USAF would have put up a
fight if the USN had said they wanted to incorporate a secondary refueling
capability in their C-40B's; just as the USN has been strangely silent over
the USAF talking about recreating an in-house stand-off jamming capability.

>
> <snip area of general agreement>
>
> > Clearly you can
> > > get a force of tankers in theater a lot faster than a force of
tankers
> > PLUS a
> > > force of fighters and all their support.
> >
> > Can you? I am not sure about that (note how quickly we got the lead
> > squadrons of the 1st TFW into Saudi Arabia in 1990), especially since
> > getting all of those tankers into the theater is only going to do you
some
> > good if the fuel for them to haul is also present, or readily available,
at
> > that operating location.
>
> The 1st TFW had an A/A role, IIRR deployed with a full loadout of missiles
on
> thea/c and could fairly easily bring an adequate number of reloads with
them, or
> fly them in later. A/G ordnance can be a very different matter, although
PGMs
> help that aspect. I can't remember if it was the A-10s or F-15Es, but in
one of
> Smallwood's books (I think), aircrews described just how limited their A/G
> ordnance options were right after they deployed. Fuel, OTOH, is
relatively
> available anywhere a commercial airliner is able to operate from. Maybe
you
> need to haul in JP-5/8 for the tactical a/c, but the tankers themselves
should
> be able to operate on Jet A/A-1.

As to fuel availability, I was referring to the ready availability of the
JP-8 in bulk form--and it won't necessarily be there (always) in the
quantity you want at those "remote" bases you refer to unless we haul it in
ourselves. Usually meaning by ship. A second ship can haul quite a few
pieces of ordnance, right? If you are tied to getting basic resources into
the TO, you might as well be "in for a penny, in for a pound". And yes, the
use of PGM's has resulted in a drastic reduction in the volume of ordnance
that has to be transported into the TO (ISTR Franks noting that during OEF
we were effectively engaging as many targets per day as we did during ODS,
with about 10% of the average daily sortie rate compared to the earlier
conflict). As we move towards use of the 500 pound JDAM, and even moreso the
SDB, the need for ordnance (in terms of volume/weight) will shrivel even
further.

>
> > How much more trouble is it for the USAF to put a
> > force that could easily surpass the per-day delivered-tonnage capability
of
> > a CVSG (given your premise that the CVN is having to operate from
extended
> > range itself)?
>
> If they've got sufficient time to get set up in advance, fine, but crises
often
> don't provide that kind of time. We've been lucky that most of our wars
in the
> past decade and a half (OAF somewhat excepted) have given us some lead
time to
> get ready.

I'd posit that using the basing options we already have in-hand (Guam, Diego
Garcia, Fairford, and CONUS), the B-1, B-52, and B-2 can acheive this pretty
much anywhere in the world *now*.

>
> > Three or four B-1B's or B-52's alone can acheive that.
>
> And provided you're willing to send them in without any SEAD at the start
of the
> war, and multi-hour cycle times are no problem, great.

I was playing devils advocate a bit here, but if you areally want to get
down to details, yeah, they could still provide a reasonable option. Use of
ALCM's to target IADS nodes/assets during the initial phase, with the
pending "electric" B-52 providing standoff jamming support, B-2's doing
their thing, and then as we start taking down the defenses, we can move a
bit closer and start using the other standoff systems (i.e., JASSM). Given
the range we saw the F-16's operate at during OEF, it would not be beyond
the realm of possibility for the F-15C's and E's to get into the ballgame at
long range, either (if they had to). As I have said a couple of times, I do
see a use for the CVN's--but barking that they just *have* to have every
tanker in the USAF at their beck-and-call does not do much to support the
argument that they are such a critical resource, does it?

>
> > OEF
> > demonstrated the use of both F-15E's and F-16's in conducting pretty
long
> > range strike operations (from the PG around Iran, up to Afghanistan and
back
> > again, at greater range than the CVN-based strikers were enduring).
>
> Sure did. Using those USAF tankers with booms to maximise the transfer
rate.
> And it helped that we were already set up in the area flying Southern
Watch
> sorties. But we're not there now, although we do still have some presence
in
> the 'Stans, IIRC.

And are getting ready to relocate our NATO-assigned assets further east,
too, to places like maybe Hungary and Rumania, etc. In the Pacific we have
Guam, the ROK bases, Okinawa. Diego Garcia in the IO is the one that is
truly the most limited in terms of ramp space, but the bases in the -stans
you mention make it a bit less critical than has been the case in the past.

>
> > Worried
> > about an enemy air threat? Then you have your standoff attack systems,
along
> > with B-2's. Yes, there are other issues (hauling in the bombs, etc.),
but
> > they are not insurmountable (i.e., we still have a surface transport
> > capability, augmented by air transport assets).
> >
> > Should we can the CVN's? No, of course not. But they can continue to
operate
> > a few more years with the support of KC-135R's and KC-10's without
HAVING to
> > have the 767's *optimized* for their very own use.
>
> Provided we have sufficient space for all those tanker a/c in theater,
fine, but
> it's still wasteful to use two a/c and crews to do the job of one. Of
course,
> if you're cycling flights of two constantly through the tankers, no big
deal,
> but gorilla packages are another matter. And we may well need to help
tank our
> allies (assuming we have any). Many of them are buying their own
multi-point
> drogue tankers now, which helps both of us if they're along for the ride.

That last bit is true. But I think you may be forgetting that during
contingency operations we tend to have to operate a number of tanker tracks
a long way from the TO (i.e., the Atlantic air-bridge, or a Pacific version,
depending upon where the TO is), so those 767's could be a major contributor
without even having to enter the local airspace. The real issue is how long
we can drag out the 135E fleet; there are 131 of them remaining in service
now, with engines that were stripped from old commercial transports some
fifteen or twenty years ago as an "interim" fix, corrosion concerns, and
obscelescent avionics. Their MC rate can only really continue to drop, which
is why yes, we can replace 131 aircraft with 100 newer aircraft and come out
in pretty good shape. Do we have the time available to dally around with
optimizing the 767 in all manners before we order them (and run the very
real risk of seeing the line shut down in the meantime), or do we take the
money we have now and order the first 40 (which is the number the USAF has
tossed about as the first firm order volume) with the lesser hose/drogue
capability, and then implement the multi-point system on the following
aircraft, with the originals being upgraded at a later date? I see the
latter as an option that makes as much, if not more, sense than the former.

Brooks

>
> Guy
>
>
>
>

[Henry J Cobb]

Guy Alcala wrote:
> I'm sure they think so. OTOH, FAIK the USAF would have fought against any such
> proposal with tooth and nail. The navy has in the past considered buying their
> own land-based tanker fleet, but ISTR that SAC (at the time) in effect said
> "over our dead body." IIRR the Tradewind was an attempt to get around that;
> after all, the USAF could hardly complain about seaplanes.

The Navy Department already has ground based tankers and unlike the
KC-767s they are effective at refueling helicopters, which is the only
thing that allows the Marines to do their deep penatration missions today.

Can a KC-767 refuel a KC-130J?

-HJC

[sid]

"Kevin Brooks" > wrote in message:
>
> is why yes, we can replace 131 aircraft with 100 newer aircraft and come out
> in pretty good shape. Do we have the time available to dally around with
> optimizing the 767 in all manners before we order them (and run the very
> real risk of seeing the line shut down in the meantime), or do we take the
> money we have now and order the first 40 (which is the number the USAF has
> tossed about as the first firm order volume) with the lesser hose/drogue
> capability, and then implement the multi-point system on the following
> aircraft, with the originals being upgraded at a later date? I see the
> latter as an option that makes as much, if not more, sense than the former.
>
> Brooks
Still clinging to the past I see Brooks

With the DSB report out the point is pretty much moot.
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/13/business/13boeing.html?ex=1085112000&en=dfe39e1ef66e254d&ei=5062&partner=GOOGLE

With no civil orders forthcoming, Boeing isn't likely to keep the 76
line open beyond whats been ordered. Already marginalized in the
budget process, that does not bode well for the E-10 either.
Its time to move from the concepts of the last century anyway. As the
report says...
A page of the report, for example, calls for the Air Force to "work
with major airframe manufacturers to develop new tanker options" that
would have "more modern airframes" than the "20-year-old 767 design."
Instead of sinking money into old, orphaned airframes, it would be
much better to invest in something like the "MACK" or BWB that could
be optimized to operate and survive in tomorrow's ari threat
environment.
Potential adversaries are realizing that we are concentrating a very
signifcant part our ability to mount offensive operations into
rehashed airliners...even if the august members of this board don't
see it. They are doing something about it too...

http://www.indiadefence.com/collab.htm
Designed to fulfill the BVR (beyond visual range) role for "outer-air
battles", an aircraft usually of Sukhoi-27/30/35/37 "Flanker/Super
Flanker" family, equipped with KS-172 (also referred to as Article
172) would be able to engage ultra-high-value airborne platforms like
AWACS (airborne warning and control system), IFR (in-flight
refuelling) and LRMP (long range maritime patrol) platforms, without
necessarily having first to deal with their fighter escorts.

http://www.ainonline.com/Publications/paris/paris_03/pd1agatpg85.html
If used on a long-range missile airframe, the ARGS-PD could give an
opposing air force the ability to take out strategic targets at
distances outside of the normal interception envelopes of U.S. or
other NATO fighters. Boeing E-3 AWACS or E-8 JSTARS aircraft–platforms
that U.S. forces depend heavily upon in time of conflict–would be
vulnerable as never before.

http://arms.ashst.com/missiles/s400.htm
The S-400 system is intended to engage current and future air threats
such as tactical and strategic aircraft, Tomahawk cruise missiles and
other type missiles, including precision-guided ones, as well as AWACS
aircraft, at ranges of up to 400 km.

http://in.news.yahoo.com/031020/43/28nkk.html
"The FT-2000 surface-to-air missile (SAM), commonly known as the
'AWACS killer', designed by Chinese experts are considered to be the
most appropriate option if the U.S. refuses to provide the same kind
of Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) to Pakistan being sold
to India by Israel," The News said.

[sid]

"Kevin Brooks" > wrote in message >...

> in pretty good shape. Do we have the time available to dally around with
> optimizing the 767 in all manners before we order them (and run the very
> real risk of seeing the line shut down in the meantime), or do we take the
> money we have now and order the first 40 (which is the number the USAF has
> tossed about as the first firm order volume) with the lesser hose/drogue
> capability, and then implement the multi-point system on the following
> aircraft, with the originals being upgraded at a later date? I see the
> latter as an option that makes as much, if not more, sense than the former.
>
> Brooks
Still clinging to the past I see Brooks

With the DSB report out the point is pretty much moot.
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/13/business/13boeing.html?ex=1085112000&en=dfe39e1ef66e254d&ei=5062&partner=GOOGLE

With no civil orders forthcoming, Boeing isn't likely to keep the 76
line open beyond whats been ordered. Already marginalized in the
budget process, that does not bode well for the E-10 either.
Its time to move from the concepts of the last century anyway. As the
report says...
A page of the report, for example, calls for the Air Force to "work
with major airframe manufacturers to develop new tanker options" that
would have "more modern airframes" than the "20-year-old 767 design."
Instead of sinking money into old, orphaned airframes, it would be
much better to invest in something like the "MACK" or BWB that could
be optimized to operate and survive in tomorrow's ari threat
environment.
Potential adversaries are realizing that we are concentrating a very
signifcant part our ability to mount offensive operations into
rehashed airliners...even if the august members of this board don't
see it. They are doing something about it too...

http://www.indiadefence.com/collab.htm
Designed to fulfill the BVR (beyond visual range) role for "outer-air
battles", an aircraft usually of Sukhoi-27/30/35/37 "Flanker/Super
Flanker" family, equipped with KS-172 (also referred to as Article
172) would be able to engage ultra-high-value airborne platforms like
AWACS (airborne warning and control system), IFR (in-flight
refuelling) and LRMP (long range maritime patrol) platforms, without
necessarily having first to deal with their fighter escorts.

http://www.ainonline.com/Publications/paris/paris_03/pd1agatpg85.html
If used on a long-range missile airframe, the ARGS-PD could give an
opposing air force the ability to take out strategic targets at
distances outside of the normal interception envelopes of U.S. or
other NATO fighters. Boeing E-3 AWACS or E-8 JSTARS aircraft–platforms
that U.S. forces depend heavily upon in time of conflict–would be
vulnerable as never before.

http://arms.ashst.com/missiles/s400.htm
The S-400 system is intended to engage current and future air threats
such as tactical and strategic aircraft, Tomahawk cruise missiles and
other type missiles, including precision-guided ones, as well as AWACS
aircraft, at ranges of up to 400 km.

http://in.news.yahoo.com/031020/43/28nkk.html
"The FT-2000 surface-to-air missile (SAM), commonly known as the
'AWACS killer', designed by Chinese experts are considered to be the
most appropriate option if the U.S. refuses to provide the same kind
of Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) to Pakistan being sold
to India by Israel," The News said.

[Guy Alcala]

Sorry for the delayed reply -- it's been a busy week.

Kevin Brooks wrote:

> "Guy Alcala" > wrote in message
> . ..
> > Kevin Brooks wrote:
> >
> > > "Guy Alcala" > wrote in message
> > > . ..
> > > > Kevin Brooks wrote:
> >
> > <snip>

> > > From DS on the USN has relied increasingly on USAF and
> > > > foreign land-based tankers, because their own tankers lack the
> > > > numbers/offload/loiter/drogue stations to allow them to go far inland
> > > with
> > > > large strikes. The USMC has its KC-130s, which are at least
> dual-point,
> > > but
> > > > they're limited to perhaps 6 a/c in a flight pre-strike, with four
> > > preferred,
> > > > before they meet the law of diminishing returns. A single-point boom
> > > tanker is
> > > > about the same. It's not that the navy can't use their S-3s or
> F-18E/Fs
> > > > exclusively, it's just that they're limited in the size/radius of
> their
> > > strikes
> > > > when they do so.
> > >
> > > Which is why the USAF will still have the capability of supporting the
> USN,
> > > with both single and dual point refueling. The fact that the 767 won't
> have
> > > that multi-point capability up-front is NOT going to create a critical
> > > situation for the USN.
> >
> > But it may be critical for bed-down and other operational issues, and it's
> > definitely inefficient. Besides,who says we're only supporting the USN?
> In
> > various conflicts we've had help from Canadian and Spanish Hornets, plus
> the
> > RAF, AMI, KDF, RNAF, Luftwaffe etc. They've helped us with _their_
> multi-point
> > tankers on occasion.
>
> And that help has been appreciated. But that does not really imply that we
> have to optimize *all* of our aircraft to perform multi-point refueling
> right *now*.

I never said they _all_ had to be optimized right _now_, but I can see no reason
not to buy new tankers set up that way from the start, as our need for drogue
tanking is clearly inceasing (cf. the proposed USAF F-35B buy).

> > > > Given our increasing jointness, it does seem odd that the KC-767 isn't
> > > planned
> > > > to have provision for wing drogues from the get-go.
> > >
> > > Not necessarily. The USAF is getting to the desperation point in regards
> to
> > > the 135E's--they are either going to have to poop a lot of money to
> upgrade
> > > them (not the wisest choice, given their age and condition), or they
> have to
> > > get a replacement in the air, and rather quickly.
> >
> > The justification for that has always been somewhat questionable. Only a
> few
> > years ago they were projecting the 135E's fatigue life out 30 or 40 years,
> > although the engines were probably going to need replacement. Let's face
> it,
> > the 767 deal has more than a little to do with keeping Boeing's 767 line
> open
> > and people employed. Would it be a good thing to get some newer tankers?
> > Sure. Do we need them right now, because the 135Es are falling apart?
> That's
> > arguable.
>
> Firstly, "only a few years ago" was before we (again) had to surge tanker
> support for two recent operations--that eats into remaining lifespan
> (operating hours for the tanker force being about a third higher than they
> were pre-9/11).

Yes, an increase from an average utilization of 300 hours/yr. to 435 hrs/year.
Even at the latter rate the KC-135Es have a fatigue lifespan of 82 years (36,000
hrs., vs. 39,000hrs for the KC-135Rs), and they're just a bit over halfway
through that.

> Second, if you are going to replace the engines (and
> associated controls), you are talking about a sizeable investment (witness
> the never-ending debate over the wisdom of reengining the B-52's, C-5's,
> etc.) right there. Then you have to remember that the E models have also not
> undergone other avionics updates due to their age/limited lifespan
> remaining, so if you want to keep them around you are going to have to do
> the whole PACER CRAIG thing, etc. In other words, turn them all into R
> models--which does not sound like a real wise investment.

We don't know that's the case, as we haven't done the assessment. Indeed, the
Defense Science Board just came out (see

http://www.airforcetimes.com/story.php?f=1-292925-2904714.php

with a report that apparently says that upgrading some Es into Pacer Crag Rs may
well be the most cost effective solution, while we take a couple of years to do
a proper tanker requirements study. We apparently never finished the one we
started in 2001, and we're now talking about doing one that will run from 2004 -
2006. What the DSB has said is that there is no need to imminently replace the
Es - we've got time to look at our options. If you google on news and search

defense science board tanker

you'll come up with several sources that provides sniuppets of detail. The
actual report isn't available yet on the DSB website, apparently because it
hasn't yet been briefed to Congress.

> It is beyond argument that the E models are the anchormen when it comes to
> MC rate (about 78% for the E models, versus 82% for the R models, based upon
> GAO figures for May 2003). Without reengining, and taking them up to the R
> standard, this MC rate difference will only grow--it drops below 75% and I'd
> think the USAF leadership will really start to howl. Corrosion maintenace is
> another (growing) concern, and it will eat up more and more money as we try
> to stretch out the E model's lifespan.

The corrosion problem is apparently under control. See the URL above. From
what I recall of the GAO report, the O&M costs for the Es was averaging $4.6
million a year vs. $3.7 million for the Rs

> Oddly, even the GAO noted that they
> recommended that the USAF start paying serious attention to replacing the
> KC-135 fleet as early as 1996 (of course, in typical GAO style, they have
> managed to cover their bases in all eventualities, so they can always say,
> "Told ya so!" regardless of how we proceed...).
>
> >
> > > That last part (quickly)
> > > seems to merit a sort-of-spiral approach, to me; get them into service
> ASAP
> > > with the boom and single-point drogue (while still having the 135R's in
> > > service, some with the multi-point hoses), and then worry about bringing
> > > them up to a higher standard later, when the time-crunch is not so
> critical.
> >
> > I see it as entirely budget-driven, with the huge bow-wave they've already
> got
> > going restricting them. Indeed, that was the primary reason for the
> KC-767
> > lease rather than buy in the first place.
>
> The lease came about because it (a) allowed the USAF to recapitalize the
> oldest portion of the tanker fleet in the most rapid fashion, and (b)
> because it was also beneficial to Boeing in terms of keeping the 767 line
> open. Don't act as if the latter is a "bad" thing--we have paced procurement
> programs to keep assembly operations going for decades, be it the C-130 or
> the M-1 tank. Consider how much MORE it would cost to *buy* the 767's if we
> drag this out through the usual (overly long) procurement cycle, and the
> line has in the meanwhile shut down; restarting a line is not going to be
> cheap. Some folks cry that this is a "help out Boeing" deal--I don't agree,
> at least completely, as it also helps out the USAF in getting timely
> replacements for the aging KC-135 fleet; and to be honest, even if it *were*
> more of a "help out Boeing" deal it would not concern me greatly, as I see a
> necessity in our keeping alive the kind of combined commercial/military
> transport production capability that we NEED to have, unless you are willing
> to be 100% reliant upon a foreign provider for our future tanking and heavy
> transport needs (I for one would hate to see the French government in a
> position to slow down or stop delivery of such a critical asset merely
> because they would want to show us they could do it).

One of the things I object to is the assumption, without any analysis, that the
767 buy is essential (the DSB says it isn't), or that it's the most
cost-effective solution (we don't know). Another thing that worries me about
rushing into a 767 buy is that we'll be buying an a/c that is essentially out of
production except for the USAF. The KC-135s were bought at the opposite
extreme. These a/c are going to last us at least 50 years, so spares are going
to be a real problem down the road, as the commercial operators are already
starting to look for replacements. Italy and Japan won't have a problem,
because they're each only going to buy airframes in the single-digits so they'll
be able to buy adequate spares from cannibalised airframes, but the USAF is
talking about buying at least 100, possibly with more to come.

When the 767 deal was first mooted, it was really the only in-production (US)
a/c in the size class available in the proper time frame. That is no longer the
case, as the 7E7 will be entering service in 2008 (this is a commercial a/c, and
unlike the military, missing production and/or performance guarantees cost the
company big bucks). We need to see if it makes more sense to buy 7E7s at the
_start_ of their production cycle, rather than 767s at the end of theirs. Which
is better suited for the role? Is the extra M0.05 in cruise a major advantage?
Does the higher composite content significantly decrease the corrosion issues
down the road? How about the 20% better fuel efficiency? Respective runway and
ramp space requirements? PFI vs. military? Etc.

<snip>

> > > Which KC-10's and KC-135R's will still be serving, you should add.
> Correct
> > > me if I am wrong, but the aircraft that the 767's are destined to
> replace,
> > > the 135E's, do not have the multi-point refueling capability, either, do
> > > they?
> >
> > No, they don't, and the 767's will at least be able to refuel both types
> of
> > refueling systems on the same sortie, and they'll have a proper drogue
> rather
> > than that ******* afterthought on the end of the boom. OTOH, we're also
> buying
> > fewer of them than the 135Es they're supposed to replace (differing MC
> rates
> > obviously play a part). But in big strikes, it's the number of refueling
> > drogues/booms in the air that determine the service rate, and it's silly
> to have
> > to use (and bed-down) double the number of a/c if we don't need to.
>
> That does not necessarily hold true. If the requirement to provide
> hose/drogue capability in-theater is 8that* important in a given case, you
> send the KC-10's and multi-point 135R's forward, and use the other aircraft
> (i.e., these pre-improvement 767's) to handle the usual airbridge su[pport
> operations into the theater.

I think KC-10s are too important as deployment tankers early on in a conflict to
use them in the tactical role. After all, that's what we bought them for,
precisely so we could get to the Middle East from the US non-stop, if we were
refused landing/overflight rights. Let's face it - being on good terms with
Portugal (Lajes) and Spain (Moron) has become more important to us than ever.
Besides, KC-10s take up a lot of space, and need stronger runways than 135s or
767s (don't know how the 7E7 stacks up), which may limit its deployment options.

> So what you really seem to be saying is that
> the 767's, even without initial multi-point capability, offer an improvement
> to the current level of support that can be afforded to the USN?

Yes, they do, but the question remains, are 767s rather than upgraded Es and
later 7E7s the best way to go; what's the best mix, what % of tankers need to
do which roles, how will the advent of UCAVs affect the need for tankers and the
type mix, what effect will USAF F-35 buys have, etc. This needs to be properly
studied.

<snip>

> > > So what you are saying is that we should delay the program even further
> than
> > > it already has been, so that all of the new aircraft are capable of
> > > performing a mission that only a certain portion of the joint force (the
> USN
> > > strikers and whatnot) can receive from them the same level of
> support...that
> > > they can already get from the other aircraft that will be remaining in
> > > service? I don't necessarily agree with that analysis (and neither does
> the
> > > USAF, apparently).
> >
> > I'm saying that it makes far more sense now to buy the capability up front
> that
> > we know we'll be adding down the road, especially since the R&D work is
> largely
> > being paid for by Italy and Japan, than to add it years from now when we
> know
> > it's going to be more expensive to do so.
>
> Whoah there, hoss. If the R&D is being picked up elsewhere (by virtue of
> those foreign sales you mention), that advantage does not go away because we
> dicide not to implement the multi-point system up-front. That R&D effort is
> still applicable. And you are avoiding the fact that it will slow the
> delivery timeline if we have to go with this optimization up-front.

I'm aware that the R&D will still apply, I'm worried about the materiel costs,
which are only going to go up. If we need the capability, then let's just buy
it and get the purchase out of the way, instead of paying inflated prices later.

> If that means we buy a/c at a slower
> > rate (and more refueling pods), good.
>
> Good? I disagree. So does the USAF, from what I have read.

The DSB doesn't, and Rumsfeld said that he was waiting on a couple of reports,
including theirs, before making a decision.

> We plan to be operating from more austere
> > bases, which tend to be somewhat limited in ramp space, so anything we can
> do
> > that limits that is a plus. That was indeed one of the USAF's arguments
> against
> > the A330 -- that it took up too much ramp space while providing no more
> > refueling stations than the 767. They considered the A330's somewhat
> greater
> > offload irrelevant for the tactical refueling mission; they were concerned
> with
> > the number of booms/drogues on station while minimizing the ground
> footprint. If
> > that logic is valid, then buying dual rather than single-point capability
> is
> > even more valuable as a way of minimizing the ground footprint. See
> below.
>
> In the long run, yes. But is it worth slowing delivery up-front even further
> than it already has been slowed?

According to the DSB, we have the time.

<snip>

> > > Another
> > > thought--the USN has been buying C-40's of late--if they are so keenly
> > > worried about their refueling capability, why did they never think about
> > > including a secondary tanker role for that aircraft, or that class of
> > > aircraft, such that they could help themselves out? Probably not,
> because
> > > that would have required them to spend their own part of the budget
> > > pie...much better to have the USAF spend their money, eh?
> >
> > I'm sure they think so. OTOH, FAIK the USAF would have fought against any
> such
> > proposal with tooth and nail. The navy has in the past considered buying
> their
> > own land-based tanker fleet, but ISTR that SAC (at the time) in effect
> said
> > "over our dead body." IIRR the Tradewind was an attempt to get around
> that;
> > after all, the USAF could hardly complain about seaplanes.
> >
> > I imagine AMC would act similarly proprietarily today, but the point (to
> me, at
> > least) isn't which service provides the capability, but that it be
> provided.
>
> But they oddly don't have a problem with the USMC buying C-130J's to augment
> their current tanker fleet.

Of course not, because a KC-130 (any flavor) clearly isn't a replacement for a
jet tanker. It meets USMC needs for a STOL tanker/transport that can also
refuel helos (AFSOC too), and for countries that also operate C-130s it's a
relatively cheap, easy way to get some A/A tanking capability; it's certainly
better than nothing, as Argentina can attest. But it's a relatively inefficient
tanker for fast jets, lacking range, speed, cruise altitude, and offload
capability.

> Personally, I doubt the USAF would have put up a
> fight if the USN had said they wanted to incorporate a secondary refueling
> capability in their C-40B's; just as the USN has been strangely silent over
> the USAF talking about recreating an in-house stand-off jamming capability.

There is no way in hell that the USN would pay the R&D NRE for a tanker mod for
their C-40s, with all their other needs.

> > <snip area of general agreement>
> >
> > > Clearly you can
> > > > get a force of tankers in theater a lot faster than a force of
> tankers
> > > PLUS a
> > > > force of fighters and all their support.
> > >
> > > Can you? I am not sure about that (note how quickly we got the lead
> > > squadrons of the 1st TFW into Saudi Arabia in 1990), especially since
> > > getting all of those tankers into the theater is only going to do you
> some
> > > good if the fuel for them to haul is also present, or readily available,
> at
> > > that operating location.
> >
> > The 1st TFW had an A/A role, IIRR deployed with a full loadout of missiles
> on
> > thea/c and could fairly easily bring an adequate number of reloads with
> them, or
> > fly them in later. A/G ordnance can be a very different matter, although
> PGMs
> > help that aspect. I can't remember if it was the A-10s or F-15Es, but in
> one of
> > Smallwood's books (I think), aircrews described just how limited their A/G
> > ordnance options were right after they deployed. Fuel, OTOH, is
> relatively
> > available anywhere a commercial airliner is able to operate from. Maybe
> you
> > need to haul in JP-5/8 for the tactical a/c, but the tankers themselves
> should
> > be able to operate on Jet A/A-1.
>
> As to fuel availability, I was referring to the ready availability of the
> JP-8 in bulk form--and it won't necessarily be there (always) in the
> quantity you want at those "remote" bases you refer to unless we haul it in
> ourselves.

JP-5 presumably, if they're refueling navy a/c that are operating from CVs. At
least, that's my understanding, but maybe some of the KC-135 people here can
comment.

> Usually meaning by ship. A second ship can haul quite a few
> pieces of ordnance, right?

Sure, but getting fuel to an airfield is relatively easy (pipelines); moving
ordnance tends to require a lot more handling and surface transport.

> If you are tied to getting basic resources into
> the TO, you might as well be "in for a penny, in for a pound". And yes, the
> use of PGM's has resulted in a drastic reduction in the volume of ordnance
> that has to be transported into the TO (ISTR Franks noting that during OEF
> we were effectively engaging as many targets per day as we did during ODS,
> with about 10% of the average daily sortie rate compared to the earlier
> conflict). As we move towards use of the 500 pound JDAM, and even moreso the
> SDB, the need for ordnance (in terms of volume/weight) will shrivel even
> further.

PGMs certainly help, but the problem is the variety of A/G ordnance that may be
required. A/A, there's two types of missiles and gun ammo. A/G, even with PGMs
there's lots of different kinds, and the usage rates are far higher.

> > > How much more trouble is it for the USAF to put a
> > > force that could easily surpass the per-day delivered-tonnage capability
> of
> > > a CVSG (given your premise that the CVN is having to operate from
> extended
> > > range itself)?
> >
> > If they've got sufficient time to get set up in advance, fine, but crises
> often
> > don't provide that kind of time. We've been lucky that most of our wars
> in the
> > past decade and a half (OAF somewhat excepted) have given us some lead
> time to
> > get ready.
>
> I'd posit that using the basing options we already have in-hand (Guam, Diego
> Garcia, Fairford, and CONUS), the B-1, B-52, and B-2 can acheive this pretty
> much anywhere in the world *now*.

In that case, let's dump the fighters altogether ;-)

> > > Three or four B-1B's or B-52's alone can acheive that.
> >
> > And provided you're willing to send them in without any SEAD at the start
> of the
> > war, and multi-hour cycle times are no problem, great.
>
> I was playing devils advocate a bit here, but if you areally want to get
> down to details, yeah, they could still provide a reasonable option. Use of
> ALCM's to target IADS nodes/assets during the initial phase, with the
> pending "electric" B-52 providing standoff jamming support, B-2's doing
> their thing, and then as we start taking down the defenses, we can move a
> bit closer and start using the other standoff systems (i.e., JASSM). Given
> the range we saw the F-16's operate at during OEF, it would not be beyond
> the realm of possibility for the F-15C's and E's to get into the ballgame at
> long range, either (if they had to). As I have said a couple of times, I do
> see a use for the CVN's--but barking that they just *have* to have every
> tanker in the USAF at their beck-and-call does not do much to support the
> argument that they are such a critical resource, does it?

No one (or at least, not I) is claiming that they every USAF tanker has to be
available to support the USN, but clearly, an increase is required. IIRR, the
GAO report stated we used 150 KC-135s in OAF and OIF; given the large percentage
of USN/Marine plus allied sorties in both of those ops, having at best only 40
KC-135s with dual point drogues seems to be inadequate.However, if the tanker
requirements study says we don't need more, I'll accept it, but the study needs
to be _done_.

> > > OEF
> > > demonstrated the use of both F-15E's and F-16's in conducting pretty
> long
> > > range strike operations (from the PG around Iran, up to Afghanistan and
> back
> > > again, at greater range than the CVN-based strikers were enduring).
> >
> > Sure did. Using those USAF tankers with booms to maximise the transfer
> rate.
> > And it helped that we were already set up in the area flying Southern
> Watch
> > sorties. But we're not there now, although we do still have some presence
> in
> > the 'Stans, IIRC.
>
> And are getting ready to relocate our NATO-assigned assets further east,
> too, to places like maybe Hungary and Rumania, etc. In the Pacific we have
> Guam, the ROK bases, Okinawa. Diego Garcia in the IO is the one that is
> truly the most limited in terms of ramp space, but the bases in the -stans
> you mention make it a bit less critical than has been the case in the past.

The $64 million question being whether those bases will be available to us when
we need them. Last I checked there'll all in muslim countries with regimes that
are more or less unstable. Given our current unpopularity in the muslim world,
I don't think we should count on such bases being available.

<snip>

> > > Should we can the CVN's? No, of course not. But they can continue to
> operate
> > > a few more years with the support of KC-135R's and KC-10's without
> HAVING to
> > > have the 767's *optimized* for their very own use.
> >
> > Provided we have sufficient space for all those tanker a/c in theater,
> fine, but
> > it's still wasteful to use two a/c and crews to do the job of one. Of
> course,
> > if you're cycling flights of two constantly through the tankers, no big
> deal,
> > but gorilla packages are another matter. And we may well need to help
> tank our
> > allies (assuming we have any). Many of them are buying their own
> multi-point
> > drogue tankers now, which helps both of us if they're along for the ride.
>
> That last bit is true. But I think you may be forgetting that during
> contingency operations we tend to have to operate a number of tanker tracks
> a long way from the TO (i.e., the Atlantic air-bridge, or a Pacific version,
> depending upon where the TO is), so those 767's could be a major contributor
> without even having to enter the local airspace. The real issue is how long
> we can drag out the 135E fleet; there are 131 of them remaining in service
> now, with engines that were stripped from old commercial transports some
> fifteen or twenty years ago as an "interim" fix, corrosion concerns, and
> obscelescent avionics. Their MC rate can only really continue to drop, which
> is why yes, we can replace 131 aircraft with 100 newer aircraft and come out
> in pretty good shape.

Or it might make sense to upgrade them all to 135R/Pacer Crag; I read one quote
somewhere of the cost savings going that route compared to the 767 buy -- AIR
it was a couple of billion dollars over the life of the deal. But that all
needs to be studied so we know.

> Do we have the time available to dally around with
> optimizing the 767 in all manners before we order them (and run the very
> real risk of seeing the line shut down in the meantime), or do we take the
> money we have now and order the first 40 (which is the number the USAF has
> tossed about as the first firm order volume) with the lesser hose/drogue
> capability, and then implement the multi-point system on the following
> aircraft, with the originals being upgraded at a later date? I see the
> latter as an option that makes as much, if not more, sense than the former.

As I've pointed out above, I think an even more fundamental question is should
we be buying the 767 at all, rather than some other option. The 767 lease is
looking more and more like roadkill, so it may be moot. However, even if we
decided to go the 767 route, there's no reason why we couldn't buy 35 of them
(or whatever the $ work out to) with wing drogues, rather than 40 without.

Guy

[Guy Alcala]

Henry J Cobb wrote:

> Guy Alcala wrote:
> > I'm sure they think so. OTOH, FAIK the USAF would have fought against any such
> > proposal with tooth and nail. The navy has in the past considered buying their
> > own land-based tanker fleet, but ISTR that SAC (at the time) in effect said
> > "over our dead body." IIRR the Tradewind was an attempt to get around that;
> > after all, the USAF could hardly complain about seaplanes.
>
> The Navy Department already has ground based tankers and unlike the
> KC-767s they are effective at refueling helicopters, which is the only
> thing that allows the Marines to do their deep penatration missions today.

As I pointed out in my reply to Kevin, a KC-130 is a poor choice for a pure jet
tanker, if you don't need STOL or helo refueling capability (and the navy doesn't).

> Can a KC-767 refuel a KC-130J?

AFAIK (don't quote me) the KC-130Js don't have probes or receptacles. There's no
technical reason why they couldn't have them, and a KC-767/KC-130J refueling would
presumably be easier than the Victor/probed C-130K hookups during the Falklands war;
the 767 shouldbe able to fly slower than a Victor, and the (K)C-130J is faster than
the earlier models.

Guy

[Kevin Brooks]

"Guy Alcala" > wrote in message
.. .
> Sorry for the delayed reply -- it's been a busy week.
>
> Kevin Brooks wrote:
>
> > "Guy Alcala" > wrote in message
> > . ..
> > > Kevin Brooks wrote:
> > >
> > > > "Guy Alcala" > wrote in message
> > > > . ..
> > > > > Kevin Brooks wrote:
> > >
> > > <snip>
>
> > > > From DS on the USN has relied increasingly on USAF and
> > > > > foreign land-based tankers, because their own tankers lack the
> > > > > numbers/offload/loiter/drogue stations to allow them to go far
inland
> > > > with
> > > > > large strikes. The USMC has its KC-130s, which are at least
> > dual-point,
> > > > but
> > > > > they're limited to perhaps 6 a/c in a flight pre-strike, with four
> > > > preferred,
> > > > > before they meet the law of diminishing returns. A single-point
boom
> > > > tanker is
> > > > > about the same. It's not that the navy can't use their S-3s or
> > F-18E/Fs
> > > > > exclusively, it's just that they're limited in the size/radius of
> > their
> > > > strikes
> > > > > when they do so.
> > > >
> > > > Which is why the USAF will still have the capability of supporting
the
> > USN,
> > > > with both single and dual point refueling. The fact that the 767
won't
> > have
> > > > that multi-point capability up-front is NOT going to create a
critical
> > > > situation for the USN.
> > >
> > > But it may be critical for bed-down and other operational issues, and
it's
> > > definitely inefficient. Besides,who says we're only supporting the
USN?
> > In
> > > various conflicts we've had help from Canadian and Spanish Hornets,
plus
> > the
> > > RAF, AMI, KDF, RNAF, Luftwaffe etc. They've helped us with _their_
> > multi-point
> > > tankers on occasion.
> >
> > And that help has been appreciated. But that does not really imply that
we
> > have to optimize *all* of our aircraft to perform multi-point refueling
> > right *now*.
>
> I never said they _all_ had to be optimized right _now_, but I can see no
reason
> not to buy new tankers set up that way from the start, as our need for
drogue
> tanking is clearly inceasing (cf. the proposed USAF F-35B buy).

That reason would be (another) delay in delivery. Why do you think it will
be such a major fiasco if the first forty 767's delivered come in without
the multi-point capability? IIRC the first contract is projected to cover
that number of delivereies. Letting a spiral handle the multi-point
capability in the subsequent 60 aircraft is not acceptable?

>
> > > > > Given our increasing jointness, it does seem odd that the KC-767
isn't
> > > > planned
> > > > > to have provision for wing drogues from the get-go.
> > > >
> > > > Not necessarily. The USAF is getting to the desperation point in
regards
> > to
> > > > the 135E's--they are either going to have to poop a lot of money to
> > upgrade
> > > > them (not the wisest choice, given their age and condition), or they
> > have to
> > > > get a replacement in the air, and rather quickly.
> > >
> > > The justification for that has always been somewhat questionable.
Only a
> > few
> > > years ago they were projecting the 135E's fatigue life out 30 or 40
years,
> > > although the engines were probably going to need replacement. Let's
face
> > it,
> > > the 767 deal has more than a little to do with keeping Boeing's 767
line
> > open
> > > and people employed. Would it be a good thing to get some newer
tankers?
> > > Sure. Do we need them right now, because the 135Es are falling apart?
> > That's
> > > arguable.
> >
> > Firstly, "only a few years ago" was before we (again) had to surge
tanker
> > support for two recent operations--that eats into remaining lifespan
> > (operating hours for the tanker force being about a third higher than
they
> > were pre-9/11).
>
> Yes, an increase from an average utilization of 300 hours/yr. to 435
hrs/year.
> Even at the latter rate the KC-135Es have a fatigue lifespan of 82 years
(36,000
> hrs., vs. 39,000hrs for the KC-135Rs), and they're just a bit over halfway
> through that.

You are forgetting the corrosion problems with the E models--corrosion tends
to reduce fatigue life, too, IIRC from my long-ago materials science
classes... It sounds to me like the only way you are going to get that long
a life from the E's would be if you also replaced some structural components
(meaning you are going even further than the old R model mods, IIRC).

>
> > Second, if you are going to replace the engines (and
> > associated controls), you are talking about a sizeable investment
(witness
> > the never-ending debate over the wisdom of reengining the B-52's, C-5's,
> > etc.) right there. Then you have to remember that the E models have also
not
> > undergone other avionics updates due to their age/limited lifespan
> > remaining, so if you want to keep them around you are going to have to
do
> > the whole PACER CRAIG thing, etc. In other words, turn them all into R
> > models--which does not sound like a real wise investment.
>
> We don't know that's the case, as we haven't done the assessment. Indeed,
the
> Defense Science Board just came out (see
>
> http://www.airforcetimes.com/story.php?f=1-292925-2904714.php
>
> with a report that apparently says that upgrading some Es into Pacer Crag
Rs may
> well be the most cost effective solution, while we take a couple of years
to do
> a proper tanker requirements study. We apparently never finished the one
we
> started in 2001, and we're now talking about doing one that will run from
2004 -
> 2006. What the DSB has said is that there is no need to imminently
replace the
> Es - we've got time to look at our options. If you google on news and
search
>
> defense science board tanker
>
> you'll come up with several sources that provides sniuppets of detail. Th
e
> actual report isn't available yet on the DSB website, apparently because
it
> hasn't yet been briefed to Congress.

Wait a second--spend *more* money on trying to upgrade E's, while doing
*another* study to determine if/when/how we replace the E's? That sounds
like a fine...bureaucratic solution? Even the GAO was saying in the 1990's
that the USAF needed to get off its duff and start planning the replacement
of the KC-135E fleet. Studies are great--unfortunately, they have a tendancy
of becoming an ends-unto-themselves. We have a good proposal that the USAF
has supported--it puts new airframes into the mission much more quickly than
if we follow the "usual" method of purchasing new aircraft (of course, you
could use the F/A-22 or F-35 model...which would mean if we started that new
study right now, we might plan on seeing some new tankers around what...2015
at best?), and it takes advantage of an existing excess production
capability/inventory at the only US company currently building aircraft of
that class--sounds like a good plan to me.

>
> > It is beyond argument that the E models are the anchormen when it comes
to
> > MC rate (about 78% for the E models, versus 82% for the R models, based
upon
> > GAO figures for May 2003). Without reengining, and taking them up to the
R
> > standard, this MC rate difference will only grow--it drops below 75% and
I'd
> > think the USAF leadership will really start to howl. Corrosion
maintenace is
> > another (growing) concern, and it will eat up more and more money as we
try
> > to stretch out the E model's lifespan.
>
> The corrosion problem is apparently under control. See the URL above.
From
> what I recall of the GAO report, the O&M costs for the Es was averaging
$4.6
> million a year vs. $3.7 million for the Rs

That is an additional $130 million bucks each *year* in operating cost (not
exactly chump-change...but even that is a "lowball" figure...). What would
be the operating cost of the 767? Less than the 135R (two engines versus
four, better fuel economy, more maintenance friendly subsystems, less
likelihood of inspection-and-repair work, more stringent (and more frequent)
inspections, etc.), that is for sure. So your operating cost per year
differential measured against the 767 is going to be greater. Add in the
cost of bringing those E's to a full PACER CRAIG R model level, and the cost
is going to be significant, to say the least. Not a wise investment plan,
IMO. If you managed your personal auto program in this manner, then you
would still be driving (only--no newer cars allowed) a 1960's era car, and
one which you had paid to drop new engines in, along with paying to modify
the emissions system to keep it in compliance (like the noise requirements
the KC-135's face), and here in 2004 you would be saying that instead of
buying a new vehicle, you'd be better off paying to essentially completely
rebuild the one you have and drop *another* new engine in it, along with
updating the other systems in the dash, maybe a new trannie to be compatible
with that new engine, etc. I don't think you would endorse such a plan (I
made the mistake once of trying to extend the life of a noble little Nissan
pick-up at the 170K point by dropping a *used* engine in it, and that was
*not* cheap--and I found that within 10K more miles I was *had* to break
down and buy a new vehicle).

As to corrosion, in March 2003 the USAF's Deputy C/S for
Installations/Logistics testified before Congress: "Within the air refueling
fleet, the KC-135E-models have experienced the most maintenance and
corrosion problems and are more costly to maintain. With an average
aircraft age of 43 years, the KC-135E fleet is the oldest combat weapon
system in the Air Force inventory. It is also the oldest large fleet of
heavy jet aircraft in aviation history...The second critical measurement
that defines aircraft life is physical age. In this fleet, corrosion is a
function of age. Accurately predicting the extent of corrosion is difficult
and this lack of predictability severely limits the ability to efficiently
sustain aging fleets...the KC-135 is particularly challenging since its
1950s design, materials, and construction did not consider corrosion
prevention measures...The most critical KC-135 tanker metric is age, and the
most pressing KC-135 problems are corrosion and stress corrosion
cracking-both age related. Stress corrosion cracking is one of the most
difficult structural failures to predict." Are you saying that all of these
problems have been solved since that date?

>
> > Oddly, even the GAO noted that they
> > recommended that the USAF start paying serious attention to replacing
the
> > KC-135 fleet as early as 1996 (of course, in typical GAO style, they
have
> > managed to cover their bases in all eventualities, so they can always
say,
> > "Told ya so!" regardless of how we proceed...).
> >
> > >
> > > > That last part (quickly)
> > > > seems to merit a sort-of-spiral approach, to me; get them into
service
> > ASAP
> > > > with the boom and single-point drogue (while still having the 135R's
in
> > > > service, some with the multi-point hoses), and then worry about
bringing
> > > > them up to a higher standard later, when the time-crunch is not so
> > critical.
> > >
> > > I see it as entirely budget-driven, with the huge bow-wave they've
already
> > got
> > > going restricting them. Indeed, that was the primary reason for the
> > KC-767
> > > lease rather than buy in the first place.
> >
> > The lease came about because it (a) allowed the USAF to recapitalize the
> > oldest portion of the tanker fleet in the most rapid fashion, and (b)
> > because it was also beneficial to Boeing in terms of keeping the 767
line
> > open. Don't act as if the latter is a "bad" thing--we have paced
procurement
> > programs to keep assembly operations going for decades, be it the C-130
or
> > the M-1 tank. Consider how much MORE it would cost to *buy* the 767's if
we
> > drag this out through the usual (overly long) procurement cycle, and the
> > line has in the meanwhile shut down; restarting a line is not going to
be
> > cheap. Some folks cry that this is a "help out Boeing" deal--I don't
agree,
> > at least completely, as it also helps out the USAF in getting timely
> > replacements for the aging KC-135 fleet; and to be honest, even if it
*were*
> > more of a "help out Boeing" deal it would not concern me greatly, as I
see a
> > necessity in our keeping alive the kind of combined commercial/military
> > transport production capability that we NEED to have, unless you are
willing
> > to be 100% reliant upon a foreign provider for our future tanking and
heavy
> > transport needs (I for one would hate to see the French government in a
> > position to slow down or stop delivery of such a critical asset merely
> > because they would want to show us they could do it).
>
> One of the things I object to is the assumption, without any analysis,
that the
> 767 buy is essential (the DSB says it isn't),

Well, the DSB also says the corrosion problem is something we can easily
discount, and has apparently decided that *outsourcing* the tanker mission,
or buying second-hand aircraft, is the way to go. Outsourcing may be great
for the RAF, etc., but the USAF is another story, IMO. Then there is the
"spend the money on already used aircraft" approach--wonderful! As if
tossing more money down the O&M pit for the E model is not enough, we should
take the money we have and buy older airframes than we can afford? (And yes,
we can afford new tankers under the current deal being offered)

or that it's the most
> cost-effective solution (we don't know). Another thing that worries me
about
> rushing into a 767 buy is that we'll be buying an a/c that is essentially
out of
> production except for the USAF. The KC-135s were bought at the opposite
> extreme. These a/c are going to last us at least 50 years, so spares are
going
> to be a real problem down the road, as the commercial operators are
already
> starting to look for replacements. Italy and Japan won't have a problem,
> because they're each only going to buy airframes in the single-digits so
they'll
> be able to buy adequate spares from cannibalised airframes, but the USAF
is
> talking about buying at least 100, possibly with more to come.

The biggest things you have to buy spares for are the avionics (which are
more plug-and-play than they were in the 135 era), and engine related
systems. There are a lot of 767's that will remain in service in the
civilian sector for decades to come--they will need spares too, and in the
end they become another source for spares for the KC version. I don't see
this as a deal-breaker.

>
> When the 767 deal was first mooted, it was really the only in-production
(US)
> a/c in the size class available in the proper time frame. That is no
longer the
> case, as the 7E7 will be entering service in 2008 (this is a commercial
a/c, and
> unlike the military, missing production and/or performance guarantees cost
the
> company big bucks). We need to see if it makes more sense to buy 7E7s at
the
> _start_ of their production cycle, rather than 767s at the end of theirs.
Which
> is better suited for the role?

> Is the extra M0.05 in cruise a major advantage?

Not likely.

> Does the higher composite content significantly decrease the corrosion
issues
> down the road?

Maybe, but doubtfull, as corrosion awareness was better incorporated into
the 767 manufacture than it was in the 135.

> How about the 20% better fuel efficiency?

Sounds good, but then again you have to examine the interval between the
time the 767 would be available and the (elsewhere not mentioned, AFAIK) 7E7
tanker version (expect what, a five or six year period at best before the
first tanker 7E7 could be available?)...I'll be kind and use a five year
period, at 131 E models costing maybe $2 million each more per year in
operating costs than the 767, that works out to around $1.3 billion in extra
operating costs? That is a hell of a lot of gas...

Respective runway and
> ramp space requirements? PFI vs. military? Etc.

Lose the outsourcing option from the get-go, IMO. Won't work for an
organization with the scope of tanking requirements that the USAF has.

>
> <snip>
>
> > > > Which KC-10's and KC-135R's will still be serving, you should add.
> > Correct
> > > > me if I am wrong, but the aircraft that the 767's are destined to
> > replace,
> > > > the 135E's, do not have the multi-point refueling capability,
either, do
> > > > they?
> > >
> > > No, they don't, and the 767's will at least be able to refuel both
types
> > of
> > > refueling systems on the same sortie, and they'll have a proper drogue
> > rather
> > > than that ******* afterthought on the end of the boom. OTOH, we're
also
> > buying
> > > fewer of them than the 135Es they're supposed to replace (differing MC
> > rates
> > > obviously play a part). But in big strikes, it's the number of
refueling
> > > drogues/booms in the air that determine the service rate, and it's
silly
> > to have
> > > to use (and bed-down) double the number of a/c if we don't need to.
> >
> > That does not necessarily hold true. If the requirement to provide
> > hose/drogue capability in-theater is 8that* important in a given case,
you
> > send the KC-10's and multi-point 135R's forward, and use the other
aircraft
> > (i.e., these pre-improvement 767's) to handle the usual airbridge
su[pport
> > operations into the theater.
>
> I think KC-10s are too important as deployment tankers early on in a
conflict to
> use them in the tactical role. After all, that's what we bought them for,
> precisely so we could get to the Middle East from the US non-stop, if we
were
> refused landing/overflight rights. Let's face it - being on good terms
with
> Portugal (Lajes) and Spain (Moron) has become more important to us than
ever.
> Besides, KC-10s take up a lot of space, and need stronger runways than
135s or
> 767s (don't know how the 7E7 stacks up), which may limit its deployment
options.

I said, "If the requirement to provide hose/drogue capability in-theater is
*that* important". We have the capability of providing substantial
hose/drogue capability if we have to--if we really need more, then buy more
kits for the existing R's. No matter how you cut it, the decision to not
initially provide multi-point capability in the first forty 767's is not
going to be a critical, or even serious, failure in terms of our operational
capability.

>
> > So what you really seem to be saying is that
> > the 767's, even without initial multi-point capability, offer an
improvement
> > to the current level of support that can be afforded to the USN?
>
> Yes, they do, but the question remains, are 767s rather than upgraded Es
and
> later 7E7s the best way to go; what's the best mix, what % of tankers
need to
> do which roles, how will the advent of UCAVs affect the need for tankers
and the
> type mix, what effect will USAF F-35 buys have, etc. This needs to be
properly
> studied.

Again with the neverending studies? :-)

>
> <snip>
>
> > > > So what you are saying is that we should delay the program even
further
> > than
> > > > it already has been, so that all of the new aircraft are capable of
> > > > performing a mission that only a certain portion of the joint force
(the
> > USN
> > > > strikers and whatnot) can receive from them the same level of
> > support...that
> > > > they can already get from the other aircraft that will be remaining
in
> > > > service? I don't necessarily agree with that analysis (and neither
does
> > the
> > > > USAF, apparently).
> > >
> > > I'm saying that it makes far more sense now to buy the capability up
front
> > that
> > > we know we'll be adding down the road, especially since the R&D work
is
> > largely
> > > being paid for by Italy and Japan, than to add it years from now when
we
> > know
> > > it's going to be more expensive to do so.
> >
> > Whoah there, hoss. If the R&D is being picked up elsewhere (by virtue of
> > those foreign sales you mention), that advantage does not go away
because we
> > dicide not to implement the multi-point system up-front. That R&D effort
is
> > still applicable. And you are avoiding the fact that it will slow the
> > delivery timeline if we have to go with this optimization up-front.
>
> I'm aware that the R&D will still apply, I'm worried about the materiel
costs,
> which are only going to go up. If we need the capability, then let's just
buy
> it and get the purchase out of the way, instead of paying inflated prices
later.

Even if it delays entry further, meaning you are also going to be paying
that higher O&M cost for the remaining E's even longer...?

>
> > If that means we buy a/c at a slower
> > > rate (and more refueling pods), good.
> >
> > Good? I disagree. So does the USAF, from what I have read.
>
> The DSB doesn't, and Rumsfeld said that he was waiting on a couple of
reports,
> including theirs, before making a decision.

I am not as impressed with the summary of the DSB report as you are (but
then again, I tend to weigh the advice of the folks actually tasked to fly
the missions a bit more than I do the DSB, GAO, etc).

>
> > We plan to be operating from more austere
> > > bases, which tend to be somewhat limited in ramp space, so anything we
can
> > do
> > > that limits that is a plus. That was indeed one of the USAF's
arguments
> > against
> > > the A330 -- that it took up too much ramp space while providing no
more
> > > refueling stations than the 767. They considered the A330's somewhat
> > greater
> > > offload irrelevant for the tactical refueling mission; they were
concerned
> > with
> > > the number of booms/drogues on station while minimizing the ground
> > footprint. If
> > > that logic is valid, then buying dual rather than single-point
capability
> > is
> > > even more valuable as a way of minimizing the ground footprint. See
> > below.
> >
> > In the long run, yes. But is it worth slowing delivery up-front even
further
> > than it already has been slowed?
>
> According to the DSB, we have the time.

The DSB that claims, contrary to what the USAF LTG testified last year, that
the corrosion problem is readily in-hand...? And thinks out-sourcing tanker
requirements is a fine idea? I am not buying into either, at this point.

>
> <snip>
>
> > > > Another
> > > > thought--the USN has been buying C-40's of late--if they are so
keenly
> > > > worried about their refueling capability, why did they never think
about
> > > > including a secondary tanker role for that aircraft, or that class
of
> > > > aircraft, such that they could help themselves out? Probably not,
> > because
> > > > that would have required them to spend their own part of the budget
> > > > pie...much better to have the USAF spend their money, eh?
> > >
> > > I'm sure they think so. OTOH, FAIK the USAF would have fought against
any
> > such
> > > proposal with tooth and nail. The navy has in the past considered
buying
> > their
> > > own land-based tanker fleet, but ISTR that SAC (at the time) in effect
> > said
> > > "over our dead body." IIRR the Tradewind was an attempt to get around
> > that;
> > > after all, the USAF could hardly complain about seaplanes.
> > >
> > > I imagine AMC would act similarly proprietarily today, but the point
(to
> > me, at
> > > least) isn't which service provides the capability, but that it be
> > provided.
> >
> > But they oddly don't have a problem with the USMC buying C-130J's to
augment
> > their current tanker fleet.
>
> Of course not, because a KC-130 (any flavor) clearly isn't a replacement
for a
> jet tanker. It meets USMC needs for a STOL tanker/transport that can also
> refuel helos (AFSOC too), and for countries that also operate C-130s it's
a
> relatively cheap, easy way to get some A/A tanking capability; it's
certainly
> better than nothing, as Argentina can attest. But it's a relatively
inefficient
> tanker for fast jets, lacking range, speed, cruise altitude, and offload
> capability.

I remain unconvinced that AMC would throw a hissy fit if the USN wanted to
include a secondary tanking capability to its C-40B's.

>
> > Personally, I doubt the USAF would have put up a
> > fight if the USN had said they wanted to incorporate a secondary
refueling
> > capability in their C-40B's; just as the USN has been strangely silent
over
> > the USAF talking about recreating an in-house stand-off jamming
capability.
>
> There is no way in hell that the USN would pay the R&D NRE for a tanker
mod for
> their C-40s, with all their other needs.

Exactly. So the lack of multi-point refuelers must not be such a critical
one, eh?

>
> > > <snip area of general agreement>
> > >
> > > > Clearly you can
> > > > > get a force of tankers in theater a lot faster than a force of
> > tankers
> > > > PLUS a
> > > > > force of fighters and all their support.
> > > >
> > > > Can you? I am not sure about that (note how quickly we got the lead
> > > > squadrons of the 1st TFW into Saudi Arabia in 1990), especially
since
> > > > getting all of those tankers into the theater is only going to do
you
> > some
> > > > good if the fuel for them to haul is also present, or readily
available,
> > at
> > > > that operating location.
> > >
> > > The 1st TFW had an A/A role, IIRR deployed with a full loadout of
missiles
> > on
> > > thea/c and could fairly easily bring an adequate number of reloads
with
> > them, or
> > > fly them in later. A/G ordnance can be a very different matter,
although
> > PGMs
> > > help that aspect. I can't remember if it was the A-10s or F-15Es, but
in
> > one of
> > > Smallwood's books (I think), aircrews described just how limited their
A/G
> > > ordnance options were right after they deployed. Fuel, OTOH, is
> > relatively
> > > available anywhere a commercial airliner is able to operate from.
Maybe
> > you
> > > need to haul in JP-5/8 for the tactical a/c, but the tankers
themselves
> > should
> > > be able to operate on Jet A/A-1.
> >
> > As to fuel availability, I was referring to the ready availability of
the
> > JP-8 in bulk form--and it won't necessarily be there (always) in the
> > quantity you want at those "remote" bases you refer to unless we haul it
in
> > ourselves.
>
> JP-5 presumably, if they're refueling navy a/c that are operating from
CVs. At
> least, that's my understanding, but maybe some of the KC-135 people here
can
> comment.

I thought we had standardized on JP-8 across the force--ISTR this came up
before, but I can't remember the final outcome. Regardless, be it JP-5 or
JP-8, you can't count on it being available in a remote operating location,
in the volume required, unless you plan on being able to haul it in
yourself.

>
> > Usually meaning by ship. A second ship can haul quite a few
> > pieces of ordnance, right?
>
> Sure, but getting fuel to an airfield is relatively easy (pipelines);
moving
> ordnance tends to require a lot more handling and surface transport.

Lots of trucks available for lease out there in the world, even in a lot of
"remote" areas (any remote are having a pipeline capability likely has a
decent truck inventory available in the general area)--or you could use a
transportation company (60 line haul tractors and 120 40-ton trailers) from
the Army (one of our TC companies that was attached to my old BN HHD did
exactly that to support B-52 operations out of Saudi Arabia during ODS). If
none of this is doable in your opinion, then IMO you have just shot your
"gotta have multi-point capability" in the foot as well, since it would mean
that we can't plan on being able to operate the tankers within range of the
receivers in the first place.

>
> > If you are tied to getting basic resources into
> > the TO, you might as well be "in for a penny, in for a pound". And yes,
the
> > use of PGM's has resulted in a drastic reduction in the volume of
ordnance
> > that has to be transported into the TO (ISTR Franks noting that during
OEF
> > we were effectively engaging as many targets per day as we did during
ODS,
> > with about 10% of the average daily sortie rate compared to the earlier
> > conflict). As we move towards use of the 500 pound JDAM, and even moreso
the
> > SDB, the need for ordnance (in terms of volume/weight) will shrivel even
> > further.
>
> PGMs certainly help, but the problem is the variety of A/G ordnance that
may be
> required. A/A, there's two types of missiles and gun ammo. A/G, even
with PGMs
> there's lots of different kinds, and the usage rates are far higher.

I'd think if we have the ability to provide both categories of support
within the confines of a CVN and supporting TAKO (isn't that the acronym?)
for the assualt predicated, we also have the ability of transporting the
same quantity of fuel and ammo to an airfield on dry land. The increasing
use of PGM's even makes it a realistic option to deliver ordnance to the
base by air--something that was unrealistic in the dumb-bomb age (witness
the poor ability to do so over The Hump for the B-29's trying to operate out
of China during WWII).


>
> > > > How much more trouble is it for the USAF to put a
> > > > force that could easily surpass the per-day delivered-tonnage
capability
> > of
> > > > a CVSG (given your premise that the CVN is having to operate from
> > extended
> > > > range itself)?
> > >
> > > If they've got sufficient time to get set up in advance, fine, but
crises
> > often
> > > don't provide that kind of time. We've been lucky that most of our
wars
> > in the
> > > past decade and a half (OAF somewhat excepted) have given us some lead
> > time to
> > > get ready.
> >
> > I'd posit that using the basing options we already have in-hand (Guam,
Diego
> > Garcia, Fairford, and CONUS), the B-1, B-52, and B-2 can acheive this
pretty
> > much anywhere in the world *now*.
>
> In that case, let's dump the fighters altogether ;-)

No, but consider maybe the option of letting the CVN provide only the
fighter and EW support (both requiring less tanking support than if they had
to provide the complete strike package), and you acheive even greater
tonnage of ordnance delivered per strike, and reduce that hose/drogue
requirement to boot... :-)

>
> > > > Three or four B-1B's or B-52's alone can acheive that.
> > >
> > > And provided you're willing to send them in without any SEAD at the
start
> > of the
> > > war, and multi-hour cycle times are no problem, great.
> >
> > I was playing devils advocate a bit here, but if you areally want to get
> > down to details, yeah, they could still provide a reasonable option. Use
of
> > ALCM's to target IADS nodes/assets during the initial phase, with the
> > pending "electric" B-52 providing standoff jamming support, B-2's doing
> > their thing, and then as we start taking down the defenses, we can move
a
> > bit closer and start using the other standoff systems (i.e., JASSM).
Given
> > the range we saw the F-16's operate at during OEF, it would not be
beyond
> > the realm of possibility for the F-15C's and E's to get into the
ballgame at
> > long range, either (if they had to). As I have said a couple of times, I
do
> > see a use for the CVN's--but barking that they just *have* to have every
> > tanker in the USAF at their beck-and-call does not do much to support
the
> > argument that they are such a critical resource, does it?
>
> No one (or at least, not I) is claiming that they every USAF tanker has to
be
> available to support the USN, but clearly, an increase is required. IIRR,
the
> GAO report stated we used 150 KC-135s in OAF and OIF; given the large
percentage
> of USN/Marine plus allied sorties in both of those ops, having at best
only 40
> KC-135s with dual point drogues seems to be inadequate.However, if the
tanker
> requirements study says we don't need more, I'll accept it, but the study
needs
> to be _done_.

Then your cheapest, and quickest, solution goes back to merely buying more
multi-point kits for use by additional 135R's.

>
> > > > OEF
> > > > demonstrated the use of both F-15E's and F-16's in conducting pretty
> > long
> > > > range strike operations (from the PG around Iran, up to Afghanistan
and
> > back
> > > > again, at greater range than the CVN-based strikers were enduring).
> > >
> > > Sure did. Using those USAF tankers with booms to maximise the
transfer
> > rate.
> > > And it helped that we were already set up in the area flying Southern
> > Watch
> > > sorties. But we're not there now, although we do still have some
presence
> > in
> > > the 'Stans, IIRC.
> >
> > And are getting ready to relocate our NATO-assigned assets further east,
> > too, to places like maybe Hungary and Rumania, etc. In the Pacific we
have
> > Guam, the ROK bases, Okinawa. Diego Garcia in the IO is the one that is
> > truly the most limited in terms of ramp space, but the bases in
the -stans
> > you mention make it a bit less critical than has been the case in the
past.
>
> The $64 million question being whether those bases will be available to us
when
> we need them. Last I checked there'll all in muslim countries with
regimes that
> are more or less unstable. Given our current unpopularity in the muslim
world,
> I don't think we should count on such bases being available.

Then we adjust, and we have the CVN's as insurance--with those additional
modified R models, if needed.

>
> <snip>
>
> > > > Should we can the CVN's? No, of course not. But they can continue to
> > operate
> > > > a few more years with the support of KC-135R's and KC-10's without
> > HAVING to
> > > > have the 767's *optimized* for their very own use.
> > >
> > > Provided we have sufficient space for all those tanker a/c in theater,
> > fine, but
> > > it's still wasteful to use two a/c and crews to do the job of one. Of
> > course,
> > > if you're cycling flights of two constantly through the tankers, no
big
> > deal,
> > > but gorilla packages are another matter. And we may well need to help
> > tank our
> > > allies (assuming we have any). Many of them are buying their own
> > multi-point
> > > drogue tankers now, which helps both of us if they're along for the
ride.
> >
> > That last bit is true. But I think you may be forgetting that during
> > contingency operations we tend to have to operate a number of tanker
tracks
> > a long way from the TO (i.e., the Atlantic air-bridge, or a Pacific
version,
> > depending upon where the TO is), so those 767's could be a major
contributor
> > without even having to enter the local airspace. The real issue is how
long
> > we can drag out the 135E fleet; there are 131 of them remaining in
service
> > now, with engines that were stripped from old commercial transports some
> > fifteen or twenty years ago as an "interim" fix, corrosion concerns, and
> > obscelescent avionics. Their MC rate can only really continue to drop,
which
> > is why yes, we can replace 131 aircraft with 100 newer aircraft and come
out
> > in pretty good shape.
>
> Or it might make sense to upgrade them all to 135R/Pacer Crag; I read one
quote
> somewhere of the cost savings going that route compared to the 767 buy --
AIR
> it was a couple of billion dollars over the life of the deal. But that
all
> needs to be studied so we know.

Argh! More study? Hell, just go ahead and plunk down the money and make them
all R's--we'll continue to pay the higher operating cost (even the R is
going to cost more to operate than the 767) for the next forty years--unless
wings start falling off, or the operating budget gets cut (not like that has
not happened, and rather recently (1990's) too), etc. Personally, I don't
see that as the best option.

Brooks

>
> > Do we have the time available to dally around with
> > optimizing the 767 in all manners before we order them (and run the very
> > real risk of seeing the line shut down in the meantime), or do we take
the
> > money we have now and order the first 40 (which is the number the USAF
has
> > tossed about as the first firm order volume) with the lesser hose/drogue
> > capability, and then implement the multi-point system on the following
> > aircraft, with the originals being upgraded at a later date? I see the
> > latter as an option that makes as much, if not more, sense than the
former.
>
> As I've pointed out above, I think an even more fundamental question is
should
> we be buying the 767 at all, rather than some other option. The 767 lease
is
> looking more and more like roadkill, so it may be moot. However, even if
we
> decided to go the 767 route, there's no reason why we couldn't buy 35 of
them
> (or whatever the $ work out to) with wing drogues, rather than 40 without.
>
> Guy
>

[sid]

Guy Alcala > wrote in message >...
> unlike the military, missing production and/or performance guarantees cost the
> company big bucks). We need to see if it makes more sense to buy 7E7s at the

....Boeing has already stated that the 7E& is unsuitable for the tanker
role due to the extensive use of composites and tight design margins
in regards to weight.

[Guy Alcala]

sid wrote:

> Guy Alcala > wrote in message >...
> > unlike the military, missing production and/or performance guarantees cost the
> > company big bucks). We need to see if it makes more sense to buy 7E7s at the
>
> ...Boeing has already stated that the 7E& is unsuitable for the tanker
> role due to the extensive use of composites and tight design margins
> in regards to weight.

Interesting - could you provide a cite? One wonders if they'll change their tune if the 767 deal falls down.

Guy

[sameolesid]

"Kevin Brooks" > wrote in message >...
>
> Argh! More study? Hell, just go ahead and plunk down the money and make them
> all R's--we'll continue to pay the higher operating cost (even the R is
> going to cost more to operate than the 767) for the next forty years--unless
> wings start falling off, or the operating budget gets cut (not like that has
> not happened, and rather recently (1990's) too), etc. Personally, I don't
> see that as the best option.
>
Still clinging to the past I see Brooks

With the DSB report out the point is pretty much moot.
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/13/business/13boeing.html?ex=1085112000&en=dfe39e1ef66e254d&ei=5062&partner=GOOGLE

With no civil orders forthcoming, Boeing isn't likely to keep the 76
line open beyond whats been ordered. Already marginalized in the
budget process anyway, that does not bode well for the E-10 either.
Its time to move from the concepts of the last century anyway. As the
report says...
A page of the report, for example, calls for the Air Force to "work
with major airframe manufacturers to develop new tanker options" that
would have "more modern airframes" than the "20-year-old 767 design."
Instead of sinking money into old, orphaned airframes, it would be
much better to invest in something like the "MACK" or BWB that could
be optimized to operate and survive in tomorrow's ari threat
environment.
Potential adversaries are realizing that we are concentrating a very
signifcant part our ability to mount offensive operations into
rehashed airliners...even if the august members of this board don't
see it. They are doing something about it too...

http://www.indiadefence.com/collab.htm
Designed to fulfill the BVR (beyond visual range) role for "outer-air
battles", an aircraft usually of Sukhoi-27/30/35/37 "Flanker/Super
Flanker" family, equipped with KS-172 (also referred to as Article
172) would be able to engage ultra-high-value airborne platforms like
AWACS (airborne warning and control system), IFR (in-flight
refuelling) and LRMP (long range maritime patrol) platforms, without
necessarily having first to deal with their fighter escorts.

http://www.ainonline.com/Publications/paris/paris_03/pd1agatpg85.html
If used on a long-range missile airframe, the ARGS-PD could give an
opposing air force the ability to take out strategic targets at
distances outside of the normal interception envelopes of U.S. or
other NATO fighters. Boeing E-3 AWACS or E-8 JSTARS aircraft–platforms
that U.S. forces depend heavily upon in time of conflict–would be
vulnerable as never before.

http://arms.ashst.com/missiles/s400.htm
The S-400 system is intended to engage current and future air threats
such as tactical and strategic aircraft, Tomahawk cruise missiles and
other type missiles, including precision-guided ones, as well as AWACS
aircraft, at ranges of up to 400 km.

http://in.news.yahoo.com/031020/43/28nkk.html
"The FT-2000 surface-to-air missile (SAM), commonly known as the
'AWACS killer', designed by Chinese experts are considered to be the
most appropriate option if the U.S. refuses to provide the same kind
of Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) to Pakistan being sold
to India by Israel," The News said.

[sameolesid]

Guy Alcala > wrote in message >...

> company big bucks). We need to see if it makes more sense to buy 7E7s at the
> _start_ of their production cycle, rather than 767s at the end of theirs.

I forgot to put in the link about what Boeing has said about the
unsuitability of the 7E7 in the tanker role...Of course they could be
lying thru their teeth in order to keep the 76 alive....

http://www.afa.org/magazine/april2004/0404watch.asp
However, a senior Boeing official said the 7E7 would be ill-suited for
tanker duty.
"The E in 7E7 stands for efficiency," he said. The efficiency comes
from the use of "very lightweight materials" to achieve long range.
The 7E7 will have too much flex in its wings and fuselage to be a good
tanker, the Boeing official said. "For a tanker, you want a really
rigid, sturdy platform, like the 767."

[C Knowles]

They have already changed their mind and said that, well, maybe with the new
alloys, it's possible after all (Air Force magazine.) I would think that
with the possibility of supplying hundreds of KC-7E7s, they could make it
work. After all, the KC-135 and 707 are two very different airplanes, both
built at the same time, each benefiting from the other.
Curt


"sameolesid" > wrote in message
om...
> Guy Alcala > wrote in message
>...
>
> > company big bucks). We need to see if it makes more sense to buy 7E7s
at the
> > _start_ of their production cycle, rather than 767s at the end of
theirs.
>
> I forgot to put in the link about what Boeing has said about the
> unsuitability of the 7E7 in the tanker role...Of course they could be
> lying thru their teeth in order to keep the 76 alive....
>
> http://www.afa.org/magazine/april2004/0404watch.asp
> However, a senior Boeing official said the 7E7 would be ill-suited for
> tanker duty.
> "The E in 7E7 stands for efficiency," he said. The efficiency comes
> from the use of "very lightweight materials" to achieve long range.
> The 7E7 will have too much flex in its wings and fuselage to be a good
> tanker, the Boeing official said. "For a tanker, you want a really
> rigid, sturdy platform, like the 767."

[C Knowles]

They have already changed their mind and said that, well, maybe with the new
alloys, it's possible after all.
Curt

"sid" > wrote in message
m...
> Guy Alcala > wrote in message
>...
> > unlike the military, missing production and/or performance guarantees
cost the
> > company big bucks). We need to see if it makes more sense to buy 7E7s
at the
>
> ...Boeing has already stated that the 7E& is unsuitable for the tanker
> role due to the extensive use of composites and tight design margins
> in regards to weight.

[Guy Alcala]

Kevin Brooks wrote:

> "Guy Alcala" > wrote in message
> .. .
> > Sorry for the delayed reply -- it's been a busy week.
> >
> > Kevin Brooks wrote:
> >
> > > "Guy Alcala" > wrote in message

<snip, trying to keep the length down to a reasonable level)

> > > In
> > > > various conflicts we've had help from Canadian and Spanish Hornets,
> plus
> > > the
> > > > RAF, AMI, KDF, RNAF, Luftwaffe etc. They've helped us with _their_
> > > multi-point
> > > > tankers on occasion.
> > >
> > > And that help has been appreciated. But that does not really imply that
> we
> > > have to optimize *all* of our aircraft to perform multi-point refueling
> > > right *now*.
> >
> > I never said they _all_ had to be optimized right _now_, but I can see no
> reason
> > not to buy new tankers set up that way from the start, as our need for
> drogue
> > tanking is clearly inceasing (cf. the proposed USAF F-35B buy).
>
> That reason would be (another) delay in delivery. Why do you think it will
> be such a major fiasco if the first forty 767's delivered come in without
> the multi-point capability? IIRC the first contract is projected to cover
> that number of delivereies. Letting a spiral handle the multi-point
> capability in the subsequent 60 aircraft is not acceptable?

This assumes we need 767s at all, so I'll try and consolidate the discussion
below instead of handling everything piecemeal.

<snip lead-in re 135 age versus 767>

> > > Firstly, "only a few years ago" was before we (again) had to surge
> tanker
> > > support for two recent operations--that eats into remaining lifespan
> > > (operating hours for the tanker force being about a third higher than
> they
> > > were pre-9/11).
> >
> > Yes, an increase from an average utilization of 300 hours/yr. to 435
> hrs/year.
> > Even at the latter rate the KC-135Es have a fatigue lifespan of 82 years
> (36,000
> > hrs., vs. 39,000hrs for the KC-135Rs), and they're just a bit over halfway
> > through that.
>
> You are forgetting the corrosion problems with the E models--corrosion tends
> to reduce fatigue life, too, IIRC from my long-ago materials science
> classes...

Corrosion is an issue with any a/c -- certainly the KC-135Rs as well, which
(after all) were 135As before, just as the Es were.

> It sounds to me like the only way you are going to get that long
> a life from the E's would be if you also replaced some structural components
> (meaning you are going even further than the old R model mods, IIRC).

Why is corrosion and fatigue on the Es supposedly so much more serious than the
Rs, when they all started out as 135As?

>
> > > Second, if you are going to replace the engines (and
> > > associated controls), you are talking about a sizeable investment
> (witness
> > > the never-ending debate over the wisdom of reengining the B-52's, C-5's,
> > > etc.) right there. Then you have to remember that the E models have also
> not
> > > undergone other avionics updates due to their age/limited lifespan
> > > remaining, so if you want to keep them around you are going to have to
> do
> > > the whole PACER CRAIG thing, etc. In other words, turn them all into R
> > > models--which does not sound like a real wise investment.
> >
> > We don't know that's the case, as we haven't done the assessment. Indeed,
> the
> > Defense Science Board just came out (see
> >
> > http://www.airforcetimes.com/story.php?f=1-292925-2904714.php
> >
> > with a report that apparently says that upgrading some Es into Pacer Crag
> Rs may
> > well be the most cost effective solution, while we take a couple of years
> to do
> > a proper tanker requirements study. We apparently never finished the one
> we
> > started in 2001, and we're now talking about doing one that will run from
> 2004 -
> > 2006. What the DSB has said is that there is no need to imminently
> replace the
> > Es - we've got time to look at our options. If you google on news and
> search
> >
> > defense science board tanker
> >
> > you'll come up with several sources that provides sniuppets of detail. Th
> e
> > actual report isn't available yet on the DSB website, apparently because
> it
> > hasn't yet been briefed to Congress.
>
> Wait a second--spend *more* money on trying to upgrade E's, while doing
> *another* study to determine if/when/how we replace the E's?

What do you mean, _trying_ to upgrade the Es? We know perfectly well how to
upgrade them -we've got 400+ prototypes in service, after all, with the R&D all
paid for.

> That sounds
> like a fine...bureaucratic solution? Even the GAO was saying in the 1990's
> that the USAF needed to get off its duff and start planning the replacement
> of the KC-135E fleet.

Sure. It didn't say what to replace them with.

> Studies are great--unfortunately, they have a tendancy
> of becoming an ends-unto-themselves. We have a good proposal that the USAF
> has supported--it puts new airframes into the mission much more quickly than
> if we follow the "usual" method of purchasing new aircraft (of course, you
> could use the F/A-22 or F-35 model...which would mean if we started that new
> study right now, we might plan on seeing some new tankers around what...2015
> at best?), and it takes advantage of an existing excess production
> capability/inventory at the only US company currently building aircraft of
> that class--sounds like a good plan to me.

Who says we need new airframes _right_ now? As we both agree, buying more pods
and converting more Rs to carry them is the best solution in the short term to
the navy/Allies problem, while converting Es to Rs _may_ be the best solution
for increasing our tanker force in a hurry. Or it may not be, butsince the USAF
never did an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA), we don't know.

> > > It is beyond argument that the E models are the anchormen when it comes
> to
> > > MC rate (about 78% for the E models, versus 82% for the R models, based
> upon
> > > GAO figures for May 2003). Without reengining, and taking them up to the
> R
> > > standard, this MC rate difference will only grow--it drops below 75% and
> I'd
> > > think the USAF leadership will really start to howl. Corrosion
> maintenace is
> > > another (growing) concern, and it will eat up more and more money as we
> try
> > > to stretch out the E model's lifespan.
> >
> > The corrosion problem is apparently under control. See the URL above.
> From
> > what I recall of the GAO report, the O&M costs for the Es was averaging
> $4.6
> > million a year vs. $3.7 million for the Rs
>
> That is an additional $130 million bucks each *year* in operating cost (not
> exactly chump-change...but even that is a "lowball" figure...). What would
> be the operating cost of the 767? Less than the 135R (two engines versus
> four, better fuel economy, more maintenance friendly subsystems, less
> likelihood of inspection-and-repair work, more stringent (and more frequent)
> inspections, etc.), that is for sure. So your operating cost per year
> differential measured against the 767 is going to be greater. Add in the
> cost of bringing those E's to a full PACER CRAIG R model level, and the cost
> is going to be significant, to say the least. Not a wise investment plan,
> IMO. If you managed your personal auto program in this manner, then you

> would still be driving (only--no newer cars allowed) a 1960's era car, and
> one which you had paid to drop new engines in, along with paying to modify
> the emissions system to keep it in compliance (like the noise requirements
> the KC-135's face), and here in 2004 you would be saying that instead of
> buying a new vehicle, you'd be better off paying to essentially completely
> rebuild the one you have and drop *another* new engine in it, along with
> updating the other systems in the dash, maybe a new trannie to be compatible
> with that new engine, etc. I don't think you would endorse such a plan (I
> made the mistake once of trying to extend the life of a noble little Nissan
> pick-up at the 170K point by dropping a *used* engine in it, and that was
> *not* cheap--and I found that within 10K more miles I was *had* to break
> down and buy a new vehicle).

If most people maintained their cars the way that the military does its tankers,
and only drove them 1/10th as much as the average 'driver', then upgading
themwith new componenets might well be the most cost effective solution for the
long-term. The numbers I have seen quoted for the E to R (plus Pacer Crag)
conversion vs. new 767 comparison imply that the conversion is indeed the most
cost-effective option, but without knowing every assumption made I'll withhold
judgement.

> As to corrosion, in March 2003 the USAF's Deputy C/S for
> Installations/Logistics testified before Congress: "Within the air refueling
> fleet, the KC-135E-models have experienced the most maintenance and
> corrosion problems and are more costly to maintain. With an average
> aircraft age of 43 years, the KC-135E fleet is the oldest combat weapon
> system in the Air Force inventory. It is also the oldest large fleet of
> heavy jet aircraft in aviation history...The second critical measurement
> that defines aircraft life is physical age. In this fleet, corrosion is a
> function of age. Accurately predicting the extent of corrosion is difficult
> and this lack of predictability severely limits the ability to efficiently
> sustain aging fleets...the KC-135 is particularly challenging since its
> 1950s design, materials, and construction did not consider corrosion
> prevention measures...The most critical KC-135 tanker metric is age, and the
> most pressing KC-135 problems are corrosion and stress corrosion
> cracking-both age related. Stress corrosion cracking is one of the most
> difficult structural failures to predict." Are you saying that all of these
> problems have been solved since that date?

Apparently they've been ameliorated to a considerable extent, so that this is no
longer a driving factor. And again, why is the E's corrosion problem supposedly
so much worse than the Rs, when they started from exactly the same airframe?

<snip old ground>

> > One of the things I object to is the assumption, without any analysis,
> that the
> > 767 buy is essential (the DSB says it isn't),
>
> Well, the DSB also says the corrosion problem is something we can easily
> discount,

Actually, I believe what they said was that the facility responsible for dealing
with it has learned to handle it so well that they are able to do the work much
quicker and cheaper than expected. I can't find the quote, unfortunately, but
I'm still looking.

> and has apparently decided that *outsourcing* the tanker mission,
> or buying second-hand aircraft, is the way to go. Outsourcing may be great
> for the RAF, etc., but the USAF is another story, IMO. Then there is the
> "spend the money on already used aircraft" approach--wonderful! As if
> tossing more money down the O&M pit for the E model is not enough, we should
> take the money we have and buy older airframes than we can afford? (And yes,
> we can afford new tankers under the current deal being offered)

They've said that it _may_ be the way to go, and:

"The report by the Defense Science Board says that, contrary to Air Force
claims, corrosion of the aging tanker fleet is "manageable" and several
options exist to refurbish the fleet.

If officials are willing to tolerate increased maintenance costs, "you can
defer major near-term . . . investments" to replace the tanker fleet, the
report said.

"There is no compelling material or financial reason to initiate a
replacement program prior to the completion of" a lengthy analysis of
alternatives and other studies, the report said. "

[Quoted from the Oregonian's Web page, May 13th. Sure will be nice when we get
access to the actual report, rather than summaries of it flitered through the
news media]

> or that it's the most
> > cost-effective solution (we don't know). Another thing that worries me
> about
> > rushing into a 767 buy is that we'll be buying an a/c that is essentially
> out of
> > production except for the USAF. The KC-135s were bought at the opposite
> > extreme. These a/c are going to last us at least 50 years, so spares are
> going
> > to be a real problem down the road, as the commercial operators are
> already
> > starting to look for replacements. Italy and Japan won't have a problem,
> > because they're each only going to buy airframes in the single-digits so
> they'll
> > be able to buy adequate spares from cannibalised airframes, but the USAF
> is
> > talking about buying at least 100, possibly with more to come.
>
> The biggest things you have to buy spares for are the avionics (which are
> more plug-and-play than they were in the 135 era), and engine related
> systems. There are a lot of 767's that will remain in service in the
> civilian sector for decades to come--they will need spares too, and in the
> end they become another source for spares for the KC version. I don't see
> this as a deal-breaker.

Given that airlines are already looking to replace their 767s ( a 20-year old
design, let's remember) with the next generation, and given that world oil
production is predicted to peak sometime in the 2007 (the pessimists) -- 2040
(the optimists) period, considerably improved fuel consumption may well drive
the mass replacement of older a/c, just as the post 9/11 slump did. It's
definitely an issue.


> > When the 767 deal was first mooted, it was really the only in-production
> (US)
> > a/c in the size class available in the proper time frame. That is no
> longer the
> > case, as the 7E7 will be entering service in 2008 (this is a commercial
> a/c, and
> > unlike the military, missing production and/or performance guarantees cost
> the
> > company big bucks). We need to see if it makes more sense to buy 7E7s at
> the
> > _start_ of their production cycle, rather than 767s at the end of theirs.
> Which
> > is better suited for the role?
>
> > Is the extra M0.05 in cruise a major advantage?
>
> Not likely.

Depends on the specific mission, and more importantly, what percentage of the
mission spectrum does that particular mission occupy. There are missions now
where the faster KC-135 is better suited than a KC-767 would be, and others
where the latter comes out ahead.

> > Does the higher composite content significantly decrease the corrosion
> issues
> > down the road?
>
> Maybe, but doubtfull, as corrosion awareness was better incorporated into
> the 767 manufacture than it was in the 135.

And will be even more incorporated into the 7E7, especally since (AFAIK) there
is no corrosion of composites yet known.

> > How about the 20% better fuel efficiency?
>
> Sounds good, but then again you have to examine the interval between the
> time the 767 would be available and the (elsewhere not mentioned, AFAIK) 7E7
> tanker version (expect what, a five or six year period at best before the
> first tanker 7E7 could be available?)...I'll be kind and use a five year
> period, at 131 E models costing maybe $2 million each more per year in
> operating costs than the 767, that works out to around $1.3 billion in extra
> operating costs? That is a hell of a lot of gas...

Check out how much the KC-767 tankers cost.

>
>
> Respective runway and
> > ramp space requirements? PFI vs. military? Etc.
>
> Lose the outsourcing option from the get-go, IMO. Won't work for an
> organization with the scope of tanking requirements that the USAF has.

Perhaps yes, perhaps no. Air bridge and training tanking doesn't require
military crewing. It's certainly an option worth looking at for at least some
tanking requirements, if not all.

<snip lead-in, about fewer a/c to provide the same number of drogues>

> > > That does not necessarily hold true. If the requirement to provide
> > > hose/drogue capability in-theater is 8that* important in a given case,
> you
> > > send the KC-10's and multi-point 135R's forward, and use the other
> aircraft
> > > (i.e., these pre-improvement 767's) to handle the usual airbridge
> su[pport
> > > operations into the theater.
> >
> > I think KC-10s are too important as deployment tankers early on in a
> conflict to
> > use them in the tactical role. After all, that's what we bought them for,
> > precisely so we could get to the Middle East from the US non-stop, if we
> were
> > refused landing/overflight rights. Let's face it - being on good terms
> with
> > Portugal (Lajes) and Spain (Moron) has become more important to us than
> ever.
> > Besides, KC-10s take up a lot of space, and need stronger runways than
> 135s or
> > 767s (don't know how the 7E7 stacks up), which may limit its deployment
> options.
>
> I said, "If the requirement to provide hose/drogue capability in-theater is
> *that* important". We have the capability of providing substantial
> hose/drogue capability if we have to--if we really need more, then buy more
> kits for the existing R's. No matter how you cut it, the decision to not
> initially provide multi-point capability in the first forty 767's is not
> going to be a critical, or even serious, failure in terms of our operational
> capability.

We agree that buying more kits for the Rs and/or modifying more than 45 Rs to
use them is probably the best idea in the short-term.

> > > So what you really seem to be saying is that
> > > the 767's, even without initial multi-point capability, offer an
> improvement
> > > to the current level of support that can be afforded to the USN?
> >
> > Yes, they do, but the question remains, are 767s rather than upgraded Es
> and
> > later 7E7s the best way to go; what's the best mix, what % of tankers
> need to
> > do which roles, how will the advent of UCAVs affect the need for tankers
> and the
> > type mix, what effect will USAF F-35 buys have, etc. This needs to be
> properly
> > studied.
>
> Again with the neverending studies? :-)

What never-ending study? The USAF failed to do such a study in the first place,
especially an AoA. The latter was predicted to take about 18 months, but the
head of AQ&L (Wynne) says they'll probably push it and complete it by December
or so.

<snip lead-in about buying multidrogue capability up front rather than adding it
later>

> > > Whoah there, hoss. If the R&D is being picked up elsewhere (by virtue of
> > > those foreign sales you mention), that advantage does not go away
> because we
> > > dicide not to implement the multi-point system up-front. That R&D effort
> is
> > > still applicable. And you are avoiding the fact that it will slow the
> > > delivery timeline if we have to go with this optimization up-front.
> >
> > I'm aware that the R&D will still apply, I'm worried about the materiel
> costs,
> > which are only going to go up. If we need the capability, then let's just
> buy
> > it and get the purchase out of the way, instead of paying inflated prices
> later.
>
> Even if it delays entry further, meaning you are also going to be paying
> that higher O&M cost for the remaining E's even longer...?

If that allows us to make a better decision for the long term, sure. We can get
upgraded Es (Pacer Crag Rs) into service faster than we can get 767s.

> > > If that means we buy a/c at a slower
> > > > rate (and more refueling pods), good.
> > >
> > > Good? I disagree. So does the USAF, from what I have read.
> >
> > The DSB doesn't, and Rumsfeld said that he was waiting on a couple of
> reports,
> > including theirs, before making a decision.
>
> I am not as impressed with the summary of the DSB report as you are (but
> then again, I tend to weigh the advice of the folks actually tasked to fly
> the missions a bit more than I do the DSB, GAO, etc).

Seeing as how the DSB works for the Pentagon, and Rumsfeld is the guy who tasked
them to do the study back in February, I put a bit more weight on their advice
than you do. Especially since opponents of the 767 deal (McCain to thefront)
believed that the DSB was much too cosy with the military and Boeing (the DSB
Chairman had to recuse himself because he was also a paid Boeing consultant and
had been mentioned in internal company e-mails back in Dec.2002/Jan. 2003 as
willing to help push the deal), and fully expected them to support it. I
believe McCain's words were something along the lines of a "fox guarding the
chickens." So yeah, when even they come out and say they that we've got time to
do the study and the corrosion is manageable, I'm inclined to believe them.

> > > We plan to be operating from more austere
> > > > bases, which tend to be somewhat limited in ramp space, so anything we
> can
> > > do
> > > > that limits that is a plus. That was indeed one of the USAF's
> arguments
> > > against
> > > > the A330 -- that it took up too much ramp space while providing no
> more
> > > > refueling stations than the 767. They considered the A330's somewhat
> > > greater
> > > > offload irrelevant for the tactical refueling mission; they were
> concerned
> > > with
> > > > the number of booms/drogues on station while minimizing the ground
> > > footprint. If
> > > > that logic is valid, then buying dual rather than single-point
> capability
> > > is
> > > > even more valuable as a way of minimizing the ground footprint. See
> > > below.
> > >
> > > In the long run, yes. But is it worth slowing delivery up-front even
> further
> > > than it already has been slowed?
> >
> > According to the DSB, we have the time.
>
> The DSB that claims, contrary to what the USAF LTG testified last year, that
> the corrosion problem is readily in-hand...?

the DSB's claim is based on the USAF unit doing the corrosion controls data,
let's remember. The situation isn't static, and they've gotten better at it
since last year.

> And thinks out-sourcing tanker
> requirements is a fine idea?

They're saying it's a viable option, it should be looked at in an AoA, and we've
got the time to do so. No more, no less.

> I am not buying into either, at this point.

Until the AoA is actually done, we have nothing to base a decision on other than
"because I think so," which IMO is a pretty poor way to spend billions of
dollars.

<snip>

> > > But they oddly don't have a problem with the USMC buying C-130J's to
> augment
> > > their current tanker fleet.
> >
> > Of course not, because a KC-130 (any flavor) clearly isn't a replacement
> for a
> > jet tanker. It meets USMC needs for a STOL tanker/transport that can also
> > refuel helos (AFSOC too), and for countries that also operate C-130s it's
> a
> > relatively cheap, easy way to get some A/A tanking capability; it's
> certainly
> > better than nothing, as Argentina can attest. But it's a relatively
> inefficient
> > tanker for fast jets, lacking range, speed, cruise altitude, and offload
> > capability.
>
> I remain unconvinced that AMC would throw a hissy fit if the USN wanted to
> include a secondary tanking capability to its C-40B's.

More likely, they'd suffer a rupture from laughing at the USN devoting such a
large proportion of its budget to paying the NRE for so few a/c of such limited
performance (as tankers).

> > > Personally, I doubt the USAF would have put up a
> > > fight if the USN had said they wanted to incorporate a secondary
> refueling
> > > capability in their C-40B's; just as the USN has been strangely silent
> over
> > > the USAF talking about recreating an in-house stand-off jamming
> capability.
> >
> > There is no way in hell that the USN would pay the R&D NRE for a tanker
> mod for
> > their C-40s, with all their other needs.
>
> Exactly. So the lack of multi-point refuelers must not be such a critical
> one, eh?

Since no one else is even considering buying 737s as tankers, and the navy is
only buying a few (somewhere between 5 and 8, as best I can tell), the navy
would have to be nuts to make that kind of investment for so few a/c, even
assuming that they would be reasonable tankers. Given their limited
payload/range and performance, I have my doubts they would be, but it's moot.

<fuel to forward bases>

> > > As to fuel availability, I was referring to the ready availability of
> the
> > > JP-8 in bulk form--and it won't necessarily be there (always) in the
> > > quantity you want at those "remote" bases you refer to unless we haul it
> in
> > > ourselves.
> >
> > JP-5 presumably, if they're refueling navy a/c that are operating from
> CVs. At
> > least, that's my understanding, but maybe some of the KC-135 people here
> can
> > comment.
>
> I thought we had standardized on JP-8 across the force--ISTR this came up
> before, but I can't remember the final outcome.

I believe either here or on s.m.n. someone stated that a/c couldn't be struck
below if they;d beenfueledwith JP-8, until they had been refueled several times
with JP-5. For land ops (training) the navy has gone to JP-8.

> Regardless, be it JP-5 or
> JP-8, you can't count on it being available in a remote operating location,
> in the volume required, unless you plan on being able to haul it in
> yourself.

Sure, which is why you'll need a tanker (the ship variety).

> > > Usually meaning by ship. A second ship can haul quite a few
> > > pieces of ordnance, right?
> >
> > Sure, but getting fuel to an airfield is relatively easy (pipelines);
> moving
> > ordnance tends to require a lot more handling and surface transport.
>
> Lots of trucks available for lease out there in the world, even in a lot of
> "remote" areas (any remote are having a pipeline capability likely has a
> decent truck inventory available in the general area)--or you could use a
> transportation company (60 line haul tractors and 120 40-ton trailers) from
> the Army (one of our TC companies that was attached to my old BN HHD did
> exactly that to support B-52 operations out of Saudi Arabia during ODS). If
> none of this is doable in your opinion, then IMO you have just shot your
> "gotta have multi-point capability" in the foot as well, since it would mean
> that we can't plan on being able to operate the tankers within range of the
> receivers in the first place.

Moving ordnance by truck requires offload from ships and lots of handling
equipment (Ro-Ro helps here), whereas every airfield of adequate size to handle
a jet tanker will already have a fuel delivery system in place. We'd only need
(assuming it's not a military field) to supply the fuel, not the delivery
system. Even assuming that the logistic infrastructure exists to move the
ordnance, it's still relatively slow, and requires a lot more organizational
effort to get things going than just pulling a tanker up to a pipeline terminal
and starting to pump.

> > > If you are tied to getting basic resources into
> > > the TO, you might as well be "in for a penny, in for a pound". And yes,
> the
> > > use of PGM's has resulted in a drastic reduction in the volume of
> ordnance
> > > that has to be transported into the TO (ISTR Franks noting that during
> OEF
> > > we were effectively engaging as many targets per day as we did during
> ODS,
> > > with about 10% of the average daily sortie rate compared to the earlier
> > > conflict). As we move towards use of the 500 pound JDAM, and even moreso
> the
> > > SDB, the need for ordnance (in terms of volume/weight) will shrivel even
> > > further.
> >
> > PGMs certainly help, but the problem is the variety of A/G ordnance that
> may be
> > required. A/A, there's two types of missiles and gun ammo. A/G, even
> with PGMs
> > there's lots of different kinds, and the usage rates are far higher.
>
> I'd think if we have the ability to provide both categories of support
> within the confines of a CVN and supporting TAKO (isn't that the acronym?)

> for the assualt predicated, we also have the ability of transporting the
> same quantity of fuel and ammo to an airfield on dry land.

In what time frame, and why would you want to move them again, when the CV
already has the infrastructure in place, lacking only sufficient tankers to
reach the targets? Down the road, sure we can start to bring in ordnance for
land-based air, but early in a conflict we've usually got the navy plus long
range USAF assets.

> The increasing
> use of PGM's even makes it a realistic option to deliver ordnance to the
> base by air--something that was unrealistic in the dumb-bomb age (witness
> the poor ability to do so over The Hump for the B-29's trying to operate out
> of China during WWII).

They certainly allow us to start some level of sustained ops sooner, but we'll
need ship-transported ordnance quantities if we're having to deal with major
attacks.

<snip>

> > > I'd posit that using the basing options we already have in-hand (Guam,
> Diego
> > > Garcia, Fairford, and CONUS), the B-1, B-52, and B-2 can acheive this
> pretty
> > > much anywhere in the world *now*.
> >
> > In that case, let's dump the fighters altogether ;-)
>
> No, but consider maybe the option of letting the CVN provide only the
> fighter and EW support (both requiring less tanking support than if they had
> to provide the complete strike package), and you acheive even greater
> tonnage of ordnance delivered per strike, and reduce that hose/drogue
> requirement to boot... :-)

Certainly worth looking at, although the navy might object to having to convert
all their shiny new F-18Fs to F-18Gs already;-)

<snip>

> As I have said a couple of times, I
> do
> > > see a use for the CVN's--but barking that they just *have* to have every
> > > tanker in the USAF at their beck-and-call does not do much to support
> the
> > > argument that they are such a critical resource, does it?
> >
> > No one (or at least, not I) is claiming that they every USAF tanker has to
> be
> > available to support the USN, but clearly, an increase is required. IIRR,
> the
> > GAO report stated we used 150 KC-135s in OAF and OIF; given the large
> percentage
> > of USN/Marine plus allied sorties in both of those ops, having at best
> only 40
> > KC-135s with dual point drogues seems to be inadequate.However, if the
> tanker
> > requirements study says we don't need more, I'll accept it, but the study
> needs
> > to be _done_.
>
> Then your cheapest, and quickest, solution goes back to merely buying more
> multi-point kits for use by additional 135R's.

And I've already said that I'm in agreement with this, especially so we can look
at if we even need the KC-767 vs. some other option. We apparently have 33
drogue kits for 45 KC-135Rs, so upping the number of kits to more closely
approximate the KC-135R MC rate, rather than the .73 rate indicated by the
above, should certainly be looked at for starters. Converting some Es to Rs and
adding the drogue kits at the same time won't take any Rs out of service.

<snip>

> > > And are getting ready to relocate our NATO-assigned assets further east,
> > > too, to places like maybe Hungary and Rumania, etc. In the Pacific we
> have
> > > Guam, the ROK bases, Okinawa. Diego Garcia in the IO is the one that is
> > > truly the most limited in terms of ramp space, but the bases in
> the -stans
> > > you mention make it a bit less critical than has been the case in the
> past.
> >
> > The $64 million question being whether those bases will be available to us
> when
> > we need them. Last I checked there'll all in muslim countries with
> regimes that
> > are more or less unstable. Given our current unpopularity in the muslim
> world,
> > I don't think we should count on such bases being available.
>
> Then we adjust, and we have the CVN's as insurance--with those additional
> modified R models, if needed.

Agreed that more Rs is likely the best answer in the short run.

<snip>

> > > > Provided we have sufficient space for all those tanker a/c in theater,
> > > fine, but
> > > > it's still wasteful to use two a/c and crews to do the job of one. Of
> > > course,
> > > > if you're cycling flights of two constantly through the tankers, no
> big
> > > deal,
> > > > but gorilla packages are another matter. And we may well need to help
> > > tank our
> > > > allies (assuming we have any). Many of them are buying their own
> > > multi-point
> > > > drogue tankers now, which helps both of us if they're along for the
> ride.
> > >
> > > That last bit is true. But I think you may be forgetting that during
> > > contingency operations we tend to have to operate a number of tanker
> tracks
> > > a long way from the TO (i.e., the Atlantic air-bridge, or a Pacific
> version,
> > > depending upon where the TO is), so those 767's could be a major
> contributor
> > > without even having to enter the local airspace. The real issue is how
> long
> > > we can drag out the 135E fleet; there are 131 of them remaining in
> service
> > > now, with engines that were stripped from old commercial transports some
> > > fifteen or twenty years ago as an "interim" fix, corrosion concerns, and
> > > obscelescent avionics. Their MC rate can only really continue to drop,
> which
> > > is why yes, we can replace 131 aircraft with 100 newer aircraft and come
> out
> > > in pretty good shape.
> >
> > Or it might make sense to upgrade them all to 135R/Pacer Crag; I read one
> quote
> > somewhere of the cost savings going that route compared to the 767 buy --
> AIR
> > it was a couple of billion dollars over the life of the deal. But that
> all
> > needs to be studied so we know.
>
> Argh! More study?

No, the same one that the USAF shoud have done back in 2001, but didn't.

> Hell, just go ahead and plunk down the money and make them
> all R's--we'll continue to pay the higher operating cost (even the R is
> going to cost more to operate than the 767) for the next forty years--unless
> wings start falling off, or the operating budget gets cut (not like that has
> not happened, and rather recently (1990's) too), etc. Personally, I don't
> see that as the best option.

I'm sure the operating cost will be higher, but then the purchase cost is a hell
of a lot lower. Fuel burn between a 135R and a KC-767's probably a wash;
CFM-56s in one and CF6s in the other, with the total thrust higher in the case
of the CF6s.

Guy

[Guy Alcala]

sameolesid wrote:

> Guy Alcala > wrote in message >...
>
> > company big bucks). We need to see if it makes more sense to buy 7E7s at the
> > _start_ of their production cycle, rather than 767s at the end of theirs.
>
> I forgot to put in the link about what Boeing has said about the
> unsuitability of the 7E7 in the tanker role...Of course they could be
> lying thru their teeth in order to keep the 76 alive...

Thanks for the link, and yeah, I'll be interested to see if miraculously the 7E7 is found to be an ideal solution for
tanking, if the 767 dies.

> http://www.afa.org/magazine/april2004/0404watch.asp
> However, a senior Boeing official said the 7E7 would be ill-suited for
> tanker duty.
> "The E in 7E7 stands for efficiency," he said. The efficiency comes
> from the use of "very lightweight materials" to achieve long range.

As opposed to the 767, where the '6' apparently stands for inefficiency, which uses super-heavy materials to achieve
short-range;-) And of course, strengthening the 7E7 wherever it might be necessary for the tanker role is absolutely
impossible from an engineering standpoint;-) Watch this space to see if the world (or at least Boeing's part of it)
suddenly turns upside down.

> The 7E7 will have too much flex in its wings and fuselage to be a good
> tanker, the Boeing official said. "For a tanker, you want a really
> rigid, sturdy platform, like the 767."

I can't speak for the 767, but the wings of the 757 I took a ride in flexed noticeably, if not in BUFF league. Couldn't
say for the fuselage. Not that such an eyeball observation has any validity whatsoever in engineering terms.

Guy

[Kevin Brooks]

"sameolesid" > wrote in message
om...
> "Kevin Brooks" > wrote in message
>...
> >
> > Argh! More study? Hell, just go ahead and plunk down the money and make
them
> > all R's--we'll continue to pay the higher operating cost (even the R is
> > going to cost more to operate than the 767) for the next forty
years--unless
> > wings start falling off, or the operating budget gets cut (not like that
has
> > not happened, and rather recently (1990's) too), etc. Personally, I
don't
> > see that as the best option.
> >
> Still clinging to the past I see Brooks

Well, you seem to be changing--your ID, that is. You still get <plonked>,
though.

Brooks

[Guy Alcala]

C Knowles wrote:

> They have already changed their mind and said that, well, maybe with the new
> alloys, it's possible after all (Air Force magazine.)

To quote Gomer,"Surprise, Surprise, Surprise!";-) Got a link? I can't find it
in the current (May) issue online.

>I would think that

> with the possibility of supplying hundreds of KC-7E7s, they could make it
> work. After all, the KC-135 and 707 are two very different airplanes, both
> built at the same time, each benefiting from the other.

You'd certainly think so.

Guy

[Kevin Brooks]

"Guy Alcala" > wrote in message
. ..
> Kevin Brooks wrote:
>
> > "Guy Alcala" > wrote in message
> > .. .
> > > Sorry for the delayed reply -- it's been a busy week.
> > >
> > > Kevin Brooks wrote:
> > >
> > > > "Guy Alcala" > wrote in message
>
> <snip, trying to keep the length down to a reasonable level)
>
> > > > In
> > > > > various conflicts we've had help from Canadian and Spanish
Hornets,
> > plus
> > > > the
> > > > > RAF, AMI, KDF, RNAF, Luftwaffe etc. They've helped us with
_their_
> > > > multi-point
> > > > > tankers on occasion.
> > > >
> > > > And that help has been appreciated. But that does not really imply
that
> > we
> > > > have to optimize *all* of our aircraft to perform multi-point
refueling
> > > > right *now*.
> > >
> > > I never said they _all_ had to be optimized right _now_, but I can see
no
> > reason
> > > not to buy new tankers set up that way from the start, as our need for
> > drogue
> > > tanking is clearly inceasing (cf. the proposed USAF F-35B buy).
> >
> > That reason would be (another) delay in delivery. Why do you think it
will
> > be such a major fiasco if the first forty 767's delivered come in
without
> > the multi-point capability? IIRC the first contract is projected to
cover
> > that number of delivereies. Letting a spiral handle the multi-point
> > capability in the subsequent 60 aircraft is not acceptable?
>
> This assumes we need 767s at all, so I'll try and consolidate the
discussion
> below instead of handling everything piecemeal.
>
> <snip lead-in re 135 age versus 767>
>
> > > > Firstly, "only a few years ago" was before we (again) had to surge
> > tanker
> > > > support for two recent operations--that eats into remaining lifespan
> > > > (operating hours for the tanker force being about a third higher
than
> > they
> > > > were pre-9/11).
> > >
> > > Yes, an increase from an average utilization of 300 hours/yr. to 435
> > hrs/year.
> > > Even at the latter rate the KC-135Es have a fatigue lifespan of 82
years
> > (36,000
> > > hrs., vs. 39,000hrs for the KC-135Rs), and they're just a bit over
halfway
> > > through that.
> >
> > You are forgetting the corrosion problems with the E models--corrosion
tends
> > to reduce fatigue life, too, IIRC from my long-ago materials science
> > classes...
>
> Corrosion is an issue with any a/c -- certainly the KC-135Rs as well,
which
> (after all) were 135As before, just as the Es were.
>
> > It sounds to me like the only way you are going to get that long
> > a life from the E's would be if you also replaced some structural
components
> > (meaning you are going even further than the old R model mods, IIRC).
>
> Why is corrosion and fatigue on the Es supposedly so much more serious
than the
> Rs, when they all started out as 135As?

I'd assume they are both going to exhibit corrosion problems, but didn't the
R's go through a significant IRAN as part of their upgrade? The USAF, per
those comments from the three-star last year, seems most concerned with the
E's.

>
> >
> > > > Second, if you are going to replace the engines (and
> > > > associated controls), you are talking about a sizeable investment
> > (witness
> > > > the never-ending debate over the wisdom of reengining the B-52's,
C-5's,
> > > > etc.) right there. Then you have to remember that the E models have
also
> > not
> > > > undergone other avionics updates due to their age/limited lifespan
> > > > remaining, so if you want to keep them around you are going to have
to
> > do
> > > > the whole PACER CRAIG thing, etc. In other words, turn them all into
R
> > > > models--which does not sound like a real wise investment.
> > >
> > > We don't know that's the case, as we haven't done the assessment.
Indeed,
> > the
> > > Defense Science Board just came out (see
> > >
> > > http://www.airforcetimes.com/story.php?f=1-292925-2904714.php
> > >
> > > with a report that apparently says that upgrading some Es into Pacer
Crag
> > Rs may
> > > well be the most cost effective solution, while we take a couple of
years
> > to do
> > > a proper tanker requirements study. We apparently never finished the
one
> > we
> > > started in 2001, and we're now talking about doing one that will run
from
> > 2004 -
> > > 2006. What the DSB has said is that there is no need to imminently
> > replace the
> > > Es - we've got time to look at our options. If you google on news
and
> > search
> > >
> > > defense science board tanker
> > >
> > > you'll come up with several sources that provides sniuppets of detail.
Th
> > e
> > > actual report isn't available yet on the DSB website, apparently
because
> > it
> > > hasn't yet been briefed to Congress.
> >
> > Wait a second--spend *more* money on trying to upgrade E's, while doing
> > *another* study to determine if/when/how we replace the E's?
>
> What do you mean, _trying_ to upgrade the Es? We know perfectly well how
to
> upgrade them -we've got 400+ prototypes in service, after all, with the
R&D all
> paid for.

No, no, no--that was not what I meant. My point is that at this point
tossing *more* money into the upgrade of the E models seems a bit
shortsighted, when that same money (along with the savings accrued from
cheaper operating costs) could go towards purchasing new-build airframes. We
did not have that option (or the money to make it happen) available back
when the original R program started--we do now.

>
> > That sounds
> > like a fine...bureaucratic solution? Even the GAO was saying in the
1990's
> > that the USAF needed to get off its duff and start planning the
replacement
> > of the KC-135E fleet.
>
> Sure. It didn't say what to replace them with.

Nope. The USAF has said what they want to replace them with--you have no
trust in the USAF?

>
> > Studies are great--unfortunately, they have a tendancy
> > of becoming an ends-unto-themselves. We have a good proposal that the
USAF
> > has supported--it puts new airframes into the mission much more quickly
than
> > if we follow the "usual" method of purchasing new aircraft (of course,
you
> > could use the F/A-22 or F-35 model...which would mean if we started that
new
> > study right now, we might plan on seeing some new tankers around
what...2015
> > at best?), and it takes advantage of an existing excess production
> > capability/inventory at the only US company currently building aircraft
of
> > that class--sounds like a good plan to me.
>
> Who says we need new airframes _right_ now? As we both agree, buying more
pods
> and converting more Rs to carry them is the best solution in the short
term to
> the navy/Allies problem, while converting Es to Rs _may_ be the best
solution
> for increasing our tanker force in a hurry. Or it may not be, butsince
the USAF
> never did an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA), we don't know.

Upgrading to R's does not do a great deal towards "increasing our tanker
force"--it instead is more of a "spend some money now to reduce O&M costs in
the long run, and keep the force from being *reduced* as E models break". Of
course, the 767 option does ptretty much the same thing--albeit with an even
greater reduction in operating costs, and a significantly better possibility
of future upgrades (at what point does it become impractical to keep trying
to modernize a 43 year old airframe?).

>
> > > > It is beyond argument that the E models are the anchormen when it
comes
> > to
> > > > MC rate (about 78% for the E models, versus 82% for the R models,
based
> > upon
> > > > GAO figures for May 2003). Without reengining, and taking them up to
the
> > R
> > > > standard, this MC rate difference will only grow--it drops below 75%
and
> > I'd
> > > > think the USAF leadership will really start to howl. Corrosion
> > maintenace is
> > > > another (growing) concern, and it will eat up more and more money as
we
> > try
> > > > to stretch out the E model's lifespan.
> > >
> > > The corrosion problem is apparently under control. See the URL above.
> > From
> > > what I recall of the GAO report, the O&M costs for the Es was
averaging
> > $4.6
> > > million a year vs. $3.7 million for the Rs
> >
> > That is an additional $130 million bucks each *year* in operating cost
(not
> > exactly chump-change...but even that is a "lowball" figure...). What
would
> > be the operating cost of the 767? Less than the 135R (two engines versus
> > four, better fuel economy, more maintenance friendly subsystems, less
> > likelihood of inspection-and-repair work, more stringent (and more
frequent)
> > inspections, etc.), that is for sure. So your operating cost per year
> > differential measured against the 767 is going to be greater. Add in the
> > cost of bringing those E's to a full PACER CRAIG R model level, and the
cost
> > is going to be significant, to say the least. Not a wise investment
plan,
> > IMO. If you managed your personal auto program in this manner, then you
>
> > would still be driving (only--no newer cars allowed) a 1960's era car,
and
> > one which you had paid to drop new engines in, along with paying to
modify
> > the emissions system to keep it in compliance (like the noise
requirements
> > the KC-135's face), and here in 2004 you would be saying that instead of
> > buying a new vehicle, you'd be better off paying to essentially
completely
> > rebuild the one you have and drop *another* new engine in it, along with
> > updating the other systems in the dash, maybe a new trannie to be
compatible
> > with that new engine, etc. I don't think you would endorse such a plan
(I
> > made the mistake once of trying to extend the life of a noble little
Nissan
> > pick-up at the 170K point by dropping a *used* engine in it, and that
was
> > *not* cheap--and I found that within 10K more miles I was *had* to break
> > down and buy a new vehicle).
>
> If most people maintained their cars the way that the military does its
tankers,
> and only drove them 1/10th as much as the average 'driver', then upgading
> themwith new componenets might well be the most cost effective solution
for the
> long-term. The numbers I have seen quoted for the E to R (plus Pacer
Crag)
> conversion vs. new 767 comparison imply that the conversion is indeed the
most
> cost-effective option, but without knowing every assumption made I'll
withhold
> judgement.

I don't buy that. My personal experience was in the more mundane area of
military trucks (we used various models in the combat engineer units). As a
company commander (late eighties/early nineties) I had dump trucks in my
unit that were manufactured in the late sixties and had pretty low mileage.
Somewhat like the KC-135 fleet, but a bit younger. Guess what? We still had
problems resulting from *age* (sometimes less use is not a *good* thing for
mechanical equipment, especially anything that has hydraulics), and we soon
(not long after I gave up command) faced a "train wreck" in terms of
supportability (the Army found it uneconomical to continue carrying the
spare parts inventory for the oldest trucks)--with no replacements
immediately available. Not unlike the situation facing the KC-135, IMO. If
the military services managed equipment like civilian entities do ( run it
to the point of best return in terms of depreciation, then unload it and buy
new equipment), the KC-135 would have been gone long ago, before corrosion
(among other factors) ever became a serious concern. That would be one
extreme, IMO--the other being what we are doing, in acting as if the KC-135
(or the B-52, for that matter) will be able to fly forever. We stretched the
KC's by doing the R conversion a few years back, when there was no option to
buy new airframes. Now there is an alternative to our continuing to slap
hundred-mile-an-hour tape on old equipment in hopes of keeping it viable
forever, and "carpe diem" would be an advisable course of action IMO. Again,
at what point do you stop tossing money into trying to keep the E models
viable, and instead commit that money to recapitalizing the fleet?

>
> > As to corrosion, in March 2003 the USAF's Deputy C/S for
> > Installations/Logistics testified before Congress: "Within the air
refueling
> > fleet, the KC-135E-models have experienced the most maintenance and
> > corrosion problems and are more costly to maintain. With an average
> > aircraft age of 43 years, the KC-135E fleet is the oldest combat weapon
> > system in the Air Force inventory. It is also the oldest large fleet of
> > heavy jet aircraft in aviation history...The second critical measurement
> > that defines aircraft life is physical age. In this fleet, corrosion is
a
> > function of age. Accurately predicting the extent of corrosion is
difficult
> > and this lack of predictability severely limits the ability to
efficiently
> > sustain aging fleets...the KC-135 is particularly challenging since its
> > 1950s design, materials, and construction did not consider corrosion
> > prevention measures...The most critical KC-135 tanker metric is age, and
the
> > most pressing KC-135 problems are corrosion and stress corrosion
> > cracking-both age related. Stress corrosion cracking is one of the most
> > difficult structural failures to predict." Are you saying that all of
these
> > problems have been solved since that date?
>
> Apparently they've been ameliorated to a considerable extent, so that this
is no
> longer a driving factor. And again, why is the E's corrosion problem
supposedly
> so much worse than the Rs, when they started from exactly the same
airframe?

Again, age and , I suspect, a pretty extensive (and comparitively costly)
IRAN process during the upgrade. Can we conquer the corrosion process in the
E model? No doubt we can--but would it be worth the cost of doing so for a
43 (or more) year old airframe?

>
> <snip old ground>
>
> > > One of the things I object to is the assumption, without any analysis,
> > that the
> > > 767 buy is essential (the DSB says it isn't),
> >
> > Well, the DSB also says the corrosion problem is something we can easily
> > discount,
>
> Actually, I believe what they said was that the facility responsible for
dealing
> with it has learned to handle it so well that they are able to do the work
much
> quicker and cheaper than expected. I can't find the quote, unfortunately,
but
> I'm still looking.

Hopefully this corrosion revelation came after the LTG quoted above gave his
testimony--a quick google on the subject did not give me any hits on sites
that indicate the corrosion problems are licked.

>
> > and has apparently decided that *outsourcing* the tanker mission,
> > or buying second-hand aircraft, is the way to go. Outsourcing may be
great
> > for the RAF, etc., but the USAF is another story, IMO. Then there is the
> > "spend the money on already used aircraft" approach--wonderful! As if
> > tossing more money down the O&M pit for the E model is not enough, we
should
> > take the money we have and buy older airframes than we can afford? (And
yes,
> > we can afford new tankers under the current deal being offered)
>
> They've said that it _may_ be the way to go, and:
>
> "The report by the Defense Science Board says that, contrary to Air Force
> claims, corrosion of the aging tanker fleet is "manageable" and several
> options exist to refurbish the fleet.

Manageable at what cost?! Ask the DSB members how many of them are driving
even twenty year old cars that they find economical to periodically strip,
inspect, repaint, and replace corroded parts as necessary--I'll bet it won't
be many, if any. That they are proposing outsourcing the tanker role seems
to me to be unrealistic for the USAF, and is indicative of a study probably
done by "experts"--not the flying kind, or the kind that even manage the
fliers, but the other kind (what we used to sarcastically define as, "an
expert is an SOB from out of town with a briefcase". Again, at what point do
you think it is unwise to keep dumping money down the tube in an effort to
keep the 135E viable, versus using that same money to help purchase new
airframes with lower operating costs and greater potential for future
upgrade?

>
> If officials are willing to tolerate increased maintenance costs, "you can
> defer major near-term . . . investments" to replace the tanker fleet, the
> report said.

Guy, that is a telling statement. I suspect the USAF folks are as afraid of
that statement as I would have been when I was on the green suit
side--because they know that when the money does get short, the first thing
that usually ends up getting cut (or really stre-e-e-e-tched) is usually the
O&M money. Those "increased maintenance costs" (for an aircraft that is
already the most expensive in its class, the E model?) represent an
increased chunk of a finite pool of O&M money. Not to sound like a broken
record, but at what point is enough enough, where you start using that money
to instead buy into newer, less costly (to operate and maintain) airframes?

>
> "There is no compelling material or financial reason to initiate a
> replacement program prior to the completion of" a lengthy analysis of
> alternatives and other studies, the report said. "

Hooray! "There is no compelling material or financial reason (of course,
you'll have to foget about that whole "increased maintenance costs" part of
what we just said), so like the bureaucrats we be, let's study it...and
study it...and analyze what we studied, and then study it some more...while
you guys keep paying out those "increased maintenance costs" you should be
oh-so-happy to "tolerate", not to mentioon having bitten the bullet and sunk
the requisite funds into belatedly upgrading the E models to R as (if?) you
secure the funding to do so..."?

>
> [Quoted from the Oregonian's Web page, May 13th. Sure will be nice when
we get
> access to the actual report, rather than summaries of it flitered through
the
> news media]
>
> > or that it's the most
> > > cost-effective solution (we don't know). Another thing that worries
me
> > about
> > > rushing into a 767 buy is that we'll be buying an a/c that is
essentially
> > out of
> > > production except for the USAF. The KC-135s were bought at the
opposite
> > > extreme. These a/c are going to last us at least 50 years, so spares
are
> > going
> > > to be a real problem down the road, as the commercial operators are
> > already
> > > starting to look for replacements. Italy and Japan won't have a
problem,
> > > because they're each only going to buy airframes in the single-digits
so
> > they'll
> > > be able to buy adequate spares from cannibalised airframes, but the
USAF
> > is
> > > talking about buying at least 100, possibly with more to come.
> >
> > The biggest things you have to buy spares for are the avionics (which
are
> > more plug-and-play than they were in the 135 era), and engine related
> > systems. There are a lot of 767's that will remain in service in the
> > civilian sector for decades to come--they will need spares too, and in
the
> > end they become another source for spares for the KC version. I don't
see
> > this as a deal-breaker.
>
> Given that airlines are already looking to replace their 767s ( a 20-year
old
> design, let's remember) with the next generation, and given that world oil
> production is predicted to peak sometime in the 2007 (the pessimists) --
2040
> (the optimists) period, considerably improved fuel consumption may well
drive
> the mass replacement of older a/c, just as the post 9/11 slump did. It's
> definitely an issue.

But you find the improved fuel consumption of the 767 versus the R models,
and especially the E models, to be a non-issue?

>
>
> > > When the 767 deal was first mooted, it was really the only
in-production
> > (US)
> > > a/c in the size class available in the proper time frame. That is no
> > longer the
> > > case, as the 7E7 will be entering service in 2008 (this is a
commercial
> > a/c, and
> > > unlike the military, missing production and/or performance guarantees
cost
> > the
> > > company big bucks). We need to see if it makes more sense to buy 7E7s
at
> > the
> > > _start_ of their production cycle, rather than 767s at the end of
theirs.
> > Which
> > > is better suited for the role?
> >
> > > Is the extra M0.05 in cruise a major advantage?
> >
> > Not likely.
>
> Depends on the specific mission, and more importantly, what percentage of
the
> mission spectrum does that particular mission occupy. There are missions
now
> where the faster KC-135 is better suited than a KC-767 would be, and
others
> where the latter comes out ahead.

Sorry, but I can't buy that the extra five one-hundredths mach is going to
be an issue either way.

>
> > > Does the higher composite content significantly decrease the corrosion
> > issues
> > > down the road?
> >
> > Maybe, but doubtfull, as corrosion awareness was better incorporated
into
> > the 767 manufacture than it was in the 135.
>
> And will be even more incorporated into the 7E7, especally since (AFAIK)
there
> is no corrosion of composites yet known.

But you have been claiming that corrosion is not a problem withthe 135 any
longer--now you want to use corrosion as a deciding point between the 767
and an aircraft that has yet to even fly, much less become available in a
tanker form?

>
> > > How about the 20% better fuel efficiency?
> >
> > Sounds good, but then again you have to examine the interval between the
> > time the 767 would be available and the (elsewhere not mentioned, AFAIK)
7E7
> > tanker version (expect what, a five or six year period at best before
the
> > first tanker 7E7 could be available?)...I'll be kind and use a five year
> > period, at 131 E models costing maybe $2 million each more per year in
> > operating costs than the 767, that works out to around $1.3 billion in
extra
> > operating costs? That is a hell of a lot of gas...
>
> Check out how much the KC-767 tankers cost.

You were talking gas, right? OK, lets be more realistic and say that if we
canned the 767 proposal and started from scratch, we'd likely not see a new
tanker enter the inventory until 2011 or so. That would be six years to the
*start* of replacing the E models. Of course, that pretty much forces you
into converting those to R's--GAO estimates the cost for that to be some
$3.6 billion. If we work *really fast* to do that, we can maybe get it done
over about a four year period, so for the last two years of that period up
to 2011 we can use the cheaper O&M cost of the R model ($3.7 million per
year per aircraft) which is (we'll assume, based upon KC-10 operating costs,
which would likely be a bit more than the 767) maybe $1.5 mil per year
greater than the 767 cost. Two years times 131 aircraft times $1.5 mil is
about $400 mil. Of course, we have that earlier period (four years)when the
E's (or the ever decreasing number remaining of them as they undergo upgrade
to R) are still flying as is, and that would add maybe another $600 mil. Say
a billion bucks total versus the operating cost of the 767's (yeah, I know
we would not get all of the 767's delivered in lump sum, but I am trying to
keep this simple and fair as well, so I am not going to figure the post-2011
additional operating cost of the 135R's versus 767 into the mix to try and
keep things even). That is a total of $4.6 billion you have just dumped into
keeping the 135E's flying just until 2011. At $200 mil per 767, that is the
equivalent of some 23 new 767's right there--over half of what the USAF is
asking for in the first lot. If you go the lease route with the first forty
tankers, you could cover a significant part of the overall lease cost with
that money. And you are getting an aircraft that carries more fuel to boot.

>
> >
> >
> > Respective runway and
> > > ramp space requirements? PFI vs. military? Etc.
> >
> > Lose the outsourcing option from the get-go, IMO. Won't work for an
> > organization with the scope of tanking requirements that the USAF has.
>
> Perhaps yes, perhaps no. Air bridge and training tanking doesn't require
> military crewing. It's certainly an option worth looking at for at least
some
> tanking requirements, if not all.

I am not crazy about the idea of having a portion of the tanker force
unavailable for use in the T/O (and no, this is not the same as my below
posit regarding using the 767's for these roles--those 767's could just as
well extend to the T/O where they provide full capacity tanking to USAF
assets, even with their (initially) marginal USN tanking support
capability).

>
> <snip lead-in, about fewer a/c to provide the same number of drogues>
>
> > > > That does not necessarily hold true. If the requirement to provide
> > > > hose/drogue capability in-theater is 8that* important in a given
case,
> > you
> > > > send the KC-10's and multi-point 135R's forward, and use the other
> > aircraft
> > > > (i.e., these pre-improvement 767's) to handle the usual airbridge
> > su[pport
> > > > operations into the theater.
> > >
> > > I think KC-10s are too important as deployment tankers early on in a
> > conflict to
> > > use them in the tactical role. After all, that's what we bought them
for,
> > > precisely so we could get to the Middle East from the US non-stop, if
we
> > were
> > > refused landing/overflight rights. Let's face it - being on good
terms
> > with
> > > Portugal (Lajes) and Spain (Moron) has become more important to us
than
> > ever.
> > > Besides, KC-10s take up a lot of space, and need stronger runways than
> > 135s or
> > > 767s (don't know how the 7E7 stacks up), which may limit its
deployment
> > options.
> >
> > I said, "If the requirement to provide hose/drogue capability in-theater
is
> > *that* important". We have the capability of providing substantial
> > hose/drogue capability if we have to--if we really need more, then buy
more
> > kits for the existing R's. No matter how you cut it, the decision to not
> > initially provide multi-point capability in the first forty 767's is not
> > going to be a critical, or even serious, failure in terms of our
operational
> > capability.
>
> We agree that buying more kits for the Rs and/or modifying more than 45 Rs
to
> use them is probably the best idea in the short-term.
>
> > > > So what you really seem to be saying is that
> > > > the 767's, even without initial multi-point capability, offer an
> > improvement
> > > > to the current level of support that can be afforded to the USN?
> > >
> > > Yes, they do, but the question remains, are 767s rather than upgraded
Es
> > and
> > > later 7E7s the best way to go; what's the best mix, what % of tankers
> > need to
> > > do which roles, how will the advent of UCAVs affect the need for
tankers
> > and the
> > > type mix, what effect will USAF F-35 buys have, etc. This needs to be
> > properly
> > > studied.
> >
> > Again with the neverending studies? :-)
>
> What never-ending study? The USAF failed to do such a study in the first
place,
> especially an AoA. The latter was predicted to take about 18 months, but
the
> head of AQ&L (Wynne) says they'll probably push it and complete it by
December
> or so.

I was referring to your DSB folks..."studies" was the term they used. As in
"more than one".

>
> <snip lead-in about buying multidrogue capability up front rather than
adding it
> later>
>
> > > > Whoah there, hoss. If the R&D is being picked up elsewhere (by
virtue of
> > > > those foreign sales you mention), that advantage does not go away
> > because we
> > > > dicide not to implement the multi-point system up-front. That R&D
effort
> > is
> > > > still applicable. And you are avoiding the fact that it will slow
the
> > > > delivery timeline if we have to go with this optimization up-front.
> > >
> > > I'm aware that the R&D will still apply, I'm worried about the
materiel
> > costs,
> > > which are only going to go up. If we need the capability, then let's
just
> > buy
> > > it and get the purchase out of the way, instead of paying inflated
prices
> > later.
> >
> > Even if it delays entry further, meaning you are also going to be paying
> > that higher O&M cost for the remaining E's even longer...?
>
> If that allows us to make a better decision for the long term, sure. We
can get
> upgraded Es (Pacer Crag Rs) into service faster than we can get 767s.

And pay some $3.6 billion for the privaledge of then having the longest
serving remaining KC-135's committed to an even longer period of service.
IMO, not a wise course of action--only to be used if the 767 deal gets
trashed due to both Boeing's stupid handling of what should have been a done
deal by now and the involvement of politicos-with-axes-to-grind, like
McCain. IMO, if that is the way it plays out, we will see the conversion to
R's, then a mindset of, "What? You want a *new* tanker, after we just sank
all of that money into upgrading those last E models? Maybe next year we
might authorize a *study*..." set in, leaving the USAF in the lurch with an
open-ended KC-135 tanker force, and the BUFF's being replaced before they
are.

>
> > > > If that means we buy a/c at a slower
> > > > > rate (and more refueling pods), good.
> > > >
> > > > Good? I disagree. So does the USAF, from what I have read.
> > >
> > > The DSB doesn't, and Rumsfeld said that he was waiting on a couple of
> > reports,
> > > including theirs, before making a decision.
> >
> > I am not as impressed with the summary of the DSB report as you are (but
> > then again, I tend to weigh the advice of the folks actually tasked to
fly
> > the missions a bit more than I do the DSB, GAO, etc).
>
> Seeing as how the DSB works for the Pentagon, and Rumsfeld is the guy who
tasked
> them to do the study back in February, I put a bit more weight on their
advice
> than you do. Especially since opponents of the 767 deal (McCain to
thefront)
> believed that the DSB was much too cosy with the military and Boeing (the
DSB
> Chairman had to recuse himself because he was also a paid Boeing
consultant and
> had been mentioned in internal company e-mails back in Dec.2002/Jan. 2003
as
> willing to help push the deal), and fully expected them to support it. I
> believe McCain's words were something along the lines of a "fox guarding
the
> chickens." So yeah, when even they come out and say they that we've got
time to
> do the study and the corrosion is manageable, I'm inclined to believe
them.

Then we will have to agree to disagree on this point.

>
> > > > We plan to be operating from more austere
> > > > > bases, which tend to be somewhat limited in ramp space, so
anything we
> > can
> > > > do
> > > > > that limits that is a plus. That was indeed one of the USAF's
> > arguments
> > > > against
> > > > > the A330 -- that it took up too much ramp space while providing
no
> > more
> > > > > refueling stations than the 767. They considered the A330's
somewhat
> > > > greater
> > > > > offload irrelevant for the tactical refueling mission; they were
> > concerned
> > > > with
> > > > > the number of booms/drogues on station while minimizing the ground
> > > > footprint. If
> > > > > that logic is valid, then buying dual rather than single-point
> > capability
> > > > is
> > > > > even more valuable as a way of minimizing the ground footprint.
See
> > > > below.
> > > >
> > > > In the long run, yes. But is it worth slowing delivery up-front even
> > further
> > > > than it already has been slowed?
> > >
> > > According to the DSB, we have the time.
> >
> > The DSB that claims, contrary to what the USAF LTG testified last year,
that
> > the corrosion problem is readily in-hand...?
>
> the DSB's claim is based on the USAF unit doing the corrosion controls
data,
> let's remember. The situation isn't static, and they've gotten better at
it
> since last year.

You left out that whole "tolerate higher maintenance cost" part of the DSB's
corrosion solution--I don't think that is a "minor" part of the equation
here, though the DSB apparently does given the off-hand way they worded that
statement.

>
> > And thinks out-sourcing tanker
> > requirements is a fine idea?
>
> They're saying it's a viable option, it should be looked at in an AoA, and
we've
> got the time to do so. No more, no less.

If you "tolerate higher maintenance costs" you have that time.

>
> > I am not buying into either, at this point.
>
> Until the AoA is actually done, we have nothing to base a decision on
other than
> "because I think so," which IMO is a pretty poor way to spend billions of
> dollars.

DSB did not say they *thought* keeping the E models would be more expensive
than what we are already paying--they said we would have to tolerate higher
maintenance costs, period, while the "studies" (plural) take place.

>
> <snip>
>
> > > > But they oddly don't have a problem with the USMC buying C-130J's to
> > augment
> > > > their current tanker fleet.
> > >
> > > Of course not, because a KC-130 (any flavor) clearly isn't a
replacement
> > for a
> > > jet tanker. It meets USMC needs for a STOL tanker/transport that can
also
> > > refuel helos (AFSOC too), and for countries that also operate C-130s
it's
> > a
> > > relatively cheap, easy way to get some A/A tanking capability; it's
> > certainly
> > > better than nothing, as Argentina can attest. But it's a relatively
> > inefficient
> > > tanker for fast jets, lacking range, speed, cruise altitude, and
offload
> > > capability.
> >
> > I remain unconvinced that AMC would throw a hissy fit if the USN wanted
to
> > include a secondary tanking capability to its C-40B's.
>
> More likely, they'd suffer a rupture from laughing at the USN devoting
such a
> large proportion of its budget to paying the NRE for so few a/c of such
limited
> performance (as tankers).

Then the critical USN "requirement" that led off this thread...must be more
of a "desire" than it is a "requirement".

>
> > > > Personally, I doubt the USAF would have put up a
> > > > fight if the USN had said they wanted to incorporate a secondary
> > refueling
> > > > capability in their C-40B's; just as the USN has been strangely
silent
> > over
> > > > the USAF talking about recreating an in-house stand-off jamming
> > capability.
> > >
> > > There is no way in hell that the USN would pay the R&D NRE for a
tanker
> > mod for
> > > their C-40s, with all their other needs.
> >
> > Exactly. So the lack of multi-point refuelers must not be such a
critical
> > one, eh?
>
> Since no one else is even considering buying 737s as tankers, and the navy
is
> only buying a few (somewhere between 5 and 8, as best I can tell), the
navy
> would have to be nuts to make that kind of investment for so few a/c, even
> assuming that they would be reasonable tankers. Given their limited
> payload/range and performance, I have my doubts they would be, but it's
moot.

They (C-40A--I goofed with the "B", which is one of the USAF models) are
replacing the C-9 in the USN; from what I gather, the plan is to replace 27
C-9's, and I doubt that 8 C-40's can do that. I read where one of the
military lobbying groups noted that the CNO wants to procure three per year
(unspecified total delivery). I am not sure the 737 would make a superior
tanker, either--my point was more in the line of, "If the USN is *really*
worried about tanking capability for its aircraft, why have they not moved
to increase their own in-house capability beyond buddy tanking and C-130's,
especially when they have recently begun procuring a new dedicated land
based logistics support aircraft?" In other words, this a BIG priority for
them--as long as somebody else is footing the bill, that is. Otherwise, the
priority seems to be somwhere down in the weeds...

>
> <fuel to forward bases>
>
> > > > As to fuel availability, I was referring to the ready availability
of
> > the
> > > > JP-8 in bulk form--and it won't necessarily be there (always) in the
> > > > quantity you want at those "remote" bases you refer to unless we
haul it
> > in
> > > > ourselves.
> > >
> > > JP-5 presumably, if they're refueling navy a/c that are operating from
> > CVs. At
> > > least, that's my understanding, but maybe some of the KC-135 people
here
> > can
> > > comment.
> >
> > I thought we had standardized on JP-8 across the force--ISTR this came
up
> > before, but I can't remember the final outcome.
>
> I believe either here or on s.m.n. someone stated that a/c couldn't be
struck
> below if they;d beenfueledwith JP-8, until they had been refueled several
times
> with JP-5. For land ops (training) the navy has gone to JP-8.
>
> > Regardless, be it JP-5 or
> > JP-8, you can't count on it being available in a remote operating
location,
> > in the volume required, unless you plan on being able to haul it in
> > yourself.
>
> Sure, which is why you'll need a tanker (the ship variety).
>
> > > > Usually meaning by ship. A second ship can haul quite a few
> > > > pieces of ordnance, right?
> > >
> > > Sure, but getting fuel to an airfield is relatively easy (pipelines);
> > moving
> > > ordnance tends to require a lot more handling and surface transport.
> >
> > Lots of trucks available for lease out there in the world, even in a lot
of
> > "remote" areas (any remote are having a pipeline capability likely has a
> > decent truck inventory available in the general area)--or you could use
a
> > transportation company (60 line haul tractors and 120 40-ton trailers)
from
> > the Army (one of our TC companies that was attached to my old BN HHD did
> > exactly that to support B-52 operations out of Saudi Arabia during ODS).
If
> > none of this is doable in your opinion, then IMO you have just shot your
> > "gotta have multi-point capability" in the foot as well, since it would
mean
> > that we can't plan on being able to operate the tankers within range of
the
> > receivers in the first place.
>
> Moving ordnance by truck requires offload from ships and lots of handling
> equipment (Ro-Ro helps here), whereas every airfield of adequate size to
handle
> a jet tanker will already have a fuel delivery system in place. We'd only
need
> (assuming it's not a military field) to supply the fuel, not the delivery
> system. Even assuming that the logistic infrastructure exists to move the
> ordnance, it's still relatively slow, and requires a lot more
organizational
> effort to get things going than just pulling a tanker up to a pipeline
terminal
> and starting to pump.
>
> > > > If you are tied to getting basic resources into
> > > > the TO, you might as well be "in for a penny, in for a pound". And
yes,
> > the
> > > > use of PGM's has resulted in a drastic reduction in the volume of
> > ordnance
> > > > that has to be transported into the TO (ISTR Franks noting that
during
> > OEF
> > > > we were effectively engaging as many targets per day as we did
during
> > ODS,
> > > > with about 10% of the average daily sortie rate compared to the
earlier
> > > > conflict). As we move towards use of the 500 pound JDAM, and even
moreso
> > the
> > > > SDB, the need for ordnance (in terms of volume/weight) will shrivel
even
> > > > further.
> > >
> > > PGMs certainly help, but the problem is the variety of A/G ordnance
that
> > may be
> > > required. A/A, there's two types of missiles and gun ammo. A/G, even
> > with PGMs
> > > there's lots of different kinds, and the usage rates are far higher.
> >
> > I'd think if we have the ability to provide both categories of support
> > within the confines of a CVN and supporting TAKO (isn't that the
acronym?)
>
> > for the assualt predicated, we also have the ability of transporting the
> > same quantity of fuel and ammo to an airfield on dry land.
>
> In what time frame, and why would you want to move them again, when the CV
> already has the infrastructure in place, lacking only sufficient tankers
to
> reach the targets? Down the road, sure we can start to bring in ordnance
for
> land-based air, but early in a conflict we've usually got the navy plus
long
> range USAF assets.
>
> > The increasing
> > use of PGM's even makes it a realistic option to deliver ordnance to the
> > base by air--something that was unrealistic in the dumb-bomb age
(witness
> > the poor ability to do so over The Hump for the B-29's trying to operate
out
> > of China during WWII).
>
> They certainly allow us to start some level of sustained ops sooner, but
we'll
> need ship-transported ordnance quantities if we're having to deal with
major
> attacks.
>
> <snip>
>
> > > > I'd posit that using the basing options we already have in-hand
(Guam,
> > Diego
> > > > Garcia, Fairford, and CONUS), the B-1, B-52, and B-2 can acheive
this
> > pretty
> > > > much anywhere in the world *now*.
> > >
> > > In that case, let's dump the fighters altogether ;-)
> >
> > No, but consider maybe the option of letting the CVN provide only the
> > fighter and EW support (both requiring less tanking support than if they
had
> > to provide the complete strike package), and you acheive even greater
> > tonnage of ordnance delivered per strike, and reduce that hose/drogue
> > requirement to boot... :-)
>
> Certainly worth looking at, although the navy might object to having to
convert
> all their shiny new F-18Fs to F-18Gs already;-)
>
> <snip>
>
> > As I have said a couple of times, I
> > do
> > > > see a use for the CVN's--but barking that they just *have* to have
every
> > > > tanker in the USAF at their beck-and-call does not do much to
support
> > the
> > > > argument that they are such a critical resource, does it?
> > >
> > > No one (or at least, not I) is claiming that they every USAF tanker
has to
> > be
> > > available to support the USN, but clearly, an increase is required.
IIRR,
> > the
> > > GAO report stated we used 150 KC-135s in OAF and OIF; given the large
> > percentage
> > > of USN/Marine plus allied sorties in both of those ops, having at best
> > only 40
> > > KC-135s with dual point drogues seems to be inadequate.However, if the
> > tanker
> > > requirements study says we don't need more, I'll accept it, but the
study
> > needs
> > > to be _done_.
> >
> > Then your cheapest, and quickest, solution goes back to merely buying
more
> > multi-point kits for use by additional 135R's.
>
> And I've already said that I'm in agreement with this, especially so we
can look
> at if we even need the KC-767 vs. some other option. We apparently have
33
> drogue kits for 45 KC-135Rs, so upping the number of kits to more closely
> approximate the KC-135R MC rate, rather than the .73 rate indicated by the
> above, should certainly be looked at for starters. Converting some Es to
Rs and
> adding the drogue kits at the same time won't take any Rs out of service.
>
> <snip>
>
> > > > And are getting ready to relocate our NATO-assigned assets further
east,
> > > > too, to places like maybe Hungary and Rumania, etc. In the Pacific
we
> > have
> > > > Guam, the ROK bases, Okinawa. Diego Garcia in the IO is the one that
is
> > > > truly the most limited in terms of ramp space, but the bases in
> > the -stans
> > > > you mention make it a bit less critical than has been the case in
the
> > past.
> > >
> > > The $64 million question being whether those bases will be available
to us
> > when
> > > we need them. Last I checked there'll all in muslim countries with
> > regimes that
> > > are more or less unstable. Given our current unpopularity in the
muslim
> > world,
> > > I don't think we should count on such bases being available.
> >
> > Then we adjust, and we have the CVN's as insurance--with those
additional
> > modified R models, if needed.
>
> Agreed that more Rs is likely the best answer in the short run.
>
> <snip>
>
> > > > > Provided we have sufficient space for all those tanker a/c in
theater,
> > > > fine, but
> > > > > it's still wasteful to use two a/c and crews to do the job of one.
Of
> > > > course,
> > > > > if you're cycling flights of two constantly through the tankers,
no
> > big
> > > > deal,
> > > > > but gorilla packages are another matter. And we may well need to
help
> > > > tank our
> > > > > allies (assuming we have any). Many of them are buying their own
> > > > multi-point
> > > > > drogue tankers now, which helps both of us if they're along for
the
> > ride.
> > > >
> > > > That last bit is true. But I think you may be forgetting that during
> > > > contingency operations we tend to have to operate a number of tanker
> > tracks
> > > > a long way from the TO (i.e., the Atlantic air-bridge, or a Pacific
> > version,
> > > > depending upon where the TO is), so those 767's could be a major
> > contributor
> > > > without even having to enter the local airspace. The real issue is
how
> > long
> > > > we can drag out the 135E fleet; there are 131 of them remaining in
> > service
> > > > now, with engines that were stripped from old commercial transports
some
> > > > fifteen or twenty years ago as an "interim" fix, corrosion concerns,
and
> > > > obscelescent avionics. Their MC rate can only really continue to
drop,
> > which
> > > > is why yes, we can replace 131 aircraft with 100 newer aircraft and
come
> > out
> > > > in pretty good shape.
> > >
> > > Or it might make sense to upgrade them all to 135R/Pacer Crag; I read
one
> > quote
> > > somewhere of the cost savings going that route compared to the 767
uy --
> > AIR
> > > it was a couple of billion dollars over the life of the deal. But
that
> > all
> > > needs to be studied so we know.
> >
> > Argh! More study?
>
> No, the same one that the USAF shoud have done back in 2001, but didn't.
>
> > Hell, just go ahead and plunk down the money and make them
> > all R's--we'll continue to pay the higher operating cost (even the R is
> > going to cost more to operate than the 767) for the next forty
years--unless
> > wings start falling off, or the operating budget gets cut (not like that
has
> > not happened, and rather recently (1990's) too), etc. Personally, I
don't
> > see that as the best option.
>
> I'm sure the operating cost will be higher, but then the purchase cost is
a hell
> of a lot lower. Fuel burn between a 135R and a KC-767's probably a wash;
> CFM-56s in one and CF6s in the other, with the total thrust higher in the
case
> of the CF6s.
>
> Guy
>

[Guy Alcala]

Kevin Brooks wrote:

> "Guy Alcala" > wrote in message
> . ..
> > Kevin Brooks wrote:
> >
> > > "Guy Alcala" > wrote in message
> > > .. .
> > > > Sorry for the delayed reply -- it's been a busy week.
> > > >
> > > > Kevin Brooks wrote:

<snip corrosion lead-in>

> > > You are forgetting the corrosion problems with the E models--corrosion
> tends
> > > to reduce fatigue life, too, IIRC from my long-ago materials science
> > > classes...
> >
> > Corrosion is an issue with any a/c -- certainly the KC-135Rs as well,
> which
> > (after all) were 135As before, just as the Es were.
> >
> > > It sounds to me like the only way you are going to get that long
> > > a life from the E's would be if you also replaced some structural
> components
> > > (meaning you are going even further than the old R model mods, IIRC).
> >
> > Why is corrosion and fatigue on the Es supposedly so much more serious
> than the
> > Rs, when they all started out as 135As?
>
> I'd assume they are both going to exhibit corrosion problems, but didn't the
> R's go through a significant IRAN as part of their upgrade?

Not that I can find, but that's not definitive. Boeing replaced the lower wing
skinsof 746 C/KC-135s, but that seems to have been applied to all models in
service. All I can figure is that the old nacelles and struts (from 707s) may be
causing the difference, which would go away if they were upgraded to Rs (which
get new struts and nacelles as well as engines).

> The USAF, per
> those comments from the three-star last year, seems most concerned with the
> E's.

See above, or possibly just because the Es were less effective than the Rs, so
sure, say they're falling apart because of corrosion so we can buy new a/c.
You've got to come up with some justification.

<snip>

> > > Wait a second--spend *more* money on trying to upgrade E's, while doing
> > > *another* study to determine if/when/how we replace the E's?
> >
> > What do you mean, _trying_ to upgrade the Es? We know perfectly well how
> to
> > upgrade them -we've got 400+ prototypes in service, after all, with the
> R&D all
> > paid for.
>
> No, no, no--that was not what I meant. My point is that at this point
> tossing *more* money into the upgrade of the E models seems a bit
> shortsighted, when that same money (along with the savings accrued from
> cheaper operating costs) could go towards purchasing new-build airframes. We
> did not have that option (or the money to make it happen) available back
> when the original R program started--we do now.

Actually, we don't have the money at the moment, which is why the whole lease
thing was suggested. But look at it another way -- might it make more sense to
upgrade some/all Es to Rs at far lower cost than than buying 767s, while we
perhaps decide to skip the 767 generation entirely and buy either a 7E7 tanker,
or even a BWB one around 2015 or so, if the latter a/c is more suitable in the
long term? Considering the difference in cost between upgrading an E to a Pacer
Crag R vs. buying new KC-767s, it's going to take a considerable time (a couple
of decades, I imagine) for the O&M cost advantage of the latter to overcome
purchase cost advantageof the former, assuming that it ever does (at least one
source claims that it won't).

> > > That sounds
> > > like a fine...bureaucratic solution? Even the GAO was saying in the
> 1990's
> > > that the USAF needed to get off its duff and start planning the
> replacement
> > > of the KC-135E fleet.
> >
> > Sure. It didn't say what to replace them with.
>
> Nope. The USAF has said what they want to replace them with--you have no
> trust in the USAF?

The USAF said what it wanted to replace them with in 2001, when they had no
other US choice, and still haven't justified the _need_ to replace them now, vs.
other options. The assumptions have changed, as has the situation.

> > > Studies are great--unfortunately, they have a tendancy
> > > of becoming an ends-unto-themselves. We have a good proposal that the
> USAF
> > > has supported--it puts new airframes into the mission much more quickly
> than
> > > if we follow the "usual" method of purchasing new aircraft (of course,
> you
> > > could use the F/A-22 or F-35 model...which would mean if we started that
> new
> > > study right now, we might plan on seeing some new tankers around
> what...2015
> > > at best?), and it takes advantage of an existing excess production
> > > capability/inventory at the only US company currently building aircraft
> of
> > > that class--sounds like a good plan to me.
> >
> > Who says we need new airframes _right_ now? As we both agree, buying more
> pods
> > and converting more Rs to carry them is the best solution in the short
> term to
> > the navy/Allies problem, while converting Es to Rs _may_ be the best
> solution
> > for increasing our tanker force in a hurry. Or it may not be, butsince
> the USAF
> > never did an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA), we don't know.
>
> Upgrading to R's does not do a great deal towards "increasing our tanker
> force"--it instead is more of a "spend some money now to reduce O&M costs in
> the long run, and keep the force from being *reduced* as E models break". Of
> course, the 767 option does ptretty much the same thing--albeit with an even
> greater reduction in operating costs, and a significantly better possibility
> of future upgrades (at what point does it become impractical to keep trying
> to modernize a 43 year old airframe?).

You'd better ask Bufdrvr (or the Air Force) about that one;-) However, I
disagree with your premise - upgrading Es to Rs does indeed increase our tanker
force, both by improving MC rates, and by increasing offload and reducing runway
length requirements, just as the KC-767 would. The E is restricted by lack of
thrust in the amount of fuel it can lift off many runways, compared to the R or
a 767 (Boeing claims the 767 can lift the same fuel load from a 4,000 foot
shorter runway). The A model was even worse, of course, being essentially
useless during DS from most runways in the middle east. Hot and/or high has
become pretty typical for us, so tankers that have trouble operating from such
fields are essentially operationally useless (which is what the USAF general
claiming that we needed the 767 to replace the Es said).

<snip>

> > > > The corrosion problem is apparently under control. See the URL above.
> > > From
> > > > what I recall of the GAO report, the O&M costs for the Es was
> averaging
> > > $4.6
> > > > million a year vs. $3.7 million for the Rs
> > >
> > > That is an additional $130 million bucks each *year* in operating cost
> (not
> > > exactly chump-change...but even that is a "lowball" figure...). What
> would
> > > be the operating cost of the 767? Less than the 135R (two engines versus
> > > four, better fuel economy, more maintenance friendly subsystems, less
> > > likelihood of inspection-and-repair work, more stringent (and more
> frequent)
> > > inspections, etc.), that is for sure. So your operating cost per year
> > > differential measured against the 767 is going to be greater. Add in the
> > > cost of bringing those E's to a full PACER CRAIG R model level, and the
> cost
> > > is going to be significant, to say the least. Not a wise investment
> plan,
> > > IMO. If you managed your personal auto program in this manner, then you
> >
> > > would still be driving (only--no newer cars allowed) a 1960's era car,
> and
> > > one which you had paid to drop new engines in, along with paying to
> modify
> > > the emissions system to keep it in compliance (like the noise
> requirements
> > > the KC-135's face), and here in 2004 you would be saying that instead of
> > > buying a new vehicle, you'd be better off paying to essentially
> completely
> > > rebuild the one you have and drop *another* new engine in it, along with
> > > updating the other systems in the dash, maybe a new trannie to be
> compatible
> > > with that new engine, etc. I don't think you would endorse such a plan
> (I
> > > made the mistake once of trying to extend the life of a noble little
> Nissan
> > > pick-up at the 170K point by dropping a *used* engine in it, and that
> was
> > > *not* cheap--and I found that within 10K more miles I was *had* to break
> > > down and buy a new vehicle).
> >
> > If most people maintained their cars the way that the military does its
> tankers,
> > and only drove them 1/10th as much as the average 'driver', then upgading
> > themwith new componenets might well be the most cost effective solution
> for the
> > long-term. The numbers I have seen quoted for the E to R (plus Pacer
> Crag)
> > conversion vs. new 767 comparison imply that the conversion is indeed the
> most
> > cost-effective option, but without knowing every assumption made I'll
> withhold
> > judgement.
>
> I don't buy that. My personal experience was in the more mundane area of
> military trucks (we used various models in the combat engineer units). As a
> company commander (late eighties/early nineties) I had dump trucks in my
> unit that were manufactured in the late sixties and had pretty low mileage.
> Somewhat like the KC-135 fleet, but a bit younger. Guess what? We still had
> problems resulting from *age* (sometimes less use is not a *good* thing for
> mechanical equipment, especially anything that has hydraulics), and we soon
> (not long after I gave up command) faced a "train wreck" in terms of
> supportability (the Army found it uneconomical to continue carrying the
> spare parts inventory for the oldest trucks)--with no replacements
> immediately available. Not unlike the situation facing the KC-135, IMO. If
> the military services managed equipment like civilian entities do ( run it
> to the point of best return in terms of depreciation, then unload it and buy
> new equipment), the KC-135 would have been gone long ago, before corrosion
> (among other factors) ever became a serious concern.

I agree that too little use can sometimes be almost as bad as too much. By
that logic, then, you're recommending that the Air Force have fewer tankers but
fly them more, so let's just stick with the Rs we have and fly them till their
wings fall off, then buy all new in 15 years or so. By that point the
procurement bow wave of the F-22 and F-35 should have died down freeing up some
money, and who knows, we may not even need conventional tankers by then.

> That would be one
> extreme, IMO--the other being what we are doing, in acting as if the KC-135
> (or the B-52, for that matter) will be able to fly forever.

No doubt they'd be chasing the DC-3s that are still in commercial service ;-)

> We stretched the
> KC's by doing the R conversion a few years back, when there was no option to
> buy new airframes. Now there is an alternative to our continuing to slap
> hundred-mile-an-hour tape on old equipment in hopes of keeping it viable
> forever, and "carpe diem" would be an advisable course of action IMO. Again,
> at what point do you stop tossing money into trying to keep the E models
> viable, and instead commit that money to recapitalizing the fleet?

I agree that the Es aren't particularly viable per se, but for operational not
cost reasons, so let's make them Rs and see what we want to _buy_ (if that makes
the most sense) when we can afford to.

<snip>

> The most critical KC-135 tanker metric is age, and
> the
> > > most pressing KC-135 problems are corrosion and stress corrosion
> > > cracking-both age related. Stress corrosion cracking is one of the most
> > > difficult structural failures to predict." Are you saying that all of
> these
> > > problems have been solved since that date?
> >
> > Apparently they've been ameliorated to a considerable extent, so that this
> is no
> > longer a driving factor. And again, why is the E's corrosion problem
> supposedly
> > so much worse than the Rs, when they started from exactly the same
> airframe?
>
> Again, age and , I suspect, a pretty extensive (and comparitively costly)
> IRAN process during the upgrade. Can we conquer the corrosion process in the
> E model? No doubt we can--but would it be worth the cost of doing so for a
> 43 (or more) year old airframe?

If it's worth it for the 42 year-old Rs, then it's worth it for the 43 year old
Es, at least if we make them Rs. I don't hear the USAF complaining about the
Rs, so the corrosion issues would seem to be due to the different engines plus
the slight difference due to age.

> > <snip old ground>
> >
> > > > One of the things I object to is the assumption, without any analysis,
> > > that the
> > > > 767 buy is essential (the DSB says it isn't),
> > >
> > > Well, the DSB also says the corrosion problem is something we can easily
> > > discount,
> >
> > Actually, I believe what they said was that the facility responsible for
> dealing
> > with it has learned to handle it so well that they are able to do the work
> much
> > quicker and cheaper than expected. I can't find the quote, unfortunately,
> but
> > I'm still looking.
>
> Hopefully this corrosion revelation came after the LTG quoted above gave his
> testimony--a quick google on the subject did not give me any hits on sites
> that indicate the corrosion problems are licked.

The DSB only began their study in February of this year, so yeah, their data is
recent. I'll keep trying to find the quote, or else hopefully the actual report
will get put up soon.

> > > and has apparently decided that *outsourcing* the tanker mission,
> > > or buying second-hand aircraft, is the way to go. Outsourcing may be
> great
> > > for the RAF, etc., but the USAF is another story, IMO. Then there is the
> > > "spend the money on already used aircraft" approach--wonderful! As if
> > > tossing more money down the O&M pit for the E model is not enough, we
> should
> > > take the money we have and buy older airframes than we can afford? (And
> yes,
> > > we can afford new tankers under the current deal being offered)
> >
> > They've said that it _may_ be the way to go, and:
> >
> > "The report by the Defense Science Board says that, contrary to Air Force
> > claims, corrosion of the aging tanker fleet is "manageable" and several
> > options exist to refurbish the fleet.
>
> Manageable at what cost?! Ask the DSB members how many of them are driving
> even twenty year old cars that they find economical to periodically strip,
> inspect, repaint, and replace corroded parts as necessary--I'll bet it won't
> be many, if any. That they are proposing outsourcing the tanker role seems
> to me to be unrealistic for the USAF, and is indicative of a study probably
> done by "experts"--not the flying kind, or the kind that even manage the
> fliers, but the other kind (what we used to sarcastically define as, "an
> expert is an SOB from out of town with a briefcase". Again, at what point do
> you think it is unwise to keep dumping money down the tube in an effort to
> keep the 135E viable, versus using that same money to help purchase new
> airframes with lower operating costs and greater potential for future
> upgrade?

When its no longer the most cost-effective option which achieves the operational
goals, just like any such choice should be made. I've owned four cars in my
life, a '65 Chevy Impala bought new by my Dad, and still running great on the
original engine 23 years later with 240,000 miles on it when I sold it, as no
longer meeting my 'operational' needs; a '69 Datsun 2000 roadster which I bought
used in '78 and drove for several years because it was fun, but not worth the
money (by me) to fix up; an '88 Subaru 4Wd wagon bought new (which replaced the
Chevy), which lasted me for 14 years and which I'd still be happily driving now
if it hadn't been stolen, and my current car (another Subaru), which I'll drive
until it no longer meets my needs or becomes so unreliable to operate that its
more trouble than it's worth, and there's something new that's so much better
that it's worth laying out the money upfront. In short, I expect to get 20 or
more years out of a car. Now, I drive far less than the average driver, and
most of the miles I put on are easy ones on the interstate rather than stop and
go commuting (kind of like the Air Force's tankers), so such lifespans can be
expected.

> > If officials are willing to tolerate increased maintenance costs, "you can
> > defer major near-term . . . investments" to replace the tanker fleet, the
> > report said.
>
> Guy, that is a telling statement. I suspect the USAF folks are as afraid of
> that statement as I would have been when I was on the green suit
> side--because they know that when the money does get short, the first thing
> that usually ends up getting cut (or really stre-e-e-e-tched) is usually the
> O&M money. Those "increased maintenance costs" (for an aircraft that is
> already the most expensive in its class, the E model?) represent an
> increased chunk of a finite pool of O&M money. Not to sound like a broken
> record, but at what point is enough enough, where you start using that money
> to instead buy into newer, less costly (to operate and maintain) airframes?

See above, and after you've done a proper Analysis of Alternatives to see just
what the most cost-effective solution is, which is what the DSB says we have
time for. They're not saying you can go on forever, they're saying we don't
have to rush out and buy a new 'car' tomorrow; we've got the time to study
Consumer Reports as well as Car and Driver, go to Edmunds.com, take some test
drives, figure out what our needs really are (as opposed to what we'd like to
have), look at several different ways we might meet them, and then see which is
the cheapest. Works for me.

> > "There is no compelling material or financial reason to initiate a
> > replacement program prior to the completion of" a lengthy analysis of
> > alternatives and other studies, the report said. "
>
> Hooray! "There is no compelling material or financial reason (of course,
> you'll have to foget about that whole "increased maintenance costs" part of
> what we just said),

Oh come now, Kevin. Putting an extra $500 into my old car every year to keep it
running while I spend more time deciding whether it makes more sense for me to
buy a $25,000 dollar car next year, or wait another year or two so I can decide
if the really neat $30,000 hybrid gas/electric SUV that will be available then
is a better fit for my long terms needs, is not "forgetting about that whole
'increased maintenance costs' part of what we just said." We all have to make
such decisions all the time, at least those of us whose last name isn't Gates
(and I bet he makes them too).

> so like the bureaucrats we be, let's study it...and
> study it...and analyze what we studied, and then study it some more...

For at most, 18 months, and it seems more likely, to the end of this year, a
study that we should have done back in 2001 but didn't.

> while
> you guys keep paying out those "increased maintenance costs" you should be
> oh-so-happy to "tolerate", not to mentioon having bitten the bullet and sunk
> the requisite funds into belatedly upgrading the E models to R as (if?) you
> secure the funding to do so..."?

See above. If you can come up with $2 billion a year for the 767 lease, you can
sure as hell come up with only $130 million a year instead (compared to the
KC-135R costs) for the Es extra O&M, even if you decide to leave them completely
unmodified.

<snip>

> > > The biggest things you have to buy spares for are the avionics (which
> are
> > > more plug-and-play than they were in the 135 era), and engine related
> > > systems. There are a lot of 767's that will remain in service in the
> > > civilian sector for decades to come--they will need spares too, and in
> the
> > > end they become another source for spares for the KC version. I don't
> see
> > > this as a deal-breaker.
> >
> > Given that airlines are already looking to replace their 767s ( a 20-year
> old
> > design, let's remember) with the next generation, and given that world oil
> > production is predicted to peak sometime in the 2007 (the pessimists) --
> 2040
> > (the optimists) period, considerably improved fuel consumption may well
> drive
> > the mass replacement of older a/c, just as the post 9/11 slump did. It's
> > definitely an issue.
>
> But you find the improved fuel consumption of the 767 versus the R models,
> and especially the E models, to be a non-issue?

I'm not sure that the 767 has a fuel consumption advantage over a 135R across
the spectrum of tanker roles (it has a small offload advantage owing to higher
gross weight), but of course it's an issue, one to be properly analysed to see
just _how much_ of an issue it is, or is likely to become. In other words,
let's do this using our brains rather than just going on gut feeling.

<snip>

> > > Which
> > > > is better suited for the role?
> > >
> > > > Is the extra M0.05 in cruise a major advantage?
> > >
> > > Not likely.
> >
> > Depends on the specific mission, and more importantly, what percentage of
> the
> > mission spectrum does that particular mission occupy. There are missions
> now
> > where the faster KC-135 is better suited than a KC-767 would be, and
> others
> > where the latter comes out ahead.
>
> Sorry, but I can't buy that the extra five one-hundredths mach is going to
> be an issue either way.

Certainly can be, depending on how fast your fighters have their best cruise at,
at what altitude, and what their best tanking speed is. M0.05 works out to
about 30 knots true at typical tanker altitudes (25-35,000 feet). If that
higher cruise speed allows the fighters to tank significantly higher or faster,
i.e. without having to drop down out of their best cruise envelope or at speeds
that put them on the back side of the drag curve, I think you'll agree that will
give a significant decrease in fuel offload required, improve range, decrease
transit time, or what have you. For deployment tanking or when transiting
to/from distant tanker tracks, higher speed gives you better utilization because
you get more trips per unit time. In emergencies, a tanker getting there a
minute or two earlier may well be the difference between saving or losing an a/c
(at say $40 million each, that could buy a lot of fuel).

And there are obviously missions where it makes no difference whatsoever, or
where the slower speed may be preferable -- time spent loitering on tanker
orbits probably being one such, and the likely better takeoff and landing
performance being another. So let's look at the tradeoffs.

> > > > Does the higher composite content significantly decrease the corrosion
> > > issues
> > > > down the road?
> > >
> > > Maybe, but doubtfull, as corrosion awareness was better incorporated
> into
> > > the 767 manufacture than it was in the 135.
> >
> > And will be even more incorporated into the 7E7, especally since (AFAIK)
> there
> > is no corrosion of composites yet known.
>
> But you have been claiming that corrosion is not a problem withthe 135 any
> longer--now you want to use corrosion as a deciding point between the 767
> and an aircraft that has yet to even fly, much less become available in a
> tanker form?

Kevin, when did I ever say that corrosion is not a problem? I said that the DSB
said it's currently manageable, and not a major driving issue _now_. At no
point did I ever say or imply that it would _never_ be an issue. Of course you
want to consider how it might affect life-cycle costs and utility, for the 767
and 7E7 just as much as with the 135. My '88 Subaru had a bit of rust on the
drivers side A-pillar; it wasn't a major issue at the time, but it might have
become one at some point, which would have factored into my decision as to when
to replace it.

> > > > How about the 20% better fuel efficiency?
> > >
> > > Sounds good, but then again you have to examine the interval between the
> > > time the 767 would be available and the (elsewhere not mentioned, AFAIK)
> 7E7
> > > tanker version (expect what, a five or six year period at best before
> the
> > > first tanker 7E7 could be available?)...I'll be kind and use a five year
> > > period, at 131 E models costing maybe $2 million each more per year in
> > > operating costs than the 767, that works out to around $1.3 billion in
> extra
> > > operating costs? That is a hell of a lot of gas...
> >
> > Check out how much the KC-767 tankers cost.
>
> You were talking gas, right?

I was talking total cost, purchase/lease plus O&M for comparable capability.

> OK, lets be more realistic and say that if we
> canned the 767 proposal and started from scratch, we'd likely not see a new
> tanker enter the inventory until 2011 or so. That would be six years to the
> *start* of replacing the E models. Of course, that pretty much forces you
> into converting those to R's--GAO estimates the cost for that to be some
> $3.6 billion.

No, it doesn't, although it might be the best choice to do so. Remember,
currently, the KC-135E fleet costs ca. $131 million (your figure) per year more
than a comparable number of 135Rs to operate. So, multiplying $131 million x 7
(to get us from here to 2011) is only an extra $917 million, vs. the $3.6
billion for the conversion, minus the incremental savings from the improved
operating costs ca. $1 million per conversion/yr. For the sake of argument,
let's assume that the average number of conversions available is half the fleet
over that period, so the conversions save an average of $65 million per year on
O&M, or $455 million over the whole 7 year period. So the total net cost looks
like $917 million (keep the unmodified Es) vs. $3.15 billion (upgrade them all
to Rs and reap the O&M savings), to the start of replacement date.

For the sake of argument, let's assume that the E vs. R O&M disadvantage doubles
for that period, which still only costs us $1.834 billion vs. $3.15 billion. In
2011, we start discarding them and replacing them with whichever a/c we decide
to replace them with, having saved ourselves somewhere between $1 - $2 billion
in the meantime.

In this simplified calc I haven't bothered to take account of the operational
advantages of an R over an E, which would of course need to be factored in, but
it does show that under certain conditions keeping the Es as they are while
waiting to buy a tanker better suited to our long-term needs, may be the
preferred solution.

> If we work *really fast* to do that, we can maybe get it done
> over about a four year period, so for the last two years of that period up
> to 2011 we can use the cheaper O&M cost of the R model ($3.7 million per
> year per aircraft) which is (we'll assume, based upon KC-10 operating costs,
> which would likely be a bit more than the 767) maybe $1.5 mil per year
> greater than the 767 cost. Two years times 131 aircraft times $1.5 mil is
> about $400 mil. Of course, we have that earlier period (four years)when the
> E's (or the ever decreasing number remaining of them as they undergo upgrade
> to R) are still flying as is, and that would add maybe another $600 mil. Say
> a billion bucks total versus the operating cost of the 767's (yeah, I know
> we would not get all of the 767's delivered in lump sum, but I am trying to
> keep this simple and fair as well, so I am not going to figure the post-2011
> additional operating cost of the 135R's versus 767 into the mix to try and
> keep things even). That is a total of $4.6 billion you have just dumped into
> keeping the 135E's flying just until 2011.

Er, no. As I understand it, you've converted them to Rs and kept them flying
until then.

> At $200 mil per 767, that is the
> equivalent of some 23 new 767's right there--over half of what the USAF is
> asking for in the first lot. If you go the lease route with the first forty
> tankers, you could cover a significant part of the overall lease cost with
> that money. And you are getting an aircraft that carries more fuel to boot.

Or you could take the $1 to $2 billion you saved by keeping the Es unmodified
and just start buying 767s (or what have you) outright, also saving yourself the
interest on the lease. We're talking about paying $2 billion per year on the
lease, which would buy 10 767s each and every year. As it was Boeing claimed
the lease was only going to allow us to start replacing 135Es about 3 years
earlier than otherwise. In short, I think the lease stinks, as we don't _need_
the new a/c right away (whatever type), so leasing instead of buying makes no
sense, especially as were going to keep the a/c for so long.

> > > Respective runway and
> > > > ramp space requirements? PFI vs. military? Etc.
> > >
> > > Lose the outsourcing option from the get-go, IMO. Won't work for an
> > > organization with the scope of tanking requirements that the USAF has.
> >
> > Perhaps yes, perhaps no. Air bridge and training tanking doesn't require
> > military crewing. It's certainly an option worth looking at for at least
> some
> > tanking requirements, if not all.
>
> I am not crazy about the idea of having a portion of the tanker force
> unavailable for use in the T/O (and no, this is not the same as my below
> posit regarding using the 767's for these roles--those 767's could just as
> well extend to the T/O where they provide full capacity tanking to USAF
> assets, even with their (initially) marginal USN tanking support
> capability).

We have a portion of the tanker force that is unavailable for use in the T/O
now, according to an AF general -- the 135Es. There will always be tankers that
are involved with routine duties outside the T/O.

<snip>

> > > > Yes, they do, but the question remains, are 767s rather than upgraded
> Es
> > > and
> > > > later 7E7s the best way to go; what's the best mix, what % of tankers
> > > need to
> > > > do which roles, how will the advent of UCAVs affect the need for
> tankers
> > > and the
> > > > type mix, what effect will USAF F-35 buys have, etc. This needs to be
> > > properly
> > > > studied.
> > >
> > > Again with the neverending studies? :-)
> >
> > What never-ending study? The USAF failed to do such a study in the first
> place,
> > especially an AoA. The latter was predicted to take about 18 months, but
> the
> > head of AQ&L (Wynne) says they'll probably push it and complete it by
> December
> > or so.
>
> I was referring to your DSB folks..."studies" was the term they used. As in
> "more than one".

Because there are several still underway as we speak, looking at various issues,
most of them ordered by the SecDef. The AoA is one of them, and almost
certainly the most important.

<snip>

> > > > I'm aware that the R&D will still apply, I'm worried about the
> materiel
> > > costs,
> > > > which are only going to go up. If we need the capability, then let's
> just
> > > buy
> > > > it and get the purchase out of the way, instead of paying inflated
> prices
> > > later.
> > >
> > > Even if it delays entry further, meaning you are also going to be paying
> > > that higher O&M cost for the remaining E's even longer...?
> >
> > If that allows us to make a better decision for the long term, sure. We
> can get
> > upgraded Es (Pacer Crag Rs) into service faster than we can get 767s.
>
> And pay some $3.6 billion for the privaledge of then having the longest
> serving remaining KC-135's committed to an even longer period of service.

So? The Rs are only a year younger on average, and yet no one's raising a big
fuss about them hanging around until 2040. So we convert the Es, and maybe
start retiring them a few years earlier.

> IMO, not a wise course of action--only to be used if the 767 deal gets
> trashed due to both Boeing's stupid handling of what should have been a done
> deal by now and the involvement of politicos-with-axes-to-grind, like
> McCain.

Just which axe is McCain grinding, other than the one (widely shared) that the
lease makes no fiscal sense, and is essentially driven by the wish to give
Boeing a bailout?

> IMO, if that is the way it plays out, we will see the conversion to
> R's, then a mindset of, "What? You want a *new* tanker, after we just sank
> all of that money into upgrading those last E models? Maybe next year we
> might authorize a *study*..." set in, leaving the USAF in the lurch with an
> open-ended KC-135 tanker force, and the BUFF's being replaced before they
> are.

If that winds up with us having equal or greater capability at equal or lesser
price, I'm all for it. Given the choice between multipoint-capable Rs now and
single point 767s (or whatever) later, I'd take the Rs, unless the economics are
are shown to go the other way. So far, I've seen no evidence that they do,
which is why I want to see an AoA done.

<snip>

> > > I am not as impressed with the summary of the DSB report as you are (but
> > > then again, I tend to weigh the advice of the folks actually tasked to
> fly
> > > the missions a bit more than I do the DSB, GAO, etc).
> >
> > Seeing as how the DSB works for the Pentagon, and Rumsfeld is the guy who
> tasked
> > them to do the study back in February, I put a bit more weight on their
> advice
> > than you do. Especially since opponents of the 767 deal (McCain to
> thefront)
> > believed that the DSB was much too cosy with the military and Boeing (the
> DSB
> > Chairman had to recuse himself because he was also a paid Boeing
> consultant and
> > had been mentioned in internal company e-mails back in Dec.2002/Jan. 2003
> as
> > willing to help push the deal), and fully expected them to support it. I
> > believe McCain's words were something along the lines of a "fox guarding
> the
> > chickens." So yeah, when even they come out and say they that we've got
> time to
> > do the study and the corrosion is manageable, I'm inclined to believe
> them.
>
> Then we will have to agree to disagree on this point.

Fair enough.

<snip>

> > > > > In the long run, yes. But is it worth slowing delivery up-front even
> > > further
> > > > > than it already has been slowed?
> > > >
> > > > According to the DSB, we have the time.
> > >
> > > The DSB that claims, contrary to what the USAF LTG testified last year,
> that
> > > the corrosion problem is readily in-hand...?
> >
> > the DSB's claim is based on the USAF unit doing the corrosion controls
> data,
> > let's remember. The situation isn't static, and they've gotten better at
> it
> > since last year.
>
> You left out that whole "tolerate higher maintenance cost" part of the DSB's
> corrosion solution--I don't think that is a "minor" part of the equation
> here, though the DSB apparently does given the off-hand way they worded that
> statement.

See my reply to you where you made much the same point, above.

> > > And thinks out-sourcing tanker
> > > requirements is a fine idea?
> >
> > They're saying it's a viable option, it should be looked at in an AoA, and
> we've
> > got the time to do so. No more, no less.
>
> If you "tolerate higher maintenance costs" you have that time.

Yes, and lower acquisition costs.

> > > I am not buying into either, at this point.
> >
> > Until the AoA is actually done, we have nothing to base a decision on
> other than
> > "because I think so," which IMO is a pretty poor way to spend billions of
> > dollars.
>
> DSB did not say they *thought* keeping the E models would be more expensive
> than what we are already paying--they said we would have to tolerate higher
> maintenance costs, period, while the "studies" (plural) take place.

And the questions we need to answer are whether that is cheaper than leasing
767s, buying them outright, buying something else down the road, converting Es
to Rs, or what have you. Makes sense to me - it may cost us a bit more right
now, but may save us a bundle down the road. Exactly the opposite applies with
leasing rather than buying 767s.

<snip>

> > > I remain unconvinced that AMC would throw a hissy fit if the USN wanted
> to
> > > include a secondary tanking capability to its C-40B's.
> >
> > More likely, they'd suffer a rupture from laughing at the USN devoting
> such a
> > large proportion of its budget to paying the NRE for so few a/c of such
> limited
> > performance (as tankers).
>
> Then the critical USN "requirement" that led off this thread...must be more
> of a "desire" than it is a "requirement".

No, it just means that you spend your money wisely, and buying a few "KC-40s" of
limited performance and very high cost is anything but that.

> > > > > Personally, I doubt the USAF would have put up a
> > > > > fight if the USN had said they wanted to incorporate a secondary
> > > refueling
> > > > > capability in their C-40B's; just as the USN has been strangely
> silent
> > > over
> > > > > the USAF talking about recreating an in-house stand-off jamming
> > > capability.
> > > >
> > > > There is no way in hell that the USN would pay the R&D NRE for a
> tanker
> > > mod for
> > > > their C-40s, with all their other needs.
> > >
> > > Exactly. So the lack of multi-point refuelers must not be such a
> critical
> > > one, eh?
> >
> > Since no one else is even considering buying 737s as tankers, and the navy
> is
> > only buying a few (somewhere between 5 and 8, as best I can tell), the
> navy
> > would have to be nuts to make that kind of investment for so few a/c, even
> > assuming that they would be reasonable tankers. Given their limited
> > payload/range and performance, I have my doubts they would be, but it's
> moot.
>
> They (C-40A--I goofed with the "B", which is one of the USAF models) are
> replacing the C-9 in the USN; from what I gather, the plan is to replace 27
> C-9's, and I doubt that 8 C-40's can do that. I read where one of the
> military lobbying groups noted that the CNO wants to procure three per year
> (unspecified total delivery).

I've been unable to find a definitive total number either. 5-8 I'm pretty sure
of, but beyond that everything seems tenuous. Kind of like how many tankers the
USAF needs, of what type, and when;-)

> I am not sure the 737 would make a superior
> tanker, either--my point was more in the line of, "If the USN is *really*
> worried about tanking capability for its aircraft, why have they not moved
> to increase their own in-house capability beyond buddy tanking and C-130's,
> especially when they have recently begun procuring a new dedicated land
> based logistics support aircraft?" In other words, this a BIG priority for
> them--as long as somebody else is footing the bill, that is. Otherwise, the
> priority seems to be somwhere down in the weeds...

The only way to settle this is to wait and see how the USAF reacts if, after
selecting whatever new tanker they pick, the USN says "hey, we want some of
those for ourselves, and here's the money." Myabe the USAF will say "you're
welcome, and thanks so much for helping out with the R&D." Or maybe they'll get
all territorial; it's not as if turf wars are dead just because we've been
fighting real ones.

Guy

[Guy Alcala]

Guy Alcala wrote:

> Kevin Brooks wrote:

<snip>

> > But you find the improved fuel consumption of the 767 versus the R models,
> > and especially the E models, to be a non-issue?
>
> I'm not sure that the 767 has a fuel consumption advantage over a 135R across
> the spectrum of tanker roles (it has a small offload advantage owing to higher
> gross weight), but of course it's an issue, one to be properly analysed to see
> just _how much_ of an issue it is, or is likely to become. In other words,
> let's do this using our brains rather than just going on gut feeling.

Just had a look at AFPAM 10-1403, which among other things lists military and CRAF
a/c types for various roles and missions. Fuel burn for generic planning purposes
of a KC-135R is listed as 10,921 lbs./hr. A CRAF B-767 (sub-type unstated) is
listed as
10,552 lb./hr. A tanker version would have more drag (boom, receptacle and various
fairings, never mind wing pods), so fuel burn of the two types appears to be
essentially equal.

Guy

[sameolesid]

Guy Alcala > wrote in message >...
> Guy Alcala wrote:
>
> > Kevin Brooks wrote:
>
> <snip>
>
> > > But you find the improved fuel consumption of the 767 versus the R models,
> > > and especially the E models, to be a non-issue?
> >
> > I'm not sure that the 767 has a fuel consumption advantage over a 135R across
> > the spectrum of tanker roles (it has a small offload advantage owing to higher
> > gross weight), but of course it's an issue, one to be properly analysed to see
> > just _how much_ of an issue it is, or is likely to become. In other words,
> > let's do this using our brains rather than just going on gut feeling.
>
> Just had a look at AFPAM 10-1403, which among other things lists military and CRAF
> a/c types for various roles and missions. Fuel burn for generic planning purposes
> of a KC-135R is listed as 10,921 lbs./hr. A CRAF B-767 (sub-type unstated) is
> listed as
> 10,552 lb./hr. A tanker version would have more drag (boom, receptacle and various
> fairings, never mind wing pods), so fuel burn of the two types appears to be
> essentially equal.
>
> Guy

Real world fuel burn for a 767-200 planned for a transatlantic this
afternoon (15May) is 10,450 lbs per hour. Of course thats without pods
or a boom.

[sameolesid]

Guy Alcala > wrote in message >...
> C Knowles wrote:
>
> > They have already changed their mind and said that, well, maybe with the new
> > alloys, it's possible after all (Air Force magazine.)
>
> To quote Gomer,"Surprise, Surprise, Surprise!";-) Got a link? I can't find it
> in the current (May) issue online.
>
> >I would think that
>
> > with the possibility of supplying hundreds of KC-7E7s, they could make it
> > work. After all, the KC-135 and 707 are two very different airplanes, both
> > built at the same time, each benefiting from the other.
>
> You'd certainly think so.
>
> Guy

Reengineering the 7E7 for this role will entail some serious costs and
time. The smarter move for Boeing would be to invest in the BWB.

[Henry J Cobb]

sameolesid wrote:
> Reengineering the 7E7 for this role will entail some serious costs and
> time. The smarter move for Boeing would be to invest in the BWB.

There's a win-win here.

http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/local/aplocal_story.asp?category=6420&slug=WA%20Boeing%20New%20747
> This time, Boeing is gauging interest in the 747A - for "Advanced" -
> that would be slightly larger and more technically advanced than the
> most current model, the 747-400ER. The plane would blend technology
> from the 7E7 with the 747's size in a package Boeing claims would be
> far cheaper to fly than the A380.

If the USAF would sign a contract to buy six KC-747A tankers a year for
the next decade (displacing the F/A-22 in the budget), each with one
center boom/drogue and a pair of wing mounted drogues you'd get a tanker
that carries a huge amount of fuel while flying very efficently thereby
doing the job of two old tankers while helping Boeing start a brand new
production line rather than getting some dead end airframes from an old
production line.

-HJC

[Guy Alcala]

sameolesid wrote:

<snip>

> > Just had a look at AFPAM 10-1403, which among other things lists military and CRAF
> > a/c types for various roles and missions. Fuel burn for generic planning purposes
> > of a KC-135R is listed as 10,921 lbs./hr. A CRAF B-767 (sub-type unstated) is
> > listed as
> > 10,552 lb./hr. A tanker version would have more drag (boom, receptacle and various
> > fairings, never mind wing pods), so fuel burn of the two types appears to be
> > essentially equal.
>
> Real world fuel burn for a 767-200 planned for a transatlantic this
> afternoon (15May) is 10,450 lbs per hour. Of course thats without pods
> or a boom.

Which engines?

Guy

[Guy Alcala]

sameolesid wrote:

> Guy Alcala > wrote in message >...
> > C Knowles wrote:
> >
> > > They have already changed their mind and said that, well, maybe with the new
> > > alloys, it's possible after all (Air Force magazine.)
> >
> > To quote Gomer,"Surprise, Surprise, Surprise!";-) Got a link? I can't find it
> > in the current (May) issue online.
> >
> > >I would think that
> >
> > > with the possibility of supplying hundreds of KC-7E7s, they could make it
> > > work. After all, the KC-135 and 707 are two very different airplanes, both
> > > built at the same time, each benefiting from the other.
> >
> > You'd certainly think so.
> >
> > Guy
>
> Reengineering the 7E7 for this role will entail some serious costs and
> time. The smarter move for Boeing would be to invest in the BWB.

That might well be the best choice for the USAF (dual booms and at least two pods), but how does a BWB stack up for
commercial use? If the USAF chose to replace their entire fleet of KC-135s (and perhaps related a/c) with BWBs, it would
probably make economic sense for Boeing to invest in it. But lacking a commercial equivalent, we'd likely see the usual
development and production delays and cost overruns that are seemingly inevitable for pure military programs.

Guy

[sameolesid]

(sameolesid) wrote in message >...
> Guy Alcala > wrote in message >...
> > Guy Alcala wrote:
> >
> > > Kevin Brooks wrote:
> >
> > <snip>
> >
> > > > But you find the improved fuel consumption of the 767 versus the R models,
> > > > and especially the E models, to be a non-issue?
> > >
> > > I'm not sure that the 767 has a fuel consumption advantage over a 135R across
> > > the spectrum of tanker roles (it has a small offload advantage owing to higher
> > > gross weight), but of course it's an issue, one to be properly analysed to see
> > > just _how much_ of an issue it is, or is likely to become. In other words,
> > > let's do this using our brains rather than just going on gut feeling.
> >
> > Just had a look at AFPAM 10-1403, which among other things lists military and CRAF
> > a/c types for various roles and missions. Fuel burn for generic planning purposes
> > of a KC-135R is listed as 10,921 lbs./hr. A CRAF B-767 (sub-type unstated) is
> > listed as
> > 10,552 lb./hr. A tanker version would have more drag (boom, receptacle and various
> > fairings, never mind wing pods), so fuel burn of the two types appears to be
> > essentially equal.
> >
> > Guy
>
> Real world fuel burn for a 767-200 planned for a transatlantic this
> afternoon (15May) is 10,450 lbs per hour. Of course thats without pods
> or a boom.


Two more real world burns for 767-200's on some long haul oceanic
north south routes are, 11105 lbs/hr and 11513 lbs/hr respectively.
So its apparent there is no fuel burn advantage for the 767 vs the
KC-135R.

[Guy Alcala]

Henry J Cobb wrote:

> sameolesid wrote:
> > Reengineering the 7E7 for this role will entail some serious costs and
> > time. The smarter move for Boeing would be to invest in the BWB.
>
> There's a win-win here.
>
> http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/local/aplocal_story.asp?category=6420&slug=WA%20Boeing%20New%20747
> > This time, Boeing is gauging interest in the 747A - for "Advanced" -
> > that would be slightly larger and more technically advanced than the
> > most current model, the 747-400ER. The plane would blend technology
> > from the 7E7 with the 747's size in a package Boeing claims would be
> > far cheaper to fly than the A380.
>
> If the USAF would sign a contract to buy six KC-747A tankers a year for
> the next decade (displacing the F/A-22 in the budget), each with one
> center boom/drogue and a pair of wing mounted drogues you'd get a tanker
> that carries a huge amount of fuel while flying very efficently thereby
> doing the job of two old tankers while helping Boeing start a brand new
> production line rather than getting some dead end airframes from an old
> production line.

Why on earth would the USAF buy 747 tankers when they're far larger than the "takes up too much ramp
space" A330s that they rejected in favor of the 767? There's a nice graphic here showing the
relative sizes of the 767 and A330:

http://www.airpictorial.com/pages/Boeings767Tanker.html

and the 747's considerably bigger than the A330. Not to mention that the USAF rejected a KC-747 in
favor of the KC-10 way back when, as the 747 was larger than they needed. A 747 is an excellent
deployment tanker (what Carlo Kopp calls a Strategic tanker), but it takes up a lot of space on the
ramp and requires long, strong runways, while providing no more refueling stations than a far
smaller 767 or 135. The Air Force is looking for a replacement for the latter, not their KC-10s.
The maximum number of refueling stations per a/c per airfield is what's important to them for the
tactical tanking role, _not_ which a/c has the largest fuel offload per plane.

This is aside from the fact that the a/c might be too long to have a boom (that's why Boeing went
with the 767-200 rather than the -300; the latter would be too limited in rotation angle with a
boom, increasing t/o and landing distances. And then there are serious doubts that the a/c will
ever get built -- as the article mentions, 'new', larger versions of the 747 (-500, -600, 747X that
I can remember) have been mooted by Boeing for the past 10 years at least, with little customer
interest. I expect the 747 production will continue to wind down, but it hasn't done badly for an
a/c that was originally expected to only carry passengers for 5-10 years or so (the SST was going to
take over from it in that role) before being converted into a freighter. It makes an excellent
freighter, but there are plenty of used -200s, -300s and -400s out there to convert.

Guy

[sameolesid]

Guy Alcala > wrote in message >...
>
> The only way to settle this is to wait and see how the USAF reacts if, after
> selecting whatever new tanker they pick, the USN says "hey, we want some of
> those for ourselves, and here's the money." Myabe the USAF will say "you're
> welcome, and thanks so much for helping out with the R&D." Or maybe they'll get
> all territorial; it's not as if turf wars are dead just because we've been
> fighting real ones.
>
> Guy

If the USN were to pony up the cash to buy land based tankers then it
would be admitting that CV's are inextricably tied to land based
assets to complete their power of projection missions. Of course
thats always been true to some extent anyway-and is more true today
than ever.
Today's scheme of "borrowing" AF assets can be explained as playing
nice nice in the "Jointness" game. Buying USN land based tankers would
be a different story altogether.

[sameolesid]

"Kevin Brooks" > wrote in message >...
>
> I am not crazy about the idea of having a portion of the tanker force
> unavailable for use in the T/O (and no, this is not the same as my below
> posit regarding using the 767's for these roles--those 767's could just as
> well extend to the T/O where they provide full capacity tanking to USAF
> assets, even with their (initially) marginal USN tanking support
> capability).
>

This is presupposing the 767s will not be made prematurely obsolete by
the emerging long range AAM and SAM threats. A Feb AvWeek article
reported USAF interest in stealthy tanker designs...even equipped with
stealthy booms.
Sounds like somebody in the AF is as crazy as me...
(Feb23 AvWeek)
"Moreover, U.S. Air Force representatives have indicated interest in a
stealthy tanker to support their stealthy attack platforms, the
F/A-22, F-35 and B-2, to make them less susceptible to attack while
they refuel. To adequately satisfy that demand, Lockheed Martin has
devised a stealth shrouding for the refueling "boom."

The 767 is a poor investment for the future, and a 7E7 variant or the
Airbus offerings would merely be more expensive poor investments.

[Guy Alcala]

sameolesid wrote:

> Guy Alcala > wrote in message >...
> >
> > The only way to settle this is to wait and see how the USAF reacts if, after
> > selecting whatever new tanker they pick, the USN says "hey, we want some of
> > those for ourselves, and here's the money." Myabe the USAF will say "you're
> > welcome, and thanks so much for helping out with the R&D." Or maybe they'll get
> > all territorial; it's not as if turf wars are dead just because we've been
> > fighting real ones.
> >
> > Guy
>
> If the USN were to pony up the cash to buy land based tankers then it
> would be admitting that CV's are inextricably tied to land based
> assets to complete their power of projection missions. Of course
> thats always been true to some extent anyway-and is more true today
> than ever.
> Today's scheme of "borrowing" AF assets can be explained as playing
> nice nice in the "Jointness" game. Buying USN land based tankers would
> be a different story altogether.

You raise an interesting point. While the vast majority of the world's population (and thus, the targets) live within the
littorals (defined as within 200nm of a coastline) and well within range of unrefueled navy strikes, three of our last four
major air conflicts (OAF being the exception) have had most/all of their targets at considerably greater distances inland.
Is this just an aberration (after all, DS and Iraq: The Sequel bias a small dataset), or are our targets increasingly likely
to be well inland on continental land masses?

If it is an aberation, which is what I expect, then there is little justification for the navy needing their own land-based
tanker support, especially as the advent of the F-18E/F and later the F-35 should increase their average un-refueled strike
radius compared to, say, DS or OEF. If this is only an occasional thing, it makes far more sense to let the USAF provide
the capability when needed.

OTOH, if this becomes the norm, then some serious re-apportionment of funding/tasking between the services may be in order.

Guy

[Kevin Brooks]

"Guy Alcala" > wrote in message
. ..
> Kevin Brooks wrote:
>
> > "Guy Alcala" > wrote in message
> > . ..
> > > Kevin Brooks wrote:
> > >
> > > > "Guy Alcala" > wrote in message
> > > > .. .
> > > > > Sorry for the delayed reply -- it's been a busy week.
> > > > >
> > > > > Kevin Brooks wrote:
>
> <snip corrosion lead-in>
>
> > > > You are forgetting the corrosion problems with the E
models--corrosion
> > tends
> > > > to reduce fatigue life, too, IIRC from my long-ago materials science
> > > > classes...
> > >
> > > Corrosion is an issue with any a/c -- certainly the KC-135Rs as well,
> > which
> > > (after all) were 135As before, just as the Es were.
> > >
> > > > It sounds to me like the only way you are going to get that long
> > > > a life from the E's would be if you also replaced some structural
> > components
> > > > (meaning you are going even further than the old R model mods,
IIRC).
> > >
> > > Why is corrosion and fatigue on the Es supposedly so much more serious
> > than the
> > > Rs, when they all started out as 135As?
> >
> > I'd assume they are both going to exhibit corrosion problems, but didn't
the
> > R's go through a significant IRAN as part of their upgrade?
>
> Not that I can find, but that's not definitive. Boeing replaced the lower
wing
> skinsof 746 C/KC-135s, but that seems to have been applied to all models
in
> service. All I can figure is that the old nacelles and struts (from 707s)
may be
> causing the difference, which would go away if they were upgraded to Rs
(which
> get new struts and nacelles as well as engines).
>
> > The USAF, per
> > those comments from the three-star last year, seems most concerned with
the
> > E's.
>
> See above, or possibly just because the Es were less effective than the
Rs, so
> sure, say they're falling apart because of corrosion so we can buy new
a/c.
> You've got to come up with some justification.

No, I don't have to. A serving USAF LTG made the statements quoted to
you--the best you have offered in response is that the DSB says they can
control the problem--if enough money is committed to maintenance on a yearly
basis. Duh. Doesn't it sound a bit odd to hear a response that says, "It is
not a problem--if we dump enough money into it annually throughout the
remaining service life..."? That sounds like the very definition of a
"problem" to me.

>
> <snip>
>
> > > > Wait a second--spend *more* money on trying to upgrade E's, while
doing
> > > > *another* study to determine if/when/how we replace the E's?
> > >
> > > What do you mean, _trying_ to upgrade the Es? We know perfectly well
how
> > to
> > > upgrade them -we've got 400+ prototypes in service, after all, with
the
> > R&D all
> > > paid for.
> >
> > No, no, no--that was not what I meant. My point is that at this point
> > tossing *more* money into the upgrade of the E models seems a bit
> > shortsighted, when that same money (along with the savings accrued from
> > cheaper operating costs) could go towards purchasing new-build
airframes. We
> > did not have that option (or the money to make it happen) available back
> > when the original R program started--we do now.
>
> Actually, we don't have the money at the moment, which is why the whole
lease
> thing was suggested. But look at it another way -- might it make more
sense to
> upgrade some/all Es to Rs at far lower cost than than buying 767s, while
we
> perhaps decide to skip the 767 generation entirely and buy either a 7E7
tanker,
> or even a BWB one around 2015 or so, if the latter a/c is more suitable in
the
> long term? Considering the difference in cost between upgrading an E to a
Pacer
> Crag R vs. buying new KC-767s, it's going to take a considerable time (a
couple
> of decades, I imagine) for the O&M cost advantage of the latter to
overcome
> purchase cost advantageof the former, assuming that it ever does (at least
one
> source claims that it won't).
>
> > > > That sounds
> > > > like a fine...bureaucratic solution? Even the GAO was saying in the
> > 1990's
> > > > that the USAF needed to get off its duff and start planning the
> > replacement
> > > > of the KC-135E fleet.
> > >
> > > Sure. It didn't say what to replace them with.
> >
> > Nope. The USAF has said what they want to replace them with--you have no
> > trust in the USAF?
>
> The USAF said what it wanted to replace them with in 2001, when they had
no
> other US choice, and still haven't justified the _need_ to replace them
now, vs.
> other options. The assumptions have changed, as has the situation.
>
> > > > Studies are great--unfortunately, they have a tendancy
> > > > of becoming an ends-unto-themselves. We have a good proposal that
the
> > USAF
> > > > has supported--it puts new airframes into the mission much more
quickly
> > than
> > > > if we follow the "usual" method of purchasing new aircraft (of
course,
> > you
> > > > could use the F/A-22 or F-35 model...which would mean if we started
that
> > new
> > > > study right now, we might plan on seeing some new tankers around
> > what...2015
> > > > at best?), and it takes advantage of an existing excess production
> > > > capability/inventory at the only US company currently building
aircraft
> > of
> > > > that class--sounds like a good plan to me.
> > >
> > > Who says we need new airframes _right_ now? As we both agree, buying
more
> > pods
> > > and converting more Rs to carry them is the best solution in the short
> > term to
> > > the navy/Allies problem, while converting Es to Rs _may_ be the best
> > solution
> > > for increasing our tanker force in a hurry. Or it may not be,
butsince
> > the USAF
> > > never did an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA), we don't know.
> >
> > Upgrading to R's does not do a great deal towards "increasing our tanker
> > force"--it instead is more of a "spend some money now to reduce O&M
costs in
> > the long run, and keep the force from being *reduced* as E models
break". Of
> > course, the 767 option does ptretty much the same thing--albeit with an
even
> > greater reduction in operating costs, and a significantly better
possibility
> > of future upgrades (at what point does it become impractical to keep
trying
> > to modernize a 43 year old airframe?).
>
> You'd better ask Bufdrvr (or the Air Force) about that one;-) However, I
> disagree with your premise - upgrading Es to Rs does indeed increase our
tanker
> force, both by improving MC rates, and by increasing offload and reducing
runway
> length requirements, just as the KC-767 would. The E is restricted by
lack of
> thrust in the amount of fuel it can lift off many runways, compared to the
R or
> a 767 (Boeing claims the 767 can lift the same fuel load from a 4,000 foot
> shorter runway). The A model was even worse, of course, being essentially
> useless during DS from most runways in the middle east. Hot and/or high
has
> become pretty typical for us, so tankers that have trouble operating from
such
> fields are essentially operationally useless (which is what the USAF
general
> claiming that we needed the 767 to replace the Es said).
>
> <snip>
>
> > > > > The corrosion problem is apparently under control. See the URL
above.
> > > > From
> > > > > what I recall of the GAO report, the O&M costs for the Es was
> > averaging
> > > > $4.6
> > > > > million a year vs. $3.7 million for the Rs
> > > >
> > > > That is an additional $130 million bucks each *year* in operating
cost
> > (not
> > > > exactly chump-change...but even that is a "lowball" figure...). What
> > would
> > > > be the operating cost of the 767? Less than the 135R (two engines
versus
> > > > four, better fuel economy, more maintenance friendly subsystems,
less
> > > > likelihood of inspection-and-repair work, more stringent (and more
> > frequent)
> > > > inspections, etc.), that is for sure. So your operating cost per
year
> > > > differential measured against the 767 is going to be greater. Add in
the
> > > > cost of bringing those E's to a full PACER CRAIG R model level, and
the
> > cost
> > > > is going to be significant, to say the least. Not a wise investment
> > plan,
> > > > IMO. If you managed your personal auto program in this manner, then
you
> > >
> > > > would still be driving (only--no newer cars allowed) a 1960's era
car,
> > and
> > > > one which you had paid to drop new engines in, along with paying to
> > modify
> > > > the emissions system to keep it in compliance (like the noise
> > requirements
> > > > the KC-135's face), and here in 2004 you would be saying that
instead of
> > > > buying a new vehicle, you'd be better off paying to essentially
> > completely
> > > > rebuild the one you have and drop *another* new engine in it, along
with
> > > > updating the other systems in the dash, maybe a new trannie to be
> > compatible
> > > > with that new engine, etc. I don't think you would endorse such a
plan
> > (I
> > > > made the mistake once of trying to extend the life of a noble little
> > Nissan
> > > > pick-up at the 170K point by dropping a *used* engine in it, and
that
> > was
> > > > *not* cheap--and I found that within 10K more miles I was *had* to
break
> > > > down and buy a new vehicle).
> > >
> > > If most people maintained their cars the way that the military does
its
> > tankers,
> > > and only drove them 1/10th as much as the average 'driver', then
upgading
> > > themwith new componenets might well be the most cost effective
solution
> > for the
> > > long-term. The numbers I have seen quoted for the E to R (plus Pacer
> > Crag)
> > > conversion vs. new 767 comparison imply that the conversion is indeed
the
> > most
> > > cost-effective option, but without knowing every assumption made I'll
> > withhold
> > > judgement.
> >
> > I don't buy that. My personal experience was in the more mundane area of
> > military trucks (we used various models in the combat engineer units).
As a
> > company commander (late eighties/early nineties) I had dump trucks in
my
> > unit that were manufactured in the late sixties and had pretty low
mileage.
> > Somewhat like the KC-135 fleet, but a bit younger. Guess what? We still
had
> > problems resulting from *age* (sometimes less use is not a *good* thing
for
> > mechanical equipment, especially anything that has hydraulics), and we
soon
> > (not long after I gave up command) faced a "train wreck" in terms of
> > supportability (the Army found it uneconomical to continue carrying the
> > spare parts inventory for the oldest trucks)--with no replacements
> > immediately available. Not unlike the situation facing the KC-135, IMO.
If
> > the military services managed equipment like civilian entities do ( run
it
> > to the point of best return in terms of depreciation, then unload it and
buy
> > new equipment), the KC-135 would have been gone long ago, before
corrosion
> > (among other factors) ever became a serious concern.
>
> I agree that too little use can sometimes be almost as bad as too much.
By
> that logic, then, you're recommending that the Air Force have fewer
tankers but
> fly them more, so let's just stick with the Rs we have and fly them till
their
> wings fall off, then buy all new in 15 years or so. By that point the
> procurement bow wave of the F-22 and F-35 should have died down freeing up
some
> money, and who knows, we may not even need conventional tankers by then.
>
> > That would be one
> > extreme, IMO--the other being what we are doing, in acting as if the
KC-135
> > (or the B-52, for that matter) will be able to fly forever.
>
> No doubt they'd be chasing the DC-3s that are still in commercial service
;-)
>
> > We stretched the
> > KC's by doing the R conversion a few years back, when there was no
option to
> > buy new airframes. Now there is an alternative to our continuing to slap
> > hundred-mile-an-hour tape on old equipment in hopes of keeping it viable
> > forever, and "carpe diem" would be an advisable course of action IMO.
Again,
> > at what point do you stop tossing money into trying to keep the E models
> > viable, and instead commit that money to recapitalizing the fleet?
>
> I agree that the Es aren't particularly viable per se, but for operational
not
> cost reasons, so let's make them Rs and see what we want to _buy_ (if that
makes
> the most sense) when we can afford to.
>
> <snip>
>
> > The most critical KC-135 tanker metric is age, and
> > the
> > > > most pressing KC-135 problems are corrosion and stress corrosion
> > > > cracking-both age related. Stress corrosion cracking is one of the
most
> > > > difficult structural failures to predict." Are you saying that all
of
> > these
> > > > problems have been solved since that date?
> > >
> > > Apparently they've been ameliorated to a considerable extent, so that
this
> > is no
> > > longer a driving factor. And again, why is the E's corrosion problem
> > supposedly
> > > so much worse than the Rs, when they started from exactly the same
> > airframe?
> >
> > Again, age and , I suspect, a pretty extensive (and comparitively
costly)
> > IRAN process during the upgrade. Can we conquer the corrosion process in
the
> > E model? No doubt we can--but would it be worth the cost of doing so for
a
> > 43 (or more) year old airframe?
>
> If it's worth it for the 42 year-old Rs, then it's worth it for the 43
year old
> Es, at least if we make them Rs. I don't hear the USAF complaining about
the
> Rs, so the corrosion issues would seem to be due to the different engines
plus
> the slight difference due to age.
>
> > > <snip old ground>
> > >
> > > > > One of the things I object to is the assumption, without any
analysis,
> > > > that the
> > > > > 767 buy is essential (the DSB says it isn't),
> > > >
> > > > Well, the DSB also says the corrosion problem is something we can
easily
> > > > discount,
> > >
> > > Actually, I believe what they said was that the facility responsible
for
> > dealing
> > > with it has learned to handle it so well that they are able to do the
work
> > much
> > > quicker and cheaper than expected. I can't find the quote,
unfortunately,
> > but
> > > I'm still looking.
> >
> > Hopefully this corrosion revelation came after the LTG quoted above gave
his
> > testimony--a quick google on the subject did not give me any hits on
sites
> > that indicate the corrosion problems are licked.
>
> The DSB only began their study in February of this year, so yeah, their
data is
> recent. I'll keep trying to find the quote, or else hopefully the actual
report
> will get put up soon.
>
> > > > and has apparently decided that *outsourcing* the tanker mission,
> > > > or buying second-hand aircraft, is the way to go. Outsourcing may be
> > great
> > > > for the RAF, etc., but the USAF is another story, IMO. Then there is
the
> > > > "spend the money on already used aircraft" approach--wonderful! As
if
> > > > tossing more money down the O&M pit for the E model is not enough,
we
> > should
> > > > take the money we have and buy older airframes than we can afford?
(And
> > yes,
> > > > we can afford new tankers under the current deal being offered)
> > >
> > > They've said that it _may_ be the way to go, and:
> > >
> > > "The report by the Defense Science Board says that, contrary to Air
Force
> > > claims, corrosion of the aging tanker fleet is "manageable" and
several
> > > options exist to refurbish the fleet.
> >
> > Manageable at what cost?! Ask the DSB members how many of them are
driving
> > even twenty year old cars that they find economical to periodically
strip,
> > inspect, repaint, and replace corroded parts as necessary--I'll bet it
won't
> > be many, if any. That they are proposing outsourcing the tanker role
seems
> > to me to be unrealistic for the USAF, and is indicative of a study
probably
> > done by "experts"--not the flying kind, or the kind that even manage the
> > fliers, but the other kind (what we used to sarcastically define as, "an
> > expert is an SOB from out of town with a briefcase". Again, at what
point do
> > you think it is unwise to keep dumping money down the tube in an effort
to
> > keep the 135E viable, versus using that same money to help purchase new
> > airframes with lower operating costs and greater potential for future
> > upgrade?
>
> When its no longer the most cost-effective option which achieves the
operational
> goals, just like any such choice should be made. I've owned four cars in
my
> life, a '65 Chevy Impala bought new by my Dad, and still running great on
the
> original engine 23 years later with 240,000 miles on it when I sold it, as
no
> longer meeting my 'operational' needs; a '69 Datsun 2000 roadster which I
bought
> used in '78 and drove for several years because it was fun, but not worth
the
> money (by me) to fix up; an '88 Subaru 4Wd wagon bought new (which
replaced the
> Chevy), which lasted me for 14 years and which I'd still be happily
driving now
> if it hadn't been stolen, and my current car (another Subaru), which I'll
drive
> until it no longer meets my needs or becomes so unreliable to operate that
its
> more trouble than it's worth, and there's something new that's so much
better
> that it's worth laying out the money upfront. In short, I expect to get
20 or
> more years out of a car. Now, I drive far less than the average driver,
and
> most of the miles I put on are easy ones on the interstate rather than
stop and
> go commuting (kind of like the Air Force's tankers), so such lifespans can
be
> expected.
>
> > > If officials are willing to tolerate increased maintenance costs, "you
can
> > > defer major near-term . . . investments" to replace the tanker fleet,
the
> > > report said.
> >
> > Guy, that is a telling statement. I suspect the USAF folks are as afraid
of
> > that statement as I would have been when I was on the green suit
> > side--because they know that when the money does get short, the first
thing
> > that usually ends up getting cut (or really stre-e-e-e-tched) is usually
the
> > O&M money. Those "increased maintenance costs" (for an aircraft that is
> > already the most expensive in its class, the E model?) represent an
> > increased chunk of a finite pool of O&M money. Not to sound like a
broken
> > record, but at what point is enough enough, where you start using that
money
> > to instead buy into newer, less costly (to operate and maintain)
airframes?
>
> See above, and after you've done a proper Analysis of Alternatives to see
just
> what the most cost-effective solution is, which is what the DSB says we
have
> time for. They're not saying you can go on forever, they're saying we
don't
> have to rush out and buy a new 'car' tomorrow; we've got the time to study
> Consumer Reports as well as Car and Driver, go to Edmunds.com, take some
test
> drives, figure out what our needs really are (as opposed to what we'd like
to
> have), look at several different ways we might meet them, and then see
which is
> the cheapest. Works for me.
>
> > > "There is no compelling material or financial reason to initiate a
> > > replacement program prior to the completion of" a lengthy analysis of
> > > alternatives and other studies, the report said. "
> >
> > Hooray! "There is no compelling material or financial reason (of course,
> > you'll have to foget about that whole "increased maintenance costs" part
of
> > what we just said),
>
> Oh come now, Kevin. Putting an extra $500 into my old car every year to
keep it
> running while I spend more time deciding whether it makes more sense for
me to
> buy a $25,000 dollar car next year, or wait another year or two so I can
decide
> if the really neat $30,000 hybrid gas/electric SUV that will be available
then
> is a better fit for my long terms needs, is not "forgetting about that
whole
> 'increased maintenance costs' part of what we just said." We all have to
make
> such decisions all the time, at least those of us whose last name isn't
Gates
> (and I bet he makes them too).
>
> > so like the bureaucrats we be, let's study it...and
> > study it...and analyze what we studied, and then study it some more...
>
> For at most, 18 months, and it seems more likely, to the end of this year,
a
> study that we should have done back in 2001 but didn't.
>
> > while
> > you guys keep paying out those "increased maintenance costs" you should
be
> > oh-so-happy to "tolerate", not to mentioon having bitten the bullet and
sunk
> > the requisite funds into belatedly upgrading the E models to R as (if?)
you
> > secure the funding to do so..."?
>
> See above. If you can come up with $2 billion a year for the 767 lease,
you can
> sure as hell come up with only $130 million a year instead (compared to
the
> KC-135R costs) for the Es extra O&M, even if you decide to leave them
completely
> unmodified.
>
> <snip>
>
> > > > The biggest things you have to buy spares for are the avionics
(which
> > are
> > > > more plug-and-play than they were in the 135 era), and engine
related
> > > > systems. There are a lot of 767's that will remain in service in the
> > > > civilian sector for decades to come--they will need spares too, and
in
> > the
> > > > end they become another source for spares for the KC version. I
don't
> > see
> > > > this as a deal-breaker.
> > >
> > > Given that airlines are already looking to replace their 767s ( a
20-year
> > old
> > > design, let's remember) with the next generation, and given that world
oil
> > > production is predicted to peak sometime in the 2007 (the
pessimists) --
> > 2040
> > > (the optimists) period, considerably improved fuel consumption may
well
> > drive
> > > the mass replacement of older a/c, just as the post 9/11 slump did.
It's
> > > definitely an issue.
> >
> > But you find the improved fuel consumption of the 767 versus the R
models,
> > and especially the E models, to be a non-issue?
>
> I'm not sure that the 767 has a fuel consumption advantage over a 135R
across
> the spectrum of tanker roles (it has a small offload advantage owing to
higher
> gross weight), but of course it's an issue, one to be properly analysed to
see
> just _how much_ of an issue it is, or is likely to become. In other
words,
> let's do this using our brains rather than just going on gut feeling.
>
> <snip>
>
> > > > Which
> > > > > is better suited for the role?
> > > >
> > > > > Is the extra M0.05 in cruise a major advantage?
> > > >
> > > > Not likely.
> > >
> > > Depends on the specific mission, and more importantly, what percentage
of
> > the
> > > mission spectrum does that particular mission occupy. There are
missions
> > now
> > > where the faster KC-135 is better suited than a KC-767 would be, and
> > others
> > > where the latter comes out ahead.
> >
> > Sorry, but I can't buy that the extra five one-hundredths mach is going
to
> > be an issue either way.
>
> Certainly can be, depending on how fast your fighters have their best
cruise at,
> at what altitude, and what their best tanking speed is. M0.05 works out
to
> about 30 knots true at typical tanker altitudes (25-35,000 feet). If that
> higher cruise speed allows the fighters to tank significantly higher or
faster,
> i.e. without having to drop down out of their best cruise envelope or at
speeds
> that put them on the back side of the drag curve, I think you'll agree
that will
> give a significant decrease in fuel offload required, improve range,
decrease
> transit time, or what have you. For deployment tanking or when transiting
> to/from distant tanker tracks, higher speed gives you better utilization
because
> you get more trips per unit time. In emergencies, a tanker getting there
a
> minute or two earlier may well be the difference between saving or losing
an a/c
> (at say $40 million each, that could buy a lot of fuel).
>
> And there are obviously missions where it makes no difference whatsoever,
or
> where the slower speed may be preferable -- time spent loitering on tanker
> orbits probably being one such, and the likely better takeoff and landing
> performance being another. So let's look at the tradeoffs.
>
> > > > > Does the higher composite content significantly decrease the
corrosion
> > > > issues
> > > > > down the road?
> > > >
> > > > Maybe, but doubtfull, as corrosion awareness was better incorporated
> > into
> > > > the 767 manufacture than it was in the 135.
> > >
> > > And will be even more incorporated into the 7E7, especally since
(AFAIK)
> > there
> > > is no corrosion of composites yet known.
> >
> > But you have been claiming that corrosion is not a problem withthe 135
any
> > longer--now you want to use corrosion as a deciding point between the
767
> > and an aircraft that has yet to even fly, much less become available in
a
> > tanker form?
>
> Kevin, when did I ever say that corrosion is not a problem? I said that
the DSB
> said it's currently manageable, and not a major driving issue _now_. At
no
> point did I ever say or imply that it would _never_ be an issue. Of
course you
> want to consider how it might affect life-cycle costs and utility, for the
767
> and 7E7 just as much as with the 135. My '88 Subaru had a bit of rust on
the
> drivers side A-pillar; it wasn't a major issue at the time, but it might
have
> become one at some point, which would have factored into my decision as to
when
> to replace it.
>
> > > > > How about the 20% better fuel efficiency?
> > > >
> > > > Sounds good, but then again you have to examine the interval between
the
> > > > time the 767 would be available and the (elsewhere not mentioned,
AFAIK)
> > 7E7
> > > > tanker version (expect what, a five or six year period at best
before
> > the
> > > > first tanker 7E7 could be available?)...I'll be kind and use a five
year
> > > > period, at 131 E models costing maybe $2 million each more per year
in
> > > > operating costs than the 767, that works out to around $1.3 billion
in
> > extra
> > > > operating costs? That is a hell of a lot of gas...
> > >
> > > Check out how much the KC-767 tankers cost.
> >
> > You were talking gas, right?
>
> I was talking total cost, purchase/lease plus O&M for comparable
capability.
>
> > OK, lets be more realistic and say that if we
> > canned the 767 proposal and started from scratch, we'd likely not see a
new
> > tanker enter the inventory until 2011 or so. That would be six years to
the
> > *start* of replacing the E models. Of course, that pretty much forces
you
> > into converting those to R's--GAO estimates the cost for that to be some
> > $3.6 billion.
>
> No, it doesn't, although it might be the best choice to do so. Remember,
> currently, the KC-135E fleet costs ca. $131 million (your figure) per year
more
> than a comparable number of 135Rs to operate. So, multiplying $131
million x 7
> (to get us from here to 2011) is only an extra $917 million, vs. the $3.6
> billion for the conversion, minus the incremental savings from the
improved
> operating costs ca. $1 million per conversion/yr. For the sake of
argument,
> let's assume that the average number of conversions available is half the
fleet
> over that period, so the conversions save an average of $65 million per
year on
> O&M, or $455 million over the whole 7 year period. So the total net cost
looks
> like $917 million (keep the unmodified Es) vs. $3.15 billion (upgrade them
all
> to Rs and reap the O&M savings), to the start of replacement date.
>
> For the sake of argument, let's assume that the E vs. R O&M disadvantage
doubles
> for that period, which still only costs us $1.834 billion vs. $3.15
billion. In
> 2011, we start discarding them and replacing them with whichever a/c we
decide
> to replace them with, having saved ourselves somewhere between $1 - $2
billion
> in the meantime.
>
> In this simplified calc I haven't bothered to take account of the
operational
> advantages of an R over an E, which would of course need to be factored
in, but
> it does show that under certain conditions keeping the Es as they are
while
> waiting to buy a tanker better suited to our long-term needs, may be the
> preferred solution.
>
> > If we work *really fast* to do that, we can maybe get it done
> > over about a four year period, so for the last two years of that period
up
> > to 2011 we can use the cheaper O&M cost of the R model ($3.7 million per
> > year per aircraft) which is (we'll assume, based upon KC-10 operating
costs,
> > which would likely be a bit more than the 767) maybe $1.5 mil per year
> > greater than the 767 cost. Two years times 131 aircraft times $1.5 mil
is
> > about $400 mil. Of course, we have that earlier period (four years)when
the
> > E's (or the ever decreasing number remaining of them as they undergo
upgrade
> > to R) are still flying as is, and that would add maybe another $600 mil.
Say
> > a billion bucks total versus the operating cost of the 767's (yeah, I
know
> > we would not get all of the 767's delivered in lump sum, but I am trying
to
> > keep this simple and fair as well, so I am not going to figure the
post-2011
> > additional operating cost of the 135R's versus 767 into the mix to try
and
> > keep things even). That is a total of $4.6 billion you have just dumped
into
> > keeping the 135E's flying just until 2011.
>
> Er, no. As I understand it, you've converted them to Rs and kept them
flying
> until then.
>
> > At $200 mil per 767, that is the
> > equivalent of some 23 new 767's right there--over half of what the USAF
is
> > asking for in the first lot. If you go the lease route with the first
forty
> > tankers, you could cover a significant part of the overall lease cost
with
> > that money. And you are getting an aircraft that carries more fuel to
boot.
>
> Or you could take the $1 to $2 billion you saved by keeping the Es
unmodified
> and just start buying 767s (or what have you) outright, also saving
yourself the
> interest on the lease. We're talking about paying $2 billion per year on
the
> lease, which would buy 10 767s each and every year. As it was Boeing
claimed
> the lease was only going to allow us to start replacing 135Es about 3
years
> earlier than otherwise. In short, I think the lease stinks, as we don't
_need_
> the new a/c right away (whatever type), so leasing instead of buying makes
no
> sense, especially as were going to keep the a/c for so long.
>
> > > > Respective runway and
> > > > > ramp space requirements? PFI vs. military? Etc.
> > > >
> > > > Lose the outsourcing option from the get-go, IMO. Won't work for an
> > > > organization with the scope of tanking requirements that the USAF
has.
> > >
> > > Perhaps yes, perhaps no. Air bridge and training tanking doesn't
require
> > > military crewing. It's certainly an option worth looking at for at
least
> > some
> > > tanking requirements, if not all.
> >
> > I am not crazy about the idea of having a portion of the tanker force
> > unavailable for use in the T/O (and no, this is not the same as my below
> > posit regarding using the 767's for these roles--those 767's could just
as
> > well extend to the T/O where they provide full capacity tanking to USAF
> > assets, even with their (initially) marginal USN tanking support
> > capability).
>
> We have a portion of the tanker force that is unavailable for use in the
T/O
> now, according to an AF general -- the 135Es. There will always be
tankers that
> are involved with routine duties outside the T/O.
>
> <snip>
>
> > > > > Yes, they do, but the question remains, are 767s rather than
upgraded
> > Es
> > > > and
> > > > > later 7E7s the best way to go; what's the best mix, what % of
tankers
> > > > need to
> > > > > do which roles, how will the advent of UCAVs affect the need for
> > tankers
> > > > and the
> > > > > type mix, what effect will USAF F-35 buys have, etc. This needs
to be
> > > > properly
> > > > > studied.
> > > >
> > > > Again with the neverending studies? :-)
> > >
> > > What never-ending study? The USAF failed to do such a study in the
first
> > place,
> > > especially an AoA. The latter was predicted to take about 18 months,
but
> > the
> > > head of AQ&L (Wynne) says they'll probably push it and complete it by
> > December
> > > or so.
> >
> > I was referring to your DSB folks..."studies" was the term they used. As
in
> > "more than one".
>
> Because there are several still underway as we speak, looking at various
issues,
> most of them ordered by the SecDef. The AoA is one of them, and almost
> certainly the most important.
>
> <snip>
>
> > > > > I'm aware that the R&D will still apply, I'm worried about the
> > materiel
> > > > costs,
> > > > > which are only going to go up. If we need the capability, then
let's
> > just
> > > > buy
> > > > > it and get the purchase out of the way, instead of paying inflated
> > prices
> > > > later.
> > > >
> > > > Even if it delays entry further, meaning you are also going to be
paying
> > > > that higher O&M cost for the remaining E's even longer...?
> > >
> > > If that allows us to make a better decision for the long term, sure.
We
> > can get
> > > upgraded Es (Pacer Crag Rs) into service faster than we can get 767s.
> >
> > And pay some $3.6 billion for the privaledge of then having the longest
> > serving remaining KC-135's committed to an even longer period of
service.
>
> So? The Rs are only a year younger on average, and yet no one's raising a
big
> fuss about them hanging around until 2040. So we convert the Es, and
maybe
> start retiring them a few years earlier.
>
> > IMO, not a wise course of action--only to be used if the 767 deal gets
> > trashed due to both Boeing's stupid handling of what should have been a
done
> > deal by now and the involvement of politicos-with-axes-to-grind, like
> > McCain.
>
> Just which axe is McCain grinding, other than the one (widely shared) that
the
> lease makes no fiscal sense, and is essentially driven by the wish to give
> Boeing a bailout?
>
> > IMO, if that is the way it plays out, we will see the conversion to
> > R's, then a mindset of, "What? You want a *new* tanker, after we just
sank
> > all of that money into upgrading those last E models? Maybe next year we
> > might authorize a *study*..." set in, leaving the USAF in the lurch with
an
> > open-ended KC-135 tanker force, and the BUFF's being replaced before
they
> > are.
>
> If that winds up with us having equal or greater capability at equal or
lesser
> price, I'm all for it. Given the choice between multipoint-capable Rs now
and
> single point 767s (or whatever) later, I'd take the Rs, unless the
economics are
> are shown to go the other way. So far, I've seen no evidence that they
do,
> which is why I want to see an AoA done.
>
> <snip>
>
> > > > I am not as impressed with the summary of the DSB report as you are
(but
> > > > then again, I tend to weigh the advice of the folks actually tasked
to
> > fly
> > > > the missions a bit more than I do the DSB, GAO, etc).
> > >
> > > Seeing as how the DSB works for the Pentagon, and Rumsfeld is the guy
who
> > tasked
> > > them to do the study back in February, I put a bit more weight on
their
> > advice
> > > than you do. Especially since opponents of the 767 deal (McCain to
> > thefront)
> > > believed that the DSB was much too cosy with the military and Boeing
(the
> > DSB
> > > Chairman had to recuse himself because he was also a paid Boeing
> > consultant and
> > > had been mentioned in internal company e-mails back in Dec.2002/Jan.
2003
> > as
> > > willing to help push the deal), and fully expected them to support it.
I
> > > believe McCain's words were something along the lines of a "fox
guarding
> > the
> > > chickens." So yeah, when even they come out and say they that we've
got
> > time to
> > > do the study and the corrosion is manageable, I'm inclined to believe
> > them.
> >
> > Then we will have to agree to disagree on this point.
>
> Fair enough.
>
> <snip>
>
> > > > > > In the long run, yes. But is it worth slowing delivery up-front
even
> > > > further
> > > > > > than it already has been slowed?
> > > > >
> > > > > According to the DSB, we have the time.
> > > >
> > > > The DSB that claims, contrary to what the USAF LTG testified last
year,
> > that
> > > > the corrosion problem is readily in-hand...?
> > >
> > > the DSB's claim is based on the USAF unit doing the corrosion controls
> > data,
> > > let's remember. The situation isn't static, and they've gotten better
at
> > it
> > > since last year.
> >
> > You left out that whole "tolerate higher maintenance cost" part of the
DSB's
> > corrosion solution--I don't think that is a "minor" part of the equation
> > here, though the DSB apparently does given the off-hand way they worded
that
> > statement.
>
> See my reply to you where you made much the same point, above.
>
> > > > And thinks out-sourcing tanker
> > > > requirements is a fine idea?
> > >
> > > They're saying it's a viable option, it should be looked at in an AoA,
and
> > we've
> > > got the time to do so. No more, no less.
> >
> > If you "tolerate higher maintenance costs" you have that time.
>
> Yes, and lower acquisition costs.
>
> > > > I am not buying into either, at this point.
> > >
> > > Until the AoA is actually done, we have nothing to base a decision on
> > other than
> > > "because I think so," which IMO is a pretty poor way to spend billions
of
> > > dollars.
> >
> > DSB did not say they *thought* keeping the E models would be more
expensive
> > than what we are already paying--they said we would have to tolerate
higher
> > maintenance costs, period, while the "studies" (plural) take place.
>
> And the questions we need to answer are whether that is cheaper than
leasing
> 767s, buying them outright, buying something else down the road,
converting Es
> to Rs, or what have you. Makes sense to me - it may cost us a bit more
right
> now, but may save us a bundle down the road. Exactly the opposite applies
with
> leasing rather than buying 767s.
>
> <snip>
>
> > > > I remain unconvinced that AMC would throw a hissy fit if the USN
wanted
> > to
> > > > include a secondary tanking capability to its C-40B's.
> > >
> > > More likely, they'd suffer a rupture from laughing at the USN devoting
> > such a
> > > large proportion of its budget to paying the NRE for so few a/c of
such
> > limited
> > > performance (as tankers).
> >
> > Then the critical USN "requirement" that led off this thread...must be
more
> > of a "desire" than it is a "requirement".
>
> No, it just means that you spend your money wisely, and buying a few
"KC-40s" of
> limited performance and very high cost is anything but that.
>
> > > > > > Personally, I doubt the USAF would have put up a
> > > > > > fight if the USN had said they wanted to incorporate a secondary
> > > > refueling
> > > > > > capability in their C-40B's; just as the USN has been strangely
> > silent
> > > > over
> > > > > > the USAF talking about recreating an in-house stand-off jamming
> > > > capability.
> > > > >
> > > > > There is no way in hell that the USN would pay the R&D NRE for a
> > tanker
> > > > mod for
> > > > > their C-40s, with all their other needs.
> > > >
> > > > Exactly. So the lack of multi-point refuelers must not be such a
> > critical
> > > > one, eh?
> > >
> > > Since no one else is even considering buying 737s as tankers, and the
navy
> > is
> > > only buying a few (somewhere between 5 and 8, as best I can tell), the
> > navy
> > > would have to be nuts to make that kind of investment for so few a/c,
even
> > > assuming that they would be reasonable tankers. Given their limited
> > > payload/range and performance, I have my doubts they would be, but
it's
> > moot.
> >
> > They (C-40A--I goofed with the "B", which is one of the USAF models) are
> > replacing the C-9 in the USN; from what I gather, the plan is to replace
27
> > C-9's, and I doubt that 8 C-40's can do that. I read where one of the
> > military lobbying groups noted that the CNO wants to procure three per
year
> > (unspecified total delivery).
>
> I've been unable to find a definitive total number either. 5-8 I'm pretty
sure
> of, but beyond that everything seems tenuous. Kind of like how many
tankers the
> USAF needs, of what type, and when;-)
>
> > I am not sure the 737 would make a superior
> > tanker, either--my point was more in the line of, "If the USN is
*really*
> > worried about tanking capability for its aircraft, why have they not
moved
> > to increase their own in-house capability beyond buddy tanking and
C-130's,
> > especially when they have recently begun procuring a new dedicated land
> > based logistics support aircraft?" In other words, this a BIG priority
for
> > them--as long as somebody else is footing the bill, that is. Otherwise,
the
> > priority seems to be somwhere down in the weeds...
>
> The only way to settle this is to wait and see how the USAF reacts if,
after
> selecting whatever new tanker they pick, the USN says "hey, we want some
of
> those for ourselves, and here's the money." Myabe the USAF will say
"you're
> welcome, and thanks so much for helping out with the R&D." Or maybe
they'll get
> all territorial; it's not as if turf wars are dead just because we've been
> fighting real ones.
>
> Guy
>

[Kevin Brooks]

"Kevin Brooks" > wrote in message
...
>
> "Guy Alcala" > wrote in message
> . ..
> > Kevin Brooks wrote:
> >
> > > "Guy Alcala" > wrote in message
> > > . ..
> > > > Kevin Brooks wrote:
> > > >
> > > > > "Guy Alcala" > wrote in
message
> > > > > .. .
> > > > > > Sorry for the delayed reply -- it's been a busy week.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Kevin Brooks wrote:
> >
> > <snip corrosion lead-in>
> >
> > > > > You are forgetting the corrosion problems with the E
> models--corrosion
> > > tends
> > > > > to reduce fatigue life, too, IIRC from my long-ago materials
science
> > > > > classes...
> > > >
> > > > Corrosion is an issue with any a/c -- certainly the KC-135Rs as
well,
> > > which
> > > > (after all) were 135As before, just as the Es were.
> > > >
> > > > > It sounds to me like the only way you are going to get that long
> > > > > a life from the E's would be if you also replaced some structural
> > > components
> > > > > (meaning you are going even further than the old R model mods,
> IIRC).
> > > >
> > > > Why is corrosion and fatigue on the Es supposedly so much more
serious
> > > than the
> > > > Rs, when they all started out as 135As?
> > >
> > > I'd assume they are both going to exhibit corrosion problems, but
didn't
> the
> > > R's go through a significant IRAN as part of their upgrade?
> >
> > Not that I can find, but that's not definitive. Boeing replaced the
lower
> wing
> > skinsof 746 C/KC-135s, but that seems to have been applied to all models
> in
> > service. All I can figure is that the old nacelles and struts (from
707s)
> may be
> > causing the difference, which would go away if they were upgraded to Rs
> (which
> > get new struts and nacelles as well as engines).
> >
> > > The USAF, per
> > > those comments from the three-star last year, seems most concerned
with
> the
> > > E's.
> >
> > See above, or possibly just because the Es were less effective than the
> Rs, so
> > sure, say they're falling apart because of corrosion so we can buy new
> a/c.
> > You've got to come up with some justification.
>
> No, I don't have to. A serving USAF LTG made the statements quoted to
> you--the best you have offered in response is that the DSB says they can
> control the problem--if enough money is committed to maintenance on a
yearly
> basis. Duh. Doesn't it sound a bit odd to hear a response that says, "It
is
> not a problem--if we dump enough money into it annually throughout the
> remaining service life..."? That sounds like the very definition of a
> "problem" to me.
>

Ooops--late night! Hit the send key a bit early...

> >
> > <snip>
> >
> > > > > Wait a second--spend *more* money on trying to upgrade E's, while
> doing
> > > > > *another* study to determine if/when/how we replace the E's?
> > > >
> > > > What do you mean, _trying_ to upgrade the Es? We know perfectly
well
> how
> > > to
> > > > upgrade them -we've got 400+ prototypes in service, after all, with
> the
> > > R&D all
> > > > paid for.
> > >
> > > No, no, no--that was not what I meant. My point is that at this point
> > > tossing *more* money into the upgrade of the E models seems a bit
> > > shortsighted, when that same money (along with the savings accrued
from
> > > cheaper operating costs) could go towards purchasing new-build
> airframes. We
> > > did not have that option (or the money to make it happen) available
back
> > > when the original R program started--we do now.
> >
> > Actually, we don't have the money at the moment, which is why the whole
> lease
> > thing was suggested. But look at it another way -- might it make more
> sense to
> > upgrade some/all Es to Rs at far lower cost than than buying 767s, while
> we
> > perhaps decide to skip the 767 generation entirely and buy either a 7E7
> tanker,
> > or even a BWB one around 2015 or so, if the latter a/c is more suitable
in
> the
> > long term? Considering the difference in cost between upgrading an E to
a
> Pacer
> > Crag R vs. buying new KC-767s, it's going to take a considerable time (a
> couple
> > of decades, I imagine) for the O&M cost advantage of the latter to
> overcome
> > purchase cost advantageof the former, assuming that it ever does (at
least
> one
> > source claims that it won't).
> >

Pardon me for not inserting "or leasing" after "purchasing". Last I heard,
Boeing has gotten very quiet about the whole BWB concept, so I am not sure
how much confidence you can put into it. And again, after spending some $3.6
billion to upgrade the remaining E's (which still have that corrosion
"problem", albeit one that the DSB contends we can discount--if we are
willing to dump enough money into future maintenance...), how sure are you
that you will be able to get funding for *another* major tanker program in
short order?


> > > > > That sounds
> > > > > like a fine...bureaucratic solution? Even the GAO was saying in
the
> > > 1990's
> > > > > that the USAF needed to get off its duff and start planning the
> > > replacement
> > > > > of the KC-135E fleet.
> > > >
> > > > Sure. It didn't say what to replace them with.
> > >
> > > Nope. The USAF has said what they want to replace them with--you have
no
> > > trust in the USAF?
> >
> > The USAF said what it wanted to replace them with in 2001, when they had
> no
> > other US choice, and still haven't justified the _need_ to replace them
> now, vs.
> > other options. The assumptions have changed, as has the situation.

Guy, for gosh sakes--they *still* have no other domestic choice beside the
767! Your 7E7 has not even been *designed* yet, much less is it ready to
take to the skies in tanker mode.

> >
> > > > > Studies are great--unfortunately, they have a tendancy
> > > > > of becoming an ends-unto-themselves. We have a good proposal that
> the
> > > USAF
> > > > > has supported--it puts new airframes into the mission much more
> quickly
> > > than
> > > > > if we follow the "usual" method of purchasing new aircraft (of
> course,
> > > you
> > > > > could use the F/A-22 or F-35 model...which would mean if we
started
> that
> > > new
> > > > > study right now, we might plan on seeing some new tankers around
> > > what...2015
> > > > > at best?), and it takes advantage of an existing excess production
> > > > > capability/inventory at the only US company currently building
> aircraft
> > > of
> > > > > that class--sounds like a good plan to me.
> > > >
> > > > Who says we need new airframes _right_ now? As we both agree,
buying
> more
> > > pods
> > > > and converting more Rs to carry them is the best solution in the
short
> > > term to
> > > > the navy/Allies problem, while converting Es to Rs _may_ be the best
> > > solution
> > > > for increasing our tanker force in a hurry. Or it may not be,
> butsince
> > > the USAF
> > > > never did an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA), we don't know.
> > >
> > > Upgrading to R's does not do a great deal towards "increasing our
tanker
> > > force"--it instead is more of a "spend some money now to reduce O&M
> costs in
> > > the long run, and keep the force from being *reduced* as E models
> break". Of
> > > course, the 767 option does ptretty much the same thing--albeit with
an
> even
> > > greater reduction in operating costs, and a significantly better
> possibility
> > > of future upgrades (at what point does it become impractical to keep
> trying
> > > to modernize a 43 year old airframe?).
> >
> > You'd better ask Bufdrvr (or the Air Force) about that one;-) However,
I
> > disagree with your premise - upgrading Es to Rs does indeed increase our
> tanker
> > force, both by improving MC rates, and by increasing offload and
reducing
> runway
> > length requirements, just as the KC-767 would. The E is restricted by
> lack of
> > thrust in the amount of fuel it can lift off many runways, compared to
the
> R or
> > a 767 (Boeing claims the 767 can lift the same fuel load from a 4,000
foot
> > shorter runway). The A model was even worse, of course, being
essentially
> > useless during DS from most runways in the middle east. Hot and/or high
> has
> > become pretty typical for us, so tankers that have trouble operating
from
> such
> > fields are essentially operationally useless (which is what the USAF
> general
> > claiming that we needed the 767 to replace the Es said).

OK, you win. I vote we keep the KC-135 flying for another forty years--when
the wings start shedding from them in flight, maybe we can discuss replacing
them? Of course, you will guarantee that the ever increasing O&M costs, to
include that extra money required to solve that "non-problem" corrosion
situation, will be forthcoming every year, and that we can continue to
upgrade them as required throughout that period... Nah, just kidding.

This has been interesting, and informative; I hate to admit it ( :-) ), but
I have learned a few things in this thread--though nothing that convinces me
that either (a) we should not continue with procurement of the 767 tanker,
or (b) there is something critically wrong with procuring the first 40 767's
without multi-point capability up-front. And BTW--I don't find the assertion
that we could keep the E's flying "as is" very convincing--ISTR there are
real concerns over the availability of engines and related parts for the
existing powerplants, so if you wanna go the "keep the E's" route you are
realistically going to *have* to upgrade them.

Thanks for the info, and I appreciate the discourse.

Brooks

<snip what has become one of our more long-winded discussions>

[sameolesid]

Guy Alcala > wrote in message >...
> sameolesid wrote:
>
> <snip>
>
> > > Just had a look at AFPAM 10-1403, which among other things lists military and CRAF
> > > a/c types for various roles and missions. Fuel burn for generic planning purposes
> > > of a KC-135R is listed as 10,921 lbs./hr. A CRAF B-767 (sub-type unstated) is
> > > listed as
> > > 10,552 lb./hr. A tanker version would have more drag (boom, receptacle and various
> > > fairings, never mind wing pods), so fuel burn of the two types appears to be
> > > essentially equal.
> >
> > Real world fuel burn for a 767-200 planned for a transatlantic this
> > afternoon (15May) is 10,450 lbs per hour. Of course thats without pods
> > or a boom.
>
> Which engines?
>
> Guy

CF6's. The higher burns (>11,000) also due to payload/much longer
stagelength differences. The 767-200 is optimized for the
transatlantic market.

[Guy Alcala]

Kevin Brooks wrote:

<snip>

> This has been interesting, and informative; I hate to admit it ( :-) ), but
> I have learned a few things in this thread--though nothing that convinces me
> that either (a) we should not continue with procurement of the 767 tanker,
> or (b) there is something critically wrong with procuring the first 40 767's
> without multi-point capability up-front. And BTW--I don't find the assertion
> that we could keep the E's flying "as is" very convincing--ISTR there are
> real concerns over the availability of engines and related parts for the
> existing powerplants, so if you wanna go the "keep the E's" route you are
> realistically going to *have* to upgrade them.
>
> Thanks for the info, and I appreciate the discourse.

Kevin, since were both tired of arguing the same points while lacking the data,
here's a Congressional Research Service report from last September which
presents both sides' arguments, as well as showing the costs and what
assumptions went in to them, plus the effect on costs if any of those
assumptions change. See:

www.fas.org/man/crs/RL32056.pdf

Of interest, my WAG that the engine struts (pylons) on the Es might be the main
(extra) corrosion driver compared to the Rs was correct. I get lucky once in a
while. Also, the report mentioned that the navy was already contracting out
training and coast-to-coast tanking services, which I was unaware of. I haven't
yet found out who they're contracting with or what kind of a/c they're using.

Guy

[Guy Alcala]

Guy Alcala wrote:

<snip>

> Also, the report mentioned that the navy was already contracting out
> training and coast-to-coast tanking services, which I was unaware of. I haven't
> yet found out who they're contracting with or what kind of a/c they're using.

Found it. They're contracting with an Irish company called Omega Air, which
provides used 707-320s (they' got one or two in service so far) equipped with a pair
of centerline Sargent-Fletcher (apparently now owned by Cobham PLC, formerly
Flight-Refueling Ltd.) FR300 drogues. Omega has also apparently bought a fleet of
used DC-10s, and plans to convert some of them into tankers in the future. At the
moment, they're concentrating on hose-drogue refueling, both because the conversion
is easier and ceaper, and because most air forces use it. the following is a quote
from a 2001 AvLeak article:

"Following retirement of its Grumman KA-6D and Lockheed KS-3A tankers, the U.S. Navy
is exploring PFI operations through a recent $6.6 million air refueling contract
with Flight International, Inc. and Omega Air. This involves 600 hours of tanker, EW
training and other U.S. Navy support missions by Omega's dual probe-and-drogue
equipped Boeing 707-320 through October this year, with renewal options up to 2005.
These, and the USAF's massive KC-X requirement, are also hungrily earmarked for
early pursuit by the FTSA contenders, who have also briefed 10 or more other
countries on their
proposals."

This article apparently dates from 2000 so is a bit out of date, but it provides
some useful info:

http://www.nawcad.navy.mil/view_release.cfm?article_id=8

Guy

[Guy Alcala]

sameolesid wrote:

> Guy Alcala > wrote in message >...
> > sameolesid wrote:
> >
> > <snip>
> >
> > > > Just had a look at AFPAM 10-1403, which among other things lists military and CRAF
> > > > a/c types for various roles and missions. Fuel burn for generic planning purposes
> > > > of a KC-135R is listed as 10,921 lbs./hr. A CRAF B-767 (sub-type unstated) is
> > > > listed as
> > > > 10,552 lb./hr. A tanker version would have more drag (boom, receptacle and various
> > > > fairings, never mind wing pods), so fuel burn of the two types appears to be
> > > > essentially equal.
> > >
> > > Real world fuel burn for a 767-200 planned for a transatlantic this
> > > afternoon (15May) is 10,450 lbs per hour. Of course thats without pods
> > > or a boom.
> >
> > Which engines?
> >
> > Guy
>
> CF6's. The higher burns (>11,000) also due to payload/much longer
> stagelength differences. The 767-200 is optimized for the
> transatlantic market.

Thanks. I take it these are -200s and not -200ERs? It's not real critical, as I think we've established that fuel burn's a
wash, but do you happen to know which CF6 model they're fitted with? There are a few options, depending on the MTOW of the
particular a/c.

Guy

[Kevin Brooks]

"Guy Alcala" > wrote in message
.. .
> Kevin Brooks wrote:
>
> <snip>
>
> > This has been interesting, and informative; I hate to admit it ( :-) ),
but
> > I have learned a few things in this thread--though nothing that
convinces me
> > that either (a) we should not continue with procurement of the 767
tanker,
> > or (b) there is something critically wrong with procuring the first 40
767's
> > without multi-point capability up-front. And BTW--I don't find the
assertion
> > that we could keep the E's flying "as is" very convincing--ISTR there
are
> > real concerns over the availability of engines and related parts for the
> > existing powerplants, so if you wanna go the "keep the E's" route you
are
> > realistically going to *have* to upgrade them.
> >
> > Thanks for the info, and I appreciate the discourse.
>
> Kevin, since were both tired of arguing the same points while lacking the
data,
> here's a Congressional Research Service report from last September which
> presents both sides' arguments, as well as showing the costs and what
> assumptions went in to them, plus the effect on costs if any of those
> assumptions change. See:
>
> www.fas.org/man/crs/RL32056.pdf
>
> Of interest, my WAG that the engine struts (pylons) on the Es might be the
main
> (extra) corrosion driver compared to the Rs was correct. I get lucky once
in a
> while. Also, the report mentioned that the navy was already contracting
out
> training and coast-to-coast tanking services, which I was unaware of. I
haven't
> yet found out who they're contracting with or what kind of a/c they're
using.

I believe that would have been Omega Air, using a single 707 tanker; there
was some info about it floating around in some of the pubs at the time,
reporting its participation in an exercise or two.

Brooks

>
> Guy
>
>

[sameolesid]

Guy Alcala > wrote in message >...
>
> Thanks. I take it these are -200s and not -200ERs? It's not real critical, as I think we've established that fuel burn's a
> wash, but do you happen to know which CF6 model they're fitted with? There are a few options, depending on the MTOW of the
> particular a/c.
>
> Guy


They are 200ERs. AFAIK there are very few straight 200s. The engines
on these are CF6-80C2B4's.

[Guy Alcala]

sameolesid wrote:

> Guy Alcala > wrote in message >...
> >
> > Thanks. I take it these are -200s and not -200ERs? It's not real critical, as I think we've established that fuel burn's a
> > wash, but do you happen to know which CF6 model they're fitted with? There are a few options, depending on the MTOW of the
> > particular a/c.
> >
> > Guy
>
> They are 200ERs. AFAIK there are very few straight 200s. The engines
> on these are CF6-80C2B4's.

Thanks.

Guy