Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944 [Archive]

The Enlightenment

July 15th 04, 02:00 PM

"Bernardz" > wrote in message
news:MPG.1b5fa98a6738c8b2989adb@news...
> What sort of problems faced a defender in attempting to intercept and
> shoot down night bombers in 1944?
>
> I am interested both over Germany and Britain.
>
> --
> Logically we attempt to devise reasons for our irrational behaviour.
>
> Observations of Bernard - No 62
>

The Lufwaffe Nachtjakgt at faced a number of problems in intercepting
bombers depending on the period in question. At the beginning of the water
on radar was actually quite good possibly the most advanced in the world
they had radars such as Freya for long range detection and more accurate
radars such as Wurzburg for tracking individual targets accurately.
Somewhat later a very effective airborne interception radar known as
Lichtenstein came into use. The flaw with these radars was that they
actually utilised similar frequencies. Although the Germans were aware of
the use of chaff or window (they had developed their own version called
Duppel) such secrecy was placed upon Duppel that countermeasures were not
ready in time. In one stroke the RAF was able to jam all three radars. The
Luftwaffe for a time had to resort to wild boar tactics which involved
single engined fighters equipped with special navigation equipment but with
no radar.

The Germans were eventually able to develop counter countermeasures, for
instance wurzlaus was a device that relied on doppler effect to separate
moving targets from window, Nurenberg relied on propeler modulations.
They also had multiple alternate frequencies and frequency chirping against
against jamming. However in general they found it hard to keep up. Other
radars in use include Jagdschloss and Wasserman and Wurzburg Riese. One
problem of all of these radar systems was that they were big and expensive
although quite effective at long range detection of aircraft: (longwave
radar is in effect better than microwave radar for some purposes for
instance stealth technology is relatively ineffective against it.) These
long wave radars are extravagantly expensive. The whole system had to be
based on these expensive radars not just the early warning system.

Quite often when the German radar was working the link between the ground
and night fighter was not. This was in fact ion many occasions the most
serious problem. The introduction of the Bernhard-Bernhardine system
improve matters. This system was very jam proof it told a night fighter
exactly where was in that provided a secure telemetry to link the night
fighter with ground control by a ticker tape.

Because the German Lichtenstein radar had large aerials aircraft were slowed
down considerably this limited number of interceptions they were able to
achieve. Bomber command played on this by practising spoof and diversionary
rates: by the time the Germans worked out they had to burn up engines.

Ironically the Germans were ahead even in microwave radar. In 1934 they
tested 200mW microwave devices that could detect a Destroyer at over 1 km
but they could not produce enough power for more than this. Their microwave
and magnetron development team was disbanded in 1940 and workers sent into
the army! This team did have some good magnetrons but I believe they
probably only produced around 80 watts of power not the kilowatts required.
The team was hurriedly reassembled when a magnetron was discovered in a
crashed RAF bomber in Rotterdam.

The Nachtjagt remained of force to the end although it did not prevent the
destruction of Germany in every for instance an archivist could fly only 772
sorties during which they are shot down no fewer than 181 aircraft (equal
to 1.2 percent of the rating force) German losses were constant at 47 night
fighters.

The night fighter pilots maintained high morale and motivation to the end.
In five years this arm of the Luftwaffe underwent greater technical and
tactical change than any other branch of the Armed Forces.

Krztalizer

July 15th 04, 04:32 PM

>The Lufwaffe Nachtjakgt

Well that looks interesting.

> The
>Luftwaffe for a time had to resort to wild boar tactics which involved
>single engined fighters equipped with special navigation equipment but with
>no radar.

The 'special navigation equipment' carried on Wilde Sau Bf 109s and FW 190s
consisted of a UV lamp and specially coated maps. The special nav features of
the FuG 16Z were not utilized because they would have required a personal
controller for each "Boar", so instead they were following the Reichjägerweile
(general information fighter broadcast - "The four-motor bombers are
approaching Kassel; all aircraft within range, strong raid approaching Kassel",
that sort of thing. No naviads in the cockpits of the Wilde Sau airmen I have
interviewed.

>Quite often when the German radar was working the link between the ground
>and night fighter was not.

They were being jammed and intruded upon for the last two years of the war.
When the voice RT was 'stepped on', most NJ pilots had their bordfunkers switch
to Morse, which was not as easier to operate in a dirty environment.

> The introduction of the Bernhard-Bernhardine system
>improve matters. This system was very jam proof it told a night fighter
>exactly where was in that provided a secure telemetry to link the night
>fighter with ground control by a ticker tape.

One cool part of that system is that it was the first on earth to provide a
blind landing capability, when hooked to a three-axis autopilot. The Interim
Nightfighter (Me 262 B-1a/U1) 'version 2' carried this setup, as did a couple
captured Ju 88 nightfighters.

Berndard was essentially an early datalink system intended for large bombers
but it evolved into a fighter director.that was quite advanced for its day.

>Because the German Lichtenstein radar had large aerials aircraft were slowed
>down considerably this limited number of interceptions they were able to
>achieve.

Crews often scored 4, 5, or even more Abschusse in a single sortie. Other
Experten crews managed up to 7. Faster speed does not help a radar
interception of a slow target in low/zero visibility.

>
>The night fighter pilots maintained high morale and motivation to the end.
>In five years this arm of the Luftwaffe underwent greater technical and
>tactical change than any other branch of the Armed Forces.

Probably true, although it should be weighed against the groud attack arm of
the airforce, that started the war in some cases with Henschel biplanes and
open cockpits and ended with Jets.

v/r
Gordon
<====(A+C====>
USN SAR

Its always better to lose -an- engine, not -the- engine.

Bill Shatzer

July 15th 04, 09:09 PM

Joel Ehrlich ) writes:

> Or prehaps to greater effect, reinstalling the belly turrets they had removed
> as "un-needed".

Did RAF bombers -ever- have belly turrets?

Certainly none of the "heavies". It was the dorsal turret which
was discontinued on some models.

--

"Cave ab homine unius libri"

M. J. Powell

July 15th 04, 10:01 PM

In message >, WalterM140
> writes
>>
>
>
>The Brits are hyper-defensive about the effect on target. The German war
>machine was not significantly hindered by the British Area Campaign. The
>Germans expended much fewer resources to defend than the Brits did to atttack.

Remind us again about the numbers of AA personnel and 88mm that were
considered necessary?

Mike
--
M.J.Powell

July 15th 04, 11:08 PM

"Krztalizer" > wrote in message
...
> Hi, Tom.
>
> > Sir, My father flew nightfighters during WW2 in the European theater,
> >(Beaufighters, then P-61's)
>
> Soo, he was in the 415th or 422nd NFS, stationed in the Med and later
> England/Belgium...? There is a small organization for P-61 crews that he
may
> already know about. If not, I can put you/him in touch with the guys.
>
> > though I'm not familiar with either of those
> >books,I wonder if they could shed some light on his service to our
country.
>
> You have to buy a book called "Queen of the Midnight Skies", about early
US
> nightfighter efforts, particularly in the theater of war that your dad
> experienced. Although the book is skewed toward the P-61 (*Badly*), the
> authors interviewed dozens of survivors and give a great insider's view of
the
> US entry into this new field of combat.
>
> >I've got a few medals but have no idea what he did to deserve them.
>
> We can find out - sure about that.
>
> >I'm not
> >even sure what they are, one says DFC or something like that on the back,
> >the other is a silver star and two purple hearts. (I know what the Hearts
> >are for, duh!) Is there any way that you know of where I could "actually"
> >find out. He's been gone for over thirty years and I always wondered what
he
> >did to get them. Sorry if this comes off a little lame but I saw the
> >nightfighter thread and got interested...
>
> Not lame at all - this is what most of us are "here" for.
>
> >BTW- As an xPanAm crew chief, you're completely correct, not the engine
is
> >"way better", though I've seen a few that did just that.
>
> As a sidelight to the other thread (Extremis Intercomm), the worst thing I
> heard on the radio out at sea was an A-7 gent announcing to the world,
"I'm
> passing through 3,000 feet and I'm in a #$^$#ing GLIDER!"
>
> My advice is to ALWAYS bring a second engine - you never know when it will
> become your *only* engine.
>
> Pleasure to meet you, Tom. Hope we can help you.
>
> v/r
> Gordon
> <====(A+C====>
> USN SAR
>
> Its always better to lose -an- engine, not -the- engine.
>
Thanks, I really appreciate your help. IIRC, my Dad flew Beaufighters for 6
or 7 months then was switched to P-61's. I do remember him telling me he was
shot down once returning to base by allied AAA! and he was in Belgium. The
415th sounds really familiar,if my Mom ever gets off the web I'll call her
and find out the particulars. ( I should have never given her that
computer!!) Oh, one thing else I remember, his flight jacket had an emblem
of an owl(bird of some kind) holding a tommygun looking around in the dark
with a flashlight or a candle. I know I still have it packed away somewhere,
I'll look and see if I can find it. Once again, Thanks.

Tom

BTW- doing an Amazon on the book right now...

Brian Colwell

July 16th 04, 03:11 AM

"Bill Shatzer" > wrote in message
...
> Joel Ehrlich ) writes:
>
> > Or prehaps to greater effect, reinstalling the belly turrets they had
removed
> > as "un-needed".
>
> Did RAF bombers -ever- have belly turrets?
>
> Certainly none of the "heavies". It was the dorsal turret which
> was discontinued on some models.
>
> --
>
>
> "Cave ab homine unius libri"

The only one I can think of was the Handley Page Hampden.....Didn't have a
very good reputation !!!

BMC

ArtKramr

July 16th 04, 03:51 AM

>Subject: Re: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944
>From: "Brian Colwell"
>Date: 7/15/2004 7:11 PM Pacific Standard Time
>Message-id: <VOGJc.35269$od7.1641@pd7tw3no>
>
>
>"Bill Shatzer" > wrote in message
...
>> Joel Ehrlich ) writes:
>>
>> > Or prehaps to greater effect, reinstalling the belly turrets they had
>removed
>> > as "un-needed".
>>
>> Did RAF bombers -ever- have belly turrets?
>>
>> Certainly none of the "heavies". It was the dorsal turret which
>> was discontinued on some models.
>>
>> --
>>
>>
>> "Cave ab homine unius libri"
>
>The only one I can think of was the Handley Page Hampden.....Didn't have a
>very good reputation !!!
>
>BMC

We offered to give the Brits B-17's each with a big fat belly turret.They
wouldn't take them. Big mistake.

Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

Guy Alcala

July 16th 04, 04:24 AM

Bill Shatzer wrote:

> Joel Ehrlich ) writes:
>
> > Or prehaps to greater effect, reinstalling the belly turrets they had removed
> > as "un-needed".
>
> Did RAF bombers -ever- have belly turrets?
>
> Certainly none of the "heavies". It was the dorsal turret which
> was discontinued on some models.

That's not quite correct. Lancasters had belly turrets, but they were being
removed or left off in early '44 to improve performance, and because there was
little perceived need for them. Except for the Canadians in 6 Group, who were
re-installing them. Some a/c (Lancs for sure, I forget whether Halifaxes did also)
had a flexible Vickers K gun mounted in the (empty) radar bulge early on, when H2S
production was running behind that of the fairings.

Guy

Guy Alcala

July 16th 04, 04:44 AM

Keith Willshaw wrote:

> "WalterM140" > wrote in message
> ...

<snip>

> > The British had to suspend their night ops over Germany. That's not well
> known
> > because they were put onto invasion targets in the same time frame.
>
> Probably because its untrue
>
> The simple fact is that during March 1944 bomber command flew a total
> of 9031 sorties with a loss rate of under 4%. Nuremburg was indeed a
> disaster
> but an isolated one. The following month the number of sorties was HIGHER
> and losses were around 2.6%.
>
> Raids on Germany occurred on almost every night with raids being made on
> Berlin , Hanover, Osnabruck, Dusseldorf, Kiel and Cologne.

To be sure, deep penetration raids much beyond the Ruhr would have been stopped
in April for the next several months in any case, because the nights were
getting too short to allow them. Post-invasion the situation changed. With
total allied air superiority by day, and allied fighters (and ground troops)
well forward on the continent (from September 1944), it was possible to go
deeper on shorter nights, at least for targets in southern Germany, because the
bombers had to spend far less time over enemy territory. And the nights were
getting longer again, in any case.

> Examples include :-
>
> Cologne - raided on 20th by 357 Lancasters and 22 Mosquitos of Nos 1, 3, 6
> and 8 Groups. 4 Lancasters lost. This concentrated attack fell into areas of
> Cologne which were north and west of the city centre and partly industrial
> in nature. 192 industrial premises suffered various degrees of damage,
> together with 725 buildings described as 'dwelling-houses with commercial
> premises attached'. 7 railway stations or yards were also severely damaged
>
> Dusseldorf - heavily hit on the 22nd by 596 aircraft - 323 Lancasters, 254
> Halifaxes, 19 Mosquitos - of all groups except No 5. 29 aircraft - 16
> Halifaxes and 13 Lancasters - lost, 4.9 percent of the force. 2,150 tons of
> bombs were dropped in this heavy attack on a German city which caused much
> destruction. The attack fell mostly in the northern districts of Düsseldorf.
> Widespread damage was caused. On the same evening 238 Lancasters and 17
> Mosquitos of No 5 Group and 10 Lancasters of No 1 Group were despatched to
> Brunswick. Few German fighters were attracted to this raid and only 4
> Lancasters were lost, 1.5 per cent of the force
>
> Karlsruhe - 24 April was attacked by 637 aircraft - 369 Lancasters, 259
> Halifaxes, 9 Mosquitos of all groups except No 5 Group. 19 aircraft - 11
> Lancasters, 8 Halifaxes - lost, 3.0 per cent of the force
>
> Essen - 26 April was bombed by 493 aircraft 342 Lancasters, 133 Halifaxes,
> 18 Mosquitos.
> 7 aircraft - 6 Lancasters, 1 Halifax were lost, 1.4 per cent of the force.

Which perfectly illustrates that most of the raids were to the Ruhr or similar
distances, only Karslruhe being somewhat beyond that, on the line Kiel -
Hannover - Karlsruhe. And Karlsruhe is very close to the French border, where
shot down aircrew, at least, had some chance of evading.

Guy

Jack

July 16th 04, 05:26 AM

ArtKramr wrote:

> We offered to give the Brits B-17's each with a big fat belly turret.
> They wouldn't take them. Big mistake.

I presume they did so because they preferred some other aircraft (or
weapon system) which we also offered. Do you know what the preferred
alternative might have been?

Perhaps they wished to avoid large manning requirements and sought
aircraft with fewer required crew positions.

Jack

Guy Alcala

July 16th 04, 06:04 AM

Jack wrote:

> ArtKramr wrote:
>
> > We offered to give the Brits B-17's each with a big fat belly turret.
> > They wouldn't take them. Big mistake.
>
> I presume they did so because they preferred some other aircraft (or
> weapon system) which we also offered. Do you know what the preferred
> alternative might have been?
>
> Perhaps they wished to avoid large manning requirements and sought
> aircraft with fewer required crew positions.

The British used B-17s in combat before we ever did. They were B-17Cs which
were used by day, but proved to be less than wonderful. Contrary to Art's
assertion, Bomber Command did operate some B-17Gs, but they were used by
100 Group (electronic countermeasures), not as part of the main force.
Coastal Command also used them, but the B-17 was less suited to night
bombing than the British a/c, barring considerable modifications. Given
that the B-17 was preferred by the 8th AF for daytime missions over the
B-24, and the B-24 was preferred in the Pacific and for various other
roles, there was no good reason for RAF Bomber Command to use them in
preference to the Lancaster and Halifax.

Guy

WalterM140

July 16th 04, 11:34 AM

>> Not having enough aviation fuel was a big problem late in 1944. Earlier,
>the
>> Germans had a pretty good handle on it, as the 3/30/44 raid to Nuremburg
>> showed.
>>
>> They nightfighters whacked at least 80 Brit bombers, total lost that
>night
>> 94-96.
>>
>> The British had to suspend their night ops over Germany. That's not well
>known
>> because they were put onto invasion targets in the same time frame.
>
>Probably because its untrue
>
>The simple fact is that during March 1944 bomber command flew a total
>of 9031 sorties with a loss rate of under 4%. Nuremburg was indeed a
>disaster
>but an isolated one.

The RAF definitely was defeated over Germany by the Luftwaffe in the Spring of
1944. Being put onto invasion targets has obscured this fact.

"Bomber Command had lost 4,160 aircraft missing and crashed in England.
Harris's failure to bring Germany to her knees, and the cost of his failure,
had become embarrassingly evident to every man but himself.

And in a letter to
the Air Ministry on April 7, 1944, he came as close as ever in his life to
conceding that he was in deep trouble:

'The strength of the German defenses [he wrote] would in time reach a point at
which night-bombing attacks by existing methods and types of heavy bombers
would involve percentage casualty rates which in the long run could not be
sustained...we have not yet reached that point, but tactical innovations which
have so far postponed it are now practically exhausted....'

This was a preamble to a demand for ten suadrons of night fighters to support
his bombers. It was the final admission of defeat for the Trenchard
doctrine....Now Bomber Command had discovered that even night operations
against Germany could no longer be continued on their existing basis unless the
enemy's night-fighter force could be crippled of destroyed."

--Bomber Command, p. 308 by Max Hastings

The Americans also had to stop deep penetrations inot Germany (they had made
precious few) until they got Mustangs and longer-legged P47's and also some
P-38's.

It's a tragedy that the USAAF had a long range escort within its grasp even in
1942, and didn't see it. That was the P-38. A P-38 group was sent to England
in 1942 but wound up in Africa after Torch. The VIIIth fighter CG, Hunter,
wanted to concentrate on the P-47. This was a big mistake. It was shown that
even a few dozen P-38's could break up the massed attacks by the Germans. But
they weren't supported, nor was the idea pushed. Eaker seemed to think that
some magic number of B-17's could be self-defending. That ultimately cost him
his job.

To get back on target, so to speak, the Americans got back over Germany by
adding the long range fighter (and new commanders) to the mix. The RAF had no
such solution.

Walt

Damian

July 16th 04, 12:02 PM

<snip>
>> Soo, he was in the 415th or 422nd NFS, stationed in the Med and later
>> England/Belgium...?
<snip>
The
>415th sounds really familiar,... his flight jacket had an emblem
>of an owl(bird of some kind) holding a tommygun looking around in the dark
>with a flashlight or a candle.

From this iste, 415th or 420th patches seem to match the description :
http://members.aol.com/brimiljeep/WebPages/SquadronPatchAAF2Page.html

Damian

Keith Willshaw

July 16th 04, 01:03 PM

"ArtKramr" > wrote in message
...
> >Subject: Re: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944

>
> We offered to give the Brits B-17's each with a big fat belly turret.They
> wouldn't take them. Big mistake.

The RAF operated at least one squadron of B-17's and a number of B-24's
Bomber command were NOT impressed by the type and operated them
mainly as EW aircraft jamming German communications

Keith

Keith Willshaw

July 16th 04, 01:38 PM

"WalterM140" > wrote in message
...
> >> Not having enough aviation fuel was a big problem late in 1944.
Earlier,
> >the
> >> Germans had a pretty good handle on it, as the 3/30/44 raid to
Nuremburg
> >> showed.
> >>
> >> They nightfighters whacked at least 80 Brit bombers, total lost that
> >night
> >> 94-96.
> >>
> >> The British had to suspend their night ops over Germany. That's not
well
> >known
> >> because they were put onto invasion targets in the same time frame.
> >
> >Probably because its untrue
> >
> >The simple fact is that during March 1944 bomber command flew a total
> >of 9031 sorties with a loss rate of under 4%. Nuremburg was indeed a
> >disaster
> >but an isolated one.
>
> The RAF definitely was defeated over Germany by the Luftwaffe in the
Spring of
> 1944. Being put onto invasion targets has obscured this fact.
>
> "Bomber Command had lost 4,160 aircraft missing and crashed in England.
> Harris's failure to bring Germany to her knees, and the cost of his
failure,
> had become embarrassingly evident to every man but himself.
>

Bull**** - losses in the first 4 months of 1944 were as follows

Month Lost Crashed %Loss
January 314 38 5.6
Febuary 199 21 5.2
March 283 39 3.6
April 214 25 2.4

During this period the B-17's of US 8th AF were suffering very
similar loss rates. For example on the 19th Jan 1944 the USAAF
dispatched 675 B-17's and 188 B-24's to Frankfurt with an escort
of 89 P-38's, 503 P-47's and 40 P-51's

34 B-17's and B-24's were lost , a loss rate of 3.94 %

> And in a letter to
> the Air Ministry on April 7, 1944, he came as close as ever in his life to
> conceding that he was in deep trouble:
>
> 'The strength of the German defenses [he wrote] would in time reach a
point at
> which night-bombing attacks by existing methods and types of heavy bombers
> would involve percentage casualty rates which in the long run could not be
> sustained...we have not yet reached that point, but tactical innovations
which
> have so far postponed it are now practically exhausted....'
>

So in fact in the spring of 1944 he is saying he has NOT been defeated,

> This was a preamble to a demand for ten suadrons of night fighters to
support
> his bombers. It was the final admission of defeat for the Trenchard
> doctrine....Now Bomber Command had discovered that even night operations
> against Germany could no longer be continued on their existing basis
unless the
> enemy's night-fighter force could be crippled of destroyed."
>

On the contrary it was a way of ensuring that he got his night fighters,
and it worked.

> --Bomber Command, p. 308 by Max Hastings
>
> The Americans also had to stop deep penetrations inot Germany (they had
made
> precious few) until they got Mustangs and longer-legged P47's and also
some
> P-38's.
>
> It's a tragedy that the USAAF had a long range escort within its grasp
even in
> 1942, and didn't see it. That was the P-38. A P-38 group was sent to
England
> in 1942 but wound up in Africa after Torch. The VIIIth fighter CG,
Hunter,
> wanted to concentrate on the P-47. This was a big mistake. It was shown
that
> even a few dozen P-38's could break up the massed attacks by the Germans.
But
> they weren't supported, nor was the idea pushed. Eaker seemed to think
that
> some magic number of B-17's could be self-defending. That ultimately cost
him
> his job.
>
> To get back on target, so to speak, the Americans got back over Germany by
> adding the long range fighter (and new commanders) to the mix. The RAF
had no
> such solution.
>

Horsefeathers.

The RAF returned to bombing German targets after D-Day as
did the US 8th AF. Ask any surviving German night fighter pilot
about the RAF response, the Mosquito intruders caused them
terrible losses.

Keith

ArtKramr

July 16th 04, 03:13 PM

>Subject: Re: Night bombers interception....
>From: Jack
>Date: 7/15/2004 9:26 PM Pacific Standard Time
>Message-id: >
>
>ArtKramr wrote:
>
>> We offered to give the Brits B-17's each with a big fat belly turret.
> > They wouldn't take them. Big mistake.
>
>I presume they did so because they preferred some other aircraft (or
>weapon system) which we also offered. Do you know what the preferred
>alternative might have been?
>
>Perhaps they wished to avoid large manning requirements and sought
>aircraft with fewer required crew positions.
>
>
>Jack
>

They sacrificed everything for max bomb load. Armor, armament everything. Even
their crews. But they flew at night to cut their losses, sacrificing accuracy
and effectiveness. There will always be an England (sheesh)

Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

ArtKramr

July 16th 04, 03:24 PM

>Subject: Re: Night bombers interception....
>From: Guy Alcala
>Date: 7/15/2004 10:04 PM Pacific Standard Time
>Message-id: >
>
>Jack wrote:
>
>> ArtKramr wrote:
>>
>> > We offered to give the Brits B-17's each with a big fat belly turret.
>> > They wouldn't take them. Big mistake.
>>
>> I presume they did so because they preferred some other aircraft (or
>> weapon system) which we also offered. Do you know what the preferred
>> alternative might have been?
>>
>> Perhaps they wished to avoid large manning requirements and sought
>> aircraft with fewer required crew positions.
>
>The British used B-17s in combat before we ever did. They were B-17Cs which
>were used by day, but proved to be less than wonderful. Contrary to Art's
>assertion, Bomber Command did operate some B-17Gs, but they were used by
>100 Group (electronic countermeasures), not as part of the main force.
>Coastal Command also used them, but the B-17 was less suited to night
>bombing than the British a/c, barring considerable modifications. Given
>that the B-17 was preferred by the 8th AF for daytime missions over the
>B-24, and the B-24 was preferred in the Pacific and for various other
>roles, there was no good reason for RAF Bomber Command to use them in
>preference to the Lancaster and Halifax.
>
>Guy
>

They never used them where they really needed them against night fighter attack
with their big fat 50 caliber Browning heavy machine guns. The German planes
were never well armored enough to withstand the American 50's. The war at night
would have gone a lot better for the Brits with B-17's..and their belly turrets
with powerful twin 50's. Have you ever seen a German fighter take the full
blast from American twin 50's? It's a beautiful sight to see and a lovely
emotional experience never to be forgotten.

Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

ArtKramr

July 16th 04, 03:27 PM

>Subject: Re: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944
>From: "Keith Willshaw"
>Date: 7/16/2004 5:03 AM Pacific Standard Time
>Message-id: >
>
>
>"ArtKramr" > wrote in message
...
>> >Subject: Re: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944
>
>>
>> We offered to give the Brits B-17's each with a big fat belly turret.They
>> wouldn't take them. Big mistake.
>
>The RAF operated at least one squadron of B-17's and a number of B-24's
>Bomber command were NOT impressed by the type and operated them
>mainly as EW aircraft jamming German communications
>
>Keith

They were getting the **** shot out of them every night as they flew planes
with no belly turrets. And hey used the planes with belly turrrets, B-17's and
B-24's for electronic jammimg? Brilliant. Just brilliant.

Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

The Enlightenment

July 16th 04, 03:59 PM

"Krztalizer" > wrote in message
...
> >The Lufwaffe Nachtjakgt
>
> Well that looks interesting.
>
> > The
> >Luftwaffe for a time had to resort to wild boar tactics which involved
> >single engined fighters equipped with special navigation equipment but
with
> >no radar.
>
> The 'special navigation equipment' carried on Wilde Sau Bf 109s and FW
190s
> consisted of a UV lamp and specially coated maps. The special nav
features of
> the FuG 16Z were not utilized because they would have required a personal
> controller for each "Boar", so instead they were following the
Reichjägerweile
> (general information fighter broadcast - "The four-motor bombers are
> approaching Kassel; all aircraft within range, strong raid approaching
Kassel",
> that sort of thing. No naviads in the cockpits of the Wilde Sau airmen I
have
> interviewed.

I believe these aircraft had artificial horizons, the FuG 16Z, ultraviolet
or Radium instrumentation dials. Protecting a fighter pilots night vision
was all important, the Luftwaffe even had a device to measure the speed of
recovery of eyes after being illuminated by light. The the the wild sow
hunted aircraft that had been caught in searchlights. They did perform
ground controled interceptions that this was of course limited by the number
of Wurzburg radars and oppertators: I believe mosquitoes were the main
target. The Me 109G6 U4N was equipped with Naxos to home onto bomber
emisions and to also home back to homebase. This type was little used
because it came at the end of wild sow tactics when the Luftwaffe had
managed to get its radars working again. I believe that great of squadrons
in training was between 20 to 75 percent. Finnish pilots trained by the
Germans in night fighting had only a 10 percent death rate simply because
they were far better trained to start with.

The correct translation of "Wilde Sau" Wild Sow not Wild Boar. It alludes
to the wild sow's willingness to aggressively defend its young.

>
> Quite often when the German radar was working the link between the
ground
> >and night fighter was not.
>
> They were being jammed and intruded upon for the last two years of the
war.
> When the voice RT was 'stepped on', most NJ pilots had their bordfunkers
switch
> to Morse, which was not as easier to operate in a dirty environment.
>
> > The introduction of the Bernhard-Bernhardine system
> >improve matters. This system was very jam proof it told a night fighter
> >exactly where was in that provided a secure telemetry to link the night
> >fighter with ground control by a ticker tape.
>
> One cool part of that system is that it was the first on earth to provide
a
> blind landing capability, when hooked to a three-axis autopilot. The
Interim
> Nightfighter (Me 262 B-1a/U1) 'version 2' carried this setup, as did a
couple
> captured Ju 88 nightfighters.

It is a fascinating system. I Would like to know the technology of it? I
have read that the Luftwaffe was heading towards fully automatic
interceptions, this system was perhaps only one step away.

You have any information on the German EGON system which was similar to
"oboe". This was quite an advanced night bombing device on the Luftwaffe's
side but I am not sure where it was used if ever.

>
> Berndard was essentially an early datalink system intended for large
bombers
> but it evolved into a fighter director.that was quite advanced for its
day.
>
> >Because the German Lichtenstein radar had large aerials aircraft were
slowed
> >down considerably this limited number of interceptions they were able to
> >achieve.
>
> Crews often scored 4, 5, or even more Abschusse in a single sortie. Other
> Experten crews managed up to 7. Faster speed does not help a radar
> interception of a slow target in low/zero visibility.

The ideal situation occurred when the night fighter pilots managed to
infiltrate into the middle of the bomber stream, it was in this situation
that these multiple victories occurred. In the middle of the bomber stream
jamming and window was minimal. I believe diversionary raids however
frequently lead the night fighters on a fruitless chase: they often were led
to the wrong city and then lacked the speed to defend the correct one in
time.

>
> >
> >The night fighter pilots maintained high morale and motivation to the
end.
> >In five years this arm of the Luftwaffe underwent greater technical and
> >tactical change than any other branch of the Armed Forces.
>
> Probably true, although it should be weighed against the groud attack arm
of
> the airforce, that started the war in some cases with Henschel biplanes
and
> open cockpits and ended with Jets.

>
> v/r
> Gordon
> <====(A+C====>
> USN SAR
>
> Its always better to lose -an- engine, not -the- engine.
>

Steve Mellenthin

July 16th 04, 04:39 PM

>They were getting the **** shot out of them every night as they flew planes
>with no belly turrets. And hey used the planes with belly turrrets, B-17's
>and
>B-24's for electronic jammimg? Brilliant. Just brilliant.
>
>
>
>Arthur Kramer

Art,

Going back to an earlier discussion on encountering AAA on a bomb run, I have
always wondered if large formations all on the same run-in headig was an
appropriate tactic for a medium (attack) bomber such as the B-26. It always
seemed to me that smaller flights on different target approach headings might
be more effective for and that the danger of a mid-air in between formations
might be less than the danger of flak in a bomber stream on a predictable
flight path. This is what the B-52s went to in Linebacker II to cut losses.
There is a tacit assumption of a good measure of air superiority in my
question.

Steve

ArtKramr

July 16th 04, 05:06 PM

>Subject: Re: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944
>From: (Steve Mellenthin)
>Date: 7/16/2004 8:39 AM Pacific Standard Time
>Message-id: >
>
>>They were getting the **** shot out of them every night as they flew planes
>>with no belly turrets. And hey used the planes with belly turrrets, B-17's
>>and
>>B-24's for electronic jammimg? Brilliant. Just brilliant.
>>
>>
>>
>>Arthur Kramer
>
>Art,
>
>Going back to an earlier discussion on encountering AAA on a bomb run, I have
>always wondered if large formations all on the same run-in headig was an
>appropriate tactic for a medium (attack) bomber such as the B-26. It always
>seemed to me that smaller flights on different target approach headings might
>be more effective for and that the danger of a mid-air in between formations
>might be less than the danger of flak in a bomber stream on a predictable
>flight path. This is what the B-52s went to in Linebacker II to cut losses.
>There is a tacit assumption of a good measure of air superiority in my
>question.
>
>Steve

Massed bombers in tight formation drop large, tight bomb patterns on the gound
for maximum destruction against targets.
We did that quite effectively so we just kept doing it.

Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

OXMORON1

July 16th 04, 05:13 PM

smartace11 wrote:

>Going back to an earlier discussion on encountering AAA on a bomb run, I have
>always wondered if large formations all on the same run-in headig was an
>appropriate tactic for a medium (attack) bomber such as the B-26. It always
>seemed to me that smaller flights on different target approach headings might
>be more effective for and that the danger of a mid-air in between formations
>might be less than the danger of flak in a bomber stream on a predictable
>flight path. This is what the B-52s went to in Linebacker II to cut losses.
>There is a tacit assumption of a good measure of air superiority in my
>question.
>
I suggest that the bombing radar system in a B-52 was more reliable/efficient
than the navigation methods and Norden bombsight that Art had available to him
during WWII. Especially considering that, IIRC, the VN B-52 raids were night
missions, fewer airplanes. Weather and selection of IPs was not as critical as
in WWII.
Also consider the B-52s had two navigators and more training than Art's
contemporaries. Different war, different systems, different all the way around.

Rick Clark

ArtKramr

July 16th 04, 05:22 PM

>Subject: Re: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944
>From: (OXMORON1)
>Date: 7/16/2004 9:13 AM Pacific Standard Time
>Message-id: >
>
>smartace11 wrote:
>
>>Going back to an earlier discussion on encountering AAA on a bomb run, I
>have
>>always wondered if large formations all on the same run-in headig was an
>>appropriate tactic for a medium (attack) bomber such as the B-26. It always
>>seemed to me that smaller flights on different target approach headings
>might
>>be more effective for and that the danger of a mid-air in between formations
>>might be less than the danger of flak in a bomber stream on a predictable
>>flight path. This is what the B-52s went to in Linebacker II to cut losses.
>>There is a tacit assumption of a good measure of air superiority in my
>>question.
>>
>I suggest that the bombing radar system in a B-52 was more reliable/efficient
>than the navigation methods and Norden bombsight that Art had available to
>him
>during WWII. Especially considering that, IIRC, the VN B-52 raids were night
>missions, fewer airplanes. Weather and selection of IPs was not as critical
>as
>in WWII.
>Also consider the B-52s had two navigators and more training than Art's
>contemporaries. Different war, different systems, different all the way
>around.
>
>Rick Clark
>

We did the best we could with what we had. And I guess we didn't do too bad
since we won that war. (sigh)

Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

Steve Mellenthin

July 16th 04, 05:23 PM

>>Going back to an earlier discussion on encountering AAA on a bomb run, I
>have
>>always wondered if large formations all on the same run-in headig was an
>>appropriate tactic for a medium (attack) bomber such as the B-26. It always
>>seemed to me that smaller flights on different target approach headings
>might
>>be more effective for and that the danger of a mid-air in between formations
>>might be less than the danger of flak in a bomber stream on a predictable
>>flight path. This is what the B-52s went to in Linebacker II to cut losses.
>>There is a tacit assumption of a good measure of air superiority in my
>>question.
>>
>>Steve
>
>
>Massed bombers in tight formation drop large, tight bomb patterns on the
>gound
>for maximum destruction against targets.
>We did that quite effectively so we just kept doing it.
>
>
>
>Arthur Kramer

That is what I have read in the literature but my question is could losses been
reduced without compromising accuracy. I understand the principle of
concentration of force but I am wondering, from a hypothetical standpoint, if
there were possibly other tactics that could have been more effective that
weren't used. Mass formations of bombers was a signature formation for the
bomber trade, at least in our AF, but it has been demonstrated that it may not
be the best tactic. I am just wondering what you opinion was in that regard.

OXMORON1

July 16th 04, 05:30 PM

Art wrote:
>We did the best we could with what we had. And I guess we didn't do too bad
>since we won that war. (sigh)

Nobody said you didn't.
However, and there is always a "however" in life, would you not agree that with
better equipment, a shared workload and a little more training you might have
been able to squeeze a little more out of the system?

Same objective, different methods, etc.

Rick Clark

Steve Mellenthin

July 16th 04, 05:35 PM

>smartace11 wrote:
>
>>Going back to an earlier discussion on encountering AAA on a bomb run, I
>have
>>always wondered if large formations all on the same run-in headig was an
>>appropriate tactic for a medium (attack) bomber such as the B-26. It always
>>seemed to me that smaller flights on different target approach headings
>might
>>be more effective for and that the danger of a mid-air in between formations
>>might be less than the danger of flak in a bomber stream on a predictable
>>flight path. This is what the B-52s went to in Linebacker II to cut losses.
>>There is a tacit assumption of a good measure of air superiority in my
>>question.
>>
>I suggest that the bombing radar system in a B-52 was more reliable/efficient
>than the navigation methods and Norden bombsight that Art had available to
>him
>during WWII. Especially considering that, IIRC, the VN B-52 raids were night
>missions, fewer airplanes. Weather and selection of IPs was not as critical
>as
>in WWII.
>Also consider the B-52s had two navigators and more training than Art's
>contemporaries. Different war, different systems, different all the way
>around.
>
>Rick Clark
>

I don't disagree at all, I am just asking the question. The B/A-26 was used in
Vietnam as well and my question is whether using a medium bomber/attack
aircraft was appropriately used in a heavy bomber role. There is no doubt that
the heavies in War 2 were employed in what seems to have been the most logical
tactic. The -26 is a bit of a different beast and its main advantage seems to
have been speed and maneuverability, not payload.

Steve Mellenthin

July 16th 04, 05:39 PM

>in WWII.
>>Also consider the B-52s had two navigators and more training than Art's
>>contemporaries. Different war, different systems, different all the way
>>around.
>>
>>Rick Clark
>>
>
>We did the best we could with what we had. And I guess we didn't do too bad
>since we won that war. (sigh)
>
>
>
>
>Arthur Kramer

I am having a hard time getting my question across here (sigh). I will re-ask
the question. Was the B-26 more effective or appropriately used in a heavy
bomber or a medium tactical attack aircraft type role. Hypothetical question.
Just looking for an opinion not a service record.

ArtKramr

July 16th 04, 05:54 PM

>Subject: Re: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944
>From: (Steve Mellenthin)
>Date: 7/16/2004 9:35 AM Pacific Standard Time
>Message-id: >
>
>>smartace11 wrote:
>>
>>>Going back to an earlier discussion on encountering AAA on a bomb run, I
>>have
>>>always wondered if large formations all on the same run-in headig was an
>>>appropriate tactic for a medium (attack) bomber such as the B-26. It
>always
>>>seemed to me that smaller flights on different target approach headings
>>might
>>>be more effective for and that the danger of a mid-air in between
>formations
>>>might be less than the danger of flak in a bomber stream on a predictable
>>>flight path. This is what the B-52s went to in Linebacker II to cut
>losses.
>>>There is a tacit assumption of a good measure of air superiority in my
>>>question.
>>>
>>I suggest that the bombing radar system in a B-52 was more
>reliable/efficient
>>than the navigation methods and Norden bombsight that Art had available to
>>him
>>during WWII. Especially considering that, IIRC, the VN B-52 raids were night
>>missions, fewer airplanes. Weather and selection of IPs was not as critical
>>as
>>in WWII.
>>Also consider the B-52s had two navigators and more training than Art's
>>contemporaries. Different war, different systems, different all the way
>>around.
>>
>>Rick Clark
>>
>
>I don't disagree at all, I am just asking the question. The B/A-26 was used
>in
>Vietnam as well and my question is whether using a medium bomber/attack
>aircraft was appropriately used in a heavy bomber role. There is no doubt
>that
>the heavies in War 2 were employed in what seems to have been the most
>logical
>tactic. The -26 is a bit of a different beast and its main advantage seems
>to
>have been speed and maneuverability, not payload.
>

The avergae B-17 group flew 21 planes per group each plane loaded with 5,000
lbs. of bombs for a total of 105,000 pounds. Each B-26 only carried 4,000 lbs
but we put up 56 planes per group for a total of 224,000 pounds of bombs per
mission. And we achieved very high accuracy working from 10,000 feet as opposed
ot the B-17's much poorer accuracy working from 22,000 feet. Of course the
B-17's had longer legs and they could hit targets we couldn't reach. But I
remember when they hit the fuel dumps at Wurzburg and missed. We came in and
wiped it out at the first pass. In fact I think it is still burning to this
day. See " Wurzburg" on my website.

Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

OXMORON1

July 16th 04, 06:12 PM

smartace asked for clarification with:
>I don't disagree at all, I am just asking the question. The B/A-26 was used
>in
>Vietnam as well and my question is whether using a medium bomber/attack
>aircraft was appropriately used in a heavy bomber role. There is no doubt
>that
>the heavies in War 2 were employed in what seems to have been the most
>logical
>tactic. The -26 is a bit of a different beast and its main advantage seems
>to
>have been speed and maneuverability, not payload.
>
Okay, I'll try again....
Different airframe, the A/B-26 of Vietnam was the Douglas Invader, not the
Martin B-26 of Art's time. The A-26 didn't get to Europe until late in the war,
redesignated the B-26 after WWII, redesignated A-26 for political reasons
during SEA. Art's unit transitioned to it after the war IIRC.
The mission for the A/B-26 in the SEA wargames was different, primarily a
single or two ship "patrol"/ "fishing" expedition, usually under the guidance
of a FAC.Sometimes they had specific targets.
Somewhat similar to the role of the B-57 interdiction missions along the
"Trail".

According to my sources the targets were more "targets of opportunity" when
compared to WWII target selection and bombing practice.
None of the group briefing of 36 crews with the Intel officer standing in front
of the group saying "the Target for Today" is....

That what you are asking about?

Rick Clark

ArtKramr

July 16th 04, 06:17 PM

>Subject: Re: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944
>From: (OXMORON1)
>Date: 7/16/2004 9:30 AM Pacific Standard Time
>Message-id: >
>
>Art wrote:
>>We did the best we could with what we had. And I guess we didn't do too bad
>>since we won that war. (sigh)
>
>Nobody said you didn't.
>However, and there is always a "however" in life, would you not agree that
>with
>better equipment, a shared workload and a little more training you might have
>been able to squeeze a little more out of the system?
>
>Same objective, different methods, etc.
>
>Rick Clark
>
Well it is hard to argue with "If things had been better wouldn't things have
been beteer" Sure thaey would have. But our training was very good. I never ran
into a situation for which I wasn't prepared to deal with. Better equipment?
Sure. But if we had GPS, now that would have been a huge advantage. Just
think. No more E6-B's., the mind boggles. (grin)

Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

ArtKramr

July 16th 04, 06:18 PM

>Subject: Re: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944
>From: (Steve Mellenthin)
>Date: 7/16/2004 9:39 AM Pacific Standard Time
>Message-id: >
>
>>in WWII.
>>>Also consider the B-52s had two navigators and more training than Art's
>>>contemporaries. Different war, different systems, different all the way
>>>around.
>>>
>>>Rick Clark
>>>
>>
>>We did the best we could with what we had. And I guess we didn't do too bad
>>since we won that war. (sigh)
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>Arthur Kramer
>
>I am having a hard time getting my question across here (sigh). I will
>re-ask
>the question. Was the B-26 more effective or appropriately used in a heavy
>bomber or a medium tactical attack aircraft type role. Hypothetical
>question.
>Just looking for an opinion not a service record.
>

YES !

Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

ArtKramr

July 16th 04, 06:28 PM

>Subject: Re: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944
>From: (OXMORON1)
>Date: 7/16/2004 10:12 AM Pacific

>Intel officer standing in front
>of the group saying "the Target for Today" is....

It's what came after"is" that sent cold shivers down your spine.

Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

Chris Mark

July 16th 04, 06:42 PM

>From: smartace11@

>I am wondering, from a hypothetical standpoint, if
>there were possibly other tactics that could have been more effective that
>weren't used.

In Italy, while full group attacks by B-25s against targets were practiced, it
was also common for targets to be attacked by a squadron or even fewer planes.
Also, the B-25 groups in Italy evolved the tactic of having a box or half-box
of anti-flak planes fly ahead of and lower than the main attack force. These
were loaded with WP and attacked the flak positions, the timing such that the
flak crews would be dodging that nasty stuff as the main force arrived. The
anti-flak ships sometimes also dropped chaff, other times a dedicated chaff
plane would fly with them. Usually the gun batteries used radar tracking for
range and optical tracking for direction. The chaff helped mess up the radar
but did nothing against the optical part of the equation. Planes would jink to
mess up the optical aiming before settling down for the bomb run, which, of
course, had to be straight and level, but as soon as bombs away, the B-25s
would peel off and dive away--terrain permitting (lot of targets were in the
Alps). In mountainous terrain, approach to the target would be planned to take
advantage of it so as to come booming over a mountain ridge lined up on the
target, reducing exposure to flak. The Germans countered this by dragging
light flak guns up on the mountain ridges. Some B-25 groups in Italy also
fooled around with low-level attacks, but, aside from using that tactic against
shipping during Operation Stranglehold, except for specific tactical needs that
might develop, as against enemy units on the move in daylight, it was abandoned
as not providing any particular advantage in damaging the target or reducing
losses.
In the Pacific, some of the B-25 groups became specialists in low level
attacks, packing the nose with machineguns to suppress anti-aircraft fire (and
to destroy targets).
I've always been puzzled by the enthusiasm shown for this tactic. Aside from
its use against shipping, when skip-bombing tactics were a good choice, it
doesn't seem to have provided much of an advantage. Casualties were
substantially higher for medium bomber groups in the Pacific than in the MTO or
ETO, despite the fact that flak defenses were generally more formidable in
these theaters. Two problems with low-level attacks: First, every ape with a
weapon can potentially fire a golden BB. And second, if you are hit when you
are on the deck, you are in instant deep dog-do. That fact was made worse by
packing the B-25's nose with guns. The D model was a pretty good single engine
ship. But by the time the J-22 came out, with a solid nose filled with 8 .50s,
it was a different story. Putting that much weight forward made the airplane
pretty much uncontrollable if an engine were lost. Lose an engine at 50 feet
in a J-22 and five crewmen together couldn't finish the phrase "Oh, sh--"
before they ceased to exist. If enough ammunition had been expended before
engine loss, pilot and co-pilot together might keep the plane in control, but
being down on the deck just made everything much harder.
And why strafe an airfield and drop parafrags and parademos with a medium?
Such an airplane could do more damage dropping bombs in a tight pattern from
10,000 feet. Let the fighters go down and strafe. They're faster, nimbler,
present less of a target.
An example: 33 B-25s went in low level against a Japanese air base on Formosa
in March, 1945, straffing and dropping parafrags and parademos. Results of the
raid: two parked fighters destroyed, nine fighters and two bombers damaged,
two barracks damaged, two small buildings destroyed. Runways not damaged at
all, airfield still in operation. In exchange, 20 B-25s were damaged by AA, 4
seriously, with five crewmen wounded. And three B-25s were shot down and 10
crewmen killed. One ditched and the crew were rescued. During the whole month
of March, this group lost almost one-third of its aircraft and almost 60
aircrew killed. Bailout was impossible and when your plane was hit, unless it
could be nursed out to sea and ditched, you died.
In contrast, in Italy in the whole month of March, in repeated attacks on
targets defended by a total of some 500 flak guns, a B-25 group lost 14
aircraft shot down and 207 damaged. Total aircraft lost and damaged between the
two groups were not that different, but in the Italian situation, most of the
aircrew were able to bail out and those who were captured were interned, going
home at war's end. In many cases the damaged aircraft was able to make it back
to friendly territory before bailout was necessary. And in still other cases,
the aircraft, although a write-off, was able to make it to an emergency field
or even home, trading altitude for miles.

Chris Mark

Chris Mark

July 16th 04, 07:07 PM

>From: smartace1

>Was the B-26 more effective or appropriately used in a heavy
>bomber or a medium tactical attack aircraft type role. Hypothetical
>question.
>Just looking for an opinion not a service record.

Mediums (B-25, B-26) were generally used to strike at logistical infrastructure
while the heavies generally went after strategic targets. Sometimes were were
used against logistical targets such as railyards, where they generally gave
poor results. Mediums flying at about a third their altitude really scored at
hitting precision targets.
In an ideal MTO world, aircraft types would have been assigned to targets
something like this:
B-17s and B-24s, the factories making the locomotives.
B-26s the rail yard.
B-25s the rail bridge.
P-47s, P-38s and A-20s the train.
P-40s, A-36s and Spitfires the trucks and carts that have unloaded the train.
That gives you an idea of how the types would have been tasked based on their
abilities. Of course, in the real world, B-26s bombed plenty of bridges and
B-25s hit plenty of rail yards. And P-47s hit plenty of road traffic (and
bridges) while P-40s strafed trains when they found them.
The biggest difference for most of the war was between the heavies hitting
factories and mediums hitting transportation targets.
In Italy mediums also bombed gun emplacements, airfields, shipping, troop
concentrations, basically becoming jacks of all trades.
In the Pacific, the mediums seem to have been used like fighter-bombers and the
heavies (before the B-29) most of the time like mediums.

Chris Mark

Steve Mellenthin

July 16th 04, 07:55 PM

>The biggest difference for most of the war was between the heavies hitting
>factories and mediums hitting transportation targets.
>In Italy mediums also bombed gun emplacements, airfields, shipping, troop
>concentrations, basically becoming jacks of all trades.
>In the Pacific, the mediums seem to have been used like fighter-bombers and
>the
>heavies (before the B-29) most of the time like mediums.
>
>
>Chris Mark
>

Thanks Chris. Pretty much what I had understood. Some of Art's recollections
sound more like my Dad's B-17 nissions than the father of a friend's in B-25s.
In North Vietnam, ingress for fighter bombers tended to be in four ship line
abreast formation with four ships in trail formation, a big box, basically for
mutual jamming coverage, until abeam of the target.. Rollins were differtent
headings to keep the gunners on their toes. My origninal question was mainly
about whether different run in headings between flights would have avoided some
aimed AAA and possibly flack concentrations. Nothng negative intended, Art,
just curious.

Steve Mellenthin

July 16th 04, 08:03 PM

>is group lost almost one-third of its aircraft and almost 60
>aircrew killed. Bailout was impossible and when your plane was hit, unless
>it
>could be nursed out to sea and ditched, you died.
>In contrast, in Italy in the whole month of March, in repeated attacks on
>targets defended by a total of some 500 flak guns, a B-25 group lost 14
>aircraft shot down and 207 damaged. Total aircraft lost and damaged between
>the
>two groups were not that different, but in the Italian situation, most of the
>aircrew were able to bail out and those who were captured were interned,
>going
>home at war's end. In many cases the damaged aircraft was able to make it
>back
>to friendly territory before bailout was necessary. And in still other
>cases,
>the aircraft, although a write-off, was able to make it to an emergency field
>or even home, trading altitude for miles.
>
>
>
>
>Chris Mark
>

Wow, Chris, great answer and thanks for taking the time to reply. This was
more in line with how I would have expected a meduim bomber to be used. You've
indeed satisfied my curiosity. I think I either asked the wrong question or
the wrong person earlier.

Steve.

Andrew Chaplin

July 16th 04, 08:16 PM

ArtKramr wrote:
>
> <snip> Have you ever seen a German fighter take the full
> blast from American twin 50's? It's a beautiful sight to see and a lovely
> emotional experience never to be forgotten.

I think the expression you're looking for is also a title to an
excellent book on Canadian war art: A Terrible Beauty.
--
Andrew Chaplin
SIT MIHI GLADIUS SICUT SANCTO MARTINO
(If you're going to e-mail me, you'll have to get "yourfinger." out.)

Steve Mellenthin

July 16th 04, 08:18 PM

> In fact I think it is still burning to this
>day. See " Wurzburg" on my website.

Thanks Art. What was the proportion of group missions vs those of squadron or
fewer aircraft? Another tactics question. Was there a reason why those 21
B-17s wouldn't have been sent on that same mission at lower level if accuracy
was that much of an issue? Or was it just the luck of the draw that one unit
went instead of another? In other words, why send 350 men and 56 planes when
21 and 210 men ata lower altitude might have accompliahed the same thing? Was
the speed and the slapper size of the B-25 a factor in the decision?

ArtKramr

July 16th 04, 09:09 PM

>Subject: Re: Night bombers interception....
>From: Andrew Chaplin
>Date: 7/16/2004 12:16 PM Pacific Standard Time
>Message-id: >
>
>ArtKramr wrote:
>>
>> <snip> Have you ever seen a German fighter take the full
>> blast from American twin 50's? It's a beautiful sight to see and a lovely
>> emotional experience never to be forgotten.
>
>I think the expression you're looking for is also a title to an
>excellent book on Canadian war art: A Terrible Beauty.
>--
>Andrew Chaplin
>SIT MIHI GLADIUS SICUT SANCTO MARTINO
>(If you're going to e-mail me, you'll have to get "yourfinger." out.)
>

Yup. Great title.

Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

ArtKramr

July 16th 04, 09:14 PM

>Subject: Re: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944
>From: (Chris Mark)
>Date: 7/16/2004 11:07 AM Pacific Standard Time
>Message-id: >
>
>>From: smartace1
>
>>Was the B-26 more effective or appropriately used in a heavy
>>bomber or a medium tactical attack aircraft type role. Hypothetical
>>question.
>>Just looking for an opinion not a service record.
>
>Mediums (B-25, B-26) were generally used to strike at logistical
>infrastructure
>while the heavies generally went after strategic targets. Sometimes were
>were
>used against logistical targets such as railyards, where they generally gave
>poor results. Mediums flying at about a third their altitude really scored
>at
>hitting precision targets.
>In an ideal MTO world, aircraft types would have been assigned to targets
>something like this:
>B-17s and B-24s, the factories making the locomotives.
>B-26s the rail yard.
>B-25s the rail bridge.
>P-47s, P-38s and A-20s the train.
>P-40s, A-36s and Spitfires the trucks and carts that have unloaded the train.
>That gives you an idea of how the types would have been tasked based on their
>abilities. Of course, in the real world, B-26s bombed plenty of bridges and
>B-25s hit plenty of rail yards. And P-47s hit plenty of road traffic (and
>bridges) while P-40s strafed trains when they found them.
>The biggest difference for most of the war was between the heavies hitting
>factories and mediums hitting transportation targets.
>In Italy mediums also bombed gun emplacements, airfields, shipping, troop
>concentrations, basically becoming jacks of all trades.
>In the Pacific, the mediums seem to have been used like fighter-bombers and
>the
>heavies (before the B-29) most of the time like mediums.
>
>
>Chris Mark

Good rundown Chris with just one minor correction. When the B-26's arrived in
the ETO the B-25's were all shipped down to the MTO. I never saw a B-25 in the
ETO except as transport for a general.

Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

Guy Alcala

July 17th 04, 01:36 AM

ArtKramr wrote:

> >Subject: Re: Night bombers interception....
> >From: Guy Alcala
> >Date: 7/15/2004 10:04 PM Pacific Standard Time
> >Message-id: >
> >
> >Jack wrote:
> >
> >> ArtKramr wrote:
> >>
> >> > We offered to give the Brits B-17's each with a big fat belly turret.
> >> > They wouldn't take them. Big mistake.
> >>
> >> I presume they did so because they preferred some other aircraft (or
> >> weapon system) which we also offered. Do you know what the preferred
> >> alternative might have been?
> >>
> >> Perhaps they wished to avoid large manning requirements and sought
> >> aircraft with fewer required crew positions.
> >
> >The British used B-17s in combat before we ever did. They were B-17Cs which
> >were used by day, but proved to be less than wonderful. Contrary to Art's
> >assertion, Bomber Command did operate some B-17Gs, but they were used by
> >100 Group (electronic countermeasures), not as part of the main force.
> >Coastal Command also used them, but the B-17 was less suited to night
> >bombing than the British a/c, barring considerable modifications. Given
> >that the B-17 was preferred by the 8th AF for daytime missions over the
> >B-24, and the B-24 was preferred in the Pacific and for various other
> >roles, there was no good reason for RAF Bomber Command to use them in
> >preference to the Lancaster and Halifax.
> >
> >Guy
> >
>
> They never used them where they really needed them against night fighter attack
> with their big fat 50 caliber Browning heavy machine guns. The German planes
> were never well armored enough to withstand the American 50's. The war at night
> would have gone a lot better for the Brits with B-17's..and their belly turrets
> with powerful twin 50's. Have you ever seen a German fighter take the full
> blast from American twin 50's? It's a beautiful sight to see and a lovely
> emotional experience never to be forgotten.

Unfortunately, the major problem at night wasnt the relative firepower of the
defensive armament, as the ranges were invariably quite short. .303s at typical
ranges of less than 200 yds are quite effective, especially when they're mounted
four to a turret. Range to a typical fighter in a Schrage Musik attack would often
be 50-100 yards or even less, below, slightly aft and to the side. For defensive
machine guns firing almost straight down, fighter armor wasn't an issue, especially
in the fighter's cockpit area.

The problem was seeing the fighters in the first place. As I and others mentioned
in other posts, the British were unaware of Schrage Musik, and were removing the
belly turrets from their Lancs to improve their performance. They would have done
exactly the same with ball turrets of either B-17s or B-24s, replacing them with
H2S radar domes (just as the Americans did for those B-17 and B-24 a/c that acted
as pathfinders, before a under-nose radar mount was developed) which were
considered more valuable. Unlike the case with daytime missions, most night
bombers never saw an attacking fighter before it opened fire, and (especially with
Schrage Musik) often not even then. When they did spot the fighters before they
opened fire, by far the most effective move to make was for the gunner to tell the
pilot to start a corkscrew; opening fire was a matter of last resort.

Ideally, the Brits would have removed the rarely used dorsal turrets and kept the
belly turret, but that's 20/20 hindsight. Even if they had, there's no guarantee
that they would have seen fighters often enough (given the typical visibility
conditions) to compensate for the reduced performance due to weight and drag.

Guy

ArtKramr

July 17th 04, 02:12 AM

>Subject: Re: Night bombers interception....
>From: Guy Alcala
>Date: 7/16/2004 5:36 PM Pac

>hen they did spot the fighters before they
>opened fire, by far the most effective move to make was for the gunner to
>tell the
>pilot to start a corkscrew; opening fire was a matter of last resort.

I think you have just identified the heart of the problem.

Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

Guy Alcala

July 17th 04, 05:45 AM

ArtKramr wrote:

> >Subject: Re: Night bombers interception....
> >From: Guy Alcala
> >Date: 7/16/2004 5:36 PM Pac
>
> >hen they did spot the fighters before they
> >opened fire, by far the most effective move to make was for the gunner to
> >tell the
> >pilot to start a corkscrew; opening fire was a matter of last resort.
>
> I think you have just identified the heart of the problem.

Not a problem, just a recognition by the Brits that it was relatively easy to
make the fighter lose sight at night, while a single bomber engaging in a gun
duel against a fighter was usually a bad idea, as the fighter had far more
concentrated firepower and was much more maneuverable. This was equally true
whether the bomber was armed with .303, .50 cal. or even 20mm defensive guns.
It was often better, then, for the gunner to not open fire if it appeared that
the fighter hadn't seen the bomber, or so that he could retain his night
vision so he would hopefully maintain sight of the fighter and call out
directions to the pilot ("Corkscrew left!") should the fighter manage to stick
with the bomber after the first evasive move.

Naturally, not all gunners had such discipline -- having been trained to fire
their guns they wanted to fire them, especially as the first German
nightfighter they saw during their tour was generally also the last, either
because they were shot down or because the odds of them ever seeing another
were so low. Besides, active defense tends to be psychologically more
satisfying than passive defense, even if the latter is more effective, so many
a/c captains would tell them to open fire. The use of tracer ammo by the
Brits could have negative effects on both the fighter pilot's and gunners
night vision, so it might be a wash.

Guy

ArtKramr

July 17th 04, 05:54 AM

>Subject: Re: Night bombers interception....
>From: Guy Alcala

>Besides, active defense tends to be psychologically more
>satisfying than passive defense, even if the latter is more effective,

My experience was just the opposite.

Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

Guy Alcala

July 17th 04, 06:36 AM

ArtKramr wrote:

> >Subject: Re: Night bombers interception....
> >From: Guy Alcala
>
> >Besides, active defense tends to be psychologically more
> >satisfying than passive defense, even if the latter is more effective,
>
> My experience was just the opposite.

My "even if" should be read "when", but at night passive defense was
usually more effective, while by day flying in massed formations, active
defense was more effective. Active vs. passive defense effectiveness tends
to be situationally dependent. The psychologically satisfying bit re
active defense seems to be universal, though. Hard kills are more
satisfying than soft kills, because the physical evidence (target blowing
up etc.) is not only more exciting, but also you can usually tell that it
was an action on your part that caused it. It's a lot tougher to determine
the cause of soft kill, leaving the situation kind of vague and
unsatisfying.

For example, take the case of a ship protecting itself from a missile. If
it manages to shoot it down by its own missiles or guns, that tends to be
fairly obvious and relatively easy to assign credit for, although if more
than one system is firing on the missile multiple claims are likely to be
made. But if the missile isn't shot down but just misses, was it decoyed,
jammed, did it have a malfunction, was it fired at too great a range, was
the target not in the acquisition envelope, was the target signature too
low to be detected, etc. There's often no way to tell, and no satisfying
explosion to see/hear, even though the ultimate effect is the same - the
target ship is safe.

Guy

Geoffrey Sinclair

July 17th 04, 08:05 AM

WalterM140 wrote in message >...

(snip)

>The RAF definitely was defeated over Germany by the Luftwaffe in the Spring of
>1944. Being put onto invasion targets has obscured this fact.

Strange as it may seem the histories make it clear the Luftwaffe
managed to defeat Bomber Command in early 1944.

>"Bomber Command had lost 4,160 aircraft missing and crashed in England.
>Harris's failure to bring Germany to her knees, and the cost of his failure,
>had become embarrassingly evident to every man but himself.

The losses for the last three months of 1943 and the first 3 months
of 1944 are, according to Hastings, 1,287 missing in action and
another 217 crashed in England, Harris says 1,328 bombers were lost.

To obtain something around the 4,160 figure mentioned you need to
sum the losses from March 1942, when Harris took command to the
end of 1943, then Hastings' loss figures 3,619 MIA plus 626 crashes,
total 4,245.

In the same period according to the USAAF the 8th Air Force lost some
1,615 heavy bombers in combat and crashes, 1,078 considered lost
on combat missions.

>And in a letter to
>the Air Ministry on April 7, 1944, he came as close as ever in his life to
>conceding that he was in deep trouble:
>
> 'The strength of the German defenses [he wrote] would in time reach a point at
>which night-bombing attacks by existing methods and types of heavy bombers
>would involve percentage casualty rates which in the long run could not be
>sustained...we have not yet reached that point, but tactical innovations which
>have so far postponed it are now practically exhausted....'
>
>This was a preamble to a demand for ten suadrons of night fighters to support
>his bombers. It was the final admission of defeat for the Trenchard
>doctrine....Now Bomber Command had discovered that even night operations
>against Germany could no longer be continued on their existing basis unless the
>enemy's night-fighter force could be crippled of destroyed."
>
>--Bomber Command, p. 308 by Max Hastings

This sort of ignores the fact the RAF had been steadily building up the
bomber support system, and the loss rates had peaked in earlier times,
with new tactics helping to drop the losses back into the acceptable
category. For example late 1941, and mid 1943.

It comes down to whatever Hastings defines as the Trenchard doctrine,
the unescorted bomber devastating the target had long been disproved
before March 1944.

>The Americans also had to stop deep penetrations inot Germany (they had
>made precious few) until they got Mustangs and longer-legged P47's and
>also some P-38's.
>
>It's a tragedy that the USAAF had a long range escort within its grasp even in
>1942, and didn't see it. That was the P-38. A P-38 group was sent to England
>in 1942 but wound up in Africa after Torch. The VIIIth fighter CG, Hunter,
>wanted to concentrate on the P-47. This was a big mistake. It was shown that
>even a few dozen P-38's could break up the massed attacks by the Germans.

There is a slight problem with this, the combat record of the P-38 over
North Africa in 1942/43 and then again over Europe on 1943/44. Then
add the long range P-38 versions came about when the cooling system
was redesigned and the J-15 version allowed 410 gallons of internal fuel
versus the 300 gallons in previous models. The first J models were
built in August 1943 without the wing tanks, with 10 J-1, 210 J-5 and
790 J-10 models built before the J-15 model was introduced, then add
the time to ramp up the line and send the aircraft overseas. In September
1943 the P-38s in the Mediterranean were classified as having a combat
radius of 350 miles, well short of that needed to escort bombers deep
into Germany.

It would have been quite easy to stop P-38 escorts in 1943, just attack
them early, and force them to jettison their external tanks, they were
carrying about as much or more fuel externally than internally.

Also P-38 numbers grew from 302 in December 1942 to 567 in
May 1943 then declined to 372 in October 1943 before rapidly
expanding to 1,063 in April 1944. The numbers are for the USAAF
deployed against Germany and include reserves etc.

> But
>they weren't supported, nor was the idea pushed. Eaker seemed to think that
>some magic number of B-17's could be self-defending. That ultimately cost him
>his job.

Eaker was not the only one and he did ask for long range tanks on
his fighters. It is not a simple good guy/bad guy situation.

>To get back on target, so to speak, the Americans got back over Germany by
>adding the long range fighter (and new commanders) to the mix. The RAF had
>no such solution.

Of course this simply ignores the long range night fighter support and
better jamming systems for a start.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

WalterM140

July 17th 04, 01:07 PM

>> >Probably because its untrue
>> >
>> >The simple fact is that during March 1944 bomber command flew a total
>> >of 9031 sorties with a loss rate of under 4%. Nuremburg was indeed a
>> >disaster
>> >but an isolated one.
>>
>> The RAF definitely was defeated over Germany by the Luftwaffe in the
>Spring of
>> 1944. Being put onto invasion targets has obscured this fact.
>>
>> "Bomber Command had lost 4,160 aircraft missing and crashed in England.
>> Harris's failure to bring Germany to her knees, and the cost of his
>failure,
>> had become embarrassingly evident to every man but himself.
>>
>
>Bull**** - losses in the first 4 months of 1944 were as follows
>
>Month Lost Crashed %Loss
>January 314 38 5.6
>Febuary 199 21 5.2
>March 283 39 3.6
>April 214 25 2.4
>
>
>During this period the B-17's of US 8th AF were suffering very
>similar loss rates.

So what? What has that got to do with the RAF?

And during the first 4 months of 1944, the USAAF was seriously attriting the
Luftwaffe. The RAF was not. The Spitfires didn't have the range to help out
over Germany. That's where the Luftwaffe was.

>
>> And in a letter to
>> the Air Ministry on April 7, 1944, he came as close as ever in his life to
>> conceding that he was in deep trouble:
>>
>> 'The strength of the German defenses [he wrote] would in time reach a
>point at
>> which night-bombing attacks by existing methods and types of heavy bombers
>> would involve percentage casualty rates which in the long run could not be
>> sustained...we have not yet reached that point, but tactical innovations
>which
>> have so far postponed it are now practically exhausted....'
>>
>
>So in fact in the spring of 1944 he is saying he has NOT been defeated,

Harris was in denial. As Hastings points out, he was the only one not saying
that.

If you watch the World At War episode, "Whirlwind", you'll hear Harris say that
the Battle of Berlin was not a defeat. But it was, and a bad one.

>
>> This was a preamble to a demand for ten suadrons of night fighters to
>support
>> his bombers. It was the final admission of defeat for the Trenchard
>> doctrine....Now Bomber Command had discovered that even night operations
>> against Germany could no longer be continued on their existing basis
>unless the
>> enemy's night-fighter force could be crippled of destroyed."
>>
>
>
>On the contrary it was a way of ensuring that he got his night fighters,
>and it worked.

"In January the British losses rose to 6.15 percent of all sorties against
Berlin and to 7.2 per cent against Stettin, Brunswick and Madgeburg. But the
effectiveness of the German defenses was not confined to destruction. Harrassed
all the way to their distant targets with bombs on board, many of the bombers
were forced to turn back in a damaged condition. Combat and evasive action
scattered the remainder over the sky so that they no longer arrived on the
target as a coherent force. Much as Berlin and the other cities suffered from
the bombing terror of the winter of 1943/44, they were spared the total
extinction that had been the enemy's prognosis.

To quote from the British
official history, "The Strategic Air Offensive against Germany":

"Bomber Command was compelled, largely by the German night-fighter force, to
draw away from its primary target, Berlin, to disperse its effort and to persue
its operations by apparently less efficient means than hitherto. ... The Battle
of Berlin was more than a failure. It was a defeat."

Luftwaffe War Diaries, p.339 by Cajus Bekker

And consider this text from "The Berlin Raids" by Martin
Middlebrook:

"Fauquier [the master bomber] devoted most of his efforts to encouraging
the Main Force to press right on into the target and not to release their bombs
prematurely. It was not easy. He could deride the flak, but Main Force crews
harrassed by fighter attack were not always inclined to listen."

-- "The Berlin Raids p.65 by Martin Middlebrooks

"The raid proceded in no better, no worse, manner than so many raids beyond
the range of oboe. Enough of the 49 pathfinder
backers-up and re-centerers arrived to produce a steady supply
of green TIs. The planned route from the south east was never
achieved. It is clear from the evidence of bombing photographs, that once
the early raid markers and bombs were seen to go down, both the pathfinders
backers-up and the main force swung in from due south, neither being
prepared to spend the extra time in
the target area flying to a theoretical turning point futher on."

They were not prepared to fly further to the briefed point because they
were being heavily engaged by night fighters. Middlebrook makes that plain.

"Many of the Main Force crews were bombing the first markers they saw, instead
of the centre of the markers as ordered, or were dropping short of the markers;
a long 'creepback' developed. The night was clear. Bomber Command's
Operational Research Section later examined 468 bombing photgraphs and
concluded that only five aircraft had bombed within three miles of the correct
Aiming Point, that only a quarter of the force bombed the vulnerable area of
Berlin, and that most of the remainer bombed lightly built up suburban areas."

Ibid p. 66

The RAF was not only getting shot to pieces, they were ineffective.

<snip>

>> To get back on target, so to speak, the Americans got back over Germany by
>> adding the long range fighter (and new commanders) to the mix. The RAF
>had no
>> such solution.
>>
>
>Horsefeathers.

What allowed Bomber Command to continue sending German cities to Harris'
bonfires was the favorable situation brought on by the Americans. That's what
Portal said.

Walt

WalterM140

July 17th 04, 01:25 PM

>>The Brits are hyper-defensive about the effect on target. The German war
>>machine was not significantly hindered by the British Area Campaign. The
>>Germans expended much fewer resources to defend than the Brits did to
>atttack.
>
>Remind us again about the numbers of AA personnel and 88mm that were
>considered necessary?
>

The Germans used Hitler Youth, Russian POW's, impressed workers, and even women
in the Flak batteries.

The RAF was immolating its finest young men.

And although the resources put into the flak guns, ancillary equipment and the
ammo were considerable, that was nothing like the resources put into Bomber
Command.

And that huge investment, almost 1/3 of the whole British war effort, had
little relative return.

Further, Harris resisted at least for a year putting BC onto more useful
targets.

Walt

WalterM140

July 17th 04, 01:57 PM

>The British used B-17s in combat before we ever did. They were B-17Cs which
>were used by day, but proved to be less than wonderful.

The Brits ignored American advice on how to use the B-17. Admittedly, the
B-17C was not ready for the big leagues.

Walt

Andrew Chaplin

July 17th 04, 03:48 PM

ArtKramr wrote:
>
> >Subject: Re: Night bombers interception....
> >From: Andrew Chaplin
> >Date: 7/16/2004 12:16 PM Pacific Standard Time
> >Message-id: >
> >
> >I think the expression you're looking for is also a title to an
> >excellent book on Canadian war art: A Terrible Beauty.
>
> Yup. Great title.

I am pretty sure Heather Robertson, the author of _A Terrible Beauty :
the art of Canada at war_, pinched it from William Butler Yeats's
"Easter, 1916":

Too long a sacrifice
Can make a stone of the heart.
O when may it suffice?
That is heaven's part, our part
To murmur name upon name,
As a mother names her child
When sleep at last has come
On limbs that had run wild.
What is it but nightfall?
No, no, not night but death;
Was it needless death after all?
For England may keep faith
For all that is done and said.
We know their dream; enough
To know they dreamed and are dead.
And what if excess of love
Bewildered them till they died?
I write it out in a verse --
MacDonagh and MacBride
And Connolly and Pearse
Now and in time to be,
Wherever green is worn,
Are changed, changed utterly:
A terrible beauty is born.
--
Andrew Chaplin
SIT MIHI GLADIUS SICUT SANCTO MARTINO
(If you're going to e-mail me, you'll have to get "yourfinger." out.)

M. J. Powell

July 17th 04, 03:58 PM

In message >, WalterM140
> writes
>>The British used B-17s in combat before we ever did. They were B-17Cs which
>>were used by day, but proved to be less than wonderful.
>
>The Brits ignored American advice on how to use the B-17. Admittedly, the
>B-17C was not ready for the big leagues.

Could that be why they ignored the advice?

Mike
--
M.J.Powell

WalterM140

July 17th 04, 04:08 PM

>It would have been quite easy to stop P-38 escorts in 1943, just attack
>them early, and force them to jettison their external tanks, they were
>carrying about as much or more fuel externally than internally.

It was -shown- that even a few dozen P-38's had a very delerious effect on the
tactics of the German day fighters.

There's no "it would have been quite easy to..." to it. What you suggest was
not a factor.

>Also P-38 numbers grew from 302 in December 1942 to 567 in
>May 1943 then declined to 372 in October 1943 before rapidly
>expanding to 1,063 in April 1944. The numbers are for the USAAF
>deployed against Germany and include reserves etc.

Thanks for the minutia.

The point is that Eaker and Hunter, 8th BC and 8th FC CGs respectively could
have stressed long range escorts and pushed P-38 enhancements, stressed
solving the technical problems, and so forth in 1942. P-38's were available in
England in 1942.

Eaker and Hunter didn't do that.

>Eaker was not the only one and he did ask for long range tanks on
>his fighters. It is not a simple good guy/bad guy situation.

Eaker dawdled on it. It wasn't important to him.

Eaker thought the B-17's could defend themselves until very late in the game.

He -was- sacked, after all.

Eaker even suggested that the first Mustang groups go to the 9th AF. He didn't
understand the problem. He didn't allow for improvements and reinforcments of
the German AF. P-38's of longer range and better reliability could have been
provided well before they were. An all P-38 force could have done what a mixed
P-47, P-51 and P-38 force DID do-- wreck the German day fighter force. -- if
it had been stressed earlier. But it was not.

Now, you'll dispute this of course. But the problems the long range escorts
gave the Germans rested on this:

The Germans had to up-armor and up-arm their single engine fighters and add
twin engine bomber destroyers to the mix, in order to kill B-17's in large
numbers. -Any- of the three main US fighters on the scene (P-38, P-47,
P-51)could have made that up-armoring and use of the twin engine bomber
destroyers impractical.

Walt

ArtKramr

July 17th 04, 04:29 PM

>Subject: Re: Night bombers interception....
>From: Andrew Chaplin
>Date: 7/17/2004 7:48 AM Pacific Standard Time
>Message-id: >
>
>ArtKramr wrote:
>>
>> >Subject: Re: Night bombers interception....
>> >From: Andrew Chaplin
>> >Date: 7/16/2004 12:16 PM Pacific Standard Time
>> >Message-id: >
>> >
>> >I think the expression you're looking for is also a title to an
>> >excellent book on Canadian war art: A Terrible Beauty.
>>
>> Yup. Great title.
>
>I am pretty sure Heather Robertson, the author of _A Terrible Beauty :
>the art of Canada at war_, pinched it from William Butler Yeats's
>"Easter, 1916":
>
>Too long a sacrifice
>Can make a stone of the heart.
>O when may it suffice?
>That is heaven's part, our part
>To murmur name upon name,
>As a mother names her child
>When sleep at last has come
>On limbs that had run wild.
>What is it but nightfall?
>No, no, not night but death;
>Was it needless death after all?
>For England may keep faith
>For all that is done and said.
>We know their dream; enough
>To know they dreamed and are dead.
>And what if excess of love
>Bewildered them till they died?
>I write it out in a verse --
>MacDonagh and MacBride
>And Connolly and Pearse
>Now and in time to be,
>Wherever green is worn,
>Are changed, changed utterly:
>A terrible beauty is born.
>--
>Andrew Chaplin
>SIT MIHI GLADIUS SICUT SANCTO MARTINO
>(If you're going to e-mail me, you'll have to get "yourfinger." out.)
>

The poem itself is a terrible beauty

Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

Chris Mark

July 17th 04, 06:09 PM

>From: smartace11@

>My origninal question was mainly
>about whether different run in headings between flights would have avoided
>some
>aimed AAA and possibly flack concentrations

More than likely. But medium bomber loss rates in Europe, especially as the
war progressed, were reasonably low. Ovrall, in the MTO, the B-26 loss rate
was one per 148 combat sorties and in the ETO one per 210 sorties. The B-25
loss rate in the MTO was one per 164 sorties, and in the Pacific one per 52
sorties.
Both the B-17 and B-24 in the ETO had loss rates of about one per 62 sorties.
Of course, these general figures hide some interesting details. For example.
The B-26 loss per sortie rate in the early days against the Japanese (attacks
against Lae, Salamaua and Rabaul) was one per 24 sorties and for B-25s one per
19. During the first year of MTO operations (June 42-June 43, the North
African phase) the loss rate for B-26s was one per 20 sorties, for the B-25 one
per 43 sorties.
In general, in whatever theater, low-level missions were killers. In the MTO
and the ETO, the medium groups largely abandoned these tactics except for
specific needs, while in the Pacific they used them extensively throughout the
war.

Chris Mark

Guy Alcala

July 17th 04, 06:31 PM

WalterM140 wrote:

> >It would have been quite easy to stop P-38 escorts in 1943, just attack
> >them early, and force them to jettison their external tanks, they were
> >carrying about as much or more fuel externally than internally.
>
> It was -shown- that even a few dozen P-38's had a very delerious effect on the
> tactics of the German day fighters.
>
> There's no "it would have been quite easy to..." to it. What you suggest was
> not a factor.

Only because the Germans rarely did so. U.S. fighter commanders were surprised
that they didn't try it more often, because it was so obviously a good idea.
Indeed, the Luftwaffe had tried to do so for a while, but heavy singl-engine
fighter losses (against P-47s) had resulted in an order from either Goring or
Schmidt (I forget which) sometime in the late-43 early '44 period (I forget) to
cease such attacks and move the fighters back. A bad decision.

BTW, ISTR for Geoffrey's info that the early J models were all retrofitted with
leading edge tanks either shortly before or shortly after achieving IOC in the ETO.

> >Also P-38 numbers grew from 302 in December 1942 to 567 in
> >May 1943 then declined to 372 in October 1943 before rapidly
> >expanding to 1,063 in April 1944. The numbers are for the USAAF
> >deployed against Germany and include reserves etc.
>
> Thanks for the minutia.

Not minutia in this case, but very germane, as the lack of P-38 numbers was a
factor. Production was very limited at the time. Then there's the extra training
time for multi-engine, which would add some additional delay to getting units
operational/providing replacement pilots.

> The point is that Eaker and Hunter, 8th BC and 8th FC CGs respectively could
> have stressed long range escorts and pushed P-38 enhancements, stressed
> solving the technical problems, and so forth in 1942. P-38's were available in
> England in 1942.
>
> Eaker and Hunter didn't do that.

While Eaker and Hunter were doctrinally blind to the need for far too long, the
need for a long-range fighter in the ETO in 1942 was hardly obvious given the
shallow penetrations we were making at the time. Arnold ordered Giles to increase
the internal fuel of the fighters around June '43 IIRR (don't have the reference,
"To Command The Sky" by McFarland and Newton, handy), giving him six months to
achieve it. Besides the P-38 was only in the ETO for a couple of months before
they were all sent to the Med.

I consider one of the great historical "what ifs" to be what if at least some P-38s
had remained in the 8th from November 1942 until September '43 (we'd have to assume
that P-38 production was sufficient that the 78th FG wouldn't have had its P-38s
stripped from it and sent to the Med as attrition replacements, so they weren't
forced to transition to the P-47). Would we have been able to fix the P-38's high
altitude/cold and wet climate problems prior to the availability of the P-51?

As it is, we know from Zemke that turbosupercharger control freeze-up was still an
issue in August _1944_ (IIRR he was flying a J-15), despite the problem being
identified no later than when the 55th FG had gone operational in mid-October '43.
Even assuming that the problems (engines, turbo controls, cockpit heat, dive flaps;
the boosted ailerons were a 'nice to have') had been fixed earlier, was it possible
to produce enough P-38s in that period to supply the needs of the PTO, MTO _and_
ETO? It seems unlikely, given the relatively low production totals of the P-38
compared to the single-engine a/c, and cost -- both the P-47 and P-38 cost about
double the P-51 to build in money, materiel and man-hours; fuel requirements were
also about double.

> >Eaker was not the only one and he did ask for long range tanks on
> >his fighters. It is not a simple good guy/bad guy situation.
>
> Eaker dawdled on it. It wasn't important to him.
>
> Eaker thought the B-17's could defend themselves until very late in the game.
>
> He -was- sacked, after all.

True.

> Eaker even suggested that the first Mustang groups go to the 9th AF. He didn't
> understand the problem. He didn't allow for improvements and reinforcments of
> the German AF. P-38's of longer range and better reliability could have been
> provided well before they were. An all P-38 force could have done what a mixed
> P-47, P-51 and P-38 force DID do-- wreck the German day fighter force. -- if
> it had been stressed earlier. But it was not.

Assuming that the numbers had been available, which seems questionable, but I agree
with your basic idea.

> Now, you'll dispute this of course.

I doubt Geoffrey will, as he's been mostly agreeing with you.

> But the problems the long range escorts
> gave the Germans rested on this:
>
> The Germans had to up-armor and up-arm their single engine fighters and add
> twin engine bomber destroyers to the mix, in order to kill B-17's in large
> numbers. -Any- of the three main US fighters on the scene (P-38, P-47,
> P-51)could have made that up-armoring and use of the twin engine bomber
> destroyers impractical.

Assuming they had the internal fuel capacity, and that took time to get into
production and service even after it was given top priority by Arnold.

Guy

ArtKramr

July 17th 04, 06:53 PM

>Subject: Re: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944
>From: (Chris Mark)
>Date: 7/17/2004 10:09 AM Pacific Standard Time
>Message-id: >
>
>>From: smartace11@
>
>>My origninal question was mainly
>>about whether different run in headings between flights would have avoided
>>some
>>aimed AAA and possibly flack concentrations
>
>More than likely. But medium bomber loss rates in Europe, especially as the
>war progressed, were reasonably low. Ovrall, in the MTO, the B-26 loss rate
>was one per 148 combat sorties and in the ETO one per 210 sorties. The B-25
>loss rate in the MTO was one per 164 sorties, and in the Pacific one per 52
>sorties.
>Both the B-17 and B-24 in the ETO had loss rates of about one per 62 sorties.
>Of course, these general figures hide some interesting details. For example.
>
>The B-26 loss per sortie rate in the early days against the Japanese (attacks
>against Lae, Salamaua and Rabaul) was one per 24 sorties and for B-25s one
>per
>19. During the first year of MTO operations (June 42-June 43, the North
>African phase) the loss rate for B-26s was one per 20 sorties, for the B-25
>one
>per 43 sorties.
>In general, in whatever theater, low-level missions were killers. In the MTO
>and the ETO, the medium groups largely abandoned these tactics except for
>specific needs, while in the Pacific they used them extensively throughout
>the
>war.
>
>
>Chris Mark
>

The B-26's were unsuited to low level operations and were not used down on the
deck. The B-25's were fine on the deck and were used there. All B-25's were
pulled from the ETO and moved to the MTO and Pacific which accounts for the
numbers you quote.

Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

Keith Willshaw

July 17th 04, 07:21 PM

"ArtKramr" > wrote in message
...
> >Subject: Re: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944
> >From: "Keith Willshaw"
> >Date: 7/16/2004 5:03 AM Pacific Standard Time
> >Message-id: >
> >
> >
> >"ArtKramr" > wrote in message
> ...
> >> >Subject: Re: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944
> >
> >>
> >> We offered to give the Brits B-17's each with a big fat belly
turret.They
> >> wouldn't take them. Big mistake.
> >
> >The RAF operated at least one squadron of B-17's and a number of B-24's
> >Bomber command were NOT impressed by the type and operated them
> >mainly as EW aircraft jamming German communications
> >
> >Keith
>
>
> They were getting the **** shot out of them every night as they flew
planes
> with no belly turrets. And hey used the planes with belly turrrets,
B-17's and
> B-24's for electronic jammimg? Brilliant. Just brilliant.
>

It was since they Germans needed those electronic aids to
find them. Bottom line Art is that most hight bombers
never saw what killed them and no radar guided turrets
were then available.

The option then was fit a belly turret of doubtful utility
and to do so you have to remove the H2S Radar dome
you need to find the target.

Keith

Keith Willshaw

July 17th 04, 07:26 PM

"Steve Mellenthin" > wrote in message
...
> >They were getting the **** shot out of them every night as they flew
planes
> >with no belly turrets. And hey used the planes with belly turrrets,
B-17's
> >and
> >B-24's for electronic jammimg? Brilliant. Just brilliant.
> >
> >
> >
> >Arthur Kramer
>
> Art,
>
> Going back to an earlier discussion on encountering AAA on a bomb run, I
have
> always wondered if large formations all on the same run-in headig was an
> appropriate tactic for a medium (attack) bomber such as the B-26. It
always
> seemed to me that smaller flights on different target approach headings
might
> be more effective for and that the danger of a mid-air in between
formations
> might be less than the danger of flak in a bomber stream on a predictable
> flight path. This is what the B-52s went to in Linebacker II to cut
losses.
> There is a tacit assumption of a good measure of air superiority in my
> question.
>
> Steve

The strategy of the bomber stream is the same as that used
by birds and fish when they form dense flocks. Its much harder
for a number of predators to pick off 10 from within the mass
than 10 individuals.

In the case of daylight ops the bombers were separated
not only by distance but by elevation with high and low
formations as well as leading and trailing ones.

Once air superiority was available the RAF flew their
daylight missions in loose gaggles of 2-4 aircraft staggered
in height to minimise flak damage.

Keith

Keith Willshaw

July 17th 04, 07:28 PM

"Steve Mellenthin" > wrote in message
...
> >smartace11 wrote:
> >

>
> I don't disagree at all, I am just asking the question. The B/A-26 was
used in
> Vietnam as well and my question is whether using a medium bomber/attack
> aircraft was appropriately used in a heavy bomber role. There is no doubt
that
> the heavies in War 2 were employed in what seems to have been the most
logical
> tactic. The -26 is a bit of a different beast and its main advantage
seems to
> have been speed and maneuverability, not payload.

Thats a different aircraft than the one Art flew

The B-26 of WW2 was the Martin Marauder, that of
Vietnam was the Douglas Invader which was originally
designated A-26 and was a later design largely replacing
the B-26.

Keith

Keith Willshaw

July 17th 04, 07:32 PM

"WalterM140" > wrote in message
...
> >> >Probably because its untrue
> >> >
> >> >The simple fact is that during March 1944 bomber command flew a total
> >> >of 9031 sorties with a loss rate of under 4%. Nuremburg was indeed a
> >> >disaster
> >> >but an isolated one.
> >>
> >> The RAF definitely was defeated over Germany by the Luftwaffe in the
> >Spring of
> >> 1944. Being put onto invasion targets has obscured this fact.
> >>
> >> "Bomber Command had lost 4,160 aircraft missing and crashed in England.
> >> Harris's failure to bring Germany to her knees, and the cost of his
> >failure,
> >> had become embarrassingly evident to every man but himself.
> >>
> >
> >Bull**** - losses in the first 4 months of 1944 were as follows
> >
> >Month Lost Crashed %Loss
> >January 314 38 5.6
> >Febuary 199 21 5.2
> >March 283 39 3.6
> >April 214 25 2.4
> >
> >
> >During this period the B-17's of US 8th AF were suffering very
> >similar loss rates.
>
> So what? What has that got to do with the RAF?
>

It shows the RAF were doing no worse than the USAF

> And during the first 4 months of 1944, the USAAF was seriously attriting
the
> Luftwaffe. The RAF was not. The Spitfires didn't have the range to help
out
> over Germany. That's where the Luftwaffe was.
>

> >
> >> And in a letter to
> >> the Air Ministry on April 7, 1944, he came as close as ever in his life
to
> >> conceding that he was in deep trouble:
> >>
> >> 'The strength of the German defenses [he wrote] would in time reach a
> >point at
> >> which night-bombing attacks by existing methods and types of heavy
bombers
> >> would involve percentage casualty rates which in the long run could not
be
> >> sustained...we have not yet reached that point, but tactical
innovations
> >which
> >> have so far postponed it are now practically exhausted....'
> >>
> >
> >So in fact in the spring of 1944 he is saying he has NOT been defeated,
>
> Harris was in denial. As Hastings points out, he was the only one not
saying
> that.
>
> If you watch the World At War episode, "Whirlwind", you'll hear Harris say
that
> the Battle of Berlin was not a defeat. But it was, and a bad one.
>

The Battle of Berlin was indeed a defeat, that was not the
entirety of the air war over Germany however and its provably
untrue to claim that ai operations over Germany were suspended.

Keith

Keith Willshaw

July 17th 04, 07:38 PM

"ArtKramr" > wrote in message
...
> >Subject: Re: Night bombers interception....
> >From: Guy Alcala
> >Date: 7/15/2004 10:04 PM Pacific Standard Time
> >Message-id: >
> >
> >Jack wrote:
> >
> >> ArtKramr wrote:
> >>
> >> > We offered to give the Brits B-17's each with a big fat belly turret.
> >> > They wouldn't take them. Big mistake.
> >>
> >> I presume they did so because they preferred some other aircraft (or
> >> weapon system) which we also offered. Do you know what the preferred
> >> alternative might have been?
> >>
> >> Perhaps they wished to avoid large manning requirements and sought
> >> aircraft with fewer required crew positions.
> >
> >The British used B-17s in combat before we ever did. They were B-17Cs
which
> >were used by day, but proved to be less than wonderful. Contrary to
Art's
> >assertion, Bomber Command did operate some B-17Gs, but they were used by
> >100 Group (electronic countermeasures), not as part of the main force.
> >Coastal Command also used them, but the B-17 was less suited to night
> >bombing than the British a/c, barring considerable modifications. Given
> >that the B-17 was preferred by the 8th AF for daytime missions over the
> >B-24, and the B-24 was preferred in the Pacific and for various other
> >roles, there was no good reason for RAF Bomber Command to use them in
> >preference to the Lancaster and Halifax.
> >
> >Guy
> >
>
> They never used them where they really needed them against night fighter
attack
> with their big fat 50 caliber Browning heavy machine guns. The German
planes
> were never well armored enough to withstand the American 50's.

You are incorrect.

The RAF operated B-17's in action in daylight long before the
USA even entered the war. The results were heavy losses and
poor results.

By the September of 1941, RAF Fortresses had flown 22 attacks against
targets such as Bremen, Brest, Emden, Kiel, Oslo, and Rotterdam, loss
rates on these missions averaged 20% and little damage was done.

The concept of self defense was flawed. This was a
lesson the USAAF would learn the hard way in 1943.

Keith

Keith Willshaw

July 17th 04, 07:41 PM

"WalterM140" > wrote in message
...
> >The British used B-17s in combat before we ever did. They were B-17Cs
which
> >were used by day, but proved to be less than wonderful.
>
> The Brits ignored American advice on how to use the B-17. Admittedly, the
> B-17C was not ready for the big leagues.
>

The USA had zero combat experiencewith the B-17 in 1941 and
sold the B-17 on the basis of the self defending bomber. It failed
in 1941 and again when the USAAF tried it in 1943.

Keith

Mike Williamson

July 17th 04, 07:57 PM

Guy Alcala wrote:
> WalterM140 wrote:
>
>
>>>It would have been quite easy to stop P-38 escorts in 1943, just attack
>>>them early, and force them to jettison their external tanks, they were
>>>carrying about as much or more fuel externally than internally.
>>
>>It was -shown- that even a few dozen P-38's had a very delerious effect on the
>>tactics of the German day fighters.
>>
>>There's no "it would have been quite easy to..." to it. What you suggest was
>>not a factor.
>
>
> Only because the Germans rarely did so. U.S. fighter commanders were surprised
> that they didn't try it more often, because it was so obviously a good idea.
> Indeed, the Luftwaffe had tried to do so for a while, but heavy singl-engine
> fighter losses (against P-47s) had resulted in an order from either Goring or
> Schmidt (I forget which) sometime in the late-43 early '44 period (I forget) to
> cease such attacks and move the fighters back. A bad decision.
>
> BTW, ISTR for Geoffrey's info that the early J models were all retrofitted with
> leading edge tanks either shortly before or shortly after achieving IOC in the ETO.
>
>
>>>Also P-38 numbers grew from 302 in December 1942 to 567 in
>>>May 1943 then declined to 372 in October 1943 before rapidly
>>>expanding to 1,063 in April 1944. The numbers are for the USAAF
>>>deployed against Germany and include reserves etc.
>>
>>Thanks for the minutia.
>
>
> Not minutia in this case, but very germane, as the lack of P-38 numbers was a
> factor. Production was very limited at the time. Then there's the extra training
> time for multi-engine, which would add some additional delay to getting units
> operational/providing replacement pilots.
>
>
>>The point is that Eaker and Hunter, 8th BC and 8th FC CGs respectively could
>>have stressed long range escorts and pushed P-38 enhancements, stressed
>>solving the technical problems, and so forth in 1942. P-38's were available in
>>England in 1942.
>>
>>Eaker and Hunter didn't do that.
>
>
> While Eaker and Hunter were doctrinally blind to the need for far too long, the
> need for a long-range fighter in the ETO in 1942 was hardly obvious given the
> shallow penetrations we were making at the time. Arnold ordered Giles to increase
> the internal fuel of the fighters around June '43 IIRR (don't have the reference,
> "To Command The Sky" by McFarland and Newton, handy), giving him six months to
> achieve it. Besides the P-38 was only in the ETO for a couple of months before
> they were all sent to the Med.
>
> I consider one of the great historical "what ifs" to be what if at least some P-38s
> had remained in the 8th from November 1942 until September '43 (we'd have to assume
> that P-38 production was sufficient that the 78th FG wouldn't have had its P-38s
> stripped from it and sent to the Med as attrition replacements, so they weren't
> forced to transition to the P-47). Would we have been able to fix the P-38's high
> altitude/cold and wet climate problems prior to the availability of the P-51?
>
> As it is, we know from Zemke that turbosupercharger control freeze-up was still an
> issue in August _1944_ (IIRR he was flying a J-15), despite the problem being
> identified no later than when the 55th FG had gone operational in mid-October '43.
> Even assuming that the problems (engines, turbo controls, cockpit heat, dive flaps;
> the boosted ailerons were a 'nice to have') had been fixed earlier, was it possible
> to produce enough P-38s in that period to supply the needs of the PTO, MTO _and_
> ETO? It seems unlikely, given the relatively low production totals of the P-38
> compared to the single-engine a/c, and cost -- both the P-47 and P-38 cost about
> double the P-51 to build in money, materiel and man-hours; fuel requirements were
> also about double.
>

Given the production totals achieved with other aircraft, the US COULD
have ramped up production of the P-38, but the war production board
didn't approve second source production until very late (IIRC about
120 P-38s were eventually produced by Vultee-Nash, but likely none
of them ever made it to the combat theaters). If the engines had been
swapped out for two-stage Merlins, the turbo and early intercooler
problems would have been eliminated, at the cost of some fuel
efficiency, and Lockheed submitted a proposal for this, although
politics prevented this. That the P-38 was developed to US
specifications before the war resulted in the Allison engine
use, and the US focused on turbosupercharging for inline engines.
Of course, at that time, the Merlin didn't have two-stage
supercharging either, so the turbo was really the only practical
way to go for high altitude performance at the time.

The Allies had their share of bad production decisions, but
the greater industrial capability tended to make these decisions
less than critical to the final outcome and not as noticed in
the overall picture.

Mike Williamson

Steve Mellenthin

July 17th 04, 07:58 PM

>The B-26 of WW2 was the Martin Marauder, that of
>Vietnam was the Douglas Invader which was originally
>designated A-26 and was a later design largely replacing
>the B-26.

I stand corrected. Lack of familiarity with the earlier B-26.

Guy Alcala

July 17th 04, 08:01 PM

Keith Willshaw wrote:

> "ArtKramr" > wrote in message
> ...
> > >Subject: Re: Night bombers interception....
> > >From: Guy Alcala
> > >Date: 7/15/2004 10:04 PM Pacific Standard Time
> > >Message-id: >
> > >
> > >Jack wrote:
> > >
> > >> ArtKramr wrote:
> > >>
> > >> > We offered to give the Brits B-17's each with a big fat belly turret.
> > >> > They wouldn't take them. Big mistake.
> > >>
> > >> I presume they did so because they preferred some other aircraft (or
> > >> weapon system) which we also offered. Do you know what the preferred
> > >> alternative might have been?
> > >>
> > >> Perhaps they wished to avoid large manning requirements and sought
> > >> aircraft with fewer required crew positions.
> > >
> > >The British used B-17s in combat before we ever did. They were B-17Cs
> which
> > >were used by day, but proved to be less than wonderful. Contrary to
> Art's
> > >assertion, Bomber Command did operate some B-17Gs, but they were used by
> > >100 Group (electronic countermeasures), not as part of the main force.
> > >Coastal Command also used them, but the B-17 was less suited to night
> > >bombing than the British a/c, barring considerable modifications. Given
> > >that the B-17 was preferred by the 8th AF for daytime missions over the
> > >B-24, and the B-24 was preferred in the Pacific and for various other
> > >roles, there was no good reason for RAF Bomber Command to use them in
> > >preference to the Lancaster and Halifax.
> > >
> > >Guy
> > >
> >
> > They never used them where they really needed them against night fighter
> attack
> > with their big fat 50 caliber Browning heavy machine guns. The German
> planes
> > were never well armored enough to withstand the American 50's.
>
> You are incorrect.
>
> The RAF operated B-17's in action in daylight long before the
> USA even entered the war. The results were heavy losses and
> poor results.

To be sure, IIRR the RAF never operated their Fortess Is (B-17Cs) in a group of
more than six, usually three or less, and often from altitudes above 30,000
feet. They just didn't have that many (only 20 in a single squadron), and the
reliability was pretty poor. RAF usage amounted to not much more than a 2 month
live fire operational test program. After all, they only dispatched 39 sorties
in those 22 missions. Still, the RAF usage was helpful in pointing out to the
US problems which needed fixing.

> By the September of 1941, RAF Fortresses had flown 22 attacks against
> targets such as Bremen, Brest, Emden, Kiel, Oslo, and Rotterdam, loss
> rates on these missions averaged 20% and little damage was done.
>
> The concept of self defense was flawed. This was a
> lesson the USAAF would learn the hard way in 1943.

To be fair, the RAF experience didn't prove or disprove the US tactical
doctrine, because their practice didn't reflect it. It had to wait until 1943
for that doctrine to be _proven_ unsound, because only then was it able to be
properly tested. It's a shame that Eaker persisted in believing the doctrine
was correct for as long as he did (in the face of all the evidence to the
contrary), but then he apparently believed the kill claims by the bomber gunners
were reasonably accurate. We know better.

Guy

Steve Mellenthin

July 17th 04, 08:09 PM

>In the case of daylight ops the bombers were separated
>not only by distance but by elevation with high and low
>formations as well as leading and trailing ones.
>
>Once air superiority was available the RAF flew their
>daylight missions in loose gaggles of 2-4 aircraft staggered
>in height to minimise flak damage.
>
>Keith
>

That is where I was headed with the question. Thanks for the response. It has
been my impression, perhaps erroneous, that the choice of the stream stragegy
was not the best decision at times when a loose gaggle and varying run-in
headings and altitudes between the 2-4 airgraft groupings would have been more
effective. As I said, only an impression not backed up by much research or
fact.

Steve

Guy Alcala

July 17th 04, 08:28 PM

Mike Williamson wrote:

> Guy Alcala wrote:

<snip>

> > Even assuming that the problems (engines, turbo controls, cockpit heat, dive flaps;
> > the boosted ailerons were a 'nice to have') had been fixed earlier, was it possible
> > to produce enough P-38s in that period to supply the needs of the PTO, MTO _and_
> > ETO? It seems unlikely, given the relatively low production totals of the P-38
> > compared to the single-engine a/c, and cost -- both the P-47 and P-38 cost about
> > double the P-51 to build in money, materiel and man-hours; fuel requirements were
> > also about double.
> >
>
> Given the production totals achieved with other aircraft, the US COULD
> have ramped up production of the P-38, but the war production board
> didn't approve second source production until very late (IIRC about
> 120 P-38s were eventually produced by Vultee-Nash, but likely none
> of them ever made it to the combat theaters).

that production could havebeen increased I dont deny. that it could have been increased
to the extent posible with the p-51 and to a lesser extent the P-47 seems unlikely, given
that the P-38 wasnt originally designed for mass production. I realize that Lockheed had
done considerable re-design to improve its mass producibility, but the a/c manhours
required are still far higher than a single. The P-47 being an exception, but then
Republic never seems to have had management as good as their designers - their a/c were
always expensive, heavy and late, but generally excellent.

> If the engines had been
> swapped out for two-stage Merlins, the turbo and early intercooler
> problems would have been eliminated, at the cost of some fuel
> efficiency, and Lockheed submitted a proposal for this, although
> politics prevented this.

Assuming the Merlin swap would have solved the major problems, it still would have taken
considerable time to do. Look how long it took between the Mustang X and the P-51B
achieving IOC.

> That the P-38 was developed to US
> specifications before the war resulted in the Allison engine
> use, and the US focused on turbosupercharging for inline engines.
> Of course, at that time, the Merlin didn't have two-stage
> supercharging either, so the turbo was really the only practical
> way to go for high altitude performance at the time.
>
> The Allies had their share of bad production decisions, but
> the greater industrial capability tended to make these decisions
> less than critical to the final outcome and not as noticed in
> the overall picture.

True, although in this case the lack of sufficient numbers of long-range escorts
available earlier was most definitely noticeable.

Guy

WalterM140

July 17th 04, 09:02 PM

>> So what? What has that got to do with the RAF?
>>
>
>It shows the RAF were doing no worse than the USAF

Not material to what is being discussed. The USAAF was not running night
bombing raids over Germany.

You're making excuses.

Walt

WalterM140

July 17th 04, 09:07 PM

>The Battle of Berlin was indeed a defeat, that was not the
>entirety of the air war over Germany however and its provably
>untrue to claim that ai operations over Germany were suspended.

Harris said he could knock Germany out of the war by attacking Berlin. And
yet he stopped attacking Berlin. Why?

If you say that Harris qualified his statement by suggesting that the
Americans must help, then he was just butchering his own men because he knew
that help wasn't coming.. Right?

If you say that Harris thought that Bomber Command could do the job alone, well
then he was wrong.

You don't become a great captain by being wrong.

Harris was not a great captain. The evidence shows that he was incompetent, if
not criminally incompetent.

Walt

WalterM140

July 17th 04, 09:12 PM

>Once air superiority was available the RAF flew their
>daylight missions in loose gaggles of 2-4 aircraft staggered
>in height to minimise flak damage.
>
>

That might have been influenced by the fact that no other aircraft type could
fly in the tight formations used by the B-17.

I've heard that B-26s could also fly in very tight formations, but I shouldn't
think as at high an altitude as the B-17.

B-17's could maintain formation at heights almost twice as high as the altitude
at which Bomber Command usually operated, either by day or by night.

Walt

Walt

Guy Alcala

July 17th 04, 09:21 PM

ArtKramr wrote:

> >Subject: Re: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944
> >From: (Chris Mark)
> >Date: 7/17/2004 10:09 AM Pacific Standard Time
> >Message-id: >
> >
> >>From: smartace11@
> >
> >>My origninal question was mainly
> >>about whether different run in headings between flights would have avoided
> >>some
> >>aimed AAA and possibly flack concentrations
> >
> >More than likely. But medium bomber loss rates in Europe, especially as the
> >war progressed, were reasonably low. Ovrall, in the MTO, the B-26 loss rate
> >was one per 148 combat sorties and in the ETO one per 210 sorties. The B-25
> >loss rate in the MTO was one per 164 sorties, and in the Pacific one per 52
> >sorties.
> >Both the B-17 and B-24 in the ETO had loss rates of about one per 62 sorties.
> >Of course, these general figures hide some interesting details. For example.
> >
> >The B-26 loss per sortie rate in the early days against the Japanese (attacks
> >against Lae, Salamaua and Rabaul) was one per 24 sorties and for B-25s one
> >per
> >19. During the first year of MTO operations (June 42-June 43, the North
> >African phase) the loss rate for B-26s was one per 20 sorties, for the B-25
> >one
> >per 43 sorties.
> >In general, in whatever theater, low-level missions were killers. In the MTO
> >and the ETO, the medium groups largely abandoned these tactics except for
> >specific needs, while in the Pacific they used them extensively throughout
> >the
> >war.
> >
> >
> >Chris Mark
> >
>
> The B-26's were unsuited to low level operations and were not used down on the
> deck.

As Chris points out, both the B-25 and B-26 were so used, in the PTO, MTO, and ETO
(not the B-25), in the early stages. High loss rates led to the move to medium
altitude in every theater other than the PTO, where Japanese flak was less.

> The B-25's were fine on the deck and were used there. All B-25's were
> pulled from the ETO and moved to the MTO and Pacific which accounts for the
> numbers you quote.

No B-25s were "pulled" from the ETO. There were a couple of Groups temporarily
deployed there while waiting to fly on to North Africa. It had originally been
planned to have two Bomb Wings of B-25s and B-26s in the ETO, the 4th and 5th
(later Air Division then Bomb Division) , but it seems the B-25's better
suitability for operating in theaters with poorer runways and logistic support
than the B-26 was happy with, led to a decision to use the B-25 everywhere other
than the ETO, with the B-26 pulled from the PTO.

I need to get down to Maxwell one of these years and do a search to find when the
decision was made as to theater allocation, and by whom. The decision to use the
B-26 exclusively in the ETO was probably made in early or more likely mid 1943.
In April 1943 the 5th Wing/Air Division was eliminated owing to Group diversions
to the 12th AF in the MTO, and its bases were reallocated to the 1st and 4th
BW/AD. Then the 4th BW/AD was supposed to get the mediums and lights, but flow
charts showed that most of the groups scheduled to deploy in the spring of '43
were equipped with B-17s. At the same time, the 3rd Wing/AD was expecting to get
a number of B-25 and B-26 Groups shortly. Sometime around May/early June, with
the failure of the first B-26 low-altitude raids and the change to medium
altitude, it was also decided to swap the bases of the medium and heavy groups of
the 3rd and 4th Air Divisions, so that the mediums would be closer to targets in
France, while the heavies could take advantage of the generally higher state of
completion of the 3rd AD airfields. (Details from one of Freeman's "The Mighty
Eighth" series books, either the first one or the technical manual; I made xeroxes
but didn't label it).

The B-25 was used exclusively in the CBI and ultimately in the PTO, both were used
in the MTO (where as Chris' data shows the B-25 had a lower loss rate than the
B-26, flying the same missions), and the B-26 was used exclusively in the ETO. I
suspect that the location of the production plants may have also played a part in
theater allocations. While both North American (Kansas City) and Martin (Omaha)
had plants in the middle of the country, the main factories were on the west
(Inglewood) and east (Baltimore) coasts respectively. Martin had to turn the
Omaha plant over to B-29 production starting in mid-43 or so, leaving only the
Baltimore plant producing B-26s.

Guy

Guy Alcala

July 17th 04, 09:23 PM

Chris Mark wrote:

> >From: smartace11@
>
> >My origninal question was mainly
> >about whether different run in headings between flights would have avoided
> >some
> >aimed AAA and possibly flack concentrations
>
> More than likely. But medium bomber loss rates in Europe, especially as the
> war progressed, were reasonably low. Ovrall, in the MTO, the B-26 loss rate
> was one per 148 combat sorties and in the ETO one per 210 sorties. The B-25
> loss rate in the MTO was one per 164 sorties, and in the Pacific one per 52
> sorties.

Chris, could I know the source of your loss rate figures? I've had difficulty in
tracking down MTO and early PTO data to compare the B-25 and B-26.

Guy

WalterM140

July 17th 04, 09:37 PM

>> >Also P-38 numbers grew from 302 in December 1942 to 567 in
>> >May 1943 then declined to 372 in October 1943 before rapidly
>> >expanding to 1,063 in April 1944. The numbers are for the USAAF
>> >deployed against Germany and include reserves etc.
>>
>> Thanks for the minutia.

>Not minutia in this case, but very germane, as the lack of P-38 numbers was a
>factor.

Gee, that is -my- point.

And the reason they were not there is because Eaker and Hunter didn't stress
it.

Was it beyond normal human kin in 1942 to devine the fact that the self
defending bomber was not going to work, even with the heavy armament, high
altitudes, tight formations and toughness of the B-17's and their crews?

Maybe so. I am not necessarily blaming Eaker and Hunter, just pointing out the
fact that a strong force of P-38's (provided that the technical problems were
addressed aggressively) could have been available a year before the pioneer
Mustang group arrived.

It's also true that some of the B-17 group commanders didn't care much about
escorts in the early part of the campaign. All that rendesvouzing made things
more complicated, don't you know.

But as the Germans realized the threat and acted to meet that threat, the B-17
bomber boxes met their match and were overborne.

> Production was very limited at the time.

Yes, I am providing a what-if. If the guys in England had been screaming for
P-38's the production could have been ramped up.

> Then there's the extra training
>time for multi-engine, which would add some additional delay to getting units
>operational/providing replacement pilots.

That doesn't seem that big an issue to me.

I recently got DVD's with the B-17 and P-38 flight operation films.

The B-17 flight ops were relatively simple. And the actor (Arthur Kennedy, who
later was the journalist in "Lawrence of Arabia", among many other roles) who
was the B-17 instructor pilot tells the trainee -- "you will -never- fly a
better bird than this." [paraphrased].

On the other hand, the P-38 film is filled with cautions and 'insert shots' of
"turn this handle if this happens" and don't forget to do this "if that
happens." The one speaker in the film is the Lockheed chief test pilot. He
says some thing like -- "hey, don't worry if you get a runaway propeller, it
happens all the time." Whoa.

I am not sure when exactly this film came out -- maybe in early in 1944. The
very first thing discussed is proper bail-out procedure in the P-38.

Don't worry, you won't hit the tail, you'll pass below it. "But don't worry
about that -- your job is to make the other guy bail out."

I wonder if perhaps ol' crazy George Patton saw this film and modified that
line and made it immortal.

>> The point is that Eaker and Hunter, 8th BC and 8th FC CGs respectively
>could
>> have stressed long range escorts and pushed P-38 enhancements, stressed
>> solving the technical problems, and so forth in 1942. P-38's were available
>in
>> England in 1942.
>>
>> Eaker and Hunter didn't do that.
>
>While Eaker and Hunter were doctrinally blind to the need for far too long,

Thats all I am saying, my friend.

>the
>need for a long-range fighter in the ETO in 1942 was hardly obvious given the
>shallow penetrations we were making at the time.

It wasn't obvious perhaps. That's why kudos go to those who see beyond the
obvious.

Arnold ordered Giles to
>increase
>the internal fuel of the fighters around June '43 IIRR (don't have the
>reference,
>"To Command The Sky" by McFarland and Newton, handy), giving him six months
>to
>achieve it. Besides the P-38 was only in the ETO for a couple of months
>before
>they were all sent to the Med.

Yes, Eaker could have been screaming bloody murder -- "hey, don't take my long
range escorts!" But he didn't, for whatever reason. Yes, it might to pure
hindsight to blame him for this in 1942. Definitely. But Eaker persisted in
supporting the self-defending bomber after 17 August, '43 and even after 14
Oct. '43.

Walt

WalterM140

July 17th 04, 09:42 PM

>>The Brits ignored American advice on how to use the B-17. Admittedly, the
>>B-17C was not ready for the big leagues.
>
>Could that be why they ignored the advice?

Perhaps.

I'll suggest that there was -no way- given the British experience in WWI that
they were going to the heavy daylight bomber route in WWI. And I don't blame
them a bit for that.

I think after all that 'Henry V'/'over the top' stuff in WWI, the Brits were
bound and determined to try a litte brain power the second time through.
B-17's were not going to help them that much in that particular endeavor.

Walt

WalterM140

July 17th 04, 09:44 PM

>You are incorrect.
>
>The RAF operated B-17's in action in daylight long before the
>USA even entered the war. The results were heavy losses and
>poor results.

The Brits didn't use enough B-17's ever, to say they had heavy losses. And the
Brits flew them at very high altitudes, and often as single attackers.

Except for elite units, British bombing accuracy throughout the war was poor.

Walt

WalterM140

July 17th 04, 09:48 PM

>The USA had zero combat experiencewith the B-17 in 1941 and
>sold the B-17 on the basis of the self defending bomber. It failed
>in 1941 and again when the USAAF tried it in 1943.

Yeah. Well we expect our political leaders to keep us out of war [excepting
the present blithering idiot in the White House] . But you're implying that
the US should have been bailing you out a long time before 1941, I am thinking.

The Americans were ultimately able to make daylight precision bombing pay off,
although not the way they intended, that is true.

Walt

ArtKramr

July 17th 04, 10:49 PM

>ubject: Re: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944
>From: Guy Alcala

>As Chris points out, both the B-25 and B-26 were so used, in the PTO, MTO,
>and ETO
>(not the B-25), in the early stages. High loss rates led to the move to
>medium

The B-26's were used on the deck with terrible results and were almost
instantly pulled up to 10,000 feet. After that the B-26 were the only mediums
used in the ETO replacing the slower, shorter range, smaller bombload B-25's.
The B-26 rendered the B-25's obsolescent.

Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

ArtKramr

July 17th 04, 10:51 PM

>Subject: Re: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944
>From: "Keith Willshaw"
>Date: 7/17/2004 11:21 AM Pacific Standard Time
>Message-id: >
>
>
>"ArtKramr" > wrote in message
...
>> >Subject: Re: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944
>> >From: "Keith Willshaw"
>> >Date: 7/16/2004 5:03 AM Pacific Standard Time
>> >Message-id: >
>> >
>> >
>> >"ArtKramr" > wrote in message
>> ...
>> >> >Subject: Re: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944
>> >
>> >>
>> >> We offered to give the Brits B-17's each with a big fat belly
>turret.They
>> >> wouldn't take them. Big mistake.
>> >
>> >The RAF operated at least one squadron of B-17's and a number of B-24's
>> >Bomber command were NOT impressed by the type and operated them
>> >mainly as EW aircraft jamming German communications
>> >
>> >Keith
>>
>>
>> They were getting the **** shot out of them every night as they flew
>planes
>> with no belly turrets. And hey used the planes with belly turrrets,
>B-17's and
>> B-24's for electronic jammimg? Brilliant. Just brilliant.
>>
>
>It was since they Germans needed those electronic aids to
>find them. Bottom line Art is that most hight bombers
>never saw what killed them and no radar guided turrets
>were then available.
>
>The option then was fit a belly turret of doubtful utility
>and to do so you have to remove the H2S Radar dome
>you need to find the target.
>
>Keith

How about take off a few pounds of bombs and do both?

Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

ArtKramr

July 17th 04, 10:54 PM

>Subject: Re: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944
>From: (Steve Mellenthin)
>Date: 7/17/2004 12:09 PM Pacific

>That is where I was headed with the question. Thanks for the response. It
>has
>been my impression, perhaps erroneous, that the choice of the stream stragegy
>was not the best decision at times when a loose gaggle and varying run-in
>headings and altitudes between the 2-4 airgraft groupings would have been
>more
>effective. As I said, only an impression not backed up by much research or
>fact.
>
>Steve

That makes for lousy bomb patterns on the target.

Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

ArtKramr

July 17th 04, 10:56 PM

>Subject: Re: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944
>From: (WalterM140)
>Date: 7/17/2004 1:12 PM Pacific Standard Time
>Message-id: >
>
>>Once air superiority was available the RAF flew their
>>daylight missions in loose gaggles of 2-4 aircraft staggered
>>in height to minimise flak damage.
>>
>>
>
>That might have been influenced by the fact that no other aircraft type could
>fly in the tight formations used by the B-17.
>
>I've heard that B-26s could also fly in very tight formations, but I
>shouldn't
>think as at high an altitude as the B-17.
>
>B-17's could maintain formation at heights almost twice as high as the
>altitude
>at which Bomber Command usually operated, either by day or by night.
>
>Walt
>
>Walt
>

No trick maintaining formation at high altitudes. The trick is hitting the
target from high altitudes.

Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

ArtKramr

July 17th 04, 10:59 PM

>Subject: Re: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944
>From: (Steve Mellenthin)
>Date: 7/17/2004 11:58 AM Pacific Standard Time
>Message-id: >
>
>>The B-26 of WW2 was the Martin Marauder, that of
>>Vietnam was the Douglas Invader which was originally
>>designated A-26 and was a later design largely replacing
>>the B-26.
>
>I stand corrected. Lack of familiarity with the earlier B-26.
>

See my website for B-26's in combat from every angle.

Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

ArtKramr

July 17th 04, 11:05 PM

>ubject: Re: Night bombers interception....
>From: (WalterM140)
>Date: 7/17/2004 1:48 PM Pacific Standard Time

>The Americans were ultimately able to make daylight precision bombing pay
>off,
>although not the way they intended, that is true.
>
>Walt

But the B-26's working from 10,000 feet exceeded their wildest dreams of
bombing accuracy

Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

ArtKramr

July 17th 04, 11:06 PM

>Subject: Re: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944
>From: Guy Alcala
>Date: 7/17/2004 1:23 PM Pacific Standard Time
>Message-id: >
>
>Chris Mark wrote:
>
>> >From: smartace11@
>>
>> >My origninal question was mainly
>> >about whether different run in headings between flights would have avoided
>> >some
>> >aimed AAA and possibly flack concentrations
>>
>> More than likely. But medium bomber loss rates in Europe, especially as
>the
>> war progressed, were reasonably low. Ovrall, in the MTO, the B-26 loss
>rate
>> was one per 148 combat sorties and in the ETO one per 210 sorties. The
>B-25
>> loss rate in the MTO was one per 164 sorties, and in the Pacific one per 52
>> sorties.
>
>Chris, could I know the source of your loss rate figures? I've had
>difficulty in
>tracking down MTO and early PTO data to compare the B-25 and B-26.
>
>Guy
>

Remember that the B-25's were in the MTO. A less hazardous theatre.

Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

Bernardz

July 18th 04, 12:03 AM

In article <40f8ceaa$0$1306$5a62ac22@per-qv1-newsreader-
01.iinet.net.au>, says...
>
> This sort of ignores the fact the RAF had been steadily building up the
> bomber support system, and the loss rates had peaked in earlier times,
> with new tactics helping to drop the losses back into the acceptable
> category. For example late 1941, and mid 1943.

What sort of tactics were used?

>
> It comes down to whatever Hastings defines as the Trenchard doctrine,
> the unescorted bomber devastating the target had long been disproved
> before March 1944.

What do these escort fighters do?

>

--
Logically we attempt to devise reasons for our irrational behaviour.

Observations of Bernard - No 62

Krztalizer

July 18th 04, 12:55 AM

>
>> The 'special navigation equipment' carried on Wilde Sau Bf 109s and FW
>190s
>> consisted of a UV lamp and specially coated maps. The special nav
>features of
>> the FuG 16Z were not utilized because they would have required a personal
>> controller for each "Boar", so instead they were following the
>Reichjägerweile
>> (general information fighter broadcast - "The four-motor bombers are
>> approaching Kassel; all aircraft within range, strong raid approaching
>Kassel",
>> that sort of thing. No naviads in the cockpits of the Wilde Sau airmen I
>have
>> interviewed.
>
>I believe these aircraft had artificial horizons, the FuG 16Z, ultraviolet
>or Radium instrumentation dials.

The guys I have interviewed were in 10./JG 300 primarily, and they were the
only instrument-rated Wilde Sau; the difference is that the rest of the program
were basically day fighters, flying under exceptionally good night visibility.
As I said before, the only thing they said was different from the standard
daylight Bf 109s in use, was the small UV maplight. Its probable that you are
right and that other Staffels in the program had slightly better navaids, but
it was never intended to use "night-flyers" in the program, just standard day
fighter pilots. We had a long conversation with Oberst Herrmann on this exact
subject as part of our interview.

> Protecting a fighter pilots night vision
>was all important, the Luftwaffe even had a device to measure the speed of
>recovery of eyes after being illuminated by light. The the the wild sow
>hunted aircraft that had been caught in searchlights.

Yes, as they all said, "The eyes of a hunter is what was needed - no radar, no
controller, nothing was more important than excellent night vision." I heard
that from every NJG pilot we tracked down.

> They did perform
>ground controled interceptions that this was of course limited by the number
>of Wurzburg radars and oppertators:

Not during the actual Wilde Sau program, but following its termination, they
did exactly this. Once the rest of JG 300 went back to exclusively daylight
combat, the sole remaining nightfighter Staffel in JG 300 (the massively
overstrength 10th Staffel at Jüterbog), THEN controllers were used to guide
single Bf 109s toward their targets. From what I have been told, this was not
done during the earlier period, when Wilde Sau's were primarily hunting
Viermots over citiesl

> I believe mosquitoes were the main
>target.

There were several Mosquito Jagd units, operating from September 44 to April
1945, including NJGr 10, 10./JG 300, two gruppes within NJG 11, etc., but these
were all after the Sept 44 demise of the Wilde Sau program.

> The Me 109G6 U4N was equipped with Naxos to home onto bomber
>emisions and to also home back to homebase. This type was little used
>because it came at the end of wild sow tactics when the Luftwaffe had
>managed to get its radars working again.

Also the reluctance of bomber crews to leave the H2S on, since all of them knew
by then that their suspicions concerning the Germans homing on it had already
been confirmed. A Mosquito was deliberately sent up as bait and it was
immediately tracked and attacked by a Naxos-equipped fighter. Later, an H2S
was operating on the -ground-, and a Luftwaffe fighter homed onto it. After
that incident, crews were quite judicious with its use, and the LW realized it
was not going to be an effective tracking tool.

> I believe that great of squadrons
>in training was between 20 to 75 percent. Finnish pilots trained by the
>Germans in night fighting had only a 10 percent death rate simply because
>they were far better trained to start with.

The "airman's death" that met most of the Wilde Sau airmen was caused by their
general inexperience, compounded by the rigors of night combat. It was
everything the day fighter nachwuchs faced, multiplied many times. Its a
wonder any of them made it through more than a flight or two.

>The correct translation of "Wilde Sau" Wild Sow not Wild Boar. It alludes
>to the wild sow's willingness to aggressively defend its young.

I know their songs :) Its difficult for me to call professional nightfighter
airmen "old lady pigs", so I used Boars - my mistake, but it was intentional.

>> Quite often when the German radar was working the link between the
>ground
>> >and night fighter was not.
>>
>> They were being jammed and intruded upon for the last two years of the
>war.
>> When the voice RT was 'stepped on', most NJ pilots had their bordfunkers
>switch
>> to Morse, which was not as easier to operate in a dirty environment.

I meant to say it was easier to operate in that environment. Silly slip....

>> > The introduction of the Bernhard-Bernhardine system
>> >improve matters. This system was very jam proof it told a night fighter
>> >exactly where was in that provided a secure telemetry to link the night
>> >fighter with ground control by a ticker tape.
>>
>> One cool part of that system is that it was the first on earth to provide
>a
>> blind landing capability, when hooked to a three-axis autopilot. The
>Interim
>> Nightfighter (Me 262 B-1a/U1) 'version 2' carried this setup, as did a
>couple
>> captured Ju 88 nightfighters.
>
>It is a fascinating system. I Would like to know the technology of it?

Look up the K-22 automatic pilot. If you send me a note off board, I will
forward some more info about it.

>I have read that the Luftwaffe was heading towards fully automatic
>interceptions, this system was perhaps only one step away.

Very close. Allies were always only a step behind, but by late 1944, early
1945, the night arm of the Luftwaffe was playing with amazing toys.

>You have any information on the German EGON system which was similar to
>"oboe". This was quite an advanced night bombing device on the Luftwaffe's
>side but I am not sure where it was used if ever.

Sorry - its at the PRO in England. I focus on nightfighters over Europe, so I
didn't copy that file when I saw it.

>> Berndard was essentially an early datalink system intended for large
>bombers
>> but it evolved into a fighter director.that was quite advanced for its
>day.
>>
>> >Because the German Lichtenstein radar had large aerials aircraft were
>slowed
>> >down considerably this limited number of interceptions they were able to
>> >achieve.
>>
>> Crews often scored 4, 5, or even more Abschusse in a single sortie. Other
>> Experten crews managed up to 7. Faster speed does not help a radar
>> interception of a slow target in low/zero visibility.
>
>The ideal situation occurred when the night fighter pilots managed to
>infiltrate into the middle of the bomber stream, it was in this situation
>that these multiple victories occurred. In the middle of the bomber stream
>jamming and window was minimal.

Yes - like piranhas in a fishtank, no place for the bombers to turn...

> I believe diversionary raids however
>frequently lead the night fighters on a fruitless chase: they often were led
>to the wrong city and then lacked the speed to defend the correct one in
>time.

Exactly so. Other times, they sat in their cockpits on the ground watching a
distant city burn, as their flight controllers denied them permission to
launch, supposedly because the target was not yet known. For the pilots, it
was unbearable.

v/r
Gordon
<====(A+C====>
USN SAR

Its always better to lose -an- engine, not -the- engine.

Chris Mark

July 18th 04, 01:16 AM

>From: Guy Alcala g_alcala@junkpostoffic

>Chris, could I know the source of your loss rate figures?

Part of a project I'm working on. I've been plugging away at a history of the
air war in the MTO off and on for some years and got curious about operations
in other theaters and how they compared.
Whether B-25 or B-26, losses track pretty closely with mission profile. For
example, the 319th, a B-26 group sent to the MTO, was trained in low-level
attacks. But after less than three months, losses were so severe that it was
withdrawn from combat and retrained in medium altitude bombardment, after which
losses plummeted. The 310th, a B-25 outfit, was somewhat similar, although it
kept a specialized low-level squadron for sea sweeps for a long time.
Whether B-25 or B-26, used as medium altitude bombers, losses were in the
roughly one per 150-200 sortie range and 3-4 times higher when they went down
on the deck.
B-26 losses were higher than B-25 losses in the MTO. I suspect the biggest
reason was better single-engine performance by the B-25.
B-26s also had much higher abort figures than the B-25, several times higher,
in fact. I suspect better reliability and easier maintenance of the B-25s
Wright engines, played some role in this, but more important likely was the
problems the B-26 had with its electrically operated props, so that a generator
failure would lead to a mission abort.
Conversely, in the Pacific, with the B-25 groups flying low-level missions, the
hydraulicly operated props caused losses. Typically, a plane would take a hit
in the oil cooler and start losing oil. Had the plane been at 10,000 feet,
that engine's prop would have been feathered and the engine shut down. Good
chance the old bird would make it home or to an emergency field. But on the
deck shutting down the engine was not an option. The plane had to maintain
power on both engines until it got clear of the target. Unfortunately, by that
time, oil pressure might well have dropped so low that the prop couldn't be
feathered.
The B-25 had good short field performance compared to the B-26. That made it
more desirable in the rougher theaters of operation. Turnaround time on the
B-25 was quicker as well, so that it was possible when needed, say as during
the Anzio invasion, for a single plane to fly multiple sorties in a single day.
Maximum lifting capability was around two-thirds greater (depending somewhat
on models compared) for the B-25 compared to the B-26, basically meaning that
B-25s could stagger into the air with seemingly impossible loads. Thus, in the
Pacific, you would have B-25s staging out of Palawan flying missions to bomb
shipping in Saigon, staying in the air 10 or 11 hours.
All the B-26 units in Italy were eventually phased out, as they had been in the
Pacific, so that eventually B-26s only operated in the ETO.

Chris Mark

Guy Alcala

July 18th 04, 01:34 AM

WalterM140 wrote:

> >>The Brits ignored American advice on how to use the B-17. Admittedly, the
> >>B-17C was not ready for the big leagues.
> >
> >Could that be why they ignored the advice?
>
> Perhaps.
>
> I'll suggest that there was -no way- given the British experience in WWI that
> they were going to the heavy daylight bomber route in WWI. And I don't blame
> them a bit for that.

Assuming that your second "WWI" above should read "WWII", I'd point out that the
Brits did go the "heavy daylight bomber route" in WW II, initially and later.
Losses on the early raids to Wilhelmshaven etc. by Wellingtons (both 'heavies',
and reasonably well-armed by the standards of the day) convinced them that
"self-defending bomber formations" weren't. They lacked a long-range escort
fighter at the time, and the BoB delayed any development of same, but they
continued to fly some daylight missions with heavies, within escort range by
Stirlings in 1941 and '42, beyond escort range by Lancs in 1942. The latter were
more in the nature of special missions, but the escorted Stirling missions were
relatively routine. The Stirling was ill-suited to daylight missions against
well-defended targets, but the RAF did give the missions a tryout. And after air
superiority had been won and escort could be provided, the heavies flew an
increasing percentage of daylight missions in 1944 and 1945.

Guy

Guy Alcala

July 18th 04, 01:54 AM

ArtKramr wrote:

> >ubject: Re: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944
> >From: Guy Alcala
>
> >As Chris points out, both the B-25 and B-26 were so used, in the PTO, MTO,
> >and ETO
> >(not the B-25), in the early stages. High loss rates led to the move to
> >medium
>
> The B-26's were used on the deck with terrible results and were almost
> instantly pulled up to 10,000 feet.

That "instantly" took several months in the MTO and the PTO. It took two
missions, both to Ijmuiden, in the ETO, with the second mission suffering 100%
losses (1 a/c aborted and was the only one to return).

> After that the B-26 were the only mediums
> used in the ETO replacing the slower, shorter range, smaller bombload B-25's.

As I stated, the B-25s were never used in the ETO; the B-26s didn't replace
them. The only time that one replaced the other in any theater was in the PTO,
where the B-25 replaced the B-26. As to speed and range, we've been through this
before. Speeds of the B-25 and B-26 models used in the MTO and ETO were
comparable, a couple of mph either way, with the difference so small as to be
lost in individual a/c variations. The B-26 and B-26As used in the PTO and the
early B-26Bs used in the MTO were faster than the contemporary B-25s, but that
changed once the long wing came in on the B-26B-10 and subsequent models.

As to range, the B-25C and later models were longer-ranged than the B-26,
although the B-26 and B-26A were longer-ranged than the B-25 up through the 'B'
model. Hardly surprising, as the B-26 (all models) had normal max. internal fuel
of 962 gallons, while the early B-25s only had 670 gallons. But from the B-25C
and D models on, the B-25 carried 974 gallons internally, vice the B-26's 962.
Combined with its smaller, less thirsty engines, the B-25 (C and later) range was
better than the B-26. The B-26's normal max bombload was greater, by 1,000 lb.
(4,000 vs. 3,000).

> The B-26 rendered the B-25's obsolescent.

Tey were both ordered out of the same design competition, and the B-26 was
removed from production before the B-25 was, which says a lot about about which
was considered more valuable to the war effort. If that's being rendered
obsolescent in your book, then most a/c would be happy to be obsolescent. Of
course, with the coming of jets they were both obsolescent, as were all
piston-engined a/c, but that's a different matter entirely.

Guy

Guy Alcala

July 18th 04, 02:23 AM

ArtKramr wrote:

> >Subject: Re: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944
> >From: Guy Alcala
> >Date: 7/17/2004 1:23 PM Pacific Standard Time
> >Message-id: >
> >
> >Chris Mark wrote:
> >
> >> >From: smartace11@
> >>
> >> >My origninal question was mainly
> >> >about whether different run in headings between flights would have avoided
> >> >some
> >> >aimed AAA and possibly flack concentrations
> >>
> >> More than likely. But medium bomber loss rates in Europe, especially as
> >the
> >> war progressed, were reasonably low. Ovrall, in the MTO, the B-26 loss
> >rate
> >> was one per 148 combat sorties and in the ETO one per 210 sorties. The
> >B-25
> >> loss rate in the MTO was one per 164 sorties, and in the Pacific one per 52
> >> sorties.
> >
> >Chris, could I know the source of your loss rate figures? I've had
> >difficulty in
> >tracking down MTO and early PTO data to compare the B-25 and B-26.
> >
> >Guy
> >
>
> Remember that the B-25's were in the MTO.

Art, read Chris's post. Both were in the MTO and PTO, which is why I asked where
he got the info. I'm going to repost Chris' data to refresh your memory:
-----------------------------------------------------------------

More than likely. But medium bomber loss rates in Europe, especially as the
war progressed, were reasonably low. Ovrall, in the MTO, the B-26 loss rate
was one per 148 combat sorties and in the ETO one per 210 sorties. The B-25
loss rate in the MTO was one per 164 sorties, and in the Pacific one per 52
sorties.

<snip>

During the first year of MTO operations (June 42-June 43, the North
African phase) the loss rate for B-26s was one per 20 sorties, for the B-25 one
per 43 sorties.
----------------------------------------------------------------

Please note that the above data provides info for those theaters where both the
B-25 and B-26 were flying the same missions at the same time, the only way to make
a valid comparision of the two a/c. To summarize the loss data:

Overall MTO loss rate:

B-25: 1/164 sorties, or .61%.
B-26: 1/148 sorties, or .68%.

Conclusion: B-25 loss rate is about 11.5% better than the B-26, flying the same
missions at the same time.

North Africa-only loss rate, Nov. '42 - June '43:

B-25: 1/43 sorties, or 2.33%.
B-26: 1/20 sorties, or 5.00%.

Conclusion: B-26 loss rate is over double B-25 loss rate.

And finally, you claimed that the MTO was :

>A less hazardous theatre [than the ETO].

Does that claim hold up? Nope.

B-26 loss rate, North Africa only: 5.00%
B-26 loss rate, overall MTO: .68%
B-26 loss rate, Overall ETO: .48%

Conclusion, B-26 loss rate in the MTO was 42% higher than it was in the ETO, and
just taking the North African theater (where there was a high percentage of
low-level missions), loss rates were 7.4 TIMES what they were in the ETO. Still
insist that the MTO was a less hazardous theater?

Guy

B-25 loss rate

> Arthur Kramer
> 344th BG 494th BS
> England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
> Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
> http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

ArtKramr

July 18th 04, 02:35 AM

>Subject: Re: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944
>From: (Chris Mark)
>Date: 7/17/2004 5:16 PM Pacific Standard Time

>All the B-26 units in Italy were eventually phased out, as they had been in
>the
>Pacific, so that eventually B-26s only operated in the ETO.
>
>
>Chris Mark
>
>

Phased out is the wrong term. They were yanked out and rushed up to the ETO
where the demands were much higher and targets much tougher. Only the best were
used in the ETO. The only reason a piece of equipment was taken out of the ETO
is because it couldn't cut.

Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

Guy Alcala

July 18th 04, 02:43 AM

Chris Mark wrote:

> >From: Guy Alcala g_alcala@junkpostoffic
>
> >Chris, could I know the source of your loss rate figures?
>
> Part of a project I'm working on. I've been plugging away at a history of the
> air war in the MTO off and on for some years and got curious about operations
> in other theaters and how they compared.

Can you break out B-25 and B-26 losses in the MTO excluding North Africa? Those
are the onesI'm really interested in. BTW, I take it theseare all combatlosses and
don't include operational losses?

> Whether B-25 or B-26, losses track pretty closely with mission profile. For
> example, the 319th, a B-26 group sent to the MTO, was trained in low-level
> attacks. But after less than three months, losses were so severe that it was
> withdrawn from combat and retrained in medium altitude bombardment, after which
> losses plummeted. The 310th, a B-25 outfit, was somewhat similar, although it
> kept a specialized low-level squadron for sea sweeps for a long time.
> Whether B-25 or B-26, used as medium altitude bombers, losses were in the
> roughly one per 150-200 sortie range and 3-4 times higher when they went down
> on the deck.
> B-26 losses were higher than B-25 losses in the MTO. I suspect the biggest
> reason was better single-engine performance by the B-25.

I'd agree, although engine maintenance would have also fed into the problem. Given
the maintenance problems, losing _an_ engine might well lead to loss of the
airplane just from failure of the other one due to overstrain, even if it was
otherwise controllable on a single. the other thing I wonder about is if the B-25
had better air filters at the time. I know many of the early B-26 groups in North
Africa retrofit the larger intakes (for air filters) on the nacelles of their early
B models, but I don't know how the B-25 setup compared at the time.

> B-26s also had much higher abort figures than the B-25, several times higher,
> in fact. I suspect better reliability and easier maintenance of the B-25s
> Wright engines, played some role in this, but more important likely was the
> problems the B-26 had with its electrically operated props, so that a generator
> failure would lead to a mission abort.

No doubt about it. There was also an issue, in the PTO at least, with prop tip
clearance while taxying on soft ground/runways. The difference between the B-25
and B-26 was only 3 inches, but that was apparently enough to cause problems. The
B-26B-4 and subsequent were given an extended nosewheel partly to compensate for
this (and also to improve the wing aspect angle on takeoff), and later the B-26F
and G models (Art flew a G) also had the wing angle of incidence increased to 3
degrees, providing similar benefits to takeoff performance and proptip clearance.

It also seems that it was far easier to make repairs on the B-25's fuselage skin,
given that it was mostly flat panels instead of the B-26's double curvature. And
as Art will tell you the B-26's nose gear was rather weak, which didn't help its
mission capable rate when operating from rough strips.

> Conversely, in the Pacific, with the B-25 groups flying low-level missions, the
> hydraulicly operated props caused losses. Typically, a plane would take a hit
> in the oil cooler and start losing oil. Had the plane been at 10,000 feet,
> that engine's prop would have been feathered and the engine shut down. Good
> chance the old bird would make it home or to an emergency field. But on the
> deck shutting down the engine was not an option. The plane had to maintain
> power on both engines until it got clear of the target. Unfortunately, by that
> time, oil pressure might well have dropped so low that the prop couldn't be
> feathered.

> The B-25 had good short field performance compared to the B-26. That made it
> more desirable in the rougher theaters of operation. Turnaround time on the
> B-25 was quicker as well, so that it was possible when needed, say as during
> the Anzio invasion, for a single plane to fly multiple sorties in a single day.
> Maximum lifting capability was around two-thirds greater (depending somewhat
> on models compared) for the B-25 compared to the B-26, basically meaning that
> B-25s could stagger into the air with seemingly impossible loads. Thus, in the
> Pacific, you would have B-25s staging out of Palawan flying missions to bomb
> shipping in Saigon, staying in the air 10 or 11 hours.
> All the B-26 units in Italy were eventually phased out, as they had been in the
> Pacific, so that eventually B-26s only operated in the ETO.

I know one US MTO B-26 Group was briefly converted to B-25s before relocating to
the states for transition to the A-26 and the PTO, but I thought the other 2? (3?)
remained in the theater. ISTR the various allied air forces flying the B-26
continued flying it in the MTO, although at least a couple of the French groups
moved to France after Anvil/Dragoon. I remember seeing a photo of one US B-26 base
on either Corsica or Sardinia, which had six parallel packed and oiled dirt
runways, giving some idea of the dust problems in theater.

Guy

Guy Alcala

July 18th 04, 03:04 AM

WalterM140 wrote:

> >Once air superiority was available the RAF flew their
> >daylight missions in loose gaggles of 2-4 aircraft staggered
> >in height to minimise flak damage.
> >
> >
>
> That might have been influenced by the fact that no other aircraft type could
> fly in the tight formations used by the B-17.

That's a question of stability and control forces. The B-17 was easier to fly in
formation than the B-24, but I have no idea how the British heavies stacked up.

> I've heard that B-26s could also fly in very tight formations, but I shouldn't
> think as at high an altitude as the B-17.

Not even close, owing to the engine supercharging.

> B-17's could maintain formation at heights almost twice as high as the altitude
> at which Bomber Command usually operated, either by day or by night.

Again, due to the superchargers. Both US mediums and the British heavies used
single-stage two-speed superchargers while the B-17 and B-24 used turbochargers
(feeding superchargers). That generally gave them max. power and top speeds ain
the range of 13,500 - 15,000 feet. A couple of years ago a few of us decided to
find out what it would take to boost RAF heavies to B-17 or B-24 formation cruise
heights. Given the available British engines, they could only have used two-stage
two-speed Merlins, 60, 70 or 80 series. Those were all being used by Spit 8/9/16s,
late model Mossie bomber/recon a/c, and of course Merlin P-51s. Major changes in
production lines (and the a/c) would have been required to provide enough for the
heavies as well.

Our conclusion was that the simplest and quickest method for the Brits to go over
to US style daylight bombing against well-defended targets in the fall of 1943 was
to use B-24s diverted from US groups in training (the 8th preferred the B-17), at
least until they could produce a high altitude bomber engine (preferably a Bristol
Hercules air-cooled radial, either turbocharged or with a two-speed supercharger)
in adequate numbers. By night most of them were able to cruise individually in
the 19 - 23,000 foot range, but formation flying limits the performance to the
worst a/c, and also requires some power in hand for throttle jockeying and
formation turns. So we figured they were likely restricted to tight formation
flying at altitudes of around 18,000 or at most 20,000 feet for Lancs or Halifax
IIIs, although we knew we'd have to lighten the bombloads to get them that high
(owing to the need to increase the defensive armament, armor, crew, and fuel
loads).

Guy

Guy Alcala

July 18th 04, 03:24 AM

ArtKramr wrote:

> >Subject: Re: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944
> >From: "Keith Willshaw"
> >Date: 7/17/2004 11:21 AM Pacific Standard Time
> >Message-id: >
> >
> >
> >"ArtKramr" > wrote in message
> ...
> >> >Subject: Re: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944
> >> >From: "Keith Willshaw"
> >> >Date: 7/16/2004 5:03 AM Pacific Standard Time
> >> >Message-id: >
> >> >
> >> >
> >> >"ArtKramr" > wrote in message
> >> ...
> >> >> >Subject: Re: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944
> >> >
> >> >>
> >> >> We offered to give the Brits B-17's each with a big fat belly
> >turret.They
> >> >> wouldn't take them. Big mistake.
> >> >
> >> >The RAF operated at least one squadron of B-17's and a number of B-24's
> >> >Bomber command were NOT impressed by the type and operated them
> >> >mainly as EW aircraft jamming German communications
> >> >
> >> >Keith
> >>
> >>
> >> They were getting the **** shot out of them every night as they flew
> >planes
> >> with no belly turrets. And hey used the planes with belly turrrets,
> >B-17's and
> >> B-24's for electronic jammimg? Brilliant. Just brilliant.
> >>
> >
> >It was since they Germans needed those electronic aids to
> >find them. Bottom line Art is that most hight bombers
> >never saw what killed them and no radar guided turrets
> >were then available.
> >
> >The option then was fit a belly turret of doubtful utility
> >and to do so you have to remove the H2S Radar dome
> >you need to find the target.
> >
> >Keith
>
> How about take off a few pounds of bombs and do both?

Many of the crews were "taking off a few pounds of bombs" to improve
performance, albeit unofficially over the North Sea or as soon as they crossed
into German airspace. A B-17 or B-24 ball turret weighed about 1,500 pounds
loaded - now you want to add the weight and drag of a radome and radar to that,
and unlike the case with US pathfinders, you're doing so on every a/c instead
of just the lead. That's a lot more than "a few pounds" of bombs, and you've
made every a/c far more vulnerable to fighters and flak, because you're slower
and can't fly as high.

As an example of just how major the drag was, in 1944 and 1945 the 8th AF
allowed various units to experiment with removing guns and turrets to see what
effect it had on performance. Most of the experiments involved only a single
position, but one group removed the chin, top and ball turrets (this was 1945,
when fighter opposition was minimal), and found that it improved the cruise IAS
by about 25 mph, as well as increasing the altitude, climb rate, and ease of
formation flying. That kind of speed increase by the night heavies (compared
to a normal cruise of 155-165IAS several thousand feet lower) would have made
interception by the radar-equipped Me-110s that made up the bulk of the
NachtJagd far more difficult if not impossible, and was worth far more for
safety than the gun turrets were. Which is why US jet nuke bombers were only
given tail guns. Daytime is another matter, at least when there's serious
fighter opposition, but we're talking about night.

Guy

Guy Alcala

July 18th 04, 03:40 AM

WalterM140 wrote:

> >The Battle of Berlin was indeed a defeat, that was not the
> >entirety of the air war over Germany however and its provably
> >untrue to claim that ai operations over Germany were suspended.
>
> Harris said he could knock Germany out of the war by attacking Berlin. And
> yet he stopped attacking Berlin. Why?
>
> If you say that Harris qualified his statement by suggesting that the
> Americans must help, then he was just butchering his own men because he knew
> that help wasn't coming.. Right?
>
> If you say that Harris thought that Bomber Command could do the job alone, well
> then he was wrong.
>
> You don't become a great captain by being wrong.
>
> Harris was not a great captain. The evidence shows that he was incompetent, if
> not criminally incompetent.

I'd say the evidence shows he was wrong, but you can be wrong without being
incompetent. Harris believed what he was doing was more effective than it was, but
unfortunately for him the Germans weren't providing BDA for him, and he couldn't
consult the USSBS. That others disagreed with him as to area bombing's
effectiveness is also true, but just because we know they were correct on that
issue NOW doesn't mean that it was obvious at the time. We can say that Harris
stuck with it long after he should of in the face of the evidence, but how many
commanders have been condemned for changing horses in midstream just when they were
on the verge of success? No one can accuse Harris of not adhering to maintenance
of aim. Of course, the same can be said of Haig; there's no one right answer.

Besides, Harris has an out; if you wish to throw around accusations of
incompetence, or rather negligence, you have to look no further than Portal. If he
disagreed with Harris' strategy and tactics and he didn't think that Harris would
properly support new ones if ordered to, it was his responsibility to replace him
with someone else; Harris said as much, in so many words. Portal punted, not
requiring him to change, and not replacing him.

Guy

Guy Alcala

July 18th 04, 04:28 AM

WalterM140 wrote:

> >> >Also P-38 numbers grew from 302 in December 1942 to 567 in
> >> >May 1943 then declined to 372 in October 1943 before rapidly
> >> >expanding to 1,063 in April 1944. The numbers are for the USAAF
> >> >deployed against Germany and include reserves etc.
> >>
> >> Thanks for the minutia.
>
> >Not minutia in this case, but very germane, as the lack of P-38 numbers was a
> >factor.
>
> Gee, that is -my- point.
>
> And the reason they were not there is because Eaker and Hunter didn't stress
> it.

No, the reason they weren't there is because there weren't enough to go around,
owing to the need to redesign the a/c for mass production, and a delayed
development due to the crash of the prototype.

> Was it beyond normal human kin in 1942 to devine the fact that the self
> defending bomber was not going to work, even with the heavy armament, high
> altitudes, tight formations and toughness of the B-17's and their crews?

We're not interested in 'divining' anything, what was needed was empirical
evidence, and early British unescorted raids by far more lightly armed, slower
twin-engined Wellingtons flying in looser formations at much lower altitudes
weren't necessarily indicative of US efforts. As it turns out, they _were_
indicative, but we didn't know that at the time.

> Maybe so. I am not necessarily blaming Eaker and Hunter, just pointing out the
> fact that a strong force of P-38's (provided that the technical problems were
> addressed aggressively) could have been available a year before the pioneer
> Mustang group arrived.

3 months maybe six months possibly, but a year? I think not. Production was still
ramping up, and the P-38 was still suffering from many of the same problems in
August 1944 as it had in October '43, 10 months after the 55th achieved IOC in the
ETO.

> It's also true that some of the B-17 group commanders didn't care much about
> escorts in the early part of the campaign. All that rendesvouzing made things
> more complicated, don't you know.
>
> But as the Germans realized the threat and acted to meet that threat, the B-17
> bomber boxes met their match and were overborne.

Certainly, and after Aug. 17th 1943 you can make a good case for accusing Eaker of
remaining wedded to doctrine over experience. You might even make that case by
June 1943 - Arnold had already reached that conclusion. But not in the Fall/Winter
of 1942/43.

> > Production was very limited at the time.
>
> Yes, I am providing a what-if. If the guys in England had been screaming for
> P-38's the production could have been ramped up.

Everyone in every theater other than the ETO (where there were no P-38s because
they were all sent to the MTO) was screaming for more, and yet production was what
it was. I very much doubt that more screaming would have increased the pace any
more than it was.

> > Then there's the extra training
> >time for multi-engine, which would add some additional delay to getting units
> >operational/providing replacement pilots.
>
> That doesn't seem that big an issue to me.

It was for P-38 units and replacements, especially those that were originally
supposed to get single-engined a/c. Lots of accidents when losing an engine on
t/o.

<snip>

> >> The point is that Eaker and Hunter, 8th BC and 8th FC CGs respectively
> >could
> >> have stressed long range escorts and pushed P-38 enhancements, stressed
> >> solving the technical problems, and so forth in 1942. P-38's were available
> >in
> >> England in 1942.
> >>
> >> Eaker and Hunter didn't do that.
> >
> >While Eaker and Hunter were doctrinally blind to the need for far too long,
>
> Thats all I am saying, my friend.

So far we agree.

> >the
> >need for a long-range fighter in the ETO in 1942 was hardly obvious given the
> >shallow penetrations we were making at the time.
>
> It wasn't obvious perhaps. That's why kudos go to those who see beyond the
> obvious.
>
> Arnold ordered Giles to
> >increase
> >the internal fuel of the fighters around June '43 IIRR (don't have the
> >reference,
> >"To Command The Sky" by McFarland and Newton, handy), giving him six months
> >to
> >achieve it. Besides the P-38 was only in the ETO for a couple of months
> >before
> >they were all sent to the Med.
>
> Yes, Eaker could have been screaming bloody murder -- "hey, don't take my long
> range escorts!" But he didn't, for whatever reason.

It wouldn't have made the slightest bit of difference if he had. With our focus on
the ETO air war and D-Day et. seq., we forget that in 1942 and 1943, the ETO wasn't
the highest priority theater - the Med was. the P-38 was consuidered absolutely
vital there, so that's where they went. Eaker screamed repeatedly to Arnold about
diversions to the MTO reducing the rate of the 8th's buildup throughout 1943; a fat
lot of good it did him prior to October or so.

And as others have mentioned, the P-38 wasn't all that much more long-ranged than
the P-47 at the time. P-38 internal fuel prior to the J with leading edge tanks,
was 300 gallons. A P-47D-23 or earlier with somewhat less total power had 305
gallons internal (the D-25 through M had 370 gal.). The P-38 would outclimb it,
but the P-47 was faster, so range was fairly close. The P-38's big advantage was
that it had large external tanks early, but the 165 gallon tanks weren't
pressurized (and never were), so couldn't have been used above 20,000 feet or so in
any case, which is where the escorts needed to be.

Let's instead postulate that the P-47 got big pressurized external tanks, either a
150 (actual cap. 165 gal.) or 200 gallon for the C/L, or a pair of 108 gallons
underwing, in August or September 1943 rather than February/April 1944.
Historically, note that despite high priority and the best efforts of Cass Hough
and Co. at Bovingdon, the first P-47 mission using drop tanks, the 200 gallon,
unpressurized and very draggy ferry tank only half loaded, was only in July 1943,
with the 75 gallon (actual cap. 84 gal.) metal pressurized tank becoming available
in August 1943, and the 108 gallon paper tank in October IIRR.

According to Zemke the 150 gal.C/L tank allowed the 56th to get to the Hanover
region, while the twin 108 gallon tanks only increased the radius a bit further
(limited by internal fuel for combat and return), but did increase the endurance.
Sure, they still can't go all the way to Berlin, but they can sure as hell take the
heavies a lot further in and meet them further in as well, decreasing the time the
Luftwaffe has to attack them. And the P-47 is a better high altitude escort
fighter than the P-38 anddoesnt suffer from all its problems, it just needs bigger
fuel tanks (external and then internal, in that order).

> Yes, it might to pure
> hindsight to blame him for this in 1942. Definitely. But Eaker persisted in
> supporting the self-defending bomber after 17 August, '43 and even after 14
> Oct. '43.

Not after Second Schweinfurt. That made him a convert. Even so, he still made the
(apparently) cognitively dissonant decision to give the P-51s to the 9th, but
Kepner fixed that, before Doolittle replaced Eaker. It made undoubted sense from a
logistic perspective, but none from a tactical perspective.

Guy

ArtKramr

July 18th 04, 04:56 AM

>Subject: Re: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944
>From: Guy Alcala

>hat's a lot more than "a few pounds" of bombs, and you've
>made every a/c far more vulnerable to fighters and flak, because you're
>slower

A B-17 would do about 140 IAS and an ME 109 would do about 350 IAS. And you are
worried about slowing the B-17 down so it can't outrun an ME 109???? I sat in
a B-26 doing 180 IAS and the FW-190's could pass us like we were sitting still.
You think if we were a bit slower it would cause a problem? Not as far as the
FW was concerned.

Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

Guy Alcala

July 18th 04, 05:16 AM

ArtKramr wrote:

> >Subject: Re: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944
> >From: (Chris Mark)
> >Date: 7/17/2004 5:16 PM Pacific Standard Time
>
> >All the B-26 units in Italy were eventually phased out, as they had been in
> >the
> >Pacific, so that eventually B-26s only operated in the ETO.
> >
> >
> >Chris Mark
> >
> >
>
> Phased out is the wrong term. They were yanked out and rushed up to the ETO
> where the demands were much higher and targets much tougher. Only the best were
> used in the ETO. The only reason a piece of equipment was taken out of the ETO
> is because it couldn't cut.

Art, no US B-26 Groups (17th, 319th, 320th) that had been assigned to the MTO were
"yanked out' and redeployed to the ETO. None, zero, zilch, nada. One of these
groups was redeployed to the US after having its B-26s replaced by B-25s (this only
lasted a month or so), for conversion to the A-26 and then movement to the Pacific.
Chris can probably correct my memory, but IIRR the other two groups were eventually
re-equipped with A-26s and stayed in the MTO, or were folded up.

Meanwhile, the RAF continued to operate 2 Squadrons of B-26s in the MTO, the South
African Air Force continued to operate 5 squadrons in the MTO, and the French
continued to operate six "Groupes" (equivalent to US squadrons) in the MTO. The
French units were later part of the 1st Tactical Air Force, operating against
targets in southern France until the end of the war.

All 8 US B-26 Groups in the ETO were originally deployed there - no B-26 Groups
arrived from any other theater.

Guy

Guy Alcala

July 18th 04, 05:57 AM

ArtKramr wrote:

> >Subject: Re: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944
> >From: Guy Alcala
>
> >hat's a lot more than "a few pounds" of bombs, and you've
> >made every a/c far more vulnerable to fighters and flak, because you're
> >slower
>
> A B-17 would do about 140 IAS

Normal B-17 formation cruise was150-160 IAS.

> and an ME 109 would do about 350 IAS. And you are
> worried about slowing the B-17 down so it can't outrun an ME 109????

Nope, I'm worried about slowing down and decreasing the cruise ceiling of a B-17,
B-24, Lancaster or Halifax operating singly at night (we are talking about night
bombing, after all) so that it's easy meat for an Me-110G loaded with 3 crew,
multiple heavy cannon, black boxes for radar and very draggy external radar
antennas, and which has a much smaller performance advantage over a bomber than a
single-engined day fighter does.

BTW, no Me-109 in sustained level flight at heavy bomber operational altitudes is
doing 350IAS: @ 20,000 feet and ISA that's about 480mph.

> I sat in
> a B-26 doing 180 IAS and the FW-190's could pass us like we were sitting still.

Sure could, at 10-15,000 feet. .But since the thread's clearly about night rather
than day missions, it's irrelevant. However, bomber speed and altitude could also
be a factor by day. The FW-190A's best performance was at or below 21,000 feet,
with performance falling off considerably above there. One of the first attempted
interceptions by FW-190As of B-17s (E or F models), the FW-190 unit commander
described tail-chasing the B-17s outbound from the target for what seemed like
forever with his throttle to the wall, closing only very slowly. He got very
frustrated by this, and even more so when his engine blew up from the prolonged
running at max. power, and he had to bial out. He (and his unit) never did catch
them on that mission.

The less speed advantage the fighter has over the bomber, the more limited the
chance to achieve an intercept (you've got to have a better set-up), and the less
chance of making multiple passes on the same formation. By day against
single-engined fighters, I agree that the speed generally made little difference
for the heavies compared to heavier armament, at least as long as fighters were the
primary threat. However, higher bomber speed and altitude can give heavily armed
multi-engined fighters real problems.

OTOH, B-24 units, when flying separately from the B-17s instead of in the same
stream, often had total mission times 30 minutes or so shorter than the B-17s
because the B-24s were that much faster, and nobody wanted to spend any more time
over enemy territory than they had to. Since they also generally flew lower than
the B-17s and attracted most of the flak and fighters, the speed advantage in that
case was at best a wash.

> You think if we were a bit slower it would cause a problem? Not as far as the
> FW was concerned.

Again, we were talking about night ops, but would you have preferred to fly your
missions at 160 IAS, 180 IAS, or 200 IAS? Which is likely to make the fighter's
job hardest? Which will allow you to spend the least amount of time in flak
envelopes, and decrease the accuracy of same the most? Was the A-26's higher speed
an advantage compared to the B-26?

Guy

ArtKramr

July 18th 04, 06:28 AM

>Subject: Re: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944
>From: (ArtKramr)

>A B-17 would do about 140 IAS and an ME 109 would do about 350 IAS.

For max range about 125.

Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

ArtKramr

July 18th 04, 06:29 AM

>Subject: Re: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944
>From: Guy Alcala

>Normal B-17 formation cruise was150-160 IAS.
>

For max rtange about 125.

Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

Geoffrey Sinclair

July 18th 04, 06:42 AM

WalterM140 wrote in message >...

firstly my deleted text, and I note the dropping of the Maxi Hastings data.

"There is a slight problem with this, the combat record of the P-38 over
North Africa in 1942/43 and then again over Europe on 1943/44. Then
add the long range P-38 versions came about when the cooling system
was redesigned and the J-15 version allowed 410 gallons of internal fuel
versus the 300 gallons in previous models. The first J models were
built in August 1943 without the wing tanks, with 10 J-1, 210 J-5 and
790 J-10 models built before the J-15 model was introduced, then add
the time to ramp up the line and send the aircraft overseas. In September
1943 the P-38s in the Mediterranean were classified as having a combat
radius of 350 miles, well short of that needed to escort bombers deep
into Germany."

>>It would have been quite easy to stop P-38 escorts in 1943, just attack
>>them early, and force them to jettison their external tanks, they were
>>carrying about as much or more fuel externally than internally.
>
>It was -shown- that even a few dozen P-38's had a very delerious effect on the
>tactics of the German day fighters.

Is this using the same sort of methodology used to "prove" the B-17
could do well against the average German fighter, total all B-17
sorties for the day, when most were not intercepted, and use the
totals rather than the results from the formations actually attacked?

Do we have one or two examples of this "few dozen P-38" phenomena?
Followed by the assumption the USAAF could do it once or twice then
they could do it at will? The P-38 was the most distinctive fighter going
around in 1944 over Europe. The Luftwaffe was quite able to work out
counter tactics of "hit the couple of P-38 formations to leave the bombers
unescorted". They Luftwaffe did quite well in Tunisia.

>There's no "it would have been quite easy to..." to it. What you suggest was
>not a factor.

A few dozen means one or two escort formations, tell JG26 to
intercept them just back from the coast.

The Luftwaffe actually tried this for a short while in 1943, hence
the RAF Spitfires flying the "insert cover". The extra fighters
meant extra Luftwaffe losses and less chance of picking the
real long range escort formations, since the P-47 was not all
that different to the Spitfire when the other type being compared
was the P-38.

>>Also P-38 numbers grew from 302 in December 1942 to 567 in
>>May 1943 then declined to 372 in October 1943 before rapidly
>>expanding to 1,063 in April 1944. The numbers are for the USAAF
>>deployed against Germany and include reserves etc.
>
>Thanks for the minutia.

If you are going to accuse someone of not using something make
sure the something was available for use first. Simply put assuming
the Mediterranean war was shut down the above figures are what
was available. And the Mediterranean war was not going to be shut
down, it was needed, at least until the end of 1943. So there were
no P-38s for the England based units, the P-38s were, after a trying
start, proving useful in the Mediterranean, mainly their superior range
compared with the P-40 and Spitfire.

>The point is that Eaker and Hunter, 8th BC and 8th FC CGs respectively could
>have stressed long range escorts and pushed P-38 enhancements, stressed
>solving the technical problems, and so forth in 1942. P-38's were available in
>England in 1942.
>
>Eaker and Hunter didn't do that.

So the theatre had control over where the scare P-38 resources
went to, given how much the Pacific wanted them, plus the
requirements of Tunisia?

Furthermore, given the number of USAAF missions to Germany in
say the first few months of 1943 the results would be so compelling
that the P-38 production line, the only high performance fighter the
USAAF had in combat, should be disrupted to add in the improvements.
Not only that but the specifications could be drawn up in say April 1943,
sent back to the US, turned into reliable engineering solutions in say
May 1943, with the first types built in say June 1943 with the arrival in
theatre in say July 1943. As opposed to the reality it took many months
to accumulate the information and turn it into numbers of improved
aircraft deployed in theatre. The first J models appeared in August 1943,
and as a rough guess it looks like the first J-15s were in December 1943
or January 1944.

In 1942 and early 1943 the P-38 was the fighter the Pacific forces
wanted, it had the better overall performance versus the P-39 and P-40
and was doing really well. The experience in Tunisia indicated the
P-38 needed work to tackle the Luftwaffe.

With nearly 1,700 built by the end of 1942, versus 532 P-47s, it was
not available in quantity, and it would take until mid 1943 to debug the
P-47 over Europe, to prove it was a worthwhile fighter. So the secondary
theatre, at least in early 1943, was given the task of proving the new
fighter in combat.

What I really like is Walter likes to run the line about how good the
B-17 was against enemy fighters, then turns around and accuses
the Generals of not providing enough escorts.

>>Eaker was not the only one and he did ask for long range tanks on
>>his fighters. It is not a simple good guy/bad guy situation.
>
>Eaker dawdled on it. It wasn't important to him.

The 8th Air Force placed large orders for drop tanks in June 1943,
placing it fourth on the list of priorities, the USAAF command back
in Washington apparently thought British production would be sufficient.

Meantime Eaker convinced Robert Lovett, the Assistant Secretary of
War for Air to push for a long range fighter.

>Eaker thought the B-17's could defend themselves until very late in the game.
>
>He -was- sacked, after all.

I know this has been pointed out many times but General Eaker
was not sacked, he was transferred to the Mediterranean in what was
a swap of commands with Spaatz and Dolittle. He was in command of
the USAAF in the Mediterranean and he was then transferred in early
1945 to Washington as deputy Air Force chief under General Arnold.

>Eaker even suggested that the first Mustang groups go to the 9th AF. He didn't
>understand the problem. He didn't allow for improvements and reinforcments of
>the German AF. P-38's of longer range and better reliability could have been
>provided well before they were. An all P-38 force could have done what a mixed
>P-47, P-51 and P-38 force DID do-- wreck the German day fighter force. -- if
>it had been stressed earlier. But it was not.

Of course give the 8th Air Force, say 1,000 P-38Js in early 1943
and watch them rip into an outnumbered western defences. Just
ignore the lack of bombers to take advantage of this wonder gift.
Just ignore the Luftwaffe doing something like new tactics or speeding
up the deployment of the fighter types historically delivered in 1944.
Just ignore the combat record of the P-38 over Europe in 1943/44.

>Now, you'll dispute this of course. But the problems the long range escorts
>gave the Germans rested on this:
>
>The Germans had to up-armor and up-arm their single engine fighters and add
>twin engine bomber destroyers to the mix, in order to kill B-17's in large
>numbers. -Any- of the three main US fighters on the scene (P-38, P-47,
>P-51)could have made that up-armoring and use of the twin engine bomber
>destroyers impractical.

Let us start with the fact in 1943 the twin engined day fighter force had
been run down, mainly by the conversion of the units to night fighters,
plus the realisation the Bf110 was not a day fighter and the Me210 was
a failure. The twin engined day fighters did not start appearing in any
numbers to defend Germany until the USAAF fighters had drop tanks.
Hitler wanted his attack at Kursk and defence of Sicily first. Hence the
use of some nightfighters in daylight in the west. The first use of rockets
was actually also the same day as the first use of P-47 drop tanks. When
things like rockets proved useful the fighters to use them were deployed.

Instead of giving the USAAF more earlier but saying the Luftwaffe stays
on the historical deployments consider the early appearance of the P-38
moves the Luftwaffe more quickly onto the line of the Fw190 bomber
destroyer. Add for extra spice the Fw190D-9 appearing earlier, the
engine it needed was in production in 1943.

The P-38 was the least effective of the USAAF fighters over Germany,
thanks to a combination of factors. Once the USAAF could deploy
escorts in numbers to the required targets then yes the Luftwaffe day
fighter force was in trouble. The engineering to provide the escorts
in numbers took most of 1943. Then the long range escorts appeared.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

Geoffrey Sinclair

July 18th 04, 06:42 AM

WalterM140 wrote in message >...
>>The Battle of Berlin was indeed a defeat, that was not the
>>entirety of the air war over Germany however and its provably
>>untrue to claim that ai operations over Germany were suspended.
>
>Harris said he could knock Germany out of the war by attacking Berlin. And
>yet he stopped attacking Berlin. Why?

I think the opening line makes that clear, the Battle of Berlin was
a defeat. I think the way Walter ducks the rest of the paragraph
makes it clear he is not interested in history.

>If you say that Harris qualified his statement by suggesting that the
>Americans must help, then he was just butchering his own men because he knew
>that help wasn't coming.. Right?

Walter likes to run this line, Harris wrote a letter to his superiors
indicating the Battle of Berlin would go better if the USAAF could
help, Walter like to turn this into Harris killing his men.

>If you say that Harris thought that Bomber Command could do the job alone, well
>then he was wrong.

And until it was tried no one knew it was wrong. Just like all the other
tactics tried.

>You don't become a great captain by being wrong.

So there are no great captains then, given all commanders are
wrong at times.

>Harris was not a great captain. The evidence shows that he was incompetent, if
>not criminally incompetent.

Walter starts from his preferred conclusion and works backward,
fitting the preferred evidence in with the deletion of inconvenient
facts.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

Geoffrey Sinclair

July 18th 04, 06:43 AM

Bernardz wrote in message ...
>In article <40f8ceaa$0$1306$5a62ac22@per-qv1-newsreader-
>01.iinet.net.au>, says...
>>
>> This sort of ignores the fact the RAF had been steadily building up the
>> bomber support system, and the loss rates had peaked in earlier times,
>> with new tactics helping to drop the losses back into the acceptable
>> category. For example late 1941, and mid 1943.
>
>What sort of tactics were used?

It depends on the era, intruder sorties were flown almost from
the start but initially by bombers, then non radar equipped
fighters, then radar equipped fighters were added to the mix.

The most obvious addition in 1941/42 was the bomber stream,
rather than allowing individual aircraft to make their own decisions
on timings and courses. The stream evolved, becoming more
compact as the war went on.

As the war went on the radio war hotted up, more radio aids used,
more methods and devices to jam them used.

>> It comes down to whatever Hastings defines as the Trenchard doctrine,
>> the unescorted bomber devastating the target had long been disproved
>> before March 1944.
>
>What do these escort fighters do?

Not sure of the question, but overall the idea is two fold, prevent bomber
losses and shoot down the interceptors. At night this meant flying around
the bomber stream, known Luftwaffe night fighter airfields and known radio
beacons.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

Geoffrey Sinclair

July 18th 04, 06:44 AM

WalterM140 wrote in message >...
>>> >Also P-38 numbers grew from 302 in December 1942 to 567 in
>>> >May 1943 then declined to 372 in October 1943 before rapidly
>>> >expanding to 1,063 in April 1944. The numbers are for the USAAF
>>> >deployed against Germany and include reserves etc.
>>>
>>> Thanks for the minutia.
>
>>Not minutia in this case, but very germane, as the lack of P-38 numbers was a
>>factor.
>
>Gee, that is -my- point.
>
>And the reason they were not there is because Eaker and Hunter didn't stress
>it.

Yes folks, Eaker and Hunter are the designated Black Hat wearers
of the moment, all evil comes from them.

The Pacific theatre really wanted more P-38s, they were by far the
biggest fans, the problems of mass producing the P-38 cannot be
ignored, plus the changes made in 1943 to make the type more
combat worthy helping to limit production. How about raging against
the decision to convert 500 P-38s to unarmed photo reconnaissance
types in 1942 and 1943, versus the 3,684 completed as fighters by
the end of 1943, including the prototype. There is your "few dozen"
extra P-38s. Note by the way the first 433 or so fighters were not
really combat worthy, that is everything before the P-38F, and the
reconnaissance versions were model F and G conversions so some
25% of the available F and G airframe ended up unarmed. Presumably
Arnold will now be considered a bad captain.

The USAAF wanted more P-38s in 1943, there was little the ETO
could do to speed up the process. It also realised the need for
high performance reconnaissance types. Only the defence of
England, of all the theatres of war, had enough allied fighters at the
start of 1943. So the P-47 went to Europe and even New Guinea.

>Was it beyond normal human kin in 1942 to devine the fact that the self
>defending bomber was not going to work, even with the heavy armament, high
>altitudes, tight formations and toughness of the B-17's and their crews?

The straight answer was it was not beyond human predictions, the
RAF told the USAAF so, but like so many bad ideas the people of
the time need to do the work to prove it was a bad idea, and this
took the first half of 1943 for most and October 1943 for all. So we
now know it was a bad idea, and it is up to us to learn from it, not
take cheap shots at those who tried it.

>Maybe so. I am not necessarily blaming Eaker and Hunter, just pointing out the
>fact that a strong force of P-38's (provided that the technical problems were
>addressed aggressively) could have been available a year before the pioneer
>Mustang group arrived.

Simply put once again Walter is wishing for his preferred solution
and ignoring any problems with it.

It takes time to ramp up production, even more time when it is clear
modifications are needed to make the aircraft perform better. Things
like better engine cooling but more cockpit heating, more internal fuel,
better dive recovery, even better roll rate, problems with the engines
at high altitudes was a big limit.

>It's also true that some of the B-17 group commanders didn't care much about
>escorts in the early part of the campaign. All that rendesvouzing made things
>more complicated, don't you know.
>
>But as the Germans realized the threat and acted to meet that threat, the B-17
>bomber boxes met their match and were overborne.
>
>> Production was very limited at the time.
>
>Yes, I am providing a what-if. If the guys in England had been screaming for
>P-38's the production could have been ramped up.

In 1943 the answer is probably not, things like the supply of engines,
two needed, meaning the equation became was 1 P-38 worth 2 P-40s?
Given the world wide shortage of fighters and the feedback about the
P-38 performance versus the Luftwaffe in Tunisia there is no definite
answer.

England was a secondary theatre in the first half of 1943, thanks to
Torch.

>> Then there's the extra training
>>time for multi-engine, which would add some additional delay to getting units
>>operational/providing replacement pilots.
>
>That doesn't seem that big an issue to me.

Yes we know wish mode will be deployed once the preferred
solution has been decided on.

(snip)

>>> The point is that Eaker and Hunter, 8th BC and 8th FC CGs respectively
>>could
>>> have stressed long range escorts and pushed P-38 enhancements, stressed
>>> solving the technical problems, and so forth in 1942. P-38's were available
>>>in England in 1942.
>>>
>>> Eaker and Hunter didn't do that.
>>
>>While Eaker and Hunter were doctrinally blind to the need for far too long,
>
>Thats all I am saying, my friend.

No Walter, you are also saying they could have had a direct influence on
the production of P-38s in 1943. You are assigning them the black hat
with the predetermined criminal conviction cluster.

>>the
>>need for a long-range fighter in the ETO in 1942 was hardly obvious given the
>>shallow penetrations we were making at the time.
>
>It wasn't obvious perhaps. That's why kudos go to those who see beyond the
>obvious.

Meantime Walter will shoot people for not spotting the not obvious.

>> Arnold ordered Giles to increase
>>the internal fuel of the fighters around June '43 IIRR (don't have the
>>reference,
>>"To Command The Sky" by McFarland and Newton, handy), giving him
>>six months to
>>achieve it. Besides the P-38 was only in the ETO for a couple of months
>>before they were all sent to the Med.
>
>Yes, Eaker could have been screaming bloody murder -- "hey, don't take my long
>range escorts!" But he didn't, for whatever reason. Yes, it might to pure
>hindsight to blame him for this in 1942. Definitely. But Eaker persisted in
>supporting the self-defending bomber after 17 August, '43 and even after 14
>Oct. '43.

In 1942 the P-38 was not a long range escort, the external fuel was
for ferry operations, large tanks with plenty of drag and no ability to
draw fuel from them above around 20,000 feet.

By the way if Eaker was still an unescorted heavy bomber fan you can
show all those sorts of missions run by the15th Air Force in 1944 when
he commanded it, correct?

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

Bernardz

July 18th 04, 08:54 AM

In article <40fa0ce6$0$1289$5a62ac22@per-qv1-newsreader-
01.iinet.net.au>, says...
> >> It comes down to whatever Hastings defines as the Trenchard doctrine,
> >> the unescorted bomber devastating the target had long been disproved
> >> before March 1944.
> >
> >What do these escort fighters do?
>
> Not sure of the question, but overall the idea is two fold, prevent bomber
> losses and shoot down the interceptors. At night this meant flying around
> the bomber stream, known Luftwaffe night fighter airfields and known radio
> beacons.

A fighter is much smaller, more mobile and generally faster then a
bomber. Finding a bomber and recognizing it was hard enough in WW2 how
successful were fighters in finding and identifying interceptors at
night?

--
Logically we attempt to devise reasons for our irrational behaviour.

Observations of Bernard - No 62

Guy Alcala

July 18th 04, 10:11 AM

ArtKramr wrote:

> >Subject: Re: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944
> >From: Guy Alcala
>
> >Normal B-17 formation cruise was150-160 IAS.
> >
>
> For max rtange about 125.

That seems a bit low but still believable, given that best rate of
climb is 135 IAS (per the pilot's manual). In any case, formation
combat cruise was 150-160 IAS, tending towards the lower end. B-24s
were at 160-180 IAS, or 155 if they had to fly with B-17s (which they
hated, because the Fort was comfortable in formation down to 140 or
even a bit less, where the B-24 was hanging on its props).

Guy

WalterM140

July 18th 04, 11:03 AM

>>He -was- sacked, after all.
>
>I know this has been pointed out many times but General Eaker
>was not sacked, he was transferred to the Mediterranean in what was
>a swap of commands with Spaatz and Dolittle.

That is typical of the crap you try and pull. Eaker fought this transfer tooth
and nail and you surely know that.

>Of course give the 8th Air Force, say 1,000 P-38Js in early 1943
>and watch them rip into an outnumbered western defences. Just
>ignore the lack of bombers to take advantage of this wonder gift.
>Just ignore the Luftwaffe doing something like new tactics or speeding
>up the deployment of the fighter types historically delivered in 1944.
>Just ignore the combat record of the P-38 over Europe in 1943/44.

Someone posted over on the WWII board that Galland, I believe, said that the
P-38 was the best allied fighter.

If it would have been so easy for the Germans to force the American fighters to
drop tanks, why didn't they rigorously enforce that against the P-51s?

And the P-38's in my hypothetical don't have to dogfight the Germans. They only
have to break up their massed attacks and make things too hot for the ME-110's.

>
>>Now, you'll dispute this of course. But the problems the long range escorts
>>gave the Germans rested on this:
>>
>>The Germans had to up-armor and up-arm their single engine fighters and add
>>twin engine bomber destroyers to the mix, in order to kill B-17's in large
>>numbers. -Any- of the three main US fighters on the scene (P-38, P-47,
>>P-51)could have made that up-armoring and use of the twin engine bomber
>>destroyers impractical.
>
>
>Let us start with the fact in 1943 the twin engined day fighter force had
>been run down, mainly by the conversion of the units to night fighters,
>plus the realisation the Bf110 was not a day fighter and the Me210 was
>a failure. The twin engined day fighters did not start appearing in any
>numbers to defend Germany until the USAAF fighters had drop tanks.

That is just false. The ME-110s played a heavy role in second Schweinfurt on
10/14/43 and earlier.

>Hitler wanted his attack at Kursk and defence of Sicily first. Hence the
>use of some nightfighters in daylight in the west. The first use of rockets
>was actually also the same day as the first use of P-47 drop tanks.

Yes, and even with drop tanks, the P-47's could get no further than the German
border in that time frame.

When
>things like rockets proved useful the fighters to use them were deployed.
>
>Instead of giving the USAAF more earlier but saying the Luftwaffe stays
>on the historical deployments consider the early appearance of the P-38
>moves the Luftwaffe more quickly onto the line of the Fw190 bomber
>destroyer.

Which P-38's could more easily disrupt or destroy.

Add for extra spice the Fw190D-9 appearing earlier, the
>engine it needed was in production in 1943.

What on earth are you talking about?

>
>The P-38 was the least effective of the USAAF fighters over Germany,
>thanks to a combination of factors.

P-38's were very capable of breaking up the German fighter formations as they
tried to do mass attacks on the bombers and they were also very capable of
engaging the ME-110s. It's not a matter of pure dogfighting ability, just as
the US Navy developed team tactics for the F-4-F's to use to fight the IJN
fighters.

Once the USAAF could deploy
>escorts in numbers to the required targets then yes the Luftwaffe day
>fighter force was in trouble.

That day -could- have come a full year sooner. First flight of the P-38
prototype was in 1939. First P-51B prototype was in November, 1942. I don't
see any reason why, as a hypothetical, that the problems the P-38's encountered
over Europe couldn't have been worked out in plenty of time to match the
increase in the B-17 force in the spring of 1943. They did have Kelley Johnson
working on the P-38 after all. It's hard to imagine he couldn't have solved
about anything.

Eaker didn't stress it, and Hunter (the 8th FC CG) didn't stress it. I don't
see any reason why the number of P-38's in Europe couldn't have been
dramatically increased, and much earlier, if it had been stressed. The
strategic bombing campaign operating out of England was, after all, the top
drawer element upon which the Army Air Force officers planned to use to make
their case for a separate air force.

>And the Mediterranean war was not going to be shut
>down, it was needed, at least until the end of 1943.

The most impotant theater to Arnold was clearly in England, and it involved
daylight precision bombing of German targets.

> So there were
>no P-38s for the England based units,

There could easily have been. That's my point.

>So the theatre had control over where the scare P-38 resources
>went to, given how much the Pacific wanted them, plus the
>requirements of Tunisia?

The most important air force was clearly in England. At least as far as Arnold
was concerned.

>Furthermore, given the number of USAAF missions to Germany in
>say the first few months of 1943 the results would be so compelling
>that the P-38 production line, the only high performance fighter the
>USAAF had in combat, should be disrupted to add in the improvements.

That's why it is a hypothetical.

>Not only that but the specifications could be drawn up in say April 1943,
>sent back to the US, turned into reliable engineering solutions in say
>May 1943, with the first types built in say June 1943 with the arrival in
>theatre in say July 1943.

Hypothectically, that could all have been done a year earlier.

>In 1942 and early 1943 the P-38 was the fighter the Pacific forces
>wanted, it had the better overall performance versus the P-39 and P-40
>and was doing really well. The experience in Tunisia indicated the
>P-38 needed work to tackle the Luftwaffe.

The P-38 could have been very effective ensuring that the Germans couldn't mass
the way they wanted to against the B-17's.

It was working -with- the B-17's that the P-38 could have done well. Of course
the P-51's and P-47's could and did do that too, but P-38's could have been
doing it a lot sooner.

Another hypothetical would be that the Allies could have mated the Merlin to
the Mustang a lot earlier. Sure. Then you would have had the same equation.
But no one, certainly not Eaker or Hunter, was pushing for that.

>What I really like is Walter likes to run the line about how good the
>B-17 was against enemy fighters, then turns around and accuses
>the Generals of not providing enough escorts.

That would just be a flat lie. The B-17 groups could not deal with fighters
after the Germans reinforced and re-armed beginning in the Spring of 1943.
With escorts to break up the German formations, and make it too dangerous for
the heavily armed German fighters (both single and twin engine) to be proximate
to the American formations, that changed.

You've seen me exposit that many, many times.

>Meantime Eaker convinced Robert Lovett, the Assistant Secretary of
>War for Air to push for a long range fighter.
>

Source?

I find no corroboration for such a supposed statement.

"Eaker as late as October 1943 still believed the key was in the size of the
bomber formations... Eaker stuck to this belief while high-ranking officers
such as Chief of the Air Staff Barney Giles and commander of the VIII Bomber
Command Fred Anderson had determined that escort was the key to victory."

-- "To Command the Sky, p. 112, by McFarland and Newton

"During June 1943 Assistant Secretary of War for Air Robert Lovett visited
England to observe Eighth Air Force operations. He spent considerable time
inspecting the VIII Fighter Command and especially the problems of escort. At
an Eighth Air Force comanders' mmeeting immediately after Lovett's visit,
Hunter told Eaker that he feared Lovett would insist on the use of P-38's for
escort. Hunter identified the P-38 as a "wonderful ship," but preferrred to
give the P-47 a "complete trial." In doing so Hunter revealed his
misunderstanding of the basic issue confronting the Eighth Air Force in the
summer and fall of 1943. The bombers needed escorts with range, bot superior
fighters. The P-47 was a better dogfighter, but it did not have the legs to fly
long escort missions."

ibid, p. 114

I find no evidence that Eaker thought it imperitive to provide escort or that
he communicated such with Lovett.

Lovett DID take that idea back to Washington with him, but he didn't get it
from Eaker.

Walt

Guy Alcala

July 18th 04, 11:07 AM

Aargh! Need to correct some brain farts.

Guy Alcala wrote:

> WalterM140 wrote:

<snip>

> > B-17's could maintain formation at heights almost twice as high as the altitude
> > at which Bomber Command usually operated, either by day or by night.
>
> Again, due to the superchargers. Both US mediums and the British heavies used
> single-stage two-speed superchargers while the B-17 and B-24 used turbochargers
> (feeding superchargers). That generally gave them max. power and top speeds ain
> the range of 13,500 - 15,000 feet.

'Them' in the above sentence refers to the US mediums and British hevies, not the B-17
and B-24, which put out max. power up to 25 or 30,000 feet, owing to the turbochargers.

<snip>

> Our conclusion was that the simplest and quickest method for the Brits to go over
> to US style daylight bombing against well-defended targets in the fall of 1943 was
> to use B-24s diverted from US groups in training (the 8th preferred the B-17), at
> least until they could produce a high altitude bomber engine (preferably a Bristol
> Hercules air-cooled radial, either turbocharged or with a two-speed supercharger)
> in adequate numbers.

"two-speed" should of course be "two-stage," usually two-stage, two-speed.

<snip rest>

Guy

WalterM140

July 18th 04, 11:48 AM

>
>formation turns. So we figured they were likely restricted to tight
>formation
>flying at altitudes of around 18,000 or at most 20,000 feet for Lancs or
>Halifax
>IIIs, although we knew we'd have to lighten the bombloads to get them that
>high
>(owing to the need to increase the defensive armament, armor, crew, and fuel
>loads).
>
>Guy
>
>

That's interesting. Didn't the RAF typically operate at @ 15,000 feet over
German targets?

On at least one occasion, B-17' were briefed to attack Berlin at 27,000 feet;
once to beat the clouds a group bombed from 30,000.

Walt

Guy Alcala

July 18th 04, 12:00 PM

Bernardz wrote:

> In article <40fa0ce6$0$1289$5a62ac22@per-qv1-newsreader-
> 01.iinet.net.au>, says...

<snip>

> > >What do these escort fighters do?
> >
> > Not sure of the question, but overall the idea is two fold, prevent bomber
> > losses and shoot down the interceptors. At night this meant flying around
> > the bomber stream, known Luftwaffe night fighter airfields and known radio
> > beacons.
>
> A fighter is much smaller, more mobile and generally faster then a
> bomber. Finding a bomber and recognizing it was hard enough in WW2 how
> successful were fighters in finding and identifying interceptors at
> night?

The RAF didn't seem to have too much trouble finding and identifying many of
those same Luftwaffe interceptors (used instead as bombers, i.e. the Ju-88 and
Do-217) by night over England. It could be a real pain trying to sort through a
returning bomber strike, as virtually every target was friendly. Here's an
account of such sorting by C.F. Rawnsley, John Cunningham's radar operator, in
his book "Night Fighter":

"The Luftwaffe kept up their attacks [Mid-43], making the most they could of
their limited numbers by sending in mixed raids of FW-190s, ME-410s and JU-88s.
This mixture of fast and comparatively slow types, and the presence all the time
of so many of our own bombers returning from raids, made the job of
identification by ground control extremely difficult. Visual recognition by the
night fighters became even more essential than before; and it helped a great
deal when we were issued with Ross night binoculars. Though they had no great
magnification, these glasses had an amazing power of collecting light. We
tried them out after dark, standing at the door of the crewroom. A vague blur
to the naked eye two hundred yards away took on with the help of the binoculars
the clear outline of a Mosquito, wth the squadron letters plainly readable on
the fuselage. . .
Halfway through August the Germans put on a sharp raid on Portsmouth . . .
Three times during the course of the raid they [the GCI station] gave us
contact, and each time I sweated after our target -- they were all coming in
fairly fast -- and brought John into visual range.

"The first one was flying as straight as an arrow. We were closing in quickly,
and I brought my new binoculars to bear. it turned out to be a Beaufighter.
The second waited until we were within three thousand feet, but before John
could see it the pilot started a tight turn to port. That was a little
puzzling, for he could hardly have seen us, unless the Germans were now equipped
with radar tail warning. But that pilot had chosen the wrong man for a winding
match, and after a couple of turns John was well inside and rapidly closing in.
Our target then steadied up and we saw that it was another Beaufighter.

"Our third customer was moving a great deal faster, and although he flew
straight on it took us some time to catch him. At John's word I looked up from
the A.I. set. The strap of the glasses caught in my harness, but even without
them I could see that this was no Beaufighter. The fuselage was much to slim
and delicate for that; it was far more likely to be an ME-410. I fumbled
impatiently with the strap and finally got the glasses to bear. Our target
leapt into clear profile. this time it was a Mosquito!"

Admittedly they usually had good GCI to get them close, but fighters pretty much
had to be around the bomber stream or their airfields to be effective. Besides,
there weren't any four-engined night fighters over nighttime Germany, which
allowed the bombers to be separated from the potential targets fairly easily ;-)

Guy

WalterM140

July 18th 04, 03:20 PM

>No, the reason they weren't there is because there weren't enough to go
>around,
>owing to the need to redesign the a/c for mass production, and a delayed
>development due to the crash of the prototype.
>

"The production in mid-1940 of 30 P-38's saw signifcant design changes
instituted to help mass production. For the first time, the fuselage was split
into left and right halves, and the nose section was built up independently.
The aft booms also were divided into two pieces with the skins adjusted to
accomodate this....The XP-38A was a converted P-38 with pressurization; next
production variant was the P38D of late summer 1940. The ever indeasing orders
for Lightnings prompted more design changes, both to improve performance and to
faciliate mass production."

--Warbird Tech Series vol 2, Lockheed P-38 Lightning pp. 22-26 by Frederick A
Johnsen

Sounds to me like the needed changes were in hand well before 1941, let alone
1942.

<snip>

>
>3 months maybe six months possibly, but a year? I think not. Production was
>still
>ramping up, and the P-38 was still suffering from many of the same problems
>in
>August 1944 as it had in October '43, 10 months after the 55th achieved IOC
>in the
>ETO.

That might have been alleviated earlier the generals in England had pushed it.
But they did not.

>
>> It's also true that some of the B-17 group commanders didn't care much
>about
>> escorts in the early part of the campaign. All that rendesvouzing made
>things
>> more complicated, don't you know.
>>
>> But as the Germans realized the threat and acted to meet that threat, the
>B-17
>> bomber boxes met their match and were overborne.
>
>Certainly, and after Aug. 17th 1943 you can make a good case for accusing
>Eaker of
>remaining wedded to doctrine over experience. You might even make that case
>by
>June 1943 - Arnold had already reached that conclusion. But not in the
>Fall/Winter
>of 1942/43.

They should have.

>
>> > Production was very limited at the time.
>>
>> Yes, I am providing a what-if. If the guys in England had been screaming
>for
>> P-38's the production could have been ramped up.
>
>Everyone in every theater other than the ETO (where there were no P-38s
>because
>they were all sent to the MTO) was screaming for more, and yet production was
>what
>it was.

Yes, production was what it was. I find it hard to believe it couldn't have
been increased.

I very much doubt that more screaming would have increased the pace
>any
>more than it was.

I can't help what you doubt. The 8th AF was the premier USAAF organization in
the world. Arnorld was clearly ready to provide anything needed by his close
friend Eaker. But Eaker didn't ask for it.

>
>> > Then there's the extra training
>> >time for multi-engine, which would add some additional delay to getting
>units
>> >operational/providing replacement pilots.
>>
>> That doesn't seem that big an issue to me.
>
>It was for P-38 units and replacements, especially those that were originally
>supposed to get single-engined a/c. Lots of accidents when losing an engine
>on
>t/o.
>

The source I quote above says accidents for P-38's were less for the P-38 than
for the P39, P-40 and P47 in 1942.

ibid p. 14

>> Yes, it might to pure
>> hindsight to blame him for this in 1942. Definitely. But Eaker persisted
>in
>> supporting the self-defending bomber after 17 August, '43 and even after 14
>> Oct. '43.
>
>Not after Second Schweinfurt. That made him a convert. Even so, he still
>made the
>(apparently) cognitively dissonant decision to give the P-51s to the 9th, but
>Kepner fixed that, before Doolittle replaced Eaker. It made undoubted sense
>from a
>logistic perspective, but none from a tactical perspective.
>
>Guy
>

Second Scheinfurt was late in the game.

Walt

bendel boy

July 18th 04, 03:46 PM

(WalterM140) wrote in message >...
> Someone posted over on the WWII board that Galland, I believe, said that the
> P-38 was the best allied fighter.
>

Going from memory, Galland said the reverse - that the P-38 was seen
as easy meat, and that it reinforced the lessons of the Bf 110.

Even with drop tanks it didn't have the eventual range of the P-51,
and, as found in the Pacific war area, it didn't have the agility to
dogfight - it had to rely on 'dive & climb' tactics. Against the Bf
109 that may not have been as profitable.

bendel boy

July 18th 04, 03:46 PM

WalterM140

July 18th 04, 03:54 PM

>> Someone posted over on the WWII board that Galland, I believe, said that
>the
>> P-38 was the best allied fighter.
>>
>
>Going from memory, Galland said the reverse - that the P-38 was seen
>as easy meat, and that it reinforced the lessons of the Bf 110.
>
>Even with drop tanks it didn't have the eventual range of the P-51,
>and, as found in the Pacific war area, it didn't have the agility to
>dogfight - it had to rely on 'dive & climb' tactics. Against the Bf
>109 that may not have been as profitable.
>
>

You're right about Galland. There was another high scoring German ace who
spoke well of the P-38.

The P-38 was the first "energy" fighter. The top two Americans aces of the war
did fly the thing, after all.

P-38's didn't have to dogfight with the Germans any more than it did the
Japanese. The idea was to keep the Germans from massing and to keep the
ME-110's out of the game.

If the range was shorter than the Mustang, it was still adequate. Also, for a
long time, there -were- no Mustangs.

Walt

Keith Willshaw

July 18th 04, 04:03 PM

"WalterM140" > wrote in message
...
> >Once air superiority was available the RAF flew their
> >daylight missions in loose gaggles of 2-4 aircraft staggered
> >in height to minimise flak damage.
> >
> >
>
> That might have been influenced by the fact that no other aircraft type
could
> fly in the tight formations used by the B-17.
>

It has more to do with the doctrine of the self defensing bomber
that was adopted by the USAAF. You'll find that B-24's
also flew in such formations.

> I've heard that B-26s could also fly in very tight formations, but I
shouldn't
> think as at high an altitude as the B-17.
>
> B-17's could maintain formation at heights almost twice as high as the
altitude
> at which Bomber Command usually operated, either by day or by night.
>

True but irrelevant since bomber command didnt fly defensive
formations by day after 1941.

Keith

Keith Willshaw

July 18th 04, 04:06 PM

"WalterM140" > wrote in message
...
> >> So what? What has that got to do with the RAF?
> >>
> >
> >It shows the RAF were doing no worse than the USAF
>
> Not material to what is being discussed. The USAAF was not running night
> bombing raids over Germany.
>
> You're making excuses.
>
> Walt

No I'm explaining that the overall loss rates were similar, if
the RAF was defeated by a loss rate of 3.6% so was the
USAAF

In reality neither was, the combined effect was a 24 hour
7 day a week assault on Germany that devastated that
nations economy and infrastructure.

Keith

Keith Willshaw

July 18th 04, 04:13 PM

"ArtKramr" > wrote in message
...

> >
> >The option then was fit a belly turret of doubtful utility
> >and to do so you have to remove the H2S Radar dome
> >you need to find the target.
> >
> >Keith
>
>
> How about take off a few pounds of bombs and do both?
>

For one thing there wasnt the physical space to fit both.
The Lancaster had a very large bomb bay and it would
have required considerable modifications to the aircraft
to allow this to happen.

Even had they done so its doubtful it would have made much
difference. Even a .50 calibtre turret would have been
outranged by the 30mm cannon used by the German
nightfighters and the chances of a gunner even spotting the
aircraft were low. Its much easier to spot a plane above
you at night than one below especially in blackout conditions.

The best defence against the NF was the bomber stream and
flying a varying course. This of course was tiring and a pain
for the navigator but it made the job of the nightfighter
very much harder.

Keith

Keith Willshaw

July 18th 04, 04:19 PM

"Bernardz" > wrote in message
news:MPG.1b64d7dd88d46ca0989ae3@news...
> In article <40fa0ce6$0$1289$5a62ac22@per-qv1-newsreader-

>
> A fighter is much smaller, more mobile and generally faster then a
> bomber. Finding a bomber and recognizing it was hard enough in WW2 how
> successful were fighters in finding and identifying interceptors at
> night?
>

By the end of the war they were extremely succesful.One tactic
widely used was for the intruders to fly around the NF base.

As the airctaft came in to land or took off the Mosquito
would swoop in for the kill. By the winter of 1944/45 there
were mor intruders flying than German night fighters and
they were considerably faster. By the time you loaded
down an Me-110 or JU-88 with its heavy guns, radar
and antennae it was rather slow and didnt handle at all
well.

Keith

Keith Willshaw

July 18th 04, 04:20 PM

"WalterM140" > wrote in message
...
> >The USA had zero combat experiencewith the B-17 in 1941 and
> >sold the B-17 on the basis of the self defending bomber. It failed
> >in 1941 and again when the USAAF tried it in 1943.
>
> Yeah. Well we expect our political leaders to keep us out of war
[excepting
> the present blithering idiot in the White House] . But you're implying
that
> the US should have been bailing you out a long time before 1941, I am
thinking.
>

Nope I'm simply pointing out that by 1941 the RAF had 2 years
of experience in air warfare and the US had none.

> The Americans were ultimately able to make daylight precision bombing pay
off,
> although not the way they intended, that is true.
>

Indeed.

Keith

Keith Willshaw

July 18th 04, 04:22 PM

"WalterM140" > wrote in message
...
> >>The Brits ignored American advice on how to use the B-17. Admittedly,
the
> >>B-17C was not ready for the big leagues.
> >
> >Could that be why they ignored the advice?
>
> Perhaps.
>
> I'll suggest that there was -no way- given the British experience in WWI
that
> they were going to the heavy daylight bomber route in WWI. And I don't
blame
> them a bit for that.
>

You are as usual wrong

> I think after all that 'Henry V'/'over the top' stuff in WWI, the Brits
were
> bound and determined to try a litte brain power the second time through.
> B-17's were not going to help them that much in that particular endeavor.
>

The British bad experience with daylight bombing was a result
of trying it in 1940 and taking 80% losses against the Luftwaffe.

Keith

Keith Willshaw

July 18th 04, 04:31 PM

"WalterM140" > wrote in message
...
> >You are incorrect.
> >
> >The RAF operated B-17's in action in daylight long before the
> >USA even entered the war. The results were heavy losses and
> >poor results.
>
> The Brits didn't use enough B-17's ever, to say they had heavy losses.
And the
> Brits flew them at very high altitudes, and often as single attackers.
>

The B-17 wasnt available in numbers in 1941. By September less than
40 B-17C's had been produced and half of these were in service
with the RAF as the Fortress I. Mass production of the aircraft began with
the B-17E in late 1941.

That single aircraft ended up over targets was a result of
the extremely poor reliability of the aircraft, it was not
uncommon for half the dispatched aircraft to have to
return to base. Indeed the USAAC described the B-17C
as being unsuitable for combat use.

> Except for elite units, British bombing accuracy throughout the war was
poor.
>

Yadda Yadda Yadda

Keith

Mike Williamson

July 18th 04, 04:42 PM

Geoffrey Sinclair wrote:

>
> The P-38 was the least effective of the USAAF fighters over Germany,
> thanks to a combination of factors. Once the USAAF could deploy
> escorts in numbers to the required targets then yes the Luftwaffe day
> fighter force was in trouble. The engineering to provide the escorts
> in numbers took most of 1943. Then the long range escorts appeared.
>

I would like to point out that the "least effective fighter" may
not be taking an overall view. Most of the problems with P-38
operations were the result of early doctrine and poor training
of aircrew in multi-engine operations. They suffered through
comparatively high loss rates in early operations where their
writ was not to pursue the enemy, but to provide close escort,
much as the Luftwaffe fighter force was in the Battle of Britain.
Being unable to pursue an enemy limits your kill potential, but
they DID cause a significant drop in bomber losses.

In 1945, P-38s which were still flying escort missions under
the later doctrine (and in equal or superior numbers to the
defenders) had about the same results as their
brethren in -47s and -51s. The P-38 also proved highly successful
with 9AF on low level interdiction sorties. Adding in its ability
to be adapted to do almost anything (how many P-51s were ever
fitted with a Norden bombsight or pathfinder blind bombing radar
system?) and the P-38 was highly successful in Europe. It's
reputation suffered from engine problems (which were absolutely
unknown in the MTO, PTO, or even Alaskan theaters, and were
quite possibly due to fuel problems which admittedly affected
the turbosupercharged Allisons more than the Merlins) and
from the inevitable process of being the aircraft tasked with
proving that your current doctrine isn't working the way it
should.

A poster noted that the use of P-38s in the photo-recon
role (F-4 and F-5) limited the number of armed fighter types
available, but strategically a squadron of long range high
speed photographers (particularly in the Pacific) was almost
certainly more valuable than another squadron of fighters -
unless they are your escort for the day, of course.

Mike
a (perhaps overly enthusiastic) fan of the P-38 and most things
Lockheed
55th Electronic Combat Group
EC-130H Compass Call*; "In Jam, No One Can Hear You Scream"

Mike Williamson

July 18th 04, 05:14 PM

bendel boy wrote:

>
> Going from memory, Galland said the reverse - that the P-38 was seen
> as easy meat, and that it reinforced the lessons of the Bf 110.
>
> Even with drop tanks it didn't have the eventual range of the P-51,
> and, as found in the Pacific war area, it didn't have the agility to
> dogfight - it had to rely on 'dive & climb' tactics. Against the Bf
> 109 that may not have been as profitable.

The P-38 was the first long range fighter the US produced, and had
comparable or longer range than the P-51 throughout the entire war.
As a quick exercise, look up the first Allied fighter escort mission
to appear over Berlin... Also look up the airfield locations, and
you'll note that a -38 had to fly quite a bit farther to fly
a round trip to Berlin than a -51 did.

As far as "dogfighting," no allied aircraft had the agility to
"dogfight" (in this case, engage in a fight in which turning ability
is a primary factor in performance) consistently with early war
Japanese aircraft, nor did they need to. As early as December of
1941, AVG P-40s in China successfully employed climb and dive
tactics, in an aircraft which markedly inferior to the P-38 in
that regard. The first British Spitfires to attempt to engage
in a WWI-style turning fight with the Japanese discovered that
their aircraft didn't come out well in such a contest, and also
adopted tactics which suited their aircraft better. Note that
the aircraft with the better performance (climb and speed) can
dictate the type of fight- the slower climbing "dogfighter"
gets to be on the receiving end of high speed diving passes...

Mike Williamson

Chris Mark

July 18th 04, 05:46 PM

>> All the B-26 units in Italy were eventually phased out, as they had been in
>the
>> Pacific, so that eventually B-26s only operated in the ETO.
>
>I know one US MTO B-26 Group was briefly converted to B-25s before relocating
>to
>the states for transition to the A-26 and the PTO, but I thought the
>other 2? (3?)
>remained in the theater.

You're correct. I was thinking only of operations in Italy.
The 319th was the group that converted to B-25s before transitioning to A-26s.
It left Italy at the beginning of 1945. After that there were only three
medium groups in Italy, the 310th, 321st and 340th, all flying B-25s.

Chris Mark

ArtKramr

July 18th 04, 05:56 PM

>ubject: Re: Night bombers interception....
>From: "Keith Willshaw"

>hat single aircraft ended up over targets was a result of
>the extremely poor reliability of the aircraft, it was not
>uncommon for half the dispatched aircraft to have to
>return to base. Indeed the USAAC described the B-17C
>as being unsuitable for combat use.
>

Why do you think we gave them to the Brits? Same reason we gave P-39's to the
Russians.

Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

Chris Mark

July 18th 04, 06:08 PM

I think we need to be careful getting too detailed with loss rates as
indicating anything significant about aircraft types because there are so many
unknown variables, everything from accuracy of squadron records to how many dud
rounds an anti-aircraft battery fired on one day compared to another.
The safe conclusions are merely that low-level missions will cause losses to
soar, whatever the aircraft type, and that single-engine performance is
important in reducing losses. Both the B-25 and B-26 were good airplanes with
slightly different attributes.

Chris Mark

Steve Mellenthin

July 18th 04, 10:19 PM

>erroneous, that the choice of the stream
>stragegy
>> was not the best decision at times when a loose gaggle and varying run-in
>> headings and altitudes between the 2-4 airgraft groupings would have been
>> more effective.
>
>The goal of the stream tactic was to overload the German
>night defences. These were not very efficient, for initially
>the German ground control needed two radars to bring about
>an interception (one to track the fighter, one to track the bomber)
>and by concentrating the bombers in a dense stream, the number
>of bombers that could be intercepted by a system of limited
>capacity fell. Later on, German tactics were much looser and
>more effective, but the concentration of the stream probably
>helped to concentrate the ECM efforts that had to be applied to
>keep the German controllers in the desired state of confusion.
>
>--
>Emmanuel Gustin
>Emmanuel dot Gustin @t skynet dot be
>Flying Guns Books and Site: http://users.skynet.be/Emmanuel.Gustin/
>

In my flying days the tactic was to vary the run-in headings for exactly the
same reason, to keep the gunners guessing in where to aim. Forces the gunners
to go to more barrage firing. Radar aimed guns were another mater but not that
difficult to defeat with jamming systems. The danger of a midair is always
present with that tactic but in practice wasn't an issue. Only problem was
rejoining after coming off the target.

ArtKramr

July 18th 04, 11:18 PM

>Subject: Re: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944
>From: (Steve Mellenthin)
>Date: 7/18/2004 2:19 PM Pacific Standard Time
>Message-id: >
>
>>erroneous, that the choice of the stream
>>stragegy
>>> was not the best decision at times when a loose gaggle and varying run-in
>>> headings and altitudes between the 2-4 airgraft groupings would have been
>>> more effective.
>>
>>The goal of the stream tactic was to overload the German
>>night defences. These were not very efficient, for initially
>>the German ground control needed two radars to bring about
>>an interception (one to track the fighter, one to track the bomber)
>>and by concentrating the bombers in a dense stream, the number
>>of bombers that could be intercepted by a system of limited
>>capacity fell. Later on, German tactics were much looser and
>>more effective, but the concentration of the stream probably
>>helped to concentrate the ECM efforts that had to be applied to
>>keep the German controllers in the desired state of confusion.
>>
>>--
>>Emmanuel Gustin
>>Emmanuel dot Gustin @t skynet dot be
>>Flying Guns Books and Site: http://users.skynet.be/Emmanuel.Gustin/
>>
>
>
>In my flying days the tactic was to vary the run-in headings for exactly the
>same reason, to keep the gunners guessing in where to aim. Forces the
>gunners

The best heaidng for a bombrun was a zero druft heaidng sinve the Norden had a
cumulative error (small) as the dirft angle increased. This was due to RCCTE
(Range Component of Cross Trail Error) because in a right triangle the
hypotenuse is always longer than either of the legs.

Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

Steve Mellenthin

July 18th 04, 11:51 PM

>The best heaidng for a bombrun was a zero druft heaidng sinve the Norden had
>a
>cumulative error (small) as the dirft angle increased. This was due to RCCTE
>(Range Component of Cross Trail Error) because in a right triangle the
>hypotenuse is always longer than either of the legs.
>
>
>Arthur Kramer

Pretty much true of any bomb run with any system. On the other hand there is
something to be said for diffusing the defenses and attacking from the least
heavily defended direction. Better to get to the target knowing there is a
cartain amount of inaccuracy in the bomb aiming device than to not get there at
all.

ArtKramr

July 18th 04, 11:57 PM

>Subject: Re: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944
>From: (Steve Mellenthin)
>Date: 7/18/2004 3:51 PM Pacific Standard Time
>Message-id: >
>
>>The best heaidng for a bombrun was a zero druft heaidng sinve the Norden
>had
>>a
>>cumulative error (small) as the dirft angle increased. This was due to RCCTE
>>(Range Component of Cross Trail Error) because in a right triangle the
>>hypotenuse is always longer than either of the legs.
>>
>>
>>Arthur Kramer
>
>Pretty much true of any bomb run with any system. On the other hand there is
>something to be said for diffusing the defenses and attacking from the least
>heavily defended direction. Better to get to the target knowing there is a
>cartain amount of inaccuracy in the bomb aiming device than to not get there
>at
>all.
>
>

It's the way we did it in the good ol' 344th.

Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

Guy Alcala

July 19th 04, 03:54 AM

Chris Mark wrote:

> I think we need to be careful getting too detailed with loss rates as
> indicating anything significant about aircraft types because there are so many
> unknown variables, everything from accuracy of squadron records to how many dud
> rounds an anti-aircraft battery fired on one day compared to another.
> The safe conclusions are merely that low-level missions will cause losses to
> soar, whatever the aircraft type, and that single-engine performance is
> important in reducing losses. Both the B-25 and B-26 were good airplanes with
> slightly different attributes.

No disagreement from me - I'm not the one who's been arguing that the B-26 was used
in the ETO exclusively because the B-25 was inferior, was less able to take damage,
had a higher loss rate, etc., in the face of all the evidence and ignoring all the
factors you mention above. It's always bugged me that the B-26 is trumpeted as
having the lowest loss rate in the ETO, when it was the _only_ medium bomber in the
ETO (operated by the US). Since there's nothing to directly compare it to in that
theater, attempting to draw conclusions about its relative survivability are
meaningless.

That is not the case in the MTO, which is why I would still like to know if you can
break down the MTO numbers for the B-25 and B-26, excluding North Africa. I've got
the North African data somewhere, but only have overall "European War" data on
bomber sorties and losses, rather than the more specific post-North Africa MTO
numbers. If you can supply sorties and losses for the B-25 and B-26 for that
period, I'd be much obliged, because I haven't been able to find that anywhere
else.

Guy

Guy Alcala

July 19th 04, 04:23 AM

WalterM140 wrote:

> >
> >formation turns. So we figured they were likely restricted to tight
> >formation
> >flying at altitudes of around 18,000 or at most 20,000 feet for Lancs or
> >Halifax
> >IIIs, although we knew we'd have to lighten the bombloads to get them that
> >high
> >(owing to the need to increase the defensive armament, armor, crew, and fuel
> >loads).
> >
> >Guy
> >
> >
>
> That's interesting. Didn't the RAF typically operate at @ 15,000 feet over
> German targets?

Depends on the period, the target and the individual crews, but in general not
the heavies, although Stirlings and squadron dogs might be that low or lower.
For the Nuremberg raid (except for Mossies, all Halifax and Lancaster) a/c were
assigned one of four cruise heights, 20, 21, 22, or 23 thousand feet, although 1
Group were given dispensation to cruise lower, 13-16,000 feet IIRR until they
reached the Rhine or some other river, in the hope of hiding in forecast cloud,
climbing to the same height as everyone else after that. The cloud wasn't there,
and they were hit hard.

Once the attacks started, anyone who could went higher -- one Halifax crew in a
new a/c were delighted to find that they could get up to 26,000 feet, and cruised
safely above the carnage below. Others jettisoned some of their bomb load to
improve their ceiling. Crews flying average a/c, or those with less experience
or more determination to follow orders stayed at the assigned altitude bands, and
were the main targets of the fighters. Dog a/c were stuck even lower, and on
that particular mission it actually saved many of them -- one crew couldn't get
their Lanc above 12,000 feet and in this case were fortunate, as the fighters
were going after the main stream above them.

> On at least one occasion, B-17' were briefed to attack Berlin at 27,000 feet;
> once to beat the clouds a group bombed from 30,000.

That's the effect of the turbos. Two-stage two-speed supercharged Merlins (or
other) would have given similar altitude performance for the British heavies. I
have a vague memory that at least one small group of B-17s dropped from close to
35,000 on one occasion, but that must have been very late war with the B-33
turbos. I've got the navigator log data for one B-24 crew's entire 35 mission
tour in 1944-45, and the highest bombing altitude recorded (for the plane) is
29,000 feet. One run was at 28,000, another at 26,700, but the majority of runs
were in the low 20s. For lightly defended targets they might drop down a few or
even several thousand feet - the lowest recorded is 9,000 feet, with another at
12,000.

Guy

Guy Alcala

July 19th 04, 04:36 AM

Keith Willshaw wrote:

> "WalterM140" > wrote in message
> ...
> > >Once air superiority was available the RAF flew their
> > >daylight missions in loose gaggles of 2-4 aircraft staggered
> > >in height to minimise flak damage.
> > >
> > >
> >
> > That might have been influenced by the fact that no other aircraft type
> could
> > fly in the tight formations used by the B-17.
> >
>
> It has more to do with the doctrine of the self defensing bomber
> that was adopted by the USAAF. You'll find that B-24's
> also flew in such formations.
>
> > I've heard that B-26s could also fly in very tight formations, but I
> shouldn't
> > think as at high an altitude as the B-17.
> >
> > B-17's could maintain formation at heights almost twice as high as the
> altitude
> > at which Bomber Command usually operated, either by day or by night.
> >
>
> True but irrelevant since bomber command didnt fly defensive
> formations by day after 1941.

I believe they did from 1944 on, but it was a somewhat looser formation than
the US flew. The RAF apparently preferred to allow a little more room for
minor evasive action.

Guy

WaltBJ

July 19th 04, 05:03 AM

I have read inan RAF history that some Canadian Halifax squadrons
installed a single flexible 50 cal in a ventral mount - and were
pretty suucessful at countering Schrage Musik attacks. I can well
believe that - looking up through the top of a canopy at a firing 50M2
at say 100 feet would probably be the last thing an LW Nachtjaeger
pilot saw.
Walt BJ

Guy Alcala

July 19th 04, 05:56 AM

WalterM140 wrote:

> >No, the reason they weren't there is because there weren't enough to go
> >around,
> >owing to the need to redesign the a/c for mass production, and a delayed
> >development due to the crash of the prototype.
> >
>
> "The production in mid-1940 of 30 P-38's saw signifcant design changes
> instituted to help mass production. For the first time, the fuselage was split
> into left and right halves, and the nose section was built up independently.
> The aft booms also were divided into two pieces with the skins adjusted to
> accomodate this....The XP-38A was a converted P-38 with pressurization; next
> production variant was the P38D of late summer 1940. The ever indeasing orders
> for Lightnings prompted more design changes, both to improve performance and to
> faciliate mass production."
>
> --Warbird Tech Series vol 2, Lockheed P-38 Lightning pp. 22-26 by Frederick A
> Johnsen
>
> Sounds to me like the needed changes were in hand well before 1941, let alone
> 1942.

Sure they were in hand, but they also caused a lot of delay, which is why the a/c
was so slow in getting into mass production and why the numbers remained so low
relatively late. The P-38F, the first full-up combat-capable version was available
for combat in August 1942; the first flight was made in January 1939, so roughly
3.5 years elapsed. Even allowing for a fairly leisurely development prior to the
war, the P-38's development was unusually prolonged, especially when compared with
its single-engined stablemates. And then in 1943 the wing leading edges, turbos,
radiators etc. all had to undergo a major redesign to fit leading edge tanks in,
then they had to re-tool before they could produce them.

> <snip>
>
> >
> >3 months maybe six months possibly, but a year? I think not. Production was
> >still
> >ramping up, and the P-38 was still suffering from many of the same problems
> >in
> >August 1944 as it had in October '43, 10 months after the 55th achieved IOC
> >in the
> >ETO.
>
> That might have been alleviated earlier the generals in England had pushed it.
> But they did not.

Can't push what you don't know you need, and since they didn't have ANY P-38s in
the late fall of 1942, winter, spring or summer of 1943, there was no opportunity
for them to work out the bugs. The 1st, 14th and 82nd FGs had all been sent to the
MTO, while the 78th had been stripped of a/c to replace losses, and transitioned to
the P-47. Sending all the P-38s to the MTO was a decision made well above Eaker's
pay grade, and there wasnt anything he could do about it.

> >> It's also true that some of the B-17 group commanders didn't care much
> >about
> >> escorts in the early part of the campaign. All that rendesvouzing made
> >things
> >> more complicated, don't you know.
> >>
> >> But as the Germans realized the threat and acted to meet that threat, the
> >B-17
> >> bomber boxes met their match and were overborne.
> >
> >Certainly, and after Aug. 17th 1943 you can make a good case for accusing
> >Eaker of
> >remaining wedded to doctrine over experience. You might even make that case
> >by
> >June 1943 - Arnold had already reached that conclusion. But not in the
> >Fall/Winter
> >of 1942/43.
>
> They should have.

Why? The Luftwaffe was still working out tactics, had barely started to attack the
heavies, hadn't yet begun to augment their fighter defenses in the west, and were
inflicting only light to moderate casualties. We were still flying shallow
penetrations, and didnt even hit a coastal target in Germany (Wilhelmshaven) until
January 30th, 1943. We were flying few missions every month owing to the poor
weather, and we only had four heavy bomb groups available (none with Tokyo tanks
that allowed us to go really deep), so no conclusive test of doctrine was possible.

> >> > Production was very limited at the time.
> >>
> >> Yes, I am providing a what-if. If the guys in England had been screaming
> >for
> >> P-38's the production could have been ramped up.
> >
> >Everyone in every theater other than the ETO (where there were no P-38s
> >because
> >they were all sent to the MTO) was screaming for more, and yet production was
> >what
> >it was.
>
> Yes, production was what it was. I find it hard to believe it couldn't have
> been increased.

And yet it wasn't, despite screams from the MTO and PTO asking for every single
P-38 they could get. The MTO was the highest priority theater in late 1942 and
most of 1943 (at least until after Salerno), so if any one was going to get them it
was the MTO. Guadalcanal got a single squadron (339th) in December 1942 while that
outcome was still in dispute, and the PTO wanted more. The ETO was well down the
list, because there was no ground combat underway, and the base was safe.

> I very much doubt that more screaming would have increased the pace
> >any
> >more than it was.
>
> I can't help what you doubt. The 8th AF was the premier USAAF organization in
> the world. Arnorld was clearly ready to provide anything needed by his close
> friend Eaker. But Eaker didn't ask for it.

Arnold was a member of the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff, who determined
allocations after their respective governments had decided which theaters had
priority. Throughout the period in question, the MTO had priority, and Arnold gave
them first choice, often re-directing units which had originally been planned to go
to the ETO. Eaker got what was left. Only after Salerno, when it became clear
that the necessary air superiority required for D-Day had not yet been established,
and the commanders started to relocate to the UK from the Med, did the ETO move to
first priority.

>
> >
> >> > Then there's the extra training
> >> >time for multi-engine, which would add some additional delay to getting
> >units
> >> >operational/providing replacement pilots.
> >>
> >> That doesn't seem that big an issue to me.
> >
> >It was for P-38 units and replacements, especially those that were originally
> >supposed to get single-engined a/c. Lots of accidents when losing an engine
> >on
> >t/o.
> >
>
> The source I quote above says accidents for P-38's were less for the P-38 than
> for the P39, P-40 and P47 in 1942.

And for units trained from the start for multi-engine, that may be correct. But
there's still the extra training time factor, and in 1943 you're talking about
transitioning single-engine pilots to twins, if you want to crew these P-38s that
are supposed to magically become available. The 55th's experience with hastly
transitioned pilots was apparently less than wonderful.

>
> ibid p. 14
>
> >> Yes, it might to pure
> >> hindsight to blame him for this in 1942. Definitely. But Eaker persisted
> >in
> >> supporting the self-defending bomber after 17 August, '43 and even after 14
> >> Oct. '43.
> >
> >Not after Second Schweinfurt. That made him a convert. Even so, he still
> >made the
> >(apparently) cognitively dissonant decision to give the P-51s to the 9th, but
> >Kepner fixed that, before Doolittle replaced Eaker. It made undoubted sense
> >from a
> >logistic perspective, but none from a tactical perspective.

> Second Scheinfurt was late in the game.

Sure. OTOH, it was entirely possible to write off Regensburg/Schweinfurt as
everything going wrong that could go wrong (it did). It was hardly a typical
mission, so Eaker probably felt that a sustained effort was necessary, with the
large size force he believed was necessary to succeed. And of course, although he
knew that the German fighters were inflicting damage on the bombers, he still
believed that the bombers were badly attriting the fighters. Hence October
10th-14th.

After that, there could be absolutely no doubt. Eaker was wrong, but he wanted to
win just as much as anyone did. As one of the prime apostles of the very doctrine
he was employing (Hansell being another), no one was in a better position to give
it a full test.

Guy

Guy Alcala

July 19th 04, 06:08 AM

WalterM140 wrote:

> >> Someone posted over on the WWII board that Galland, I believe, said that
> >the
> >> P-38 was the best allied fighter.
> >>
> >
> >Going from memory, Galland said the reverse - that the P-38 was seen
> >as easy meat, and that it reinforced the lessons of the Bf 110.
> >
> >Even with drop tanks it didn't have the eventual range of the P-51,
> >and, as found in the Pacific war area, it didn't have the agility to
> >dogfight - it had to rely on 'dive & climb' tactics. Against the Bf
> >109 that may not have been as profitable.
> >
> >
>
> You're right about Galland. There was another high scoring German ace who
> spoke well of the P-38.
>

OTOH, McFarland and Newton quote the Luftwaffe advice re the three US fighters they
were facing over Germany. IIRR it was alongthe lines of "If P-51s, avoid always.
If P-47s engage at low and medium altitudes, but avoid at high altitudes. Engage
the P-38 anywhere, anytime." Which is odd, because at low/medium altitudes the
P-38 was arguably superior to both the ME-109 and FW-190. It could out-turn either
at slow speed, could probably out-sustain climb the FW-190A if not the ME-109, and
didn't suffer from compressibility in the dive at those altitudes. Roll
acceleration was bad, especially compared to the FW-190, but visibility and
firepower were good to excellent.

Galland had one of the toughest fights of his life against a P-38 flown by an ace,
andwas lucky to get away unscathed, but that was the pilot more than the a/c.

> The P-38 was the first "energy" fighter. The top two Americans aces of the war
> did fly the thing, after all.

And the results would likely have been the same if they'd flown the Corsair, P-47
or P-51.

> P-38's didn't have to dogfight with the Germans any more than it did the
> Japanese. The idea was to keep the Germans from massing and to keep the
> ME-110's out of the game.

True, the type of fighter was less relevant than the range of the fighter.

> If the range was shorter than the Mustang, it was still adequate.

Until the P-38J with LE tanks came in, the range was substantially the same as the
P-47.

> Also, for a
> long time, there -were- no Mustangs.

And no long-range P-38s, either. At least, not at ETO bomber escort altitudes.
Drop tanks that you can't draw fuel from above 20,000 feet or so aren't much use in
the ETO escort business.

Guy

Guy Alcala

July 19th 04, 06:26 AM

Mike Williamson wrote:

> bendel boy wrote:
>
> >
> > Going from memory, Galland said the reverse - that the P-38 was seen
> > as easy meat, and that it reinforced the lessons of the Bf 110.
> >
> > Even with drop tanks it didn't have the eventual range of the P-51,
> > and, as found in the Pacific war area, it didn't have the agility to
> > dogfight - it had to rely on 'dive & climb' tactics. Against the Bf
> > 109 that may not have been as profitable.
>
> The P-38 was the first long range fighter the US produced, and had
> comparable or longer range than the P-51 throughout the entire war.

Slightly less, I'll buy. Comparable or longer, no.

> As a quick exercise, look up the first Allied fighter escort mission
> to appear over Berlin...

Uh huh, and these were J models with 410 gal. internal. (205 per engine),
vs. the P-51B/D's (with aft tank) 289 gallons and lower drag.

> Also look up the airfield locations, and
> you'll note that a -38 had to fly quite a bit farther to fly
> a round trip to Berlin than a -51 did.

<snip>

Depends on the unit. The 55th and 20th at Nuthampstead and King's Cliffe
were well west, but then so was the 4th at Debden and the 78th at Duxford,
whether flying P-47s or P-51s. The 479th was at Wattisham, forward of the
4th and 78th, as were the 364th at Honington and the 55th after it moved
to Wormingford. The 56th was just about the most forward fighter unit
when they were at Halesworth, but moved south and a bit west to Boxted in
1944.

Guy

Henry J Cobb

July 19th 04, 08:17 AM

http://www.p-38online.com/p38j.html
> In spite of all the advances and improvements, the P-38 J would suffer in
> the European Theater of Operations. Lockheed did all the testing in the
> United States, and were never tested in conditions similar to those in
> Britain. Once the P-38 J arrived in Britain, problems were encountered
> immediately. In addition to the new problems, many new, inexperienced pilots
> were beginning to fly. The problems would take time to work out, but the 8th
> Air Force was not able or willing to wait. At this time, P-51 D Mustangs and
> new versions of the P-47 Thunderbolt were available to perform long-range
> escort and strike missions. This was the beginning of the end of the P-38 in
> the ETO.

-HJC

WalterM140

July 19th 04, 10:28 AM

>> >No, the reason they weren't there is because there weren't enough to go
>> >around,
>> >owing to the need to redesign the a/c for mass production, and a delayed
>> >development due to the crash of the prototype.
>> >
>>
>> "The production in mid-1940 of 30 P-38's saw signifcant design changes
>> instituted to help mass production. For the first time, the fuselage was
>split
>> into left and right halves, and the nose section was built up
>independently.
>> The aft booms also were divided into two pieces with the skins adjusted to
>> accomodate this....The XP-38A was a converted P-38 with pressurization;
>next
>> production variant was the P38D of late summer 1940. The ever indeasing
>orders
>> for Lightnings prompted more design changes, both to improve performance
>and to
>> faciliate mass production."
>>
>> --Warbird Tech Series vol 2, Lockheed P-38 Lightning pp. 22-26 by Frederick
>A
>> Johnsen
>>
>> Sounds to me like the needed changes were in hand well before 1941, let
>alone
>> 1942.
>
>Sure they were in hand, but they also caused a lot of delay, which is why the
>a/c
>was so slow in getting into mass production and why the numbers remained so
>low
>relatively late.

If someone had said, "hey, we are going to need long range escorts, and the
only aircraft even remotely capable is the P-38," then these problems might
have been overcome.

The P-38F, the first full-up combat-capable version was
>available
>for combat in August 1942; the first flight was made in January 1939, so
>roughly
>3.5 years elapsed. Even allowing for a fairly leisurely development prior to
>the
>war, the P-38's development was unusually prolonged, especially when compared
>with
>its single-engined stablemates. And then in 1943 the wing leading edges,
>turbos,
>radiators etc. all had to undergo a major redesign to fit leading edge tanks
>in,
>then they had to re-tool before they could produce them.
>
>> <snip>
>>
>> >
>> >3 months maybe six months possibly, but a year? I think not. Production
>was
>> >still
>> >ramping up, and the P-38 was still suffering from many of the same
>problems
>> >in
>> >August 1944 as it had in October '43, 10 months after the 55th achieved
>IOC
>> >in the
>> >ETO.
>>
>> That might have been alleviated earlier the generals in England had pushed
>it.
>> But they did not.
>
>Can't push what you don't know you need,

They could have known they were going to need a lot more P-38's. The kernal of
this whole issue is that Eaker and Hunter didn't divine that they needed a long
range escort, and remained blind to this fact after pretty much everyone else
had tumbled onto it.

and since they didn't have ANY P-38s
>in
>the late fall of 1942, winter, spring or summer of 1943, there was no
>opportunity
>for them to work out the bugs.

Now that doesn't seem fair, because a P-38 group WAS in England in December
1942. That was the 78th FG. According to Freeman in "The Mighty Eighth", most
of the aircraft and pilots were sent to North Africa.

Also, at the start of 1943, the B-17 groups were dealing fairly well with the
German fighters. By the summer the Germans would modfy the equation in their
favor. Freeman does note that the P-38 was "a complicated aircraft to build and
production was unable to meet the demands both the demands of attrition and
equipment of new units."

Perhaps what it comes down to is this:

Even if Eaker and Hunter had been strongly seeking P-38's for escort, could
those demands have been met by say, "Blitz Week" in 1943, when the GAF really
started to hurt the Fortresses?

You're suggesting that production could not possibly have met the need. I'll
grant that possibility. It's a what-if, and we'll never know.

The 1st, 14th and 82nd FGs had all been sent
>to the
>MTO, while the 78th had been stripped of a/c to replace losses, and
>transitioned to
>the P-47. Sending all the P-38s to the MTO was a decision made well above
>Eaker's
>pay grade, and there wasnt anything he could do about it.

As I say above, the B-17's at the start of 1943 were seen to be coping with the
Luftwaffe defense. But it's also true that the 8th AF was the premier force in
the world as far as Arnold was concerned.

If the 8th had been seen as needing long range escorts, surely they could have
been provided.

>
>> >> It's also true that some of the B-17 group commanders didn't care much
>> >about
>> >> escorts in the early part of the campaign. All that rendesvouzing made
>> >things
>> >> more complicated, don't you know.
>> >>
>> >> But as the Germans realized the threat and acted to meet that threat,
>the
>> >B-17
>> >> bomber boxes met their match and were overborne.
>> >
>> >Certainly, and after Aug. 17th 1943 you can make a good case for accusing
>> >Eaker of
>> >remaining wedded to doctrine over experience. You might even make that
>case
>> >by
>> >June 1943 - Arnold had already reached that conclusion. But not in the
>> >Fall/Winter
>> >of 1942/43.
>>
>> They should have.
>
>Why?

Because they got their asses handed to them.

The Luftwaffe was still working out tactics, had barely started to
>attack the
>heavies, hadn't yet begun to augment their fighter defenses in the west, and
>were
>inflicting only light to moderate casualties.

That's right. It's all a big what if. All I am saying is, "what if Eaker and
Hunter had seen the need for a long range escort?"

But they didn't. And they didn't see the need either of them, until after it
was plain to everyone else that the bombers needed help. It's tragic, but
there it is.

We were still flying shallow
>penetrations, and didnt even hit a coastal target in Germany (Wilhelmshaven)
>until
>January 30th, 1943. We were flying few missions every month owing to the
>poor
>weather, and we only had four heavy bomb groups available (none with Tokyo
>tanks
>that allowed us to go really deep), so no conclusive test of doctrine was
>possible.
>
>> >> > Production was very limited at the time.
>> >>
>> >> Yes, I am providing a what-if. If the guys in England had been
>screaming
>> >for
>> >> P-38's the production could have been ramped up.
>> >
>> >Everyone in every theater other than the ETO (where there were no P-38s
>> >because
>> >they were all sent to the MTO) was screaming for more, and yet production
>was
>> >what
>> >it was.
>>
>> Yes, production was what it was. I find it hard to believe it couldn't
>have
>> been increased.
>
>And yet it wasn't, despite screams from the MTO and PTO asking for every
>single
>P-38 they could get.

Do you know that? Maybe they were straining every sinew to turn out P-38's.
I've gotten the impression that no particular stress was put on. They were
surely working as dilligently as anyone in war production, but did anyone say,
this is the most important fighter we have? The USAAF was sold on the
Thunderbolt. Development of the Merlin Mustangs lagged also.

If someone had said, "yes we are handling the GAF now but they might produce
new tactics, new equipment and strongly reinforce," then it might have been a
different story beginning in the summer of '43.

You make some very good points and I appreciate them.

Walt

WalterM140

July 19th 04, 10:37 AM

>There is an interesting thing about post-war bombing
>and that is that, on the whole, it was based on British
>WWII tactics more than anything else. The debate about
>which force used the better tactics during WWII, the
>RAF or the USAAF, is fairly pointless.

As far as tactics go, perhaps.

The RAF was attacking targets that couldn't help bring Germay closer to defeat,
certainly not in relation to the losses the RAF suffered.

>At the time, both
>did the best they could, and in the end they were both
>reasonably successful.

The RAF was -not- successful. If not for the USAAF, they couldn't have
appeared over Germany at all after D-day.

Walt

WalterM140

July 19th 04, 10:40 AM

>> The P-38 was the least effective of the USAAF fighters over Germany,
>> thanks to a combination of factors. Once the USAAF could deploy
>> escorts in numbers to the required targets then yes the Luftwaffe day
>> fighter force was in trouble. The engineering to provide the escorts
>> in numbers took most of 1943. Then the long range escorts appeared.
>>
>
> I would like to point out that the "least effective fighter" may
>not be taking an overall view. Most of the problems with P-38
>operations were the result of early doctrine and poor training
>of aircrew in multi-engine operations. They suffered through
>comparatively high loss rates in early operations where their
>writ was not to pursue the enemy, but to provide close escort,
>much as the Luftwaffe fighter force was in the Battle of Britain.
>Being unable to pursue an enemy limits your kill potential, but
>they DID cause a significant drop in bomber losses.
>
> In 1945, P-38s which were still flying escort missions under
>the later doctrine (and in equal or superior numbers to the
>defenders) had about the same results as their
>brethren in -47s and -51s.

MNr. Sinclair's preferred method is not to disagree with what you say 90% of
the time. It is to nitpick over the other 10% so he can parade his pedantry.

Walt

WalterM140

July 19th 04, 10:47 AM

>>>> >Also P-38 numbers grew from 302 in December 1942 to 567 in
>>>> >May 1943 then declined to 372 in October 1943 before rapidly
>>>> >expanding to 1,063 in April 1944. The numbers are for the USAAF
>>>> >deployed against Germany and include reserves etc.
>>>>
>>>> Thanks for the minutia.
>>
>>>Not minutia in this case, but very germane, as the lack of P-38 numbers was
>a
>>>factor.
>>
>>Gee, that is -my- point.
>>
>>And the reason they were not there is because Eaker and Hunter didn't stress
>>it.
>
>Yes folks, Eaker and Hunter are the designated Black Hat wearers
>of the moment, all evil comes from them.

I have said that it might have been beyond anyone to make such a determination.
But for whatever reason, they didn't make it, didn't tumble onto it after many
others had, and were sacked in large part because of it.

<snip pedantic rant>

I'll look in later notes in the thread, but you seem to not responded to this
piece of text:

>Meantime Eaker convinced Robert Lovett, the Assistant Secretary of
>War for Air to push for a long range fighter.
>

Source?

I find no corroboration for such a supposed statement.

"Eaker as late as October 1943 still believed the key was in the size of the
bomber formations... Eaker stuck to this belief while high-ranking officers
such as Chief of the Air Staff Barney Giles and commanmder of the VIII Bomber
Command Fred Anderson had determined that escort was the key to victory."

-- "To Command the Sky, p. 112, by McFarland and Newton

"During June 1943 Assistant Secretary of War for Air Robert Lovett visited
England to observe Eighth Air Force operations. He spent considerable time
inspecting the VIII Fighter Command and especially the problems of escort. At
an Eighth Air Force comanders' mmeeting immediately after Lovett's visit,
Hunter told Eaker that he feared Lovett would insist on the use of P-38's for
escort. Hunter identified the P-38 as a "wonderful ship," but preferrred to
give the P-47 a "complete trial." In doing so Hunter reavealed his
misunderstanding of the basic issue confronting the Eighth Ar Force in the
summer and fall of 1943. The bombers needed escorts with range, bot superior
fighters. The P-47 was a better dogfighter, but it did not have the legs to fly
long escort missions."

ibid, p. 114

I find no evidence that Eaker thought it imperitive to provide escort or that
he communicated such with Lovett.

You seem to have just made it up.

Walt

WalterM140

July 19th 04, 10:50 AM

>In reality neither was, the combined effect was a 24 hour
>7 day a week assault on Germany that devastated that
>nations economy and infrastructure.

For at least the last year, the RAF was attacking targets that added little to
the final destruction of Germany when it could have done better.

Walt

Alan Dicey

July 19th 04, 11:59 AM

WaltBJ wrote:

> I have read inan RAF history that some Canadian Halifax squadrons
> installed a single flexible 50 cal in a ventral mount - and were
> pretty suucessful at countering Schrage Musik attacks.

We talked about this a few months ago - thread was called "Has there
ever been an off-center gun?" As far as I can tell, all ventral
mountings, apart from the Sperry ball turret, suffered from either an
enormous amount of drag (dustbins), or a restricted field of view
(periscopes, little windows etc). Good visibility seems like a
prerequisite for locating night fighters, but the added weight and drag
of the dustbin turrets was deemed a liability by the crews, who were
instrumental in their removal (apparantly).

The Canadian Halifax "Preston Green" mountings were installed in place
of the missing H2S scanner, when radar production was running behind
bomber production. When the radar became available it was fitted in the
place of the gun.

Keith Willshaw

July 19th 04, 01:17 PM

"WalterM140" > wrote in message
...
> >In reality neither was, the combined effect was a 24 hour
> >7 day a week assault on Germany that devastated that
> >nations economy and infrastructure.
>
> For at least the last year, the RAF was attacking targets that added
little to
> the final destruction of Germany when it could have done better.
>
> Walt

The RAF layed a major part in the oil war in that period.

Which targets do you think were more important ?

Keith

Keith Willshaw

July 19th 04, 01:20 PM

"ArtKramr" > wrote in message
...
> >ubject: Re: Night bombers interception....
> >From: "Keith Willshaw"
>
> >hat single aircraft ended up over targets was a result of
> >the extremely poor reliability of the aircraft, it was not
> >uncommon for half the dispatched aircraft to have to
> >return to base. Indeed the USAAC described the B-17C
> >as being unsuitable for combat use.
> >
>
> Why do you think we gave them to the Brits?

You didnt 'give' then to us, we bought them.
This was before lend lease.

Keith

Keith Willshaw

July 19th 04, 01:24 PM

"WaltBJ" > wrote in message
om...
> I have read inan RAF history that some Canadian Halifax squadrons
> installed a single flexible 50 cal in a ventral mount - and were
> pretty suucessful at countering Schrage Musik attacks. I can well
> believe that - looking up through the top of a canopy at a firing 50M2
> at say 100 feet would probably be the last thing an LW Nachtjaeger
> pilot saw.
> Walt BJ

Trouble is a fight between an aircraft armed with 30mm cannon and
one armed with a single 0.5 will mostly favour the fighter.
The most successful defensive tactic was to perform an
immediate evasion by flying a violent corkscrew manoeuvre

Keith

ian maclure

July 19th 04, 05:37 PM

On Mon, 19 Jul 2004 13:24:16 +0100, Keith Willshaw wrote:

[snip]

> The most successful defensive tactic was to perform an
> immediate evasion by flying a violent corkscrew manoeuvre

Which, be it noted, the single pilot Lancaster was perfectly
capable of doing. Not sure about the Halifax or American Bs.

IBM

__________________________________________________ _____________________________
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Nele VII

July 19th 04, 05:48 PM

ArtKramr wrote in message >...
>>ubject: Re: Night bombers interception....
>>From: "Keith Willshaw"
>
>>hat single aircraft ended up over targets was a result of
>>the extremely poor reliability of the aircraft, it was not
>>uncommon for half the dispatched aircraft to have to
>>return to base. Indeed the USAAC described the B-17C
>>as being unsuitable for combat use.
>>
>
>Why do you think we gave them to the Brits? Same reason we gave P-39's to
the
>Russians.

Pokrishkin was grateful for P-39 achieving "only" 59 victories! So much for
an "Iron Dog" in the hands of an ace :))))))

>
>
>Arthur Kramer
>344th BG 494th BS
> England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
>Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
>http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer
>

Keith Willshaw

July 19th 04, 10:15 PM

"ian maclure" > wrote in message
...
> On Mon, 19 Jul 2004 13:24:16 +0100, Keith Willshaw wrote:
>
> [snip]
>
> > The most successful defensive tactic was to perform an
> > immediate evasion by flying a violent corkscrew manoeuvre
>
> Which, be it noted, the single pilot Lancaster was perfectly
> capable of doing. Not sure about the Halifax or American Bs.
>
> IBM
>

The Halifax used the same tactic, it was simply inappropriate
for the B-17 which operated in tight formation in daylight.

Keith

ArtKramr

July 19th 04, 10:33 PM

>Subject: Re: Night bombers interception....
>From: "Keith Willshaw"
>Date: 7/19/2004 2:15 PM Pacific Standard Time
>Message-id: >
>
>
>"ian maclure" > wrote in message
...
>> On Mon, 19 Jul 2004 13:24:16 +0100, Keith Willshaw wrote:
>>
>> [snip]
>>
>> > The most successful defensive tactic was to perform an
>> > immediate evasion by flying a violent corkscrew manoeuvre
>>
>> Which, be it noted, the single pilot Lancaster was perfectly
>> capable of doing. Not sure about the Halifax or American Bs.
>>
>> IBM
>>
>
>The Halifax used the same tactic, it was simply inappropriate
>for the B-17 which operated in tight formation in daylight.
>
>Keith

And it would result in death, destruction amid mid-air collisions

Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

WalterM140

July 19th 04, 11:46 PM

>The Halifax used the same tactic, it was simply inappropriate
>for the B-17 which operated in tight formation in daylight.

B-17's, even in formation, could skid and turn slightly at the right tme to
throw off the German's aim. Given the ballistics of a head on attack, the
firing window was a fraction of a second.

Robert Morgan related in his auto-bio a time when he was flying "Memphis Belle"
in which he pulled up slightly at the very last instant in response to a
German fighter attack. Instead of the cockpit area being hit, the tail was
shredded badly.

Walt

Eunometic

July 20th 04, 05:23 AM

(WalterM140) wrote in message >...
> >The Halifax used the same tactic, it was simply inappropriate
> >for the B-17 which operated in tight formation in daylight.
>
> B-17's, even in formation, could skid and turn slightly at the right tme to
> throw off the German's aim. Given the ballistics of a head on attack, the
> firing window was a fraction of a second.
>
> Robert Morgan related in his auto-bio a time when he was flying "Memphis Belle"
> in which he pulled up slightly at the very last instant in response to a
> German fighter attack. Instead of the cockpit area being hit, the tail was
> shredded badly.
>
> Walt

The American formations also learned to jink (on command of the rear
gunner) to try and avoid attack by the 21cm rockets (and even 250kg
bombs) the Germans were firing and dropping on them. These rockets
were very effective and often took out 3 or 4 bombers and broke up the
formation. It was the appearence of the P38 Lightning that rendered
the use of such heavily laden Me 110, Bf 109 and Fw 190s generaly too
costly. Once the formation was scattered the Bombers were easily
despatched.

ArtKramr

July 20th 04, 05:37 AM

>Subject: Re: Night bombers interception....
>From: (Eunometic)
>Date: 7/19/2004 9:23 PM Pacific Standard Time

>The American formations also learned to jink (on command of the rear
>gunner) to try and avoid attack by the 21cm rockets (and even

After all the missions I have flown I never once heard the word "jinking" We
did none of that. it was straight and level all the way in and steady as a
rock. "jinking" would tumble the gyro on the Norden and force a go-around.

Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

Presidente Alcazar

July 20th 04, 09:20 AM

On Mon, 19 Jul 2004 13:24:16 +0100, "Keith Willshaw"
> wrote:

>Trouble is a fight between an aircraft armed with 30mm cannon and
>one armed with a single 0.5 will mostly favour the fighter.
>The most successful defensive tactic was to perform an
>immediate evasion by flying a violent corkscrew manoeuvre

Indeed, and I'm skeptical of the utility of a hand-mounted machine-gun
in a ventral window with restricted vision, manned by a frozen
air-gunner who has to endure hour after hour of vigilance on multimple
missions before facing the slit-second reactions required to deal with
a real assailant. Plenty of bombers were lost to stern attacks, and
even attacks from beneath passed through the visible arc of the rear
turret before they closed to engage, which should indicate the real
problems encountered relying on unassistated visual observation alone
for bomber defence.

Gavin Bailey

--

Apply three phase AC 415V direct to MB. This work real good. How you know, you
ask? Simple, chip get real HOT. System not work, but no can tell from this.
Exactly same as before. Do it now. - Bart Kwan En

Geoffrey Sinclair

July 20th 04, 10:14 AM

WalterM140 wrote in message >...

I wrote,

>>Yes folks, Eaker and Hunter are the designated Black Hat wearers
>>of the moment, all evil comes from them.
>
>I have said that it might have been beyond anyone to make such a determination.
> But for whatever reason, they didn't make it, didn't tumble onto it after many
>others had, and were sacked in large part because of it.
>
><snip pedantic rant>

Sample of Deleted text, which is described as a pedantic rant,
the full text refutes Walter's pet conclusion, so it needs to be deleted
and editorialised away.

The Pacific theatre really wanted more P-38s, they were by far the
biggest fans, the problems of mass producing the P-38 cannot be
ignored, plus the changes made in 1943 to make the type more
combat worthy helping to limit production. How about raging against
the decision to convert 500 P-38s to unarmed photo reconnaissance
types in 1942 and 1943, versus the 3,684 completed as fighters by
the end of 1943, including the prototype. There is your "few dozen"
extra P-38s. Note by the way the first 433 or so fighters were not
really combat worthy, that is everything before the P-38F, and the
reconnaissance versions were model F and G conversions so some
25% of the available F and G airframe ended up unarmed. Presumably
Arnold will now be considered a bad captain.

The USAAF wanted more P-38s in 1943, there was little the ETO
could do to speed up the process. It also realised the need for
high performance reconnaissance types. Only the defence of
England, of all the theatres of war, had enough allied fighters at the
start of 1943. So the P-47 went to Europe and even New Guinea.

>I'll look in later notes in the thread, but you seem to not responded to this
>piece of text:

You see folks, Walter has a basic test for "responses", he expects
one before you have actually seen the request. Then tries to imply
you are ducking the issue.

>>Meantime Eaker convinced Robert Lovett, the Assistant Secretary of
>>War for Air to push for a long range fighter.
>Source?

Williamson Murray in his book Luftwaffe, quoting Boylan, in The
development of the long range fighter escort, pages 90 to 91
and 121.

>I find no corroboration for such a supposed statement.

Walter does not bother to look for facts that disturb the preferred
conclusions.

>"Eaker as late as October 1943 still believed the key was in the size of the
>bomber formations... Eaker stuck to this belief while high-ranking officers
>such as Chief of the Air Staff Barney Giles and commanmder of the VIII Bomber
>Command Fred Anderson had determined that escort was the key to victory."
>
>-- "To Command the Sky, p. 112, by McFarland and Newton
>
>"During June 1943 Assistant Secretary of War for Air Robert Lovett visited
>England to observe Eighth Air Force operations. He spent considerable time
>inspecting the VIII Fighter Command and especially the problems of escort. At
>an Eighth Air Force comanders' mmeeting immediately after Lovett's visit,
>Hunter told Eaker that he feared Lovett would insist on the use of P-38's for
>escort. Hunter identified the P-38 as a "wonderful ship," but preferrred to
>give the P-47 a "complete trial." In doing so Hunter reavealed his
>misunderstanding of the basic issue confronting the Eighth Ar Force in the
>summer and fall of 1943. The bombers needed escorts with range, bot superior
>fighters. The P-47 was a better dogfighter, but it did not have the legs to fly
>long escort missions."
>
>ibid, p. 114
>
>I find no evidence that Eaker thought it imperitive to provide escort or that
>he communicated such with Lovett.

So why were P-47s fitted with drop tanks and used as escorts during
Eaker's period of command?

>You seem to have just made it up.

Translation Walter is as bad at character assassination as history.

See for example Eaker's letter to Wilfrid Freeman noting that the
Munster raid of 10th October 1943 might have lost only 10 bombers
instead of the around 30 lost if the escorts had been able to stay
with the bombers.

It is really simple, Eaker was more complicated that the cardboard
black hat wearing bad guy Walter prefers. He was amongst the last
to hold the unescorted bombers idea but he hedged his bets.

deleted text,

"By the way if Eaker was still an unescorted heavy bomber fan you can
show all those sorts of missions run by the15th Air Force in 1944 when
he commanded it, correct?"

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

Geoffrey Sinclair

July 20th 04, 10:15 AM

WalterM140 wrote in message >...

I wrote,

firstly my deleted text, and I note the dropping of the Maxi Hastings data.
scroll down to the next > to skip it, Walter likes deleting facts.

"There is a slight problem with this, the combat record of the P-38 over
North Africa in 1942/43 and then again over Europe on 1943/44. Then
add the long range P-38 versions came about when the cooling system
was redesigned and the J-15 version allowed 410 gallons of internal fuel
versus the 300 gallons in previous models. The first J models were
built in August 1943 without the wing tanks, with 10 J-1, 210 J-5 and
790 J-10 models built before the J-15 model was introduced, then add
the time to ramp up the line and send the aircraft overseas. In September
1943 the P-38s in the Mediterranean were classified as having a combat
radius of 350 miles, well short of that needed to escort bombers deep
into Germany."

(On P-38 effectiveness)

Is this using the same sort of methodology used to "prove" the B-17
could do well against the average German fighter, total all B-17
sorties for the day, when most were not intercepted, and use the
totals rather than the results from the formations actually attacked?

Do we have one or two examples of this "few dozen P-38" phenomena?
Followed by the assumption the USAAF could do it once or twice then
they could do it at will? The P-38 was the most distinctive fighter going
around in 1944 over Europe. The Luftwaffe was quite able to work out
counter tactics of "hit the couple of P-38 formations to leave the bombers
unescorted". They Luftwaffe did quite well in Tunisia.

A few dozen means one or two escort formations, tell JG26 to
intercept them just back from the coast.

The Luftwaffe actually tried this for a short while in 1943, hence
the RAF Spitfires flying the "insert cover". The extra fighters
meant extra Luftwaffe losses and less chance of picking the
real long range escort formations, since the P-47 was not all
that different to the Spitfire when the other type being compared
was the P-38.

If you are going to accuse someone of not using something make
sure the something was available for use first. Simply put assuming
the Mediterranean war was shut down the above figures are what
was available. And the Mediterranean war was not going to be shut
down, it was needed, at least until the end of 1943. So there were
no P-38s for the England based units, the P-38s were, after a trying
start, proving useful in the Mediterranean, mainly their superior range
compared with the P-40 and Spitfire.

So the theatre had control over where the scare P-38 resources
went to, given how much the Pacific wanted them, plus the
requirements of Tunisia?

Furthermore, given the number of USAAF missions to Germany in
say the first few months of 1943 the results would be so compelling
that the P-38 production line, the only high performance fighter the
USAAF had in combat, should be disrupted to add in the improvements.
Not only that but the specifications could be drawn up in say April 1943,
sent back to the US, turned into reliable engineering solutions in say
May 1943, with the first types built in say June 1943 with the arrival in
theatre in say July 1943. As opposed to the reality it took many months
to accumulate the information and turn it into numbers of improved
aircraft deployed in theatre. The first J models appeared in August 1943,
and as a rough guess it looks like the first J-15s were in December 1943
or January 1944.

In 1942 and early 1943 the P-38 was the fighter the Pacific forces
wanted, it had the better overall performance versus the P-39 and P-40
and was doing really well. The experience in Tunisia indicated the
P-38 needed work to tackle the Luftwaffe.

With nearly 1,700 built by the end of 1942, versus 532 P-47s, it was
not available in quantity, and it would take until mid 1943 to debug the
P-47 over Europe, to prove it was a worthwhile fighter. So the secondary
theatre, at least in early 1943, was given the task of proving the new
fighter in combat.

What I really like is Walter likes to run the line about how good the
B-17 was against enemy fighters, then turns around and accuses
the Generals of not providing enough escorts.

The 8th Air Force placed large orders for drop tanks in June 1943,
placing it fourth on the list of priorities, the USAAF command back
in Washington apparently thought British production would be sufficient.

Meantime Eaker convinced Robert Lovett, the Assistant Secretary of
War for Air to push for a long range fighter.

>>>He -was- sacked, after all.
>>
>>I know this has been pointed out many times but General Eaker
>>was not sacked, he was transferred to the Mediterranean in what was
>>a swap of commands with Spaatz and Dolittle.
>
>That is typical of the crap you try and pull. Eaker fought this transfer tooth
>and nail and you surely know that.

Apparently "sacked" is defined as being transferred to another
combat post with the same, if not more seniority. The fact
Eaker preferred to stay is another matter. The Mediterranean
command team was going to lead the invasion of France.

>>Of course give the 8th Air Force, say 1,000 P-38Js in early 1943
>>and watch them rip into an outnumbered western defences. Just
>>ignore the lack of bombers to take advantage of this wonder gift.
>>Just ignore the Luftwaffe doing something like new tactics or speeding
>>up the deployment of the fighter types historically delivered in 1944.
>>Just ignore the combat record of the P-38 over Europe in 1943/44.
>
>Someone posted over on the WWII board that Galland, I believe, said that the
>P-38 was the best allied fighter.

You see folks, Walter looks for the one quote, no make that the
ONE QUOTE to rule them all. He does not bother with things
like the Luftwaffe intelligence reports that rated the P-38 below
the P-47 and P-51 for fighter versus fighter combat.

>If it would have been so easy for the Germans to force the American fighters to
>drop tanks, why didn't they rigorously enforce that against the P-51s?

I know this is silly but the tactic was used in mid/late 1943 when the escort
fighters were sent only part of the way and in small numbers, it was a
method of stripping the cover away. The counter move was the shorter
ranged fighters "escorting" the longer ranged fighters during insertion.
The counter tactic worked well enough, the escort range grew more
and the escort numbers grew larger. So it became better for the
Luftwaffe to engage back from the coast.

There is a big difference in tactics of there are only "a few dozen"
long range escorts, easily detectable, versus hundreds of escorts.

>And the P-38's in my hypothetical don't have to dogfight the Germans. They only
>have to break up their massed attacks and make things too hot for the ME-110's.

You see the P-38 is so good the pilots fly by waving US flags and the
Germans promptly fly away. An amazing aircraft the P-38, no need to
drop the external tanks that made them slower than the Bf109 or Fw190
just use the Bf110 homing device and sing the national anthem it seems.

Want to look up the top speed of the P-38 with external tanks and
the Bf110 as deployed in 1943?

The P-38s would have to fight and the idea they would be able to
hit the Bf110s so well is a joke, what about the Luftwaffe escorting
the heavy fighters for a start.

>>>Now, you'll dispute this of course. But the problems the long range escorts
>>>gave the Germans rested on this:
>>>
>>>The Germans had to up-armor and up-arm their single engine fighters and add
>>>twin engine bomber destroyers to the mix, in order to kill B-17's in large
>>>numbers. -Any- of the three main US fighters on the scene (P-38, P-47,
>>>P-51)could have made that up-armoring and use of the twin engine bomber
>>>destroyers impractical.
>>
>>Let us start with the fact in 1943 the twin engined day fighter force had
>>been run down, mainly by the conversion of the units to night fighters,
>>plus the realisation the Bf110 was not a day fighter and the Me210 was
>>a failure. The twin engined day fighters did not start appearing in any
>>numbers to defend Germany until the USAAF fighters had drop tanks.
>
>That is just false. The ME-110s played a heavy role in second Schweinfurt on
>10/14/43 and earlier.

Why not actually look at the evolution of the German tactics and
note they were drawing on the night fighters in October 1943,
not the twin engined day fighters, those came home as it became
obvious the weight if attack by both day and night was increasing.

>>Hitler wanted his attack at Kursk and defence of Sicily first. Hence the
>>use of some nightfighters in daylight in the west. The first use of rockets
>>was actually also the same day as the first use of P-47 drop tanks.
>
>Yes, and even with drop tanks, the P-47's could get no further than the German
>border in that time frame.

Strange as it may seem guess where the P-38 could reach at the
same time, around 350 miles as used in the Mediterranean.

>> When
>>things like rockets proved useful the fighters to use them were deployed.
>>
>>Instead of giving the USAAF more earlier but saying the Luftwaffe stays
>>on the historical deployments consider the early appearance of the P-38
>>moves the Luftwaffe more quickly onto the line of the Fw190 bomber
>>destroyer.
>
>Which P-38's could more easily disrupt or destroy.

Yes folks, the invincible P-38 so stuns the Germans that they
cannot work out any counter tactics. Always hitting the Bf110
formations with uncanny accuracy and minimal combat.

>>Add for extra spice the Fw190D-9 appearing earlier, the
>>engine it needed was in production in 1943.
>
>What on earth are you talking about?

Noting the usual Walter what if, boost the favourites, the other
side continues as if nothing happened.

>>The P-38 was the least effective of the USAAF fighters over Germany,
>>thanks to a combination of factors.
>
>P-38's were very capable of breaking up the German fighter formations as they
>tried to do mass attacks on the bombers and they were also very capable of
>engaging the ME-110s. It's not a matter of pure dogfighting ability, just as
>the US Navy developed team tactics for the F-4-F's to use to fight the IJN
>fighters.

Yes folks, the P-38 is so wonderful we should ignore the actual combat
record in the European theatre of operations in 1943 and 1944.

>> Once the USAAF could deploy
>>escorts in numbers to the required targets then yes the Luftwaffe day
>>fighter force was in trouble.
>
>That day -could- have come a full year sooner. First flight of the P-38
>prototype was in 1939. First P-51B prototype was in November, 1942. I don't
>see any reason why, as a hypothetical, that the problems the P-38's encountered
>over Europe couldn't have been worked out in plenty of time to match the
>increase in the B-17 force in the spring of 1943. They did have Kelley Johnson
>working on the P-38 after all. It's hard to imagine he couldn't have solved
>about anything.

Why not look up the gap between the initial P-38 design, with its
37 mm cannon, its non self sealing fuel tanks and so on versus
the P-38F and onwards. Then go realise the P-51B was using
an already proved airframe and proven engine.

>Eaker didn't stress it, and Hunter (the 8th FC CG) didn't stress it. I don't
>see any reason why the number of P-38's in Europe couldn't have been
>dramatically increased, and much earlier, if it had been stressed. The
>strategic bombing campaign operating out of England was, after all, the top
>drawer element upon which the Army Air Force officers planned to use to make
>their case for a separate air force.

Walter all you are doing is parading your ignorance of WWII, in
this case the P-38 engineering and the problems in ramping up
production.

If Arnold was so pro the idea and it was a "top drawer element"
then start blaming the people in Washington, they had the results
from the USAAF in the Pacific and Mediterranean to look at.
They should have been pushing the idea, or at least be forced
to wear the Walter black hat until Walter moves onto another
target.

> >And the Mediterranean war was not going to be shut
>>down, it was needed, at least until the end of 1943.
>
>The most impotant theater to Arnold was clearly in England, and it involved
>daylight precision bombing of German targets.

The most important theatre for Harris was England as well. The
allies however rated the Mediterranean ahead of England for
over the first half of 1943 and allocated the resource accordingly.

>> So there were
>>no P-38s for the England based units,
>
>There could easily have been. That's my point.

Walter will simply keep ignoring the sort of P-38s available in
early 1943, giving them the late 1943 abilities, and failing to note
the problems the P-38 had even then.

>>So the theatre had control over where the scare P-38 resources
>>went to, given how much the Pacific wanted them, plus the
>>requirements of Tunisia?
>
>The most important air force was clearly in England. At least as far as Arnold
>was concerned.

Yes folks, mantra away find the ONE QUOTE and proclaim it the
"truth". Arnold was not the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

>>Furthermore, given the number of USAAF missions to Germany in
>>say the first few months of 1943 the results would be so compelling
>>that the P-38 production line, the only high performance fighter the
>>USAAF had in combat, should be disrupted to add in the improvements.
>
>That's why it is a hypothetical.

Walter will however condemn Eaker on the hypothetical.

>>Not only that but the specifications could be drawn up in say April 1943,
>>sent back to the US, turned into reliable engineering solutions in say
>>May 1943, with the first types built in say June 1943 with the arrival in
>>theatre in say July 1943.
>
>Hypothectically, that could all have been done a year earlier.

Yes folks, in which case hypothetically the Germans could have
deployed the Me262 earlier, using the same sort of wonder
insight being granted to the favoured characters in the non
passion play.

>>In 1942 and early 1943 the P-38 was the fighter the Pacific forces
>>wanted, it had the better overall performance versus the P-39 and P-40
>>and was doing really well. The experience in Tunisia indicated the
>>P-38 needed work to tackle the Luftwaffe.
>
>The P-38 could have been very effective ensuring that the Germans couldn't mass
>the way they wanted to against the B-17's.

Yes folks, just ignore the problems with numbers and what actually
did occur when such missions were run.

>It was working -with- the B-17's that the P-38 could have done well. Of course
>the P-51's and P-47's could and did do that too, but P-38's could have been
>doing it a lot sooner.

The straight answer is simple, Walter has his current preferred
solution and evidence is irrelevant.

>Another hypothetical would be that the Allies could have mated the Merlin to
>the Mustang a lot earlier. Sure. Then you would have had the same equation.
>But no one, certainly not Eaker or Hunter, was pushing for that.

This is quite funny Churchill apparently was involved in urging the
mating of the Mustang and the Merlin. The USAAF with no less
than 4 fighter designs in production was somewhat resistant to
having a fifth fighter type.

>>What I really like is Walter likes to run the line about how good the
>>B-17 was against enemy fighters, then turns around and accuses
>>the Generals of not providing enough escorts.
>
>That would just be a flat lie.

Yes when in doubt Walter simply drops his previous claims and
then accuses people of telling lies when they report them.

A quote from Walter,

"If you watch the World at War episode "Whirlwind", you''ll see Col.
Leon Johnson interviewed. Col. Johnson was on the first Ploesti mission, on
which he won the Medal of Honor. Later, he was a B-24 group commander in
the 8th. He makes this statement: "They found they could cope with the
fighters, more or less..."

>The B-17 groups could not deal with fighters
>after the Germans reinforced and re-armed beginning in the Spring of 1943.
>With escorts to break up the German formations, and make it too dangerous for
>the heavily armed German fighters (both single and twin engine) to be proximate
>to the American formations, that changed.
>
>You've seen me exposit that many, many times.

No Walter people have seen you many times trying to promote the
B-17 heavy fighter idea.

>>Meantime Eaker convinced Robert Lovett, the Assistant Secretary of
>>War for Air to push for a long range fighter.
>
>Source?
>
>I find no corroboration for such a supposed statement.

Williamson Murray in his book Luftwaffe, quoting Boylan, in The
development of the long range fighter escort, pages 90 to 91
and 121.

>"Eaker as late as October 1943 still believed the key was in the size of the
>bomber formations... Eaker stuck to this belief while high-ranking officers
>such as Chief of the Air Staff Barney Giles and commander of the VIII Bomber
>Command Fred Anderson had determined that escort was the key to victory."
>
>-- "To Command the Sky, p. 112, by McFarland and Newton
>
>"During June 1943 Assistant Secretary of War for Air Robert Lovett visited
>England to observe Eighth Air Force operations. He spent considerable time
>inspecting the VIII Fighter Command and especially the problems of escort. At
>an Eighth Air Force comanders' mmeeting immediately after Lovett's visit,
>Hunter told Eaker that he feared Lovett would insist on the use of P-38's for
>escort. Hunter identified the P-38 as a "wonderful ship," but preferrred to
>give the P-47 a "complete trial." In doing so Hunter revealed his
>misunderstanding of the basic issue confronting the Eighth Air Force in the
>summer and fall of 1943. The bombers needed escorts with range, bot superior
>fighters. The P-47 was a better dogfighter, but it did not have the legs to fly
>long escort missions."
>
>ibid, p. 114
>
>I find no evidence that Eaker thought it imperitive to provide escort or that
>he communicated such with Lovett.

So why were P-47s fitted with drop tanks and used as escorts during
Eaker's period of command?

>Lovett DID take that idea back to Washington with him, but he didn't get it
>from Eaker.

See for example Eaker's letter to Wilfrid Freeman noting that the
Munster raid of 10th October 1943 might have lost only 10 bombers
instead of the around 30 lost if the escorts had been able to stay
with the bombers.

It is really simple, Eaker was more complicated that the cardboard
black hat wearing bad guy Walter prefers. He was amongst the last
to hold the unescorted bombers idea but he hedged his bets.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

Geoffrey Sinclair

July 20th 04, 10:24 AM

Mike Williamson wrote in message >...
>Geoffrey Sinclair wrote:
>
>> The P-38 was the least effective of the USAAF fighters over Germany,
>> thanks to a combination of factors. Once the USAAF could deploy
>> escorts in numbers to the required targets then yes the Luftwaffe day
>> fighter force was in trouble. The engineering to provide the escorts
>> in numbers took most of 1943. Then the long range escorts appeared.
>>
>
> I would like to point out that the "least effective fighter" may
>not be taking an overall view.

Would it help is I mentioned the implied late 1943 and early
1944 and on heavy bomber escort missions? The P-38
had real problems with both tactics and equipment in this
environment.

>Most of the problems with P-38
>operations were the result of early doctrine and poor training
>of aircrew in multi-engine operations. They suffered through
>comparatively high loss rates in early operations where their
>writ was not to pursue the enemy, but to provide close escort,
>much as the Luftwaffe fighter force was in the Battle of Britain.
>Being unable to pursue an enemy limits your kill potential, but
>they DID cause a significant drop in bomber losses.

The P-38s had cockpit heating problems with rally degraded
pilot performance, they also had problems with high speed
dives, the pilots were very wary of them, and the Luftwaffe
liked diving away from combat. It made it hard to use the
dive tactic.

Also, unlike the Pacific the P-38 was not significantly faster
than the fighters it was engaging.

The trouble with training is a limit on early deployment of
effective fighters.

> In 1945, P-38s which were still flying escort missions under
>the later doctrine (and in equal or superior numbers to the
>defenders) had about the same results as their
>brethren in -47s and -51s.

As far as I am aware the use of P-38s on heavy bomber escort
missions in 1945 was very limited, what sort of information do
you have on the mission.

>The P-38 also proved highly successful
>with 9AF on low level interdiction sorties.

Agreed.

>Adding in its ability
>to be adapted to do almost anything (how many P-51s were ever
>fitted with a Norden bombsight or pathfinder blind bombing radar
>system?) and the P-38 was highly successful in Europe.

As a fighter bomber clearly it worked well. Unfortunately the
requirement is for a high altitude long range escort fighter
in 1943.

>It's
>reputation suffered from engine problems (which were absolutely
>unknown in the MTO, PTO, or even Alaskan theaters, and were
>quite possibly due to fuel problems which admittedly affected
>the turbosupercharged Allisons more than the Merlins) and
>from the inevitable process of being the aircraft tasked with
>proving that your current doctrine isn't working the way it
>should.

And that meant the ability to put together a reliable escort force
was significantly reduced.

> A poster noted that the use of P-38s in the photo-recon
>role (F-4 and F-5) limited the number of armed fighter types
>available, but strategically a squadron of long range high
>speed photographers (particularly in the Pacific) was almost
>certainly more valuable than another squadron of fighters -
>unless they are your escort for the day, of course.

The poster was me, pointing out the reality of allocating scarce
resources instead of the cardboard cut out "bad guys" approach
to the history.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

Guy Alcala

July 20th 04, 11:03 AM

WalterM140 wrote:

<snip>

> >> Sounds to me like the needed changes were in hand well before 1941, let
> >alone
> >> 1942.
> >
> >Sure they were in hand, but they also caused a lot of delay, which is why the
> >a/c
> >was so slow in getting into mass production and why the numbers remained so
> >low
> >relatively late.
>
> If someone had said, "hey, we are going to need long range escorts, and the
> only aircraft even remotely capable is the P-38," then these problems might
> have been overcome.

But the P-38 wasn't "the only aircraft even remotely capable" of long range escort,
especially not in 1943. Remember that the longest-ranged US escort fighter of the
war wasn't a P-38 or P-51. As I pointed out in another post, the P-38 prior to the
J had 300 gallons of internal fuel, and the P-47 prior to the D-25 had 305. Go
here:

http://www.zenoswarbirdvideos.com/More_P-38_Stuff.html

and here

http://www.zenoswarbirdvideos.com/P-47.html

And click on the links for the "Flight Operation Instruction Chart" for both a/c
(it helps if you save them and then tile them side by side). This is for a P-38L
w/410 gallons internal instead of 300, vs. an early model P-47 w/o water injection,
but just compare the cruise ranges and gal/hr. fuel flows in say Cruise Condition
IV at 25,000 or 30,000 feet, with each a/c assumed to have 250 gallons of fuel for
cruise. You'll note that the range is identical at 700 statute miles, with the
P-38L cruising slightly faster (an earlier version without the extra internal fuel
would probably cruise a bit slower for max. range) but burning about 3-4 gal./hr.
more than the P-47. The need was for a longer-range fighter, and the P-38, P-47
and P-51 could all be modified to increase theirinternal/ and/or external fuel
carriage. And they all were.

The P-38's original perceived range advantage was due to its large external,
unpressurized 165 gallon ferry tanks, which was fine in the low/medium overwater
cruise conditions typical of the PTO and MTO, but unacceptable in the ETO owing to
the need to be above 20,000 feet relatively soon to avoid flak on crossing the
occupied Dutch/Belgian/French coasts. Otherwise the P-47's 200 gallon ferry tank
would have been reasonably acceptable in the ETO, and histories would be describing
the P-47 as a long-range fighter from the get go. Instead, the tank was carried
only half full so that all the fuel would be burned by the time the a/c reached
about 22,000 feet or so, above which no fuel could be drawn. Better than nothing,
but the a/c had to pay the drag for 200 gallons of fuel while only receiving the
benefit of 100 gallons. The same would have been the case with the P-38, and there
would have been no point in carrying more than a single 165 gallon tank for ETO
high altitude escort missions.

>
> The P-38F, the first full-up combat-capable version was
> >available
> >for combat in August 1942; the first flight was made in January 1939, so
> >roughly
> >3.5 years elapsed. Even allowing for a fairly leisurely development prior to
> >the
> >war, the P-38's development was unusually prolonged, especially when compared
> >with
> >its single-engined stablemates. And then in 1943 the wing leading edges,
> >turbos,
> >radiators etc. all had to undergo a major redesign to fit leading edge tanks
> >in,
> >then they had to re-tool before they could produce them.
> >
> >> <snip>
> >>
> >> >
> >> >3 months maybe six months possibly, but a year? I think not. Production
> >was
> >> >still
> >> >ramping up, and the P-38 was still suffering from many of the same
> >problems
> >> >in
> >> >August 1944 as it had in October '43, 10 months after the 55th achieved
> >IOC
> >> >in the
> >> >ETO.
> >>
> >> That might have been alleviated earlier the generals in England had pushed
> >it.
> >> But they did not.
> >
> >Can't push what you don't know you need,
>
> They could have known they were going to need a lot more P-38's. The kernal of
> this whole issue is that Eaker and Hunter didn't divine that they needed a long
> range escort, and remained blind to this fact after pretty much everyone else
> had tumbled onto it.

Summarizing from Freeman, the first RFI for availability of drop tanks for fighters
was sent from the 8th back to Air Materiel Command on 3 October 1942, which
certainly implies that improved range was on someone's mind quite early. After it
became clear that the 8th would only be dealing with the P-47 for some time,
arrangements were made in January 1943 to ship Republic 200 gallon paper composite
ferry tanks to the UK. A few arrived in February and were evaluated by VIIITH AFSC
at Langford Lodge and by Cass Hough's 8th Air Technical Section at Bovingdon,
numerous operational deficiencies being noted, including poor aerodynamics, lack of
pressurization so fuel couldn't be drawn above 22,000 feet, the tank tended to
impact the a/c upon release, and if fuel was left in the tanks for more than a few
hours it started to leak. The tank also lacked the strength to be pressurized.
Changes were designed and tested to improve the jettison behavior.

Simultaneously 8th AFSC was requested to design a 100 gallon steel tank that could
be attached under a P-47, and which wouldn't suffer from the faults of the Republic
tank. Prototype testing was successful in March, and an order was placed to
deliver 1,000/month starting in June, but shortages of sheet steel in England
delayed production.

Meanwhile, In May 8th ATS had managed to modify the P-47's instrument vacuum system
to pressurize a drop tank, which meant that fuel could be drawn as high as 35,000
feet. Further improvements were made to the design as well as to the tank pipe
connections to ensure a clean break on jettison.

Production delays with the steel 100 gallon tank caused ATS to look at the British
108 gallon paper composite tank as a substitute. It had been examined earlier but
was insufficiently strong to be pressurized. Investigation found that it was
possible to strengthen the tank to withstand 17psi, and it was cleared for
production on 7 July 1943. The first was delivered on 12 July.

Meanwhile, because the need was so obvious, 8th FC decided to use the 200 gallon
Republic tank despite its deficiencies, as being the only tank available in any
quantity (1,150 on hand on 24 July 1943) at the time. It was only filled halfway
owing to the lack of pressurization, and they were dropped at 23,000 feet.

As an additional stopgap, in July 4,000 nominally 75 gallon (actually 84 gallon)
P-39 tanks which had been ordered from the US had also arrived. These provided
about as much radius increase as the half-full 200 gallon tanks owing to their far
lower drag, and could be pressurized. However, modifications had to be made to the
tanks and the P-47s to fit them to belly shackles. First mission use followed in
late August 1943, after the 56th FG's a/c had been modified.

At the beginning of September the first cylindrical 108 gallon steel tanks (the
production version of the ATS 100 gallon design) started delivery, and the same
month the strengthened 108 gal. cylindrical paper tanks began delivery, seeing
first use on the 27 September mission to Emden. A problem with these tanks was
that there was only 4 inches of ground clearance when mounted on the P-47's
centerline, making them unusable on rough airfields. A request for a flat 150
gallon steel tank to avoid this problem was made in August, with the tanks being
delivered starting in the following February.

Meanwhile more 75 gallon P-39 steel tanks had been arriving, but further deliveries
were cancelled in December, at which time 7,500 108 gallon tanks had been
delivered. The 75 gallon tanks were then restricted to P-51 units until used up.

In early 1944, P-47s had wing pylons added (a production change), which allowed a
pair of 108 gallon (or even 150 gallon) tanks to be carried underwing, although
some delay ensued owing to the need to improve sway braces. Only when this point
was reached was the P-47's combat radius limited by its internal fuel capacity.
The P-47D-25 with increased internal tankage and a bubble canopy was in production,
but deliveries would obviously take some time to make it to the operating
theaters. That was less of a problem than it might have been, as the P-51 and
P-38J which had been going through much the same range improvement process (but
without the big fuselage redesign also underway on the P-47D-25) were available in
increasing numbers to provide the TARCAP, while the P-47s provided ingress and
egress escort.

Ultimately the P-47N became the longest-ranged escort fighter of WW2, but it took a
near total wing redesign to do it, and the a/c just barely made it into the war in
the Pacific.

The point of all this is that the 8th was aware of the range issue and was doing
what it could to improve it with the a/c (P-47) and resources available to it, from
a very early stage. They were forced to utilize many stopgaps and work-arounds,
but with two possible exceptions, it seems to me that the 8th was doing everything
in their power to fix the problem (along with thousands of others). The first
exception was Eaker's placing improved fighter range 4th on his priority list (and
I've never seen what Nos. 1-3 were, so am not in a position to judge if the order
should have been changed). The second exception was the relatively long time
between the request for a 150 gallon flat tank and its availability. I assume this
was probably due to materiel shortages, but don't know. Alternatively the P-47
could have been given wet wing pylons earlier, but that's probably requires a
production mod (for wing strengthening at least), not a field retrofit.

> and since they didn't have ANY P-38s
> >in
> >the late fall of 1942, winter, spring or summer of 1943, there was no
> >opportunity
> >for them to work out the bugs.
>
> Now that doesn't seem fair, because a P-38 group WAS in England in December
> 1942. That was the 78th FG. According to Freeman in "The Mighty Eighth", most
> of the aircraft and pilots were sent to North Africa.

The 78th arrived in Nov. - Dec., and the a/c and pilots were sent down to North
Africa in February. In the meantime, few bombing missions were flown owing to the
poor weather, and I'm not even sure if the 78th flew any combat missions at the
time - they may well have been training, or rectifying equipment deficiencies.

> Also, at the start of 1943, the B-17 groups were dealing fairly well with the
> German fighters. By the summer the Germans would modfy the equation in their
> favor. Freeman does note that the P-38 was "a complicated aircraft to build and
> production was unable to meet the demands both the demands of attrition and
> equipment of new units."
>
> Perhaps what it comes down to is this:
>
> Even if Eaker and Hunter had been strongly seeking P-38's for escort, could
> those demands have been met by say, "Blitz Week" in 1943, when the GAF really
> started to hurt the Fortresses?
>
> You're suggesting that production could not possibly have met the need. I'll
> grant that possibility. It's a what-if, and we'll never know.
>
> The 1st, 14th and 82nd FGs had all been sent
> >to the
> >MTO, while the 78th had been stripped of a/c to replace losses, and
> >transitioned to
> >the P-47. Sending all the P-38s to the MTO was a decision made well above
> >Eaker's
> >pay grade, and there wasnt anything he could do about it.
>
> As I say above, the B-17's at the start of 1943 were seen to be coping with the
> Luftwaffe defense. But it's also true that the 8th AF was the premier force in
> the world as far as Arnold was concerned.

But not as far as the rest of the JCS, CCS and the respective governments were
concerned, and Arnold was going to go along with them.

> If the 8th had been seen as needing long range escorts, surely they could have
> been provided.

And they were, but only from about Nov. - Dec. 1943, as early as it was possible to
do so, and six months after the requirement was identified. And the same holds
true for every other theater, except that they got their long-range escorts even
later. The P-38F/G/H was a useful interim "long-range fighter" in those theaters
where altitude and climate performance wasn't the issue it was in the ETO, but it
wasn't inherently any longer-ranged than the contemporary P-47. As far as
long-range and combat radius goes, the best 1943 medium and high altitude fighter
was the early Corsair, with 361 gallons internal and a 150 gallon tank. But the
124 gallons in the wings was a bit dangerous (not self-sealing, but inerted), and
was deleted from later versions. Now there's a 'what if' for you, but it suffers
from similar production number limitations as the P-38 in that timeframe.

<snip>

> >> >Certainly, and after Aug. 17th 1943 you can make a good case for accusing
> >> >Eaker of
> >> >remaining wedded to doctrine over experience. You might even make that
> >case
> >> >by
> >> >June 1943 - Arnold had already reached that conclusion. But not in the
> >> >Fall/Winter
> >> >of 1942/43.
> >>
> >> They should have.
> >
> >Why?
>
> Because they got their asses handed to them.

Not prior to mid-43 they hadn't, so why should they be expected to be clairvoyant
in late '42?

<snip>

> >> Yes, production was what it was. I find it hard to believe it couldn't
> >have
> >> been increased.
> >
> >And yet it wasn't, despite screams from the MTO and PTO asking for every
> >single
> >P-38 they could get.
>
> Do you know that? Maybe they were straining every sinew to turn out P-38's.
> I've gotten the impression that no particular stress was put on. They were
> surely working as dilligently as anyone in war production, but did anyone say,
> this is the most important fighter we have?

In the MTO and PTO, you bet they did. Which were the only theaters they were being
used in at the time.

> The USAAF was sold on the
> Thunderbolt.

And was doing everything possible to improve it, in the theaters it was being used
in.

> Development of the Merlin Mustangs lagged also.

<snip>

Not that I've seen, once the performance of the Mk.X conversion was known. But it
took NA quite a while to a production design and then get it into production and
service, and the Mustang was the fastest US fighter development program in the
World War 2 period. I've seen no indication that there was unnecessary delay in
that period; the delay seems to have been in the Mustang I era, when the USAAF was
so dilatory in testing it.

Guy

WalterM140

July 20th 04, 12:26 PM

>>"Eaker as late as October 1943 still believed the key was in the size of the
>>bomber formations... Eaker stuck to this belief while high-ranking officers
>>such as Chief of the Air Staff Barney Giles and commanmder of the VIII
>Bomber
>>Command Fred Anderson had determined that escort was the key to victory."
>>
>>-- "To Command the Sky, p. 112, by McFarland and Newton
>>
>>"During June 1943 Assistant Secretary of War for Air Robert Lovett visited
>>England to observe Eighth Air Force operations. He spent considerable time
>>inspecting the VIII Fighter Command and especially the problems of escort.
>At
>>an Eighth Air Force comanders' mmeeting immediately after Lovett's visit,
>>Hunter told Eaker that he feared Lovett would insist on the use of P-38's
>for
>>escort. Hunter identified the P-38 as a "wonderful ship," but preferrred to
>>give the P-47 a "complete trial." In doing so Hunter reavealed his
>>misunderstanding of the basic issue confronting the Eighth Ar Force in the
>>summer and fall of 1943. The bombers needed escorts with range, bot
>superior
>>fighters. The P-47 was a better dogfighter, but it did not have the legs to
>fly
>>long escort missions."
>>
>>ibid, p. 114
>>
>>I find no evidence that Eaker thought it imperitive to provide escort or
>that
>>he communicated such with Lovett.
>
>So why were P-47s fitted with drop tanks and used as escorts during
>Eaker's period of command?
>
>>You seem to have just made it up.
>
>Translation Walter is as bad at character assassination as history.

You lied. You got caught. Again.

You wrote:

>Meantime Eaker convinced Robert Lovett, the Assistant Secretary of
>War for Air to push for a long range fighter.
>

Eaker never said anything during the summer of 1943 to Asst. SecWar Lovett such
as you said he did.

Bye, Sinclair.

Walt

ArtKramr

July 20th 04, 02:46 PM

>Subject: Re: Night bombers interception....
>From: Presidente Alcazar
>Date: 7/20/2004 1:20 AM Pacific Standard Time
>Message-id: >
>
>On Mon, 19 Jul 2004 13:24:16 +0100, "Keith Willshaw"
> wrote:
>
>>Trouble is a fight between an aircraft armed with 30mm cannon and
>>one armed with a single 0.5 will mostly favour the fighter.
>>The most successful defensive tactic was to perform an
>>immediate evasion by flying a violent corkscrew manoeuvre
>
>Indeed, and I'm skeptical of the utility of a hand-mounted machine-gun
>in a ventral window with restricted vision, manned by a frozen
>air-gunner who has to endure hour after hour of vigilance on multimple
>missions before facing the slit-second reactions required to deal with
>a real assailant. Plenty of bombers were lost to stern attacks, and
>even attacks from beneath passed through the visible arc of the rear
>turret before they closed to engage, which should indicate the real
>problems encountered relying on unassistated visual observation alone
>for bomber defence.
>
>Gavin Bailey
>

True. The fighter had the advantage. But we got a lot of those little *******s
anyway. When you fight a war you take your losses and keep fighting no matter
what..

Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

ArtKramr

July 20th 04, 02:52 PM

>Subject: Re: Night bombers interception....
>From: "Nele VII"
>Date: 7/19/2004 9:48 AM Pacific Standard Time
>Message-id: >
>
>
>
>ArtKramr wrote in message >...
>>>ubject: Re: Night bombers interception....
>>>From: "Keith Willshaw"
>>
>>>hat single aircraft ended up over targets was a result of
>>>the extremely poor reliability of the aircraft, it was not
>>>uncommon for half the dispatched aircraft to have to
>>>return to base. Indeed the USAAC described the B-17C
>>>as being unsuitable for combat use.
>>>
>>
>>Why do you think we gave them to the Brits? Same reason we gave P-39's to
>the
>>Russians.
>
>Pokrishkin was grateful for P-39 achieving "only" 59 victories! So much for
>an "Iron Dog" in the hands of an ace :))))))
>
>>
>>
>>Arthur Kramer
>>344th BG 494th BS
>> England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
>>Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
>>http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

How a plane performs in the hands of an ace is meningless. There were too few
of them to matter. Its flat spin problems killed too many average pilots to be
acceptable to us. We had better planes so why suffer a dog? THe Russians were
not so fortunate

Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

Keith Willshaw

July 20th 04, 03:09 PM

"ArtKramr" > wrote in message
...
> >Subject: Re: Night bombers interception....
> >From: "Nele VII"
> >Date: 7/19/2004 9:48 AM Pacific Standard Time
> >Message-id: >
> >
> >
> >
> >ArtKramr wrote in message
>...
> >>>ubject: Re: Night bombers interception....
> >>>From: "Keith Willshaw"
> >>
> >>>hat single aircraft ended up over targets was a result of
> >>>the extremely poor reliability of the aircraft, it was not
> >>>uncommon for half the dispatched aircraft to have to
> >>>return to base. Indeed the USAAC described the B-17C
> >>>as being unsuitable for combat use.
> >>>
> >>
> >>Why do you think we gave them to the Brits? Same reason we gave P-39's
to
> >the
> >>Russians.
> >
> >Pokrishkin was grateful for P-39 achieving "only" 59 victories! So much
for
> >an "Iron Dog" in the hands of an ace :))))))
> >
> >>
> >>
> >>Arthur Kramer
> >>344th BG 494th BS
> >> England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
> >>Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
> >>http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer
>
>
> How a plane performs in the hands of an ace is meningless. There were too
few
> of them to matter. Its flat spin problems killed too many average pilots
to be
> acceptable to us. We had better planes so why suffer a dog? THe Russians
were
> not so fortunate
>

The USAAF operated over 2000 P-39's at peak in early 1944.
Most of these were in the PTO and MTO as the type suffered
heavy losses against the Luftwaffe over France and was replaced by the
Spitfire V in the 31st Fighter Group based in southern England.

They were heavily used in the Med however and post war analysis
showed that they had the lowest loss rate per sortie of any USAAF
fighter used in the European theatre.

Keith

ArtKramr

July 20th 04, 03:33 PM

>Subject: Re: Night bombers interception....
>From: "Keith Willshaw"
>Date: 7/20/2004 7:09 AM Pacific Standard Time
>Message-id: >
>
>
>"ArtKramr" > wrote in message
...
>> >Subject: Re: Night bombers interception....
>> >From: "Nele VII"
>> >Date: 7/19/2004 9:48 AM Pacific Standard Time
>> >Message-id: >
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >ArtKramr wrote in message
>...
>> >>>ubject: Re: Night bombers interception....
>> >>>From: "Keith Willshaw"
>> >>
>> >>>hat single aircraft ended up over targets was a result of
>> >>>the extremely poor reliability of the aircraft, it was not
>> >>>uncommon for half the dispatched aircraft to have to
>> >>>return to base. Indeed the USAAC described the B-17C
>> >>>as being unsuitable for combat use.
>> >>>
>> >>
>> >>Why do you think we gave them to the Brits? Same reason we gave P-39's
>to
>> >the
>> >>Russians.
>> >
>> >Pokrishkin was grateful for P-39 achieving "only" 59 victories! So much
>for
>> >an "Iron Dog" in the hands of an ace :))))))
>> >
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>Arthur Kramer
>> >>344th BG 494th BS
>> >> England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
>> >>Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
>> >>http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer
>>
>>
>> How a plane performs in the hands of an ace is meningless. There were too
>few
>> of them to matter. Its flat spin problems killed too many average pilots
>to be
>> acceptable to us. We had better planes so why suffer a dog? THe Russians
>were
>> not so fortunate
>>
>
>The USAAF operated over 2000 P-39's at peak in early 1944.
>Most of these were in the PTO and MTO as the type suffered
>heavy losses against the Luftwaffe over France and was replaced by the
>Spitfire V in the 31st Fighter Group based in southern England.
>
>They were heavily used in the Med however and post war analysis
>showed that they had the lowest loss rate per sortie of any USAAF
>fighter used in the European theatre.
>
>Keith
>

The Med and the ETO were two world's apart. No comparison on any basis.

Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

ArtKramr

July 20th 04, 03:42 PM

>Subject: Re: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944
>From: "Geoffrey Sinclair"
>Date: 7/20/2004 2:24 AM Pacific Standard Time

>As far as I am aware the use of P-38s on heavy bomber escort
>missions in 1945 was very limited, what sort of information do
>you have on the mission.

The only P-38's I ever saw in the ETO carried cameras for recon work. No
guns.They used to come in at our field at Florennes for gas.on thier way home.
Besides for the cost and labor to make a P-38 you could darn near make two
P-51's, so why bother?

Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

Krztalizer

July 20th 04, 03:56 PM

>These rockets
>were very effective and often took out 3 or 4 bombers and broke up the
>formation.

Often? That doesn't jibe with German claims - multiple claims from a single
rocket salvo were VERY rare, as most of the pilots using them misjudged the
release point for the often-erratic WGr 21s.

Damage to more than one bomber was common; but destroying more than one was
not. I haven't met a LW pilot that felt the rockets were a better choice than
cannons - and I have heard more than one of them curse about those "damned
rockets" that made their aircraft sitting ducks for escorts.

v/r
Gordon
<====(A+C====>
USN SAR

Its always better to lose -an- engine, not -the- engine.

Chris Mark

July 20th 04, 04:44 PM

>As far as I am aware the use of P-38s on heavy bomber escort
>missions in 1945 was very limited, what sort of information do
>you have on the mission.

They were certainly being used. An example: The 1st fighter group conducted 12
heavy bomber escort missions in April, 1945. That's down from 18 heavy bomber
escort missions in April, 1944. But in that month the group conducted only one
other operation--a strafing mission. However, in April, 1945, the 1st, besides
the 12 bomber escort missions, conducted 29 photo escort missions, 14
dive-bombing missions, 10 armed reconnaissance missions, and two fighters
sweeps. Busy schedule.

Chris Mark

ArtKramr

July 20th 04, 05:10 PM

>Subject: Re: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944
>From: (Chris Mark)
>Date: 7/20/2004 8:44 AM Pacific Standard Time
>Message-id: >
>
>>As far as I am aware the use of P-38s on heavy bomber escort
>>missions in 1945 was very limited, what sort of information do
>>you have on the mission.
>
>They were certainly being used. An example: The 1st fighter group conducted
>12
>heavy bomber escort missions in April, 1945. That's down from 18 heavy
>bomber
>escort missions in April, 1944. But in that month the group conducted only
>one
>other operation--a strafing mission. However, in April, 1945, the 1st,
>besides
>the 12 bomber escort missions, conducted 29 photo escort missions, 14
>dive-bombing missions, 10 armed reconnaissance missions, and two fighters
>sweeps. Busy schedule.
>
>
>Chris Mark
>

Was that in the MTO? I never saw any P-38's in the ETO 1944-45. Juist recon
P-38's.

Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

Brett

July 20th 04, 10:31 PM

"WalterM140" > wrote:

<...>

> >Translation Walter is as bad at character assassination as history.
>
>
> You lied. You got caught. Again.

Mr. Sinclair came to a valid conclusion about you.

> You wrote:
>
> >Meantime Eaker convinced Robert Lovett, the Assistant Secretary of
> >War for Air to push for a long range fighter.
> >
>
> Eaker never said anything during the summer of 1943 to Asst. SecWar Lovett
such
> as you said he did.

Were you there, as for him not saying it there are a good numbers references
that say that conversation did take place.

Guy Alcala

July 20th 04, 10:36 PM

Keith Willshaw wrote:

> "ArtKramr" > wrote in message
> ...
> > >Subject: Re: Night bombers interception....
> > >From: "Nele VII"
> > >Date: 7/19/2004 9:48 AM Pacific Standard Time
> > >Message-id: >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >ArtKramr wrote in message
> >...
> > >>>ubject: Re: Night bombers interception....
> > >>>From: "Keith Willshaw"
> > >>
> > >>>hat single aircraft ended up over targets was a result of
> > >>>the extremely poor reliability of the aircraft, it was not
> > >>>uncommon for half the dispatched aircraft to have to
> > >>>return to base. Indeed the USAAC described the B-17C
> > >>>as being unsuitable for combat use.
> > >>>
> > >>
> > >>Why do you think we gave them to the Brits? Same reason we gave P-39's
> to
> > >the
> > >>Russians.
> > >
> > >Pokrishkin was grateful for P-39 achieving "only" 59 victories! So much
> for
> > >an "Iron Dog" in the hands of an ace :))))))
> > >
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>Arthur Kramer
> > >>344th BG 494th BS
> > >> England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
> > >>Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
> > >>http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer
> >
> >
> > How a plane performs in the hands of an ace is meningless. There were too
> few
> > of them to matter. Its flat spin problems killed too many average pilots
> to be
> > acceptable to us. We had better planes so why suffer a dog? THe Russians
> were
> > not so fortunate
> >
>
> The USAAF operated over 2000 P-39's at peak in early 1944.
> Most of these were in the PTO and MTO as the type suffered
> heavy losses against the Luftwaffe over France and was replaced by the
> Spitfire V in the 31st Fighter Group based in southern England.
>
> They were heavily used in the Med however and post war analysis
> showed that they had the lowest loss rate per sortie of any USAAF
> fighter used in the European theatre.

The P-39 worked fine for us when it was used as intended, at low/medium
altitudes, which is how the soviets used it. It certainly outperformed the P-40
in that part of the envelope. The US's biggest problem with the a/c was its
lack of range, something that couldn't be improved owing to the lack of space
forward and aft-mounted engine; there was just no room to put fuel where it
wouldn't screw the Cg. Where that wasn't an issue, and the a/c was used well
forward (as the Russians did), it was fine. And the Soviets had their share of
excellent a/c.

IIRR it was only used by one or two groups in the Med, but still managed to fly
30,547 combat sorties (mostly strafing missions) while only losing 107 a/c in
combat, a loss rate of just 0.4%. US P-40s flew about twice as many combat
sorties in the MTO, 67,059, but lost 553 in combat, or 0.8%. They claimed a lot
more A-A kills, though, 481 vs. 14, which represents their different tasking,
and also dropped a lot more bombs than the P-39 (same Cg/range problem). The
P-63 eliminated the P-39's handling quirks and improved its performance, but
range was still limited and by the time it entered service the USAAF was using
the P-47 as its prime fighter-bomber. But the Russians certainly liked both the
P-39 and P-63, because its range wasn't an issue for them. It's interesting to
speculate how the P-63 would have done in the 9th AF after the invasion, as a
fighter-bomber in lieu of the P-47 or especially the P-51. The Soviets did like
the 37mm cannon, and the engine was certanly better protected against flak
during strafing attacks than was a P-51's.

Guy

ArtKramr

July 20th 04, 11:09 PM

>Subject: Re: Night bombers interception....
>From: Guy Alcala
>Date: 7/20/2004 2:36 PM Pacific Standard Time
>Message-id: >
>
>Keith Willshaw wrote:
>
>> "ArtKramr" > wrote in message
>> ...
>> > >Subject: Re: Night bombers interception....
>> > >From: "Nele VII"
>> > >Date: 7/19/2004 9:48 AM Pacific Standard Time
>> > >Message-id: >
>> > >
>> > >
>> > >
>> > >ArtKramr wrote in message
>> >...
>> > >>>ubject: Re: Night bombers interception....
>> > >>>From: "Keith Willshaw"
>> > >>
>> > >>>hat single aircraft ended up over targets was a result of
>> > >>>the extremely poor reliability of the aircraft, it was not
>> > >>>uncommon for half the dispatched aircraft to have to
>> > >>>return to base. Indeed the USAAC described the B-17C
>> > >>>as being unsuitable for combat use.
>> > >>>
>> > >>
>> > >>Why do you think we gave them to the Brits? Same reason we gave
>P-39's
>> to
>> > >the
>> > >>Russians.
>> > >
>> > >Pokrishkin was grateful for P-39 achieving "only" 59 victories! So much
>> for
>> > >an "Iron Dog" in the hands of an ace :))))))
>> > >
>> > >>
>> > >>
>> > >>Arthur Kramer
>> > >>344th BG 494th BS
>> > >> England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
>> > >>Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
>> > >>http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer
>> >
>> >
>> > How a plane performs in the hands of an ace is meningless. There were
>too
>> few
>> > of them to matter. Its flat spin problems killed too many average pilots
>> to be
>> > acceptable to us. We had better planes so why suffer a dog? THe Russians
>> were
>> > not so fortunate
>> >
>>
>> The USAAF operated over 2000 P-39's at peak in early 1944.
>> Most of these were in the PTO and MTO as the type suffered
>> heavy losses against the Luftwaffe over France and was replaced by the
>> Spitfire V in the 31st Fighter Group based in southern England.
>>
>> They were heavily used in the Med however and post war analysis
>> showed that they had the lowest loss rate per sortie of any USAAF
>> fighter used in the European theatre.
>
>The P-39 worked fine for us when it was used as intended, at low/medium
>altitudes, which is how the soviets used it. It certainly outperformed the
>P-40
>in that part of the envelope. The US's biggest problem with the a/c was its
>lack of range, something that couldn't be improved owing to the lack of space
>forward and aft-mounted engine; there was just no room to put fuel where it
>wouldn't screw the Cg. Where that wasn't an issue, and the a/c was used well
>forward (as the Russians did), it was fine. And the Soviets had their share
>of
>excellent a/c.
>
>IIRR it was only used by one or two groups in the Med, but still managed to
>fly
>30,547 combat sorties (mostly strafing missions) while only losing 107 a/c in
>combat, a loss rate of just 0.4%. US P-40s flew about twice as many combat
>sorties in the MTO, 67,059, but lost 553 in combat, or 0.8%. They claimed a
>lot
>more A-A kills, though, 481 vs. 14, which represents their different tasking,
>and also dropped a lot more bombs than the P-39 (same Cg/range problem). The
>P-63 eliminated the P-39's handling quirks and improved its performance, but
>range was still limited and by the time it entered service the USAAF was
>using
>the P-47 as its prime fighter-bomber. But the Russians certainly liked both
>the
>P-39 and P-63, because its range wasn't an issue for them. It's interesting
>to
>speculate how the P-63 would have done in the 9th AF after the invasion, as a
>fighter-bomber in lieu of the P-47 or especially the P-51. The Soviets did
>like
>the 37mm cannon, and the engine was certanly better protected against flak
>during strafing attacks than was a P-51's.
>
>Guy
>

Every WW II pilot I knew who flew the P-39 was glad ot be rid if it.

Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

Guy Alcala

July 20th 04, 11:48 PM

ArtKramr wrote:

> Every WW II pilot I knew who flew the P-39 was glad ot be rid if it.

I know of several, starting with Yeager and Anderson, who liked its handling and
would happily have gone to war in it. It had its handling quirks, but so did
every other a/c. The P-40 was renowned for its tendency to groundlooping, and
also (IIRR) for its nasty stall/spin. The P-38 had serious compressibility
problems, and like all twins could bite you if you lost an engine on takeoff. The
Merlin P-51 had to be very careful not to get into combat with the aft tank more
than about 1/3 - 1/2 full, and there were yaw issues at high speed. About the
only USAAF fighter I can think of that wasn't commonly associated with any bad
handling quirks was the P-47 (quite typical of Republic fighters, judging by the
jets that followed).

Guy

Chris Mark

July 21st 04, 12:40 AM

>Was that in the MTO?

Yep.

Chris Mark

ArtKramr

July 21st 04, 02:55 AM

>Subject: Re: Night bombers interception....
>From: Guy Alcala
>Date: 7/20/2004 3:48 PM Pacific Standard Time
>Message-id: >
>
>ArtKramr wrote:
>
>> Every WW II pilot I knew who flew the P-39 was glad ot be rid if it.
>
>I know of several, starting with Yeager and Anderson, who liked its handling
>and
>would happily have gone to war in it. It had its handling quirks, but so did
>every other a/c. The P-40 was renowned for its tendency to groundlooping,
>and
>also (IIRR) for its nasty stall/spin. The P-38 had serious compressibility
>problems, and like all twins could bite you if you lost an engine on takeoff.
>The
>Merlin P-51 had to be very careful not to get into combat with the aft tank
>more
>than about 1/3 - 1/2 full, and there were yaw issues at high speed. About
>the
>only USAAF fighter I can think of that wasn't commonly associated with any
>bad
>handling quirks was the P-47 (quite typical of Republic fighters, judging by
>the
>jets that followed).
>
>Guy

I think all questions are answere by looking at the total recordsof the P-51,
P47 and P-39.

Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

ArtKramr

July 21st 04, 02:56 AM

>Subject: Re: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944
>From: (Chris Mark)
>Date: 7/20/2004 4:40 PM Pacific Standard Time
>Message-id: >
>
>>Was that in the MTO?
>
>Yep.
>
>
>Chris Mark
>

Figures.

Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

Geoffrey Sinclair

July 21st 04, 06:52 AM

WalterM140 wrote in message >...

Firstly some deleted text I wrote, on what Eaker said to Lovett,
the source for my comments,

Williamson Murray in his book Luftwaffe, quoting Boylan, in The
development of the long range fighter escort, pages 90 to 91
and 121.

This has to be deleted. It cannot exist if Walter is to try and smear.

(snip)

>>>I find no evidence that Eaker thought it imperitive to provide escort or
>>>that he communicated such with Lovett.
>>
>>So why were P-47s fitted with drop tanks and used as escorts during
>>Eaker's period of command?
>>
>>>You seem to have just made it up.
>>
>>Translation Walter is as bad at character assassination as history.
>
>You lied. You got caught. Again.

Walter's definition of telling lies is basically pointing out unpleasant
facts that ruin his preferred fiction.

>You wrote:
>
>>Meantime Eaker convinced Robert Lovett, the Assistant Secretary of
>>War for Air to push for a long range fighter.
>
>Eaker never said anything during the summer of 1943 to Asst.
>SecWar Lovett such as you said he did.

I presume Walter has the transcripts of all the Eaker Lovett conversations,
to make this claim but I doubt it. Alternatively he has read the Boylan book
I referenced, but I doubt that as well.

It appears Eaker is set up as the 2 dimensional bad guy, so the fact
the 8th did improve escort range and numbers during his command is
to be ignored, the fact people have noted Eaker did understand the
idea of long range escorts has to be dropped.

>Bye, Sinclair.

Hey great, Walter is going to move onto something else.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

WalterM140

July 21st 04, 10:16 AM

>>>>I find no evidence that Eaker thought it imperitive to provide escort or
>>>>that he communicated such with Lovett.
>>>
>>>So why were P-47s fitted with drop tanks and used as escorts during
>>>Eaker's period of command?
>>>
>>>>You seem to have just made it up.
>>>
>>>Translation Walter is as bad at character assassination as history.
>>
>>You lied. You got caught. Again.
>
>Walter's definition of telling lies is basically pointing out unpleasant
>facts that ruin his preferred fiction.
>
>> Sinclair wrote:
>>
>>>Meantime Eaker convinced Robert Lovett, the Assistant Secretary of
>>>War for Air to push for a long range fighter.
>>
>>Eaker never said anything during the summer of 1943 to Asst.
>>SecWar Lovett such as you said he did.
>
>I presume Walter has the transcripts of all the Eaker Lovett conversations,

You made the statement. You can't back it up. You lied. You got caught.

Eaker did not discuss the development of a long range fighter with Lovett when
Lovett came to England in the Summer of 1943. Eaker did not urge the rapid
development of such an aircraft at that time.

You lied. You got caught.

Walt

The Enlightenment

July 21st 04, 03:36 PM

(Krztalizer) wrote in message >...
> >
> >> The 'special navigation equipment' carried on Wilde Sau Bf 109s and FW
> 190s
> >> consisted of a UV lamp and specially coated maps. The special nav
> features of
> >> the FuG 16Z were not utilized because they would have required a personal
> >> controller for each "Boar", so instead they were following the
> Reichjägerweile
> >> (general information fighter broadcast - "The four-motor bombers are
> >> approaching Kassel; all aircraft within range, strong raid approaching
> Kassel",
> >> that sort of thing. No naviads in the cockpits of the Wilde Sau airmen I
> have
> >> interviewed.
> >
> >I believe these aircraft had artificial horizons, the FuG 16Z, ultraviolet
> >or Radium instrumentation dials.
>
> The guys I have interviewed were in 10./JG 300 primarily, and they were the
> only instrument-rated Wilde Sau; the difference is that the rest of the program
> were basically day fighters, flying under exceptionally good night visibility.
> As I said before, the only thing they said was different from the standard
> daylight Bf 109s in use, was the small UV maplight. Its probable that you are
> right and that other Staffels in the program had slightly better navaids, but
> it was never intended to use "night-flyers" in the program, just standard day
> fighter pilots. We had a long conversation with Oberst Herrmann on this exact
> subject as part of our interview.

You no doubt have great personal experience in these matters: however
so many variants of the Me 109G series are described as 'dirty weather
fighters'. Also there was in squadrans sometimes only a few pilots
with an instrument rating and I have the impression not all 109s had
artificial horizons.

This is from "Heinz Knoke's" wartime diary "I flew for the Fuhrer"
recently reprinted and obviously a leary publishers title. He was an
Me 109 pilot of 63 victories. Here he describes a dirty weather
interception and shootdown of a Mosquito. Probably Fug 16 and Wurzburg
directed. I believe this is one of the Mosquitos that embarased
Goering in Berlin during an political rally.

*******
6th November, 1942.

12oo hours: from Division Headquarters comes a report of two
Mosquitoes approaching. At the same moment there is a ring at my
telephone. Lieutenant Kramer, our Fighter Control Officer at Division,
calls to ask if 1 can fly in the bad weather.

I reply in the negative. Cloud ceiling is down to 100 feet, and
visibility is impossible. I cannot even see across to the other side
of the field.

" Sorry, Kramer, it cannot be done. Anyway, in this sort of muck the
two Tommies will come down on their snouts without our help."

For several hours it has been raining-a steady, persistent drizzle.
The pilots sit around, playing cards or writing letters home, or lie
sleeping on camp-cots in the next room.

I plot the progress of the Mosquitoes from the position reports as
they come in. They actually fly inland over the heart of the Reich.
Inside of an hour they are reported to be over Berlin, and our flak
opens up on them. Those lads must have guts all right. Weather like
this makes flying anything but a picnic.

The telephone rings again.

" No. 5 Flight; Lieutenant Knoke here."

The call this time is from Colonel Henschel, commanding fighter
defences in the North Sea coastal area. How is the weather at your
end, Knoke ? just as bad as it can be, sir. I can see only for a few
yards." Knoke, you will have to fly, and that is all there is to it. I
have just had a telephone call from Reich-Marshal Goring He is in one
of his rages. Why are we not in the air? The weather is too bad for us
to fly; yet those confounded Tommies can get over Berlin. Do you
imagine 1 would tell that to the Reich-Marshal ? Those Mosquitoes are
to be shot down at all costs. Do you understand?

" Yes, sir."

" Which of the pilots are you going to send?

" Flight Sergeant Wenneckers and myself, sir."

" Very well-and the best of luck to you!

" Thank you, sir."

Wenneckers and I are the only pilots in the Wing with experience in
blind flying. This is not the first time that we have set off together
in dirty weather.

Take-off 133o hours.

I can see hardly anything ahead. This blasted rain! Keeping down low,
we hurtle over the roof-tops, trees and power-lines. Radio reception
from the ground is good. Lieutenant Kramer directs me.

The Tommies are heading north-west over the Bremen area. From past
experience they may be expected to cross the East Friesian Islands.

I head for the coast. The weather over the sea is not any better.

The most recent report gives

the Position Of the Mosquitoes

as map reference sector Berta-Quelle-eight, on course threeone-five.
At any moment now we may sight the *******s, if we keep our eyes
peeled. If only it would stop raining! We have to concentrate our
attention on not running into some obstruction.

Time: 1347 hours.

I am unable to see anything at all ahead. It is maddening. Base calls:
" You should see them now. Try a little to the left."

I do not answer. For a shadow suddenly looms out of the greyness
ahead. It is a Mosquito.

He has spotted me also, and whips round to the left in a vertical
bank, almost dipping his wing-tip in the sea. Now he twists round to
the right. Then he dodges to the left again.

" No, no, my friend, it is not such a simple matter to shake off
Knoke." Every time he turns I fire in front of his nose.

We are flying low, very low, heading out over the open sea now. My
Tommy leaves a faint trail of smoke. At full throttle he follows a
steady course of three-two-zero. He moves at such a blasted high
speed. But my good Gustav is just able to maintain the pace. I stay on
his tail. Wenneckers

gradually falls behind. The terrific speed is too high for his plane.

I want to fire at only the closest possible range, and hence

try to close the gap between us. Slowly, almost imperceptibly, I draw
nearer to my opponent. I shut the radiator flaps, and the range drops
to 150 feet. He is squarely in my sights.

" Fire, Knoke, fire-NOW!! "

I press both firing-buttons. The burst catches him in the left engine.
The plane is constructed of wood. The wing goes up in flames at once
and shears off at the root. A few seconds later one De Havilland
Mosquito vanishes into the green depths of the North Sea.

That was my third.

Nothing but a sludge of oil is left on the surface. I mop the sweat
from my face.

*******

Knokes diary is interesting becuase he often speeks of improvements to
the electonics or engine boost for his Me 109 but seldom mentions the
series he is in. One is left with an impression of the power of the
30mm armament on the 109 he seemed to have no trouble bringing down
the mighty P47 with it.

>
> > Protecting a fighter pilots night vision
> >was all important, the Luftwaffe even had a device to measure the speed of
> >recovery of eyes after being illuminated by light. The the the wild sow
> >hunted aircraft that had been caught in searchlights.
>
> Yes, as they all said, "The eyes of a hunter is what was needed - no radar, no
> controller, nothing was more important than excellent night vision." I heard
> that from every NJG pilot we tracked down.
>
> > They did perform
> >ground controled interceptions that this was of course limited by the number
> >of Wurzburg radars and oppertators:
>
> Not during the actual Wilde Sau program, but following its termination, they
> did exactly this. Once the rest of JG 300 went back to exclusively daylight
> combat, the sole remaining nightfighter Staffel in JG 300 (the massively
> overstrength 10th Staffel at Jüterbog), THEN controllers were used to guide
> single Bf 109s toward their targets. From what I have been told, this was not
> done during the earlier period, when Wilde Sau's were primarily hunting
> Viermots over citiesl
>
> > I believe mosquitoes were the main
> >target.
>
> There were several Mosquito Jagd units, operating from September 44 to April
> 1945, including NJGr 10, 10./JG 300, two gruppes within NJG 11, etc.,
> but these
> were all after the Sept 44 demise of the Wilde Sau program.
>
> >The Me 109G6 U4N was equipped with Naxos to home onto bomber
> >emisions and to also home back to homebase. This type was little used
> >because it came at the end of wild sow tactics when the Luftwaffe had
> >managed to get its radars working again.
>
> Also the reluctance of bomber crews to leave the H2S on, since all
> of them knew
> by then that their suspicions concerning the Germans homing on it had already
> been confirmed. A Mosquito was deliberately sent up as bait and it was
> immediately tracked and attacked by a Naxos-equipped fighter. Later, an H2S
> was operating on the -ground-, and a Luftwaffe fighter homed onto it. After
> that incident, crews were quite judicious with its use, and the LW realized it
> was not going to be an effective tracking tool.
>
> >I believe that the death rate of wilde sau squadrons
> >in training was between 20 to 75 percent. Finnish pilots trained by the
> >Germans in night fighting had only a 10 percent death rate simply because
> >they were far better trained to start with.
>
> The "airman's death" that met most of the Wilde Sau airmen was caused by their
> general inexperience, compounded by the rigors of night combat. It was
> everything the day fighter nachwuchs faced, multiplied many times. Its a
> wonder any of them made it through more than a flight or two.
>
> >The correct translation of "Wilde Sau" Wild Sow not Wild Boar. It alludes
> >to the wild sow's willingness to aggressively defend its young.
>
> I know their songs :) Its difficult for me to call professional
> nightfighter airmen "old lady pigs", so I used Boars - my mistake, but it was > intentional.
>
> >>Quite often when the German radar was working the link between the
> ground
> >> >and night fighter was not.
> >>
> >> They were being jammed and intruded upon for the last two years of the
> war.
> >> When the voice RT was 'stepped on', most NJ pilots had their bordfunkers
> switch
> >> to Morse, which was not as easier to operate in a dirty environment.
>
> I meant to say it was easier to operate in that environment. Silly slip....
>
> >> > The introduction of the Bernhard-Bernhardine system
> >> >improve matters. This system was very jam proof it told a night fighter
> >> >exactly where was in that provided a secure telemetry to link the night
> >> >fighter with ground control by a ticker tape.
> >>
> >> One cool part of that system is that it was the first on earth to provide
> a
> >> blind landing capability, when hooked to a three-axis autopilot. The
> Interim
> >> Nightfighter (Me 262 B-1a/U1) 'version 2' carried this setup, as did a
> couple
> >> captured Ju 88 nightfighters.
> >
> >It is a fascinating system. I Would like to know the technology of it?
>
> Look up the K-22 automatic pilot. If you send me a note off board, I will
> forward some more info about it.
>
>
> >I have read that the Luftwaffe was heading towards fully automatic
> >interceptions, this system was perhaps only one step away.
>
> Very close. Allies were always only a step behind, but by late 1944, early
> 1945, the night arm of the Luftwaffe was playing with amazing toys.
>
> >You have any information on the German EGON system which was similar to
> >"oboe". This was quite an advanced night bombing device on the Luftwaffe's
> >side but I am not sure where it was used if ever.
>
> Sorry - its at the PRO in England. I focus on nightfighters over Europe, so I
> didn't copy that file when I saw it.
>
> >> Berndard was essentially an early datalink system intended for large
> bombers
> >> but it evolved into a fighter director.that was quite advanced for its
> day.
> >>
> >> >Because the German Lichtenstein radar had large aerials aircraft were
> slowed
> >> >down considerably this limited number of interceptions they were able to
> >> >achieve.
> >>
> >> Crews often scored 4, 5, or even more Abschusse in a single sortie. Other
> >> Experten crews managed up to 7. Faster speed does not help a radar
> >> interception of a slow target in low/zero visibility.
> >
> >The ideal situation occurred when the night fighter pilots managed to
> >infiltrate into the middle of the bomber stream, it was in this situation
> >that these multiple victories occurred. In the middle of the bomber stream
> >jamming and window was minimal.
>
> Yes - like piranhas in a fishtank, no place for the bombers to turn...
>
> > I believe diversionary raids however
> >frequently lead the night fighters on a fruitless chase: they often were led
> >to the wrong city and then lacked the speed to defend the correct one in
> >time.
>
> Exactly so. Other times, they sat in their cockpits on the ground watching a
> distant city burn, as their flight controllers denied them permission to
> launch, supposedly because the target was not yet known. For the pilots, it
> was unbearable.
>
> v/r
> Gordon
> <====(A+C====>
> USN SAR
>
> Its always better to lose -an- engine, not -the- engine.

Chris Mark

July 21st 04, 04:39 PM

>>>Was that in the MTO?
>>
>>Yep.

>Figures.

Whether a guy flew into Germany from the East or South makes so much
difference?

As a data point, these boys lost 18 pilots shot down in the last two months of
the war, including the group CO. They lost five on April 15, 1945. But, being
the MTO, this is of no significance or interest.

Chris Mark

Brett

July 21st 04, 10:11 PM

"WalterM140" > wrote:
> >>>>I find no evidence that Eaker thought it imperitive to provide escort
or
> >>>>that he communicated such with Lovett.
> >>>
> >>>So why were P-47s fitted with drop tanks and used as escorts during
> >>>Eaker's period of command?
> >>>
> >>>>You seem to have just made it up.
> >>>
> >>>Translation Walter is as bad at character assassination as history.
> >>
> >>You lied. You got caught. Again.
> >
> >Walter's definition of telling lies is basically pointing out unpleasant
> >facts that ruin his preferred fiction.
> >
> >> Sinclair wrote:
> >>
> >>>Meantime Eaker convinced Robert Lovett, the Assistant Secretary of
> >>>War for Air to push for a long range fighter.
> >>
> >>Eaker never said anything during the summer of 1943 to Asst.
> >>SecWar Lovett such as you said he did.
> >
> >I presume Walter has the transcripts of all the Eaker Lovett
conversations,
>
> You made the statement. You can't back it up.

He did back it up, your comments and sources on the subject appear to be
very thin.

> You lied.

No that's your problem.

> You got caught.

He caught you several times.

> Eaker did not discuss the development of a long range fighter with Lovett
when
> Lovett came to England in the Summer of 1943. Eaker did not urge the
rapid
> development of such an aircraft at that time.
>
> You lied. You got caught.

If Eaker didn't discuss it with Lovett during the Summer of 1943 who did
discuss it with Lovett during that time? Lovett came back from that visit to
England in the Summer of 1943 pushing for the development of a long range
fighter.

You can start here for a reference:

The Neglect of Long-Range Escort Development Dduring The Interwar Years
(1918-1943) by Major Robert A. Eslinger.

research.maxwell.af.mil/papers/ay1997/acsc/97-0126A.pdf

But you have already demonstrated you have an inability to read anything but
the simplest text on any subject.

Geoffrey Sinclair

July 22nd 04, 05:43 AM

WalterM140 wrote in message >...

My text, deleted again it seems.

Firstly some deleted text I wrote, on what Eaker said to Lovett,
the source for my comments,

Williamson Murray in his book Luftwaffe, quoting Boylan, in The
development of the long range fighter escort, pages 90 to 91
and 121.

This has to be deleted. It cannot exist if Walter is to try and smear.

>>>>>I find no evidence that Eaker thought it imperitive to provide escort or
>>>>>that he communicated such with Lovett.
>>>>
>>>>So why were P-47s fitted with drop tanks and used as escorts during
>>>>Eaker's period of command?
>>>>
>>>>>You seem to have just made it up.
>>>>
>>>>Translation Walter is as bad at character assassination as history.
>>>
>>>You lied. You got caught. Again.
>>
>>Walter's definition of telling lies is basically pointing out unpleasant
>>facts that ruin his preferred fiction.
>>
>>> Sinclair wrote:
>>>
>>>>Meantime Eaker convinced Robert Lovett, the Assistant Secretary of
>>>>War for Air to push for a long range fighter.
>>>
>>>Eaker never said anything during the summer of 1943 to Asst.
>>>SecWar Lovett such as you said he did.
>>
>>I presume Walter has the transcripts of all the Eaker Lovett conversations,

deleted text,

"to make this claim but I doubt it. Alternatively he has read the Boylan book
I referenced, but I doubt that as well."

Yes folks, whenever I back up the claim the information has to be
deleted it seems, otherwise the next sentence cannot be written.

>You made the statement. You can't back it up. You lied. You got caught.

This is becoming very funny, every time I post the source for the
information Walter deletes the reference and announces "lies".

Walter's definition of telling lies is basically pointing out unpleasant
facts that ruin his preferred fiction.

>Eaker did not discuss the development of a long range fighter with Lovett when
>Lovett came to England in the Summer of 1943. Eaker did not urge the rapid
>development of such an aircraft at that time.

Note by the way the new addition to the Walter claims, "the rapid
development one". Another standard tactic, introduce a different
claim and go on about it. I have little doubt Eaker would not be in
the "rapid development" camp, but it appears he had a foot in the
"good idea to develop one" camp. He was also doing it, with the
efforts to put drop tanks on P-47s. I also note the new claim the
idea Lovett did not discuss the idea of long range fighters with
the commander of the air force he was visiting. Why not? Since it
is clear the idea was going around, why did Lovett fail to raise the
topic?

It appears Eaker is set up as the 2 dimensional bad guy, so the fact
the 8th did improve escort range and numbers during his command is
to be ignored, the fact people have noted Eaker did understand the
idea of long range escorts has to be dropped.

>You lied. You got caught.

Silly isn't it? It seems Walter's idea of "bye" is to simply repeat claims
of lies over and over.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

ArtKramr

July 22nd 04, 03:40 PM

>Subject: Re: Why not more P-38s?
>From: "Geoffrey Sinclair"
>Date: 7/21/2004 9:43 PM Pacific

>So why were P-47s fitted with drop tanks and used as escorts during
>>>>>Eaker's period of command?
>>>>>

I don't know about Eaker, but I flew missions where we had P-47's with drop
tanks for top cover.

Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

Peter Stickney

July 22nd 04, 05:31 PM

In article >,
"Emmanuel Gustin" > writes:
> "OXMORON1" > wrote in message
> ...
>
>> I suggest that the bombing radar system in a B-52 was more
> reliable/efficient
>> than the navigation methods and Norden bombsight that Art had available
>> to him during WWII.
>
> There is an interesting thing about post-war bombing
> and that is that, on the whole, it was based on British
> WWII tactics more than anything else. The debate about
> which force used the better tactics during WWII, the
> RAF or the USAAF, is fairly pointless. At the time, both
> did the best they could, and in the end they were both
> reasonably successful.

Just so. And the two efforst were complimentary. The Germans werent'
able to get away with building one Air Defence System - they had to
build two. (Well, actually, they could have built one, if they'd
organized it right)
>
> But soon after the war was over, the USAAF tactics
> became a historical curiosity. With the exception of
> some B-29 operations in Korea, no post-war bomber
> force tried to fight its way into enemy territory in
> daylight and close formation. The preferred tactics
> were an extension of those preferred and developed
> by the RAF in wartime years -- a fairly diffuse approach,
> based on suppressing or misleading enemy air defenses
> and moving in bombers, if possible, unseen; defensive
> armament largely disappeared from bombers. Of course
> this trend was stimulated by the appearance of nuclear
> weapons, guided missiles, and, in recent years, stealth.

I think the big sea-change here wasn't that the RAF tactics were
superior, but the incresdible jump in the lethality of an individual
bomber. When the goal changed from getting an X-ton bomb pattern on a
particular target to getting a single airplane over that target, the
large close foramations of bombers became redundant.
It's worth noting that in Korea, when the B-29s were bombing targets
using conventional bombs, they used large, mutually supporting
formations. Until they ran out of targets, that is. (It also makes
the job of escorting the bombers a lot easier, if you have then all in
one place, rather than spread out all over the sky. If the bombers
can't protect themselves, at least the interceptors will be
concentrating on one target, so that the escorts can gat at them.)

Until the advent of SAGE, the big limitation of bomber defence was the
limited ability of the GCI networks to handle interceptions. A
Canadian study on the tactical use of the CF-105 Arrow specifies that
interceptors can be vectored at targets at a rate of 1/minute. If the
interceptors don't have a significant speed advantage over the
bombers, and sufficient radius to be able to intercept a target that
isn't obligingly flying directly at the interceptor's airfield, (Not a
trivial issue, by any means), then it's fairly easy to saturate the
system by flying in singletons at spacings of 30-40 seconds through
the same GCI sector. In some respects, that's what teh British were
doing with the Bomber Streams - concentrating teh airplanes through
specific points to saturate the very, very brittle German GCI system.
The bomber streams also helped by reducing the volume of sky that a
bomber would be found in - Even with AI radar, the field of
view/search of a night fighter was very limited. In order to find
the targets, they had to get themselves pointed at teh target within a
fairly short distance. The long wavelengths of German AI radars meant
that angular discrimination was fairly poor, and the minumum range of
teh radars was large, so they couldn't be used for the attack. (This
also was a problem with the early Allied radars) This meant that at
some point in the interception, the fighter would have to acquire the
blacked-out bomber visually.
Of course, once the fighters got into the bomber stream, they had an
easier time of it, since the targets were fairly concentrated.
Keeping the fighters out of teh bomber stream was aided by chaff,
decoy and spoof raids, and buggering with the GCI net.

> For all its failings, Bomber Command pioneered modern
> air warfare, with its high emphasis on "blinding" enemy
> air defense systems. It is an interesting question whether
> eventually the nature of the problem will shift back, with
> increasingly sophistication creating tight air defenses that
> again can only be countered by a frontal assault with
> overwhelming strength. I expect not.
>

I agree. Back then, an attacking airplane had only one option - fly
over the target and place itself at teh proper point with enough
precision to drop a load of dumb bombs. Nowadays, the attackers have
much more flexibility - the systems on board the airplanes allow than
to attack from any direction, speed, or height, and to acquire targets
on the fly with very high accuracy. With PGM's and todays' standoff
weapons, there's no need ot get close to the target. That increases
the volume of space teh defence needs to be able to monitor and be
able to intercept in tremendously. As the attackers become more
stealthy, it also becomes necessary to increase the number of sensors
(Radar/IR/Ground Obcervers/Ouija Boards) by an even more astronomical
amount.

--
Pete Stickney
A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many
bad measures. -- Daniel Webster