Well, that's interesting, but it seems to indicate that the Brits were
gambling
they could induce the Argintines to attack incorrectly. Not very prudent.

It wasn't a gamble at all, it was planned that way. Clapp had been a
Buccaneer
observer and squadron commander, and he chose San Carlos Water for the
landings and
set up the ships and land defenses to provide the Argentine pilots with just
that
dilemma. The layout of the defenses was optimised to hit pilots making
pop-up dive
attacks; British missiles would have been more effective as well, not being
bothered as much by ground clutter, and there would have been less worry
about
having to check fire to avoid shooting up friendly troops/ships on the other
side
of the water. As it was, the Argentine pilots chose to come in very low and
fast,
limiting their acquisition time and the effectiveness of their attacks, but
improving their survival rate. Looked at objectively, they should have
accepted
the higher losses of dive attacks for the potentially higher gains, but then
that's
easy to say from the comfort of my chair.

You seem to agree that if -all- the bombs had detonated the Brit supporting
force would have been reduced below a level where the invasion could have
been
supported.

Doubtful. Most of the bombs hit the escorts outside of San Carlos Water;
some were
effectively knocked out of the war in any case, even though they weren't
sunk.
Only two LSLs were hit by bombs in SCW, Sir Lancelot and Sir Galahad, and the
amount of damage caused if they'd gone off would have depended on where they
hit
and what they were carrying at the time. If all the bombs had gone off then
it's
possible that the British government might have decided that the cost was too
high,
and it would almost certainly have delayed the ground forces. But they had
lots of
reinforcing ships on the way, most of which arrived when the war was over or
nearly
so, so their stores/equipment weren't needed. Argentina had no such second
wave
capability. And Fuerza Aerea target priorities on D-Day sucked, which was
ultimately a far bigger problem than the dud bombs. Hitting the escorts
didn't
delay the land campaign; hitting more of the supply ships before they could
unload
would have.

Assuming that they'd ever been hit, the loss of Fearless would have caused a
major
delay as she was the amphibious command ship, but her sister Intrepid could
have
taken over, albeit at lower efficiency. Other than that, the Brits would have
had
to lose a carrier; everything else (other than lives) was replaceable. As an
example, losing Atlantic Conveyor and the Chinook/Wessex helos she was
bringing
down was the single most important blow to the campaign that the British
suffered,
but her sister Atlantic Causeway arrived less than a week later, bringing
another
28 or so helos with her (Wessex/Sea King). Another two ships were coming
south
bringing more Chinooks and other helos, and arrived right about the time of
the
surrender.

Guy


Sounds like good info. Thanks,

Walt