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Well, that's interesting, but it seems to indicate that the Brits were
gambling they could induce the Argintines to attack incorrectly. Not very prudent. It wasn't a gamble at all, it was planned that way. Clapp had been a Buccaneer observer and squadron commander, and he chose San Carlos Water for the landings and set up the ships and land defenses to provide the Argentine pilots with just that dilemma. The layout of the defenses was optimised to hit pilots making pop-up dive attacks; British missiles would have been more effective as well, not being bothered as much by ground clutter, and there would have been less worry about having to check fire to avoid shooting up friendly troops/ships on the other side of the water. As it was, the Argentine pilots chose to come in very low and fast, limiting their acquisition time and the effectiveness of their attacks, but improving their survival rate. Looked at objectively, they should have accepted the higher losses of dive attacks for the potentially higher gains, but then that's easy to say from the comfort of my chair. You seem to agree that if -all- the bombs had detonated the Brit supporting force would have been reduced below a level where the invasion could have been supported. Doubtful. Most of the bombs hit the escorts outside of San Carlos Water; some were effectively knocked out of the war in any case, even though they weren't sunk. Only two LSLs were hit by bombs in SCW, Sir Lancelot and Sir Galahad, and the amount of damage caused if they'd gone off would have depended on where they hit and what they were carrying at the time. If all the bombs had gone off then it's possible that the British government might have decided that the cost was too high, and it would almost certainly have delayed the ground forces. But they had lots of reinforcing ships on the way, most of which arrived when the war was over or nearly so, so their stores/equipment weren't needed. Argentina had no such second wave capability. And Fuerza Aerea target priorities on D-Day sucked, which was ultimately a far bigger problem than the dud bombs. Hitting the escorts didn't delay the land campaign; hitting more of the supply ships before they could unload would have. Assuming that they'd ever been hit, the loss of Fearless would have caused a major delay as she was the amphibious command ship, but her sister Intrepid could have taken over, albeit at lower efficiency. Other than that, the Brits would have had to lose a carrier; everything else (other than lives) was replaceable. As an example, losing Atlantic Conveyor and the Chinook/Wessex helos she was bringing down was the single most important blow to the campaign that the British suffered, but her sister Atlantic Causeway arrived less than a week later, bringing another 28 or so helos with her (Wessex/Sea King). Another two ships were coming south bringing more Chinooks and other helos, and arrived right about the time of the surrender. Guy Sounds like good info. Thanks, Walt |
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