Gyros - which do you trust?

We had a debate a couple of weeks ago about instrument failure recognition
and partial panel. Here's another data point:

http://www.dft.gov.uk/stellent/group...ty_023258.hcsp

It's the long-awaited report into the loss of a KAL cargo 747 shortly after
departure from London Stansted just before Christmas 1999. The Captain's AI
was faulty (or possibly the INU used as attitude input to the AI was
faulty). Despite the presence of a First Officer with a serviceable AI in
front of him, a third standby instrument that was apparently operating
normally and a Flight Engineer who prompted the Captain to cross-check the
AIs, the aircraft was lost along with the lives of all 4 aboard.

Julian Scarfe

(Everett M. Greene) wrote
I thought KLM was taken to task for lack of CRM after the
Tenerife disaster...

I think that we are discussing KAL not KLM.

Bob Moore

There was a post a year or two back by someone who acted as
some kind of CRM inspector on a KAL flight into SFO. Based on
that I would never fly KAL again (or let anyone I care about do so).
It was horrific. Unfortunately a quick Google doesn't find it. Things
like not only flying through their own (28R) localizer but also the
28L loc and generally heading for the hills before realizing anything
was wrong, and a lot of commentary about the internal culture.

We're all supposed to be able to detect a failed AI and do the
right thing. Not saying we'd all be perfect (including me) in the
heat of the moment, but even so this is pretty astonishing.

John

"Robert Moore" wrote in message
. 7...
"Julian Scarfe" wrote
It's the long-awaited report into the loss of a KAL cargo 747
shortly after departure from London Stansted just before
Christmas 1999. The Captain's AI was faulty (or possibly the
INU used as attitude input to the AI was faulty). Despite the
presence of a First Officer with a serviceable AI in front of
him, a third standby instrument that was apparently operating
normally and a Flight Engineer who prompted the Captain to
cross-check the AIs, the aircraft was lost along with the lives
of all 4 aboard.

Back in the 70's, when KAL first started flying 707s
internationally, several of my furloughed PanAm friends
took copilot jobs with them primariy to provide an English
speaking capability. The horror stories that they brought
back would turn your hair white.
Their lack of anything resembling a CRM program is obvious.

Bob Moore

Sydney Hoeltzli wrote

Robert Moore wrote:
The horror stories that they brought back
would turn your hair white.

Like?

Sydney, I don't type that fast! :-)

Bob

Robert Moore wrote:

Sydney, I don't type that fast! :-)

Oh, pick one or two and type slowly

I have to say this accident report totally flummoxed me.

I do wonder how much culture is an influence

Cheers,
Sydney

Sydney Hoeltzli wrote:
Robert Moore wrote:
Sydney, I don't type that fast! :-)

Oh, pick one or two and type slowly

I retract my request.

I found this:
http://www.vision.net.au/~apaterson/...rean_audit.htm

It said enough, I don't want to hear any more.

For John Harper:
The description of the KAL crew flying through the loc for 26L
AND 26R is item 26 under "Descent and approach area arrival"
on the above link

Allegedly "steps have been taken" and things have improved but
unless a lot of people got sacked one wonders how much.

Eek! Don't spare us Robert any more scarelines to avoid?

Sydney

Back in the 70's, when KAL first started flying 707s
internationally, several of my furloughed PanAm friends
took copilot jobs with them primariy to provide an English
speaking capability. The horror stories that they brought
back would turn your hair white.
Their lack of anything resembling a CRM program is obvious.

I thought KLM was taken to task for lack of CRM after the
Tenerife disaster...


In my honest opinion : a plane is flown by a crew/captain and not by the
airline. This implies that the Tenerife incident should be put on the
shoulders of the captain, not of the airline. There's a big difference,

Regards,
René