Malaysia Flight 370 - Troubling Questions

Hi all,

The news on flight 370 got more interesting today. It appears the plane flew for several hours after dropping off radar. This begs a few questions.

Why, in this day in the security age, is it possible to turn of the transponders in flight?
Why don't all airplanes have GPS tracking systems giving real time data to ATC (perhaps we could loan them a SPOT)?
It appears some data was sent to Rolls Royce about the condition of the engines. Why did it take so long for them to provide this data?

I am sure there are more questions. But I'm also pretty sure that giving full cavity searches at the airport does not appear to be addressing critical security issues that have simple, one time fixes.

Thoughts?

2C

Kevin,

This is one of those cases where you might find yourself cursed with what you asked for. When the FAA hands out new rules, they aren't always careful who they deal the cards to. Often, yes, to their credit. But far from always.

14CFR§99.13 already requires that most aircraft equipped with transponders have to have them turned on for the majority of flight operations. Fortunately 14CFR§99.13(d) allows an exception in the case of gliders. However, guidance from FSDOs seem to indicate that they expect that, if you turn a transponder on, they expect you to leave it on for the duration of the flight.

Of course, 14CFR§91.3 give the pilot ultimate responsibility over the aircraft, and under its authority can take any action the pilot deems necessary to ensure safety of flight. And that includes turning the transponder off if, for example, it is using electrical power that might otherwise be needed for arguably more critical equipment such as varios or navigation equipment. However, 14CFR§91.3 is not a get-out-of-jail free card. When you invoke it, you should fully expect to have to explain the context and rationale for your decisions to the FAA administrator or their designated representative.

One takeaway here is that when the FAA tightens up its regulations, it often starts by eliminating loopholes such as that offered in 14CFR§99.13(d). Which, all things considered might be a good thing as regards safety of flight, but I have to respect that many pilots and aircraft owners will see it differently.

Another takeaway is that when authorities start requiring thus-and-such equipment must be permanently enabled and powered on, it flies in the face of 14CFR§91.3 which establishes the essential authority of the pilot in command. If the pilot does not have ultimate authority over every single switch, valve, and control on their aircraft, then who does? Who else sould we trust with such responsibility?

Thanks, Bob K.


On Thursday, March 13, 2014 8:11:10 AM UTC-7, Kevin Christner wrote:
Hi all,



The news on flight 370 got more interesting today. It appears the plane flew for several hours after dropping off radar. This begs a few questions..



Why, in this day in the security age, is it possible to turn of the transponders in flight?

Why don't all airplanes have GPS tracking systems giving real time data to ATC (perhaps we could loan them a SPOT)?

It appears some data was sent to Rolls Royce about the condition of the engines. Why did it take so long for them to provide this data?



I am sure there are more questions. But I'm also pretty sure that giving full cavity searches at the airport does not appear to be addressing critical security issues that have simple, one time fixes.



Thoughts?



2C

On Thursday, March 13, 2014 11:17:12 AM UTC-5, Bob Kuykendall wrote:
Kevin,



This is one of those cases where you might find yourself cursed with what you asked for. When the FAA hands out new rules, they aren't always careful who they deal the cards to. Often, yes, to their credit. But far from always.



14CFR§99.13 already requires that most aircraft equipped with transponders have to have them turned on for the majority of flight operations. Fortunately 14CFR§99.13(d) allows an exception in the case of gliders. However, guidance from FSDOs seem to indicate that they expect that, if you turn a transponder on, they expect you to leave it on for the duration of the flight.



Of course, 14CFR§91.3 give the pilot ultimate responsibility over the aircraft, and under its authority can take any action the pilot deems necessary to ensure safety of flight. And that includes turning the transponder off if, for example, it is using electrical power that might otherwise be needed for arguably more critical equipment such as varios or navigation equipment. However, 14CFR§91.3 is not a get-out-of-jail free card. When you invoke it, you should fully expect to have to explain the context and rationale for your decisions to the FAA administrator or their designated representative.



One takeaway here is that when the FAA tightens up its regulations, it often starts by eliminating loopholes such as that offered in 14CFR§99.13(d). Which, all things considered might be a good thing as regards safety of flight, but I have to respect that many pilots and aircraft owners will see it differently.



Another takeaway is that when authorities start requiring thus-and-such equipment must be permanently enabled and powered on, it flies in the face of 14CFR§91.3 which establishes the essential authority of the pilot in command. If the pilot does not have ultimate authority over every single switch, valve, and control on their aircraft, then who does? Who else sould we trust with such responsibility?



Thanks, Bob K.





On Thursday, March 13, 2014 8:11:10 AM UTC-7, Kevin Christner wrote:

Hi all,







The news on flight 370 got more interesting today. It appears the plane flew for several hours after dropping off radar. This begs a few questions.







Why, in this day in the security age, is it possible to turn of the transponders in flight?



Why don't all airplanes have GPS tracking systems giving real time data to ATC (perhaps we could loan them a SPOT)?



It appears some data was sent to Rolls Royce about the condition of the engines. Why did it take so long for them to provide this data?







I am sure there are more questions. But I'm also pretty sure that giving full cavity searches at the airport does not appear to be addressing critical security issues that have simple, one time fixes.







Thoughts?







2C

99.13(d) only expempts gliders from paragraphs (b) and (c). Paragraph (a) requires transponders to always be on if installed, and would still apply to a transponder equipped glider.

On Thursday, March 13, 2014 9:11:10 AM UTC-6, Kevin Christner wrote:
Not professing to know what happened but maybe just provide some insight...

Why, in this day in the security age, is it possible to turn of the transponders in flight?

With the widespread use of airport surveillance radar Transponders are on from before push till after block in. The TX switch has a few different modes that might be appropriate for different situations. Reference T. C.s answer.

Why don't all airplanes have GPS tracking systems giving real time data to ATC (perhaps we could loan them a SPOT)?

What if ATC is not available to track it? HF is typically used in transoceanic airspace but I would bet an ETOPS equipped Triple would have SATCOM voice/data. Several times better than SPOT.

It appears some data was sent to Rolls Royce about the condition of the engines. Why did it take so long for them to provide this data?

When were they ask for it? Trend monitoring is typically send via VHF ACARS and although it is collected at regular intervals it might only be sent when radio reception is adequate.



I am sure there are more questions. But I'm also pretty sure that giving full cavity searches at the airport does not appear to be addressing critical security issues that have simple, one time fixes.
???

On 3/13/14 8:11 AM, Kevin Christner wrote:
Hi all,

The news on flight 370 got more interesting today. It appears the plane flew for several hours after dropping off radar. This begs a few questions.

Why, in this day in the security age, is it possible to turn of the transponders in flight?

The historical answer to that is pretty simple. ATC actually wants the
pilot to be able to turn off a transponder if say it is transmitting
garbage, the wrong squawk code etc. Similar transponders allow the pilot
to disable ALT mode on the transponder if it is spewing wrong altitude
data. In say the worst case a transponder stuck transmitting various
7xxx codes is not going to be real popular with ATC. FAR/AIM discuses
the phraseology ATC will use to instruct a pilot to turn off ALT mode
("STOP ALTITUDE SQUAWK") or turn off the transponder ("SQAWK STANDBY").

Why don't all airplanes have GPS tracking systems giving real time
data to ATC (perhaps we could loan them a SPOT)?

I think parts of that question has been addressed in lots of places
including the general media. This B777 had lots of tracking technology
on board, including Mode S transponders, 1090ES Out, ACARS via both VHF
Data and SITA/Inmarsat. I am not sure that it needs any more technology
added to it. And anything you do add will be able to be disabled by
somebody with the appropriate access (even if that meant doing things
like visiting the avionics bay).

My concern are less about any technology aboard the B777. That aircraft
is was flying close to Malaysia when contact was lost. How can you
possibly have a modern military air defense systems not be able to track
a primary radar target the size of a B777 so close to your coastline,
and that then apparently turns back and flies over your mainland.

Malaysia sit between Indonesia and the South China Sea area. If it was
me I'd be making sure my integrated air defense system actually worked
(they have supposedly spent money on building that). They owns enough
interesting modern air defense radar bits and pieces, multiple SELEX
RAT31 systems for example. They should have had a pair of armed
F/A-18D's out of RMAF Butterworth heading towards that B777 soon after
things went very weird (especially if they thought they had a
VHF/HF/Transponder silent B777 turning back towards the country). They
have a squadron of upgraded F/A-18Ds with APG-79 radar sitting at
Butterworth, should be able to pick up an airliner near the last
reported location not long after take off from there. And the B777 seems
to have practically turned back and overflew Butterworth...

The Malaysian military and their air defense system pretty looks beyond
pathetic based on all this, especially in a post 9/11 world.

Darryl