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#21
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![]() "Peter Skelton" wrote in message ... On Mon, 7 Jun 2004 20:31:42 +0100, "Keith Willshaw" wrote: Gee I just said that No, you blamed the accident on failure to anchor a bypass. Which is functionally identical to what you posted. Did you even read it ? Yes, the functional equivalency is only at the level of escaped material. This is not a crucial point, can we move on? No we cant The acident happened because when a Reactor was taken out of service a bypass consisting of sections of pipe and bellows units was put in its place. This rested on temporary scaffolding and the load from the liquid slug ruptured the bellows. http://www.cheresources.com/procacc.shtml There was no automatic shut-off upstream. The plant lacked modern process controllers[3] and was, even by standards of the day, not centrally controlled. Quite so , not that it would have helped much It would have ended the fire within fifteen minutes. Only if it were still functional after the initial explosion, given the scale of the damage done by what was to all intents a 50 ton FAE thats unlikely. The issue is moot however since the major damage was done by the initial explosion I doubt there'd have been an explosion of anythihg like that magnitude. There was , read the bloody report. A lot of material had to leak fast. It did, , read the bloody report. A leak of that size should automatically close both the upstream and downstream valves. What upstream and downstream valves ? The explosion was 15 tons equivalent of the BLEVE [1] type, the fire lasted days becuase about 10% of the plant inventory had to be allowed to burn out [2]. There was minimal effect past the fence. Wrong. Even though the explosion occurred on a rural site 53 members of the public received major injuries and hundreds more sustained minor injuries. The plant was destroyed as were several others on the same site and close to two thousand houses, shops, and factories were damaged with some 3000 residents being left homeless No part of the plant met modern standards. There are plenty of 1970's pterochem plants still out there and the best control system in the world doesnt help when you dump 50 tons of Cyclohexane into the environment. There aren't may fifties plants out there and there aren't any at all that will dump fifty tons of cyane from a pipe rupture. There are lots of plants built in 60's and 70's Certainly. When was this one built? You mean your sekrit info didnt include that fact ? Funny the official report did, Incidentally there are lots of fifties plants still running but few of them have any original process equipment still running. Fewer still use original controll equipment. (I should have phrased my original comment better.) You should have kept quiet, The causes of the event were internal to the plant. The process affected was obsolete and hazardous at the time and recognized as such. A bulldozer tearing open a line would have had the same effect. How do you get the bulldozer to the line? How you ever actually seen a pipe trench ? We use bridges over here. The reason is frost, or so I was told, but they use bridges in the southern states too. Bull****, trenches and bridges are used everywhere. Bridges are used to cross stuuf like roads, thats why they call em bridges I think I'd better explain a bit. To aproach Maitland Works, or Polysar, you've pretty much got to go in at a gate because the ditches at the road are substantial. The gate is no real barrier (and I've used a loose definition of "at" because the fencing between the parking lot and the plant is ordinary chain link.) Most plants are similar. So no real barrier at all in fact The plants are pretty spread out. At Miatland, it's about a fifteen minute walk from the gate to the Cyane tower, and farther to the other nasty processes and the tank farm. Ten minutes would suffice (in 1975) to render the tower (really the associated piping) safe, so even if the event started in the parking lot, they should be able to handle the situation. Polysar is more spread out and easier to shut down. A LOT can happen in 10 seconds let alone 10 minutes Then how do you get the line to dump much more than its contents? Have you ever calculated how much Cyclohexane a 14" line 1000 m long contains ? Try it , just for kicks. Try to find an continuous kilometer long pipe in a modern, North-American plant. Besides, without the pressure, you don't get the explosion. Jeesus Petey you've just been telling us how big the plants you worked on were, get a grip will ya. And who still oxidizes cyane outside a collum? It was cyclohexane and its widely used in the production of Nylon, and any leak is highly likely to oxidise externally. Maitland Words is nylon intermediates plant. Cyane and cyclohexane are synonyms here (is it different in Europe?). Cyclohexane is slighjtly less nasty than high test gasoline. Which is like saying arsenic isnt as bad as cyanide. The situation you describe is nothing like this. In your case vapour burns as soon as it finds an oxidizer, mixing is not possible. Shut-offs would function automatically and limit the amount of fuel. There will be no big bang, although there would be one hell of a whoosh. You are assuming no coincident or consequential damage occurs, this is a POOR assumption. What structures are being weakened by that flame and what happens when they fail. No an awfull lot. That's what the controlls are about. Controls dont stop steel losing its structural strength in a fire No, they limit the duration and intensity of the fire. Maybe, maybe not. BTW, I'm assuming the builldozer doesn't get far into the plant. It's not all that easy to do here. Bull**** Peter, all that protects most plant are earth bunds and chain link wire fences Not bull****, as I explained above. Quote "The gate is no real barrier" It is such risks that are rarely analysed and often provide the nasty shock when an incident occurs One of the worst industrial Bleve's happened on a french plant where a small fire started at a faulty valve. Trouble is the flame impinged on a LPG storage sphere BANG You've still not dealt with the basic question. Which is whether there was a chemical plant near the incident that was so grossly mis-constructed and mis-managed as to be vulnerable to such an attack. I responded to a claim that it couldnt happen - IT CAN I think you might have misread the claim or I might have mistyped it. The furnace scenario you chose shows little understanding of explosions or chemical plants. Really , care to dispute the facts ? I did. You snipped it without comment. I'll take that as a no The plant you chose is ludicrously different from existing types. Peter I have worked in this industry since I was 16, I have seen 2 major Petrochemical incidents and investigated many others. One of those included a major fire and explosion caused by a mobile crane striking a pipe bridge. Go find your Granny and teach her to suck eggs. You too. Care to try to tell me that F was like a modern plant? It had cyclohexane lines, so do modern plants. I've already dealt with that at some length. Evasion doesnt count Keith |
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On Mon, 7 Jun 2004 23:57:31 +0100, "Keith Willshaw"
wrote: "Peter Skelton" wrote in message .. . On Mon, 7 Jun 2004 20:31:42 +0100, "Keith Willshaw" wrote: Gee I just said that No, you blamed the accident on failure to anchor a bypass. Which is functionally identical to what you posted. Did you even read it ? Yes, the functional equivalency is only at the level of escaped material. This is not a crucial point, can we move on? No we cant The acident happened because when a Reactor was taken out of service a bypass consisting of sections of pipe and bellows units was put in its place. This rested on temporary scaffolding and the load from the liquid slug ruptured the bellows. http://www.cheresources.com/procacc.shtml There was no automatic shut-off upstream. The plant lacked modern process controllers[3] and was, even by standards of the day, not centrally controlled. Quite so , not that it would have helped much It would have ended the fire within fifteen minutes. Only if it were still functional after the initial explosion, given the scale of the damage done by what was to all intents a 50 ton FAE thats unlikely. The issue is moot however since the major damage was done by the initial explosion I doubt there'd have been an explosion of anythihg like that magnitude. There was , read the bloody report. ??????? There was? this is a sequence that did *not* happen. You might argue that there would have been, but what you typed is nonsense. A lot of material had to leak fast. It did, , read the bloody report. See above A leak of that size should automatically close both the upstream and downstream valves. What upstream and downstream valves ? We're talking here about the effect of valves that were not in the system. Here's the important text, copied from above: --- There was no automatic shut-off upstream. The plant lacked modern process controllers[3] and was, even by standards of the day, not centrally controlled. ---- The explosion was 15 tons equivalent of the BLEVE [1] type, the fire lasted days becuase about 10% of the plant inventory had to be allowed to burn out [2]. There was minimal effect past the fence. Wrong. Even though the explosion occurred on a rural site 53 members of the public received major injuries and hundreds more sustained minor injuries. The plant was destroyed as were several others on the same site and close to two thousand houses, shops, and factories were damaged with some 3000 residents being left homeless No part of the plant met modern standards. There are plenty of 1970's pterochem plants still out there and the best control system in the world doesnt help when you dump 50 tons of Cyclohexane into the environment. There aren't may fifties plants out there and there aren't any at all that will dump fifty tons of cyane from a pipe rupture. There are lots of plants built in 60's and 70's Certainly. When was this one built? You mean your sekrit info didnt include that fact ? I did not say secret. Go back and look. Funny the official report did, Sure it did. As you refuse to answer the question I am free to assume that you've never seen it. (Sauce for the goose. . .) Incidentally there are lots of fifties plants still running but few of them have any original process equipment still running. Fewer still use original controll equipment. (I should have phrased my original comment better.) You should have kept quiet, I can't see why. So far I've not been corrected on anything except for a major brain fart I long since admitted. The causes of the event were internal to the plant. The process affected was obsolete and hazardous at the time and recognized as such. A bulldozer tearing open a line would have had the same effect. How do you get the bulldozer to the line? How you ever actually seen a pipe trench ? We use bridges over here. The reason is frost, or so I was told, but they use bridges in the southern states too. Bull****, trenches and bridges are used everywhere. Bridges are used to cross stuuf like roads, thats why they call em bridges Have you seen a North American plant? I think I'd better explain a bit. To aproach Maitland Works, or Polysar, you've pretty much got to go in at a gate because the ditches at the road are substantial. The gate is no real barrier (and I've used a loose definition of "at" because the fencing between the parking lot and the plant is ordinary chain link.) Most plants are similar. So no real barrier at all in fact Certainly, read on. The plants are pretty spread out. At Miatland, it's about a fifteen minute walk from the gate to the Cyane tower, and farther to the other nasty processes and the tank farm. Ten minutes would suffice (in 1975) to render the tower (really the associated piping) safe, so even if the event started in the parking lot, they should be able to handle the situation. Polysar is more spread out and easier to shut down. A LOT can happen in 10 seconds let alone 10 minutes Yes but there's clearly time to deal with this sort of incursion which is the point. An air-strike is clearly not called for. Then how do you get the line to dump much more than its contents? Have you ever calculated how much Cyclohexane a 14" line 1000 m long contains ? Try it , just for kicks. Try to find an continuous kilometer long pipe in a modern, North-American plant. Besides, without the pressure, you don't get the explosion. Jeesus Petey you've just been telling us how big the plants you worked on were, get a grip will ya. They just don't run lines (at least of hazardous stuff) that far inside a plant without valving these days. There was a lot of retrofitting in the eighties, I doubt many plants still need it. And who still oxidizes cyane outside a collum? It was cyclohexane and its widely used in the production of Nylon, and any leak is highly likely to oxidise externally. Maitland Words is nylon intermediates plant. Cyane and cyclohexane are synonyms here (is it different in Europe?). Cyclohexane is slighjtly less nasty than high test gasoline. Which is like saying arsenic isnt as bad as cyanide. So you admit cyane and cyclohexane are the same. Now tell us how gasoline (or cyane) is likely to oxidize externally. You shudda kept your trap shut. The situation you describe is nothing like this. In your case vapour burns as soon as it finds an oxidizer, mixing is not possible. Shut-offs would function automatically and limit the amount of fuel. There will be no big bang, although there would be one hell of a whoosh. You are assuming no coincident or consequential damage occurs, this is a POOR assumption. What structures are being weakened by that flame and what happens when they fail. No an awfull lot. That's what the controlls are about. Controls dont stop steel losing its structural strength in a fire No, they limit the duration and intensity of the fire. Maybe, maybe not. That's life. Would you call an air strike in a populated area on the chance they won'r function? BTW, I'm assuming the builldozer doesn't get far into the plant. It's not all that easy to do here. Bull**** Peter, all that protects most plant are earth bunds and chain link wire fences Not bull****, as I explained above. Quote "The gate is no real barrier" Quote "Certainly, read on." I made the point about no real barrier myself and clearly. That's because barrier isn't the issue, distance/time is. It is such risks that are rarely analysed and often provide the nasty shock when an incident occurs One of the worst industrial Bleve's happened on a french plant where a small fire started at a faulty valve. Trouble is the flame impinged on a LPG storage sphere BANG You've still not dealt with the basic question. Which is whether there was a chemical plant near the incident that was so grossly mis-constructed and mis-managed as to be vulnerable to such an attack. I responded to a claim that it couldnt happen - IT CAN I think you might have misread the claim or I might have mistyped it. The furnace scenario you chose shows little understanding of explosions or chemical plants. Really , care to dispute the facts ? I did. You snipped it without comment. I'll take that as a no Given that what I said is an explicit "yes", I think you're erring. The plant you chose is ludicrously different from existing types. Peter I have worked in this industry since I was 16, I have seen 2 major Petrochemical incidents and investigated many others. One of those included a major fire and explosion caused by a mobile crane striking a pipe bridge. Go find your Granny and teach her to suck eggs. You too. Care to try to tell me that F was like a modern plant? It had cyclohexane lines, so do modern plants. DOH I've already dealt with that at some length. Evasion doesnt count Evasion ot what? Peter Skelton |
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In message , Keith Willshaw
writes In the case of the Flixborough accident in the UK a pressure vessel was bypassed by the maintenance dept using pipes and bellows units. Unfortunately the bypass was not properly anchored and a slug of liquid caused the bypass to tear loose. How do you prevent this with an air strike? (FWIW I was too young to remember, but I lived on the edge of S****horpe at the time: I'm told I was playing outside when my father heard the explosion, heard the windows rattle, and ran out to see a mushroom cloud rising. It left quite a mark on him mentally, as he gladly admits, but did him no physical harm whatsoever) -- He thinks too much: such men are dangerous. Julius Caesar I:2 Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk |
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![]() "Tamas Feher" wrote in message ... A home-made armored Caterpillar turns Colorado into Palestine? Palestine has dead. The authorities ended this one without public deaths. Pure chance. They had no absolutely contact with the madman whatsoever . If he decided to target a chemical plant and cause a Bhopal-scale industrial disaster, the cops simply couldn't stop him. In the end an entire county could get killed. Even if it was possible at a few MPH it will take a long time for an armoured Bulldozer to get to the plant. Well the cops might well let you drive around a low rise part of town they have evacuated untill you brake down, get bored or cap yourself if you are heading for a major chem plant they will stop you. And no need to call in air strikes, a cop in a truck crashing into the rear idler/drive sproket will stop any Bulldozer just fine. Failing that a few petrol bombs will do the job at no risk to a cop. |
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![]() "Peter Skelton" wrote in message ... On Mon, 7 Jun 2004 14:59:36 -0400, "Kevin Brooks" wrote: "Peter Skelton" wrote in message .. . On Mon, 7 Jun 2004 17:03:49 +0100, "Keith Willshaw" wrote: snip Go and look at the report on what happened at Flixborough I have, in detail, often, with access to a lot that isn't generally available. Bingo. Another claim of access to information not available to the rest of us--to go along with prior claims of attending sensitive briefings on what US personnel were doing with the contras in Nicaragua, and battle update briefings with a command that had troops engaged in Afghanistan? And you wonder why more and more folks don't believe you? I expalined quite directly why I had deeper knowledge than generally available. Anybody who worked at Maitland or the Texas plant (Victoria?) had the same. As you snipped that, I conclude you're up to your old bull again, removing context so that you can invent some. You've recently proven yourself grossly dishonest three times, isn't that enough? No, Keith has demonstrated quite amply that you are clueless regarding the incident at hand, not to mention of questionable veracity regarding the subject in general, despite your, as he put it "sekret" information... Sounds like just another example of your trying to pad your background a bit too much, and as I noted, it ain't the first time you have been caught out like this. snip The explosion was 15 tons equivalent of the BLEVE [1] type, the fire lasted days becuase about 10% of the plant inventory had to be allowed to burn out [2]. There was minimal effect past the fence. Gee, with all that access to information, you did not realize the true extent of offsite damage and injury, as we can see from Keith's response below...amazing, huh? I certainly had a senior moment there. Kieth handled it nicely. Do you have anything to contribute? Yeah. Keith did indeed "handle it nicely"; he made you out to be full of bovine fecal materiel in spite of all that "sekret" stuff you have lying about and you apparently haven't caught on to it as of yet. Brooks Wrong. Even though the explosion occurred on a rural site 53 members of the public received major injuries and hundreds more sustained minor injuries. The plant was destroyed as were several others on the same site and close to two thousand houses, shops, and factories were damaged with some 3000 residents being left homeless Peter Skelton |
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![]() "Peter Skelton" wrote in message ... On Mon, 7 Jun 2004 23:57:31 +0100, "Keith Willshaw" wrote: Only if it were still functional after the initial explosion, given the scale of the damage done by what was to all intents a 50 ton FAE thats unlikely. The issue is moot however since the major damage was done by the initial explosion I doubt there'd have been an explosion of anythihg like that magnitude. There was , read the bloody report. ??????? There was? this is a sequence that did *not* happen. You might argue that there would have been, but what you typed is nonsense. From the report "Approximately 50 tons of cyclohexane was released, mixed with air, and exploded" A lot of material had to leak fast. It did, , read the bloody report. See above I repeat from the report "Approximately 50 tons of cyclohexane was released, mixed with air, and exploded" Are you going to turn into Tarver now ? Continually denying that a large explosion occurred is not smart given the incontrovertible evidence that it did. Keith ----== Posted via Newsfeed.Com - Unlimited-Uncensored-Secure Usenet News==---- http://www.newsfeed.com The #1 Newsgroup Service in the World! 100,000 Newsgroups ---= 19 East/West-Coast Specialized Servers - Total Privacy via Encryption =--- |
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![]() "Peter Skelton" wrote in message ... On Mon, 7 Jun 2004 23:57:31 +0100, "Keith Willshaw" wrote: Only if it were still functional after the initial explosion, given the scale of the damage done by what was to all intents a 50 ton FAE thats unlikely. The issue is moot however since the major damage was done by the initial explosion I doubt there'd have been an explosion of anythihg like that magnitude. There was , read the bloody report. ??????? There was? this is a sequence that did *not* happen. You might argue that there would have been, but what you typed is nonsense. From the report "Approximately 50 tons of cyclohexane was released, mixed with air, and exploded" A lot of material had to leak fast. It did, , read the bloody report. See above I repeat from the report "Approximately 50 tons of cyclohexane was released, mixed with air, and exploded" Are you going to turn into Tarver now ? Continually denying that a large explosion occurred is not smart given the incontrovertible evidence that it did. Keith ----== Posted via Newsfeed.Com - Unlimited-Uncensored-Secure Usenet News==---- http://www.newsfeed.com The #1 Newsgroup Service in the World! 100,000 Newsgroups ---= 19 East/West-Coast Specialized Servers - Total Privacy via Encryption =--- |
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![]() "Paul J. Adam" wrote in message news ![]() In message , Keith Willshaw writes In the case of the Flixborough accident in the UK a pressure vessel was bypassed by the maintenance dept using pipes and bellows units. Unfortunately the bypass was not properly anchored and a slug of liquid caused the bypass to tear loose. How do you prevent this with an air strike? You dont and I have never suggested otherwise Keith ----== Posted via Newsfeed.Com - Unlimited-Uncensored-Secure Usenet News==---- http://www.newsfeed.com The #1 Newsgroup Service in the World! 100,000 Newsgroups ---= 19 East/West-Coast Specialized Servers - Total Privacy via Encryption =--- |
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On Tue, 8 Jun 2004 00:44:39 -0400, "Kevin Brooks"
wrote: "Peter Skelton" wrote in message .. . On Mon, 7 Jun 2004 14:59:36 -0400, "Kevin Brooks" wrote: "Peter Skelton" wrote in message .. . On Mon, 7 Jun 2004 17:03:49 +0100, "Keith Willshaw" wrote: snip Go and look at the report on what happened at Flixborough I have, in detail, often, with access to a lot that isn't generally available. Bingo. Another claim of access to information not available to the rest of us--to go along with prior claims of attending sensitive briefings on what US personnel were doing with the contras in Nicaragua, and battle update briefings with a command that had troops engaged in Afghanistan? And you wonder why more and more folks don't believe you? I expalined quite directly why I had deeper knowledge than generally available. Anybody who worked at Maitland or the Texas plant (Victoria?) had the same. As you snipped that, I conclude you're up to your old bull again, removing context so that you can invent some. You've recently proven yourself grossly dishonest three times, isn't that enough? No, Keith has demonstrated quite amply that you are clueless regarding the incident at hand, not to mention of questionable veracity regarding the subject in general, despite your, as he put it "sekret" information... Sounds like just another example of your trying to pad your background a bit too much, and as I noted, it ain't the first time you have been caught out like this. I'm not going to argue about Kieth with you. You've been caught yourself more than once recently, as I said. As usual, you have nothing to contribute. I have two choices, switch things back to one of your idiot statements, like the bit about artillery hitting without knowing where the target is, or ignoring you. I'll take the second. Peter Skelton |
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Disagree with them? ROFLOL if you call sending people to blow up busses
and all that are in them disagreements then you need to get to some anger management classes fast! -- "I have seen the worst that man can do.and I can still laugh loudly" R.J. Goldman http://www.usidfvets.com and http://www.stopfcc.com "Nicholas Smid" wrote in message ... "Tamas Feher" wrote in message ... Posse Comitatus Act and such ..do not affect the ANG (Air National Guard), of course. You didn't read the very post you replied to! Well given the common side effects of Israils use of air to serface missiles, for terminating people who dare to disagree with them, sending in the ANG to blow **** up might well kill more people than letting the idiot drive around for a while. And given that if the missile so much as musses a bystanders hair the county sheriff gets sued for his liver and lungs you can see how they might be a bit reluctant to let the ANG drop bombs all over their town. |
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