The end of the Naval Air Reserves???

"Bill Kambic" wrote in message
...
"Giz" wrote in message

snipped for brevity

Hey Bill, are you an A-dub?

Ayup!g

I'm one of the active duty types that has seen
behind
the curtain. I left active duty after my first 4 and joined the
reserves
(SAU VP0545),
but came back to active duty after 4.5 there. I don't view the reserves
as
wasteful,
but I do view them as somewhat of a luxury. We shouldn't have reserve
squadrons
instead of active squadrons.

Well, maybe so and maybe not. A lot depends on your definition of
"luxury"
and and missions that need to be accomplished.

Substantial numbers of birds will be parked this summer. By luxury I mean
we
are facing a this or that choice. The day when we could have both has
passed
us by. To keep all the Reserve Squadrons would cost us Active Squadrons.
While I believe in the value of the Reserves, I don't think that would be a
wise
choice. Bottom line, we can't have both.

One of the hardest lessons of WWII was that the virtual elimination of ASW
assets in the RN and USN after WWI damn near caused a catastrophe. If the
Japanese had followed German practice with their subs it probably would
have. Again, the WWII analogy is not directly on point as no potential
adversary CURRENTLY possesses a significant subsurface threat. There are
lots of subs out there in the hands of possible "bad guys" but so far they
have not choosen to use them. If they do then long range maritime patrol
may not be of too much help and the S3 series might be sorely missed.

A choice that the VP community would be facing
in the
near future if we didn't make use of the aircraft in the reserve units.
I
do believe that
the SAU concept will be making a return to the Naval Air Reserve, and
hopefully we
can reform some of the units when MMA is online.

I doubt that budget pressures in the future will be less than they are
now.
The idea that we will buy enough MMA airframes to outfit non-existant
RESFORON/SAUs smacks of a GREAT DEAL of optomism!g

I doubt that too, but a shuffle of P-3 airframes that are left may
reconstitute
several Reserve Squadrons.

And that still does not address the other hardware units. If the air
assets
go how long before the FFGs follow?

It seems to me that if the Reserve Forces are to survive being anything
but
"knife and fork" units spending their time watching "Victory at Sea"
reruns
then they had better look to their "hole card" and crack up some
Congressional support for at least maintenace of the status quo.

Hopefully, the SAU concept will keep that from happening.

Bill Kambic

Giz

AW1(NAC/AW)
CPW-11, CV-59, VP-0545, CV-66, VP-45, VP-30 WTU

Mr. Kambic makes some good points below, and the first paragraph of his I
left below is very true. The Navy has never quite seemed to been able to
integrate its reserve forces in the manner that the USAF has, even with the
drawdown after Desert Storm, when the reserves became a greater percentage
of the total force. The last USNR squadron I was in had spent the last few
years conducting 6 month deployments aboard ship. Unheard of not long
before.

What are some advantages of a robust reserve force? A typical RESFORON is
manned by aviators with an average of ten or more years of experience. These
aviators come at a cost of about 1/3 of their active duty counterparts. They
leave active duty for a variety of reasons, but allowing them to continue to
serve in a reserve capacity enables the Navy to retain experienced people at
a low cost. People who can be mobilized in time of national crisis. It's a
face card in the back pocket of the leadership.

I think someone made a statement that getting rid of some of the RESFORONS
will free up airframes for active duty squadrons.To me, that reasoning
sounds like a poor Band-Aid for an airframe availability problem. The
airframes the reserves get are usually the beaters and cast-offs from the
active duty. (It took a good deal of scraping to find FOUR airframes to
stand up HSL-60, all of which were put through rework before being sent to
the squadron.) Decimating reserve squadrons is not going to solve the woes
of the active duty side of nav air. As Mr. Kambic alluded to in his second
paragraph below, it may, in fact, lead to other problems in the future. If
getting rid of RESFORONS, hardware, and people, is seen as a solution to
budget problems, I think there may some more serious, underlying issues at
work.

Is there waste in the Naval Reserve? A certain amount exists on both sides
of the fence, and it becomes a matter of where you want to shine the
spotlight, your point of view, and your ability to spin.

One plan I have heard suggested is that reserve aircrews become part of
"augment units" that support active duty squadrons. This raised a few
questions, and I don't recall if they were really answered. How are the
reserve aircrews funded? Who will manage their continued training and
operating within the active duty squadrons? Could such a plan work? I think
so, but only if the active duty squadrons see the reserves as a benefit to
them.

Of course, as with any plan, the one that started this whole thread could
change by next week. In the end we shall see what we shall see.

Just my 2 cents.

Eric Scheie


"Bill Kambic" wrote in message
...

More to the point, loss of an internal Reserve hardware capability is
unlikely to EVER return. The RESFORONS have always been "poor relations"
but made do with what they had and sometimes embarassed Active Duty types
in
head to head competition. The Active Duty types have, in my personal
presence, often noted the vast "wastage" of funds on the Reserve hardware
units. (To be completely fair, a fair number have also "looked behind the
curtain" and seen the reasons why hardware units are a Very Good Thing.)

The likelyhood of facing the hords of the Red Army (or the late,
unlamented
Soviet Navy) is very small. But there are still places where you can lose
a
bunch of aircraft and people in a hurry and have to replace them the same
way (a "dust up" in North Korea comes to mind). The complexity of modern
aircraft means that the "WWII Approach" of 90 day wonder to Fleet Fighter
Pilot in a year (or so) is unlikely to EVER be seen again. This means
that
you have to have a "well" of trained people to draw on in time of crisis.
The REFORON/SRU hardware units filled that need. When they "go away" so
will a cheap solution to an expensive problem.

Bill Kambic

Formerly of VS-73 (the SRU part whose numbers escape me) and VP-93
(ditto),
NAF Detroit, 1974-1978

"Eric Scheie" wrote in message
. net...
Mr. Kambic makes some good points below, and the first paragraph of his I
left below is very true. The Navy has never quite seemed to been able to
integrate its reserve forces in the manner that the USAF has, even with
the
drawdown after Desert Storm, when the reserves became a greater percentage
of the total force. The last USNR squadron I was in had spent the last few
years conducting 6 month deployments aboard ship. Unheard of not long
before.

What are some advantages of a robust reserve force? A typical RESFORON is
manned by aviators with an average of ten or more years of experience.
These
aviators come at a cost of about 1/3 of their active duty counterparts.
They
leave active duty for a variety of reasons, but allowing them to continue
to
serve in a reserve capacity enables the Navy to retain experienced people
at
a low cost. People who can be mobilized in time of national crisis. It's a
face card in the back pocket of the leadership.

I doubt any here question their value. I don't.

I think someone made a statement that getting rid of some of the RESFORONS
will free up airframes for active duty squadrons.To me, that reasoning
sounds like a poor Band-Aid for an airframe availability problem. The
airframes the reserves get are usually the beaters and cast-offs from the
active duty. (It took a good deal of scraping to find FOUR airframes to
stand up HSL-60, all of which were put through rework before being sent to
the squadron.) Decimating reserve squadrons is not going to solve the woes
of the active duty side of nav air. As Mr. Kambic alluded to in his second
paragraph below, it may, in fact, lead to other problems in the future. If
getting rid of RESFORONS, hardware, and people, is seen as a solution to
budget problems, I think there may some more serious, underlying issues at
work.

At one time this was true. Currently, many of the Reserve's airframes have
less
hours on them. Will getting these airframes fix the problem? No, but it
may
keep us alive until the fix (new airframes) reaches us. The fact is that in
the
next few years squadrons will be decommissioned. What we're discussing
is who should lose those squadrons. Navair or Navairres.

Is there waste in the Naval Reserve? A certain amount exists on both sides
of the fence, and it becomes a matter of where you want to shine the
spotlight, your point of view, and your ability to spin.

One plan I have heard suggested is that reserve aircrews become part of
"augment units" that support active duty squadrons. This raised a few
questions, and I don't recall if they were really answered. How are the
reserve aircrews funded? Who will manage their continued training and
operating within the active duty squadrons? Could such a plan work? I
think
so, but only if the active duty squadrons see the reserves as a benefit to
them.

It worked in the 80's. I spent 4.5 years as a Selres in an SAU, VP-0545.
I enjoyed acdutras with VP-45 in both Rota and Bermuda and got some
quality onsta time. We seem to have forgotten the value of the SAU's.

Giz

On 7/4/03 3:52 PM, in article ,
"Giz" wrote:



Is there waste in the Naval Reserve? A certain amount exists on both sides
of the fence, and it becomes a matter of where you want to shine the
spotlight, your point of view, and your ability to spin.

One plan I have heard suggested is that reserve aircrews become part of
"augment units" that support active duty squadrons. This raised a few
questions, and I don't recall if they were really answered. How are the
reserve aircrews funded? Who will manage their continued training and
operating within the active duty squadrons? Could such a plan work? I
think
so, but only if the active duty squadrons see the reserves as a benefit to
them.

It worked in the 80's. I spent 4.5 years as a Selres in an SAU, VP-0545.
I enjoyed acdutras with VP-45 in both Rota and Bermuda and got some
quality onsta time. We seem to have forgotten the value of the SAU's.

Giz


SAU is a program that works in FRS's and deployed VP units but not in
reserve VF's or VFA's.

A single-seat pilot especially would have some major trouble working up for,
traveling to, and flying his ACDUTRA in a deployed CVW for two weeks for a
variety of reasons.

Likewise, the VFA's are not having the airframe problems that the VP's are
having.

What I'm saying is keep the reserve VFA status quo. Consider SAU-ing
reserves into the active duty VP's.

--Woody

Well done. Very well written post.

The loss of Naval Air Reserve hardware units would be a tragedy. It is a
short-sighted move initiated not by the politicians (like GWB as has been
suggested) but by the active duty Flag Officers.

Unfortunately, the casualty will be the cost-effective "insurance policy"
and professional adversary elements of Naval Aviation. Don't think for a
moment that the VFC's can handle all of the commitments. VFC's cover
SFARP's, but the FRS's have relied heavily on the reserve VFA's to be their
bogies.

By the way, this is no surprise to those of us in the reserves. Ever since
the separate appropriation line for the Naval Reserves was melded into the
active duty's line, this has only been a matter of time. For the last two
years, they've been trying to write VFA-203 out of the budget and in the
short term, this year, it looks as if they've succeeded.

The only thing that will keep USNR air alive will be heavy congressional
involvement.

--Woody

On 7/4/03 3:07 PM, in article
, "Eric Scheie"
wrote:

Mr. Kambic makes some good points below, and the first paragraph of his I
left below is very true. The Navy has never quite seemed to been able to
integrate its reserve forces in the manner that the USAF has, even with the
drawdown after Desert Storm, when the reserves became a greater percentage
of the total force. The last USNR squadron I was in had spent the last few
years conducting 6 month deployments aboard ship. Unheard of not long
before.

What are some advantages of a robust reserve force? A typical RESFORON is
manned by aviators with an average of ten or more years of experience. These
aviators come at a cost of about 1/3 of their active duty counterparts. They
leave active duty for a variety of reasons, but allowing them to continue to
serve in a reserve capacity enables the Navy to retain experienced people at
a low cost. People who can be mobilized in time of national crisis. It's a
face card in the back pocket of the leadership.

I think someone made a statement that getting rid of some of the RESFORONS
will free up airframes for active duty squadrons.To me, that reasoning
sounds like a poor Band-Aid for an airframe availability problem. The
airframes the reserves get are usually the beaters and cast-offs from the
active duty. (It took a good deal of scraping to find FOUR airframes to
stand up HSL-60, all of which were put through rework before being sent to
the squadron.) Decimating reserve squadrons is not going to solve the woes
of the active duty side of nav air. As Mr. Kambic alluded to in his second
paragraph below, it may, in fact, lead to other problems in the future. If
getting rid of RESFORONS, hardware, and people, is seen as a solution to
budget problems, I think there may some more serious, underlying issues at
work.

Is there waste in the Naval Reserve? A certain amount exists on both sides
of the fence, and it becomes a matter of where you want to shine the
spotlight, your point of view, and your ability to spin.

One plan I have heard suggested is that reserve aircrews become part of
"augment units" that support active duty squadrons. This raised a few
questions, and I don't recall if they were really answered. How are the
reserve aircrews funded? Who will manage their continued training and
operating within the active duty squadrons? Could such a plan work? I think
so, but only if the active duty squadrons see the reserves as a benefit to
them.

Of course, as with any plan, the one that started this whole thread could
change by next week. In the end we shall see what we shall see.

Just my 2 cents.

Eric Scheie


"Bill Kambic" wrote in message
...

More to the point, loss of an internal Reserve hardware capability is
unlikely to EVER return. The RESFORONS have always been "poor relations"
but made do with what they had and sometimes embarassed Active Duty types
in
head to head competition. The Active Duty types have, in my personal
presence, often noted the vast "wastage" of funds on the Reserve hardware
units. (To be completely fair, a fair number have also "looked behind the
curtain" and seen the reasons why hardware units are a Very Good Thing.)

The likelyhood of facing the hords of the Red Army (or the late,
unlamented
Soviet Navy) is very small. But there are still places where you can lose
a
bunch of aircraft and people in a hurry and have to replace them the same
way (a "dust up" in North Korea comes to mind). The complexity of modern
aircraft means that the "WWII Approach" of 90 day wonder to Fleet Fighter
Pilot in a year (or so) is unlikely to EVER be seen again. This means
that
you have to have a "well" of trained people to draw on in time of crisis.
The REFORON/SRU hardware units filled that need. When they "go away" so
will a cheap solution to an expensive problem.

Bill Kambic

Formerly of VS-73 (the SRU part whose numbers escape me) and VP-93
(ditto),
NAF Detroit, 1974-1978