Twenty Four Hour Spad Missions

Very interesting post, sidis, think we must first decide on just what
the primary mission of our CVG's is or are. The 1961 whale could
indeed go out 2000 miles, drop an internally carried payload of 12000
lbs and have enough fuel to return. This hop would have to be
unescorted by fighters or ECM birds. Maybe an okay mission for SIOP
but not so good for over the beach stuff like, Vietnam, or IRAQ. I
think the major change is that our CVG isn't tasked to seek out and
destroy the Soviet fleet. Now the most likely scenarios include
missions over land defended by AAA and SAMs. Whales would not survive
there just as the Spads couldn't survive the North Vietnam defenses. I
think we have a brand new ball game to equip for. It wouldn't bother
me a bit to tank from a land based asset since we can get these tankers
to wherever. The CVG still needs an integral tanking capability and I
believe it has one, not like the old days but adequate to cover night
OPs, etc. If I need ECM jammers, I don't care where they come from,
overhead assets, EA-6's, or the girl scouts as long as they get it done
when I need it.

I completely agree that Marines could use some Spads overhead for some
realistic CAS but as long as we have a ROE which prohibits airplanes
from descending below 20 grand, well the Spad will have to remain a
relic of older days. I also agree we probably would be hard pressed to
make a 1000 mile, unrefueled strike with anything we have today. I'm
just not sure we need to anymore.

Interesting article in this month's Proceedings has this to say:
http://www.usni.org/proceedings/arti...o02Stone-2.htm
The Navy's senior leaders proudly assert that "naval aviation allows us
to take credible combat power across the globe without a permission
slip."23 This may once have been true, but the all-Hornet air wing is
sorely taxed to take its combat power further than 150 miles from the
nearest blue water. Except for small strikes, this capability, once
available to a carrier air wing with organic, dedicated tankers, now
exists only when the Navy has Air Force tanker support, which requires
permission from a host country.

I don't understand what you mean by " but the all-Hornet air wing is
sorely taxed to take its combat power further than 150 miles from the
nearest blue water.". Do you mean 150 miles from an overland target
area? I'm no fan of the short legged Hornet but I think it could make
a 500, maybe 600 mile strike and return? USAF and NATO tanker support
can be based a long ways from the target area, how far I don't know.
Probably far enough not to need a permission slip from any non-friendly
country. I would love to see an F-14/A-6 CVG but the chance of this is
about like getting Spad CAS for the Marines.

That's a quote from the Proceeding article written by Lt Stone an
F/A-18 driver. I see you have to register to read it...USNI
registration is free so log on and check out the whole article.
He also notes:

-Even a 2,000-pound bomb (the largest available to carrier-based
aircraft) can cause only limited damage. The idea of destroying a large
building or hardened bunker with one conventional bomb and 100%
reliability in wartime is laughable. Even in benign environments,
strike planners expect only 70% effectiveness. In Afghanistan, where
93% of the ordnance employed was precision-guided, only 84% of all
sorties (and fewer bombs) hit their targets.13 If the enemy had the
ability to jam GPS signals, the weapons' reliability would be reduced
significantly.

-The Hornet's ability to carry four 2,000-pound bombs is dependent on a
short-range strike that does not require external fuel tanks to be
carried on wing pylons. Virtually all current areas of concern require
long-range drop tanks, however, and the Hornet's maximum bomb load is
reduced accordingly. The two extra wing pylons on the Super Hornet,
widely touted as improvements over the "baby" Hornet, will be occupied
by fuel tanks to support other aircraft on all but the shortest
strikes.

-During any major operation, the ability to sustain a high combat tempo
is directly related to the ability of an air wing to keep jets
airborne. Reducing complements by 16% may not appreciably affect the
ability to conduct occasional low-intensity strikes, but it severely
diminishes the number of sorties sustainable in wartime.

but the all-Hornet air wing is
sorely taxed to take its combat power further than 150 miles from the
nearest blue water.". Do you mean 150 miles from an overland target
area? I'm no fan of the short legged Hornet but I think it could make
a 500, maybe 600 mile strike and return?

I have seen the Hornets in action as a A-6 Driver. The 150 mile range is
realistic, any more range would require non indiginious tanking. In the late
80's we practiced long range strikes of over 1000 miles from the carrier
(Enterprise) with our own tanking. It was a pretty wild scenario but suffice it
to say it would have been a strike against terrorist and terrorism before those
*******s did their deed on Sep11.
In the early 90's when the sun was setting on the last of the long range
carrier strike aircraft the Navy came up with a new warfare slogan called "From
the Sea" this was litorial warfare policy designed to match the carriers
reduced capibility to that of the Aircraft on board. An interesting 180 degree
change of thinking from what the carrier was designed to do.
Given the scenario that we have faced for the last 12 years its no wonder that
Rumsfeld wanted to know were the A-6's were when he became SecDef. The A-6
would have been the perfect delivery platform for the Iraq ops. 20-28 MK-82 GPS
bombs overhead at 25K for 3-4 hours.
Rant Over.
Sparky

I can't think of a more perfect example of a "Stretch-To-Fit"
operational doctrine than "From The Sea" Elm.
Here is the specious argument:
http://www.afa.org/magazine/1993/0193watch_print.html

At a recent session with defense reporters, Secretary of the Navy Sean
O'Keefe claimed that the Navy does not require the A/F-X to be "a
long-range interdiction aircraft" because deep interdiction missions
"are not the highest probability [for the service] in the years ahead."
Thus, he said, it makes sense that the A/F-X "evolved" from its A-X
beginnings as a straightforward replacement for the A-6E bomber to
become "an attack fighter aircraft, with primary focus on attack."
"We just don't need . . . this extraordinary 750-mile range" once
earmarked for the A-X, said Secretary O'Keefe, "because nobody's going
to be out there" for the plane to attack.

Subsequent events have proven the Honorable Mr. O'Keefe Absolutely
Wrong...

And as a postscript...ain't it interesting that it's an Air Force
publication that saw fit to preserve this...

The 1961 whale could indeed go out 2000 miles, drop an internally
carried payload of 12000 lbs and have enough fuel to return. This hop
would have to be unescorted by fighters or ECM birds.

This is a mission the navy gave up when they didn't continue
"first-day-of-war" stealth after the demise of the A-12. This kind of
mission now belongs soley to the Air Force.

I think the major change is that our CVG isn't tasked to seek out and
destroy the Soviet fleet.

Actually, Heavy Attack died with the end of the carriers' primary SIOP
mission in the '60s and the retirement of the A-3s. Although the
ostensibly heavy RA-5's retained the capability to drop nukes, the
problems with the linear bomb bay meant that they could only carry much
smaller weapons underwing.
And it was the shift of the carriers' mission from Power Of Projection
Ashore to Sea Control (to use the parlance of the day) in 1971 and CVAs
became CVs that started the gradual deemphasis on range. The 80's saw
the rise of the Hornet and by the early '90s the From The Sea doctrine
was written for it's short legs. Whats ironic is that the carriers have
only Power Of Projection Ashore missions in anger since WWII.

It wouldn't bother me a bit to tank from a land based asset since we
can get these tankers to wherever.

We've been able to-so far. Can we continue to count on that ability? As
the Lieutenant said, carrier has always been touted for its ability to
operate *without* a permission slip, but that simply no longer true.
Also the Air Force can make the credible argument that their TACAIR
could be supported by those same tankers (and other vital support such
as ELINT)from bases that they will need regardless, carry something
bigger than a 2000 lb bomb with first day of war stealth, and perhaps
most importantly, with carriers now obligated to fight from the very
dangerous littorals that force protection no longer favors the navy.

In article . com,
writes:
The 1961 whale could indeed go out 2000 miles, drop an internally
carried payload of 12000 lbs and have enough fuel to return. This hop
would have to be unescorted by fighters or ECM birds.

This is a mission the navy gave up when they didn't continue
"first-day-of-war" stealth after the demise of the A-12. This kind of
mission now belongs soley to the Air Force.

I think the major change is that our CVG isn't tasked to seek out and
destroy the Soviet fleet.

Actually, Heavy Attack died with the end of the carriers' primary SIOP
mission in the '60s and the retirement of the A-3s. Although the
ostensibly heavy RA-5's retained the capability to drop nukes, the
problems with the linear bomb bay meant that they could only carry much
smaller weapons underwing.

That's not really the case - the A-5's internal bay could handle a
single Mk 27, B28, or B43 bomb, with all manner of problems that
go along with blowing off a piece of your airplane and blsating part
of its fuel system out of the back. (The bombs were part of a
bomb/tank "train". Firing the train out of the back required severing
fuel, pressure, and instrumentation lines, as well as the usual stuff
to get the bomb aremd and ready to go.
The pylons could handle B28, B43, or B57 bombs, with much better
release behavior. And you could carry 2 of them.
The RA-5 may well have been the only nuclear bomber to have had its
ability to deliver weapons improved by the elimination of the internal
bay. (Well, the F-105, maybe, as well)

By the mid '60s, though, the Powers That Be had realized that the RA-5
wa much more useful as a sensor platform. It could go places nobody
else could, and get data that nobody else could dig up.

--
Pete Stickney

Without data, all you have are opinions

That's not really the case - the A-5's internal bay could handle a
single Mk 27, B28, or B43 bomb, with all manner of problems that
go along with blowing off a piece of your airplane and blsating part
of its fuel system out of the back.
This is true, but after the straight A-5 was gone nobody really
considered it a viable way to deliver a weapon (at least that was true
by 1969)....And more than once an Vigi puked out those tanks on a cat
shot. Talk about some excitement for all involved!

By the mid '60s, though, the Powers That Be had realized that the RA-5

wa much more useful as a sensor platform. It could go places nobody
else could, and get data that nobody else could dig up.
True again, but it did retain a secondary nuke delivery role into the
'70s. Its capabilities were sorely missed in Lebanon just a couple of
years after its retirement.