Skyguide traffic controller killed

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

Dean Wilkinson wrote:


I think that this case is a good example of why privatizing air
traffic control in the U.S.A. is a bad idea. When safety takes a back
seat to cost controls and profit margins, people die.

What makes you think eliminating the profit issue - that is, leaving ATC in
government hands - would address the type of problem that occurred at
Skyguide? Having recently read the final report on a midair near KCDW a
while back, I can tell you: Federal Towers leave a single overworked
controller alone too.

- Andrew

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.2.4 (GNU/Linux)

iD8DBQFAQTdosJzG+JC8BsgRAkJFAJ966od8E03gjqn7weGVUm nsihQ9UACglOln
lcOXqiCSAbyL0DqSHF7mw4c=
=XavA
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Well, first of all this was a center controller, not a tower
controller. I don't believe that center controllers work alone in the
U.S., if they do I would be surprised. Secondly, their phone system
was offline and their conflict warning system was down... what, no
money for backup systems? Would that happen in the U.S.? I sure hope
not...

Andrew Gideon wrote in message gonline.com...
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

Dean Wilkinson wrote:


I think that this case is a good example of why privatizing air
traffic control in the U.S.A. is a bad idea. When safety takes a back
seat to cost controls and profit margins, people die.

What makes you think eliminating the profit issue - that is, leaving ATC in
government hands - would address the type of problem that occurred at
Skyguide? Having recently read the final report on a midair near KCDW a
while back, I can tell you: Federal Towers leave a single overworked
controller alone too.

- Andrew

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.2.4 (GNU/Linux)

iD8DBQFAQTdosJzG+JC8BsgRAkJFAJ966od8E03gjqn7weGVUm nsihQ9UACglOln
lcOXqiCSAbyL0DqSHF7mw4c=
=XavA
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

"Dean Wilkinson" wrote in message
m...
Well, first of all this was a center controller, not a tower
controller. I don't believe that center controllers work alone in the
U.S., if they do I would be surprised. Secondly, their phone system
was offline and their conflict warning system was down... what, no
money for backup systems? Would that happen in the U.S.? I sure hope
not...

Do the airlines have redundant (backup) systems?

Yes, most of the avionics systems on airliners have at least one
backup if they serve a critical function. Some have more.

Autoland is a triple redundant system and all three boxes have to
agree in order to autoland the airplane. Nav/Com radios are also
triple redundant on the 777. The Air Data Intertial Reference Unit on
the 777 (ADIRU) is fault-tolerant, and it is backup up by the SAARU.
TCAS is also redundant on the 777. Faults are detectable by BITE
software.

Dean

"Tom Sixkiller" wrote in message ...
"Dean Wilkinson" wrote in message
m...
Well, first of all this was a center controller, not a tower
controller. I don't believe that center controllers work alone in the
U.S., if they do I would be surprised. Secondly, their phone system
was offline and their conflict warning system was down... what, no
money for backup systems? Would that happen in the U.S.? I sure hope
not...

Do the airlines have redundant (backup) systems?

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

Dean Wilkinson wrote:

Well, first of all this was a center controller, not a tower
controller. I don't believe that center controllers work alone in the
U.S., if they do I would be surprised. Secondly, their phone system
was offline and their conflict warning system was down... what, no
money for backup systems? Would that happen in the U.S.? I sure hope
not...

According to the NTSB report, the controller at CDW should not have been
left alone. So it "should not" happen there...yet it does.

Does it happen at Centers? I've no idea. But my point is that Federal
ownership doesn't seem to be a silver bullet. The government can mismanage
as well as anyone else.

- Andrew

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.2.4 (GNU/Linux)

iD8DBQFAQjhMsJzG+JC8BsgRAlGgAJ4y3oOMTgIotWSrUqZylw PBSmU2IwCgj3RB
rksZWpA+5Mt+MH+nsREwRfM=
=DkyX
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

(Dean Wilkinson) wrote

Autoland is a triple redundant system and all three boxes have to
agree in order to autoland the airplane.

It might have been more correct to state that Autoland from a Cat III
approach is a triple redundant system. I have flown many Autolands
from Cat II approaches in B-727s with only one Sperry autopilot, either
the SP-50 or the SP-150.
It is true that this one autoland approved autopilot was equipped with
an additional "roll monitor" card that became active whenever the
autoland function was engaged and the aircraft was below 500'AGL and it
had two elevator channels, one controlling the left elevator and the
other controlling the right elevator.
But, there was still just one autopilot with just one power source and
receiving ILS signals from one LOC/GS receiver.

Bob Moore

"Dean Wilkinson" wrote in message
m...
Well, first of all this was a center controller, not a tower
controller. I don't believe that center controllers work alone in the
U.S., if they do I would be surprised. Secondly, their phone system
was offline and their conflict warning system was down... what, no
money for backup systems? Would that happen in the U.S.? I sure hope
not...


1. Center controllers do indeed work alone in the US. We shouldn't, but
because we are very understaffed, we do. Two controllers per Area is the
staffing number for several midnight watches in my ARTCC. We don't have
both controllers on duty together all night long for an entire 8 hour shift.

2. We *routinely* operate on a back-up radar system on mid shifts while the
main bang is down for maintenance. This includes long periods of time where
the conflict warning system is down and a solo controller is on duty while
the other controller is on break. And yes, we generally have some air
traffic all night long...

Safe? Your call...

Chip, ZTL

Andrew Gideon wrote in message gonline.com...

Dean Wilkinson wrote:
I think that this case is a good example of why privatizing air
traffic control in the U.S.A. is a bad idea. When safety takes a back
seat to cost controls and profit margins, people die.

What makes you think eliminating the profit issue - that is, leaving ATC in
government hands - would address the type of problem that occurred at
Skyguide? Having recently read the final report on a midair near KCDW a
while back, I can tell you: Federal Towers leave a single overworked
controller alone too.

Andrew,

The problem is, I'm not sure that leaving ATC in government hands
"eliminates the profit issue" exactly. Or at least, while it's
not exactly a profit issue, I'm not so sure but that safety is
taking a back seat to cost controls, with complications from
ponderous Federal hiring and relocation rules. For example, I
understand that some unGodly large fraction of the Chicago TRACON
controllers are due to retire PDQ but trainees are in very short
supply, because overall staffing is defined as "adequate" -- which
I suppose means more desireable positions are fully or overstaffed,
and management is oversupplied, but due to budgetary limitations
on hiring or relocating, bodies can't be put where they're really
needed.

Just what I've heard -- NB that I'm not an ATCS for which the world
can be duly thankful.

Cheers,
Sydney

Snowbird wrote:

Or at least, while it's
not exactly a profit issue, I'm not so sure but that safety is
taking a back seat to cost controls, with complications from
ponderous Federal hiring and relocation rules.

Yes, that's a better expression of my concern than I could provide.

- Andrew

Just curious guys &(or) gals,

How many airliners are equipped with Category III Autoland?
Percent wise.
Also how many airports are equipped to oblige them?

Marty

"Robert Moore" wrote in message
. 7...
(Dean Wilkinson) wrote

Autoland is a triple redundant system and all three boxes have to
agree in order to autoland the airplane.

It might have been more correct to state that Autoland from a Cat III
approach is a triple redundant system. I have flown many Autolands
from Cat II approaches in B-727s with only one Sperry autopilot, either
the SP-50 or the SP-150.
It is true that this one autoland approved autopilot was equipped with
an additional "roll monitor" card that became active whenever the
autoland function was engaged and the aircraft was below 500'AGL and it
had two elevator channels, one controlling the left elevator and the
other controlling the right elevator.
But, there was still just one autopilot with just one power source and
receiving ILS signals from one LOC/GS receiver.

Bob Moore