Who's At Fault in UAV/Part91 MAC?

On Fri, 23 Apr 2004 05:08:42 GMT, "John T" wrote in
Message-Id: om:

"Larry Dighera" wrote in message


Implicit in your question is the notion that, because there are less
international Part 91 operations than domestic, there is no problem
compromising their safety. I do not hold that view.

You're assuming a significant rise in the danger to other aircraft (*You*,
not I, separated Part 91 traffic from the rest.) I'm not yet convinced that
adding remotely piloted aircraft to a relatively rarely-travelled slice of
airspace over very sparsely populated border areas raises the danger to
pilots enough for me to be worried.

Intentionally compromising air safety is always a bad idea. Once the
UAV 'camel' has its nose under the tent, you can bet that you will be
sleeping with it soon, fleas and all.

Frankly, I'd give much better odds to having an in-flight fire or engine
failure than a MAC with a remotely piloted aircraft.

How did you arrive at that point of view. Do you have any data to
support it?

Giving odds or taking chances is an inappropriate approach to air
safety.

The Big Sky is much bigger in the border areas discussed
in your articles.

The "Big Sky" is a total myth. Any rational system that relies upon
chance to insure air safety is doomed to failure. I hope you're not
an FAA employee.

Are you implying that the ground based crew operating the UAV would be
able to meet the vision standards required of a certificated airman...
solely through the use of video equipment on-board the UAV?

I implied no such thing.

You questioned my use of the term 'reduced vision standards'. That
lead me to believe that you felt that UAV operators would be held to
the same (not reduced) vision standards as certificated airmen. If
your questioning of my use of the term 'reduced vision standards' did
not imply your belief that they UAV operators would be held to the
same standards as certificated airmen, what were you implying?

:However, I'm curious to know why you're implying
they *wouldn't* be able to meet those requirements. Are you aware of all
the capabilities of the UAV's you're talking about? I'm not so I can't make
too many assumptions either way.

The military has not disclosed to me all the capabilities of their
UAVs. :-) However, unless there is high-resolutin, color, binocular
vision in all quadrants, the UAV operators visual capability to see
and avoid will be substandard to that required of a certificated
airman.

I make no assumptions - including one regarding "hysteria". The only
hysterical one here appears to be you.

What has lead you to that conclusion?

What led you to yours? Does "Chicken Little" mean anything to you?

Your apparent lack of concern for air safety and reliance on chance
(Big Sky)for aircraft separation betrays your shallow understanding of
the issue.

From the past behavior of military in MACs with civil aircraft, I would
expect the military to deny all responsibility.

Perhaps, but the NTSB would still make their ruling, wouldn't they?

The NTSB has shown a significant lack of impartiality in at least one
civil/military MAC case:

The NTSB has shown a "significant lack of impartiality" in a number of other
cases, too, but they're still the closest thing we have to a standing
impartial review board that merits trust.

So you feel that a _biased_ (as opposed to _impartial_) governmental
investigative organization does not warrant reform? Comon' man,
think!

"Larry Dighera" wrote in message


Frankly, I'd give much better odds to having an in-flight fire or
engine failure than a MAC with a remotely piloted aircraft.

How did you arrive at that point of view. Do you have any data to
support it?

No, I don't. Those are *my* odds I'm offering.

Giving odds or taking chances is an inappropriate approach to air
safety.

BS. You take chances stepping into the shower. You take chances crossing
the street. You take chances driving to the airport. You take chances
leaving the ground in an aircraft. It's what you do to minimize those
chances that counts and nothing I've seen in your articles UAV's leads
me to believe that they're necessarily a significant safety issue. Once you
show me *evidence* of lackadaisical attention to safety by the owners and
operators of those very expensive bits of hardware, then I'll join your
rally. Until then, this is my last post on the issue. It's already gotten
far more attention than it deserves at this stage.

The "Big Sky" is a total myth. Any rational system that relies upon
chance to insure air safety is doomed to failure. I hope you're not
an FAA employee.

hmm... For the record, no, I'm not an FAA employee. However, the "myth" of
the big sky is shattered everytime I go up VFR. For all the VFR flight I've
done, the only time I have ever gotten close to another craft
unintentionally was near an airport. See and avoid? Perhaps, but I don't
recall ever maneuvering to avoid another aircraft during VFR cruise. Also
for the record, you inferred a reliance on chance for safety. I implied no
such thing. Until proven otherwise, I will stand by my assertion that there
are far fewer airplanes in operation (i.e., "Big Sky") in the border areas
under consideration for UAV use, though.

You questioned my use of the term 'reduced vision standards'.

Yes, I did.

That
lead me to believe that you felt that UAV operators would be held to
the same (not reduced) vision standards as certificated airmen.

I can't help that.

If
your questioning of my use of the term 'reduced vision standards' did
not imply your belief that they UAV operators would be held to the
same standards as certificated airmen, what were you implying?

I was implying that you have no idea what are the capabilities of these
UAV's you're trying to get us all stirred up about. Nothing more.

The military has not disclosed to me all the capabilities of their
UAVs. :-) However, unless there is high-resolutin, color, binocular
vision in all quadrants, the UAV operators visual capability to see
and avoid will be substandard to that required of a certificated
airman.

That may be, but there are ways to compensate. Again, you haven't
demonstrated that the proposed operation of these UAV's will significantly
degrade aviation safety. Come back when you have something more solid than
"omigod they're putting unmanned aircraft in the skies!"

Your apparent lack of concern for air safety and reliance on chance
(Big Sky)for aircraft separation betrays your shallow understanding of
the issue.

It's interesting that you think I have any less concern for aviation safety
than anybody else - much less rely on chance for separation. Larry, you're
demonstrating a serious ignorance here.

So you feel that a _biased_ (as opposed to _impartial_) governmental
investigative organization does not warrant reform? Comon' man,
think!

Now you're trying to change the subject. If you want to talk about
revamping the NTSB, start another thread. This one's dead.

--
John T
http://tknowlogy.com/TknoFlyer
http://www.pocketgear.com/products_s...veloperid=4415
____________________

On Sat, 24 Apr 2004 05:38:37 GMT, "John T" wrote in
Message-Id: om:

"Larry Dighera" wrote in message


Giving odds or taking chances is an inappropriate approach to air
safety.

BS. You take chances stepping into the shower. You take chances crossing
the street. You take chances driving to the airport. You take chances
leaving the ground in an aircraft. It's what you do to minimize those
chances that counts

Fortunately, the chances you cite are not criteria for NAS design.

In engineering a workable NAS I would prefer that the designers employ
methodologies that _insure_ separation of air traffic, not merely
reduce the _chances_ of a MAC. Anything less is irresponsible
negligence.

If reliance on the Big Sky theory were adequate for separating
aircraft, we wouldn't need ATC.

and nothing I've seen in your articles UAV's leads
me to believe that they're necessarily a significant safety issue. Once you
show me *evidence* of lackadaisical attention to safety by the owners and
operators of those very expensive bits of hardware, then I'll join your
rally.

I'm happy to have you aboard. :-) Here is the information you
request:

http://www.aetc.randolph.af.mil/se2/...305/runway.htm
GROUND CREW’S INATTENTION
LEADS TO UNMANNED AIRCRAFT CRASH

LANGLEY AIR FORCE BASE, Va. (ACCNS) — Investigators determined
that pilot error caused an Air Force RQ-1 Predator aircraft to
crash Oct. 25, nine miles west of Indian Springs Air Force
Auxiliary Field, Nev.

The Predator, an unmanned reconnaissance aircraft, was destroyed
upon impact. The loss is estimated at $3.3 million. No one was
injured. The aircraft was assigned to the 11th Reconnaissance
Squadron at Nellis Air Force Base, Nev.

According to an Air Combat Command accident investigation report
released last month, the primary cause of the accident was the
ground crew’s inattention to the aircraft’s altitude.

While trying to enter the Indian Springs flight pattern, the
aircraft was flown over mountainous terrain, obstructing the
datalink and causing the ground crew to lose electronic contact
with the aircraft.

Following failed attempts to regain the link, the pilot executed
emergency procedures designed to safeguard the aircraft; however,
the aircraft impacted mountainous terrain 16 seconds later.


http://www.af.mil/news/Feb2001/n2001...shtmlOfficials

02/02/01
Officials release RQ-1L Predator RQ-1L Predator accident report
the accident resulted from operator error.

the pilot -- who flies the aircraft from a ground control station
-- inadvertently cleared the primary control module's random
access memory. As a result, the Predator lost its data link
connection with the ground control station.


http://www.globalsecurity.org/milita...0219-acc01.htm
releases RQ-1 accident report

In-Depth Coverage

Released: Feb. 19, 2003

LANGLEY AIR FORCE BASE, Va. (ACCNS) -- Air Force investigators
have determined that human error caused an RQ-1 Predator aircraft
to crash Sept. 17 at a classified forward-operating location in
Southwest Asia.

The Predator, which is an unmanned reconnaissance aircraft, was
destroyed upon impact. The loss is estimated at $3.2 million. No
one was injured in the accident. The aircraft was assigned to the
11th Reconnaissance Squadron at Nellis Air Force Base, Nev.

According to an Air Combat Command accident investigation report
released today, the primary cause of the accident was that the
pilot unintentionally flew the aircraft into a hazardous cloud.

The pilot lost communication with the aircraft several times, but
was able to re-establish communication twice. However, the
aircraft failed to respond to the pilot’s commands, indicating the
flight control computers were disabled by the hazardous weather
conditions


http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell...s/predator.htm
As of 31 October 2001 the Air Force had received a total of 68 air
vehicles, and had lost 19 due to mishaps or losses over enemy
territory, including four over enemy territory in Kosovo. A good
number of them were lost due to operator error, since it is hard
to land the UAV. The operator has the camera pointing out the
front of the plane, but he really has lost a lot of situational
awareness that a normal pilot would have of where the ground is
and where the attitude of his aircraft is.

The CIA has a small number of the armed drones. Newer versions of
the Predator, at $4.5 million each, are being produced at a rate
of about two aircraft a month.


http://www.reviewjournal.com/lvrj_ho.../19962521.html
Thursday, October 31, 2002
Las Vegas Review-Journal

May 17 crash of unmanned spy plane blamed on human error

Investigators have blamed the May 17 crash of an unmanned Predator
spy plane in Southwest Asia on human error, saying one of the
plane's tail control mechanisms had been improperly assembled by
the manufacturer, according to an Air Force statement Wednesday.

The remote-controlled RQ-1 Predator was assigned to Nellis Air
Force Base's 15th Reconnaissance Squadron in Indian Springs.

The plane, which had been deployed as part of the 386th
Expeditionary Group, went down "near a classified forward
operating location" in Southwest Asia, said the statement from Air
Combat Command headquarters at Langley Air Force Base, Va.

The loss of the plane made by General Atomics of San Diego is
valued at $3.3 million, the statement said.

Air Force investigators determined that incorrect assembly of the
"right tail plane control servo" was the sole cause of the
accident, the statement said.

A spokesman for Air Combat Command said Air Force officials are
still probing Friday's crash of a Predator during a training
mission near Indian Springs. That plane was assigned to Nellis'
11th Reconnaissance Squadron.


http://www2.acc.af.mil/accnews/aug01/01267.html
Released: Aug. 16, 2001

RQ-1 Predator accident report released

The RQ-1 Predator is a medium-altitude, long-endurance unmanned
aerial vehicle system. The Predator is a system, not just an
aircraft. The fully operational system consists of four air
vehicles (with sensors), a ground control station, a Predator
primary satellite link communication suite and 55 people.
(Courtesy photo)

LANGLEY AIR FORCE BASE, Va. (ACCNS) -- Officials investigating the
March 30 crash of an RQ-1L Predator unmanned aerial vehicle have
determined the accident resulted from operator error.

According to the Accident Investigation Board report released
today by Air Combat Command, the Predator experienced an icing
problem and the pilot was unable to maintain control of the
aircraft.

The Predator, which belonged to the 11th Reconnaissance Squadron
at Nellis AFB, Nev., was supporting the Kosovo Stabilization
Force. There were no injuries or fatalities. The Predator was
destroyed upon impact.

According to the report, the pilot recognized the icing problem,
but failed to immediately execute critical checklist steps for
pitot static system failure. The pitot static system uses air and
static pressure to determine the aircraft’s altitude and airspeed.
There is also substantial evidence that nonuse of the pitot static
heating system was a substantially contributing factor in this
mishap.

http://www2.acc.af.mil/accnews/dec99/990383.html
Released: December 23, 1999

RQ-1 Predator accident report released

LANGLEY AIR FORCE BASE, VA. (ACCNS) -- Officials investigating the
April 18 crash of an RQ-1 Predator unmanned aerial vehicle near
Tuzla Air Base, Bosnia, have determined the accident resulted from
a combination of mechanical and human factors.

The Predator, which belonged to the 11th Reconnaissance Squadron
at Nellis Air Force Base, Nev., was returning from a
reconnaissance mission over Kosovo in support of Operation Allied
Force. It was destroyed upon impact.

According to the Accident Investigation Board report released Dec.
22 by Air Combat Command, the Predator experienced a fuel problem
during its descent into Tuzla. Upon entering instrument
meteorological conditions and experiencing aircraft icing, the
Predator lost engine power.

The two Predator pilots, who control the aircraft from a ground
station, executed critical action procedures but were unable to
land the aircraft safely. It crashed in a wooded area four miles
south of Tuzla AB.

According to the report, the pilots' attention became too focused
on flying the Predator in icing and weather conditions they had
rarely encountered. The report also cites lack of communication
between the two pilots during the flight emergency as a cause of
the accident.

For more information, please contact the Air Combat Command Public
Affairs office at (757) 764-5994 or e-mail .


http://www2.acc.af.mil/accnews/apr01/01127.html
Released: April 13, 2001

Predator accident report released

LANGLEY AIR FORCE BASE, Va. (ACCNS) -- An RQ-1K Predator unmanned
aerial vehicle crashed Oct. 23 in Kosovo as a result of mechanical
failure, according to accident investigators.

The Predator is an unmanned reconnaissance aircraft used to survey
battlefields and return video footage and radar data. The accident
happened about 180 miles southeast of Tuzla Air Base, Bosnia,
where the aircraft was based. The Predator was part of an
Operation Joint Forge reconnaissance mission over Kosovo and was
assigned to the 11th Reconnaissance Squadron, Nellis Air Force
Base, Nev.

According to Air Combat Command's Accident Investigation Board
report released Thursday, the accident resulted from mechanical
failure in the UAV's propeller control system. Investigators found
substantial evidence indicating errors during maintenance on the
propeller control system on Sept. 28 played a critical role in the
accident. Evidence showed that certain components of the propeller
assembly were not adequately lubricated; in addition, a key bolt
was stripped and had not been tightened properly. These errors
likely led to the accident, according to the lead investigator.


Until then, this is my last post on the issue.

I suppose that means you'll be continuing to post to this thread. :-)

It's already gotten far more attention than it deserves at this stage.

At what stage do you feel public scrutiny of UAV operation in civil
airspace would be appropriate? Oh I forgot. You want to see NTSB
reports before you consider the hazard posed by UAV operation in civil
airspace. Brilliant! :-)

The "Big Sky" is a total myth. Any rational system that relies upon
chance to insure air safety is doomed to failure. I hope you're not
an FAA employee.

hmm... For the record, no, I'm not an FAA employee. However, the "myth" of
the big sky is shattered everytime I go up VFR. For all the VFR flight I've
done, the only time I have ever gotten close to another craft
unintentionally was near an airport.

There are several airports very near the US/Mexico boarder.

See and avoid? Perhaps, but I don't
recall ever maneuvering to avoid another aircraft during VFR cruise.

I suppose encountering conflicting air traffic is more likely in
congested airspace, however I've often had traffic in close proximity
over the Mojave Desert. The sky is getting smaller all the time as
the military grabs more and airline traffic increases require
increasing the size of class, B, C, & D areas.

Also for the record, you inferred a reliance on chance for safety. I implied no
such thing.

Citing the Big Sky theory as your separation methodology of choice for
UAV operation seems to contradict your denial of reliance on chance
for air safety.

Until proven otherwise, I will stand by my assertion that there
are far fewer airplanes in operation (i.e., "Big Sky") in the border areas
under consideration for UAV use, though.

How does the number of aircraft operating in a given area justify
chance as the chosen method of separating them?

You questioned my use of the term 'reduced vision standards'.

Yes, I did.

That
lead me to believe that you felt that UAV operators would be held to
the same (not reduced) vision standards as certificated airmen.

I can't help that.

If
your questioning of my use of the term 'reduced vision standards' did
not imply your belief that they UAV operators would be held to the
same standards as certificated airmen, what were you implying?

I was implying that you have no idea what are the capabilities of these
UAV's you're trying to get us all stirred up about. Nothing more.

No idea? They are unmanned. I believe that a pilot is certified to
meet vision standards that are impossible to meet with synthetic
vision.

The military has not disclosed to me all the capabilities of their
UAVs. :-) However, unless there is high-resolutin, color, binocular
vision in all quadrants, the UAV operators' visual capability to see
and avoid will be substandard to that required of a certificated
airman.

That may be, but there are ways to compensate.

Please don't withhold your description of those "ways to compensate."
I am most interested to know to which 'ways' you allude.

Again, you haven't
demonstrated that the proposed operation of these UAV's will significantly
degrade aviation safety. Come back when you have something more solid than
"omigod they're putting unmanned aircraft in the skies!"

See the citations of numerous UAV operator error crashes I provided
above. These mishaps enumerate operator inattention, improper
operator commands, loss of control due to data link failure as a
result of flying into a cloud, operator loss of situational awareness,
operator failure to recognize pitot static system failure, incorrect
assembly of control servo, operator lack of experience in IMC, lack of
lubrication and improper assembly...

Your apparent lack of concern for air safety and reliance on chance
(Big Sky)for aircraft separation betrays your shallow understanding of
the issue.

It's interesting that you think I have any less concern for aviation safety
than anybody else - much less rely on chance for separation. Larry, you're
demonstrating a serious ignorance here.

I'm just reading what you wrote. If you meant something else, you
should have said something else.

So you feel that a _biased_ (as opposed to _impartial_) governmental
investigative organization does not warrant reform? Comon' man,
think!

Now you're trying to change the subject. If you want to talk about
revamping the NTSB, start another thread. This one's dead.

It was you who first mentioned the NTSB not me:

Message-ID: om
As for your subject line question, I'd wait for an NTSB ruling
before passing judgment on that.

But I suppose you forgot what you said a day and a half ago.

Fortunately, the chances you cite are not criteria for NAS design.

In engineering a workable NAS I would prefer that the designers employ
methodologies that _insure_ separation of air traffic, not merely
reduce the _chances_ of a MAC. Anything less is irresponsible
negligence.

In any system, there's always a small probability that a catastrophe will
occur. Aircraft certification rules and separation standards acknowledge this
and are established to keep the risk acceptably low. For example, for lateral
separation of two aircraft traveling at the same flight level on parallel
routes, the Target Level of Safety (TLS) set by ICAO (with FAA participation)
is 5 x 10^-9 per flight hour. That is, loss of lateral separation should
lead to no more than one accident every 200 million flight hours. The TLS is
not zero. Some people don't like to accept this, but it's just not realistic
to insist on zero risk.

Barry

On Sat, 24 Apr 2004 11:44:10 -0400, "Barry" wrote in
Message-Id: :

Fortunately, the chances you cite are not criteria for NAS design.

In engineering a workable NAS I would prefer that the designers employ
methodologies that _insure_ separation of air traffic, not merely
reduce the _chances_ of a MAC. Anything less is irresponsible
negligence.

In any system, there's always a small probability that a catastrophe will
occur. Aircraft certification rules and separation standards acknowledge this
and are established to keep the risk acceptably low. For example, for lateral
separation of two aircraft traveling at the same flight level on parallel
routes, the Target Level of Safety (TLS) set by ICAO (with FAA participation)
is 5 x 10^-9 per flight hour. That is, loss of lateral separation should
lead to no more than one accident every 200 million flight hours. The TLS is
not zero. Some people don't like to accept this, but it's just not realistic
to insist on zero risk.

Barry


Thank you for the information.

How would the TLS be affected if the Big Sky theory were relied upon
for aircraft separation as John T. suggested?

How would the TLS be affected if the Big Sky theory were relied upon
for aircraft separation as John T. suggested?

I'm not very familiar with this subject, but you can read "Safety
Considerations for Operation of Small Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in
Civil Airspace" produced by the MIT International Center for Air
Transportation:

http://icat-server.mit.edu/Library/f....cgi?idDoc=205

They studied both midair collisions and exposure to people on the ground. The
relevant conclusions for midairs:

Significant Amount of Airspace with Exposure Risk
Below the Target Level of Safety
- Areas around major airports are above the TLS

Opportunities may exist to allow a class of small
UAV’s to operate with limited restrictions
- Limiting operation in airspace near airports
may achieve TLS

Mitigation Strategies Are Available to Further Reduce the Risk
-Vehicles can be designed with capabilities to limit
likelihood of midair collisions

Barry

"Barry" wrote in message
...

How would the TLS be affected if the Big Sky theory were relied upon
for aircraft separation as John T. suggested?

I'm not very familiar with this subject, but you can read "Safety
Considerations for Operation of Small Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in
Civil Airspace" produced by the MIT International Center for Air
Transportation:

http://icat-server.mit.edu/Library/f....cgi?idDoc=205

They studied both midair collisions and exposure to people on the ground.
The
relevant conclusions for midairs:

Significant Amount of Airspace with Exposure Risk
Below the Target Level of Safety
- Areas around major airports are above the TLS

Opportunities may exist to allow a class of small
UAV's to operate with limited restrictions
- Limiting operation in airspace near airports
may achieve TLS

Mitigation Strategies Are Available to Further Reduce the Risk
-Vehicles can be designed with capabilities to limit
likelihood of midair collisions

This study attempts to 'bound' the danger through a Bayesian
analysis of engine failure probability and chances of hitting
something at random in the airspace 'per flight hour'. In high
traffic areas, the probability is small (10-8). But the total
accident rate will depend on how many of these things are
flying around. There is nothing about 'accountability' in the
"Mitigation Strategies", which is very odd since accountability
looms very large in current aviation practice (and FAA regulation).

I'm concerned that the model for this sees a UAV "pilot" as a
sort of hands-on air traffic controller, rather than as a proper
"pilot" with the attendant certification and responsibility
requirements. This is a major departure from existing practice,
and potentially devastating for GA.

"Larry Dighera" wrote in message


Once you show me *evidence* of lackadaisical attention to safety by
the owners and operators of those very expensive bits of hardware,

I'm happy to have you aboard. :-) Here is the information you
request:

Interesting that none of those cites indicate anything approaching "evidence
of lackadisical attention to safety".

Lessee... Inadvertent cloud entry. Reference to difficulty in landing.
Faulty assembly. Icing encounters (two of those). Mechanical failure due
to inadequate lubrication.

Sounds like a reading from the NTSB database.

The point is that none of these equate to "lackadaisical attention to safety
by the owners and operators".

On Tue, 27 Apr 2004 20:11:17 GMT, "Bob Jones" wrote
in Message-Id: m:

"Larry Dighera" wrote in message


Once you show me *evidence* of lackadaisical attention to safety by
the owners and operators of those very expensive bits of hardware,

I'm happy to have you aboard. :-) Here is the information you
request:

Interesting that none of those cites indicate anything approaching "evidence
of lackadisical attention to safety".

Obviously our assessments differ.

Lessee... Inadvertent cloud entry.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/milita...0219-acc01.htm
releases RQ-1 accident report
According to an Air Combat Command accident investigation report
released today, the primary cause of the accident was that the
pilot unintentionally flew the aircraft into a hazardous cloud.

FARs prescribe limits on how close to clouds a VFR flight may be, and
a certificated pilot is trained in recovery techniques.


Reference to difficulty in landing.

http://www2.acc.af.mil/accnews/dec99/990383.html
The two Predator pilots, who control the aircraft from a ground
station, executed critical action procedures but were unable to
land the aircraft safely. It crashed in a wooded area four miles
south of Tuzla AB.

According to the report, the pilots' attention became too focused
on flying the Predator in icing and weather conditions they had
rarely encountered. The report also cites lack of communication
between the two pilots during the flight emergency as a cause of
the accident.


Faulty assembly.

http://www2.acc.af.mil/accnews/apr01/01127.html
According to Air Combat Command's Accident Investigation Board
report released Thursday, the accident resulted from mechanical
failure in the UAV's propeller control system. Investigators found
substantial evidence indicating errors during maintenance on the
propeller control system on Sept. 28 played a critical role in the
accident. Evidence showed that certain components of the propeller
assembly were not adequately lubricated; in addition, a key bolt
was stripped and had not been tightened properly. These errors
likely led to the accident, according to the lead investigator.

As you will note, the maintenance personnel did not apply the same
diligence in maintaining the unmanned aircraft as is required by
regulation for manned aircraft.


Icing encounters (two of those).

http://www2.acc.af.mil/accnews/aug01/01267.html
LANGLEY AIR FORCE BASE, Va. (ACCNS) -- Officials investigating the
March 30 crash of an RQ-1L Predator unmanned aerial vehicle have
determined the accident resulted from operator error.

According to the Accident Investigation Board report released
today by Air Combat Command, the Predator experienced an icing
problem and the pilot was unable to maintain control of the
aircraft.

According to the report, the pilot recognized the icing problem,
but failed to immediately execute critical checklist steps for
pitot static system failure.


Mechanical failure due to inadequate lubrication.

Yes, and a stripped bolt. That sort of poor maintenance practice is
not permitted manned aircraft.


http://www2.acc.af.mil/accnews/apr01/01127.html
According to Air Combat Command's Accident Investigation Board
report released Thursday, the accident resulted from mechanical
failure in the UAV's propeller control system. Investigators found
substantial evidence indicating errors during maintenance on the
propeller control system on Sept. 28 played a critical role in the
accident. Evidence showed that certain components of the propeller
assembly were not adequately lubricated; in addition, a key bolt
was stripped and had not been tightened properly. These errors
likely led to the accident, according to the lead investigator.


Sounds like a reading from the NTSB database.

No. It sounds like you failed to appreciate the operational errors
committed by the ground based UAV operators and maintenance personnel.

The point is that none of these equate to "lackadaisical attention to safety
by the owners and operators".


By omitting the citations below, you publicly demonstrate your biased
thinking:

http://www.aetc.randolph.af.mil/se2/...305/runway.htm
GROUND CREW’S INATTENTION LEADS TO UNMANNED AIRCRAFT CRASH
According to an Air Combat Command accident investigation report
released last month, the primary cause of the accident was the
ground crew’s inattention to the aircraft’s altitude.


http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell...s/predator.htm
As of 31 October 2001 the Air Force had received a total of 68 air
vehicles, and had lost 19 ...
The operator has the camera pointing out the front of the plane,
but he really has lost a lot of situational awareness that a
normal pilot would have of where the ground is and where the
attitude of his aircraft is.


http://www.reviewjournal.com/lvrj_ho.../19962521.html
May 17 crash of unmanned spy plane blamed on human error


http://www.af.mil/news/Feb2001/n2001...shtmlOfficials

02/02/01
Officials release Predator RQ-1L Predator accident report
the accident resulted from operator error.

... the pilot -- who flies the aircraft from a ground control
station -- inadvertently cleared the primary control module's
random access memory. As a result, the Predator lost its data link
connection with the ground control station.

"Larry Dighera" wrote in message


FARs prescribe limits on how close to clouds a VFR flight may be, and
a certificated pilot is trained in recovery techniques.

Where in that report did it mention the flight plan type? You're either
making assumptions again or making another bad comparison.

According to the report, the pilots' attention became too focused
on flying the Predator in icing and weather conditions they had
rarely encountered. The report also cites lack of communication
between the two pilots during the flight emergency as a cause of
the accident.

Again, you posted these cites in response to a request for evidence of
"lackadaisical attention to safety". How does this provide such evidence?
For that matter, how is this any different from an IR pilot unaccustomed to
actual conditions suddenly finding himself coated in ice? Human error?
Yes. Additional safety concern? No.

As you will note, the maintenance personnel did not apply the same
diligence in maintaining the unmanned aircraft as is required by
regulation for manned aircraft.

How is this different from certificated A&P's working for, say, Alaska
Airlines? Or any number of similar NTSB reports for GA crashes. You still
haven't made the case that UAV's pose an inherent aviation safety risk.

Mechanical failure due to inadequate lubrication.

Yes, and a stripped bolt. That sort of poor maintenance practice is
not permitted manned aircraft.

"Not permitted," he says. See above. Humans make maintenance mistakes
regardless of aircraft type (manned or not). You still haven't made the
case that UAV's pose an inherent aviation safety risk.

No. It sounds like you failed to appreciate the operational errors
committed by the ground based UAV operators and maintenance personnel.

"Operational errors" like the hundreds (thousands?) of similar incidents
committed with manned aircraft. You still haven't made the case that UAV's
pose an inherent aviation safety risk.

By omitting the citations below, you publicly demonstrate your biased
thinking:

"Biased", eh? Like you're totally open-minded on this issue. You so full
of BS your eyes are brown.

You keep making the claim that UAV's pose a risk to manned aircraft.
However, even when asked for such evidence, you can't find a single incident
where a manned aircraft was threatened much less harmed by UAV's.

...the primary cause of the accident was the
ground crew's inattention to the aircraft's altitude.

No different from manned aircraft.

The operator has the camera pointing out the front of the plane,
but he really has lost a lot of situational awareness that a
normal pilot would have of where the ground is and where the
attitude of his aircraft is.

Actually, I did reference this one. See "difficulty landing". You left out
the critical context of your quote. See this (from your link):
"A good number of them were lost due to operator error, **since it is hard
to land the UAV.** The operator has the camera pointing out the front of the
plane, but he really has lost a lot of situational awareness that a normal
pilot would have of where the ground is and where the attitude of his
aircraft is."
[Emphasis added by me.]

Larry, don't bother calling me biased when you're not even *close* to
unbiased.


http://www.reviewjournal.com/lvrj_ho.../19962521.html
May 17 crash of unmanned spy plane blamed on human error

"Human error" does not equate to "lackadaisical attention to safety." You
still have not proven that UAV's pose an inherent aviation safety risk.

... the pilot -- who flies the aircraft from a ground control
station -- inadvertently cleared the primary control module's
random access memory. As a result, the Predator lost its data link
connection with the ground control station.

Human error again, but not "lackadaisical attention to safety." You still
have not proven that UAV's pose an inherent aviation safety risk. (Note:
I'd venture to say this is a bad design feature. The pilot should not be
able to clear the UAV's RAM - especially if doing so can cause the UAV to
lose connectivity with ground control.)